Azure Windows

Overview

Azure Virtual Machines service is developed and managed by Microsoft Corp.

Related Built-in Rules

Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade Azure Windows with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.

SEKOIA.IO x Azure Windows on ATT&CK Navigator

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

• Effort: master

Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

• Effort: master

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

• Effort: elementary

Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

• Effort: advanced

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

• Effort: intermediate

Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

• Effort: advanced

Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

• Effort: master

Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

• Effort: intermediate

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

• Effort: elementary

Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: master

BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

• Effort: advanced

Backup Catalog Deleted

The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.

• Effort: intermediate

BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

• Effort: intermediate

Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

• Effort: intermediate

Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

• Effort: elementary

Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner)

• Effort: intermediate

CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

• Effort: intermediate

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

• Effort: intermediate

CVE 2022-1292

The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

• Effort: advanced

CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

• Effort: master

CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

• Effort: master

Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

• Effort: intermediate

Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

• Effort: master

Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

• Effort: advanced

Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

• Effort: intermediate

Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

• Effort: advanced

Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

• Effort: intermediate

Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

• Effort: elementary

Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

• Effort: intermediate

Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

• Effort: advanced

Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

• Effort: elementary

Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

• Effort: intermediate

Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: advanced

DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

• Effort: intermediate

DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

• Effort: intermediate

DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

• Effort: intermediate

DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

• Effort: master

DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

• Effort: elementary

Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

• Effort: master

Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

• Effort: intermediate

Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

• Effort: elementary

Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

• Effort: advanced

Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

• Effort: intermediate

Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

• Effort: elementary

Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

• Effort: elementary

Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

• Effort: advanced

Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: elementary

Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

• Effort: advanced

Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

• Effort: advanced

Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

• Effort: elementary

Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

• Effort: advanced

ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

• Effort: intermediate

Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

• Effort: elementary

Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

• Effort: elementary

Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

• Effort: elementary

Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

• Effort: advanced

Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

• Effort: intermediate

Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

• Effort: intermediate

Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

• Effort: intermediate

Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

• Effort: intermediate

Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

• Effort: advanced

Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

• Effort: intermediate

Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

• Effort: elementary

Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

• Effort: advanced

Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine

Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189

• Effort: elementary

Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

• Effort: intermediate

Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

• Effort: intermediate

Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

• Effort: elementary

Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

• Effort: master

File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

• Effort: master

FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

• Effort: elementary

Formbook File Creation DB1

Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.

• Effort: intermediate

Formbook Hijacked Process Command

Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.

• Effort: intermediate

Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

• Effort: intermediate

HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

• Effort: intermediate

Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

• Effort: advanced

High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

• Effort: intermediate

Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

• Effort: intermediate

ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

• Effort: elementary

IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

• Effort: elementary

Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

• Effort: elementary

Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

• Effort: intermediate

KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

• Effort: intermediate

Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

• Effort: advanced

Koadic Execution

Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool

• Effort: intermediate

Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

• Effort: elementary

Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

• Effort: elementary

List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

• Effort: master

Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: intermediate

Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: intermediate

MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

• Effort: intermediate

MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

• Effort: intermediate

MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

• Effort: intermediate

MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir

Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.

• Effort: intermediate

MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

• Effort: intermediate

MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

• Effort: intermediate

MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

• Effort: intermediate

Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

• Effort: elementary

Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

• Effort: master

Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

• Effort: advanced

Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

• Effort: intermediate

Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

• Effort: elementary

Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

• Effort: elementary

Mshta Suspicious Child Process

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

• Effort: intermediate

NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

• Effort: advanced

NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

• Effort: intermediate

Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

• Effort: master

NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

• Effort: intermediate

Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

• Effort: advanced

Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

• Effort: intermediate

Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

• Effort: elementary

Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

• Effort: master

Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location

Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.

• Effort: intermediate

Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

• Effort: elementary

Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

• Effort: intermediate

Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

• Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

• Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

• Effort: intermediate

New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: intermediate

New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

• Effort: advanced

Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

• Effort: intermediate

NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

• Effort: intermediate

NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

• Effort: intermediate

Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

• Effort: intermediate

OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: intermediate

OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

• Effort: intermediate

OneNote Suspicious Children Process

In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.

• Effort: elementary

Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

• Effort: advanced

Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

• Effort: elementary

Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: intermediate

Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

• Effort: intermediate

PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

• Effort: elementary

Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

• Effort: elementary

Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

• Effort: elementary

Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

• Effort: intermediate

Potential RDP Connection To Non-Domain Host

Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain using RDP (TermSrv). Event ID 8001 corresponds to outgoing NTLM authentication traffic and TermSrv stands for RDP Terminal Services Server. Check if the contacted host is legitimate. To use this detection rule, enable logging of outbound NTLM authentications on all domain controllers, using the following Group Policy (GPO) - Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers -> Define this policy setting: Audit all.

• Effort: master

PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

• Effort: intermediate

PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

• Effort: elementary

PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

• Effort: elementary

PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

• Effort: intermediate

PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

• Effort: advanced

PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

• Effort: intermediate

PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

• Effort: advanced

Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

• Effort: intermediate

Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

• Effort: advanced

Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

• Effort: elementary

Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

• Effort: advanced

PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

• Effort: advanced

Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

• Effort: intermediate

QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

• Effort: intermediate

Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

• Effort: intermediate

RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: advanced

RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

• Effort: advanced

RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

• Effort: elementary

RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: advanced

RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username

Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.

• Effort: elementary

Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

• Effort: elementary

Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

• Effort: advanced

Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

• Effort: intermediate

Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

• Effort: advanced

RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: elementary

Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

• Effort: advanced

SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

• Effort: elementary

SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

• Effort: intermediate

STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

• Effort: intermediate

Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

• Effort: elementary

Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

• Effort: intermediate

Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

• Effort: intermediate

Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

• Effort: intermediate

Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

• Effort: intermediate

Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

• Effort: elementary

Sliver DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing

• Effort: intermediate

Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

• Effort: intermediate

Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

• Effort: intermediate

Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

• Effort: intermediate

SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

• Effort: intermediate

SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

• Effort: intermediate

Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

• Effort: intermediate

Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

• Effort: intermediate

SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

• Effort: intermediate

Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: elementary

Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

• Effort: elementary

Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool

Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).

• Effort: advanced

Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

• Effort: advanced

Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

• Effort: advanced

Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

• Effort: elementary

Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

• Effort: elementary

Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

• Effort: elementary

Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

• Effort: advanced

Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

• Effort: elementary

Suspicious Windows DNS Queries

Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).

• Effort: advanced

Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

• Effort: master

Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

• Effort: intermediate

Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

• Effort: advanced

Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

• Effort: advanced

Sysmon Windows File Block Executable

Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.

• Effort: master

Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

• Effort: intermediate

System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

• Effort: master

Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

• Effort: intermediate

Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

• Effort: advanced

Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

• Effort: intermediate

Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

• Effort: advanced

Trickbot Malware Activity

Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe

• Effort: intermediate

UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: intermediate

UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

• Effort: elementary

UAC Bypass via Event Viewer

Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.

• Effort: elementary

Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

• Effort: elementary

Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

• Effort: intermediate

Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: master

User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

• Effort: master

User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

• Effort: master

Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: intermediate

WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

• Effort: intermediate

WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

• Effort: elementary

WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

• Effort: advanced

WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

• Effort: intermediate

WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

• Effort: intermediate

Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

• Effort: master

Webshell Execution W3WP Process

Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.

• Effort: advanced

WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

• Effort: elementary

Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

• Effort: elementary

Windows Defender Disabled

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line or registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration).

• Effort: intermediate

Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

• Effort: elementary

Windows Defender History Deleted

Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

• Effort: master

Windows Defender History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

• Effort: elementary

Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

• Effort: intermediate

Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

• Effort: elementary

Windows Defender Tampering Detected

Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.

• Effort: intermediate

Windows Defender Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

• Effort: intermediate

Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

• Effort: master

Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

• Effort: master

Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

• Effort: elementary

Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: intermediate

Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

• Effort: advanced

Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

• Effort: intermediate

Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

• Effort: elementary

Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

• Effort: advanced

Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

• Effort: intermediate

Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

• Effort: intermediate

Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

• Effort: intermediate

Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

• Effort: intermediate

XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

• Effort: advanced

XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

• Effort: intermediate

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source	Description
Access tokens	security identifiers are extracted from several events
Authentication logs	audit logon events are examined in detail
File monitoring	information about files are extracted from several events
PowerShell logs	Windows PowerShell logs are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up
Process command-line parameters	Windows Security Auditing logs provide information about process creation
Process monitoring	Windows Security Auditing records information on running process activities
Process use of network	information on processes having network activities are collected
Windows event logs	events related to Windows Event logs shutdown or restart are analyzed
Windows Registry	registry auditing events are examined in detail

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO.

Event_4719.jsoninvalid_message.jsonkerberos.jsonkey_file_operation.jsonloggedoff.jsonprocess_operation.jsonprocess_operation2.jsonrestart_manager.jsonsysmon.jsonsysmon_11.jsonsysmon_13.jsonsysmon_22.jsonsysmon_3.jsonworking_dir.json

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2021-01-11T10:48:46.4763308Z\",\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"DeploymentId\":\"e089eb44-8406-4be5-b134-3569ba534888\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZNTDC02\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"EventId\":4719,\"Level\":0,\"Pid\":592,\"Tid\":6452,\"Opcode\":0,\"Task\":13568,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Description\":\"System audit policy was changed.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tACMEAccountName$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tACME\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nAudit Policy Change:\\r\\n\\tCategory:\\t\\tLogon/Logoff\\r\\n\\tSubcategory:\\t\\tLogon\\r\\n\\tSubcategory GUID:\\t{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}\\r\\n\\tChanges:\\t\\tFailure removed\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4719</EventID><Version>0</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>13568</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2021-01-11T10:48:46.476330800Z'/><EventRecordID>56204662</EventRecordID><Correlation ActivityID='{C42E760F-E51E-4CE7-9AF9-0AA6DA068F9B}'/><Execution ProcessID='592' ThreadID='6452'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>WinAzureTest</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-5-18</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>Acmesubject$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ACME</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='CategoryId'>%%8273</Data><Data Name='SubcategoryId'>%%12544</Data><Data Name='SubcategoryGuid'>{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}</Data><Data Name='AuditPolicyChanges'>%%8450</Data></EventData></Event>\"}}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4719",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "WinAzureTest"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "WinAzureTest",
        "name": "WinAzureTest"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "ACME",
        "name": "Acmesubject$"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 6452
        },
        "pid": 592
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "13568",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "event_data": {
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "SubjectUserName": "Acmesubject$",
            "SubjectDomainName": "ACME",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "CategoryId": "%%8273",
            "SubcategoryId": "%%12544",
            "SubcategoryGuid": "{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}",
            "AuditPolicyChanges": "%%8450"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 4719,
        "record_id": 56204662,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0,
                "AuditPolicyChanges": "%%8450"
            }
        ],
        "name": "System audit policy was changed",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "WinAzureTest"
        ],
        "user": [
            "Acmesubject$"
        ]
    }
}

{
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    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
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}

{
    "message": "{\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"DeploymentId\":\"cbfba34a-3d3d-4425-aefb-968ee470a8f4\",\"Description\":\"An account was successfully logged on.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Information:\\r\\n\\tLogon Type:\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\tRestricted Admin Mode:\\t-\\r\\n\\tVirtual Account:\\t\\tNo\\r\\n\\tElevated Token:\\t\\tYes\\r\\n\\r\\nImpersonation Level:\\t\\tIdentification\\r\\n\\r\\nNew Logon:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1004336348-2052111302-725345543-33053\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tHOSTMON\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tACME.LOCAL\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x6409B67A\\r\\n\\tLinked Logon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tNetwork Account Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tNetwork Account Domain:\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{FF0FDD6A-555D-EA36-45CB-9167DFB9C75D}\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tWorkstation Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tSource Network Address:\\t10.129.224.1\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t55731\\r\\n\\r\\nDetailed Authentication Information:\\r\\n\\tLogon Process:\\t\\tKerberos\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Package:\\tKerberos\\r\\n\\tTransited Services:\\t-\\r\\n\\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\\t-\\r\\n\\tKey Length:\\t\\t0\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\\r\\n\\r\\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\\r\\n\\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\\r\\n\\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.\",\"EventId\":4624,\"Level\":0,\"Opcode\":0,\"Pid\":632,\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4624</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>12544</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2019-07-22T11:20:54.558577600Z'/><EventRecordID>9999727</EventRecordID><Correlation ActivityID='{32528DD5-0278-4450-AFD8-22FEBDA102F1}'/><Execution ProcessID='632' ThreadID='904'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>AZNTPI-01.acme.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-0-0</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x0</Data><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>S-1-5-21-1004336348-2052111302-725345543-33053</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>HOSTMON</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>ACME.LOCAL</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x6409b67a</Data><Data Name='LogonType'>3</Data><Data Name='LogonProcessName'>Kerberos</Data><Data Name='AuthenticationPackageName'>Kerberos</Data><Data Name='WorkstationName'>-</Data><Data Name='LogonGuid'>{FF0FDD6A-555D-EA36-45CB-9167DFB9C75D}</Data><Data Name='TransmittedServices'>-</Data><Data Name='LmPackageName'>-</Data><Data Name='KeyLength'>0</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x0</Data><Data Name='ProcessName'>-</Data><Data Name='IpAddress'>10.129.224.1</Data><Data Name='IpPort'>55731</Data><Data Name='ImpersonationLevel'>%%1832</Data><Data Name='RestrictedAdminMode'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetOutboundUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetOutboundDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='VirtualAccount'>%%1843</Data><Data Name='TargetLinkedLogonId'>0x0</Data><Data Name='ElevatedToken'>%%1842</Data></EventData></Event>\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZNTPI-01\",\"Task\":12544,\"Tid\":904},\"time\":\"2019-07-22T11:20:54.5585776Z\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4624",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
        "name": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-0-0"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "10.129.224.1",
        "port": 55731,
        "address": "10.129.224.1"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 904
        },
        "pid": 632,
        "parent": {
            "pid": 0
        }
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "12544",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "event_data": {
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "SubjectUserName": "-",
            "SubjectDomainName": "-",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1004336348-2052111302-725345543-33053",
            "TargetUserName": "HOSTMON",
            "TargetDomainName": "ACME.LOCAL",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x6409b67a",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "LogonProcessName": "Kerberos",
            "AuthenticationPackageName": "Kerberos",
            "WorkstationName": "-",
            "LogonGuid": "{FF0FDD6A-555D-EA36-45CB-9167DFB9C75D}",
            "TransmittedServices": "-",
            "LmPackageName": "-",
            "KeyLength": "0",
            "ProcessId": "0x0",
            "ProcessName": "-",
            "IpAddress": "10.129.224.1",
            "IpPort": "55731",
            "ImpersonationLevel": "%%1832",
            "RestrictedAdminMode": "-",
            "TargetOutboundUserName": "-",
            "TargetOutboundDomainName": "-",
            "VirtualAccount": "%%1843",
            "TargetLinkedLogonId": "0x0",
            "ElevatedToken": "%%1842"
        },
        "user": {
            "identifier": "S-1-5-21-1004336348-2052111302-725345543-33053",
            "type": "targetedUser",
            "name": "HOSTMON",
            "domain": {
                "name": "ACME.LOCAL"
            }
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 4624,
        "record_id": 9999727,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0,
                "id": "S-1-5-21-1004336348-2052111302-725345543-33053",
                "name": "HOSTMON",
                "type": "targetedUser",
                "domain": "ACME.LOCAL"
            }
        ],
        "target": "user",
        "name": "An account was successfully logged on",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.129.224.1"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\": \"2019-06-24T09:20:18.0542085Z\",\"category\": \"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\": \"Informational\",\"properties\": {\"DeploymentId\": \"cdc4f011-0dd5-4969-95b1-8c7a914a82f6\",\"Role\": \"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\": \"_WindowsDesktop\",\"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\",\"ProviderName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"EventId\": 5058,\"Level\": 0,\"Pid\": 704,\"Tid\": 6864,\"Opcode\": 0,\"Task\": 12292,\"Channel\": \"Security\",\"Description\": \"Key file operation.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tWindowsDesktop$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tWORKGROUP\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t5396\\r\\n\\tProcess Creation Time:\\t\u200e2019\u200e-\u200e06\u200e-\u200e24T09:18:43.902454200Z\\r\\n\\r\\nCryptographic Parameters:\\r\\n\\tProvider Name:\\tMicrosoft Software Key Storage Provider\\r\\n\\tAlgorithm Name:\\tUNKNOWN\\r\\n\\tKey Name:\\t{3F1E0FA6-ACA6-4152-803B-976EF5816428}\\r\\n\\tKey Type:\\tMachine key.\\r\\n\\r\\nKey File Operation Information:\\r\\n\\tFile Path:\\tC:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Crypto\\\\RSA\\\\MachineKeys\\\\5dc8d7cc0741b353e4e980818c304a9b_f67648d5-9dc6-457b-b947-f44d21889d9b\\r\\n\\tOperation:\\tRead persisted key from file.\\r\\n\\tReturn Code:\\t0x0\",\"RawXml\": \"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}'/><EventID>5058</EventID><Version>1</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>12292</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2019-06-24T09:20:18.054208500Z'/><EventRecordID>249096</EventRecordID><Correlation ActivityID='{4ef44f5e-5539-0000-271e-87006b2ad501}'/><Execution ProcessID='704' ThreadID='6864'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>WindowsDesktop</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-5-18</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>WindowsDesktop$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>WORKGROUP</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='ClientProcessId'>5396</Data><Data Name='ClientCreationTime'>2019-06-24T09:18:43.902454200Z</Data><Data Name='ProviderName'>Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider</Data><Data Name='AlgorithmName'>UNKNOWN</Data><Data Name='KeyName'>{3F1E0FA6-ACA6-4152-803B-976EF5816428}</Data><Data Name='KeyType'>%%2499</Data><Data Name='KeyFilePath'>C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Crypto\\\\RSA\\\\MachineKeys\\\\5dc8d7cc0741b353e4e980818c304a9b_f67648d5-9dc6-457b-b947-f44d21889d9b</Data><Data Name='Operation'>%%2458</Data><Data Name='ReturnCode'>0x0</Data></EventData></Event>\"}}",
    "event": {
        "code": "5058",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "WindowsDesktop"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "WindowsDesktop",
        "name": "WindowsDesktop"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "WORKGROUP",
        "name": "WindowsDesktop$"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 6864
        },
        "pid": 704
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "12292",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "event_data": {
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "SubjectUserName": "WindowsDesktop$",
            "SubjectDomainName": "WORKGROUP",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "ClientProcessId": "5396",
            "ClientCreationTime": "2019-06-24T09:18:43.902454200Z",
            "ProviderName": "Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider",
            "AlgorithmName": "UNKNOWN",
            "KeyName": "{3F1E0FA6-ACA6-4152-803B-976EF5816428}",
            "KeyType": "%%2499",
            "KeyFilePath": "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\5dc8d7cc0741b353e4e980818c304a9b_f67648d5-9dc6-457b-b947-f44d21889d9b",
            "Operation": "%%2458",
            "ReturnCode": "0x0"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 5058,
        "record_id": 249096,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "Key file operation",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "WindowsDesktop"
        ],
        "user": [
            "WindowsDesktop$"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"DeploymentId\":\"cbfba34a-3d3d-4425-aefb-968ee470a8f4\",\"Description\":\"An account was logged off.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tAZNTPI-01$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tACME\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x686007F9\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.\",\"EventId\":4634,\"Level\":0,\"Opcode\":0,\"Pid\":632,\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4634</EventID><Version>0</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>12545</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2019-07-23T15:33:09.199351700Z'/><EventRecordID>10036511</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='632' ThreadID='3136'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>AZNTPI-01.acme.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>S-1-5-18</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>AZNTPI-01$</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>ACME</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x686007f9</Data><Data Name='LogonType'>3</Data></EventData></Event>\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZNTPI-01\",\"Task\":12545,\"Tid\":3136},\"time\":\"2019-07-23T15:33:09.1993517Z\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4634",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
        "name": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
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        },
        "pid": 632
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "12545",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "event_data": {
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "TargetUserName": "AZNTPI-01$",
            "TargetDomainName": "ACME",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x686007f9",
            "LogonType": "3"
        },
        "user": {
            "identifier": "S-1-5-18",
            "type": "targetedUser",
            "name": "AZNTPI-01$",
            "domain": {
                "name": "ACME"
            }
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 4634,
        "record_id": 10036511,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0,
                "id": "S-1-5-18",
                "name": "AZNTPI-01$",
                "type": "targetedUser",
                "domain": "ACME"
            }
        ],
        "target": "user",
        "name": "An account was logged off",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"DeploymentId\":\"0ea500b5-def1-4e62-9020-b5dad9577dad\",\"Description\":\"A new process has been created.\\r\\n\\r\\nCreator Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tAZNTPI-02$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tACME\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nTarget Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x50\\r\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\\\Agent\\\\Health Service State\\\\Monitoring Host Temporary Files 52\\\\696\\\\pmfexe.exe\\r\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\t%%1936\\r\\n\\tMandatory Label:\\t\\tS-1-16-16384\\r\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x1568\\r\\n\\tCreator Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\\\Agent\\\\MonitoringHost.exe\\r\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\t\\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\\\Agent\\\\Health Service State\\\\Monitoring Host Temporary Files 52\\\\696\\\\pmfexe.exe\\\" -PerfMode optimize -quickscan -event -json\\r\\n\\r\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\",\"EventId\":4688,\"Level\":0,\"Opcode\":0,\"Pid\":4,\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"RawXml\": \"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4688</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>13312</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2019-07-16T14:16:10.209241300Z'/><EventRecordID>3892523</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='8060'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>AZNTPI-02.acme.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-5-18</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>AZNTPI-02$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ACME</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='NewProcessId'>0x50</Data><Data Name='NewProcessName'>C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\\\Agent\\\\Health Service State\\\\Monitoring Host Temporary Files 52\\\\696\\\\pmfexe.exe</Data><Data Name='TokenElevationType'>%%1936</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x1568</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>\\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\\\Agent\\\\Health Service State\\\\Monitoring Host Temporary Files 52\\\\696\\\\pmfexe.exe\\\" -PerfMode optimize -quickscan -event -json</Data><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>S-1-0-0</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x0</Data><Data Name='ParentProcessName'>C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\\\Agent\\\\MonitoringHost.exe</Data><Data Name='MandatoryLabel'>S-1-16-16384</Data></EventData></Event>\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZNTPI-02\",\"Task\":13312,\"Tid\":8060},\"time\":\"2019-07-16T14:16:10.2092413Z\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4688",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-02.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-02.acme.local",
        "name": "AZNTPI-02.acme.local"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "ACME",
        "name": "AZNTPI-02$"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 8060
        },
        "pid": 80,
        "name": "pmfexe.exe",
        "working_directory": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\health service state\\monitoring host temporary files 52\\696",
        "executable": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\health service state\\monitoring host temporary files 52\\696\\pmfexe.exe",
        "command_line": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\health service state\\monitoring host temporary files 52\\696\\pmfexe.exe -perfmode optimize -quickscan -event -json",
        "parent": {
            "name": "monitoringhost.exe",
            "working_directory": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent",
            "executable": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\monitoringhost.exe",
            "pid": 5480
        }
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "13312",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "event_data": {
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "SubjectUserName": "AZNTPI-02$",
            "SubjectDomainName": "ACME",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "NewProcessId": "0x50",
            "NewProcessName": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\Health Service State\\Monitoring Host Temporary Files 52\\696\\pmfexe.exe",
            "TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
            "ProcessId": "0x1568",
            "CommandLine": "\"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\Health Service State\\Monitoring Host Temporary Files 52\\696\\pmfexe.exe\" -PerfMode optimize -quickscan -event -json",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetUserName": "-",
            "TargetDomainName": "-",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x0",
            "ParentProcessName": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\MonitoringHost.exe",
            "MandatoryLabel": "S-1-16-16384"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 4688,
        "record_id": 3892523,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0,
                "ParentImage": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\monitoringhost.exe"
            }
        ],
        "name": "A new process has been created",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZNTPI-02.acme.local"
        ],
        "user": [
            "AZNTPI-02$"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"DeploymentId\":\"46c98274-e8d7-4247-a358-11a02975100a\",\"Description\":\"A new process has been created.\\r\\n\\r\\nCreator Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tAZSQL-02$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tACME\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nTarget Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x17b4\\r\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\r\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\\r\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x1788\\r\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\t\\\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\\" \\\"-ExecutionPolicy\\\" \\\"Unrestricted\\\" \\\"-Noninteractive\\\" \\\"-NoProfile\\\" \\\"-NoLogo\\\" \\\"-File\\\" \\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Dependency Agent\\\\plugins\\\\AzureMetadata.ps1\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\",\"EventId\":4688,\"Level\":0,\"Opcode\":0,\"Pid\":4,\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4688</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>13312</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2019-07-22T12:54:05.281641000Z'/><EventRecordID>4948641</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='9396'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>AZSQL-02.acme.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-5-18</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>AZSQL-02$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ACME</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='NewProcessId'>0x17b4</Data><Data Name='NewProcessName'>C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='TokenElevationType'>%%1936</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x1788</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>\\\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\\" \\\"-ExecutionPolicy\\\" \\\"Unrestricted\\\" \\\"-Noninteractive\\\" \\\"-NoProfile\\\" \\\"-NoLogo\\\" \\\"-File\\\" \\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft Dependency Agent\\\\plugins\\\\AzureMetadata.ps1\\\"</Data><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>S-1-0-0</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x0</Data></EventData></Event>\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZSQL-02\",\"Task\":13312,\"Tid\":9396},\"time\":\"2019-07-22T12:54:05.2816410Z\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4688",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
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    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZSQL-02.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZSQL-02.acme.local",
        "name": "AZSQL-02.acme.local"
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        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "ACME",
        "name": "AZSQL-02$"
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            "id": 9396
        },
        "pid": 6068,
        "name": "powershell.exe",
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0",
        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
        "command_line": "c:\\windows\\system32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -executionpolicy unrestricted -noninteractive -noprofile -nologo -file c:\\program files\\microsoft dependency agent\\plugins\\azuremetadata.ps1",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 6024
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    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "13312",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
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            "SubjectUserName": "AZSQL-02$",
            "SubjectDomainName": "ACME",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "NewProcessId": "0x17b4",
            "NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
            "TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
            "ProcessId": "0x1788",
            "CommandLine": "\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" \"-ExecutionPolicy\" \"Unrestricted\" \"-Noninteractive\" \"-NoProfile\" \"-NoLogo\" \"-File\" \"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Dependency Agent\\plugins\\AzureMetadata.ps1\"",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetUserName": "-",
            "TargetDomainName": "-",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x0"
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    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 4688,
        "record_id": 4948641,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "A new process has been created",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZSQL-02.acme.local"
        ],
        "user": [
            "AZSQL-02$"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-01-12T10:33:34.9717584Z\",\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"DeploymentId\":\"f329f776-83f1-4c79-95e5-6ad3f77f11e5\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_lab-vm\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{0888e5ef-9b98-4695-979d-e92ce4247224}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager\",\"EventId\":10001,\"Level\":4,\"Pid\":3732,\"Tid\":2144,\"Opcode\":0,\"Task\":0,\"Channel\":\"Application\",\"Description\":\"Ending session 0 started \u200e2022\u200e-\u200e01\u200e-\u200e12T10:33:34.805069900Z.\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager' Guid='{0888e5ef-9b98-4695-979d-e92ce4247224}'/><EventID>10001</EventID><Version>0</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>0</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2022-01-12T10:33:34.9717584Z'/><EventRecordID>9379</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='3732' ThreadID='2144'/><Channel>Application</Channel><Computer>lab-vm</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><UserData><RmSessionEvent xmlns='http://www.microsoft.com/2005/08/Windows/Reliability/RestartManager/'><RmSessionId>0</RmSessionId><UTCStartTime>2022-01-12T10:33:34.8050699Z</UTCStartTime></RmSessionEvent></UserData></Event>\"}}",
    "event": {
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        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager"
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    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "lab-vm"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "lab-vm",
        "name": "lab-vm"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
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        },
        "pid": 3732
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "0",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "0888e5ef-9b98-4695-979d-e92ce4247224",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager"
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    "action": {
        "type": "Application",
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        "record_id": 9379,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "no match",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "lab-vm"
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    }
}

{
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    "event": {
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        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
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    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "WindowsDesktop"
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    "host": {
        "hostname": "WindowsDesktop",
        "name": "WindowsDesktop"
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    "user": {
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        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY"
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        "name": "cscript.exe",
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32",
        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\cscript.exe",
        "command_line": "c:\\windows\\system32\\cscript.exe /nologo monitorknowledgediscovery.vbs",
        "parent": {
            "name": "monitoringhost.exe",
            "working_directory": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent",
            "executable": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\monitoringhost.exe",
            "command_line": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\monitoringhost.exe -embedding",
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    "azure_windows": {
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        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "event_data": {
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            "ProcessGuid": "{f67648d5-384f-5d69-0000-00101bd8b501}",
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            "CommandLine": "\"C:\\windows\\system32\\cscript.exe\" /nologo \"MonitorKnowledgeDiscovery.vbs\"",
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            "User": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
            "LogonGuid": "{f67648d5-e752-5d68-0000-0020e7030000}",
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            "IntegrityLevel": "System",
            "Hashes": "MD5=A45586B3A5A291516CD10EF4FD3EE768,SHA256=59D3CDC7D51FA34C6B27B8B04EA17992955466EB25022B7BD64880AB35DF0BBC",
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    "action": {
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "id": 1,
        "record_id": 120166,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0,
                "ParentImage": "c:\\program files\\microsoft monitoring agent\\agent\\monitoringhost.exe"
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        ],
        "name": "Process creation",
        "outcome": "success"
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{
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    "event": {
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    "os": {
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        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
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    "host": {
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        "path": "c:\\windows\\temp"
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    "process": {
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        },
        "pid": 2232,
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        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
        "parent": {
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    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "11",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "event_data": {
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            "ProcessGuid": "{4A43FA81-9578-5DDE-0000-0010490B8303}",
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        }
    },
    "action": {
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        "id": 11,
        "record_id": 121811,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "FileCreate",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2020-04-01T06:34:15.2142250Z\",\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"DeploymentId\":\"cbfba34a-3d3d-4425-aefb-968ee470a8f4\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZNTPI-01\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"EventId\":13,\"Level\":4,\"Pid\":2140,\"Tid\":3628,\"Opcode\":0,\"Task\":13,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Description\":\"Registry value set:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nEventType: SetValue\\r\\nUtcTime: 2020-04-01 06:34:15.158\\r\\nProcessGuid: {4A43FA81-9258-5E74-0000-0010EB030000}\\r\\nProcessId: 4\\r\\nImage: System\\r\\nTargetObject: HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Enum\\\\SWD\\\\PRINTENUM\\\\{8D2AEEAE-D27D-4E4D-8F57-A3DA76648B01}\\\\FriendlyName\\r\\nDetails: Microsoft Print to PDF (redirected 5)\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>13</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>13</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2020-04-01T06:34:15.214225000Z'/><EventRecordID>530135</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='2140' ThreadID='3628'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>AZNTPI-01.acme.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'></Data><Data Name='EventType'>SetValue</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2020-04-01 06:34:15.158</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{4A43FA81-9258-5E74-0000-0010EB030000}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>4</Data><Data Name='Image'>System</Data><Data Name='TargetObject'>HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Enum\\\\SWD\\\\PRINTENUM\\\\{8D2AEEAE-D27D-4E4D-8F57-A3DA76648B01}\\\\FriendlyName</Data><Data Name='Details'>Microsoft Print to PDF (redirected 5)</Data></EventData></Event>\"}}",
    "event": {
        "code": "13",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
        "name": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "registry": {
        "path": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\SWD\\PRINTENUM\\{8D2AEEAE-D27D-4E4D-8F57-A3DA76648B01}\\FriendlyName",
        "data": {
            "type": "REG_SZ",
            "strings": [
                "Microsoft Print to PDF (redirected 5)"
            ]
        },
        "hive": "HKLM",
        "key": "System\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\SWD\\PRINTENUM\\{8D2AEEAE-D27D-4E4D-8F57-A3DA76648B01}",
        "value": "FriendlyName"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 3628
        },
        "pid": 2140,
        "name": "system",
        "executable": "system",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 4
        }
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "13",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "event_data": {
            "RuleName": null,
            "EventType": "SetValue",
            "UtcTime": "2020-04-01 06:34:15.158",
            "ProcessGuid": "{4A43FA81-9258-5E74-0000-0010EB030000}",
            "ProcessId": "4",
            "Image": "System",
            "TargetObject": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\SWD\\PRINTENUM\\{8D2AEEAE-D27D-4E4D-8F57-A3DA76648B01}\\FriendlyName",
            "Details": "Microsoft Print to PDF (redirected 5)"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "id": 13,
        "record_id": 530135,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "RegistryEvent (Value Set)",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"DeploymentId\":\"23fa1f98-e483-4ae2-a043-88cb9c91c426\",\"Description\":\"Dns query:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2020-02-26 11:08:09.059\\r\\nProcessGuid: {f67648d5-4d39-5e56-0000-0010ec220200}\\r\\nProcessId: 3676\\r\\nQueryName: v10.events.data.microsoft.com\\r\\nQueryStatus: 0\\r\\nQueryResults: type:  5 v10.events.data.microsoft.com.aria.akadns.net;type:  5 onecollector.cloudapp.aria.akadns.net;::ffff:52.114.132.20;\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"EventId\":22,\"Level\":4,\"Opcode\":0,\"Pid\":3780,\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'/><EventID>22</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>22</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2020-02-26T11:08:11.071181600Z'/><EventRecordID>136242</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='3780' ThreadID='9096'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>WinAzureTest</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'></Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2020-02-26 11:08:09.059</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{f67648d5-4d39-5e56-0000-0010ec220200}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>3676</Data><Data Name='QueryName'>v10.events.data.microsoft.com</Data><Data Name='QueryStatus'>0</Data><Data Name='QueryResults'>type:  5 v10.events.data.microsoft.com.aria.akadns.net;type:  5 onecollector.cloudapp.aria.akadns.net;::ffff:52.114.132.20;</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe</Data></EventData></Event>\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_WindowsDesktop\",\"Task\":22,\"Tid\":9096},\"time\":\"2020-02-26T11:08:11.0711816Z\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "22",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "WinAzureTest"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "WinAzureTest",
        "name": "WinAzureTest"
    },
    "dns": {
        "response_code": "0",
        "question": {
            "name": "v10.events.data.microsoft.com"
        },
        "size_in_char": 29,
        "type": "answer",
        "answers": [
            {
                "name": "v10.events.data.microsoft.com.aria.akadns.net",
                "type": "CNAME"
            },
            {
                "name": "onecollector.cloudapp.aria.akadns.net",
                "type": "CNAME"
            },
            {
                "name": "::ffff:52.114.132.20",
                "type": "AAAA"
            }
        ]
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 9096
        },
        "pid": 3780,
        "name": "svchost.exe",
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32",
        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 3676
        }
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "22",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "event_data": {
            "RuleName": null,
            "UtcTime": "2020-02-26 11:08:09.059",
            "ProcessGuid": "{f67648d5-4d39-5e56-0000-0010ec220200}",
            "ProcessId": "3676",
            "QueryName": "v10.events.data.microsoft.com",
            "QueryStatus": "0",
            "QueryResults": "type:  5 v10.events.data.microsoft.com.aria.akadns.net;type:  5 onecollector.cloudapp.aria.akadns.net;::ffff:52.114.132.20;",
            "Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "id": 22,
        "record_id": 136242,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "DNS query",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "WinAzureTest",
            "v10.events.data.microsoft.com"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"DeploymentId\":\"cbfba34a-3d3d-4425-aefb-968ee470a8f4\",\"Description\":\"Network connection detected:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2019-12-18 16:57:18.516\\r\\nProcessGuid: {4A43FA81-5A68-5DFA-0000-0010A992AC18}\\r\\nProcessId: 4364\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\r\\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\nProtocol: tcp\\r\\nInitiated: true\\r\\nSourceIsIpv6: false\\r\\nSourceIp: 10.100.8.36\\r\\nSourceHostname: AZNTPI-01.acme.local\\r\\nSourcePort: 55664\\r\\nSourcePortName: \\r\\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\\r\\nDestinationIp: 169.254.169.254\\r\\nDestinationHostname: \\r\\nDestinationPort: 80\\r\\nDestinationPortName: http\",\"EventId\":3,\"Level\":4,\"Opcode\":0,\"Pid\":2116,\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}'/><EventID>3</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>3</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2019-12-18T16:57:17.936358800Z'/><EventRecordID>189923</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='2116' ThreadID='3760'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>AZNTPI-01.acme.local</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'></Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2019-12-18 16:57:18.516</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{4A43FA81-5A68-5DFA-0000-0010A992AC18}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>4364</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe</Data><Data Name='User'>NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM</Data><Data Name='Protocol'>tcp</Data><Data Name='Initiated'>true</Data><Data Name='SourceIsIpv6'>false</Data><Data Name='SourceIp'>10.100.8.36</Data><Data Name='SourceHostname'>AZNTPI-01.acme.local</Data><Data Name='SourcePort'>55664</Data><Data Name='SourcePortName'></Data><Data Name='DestinationIsIpv6'>false</Data><Data Name='DestinationIp'>169.254.169.254</Data><Data Name='DestinationHostname'></Data><Data Name='DestinationPort'>80</Data><Data Name='DestinationPortName'>http</Data></EventData></Event>\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZNTPI-01\",\"Task\":3,\"Tid\":3760},\"time\":\"2019-12-18T16:57:17.9363588Z\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "3",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
        "name": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "SYSTEM",
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "169.254.169.254",
        "port": 80,
        "address": "169.254.169.254"
    },
    "network": {
        "transport": "tcp",
        "type": "ipv4"
    },
    "source": {
        "domain": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
        "ip": "10.100.8.36",
        "port": 55664,
        "size_in_char": 20,
        "address": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
        "subdomain": "AZNTPI-01.acme"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 3760
        },
        "pid": 2116,
        "name": "powershell.exe",
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0",
        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 4364
        }
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "3",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "event_data": {
            "RuleName": null,
            "UtcTime": "2019-12-18 16:57:18.516",
            "ProcessGuid": "{4A43FA81-5A68-5DFA-0000-0010A992AC18}",
            "ProcessId": "4364",
            "Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
            "User": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
            "Protocol": "tcp",
            "Initiated": "true",
            "SourceIsIpv6": "false",
            "SourceIp": "10.100.8.36",
            "SourceHostname": "AZNTPI-01.acme.local",
            "SourcePort": "55664",
            "SourcePortName": null,
            "DestinationIsIpv6": "false",
            "DestinationIp": "169.254.169.254",
            "DestinationHostname": null,
            "DestinationPort": "80",
            "DestinationPortName": "http"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "id": 3,
        "record_id": 189923,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "target": "network-traffic",
        "name": "Network connection",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZNTPI-01.acme.local"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.100.8.36",
            "169.254.169.254"
        ],
        "user": [
            "SYSTEM"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2020-10-22T11:31:18.8344123Z\",\"category\":\"WindowsEventLogsTable\",\"level\":\"Informational\",\"properties\":{\"DeploymentId\":\"46c98274-e8d7-4247-a358-11a02975100a\",\"Role\":\"IaaS\",\"RoleInstance\":\"_AZSQL-02\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"ProviderName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"EventId\":4688,\"Level\":0,\"Pid\":4,\"Tid\":8568,\"Opcode\":0,\"Task\":13312,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Description\":\"A new process has been created.\\r\\n\\r\\nCreator Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tAZSQL-02$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tACME\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nTarget Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x12f0\\r\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\\r\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\\r\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x25c\\r\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k wsappx\\r\\n\\r\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\",\"RawXml\":\"<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing' Guid='{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}'/><EventID>4688</EventID><Version>2</Version><Level>0</Level><Task>13312</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2020-10-22T11:31:18.834412300Z'/><EventRecordID>13259890</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='4' ThreadID='8568'/><Channel>Security</Channel><Computer>AZSQL-02.acme.local</Computer><Security/></System><EventData><Data Name='SubjectUserSid'>S-1-5-18</Data><Data Name='SubjectUserName'>AZSQL-02$</Data><Data Name='SubjectDomainName'>ACME</Data><Data Name='SubjectLogonId'>0x3e7</Data><Data Name='NewProcessId'>0x12f0</Data><Data Name='NewProcessName'>C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe</Data><Data Name='TokenElevationType'>%%1936</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>0x25c</Data><Data Name='CommandLine'>C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k wsappx</Data><Data Name='TargetUserSid'>S-1-0-0</Data><Data Name='TargetUserName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetDomainName'>-</Data><Data Name='TargetLogonId'>0x0</Data></EventData></Event>\"}}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4688",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "AZSQL-02.acme.local"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "AZSQL-02.acme.local",
        "name": "AZSQL-02.acme.local"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "ACME",
        "name": "AZSQL-02$"
    },
    "process": {
        "thread": {
            "id": 8568
        },
        "pid": 4848,
        "name": "svchost.exe",
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32",
        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
        "command_line": "c:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k wsappx",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 604
        }
    },
    "azure_windows": {
        "task": "13312",
        "opcode": "0",
        "provider_guid": "54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "event_data": {
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "SubjectUserName": "AZSQL-02$",
            "SubjectDomainName": "ACME",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "NewProcessId": "0x12f0",
            "NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
            "TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
            "ProcessId": "0x25c",
            "CommandLine": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k wsappx",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetUserName": "-",
            "TargetDomainName": "-",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x0"
        }
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "Security",
        "id": 4688,
        "record_id": 13259890,
        "properties": [
            {
                "opcode": 0
            }
        ],
        "name": "A new process has been created",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "AZSQL-02.acme.local"
        ],
        "user": [
            "AZSQL-02$"
        ]
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name	Type	Description
action.properties	object	A list of objects
action.target	keyword	The target of the action
azure_windows.event_data	object	The event-specific data
azure_windows.opcode	keyword	The opcode defined in the event. Task and opcode are typically used to identify the location in the application from where the event was logged.
azure_windows.provider_guid	keyword	A globally unique identifier that identifies the provider that logged the event
azure_windows.provider_name	keyword	The source of the event log record (the application or service that logged the record).
azure_windows.task	keyword	The task defined in the event. Task and opcode are typically used to identify the location in the application from where the event was logged
azure_windows.user.domain.name	keyword	The domain that the account associated with this event is a member of
azure_windows.user.identifier	keyword	The Windows security identifier (SID) of the account associated with this event
azure_windows.user.name	keyword	Name of the user associated with this event
azure_windows.user.type	keyword	The type of account associated with this event
destination.domain	keyword	The domain name of the destination.
destination.ip	ip	IP address of the destination.
destination.port	long	Port of the destination.
destination.size_in_char	number	The length of the destination domain
dns.answers	object	Array of DNS answers.
dns.question.name	keyword	The name being queried.
dns.response_code	keyword	The DNS response code.
dns.size_in_char	number	The length of the requested domain in the dns query
dns.type	keyword	The type of DNS event captured, query or answer.
event.code	keyword	Identification code for this event.
event.provider	keyword	Source of the event.
file.created	date	File creation time.
file.name	keyword	Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.path	keyword	Full path to the file, including the file name.
host.hostname	keyword	Hostname of the host.
network.transport	keyword	Protocol Name corresponding to the field iana_number.
network.type	keyword	In the OSI Model this would be the Network Layer. ipv4, ipv6, ipsec, pim, etc
process.command_line	wildcard	Full command line that started the process.
process.executable	keyword	Absolute path to the process executable.
process.hash.md5	keyword	MD5 hash.
process.hash.sha1	keyword	SHA1 hash.
process.hash.sha256	keyword	SHA256 hash.
process.hash.sha384	keyword
process.hash.sha512	keyword	SHA512 hash.
process.name	keyword	Process name.
process.parent.command_line	wildcard	Full command line that started the process.
process.parent.executable	keyword	Absolute path to the process executable.
process.parent.name	keyword	Process name.
process.parent.pid	long	Process id.
process.parent.working_directory	keyword	The working directory of the process.
process.pid	long	Process id.
process.thread.id	long	Thread ID.
process.working_directory	keyword	The working directory of the process.
registry.data.strings	wildcard	List of strings representing what was written to the registry.
registry.data.type	keyword	Standard registry type for encoding contents
registry.hive	keyword	Abbreviated name for the hive.
registry.key	keyword	Hive-relative path of keys.
registry.path	keyword	Full path, including hive, key and value
registry.value	keyword	Name of the value written.
source.domain	keyword	The domain name of the source.
source.ip	ip	IP address of the source.
source.port	long	Port of the source.
source.size_in_char	number	The length of the source domain
user.domain	keyword	Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.id	keyword	Unique identifier of the user.
user.name	keyword	Short name or login of the user.

Configure

This setup guide will show you how to forward events produced by a Windows Virtual Machine hosted on Azure platform to SEKOIA.IO.

Theses changes have to be made from the Azure Web Portal.

Azure Event Hubs

As a prerequisite, you need to choose an existing “resource group”, or create a new one (e.g. company-resource-group).

Retrieve your Subscription ID

You also need your “Subscription ID” if you don't have a default one. In Azure Web Portal, navigate to: “Home”, “Cost Management + Billing”, ”Subscriptions”. From there, copy the relevant “Subscription ID” that will be used in the command line (e.g. uuid)

Create the Event Hubs

Use Azure PowerShell (within Cloud Shell interface for example) to create a namespace (e.g. company-eventhub) and a specific Event Hub (e.g. windows-event) within your “resource group” (e.g. company-resource-group)

PS Azure:\> az eventhubs namespace create --name company-eventhub --resource-group company-resource-group --enable-kafka true --subscription uuid

PS Azure:\> az eventhubs eventhub create --resource-group company-resource-group --namespace-name company-eventhub --name windows-event --message-retention 3 --partition-count 4 --subscription uuid

Info

Please replace :

• company-resource-group with the name of your “resource group”.
• uuid with your subscription ID retrieved previously (see below).

Create “Shared Access Policies”

1. Navigate to “Home”, “Event Hubs”, “company-eventhub - Shared access policies”. From there, you can create a policy (e.g. RootManageSharedAccessKey) with the claims Manage, Send and Listen, and note the Primary Key that will be used as the SharedAccessKey.
2. Navigate to “Home”, “Event Hubs”, “company-eventhub”, “windows-event - Shared access policies”. From there, you can create a policy (e.g. sekoiaio) with the claims Listen. Once created, click on the policy and save the Connection string-primary key, to be sent to SEKOIA.IO.
3. Navigate to “Home”, “Event Hubs”, “company-eventhub”, ”windows-event - Consumer groups”. From there, you can create a consumer group (e.g. sekoiaio).

Create a Blob Storage for Checkpointing

In order to allow SEKOIA.IO keep track of the consumed events, the next step consists in creating a dedicated Azure Blob Storage.

To proceed, you can use Azure PowerShell:

PS Azure:\> az storage account create --name "sekoiaiocheckpoint" --resource-group "company-resource-group"

PS Azure:\> az storage container create --name "windows-event" --account-name "sekoiaiocheckpoint"

Info

The container name, here windows-event should be the same as the Event Hub’s one. You also need to replace company-resource-group with the name of your “resource group”.

Finally, you have to retrieve the connection string from Azure Web Portal by going in “Storage Accounts”, then in the created storage (sekoiaiocheckpoint) and finally in the “Access Keys” section. After clicking on “Show keys”, you can copy the first of the two connection strings.

Windows Virtual Machine

You need to activate and configure the diagnostic extension Microsoft.Insights.VMDiagnosticsSettings.

Navigate to “Home”, “Virtual machines”, “virtual machine name” (e.g. company-windows), “Settings” and “Extensions”. Install it and note the new StorageAccount name created (e.g. company-storage-account).

Navigate to “Home”, “Storage accounts”, “company-storage-account”, ”Access keys”. From there you can note the key value later used as the storageAccountKey.

You need to create two configuration files public_settings.json and protected_settings.json.

Once again you need Azure powershell to do it using your favorite text editor:

PS Azure:\> vim public_settings.json

Adapt the public settings configuration file with the value oh theses variables: Url, SharedAccessKeyName, StorageAccount.

{
"WadCfg": {
        "DiagnosticMonitorConfiguration": {
            "overallQuotaInMB": 4096,
            "sinks": "applicationInsights.errors",
            "DiagnosticInfrastructureLogs": {
                "scheduledTransferLogLevelFilter": "Error"
            },
            "WindowsEventLog": {
                "scheduledTransferPeriod": "PT1M",
                "DataSource": [
                    {
                      "name": "Application!*"
                    },
                    {
                      "name": "System!*"
                    },
                    {
                      "name": "Security!*"
                    }
                ],
                "sinks": "HotPath"
            },
            "Logs": {
                "scheduledTransferPeriod": "PT1M",
                "scheduledTransferLogLevelFilter": "Error",
                "sinks": "HotPath"
            }
        },
        "SinksConfig": {
            "Sink": [
                {
                    "name": "HotPath",
                    "type": "JsonBlob",
                    "EventHub": {
                        "Url": "https://company-eventhub.servicebus.windows.net/windows-event",
                        "SharedAccessKeyName": "RootManageSharedAccessKey"
                    }
                },
                {
                    "name": "applicationInsights",
                    "ApplicationInsights": "",
                    "Channels": {
                        "Channel": [
                            {
                                "logLevel": "Error",
                                "name": "errors"
                            }
                        ]
                    }
                }
            ]
        }
    },
    "StorageAccount": "company-storage-account"
}

A more specific windows event log can be added by specifying the event log filename (e.g for Sysmon: "name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational!*").

Then edit the protected settings configuration file:

PS Azure:\> vim protected_settings.json

Adapt the public protected settings configuration file with the value of theses variables: storageAccountName, storageAccountKey, Url, SharedAccessKeyName, SharedAccessKey:

{
    "storageAccountName": "company-storage-account",
    "storageAccountKey": "base64-string",
    "storageAccountEndPoint": "https://core.windows.net",
    "EventHub": {
        "Url": "https://company-eventhub.servicebus.windows.net/windows-event",
        "SharedAccessKeyName": "RootManageSharedAccessKey",
        "SharedAccessKey": "base64-string"
    }
}

Finally you could push the change of the diagnostic extension configuration (adapt the parameters resource-group, vm-name):

PS Azure:\> az vm extension set --publisher Microsoft.Azure.Diagnostics --name IaaSDiagnostics --version 1.5 --resource-group company-resource-group --vm-name company-windows --protected-settings protected_settings.json --settings public_settings.json --subscription uuid

Sysmon

Sysmon tool from Microsoft could improve the detection on Windows computers. You could download the tool on Microsoft website. If you do not know how to use and configure it, please check SwiftOnSecurity github.

Forward the Connection Keys to SEKOIA.IO

Finally, please send to SEKOIA.IO the following information:

• Azure Event Hub’s “Connection string-primary key” (e.g. "Endpoint=sb://company-eventhub.servicebus.windows.net/;SharedAccessKeyName=sekoiaio;SharedAccessKey=XXXXXX;EntityPath=windows-event").
• Azure Event Hub’s consumer group name (e.g. sekoiaio).
• Azure Blob Storage’s connection string (e.g. "DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=sekoiaiocheckpoint;AccountKey=XXXXX").

Further Readings

• Microsoft Github windows diagnostic extension documentation