Microsoft 365 Defender
Overview
This Intake was previously called Microsoft Defender for Endpoints.
Microsoft 365 Defender is a unified pre- and post-breach enterprise defense suite that natively coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and applications to provide integrated protection against sophisticated attacks.
This setup guide describes how to forward events produced by Microsoft 365 Defender to Sekoia.io XDR.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Microsoft 365 Defender. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Microsoft 365 Defender on ATT&CK Navigator
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll
Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.
- Effort: advanced
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group
Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system
- Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Aspnet Compiler
Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.
- Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.
- Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line
Detects use of azureedge in the command line.
- Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)
Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA
- Effort: elementary
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE
Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access
Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read
Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability
Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.
- Effort: intermediate
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe
Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality
- Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands
Detects command lines with suspicious args
- Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon
Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Compress Data for Exfiltration via Archiver
Detects data compressed by specific tools.
- Effort: advanced
Compression Followed By Suppression
Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.
- Effort: advanced
Container Credential Access
Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data
Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Csrss Wrong Parent
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater
Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.
- Effort: elementary
Data Compressed With Rar
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers
This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.
- Effort: elementary
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled
Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disable Workstation Lock
Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Disabled Service
Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.
- Effort: advanced
Dism Disabling Windows Defender
Detects windows defender disabled by dism.
- Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent
Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount
Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot
- Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration
Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
- Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor
Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom
- Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity
Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity
- Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History
Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history.
- Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export
Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file, from command line or PowerShell script.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp
Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.
- Effort: advanced
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641
Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
- Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262
Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262 through command line or PowerShell script. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.
- Effort: advanced
Explorer Process Executing HTA File
Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.
- Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent
Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.
- Effort: advanced
FLTMC command usage
Detects the use of fltmc to list and load/unload a filter driver.
- Effort: advanced
Fail2ban Unban IP
An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.
- Effort: advanced
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.
- Effort: master
FlowCloud Malware
Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.
- Effort: elementary
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility
Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe
Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
- Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd
Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.
- Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel
Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.
- Effort: elementary
Impacket Wmiexec Module
Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.
- Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python
Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.
- Effort: advanced
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command
Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module
- Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute
Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload
Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Nohup Exec
Detects suspicious usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search
Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems
- Effort: intermediate
List Shadow Copies
Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).
- Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: advanced
Logonui Wrong Parent
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
Lsass Wrong Parent
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
MMC Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process
- Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement
Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.
- Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution
Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.
- Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir
Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.
- Effort: master
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender XDR Alert
Microsoft Defender XDR has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender XDR Cloud App Security Alert
Microsoft Defender XDR has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender XDR Endpoint Alert
Microsoft Defender XDR has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender XDR Office 365 Alert
Microsoft Defender XDR for Office 365 has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Mshta JavaScript Execution
Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell
- Effort: intermediate
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation
Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command
- Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command
Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).
- Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service from command line
- Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent
Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: master
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity
Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Opening Of a Password File
Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.
- Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic
Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.
- Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading
Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.
- Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension
Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension
- Effort: elementary
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents
Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent
- Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent
Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".
- Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL
Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32
Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths
Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Python Exfiltration Tools
Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages
Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement
- Effort: master
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter
Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SELinux Disabling
An attacker can disable SELinux to make workstation or server compromise easier as it disables several protections.
- Effort: intermediate
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task
Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'
- Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges
Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent
Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.
- Effort: intermediate
Searchindexer Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.
- Effort: advanced
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.
- Effort: advanced
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration
Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Smss Wrong Parent
Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.
- Effort: advanced
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process
Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.
- Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL
Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line
Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP
Detects a code page switch in command line
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern
Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process
Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process
Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Driver Loaded
Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Email Attachment Received
Detects email containing an .exe|.dll|.ps1|.bat|.hta attachment. Most of the time files send by mail like this are malware.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Finger Usage
Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Hangul Word Processor Child Process
Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File
Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution
Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi
Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line
Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage
catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution
Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign
Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter
Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action
Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
- Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent
Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).
- Effort: advanced
Sysprep On AppData Folder
Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.
- Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
Taskhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.
- Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.
- Effort: advanced
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper
Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Ursnif Registry Key
Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
Userinit Wrong Parent
Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
Webshell Execution W3WP Process
Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.
- Effort: advanced
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Windows Update LolBins
This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.
- Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent
Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
Winlogon wrong parent
Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.
- Effort: advanced
Winword Document Droppers
Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent
Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.
- Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent
Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.
- Effort: advanced
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).
- Effort: advanced
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack
Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
- Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution
Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Binary file metadata |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files |
Disk forensics |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices |
File monitoring |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files |
Host network interface |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices |
Kernel drivers |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Loaded DLLs |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Named Pipes |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
PowerShell logs |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Process command-line parameters |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Process monitoring |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Process use of network |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Services |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Windows event logs |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint watch events logs |
Windows Registry |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors the registry |
WMI Objects |
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes |
Email gateway |
Microsoft Defender for O365 monitors emails |
OAuth audit logs |
Microsoft Defender for Cloud App monitors users, entity behavior and activities |
Authentication logs |
Microsoft Defender for Identity monitors users, entity behavior and activities |
Asset management |
Microsoft Defender for Identity monitors users identity and credentials |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | alert, enrichment |
| Category | authentication, connection, email, file, host, iam, intrusion_detection, network, process, threat |
| Type | indicator, info |
Event Samples
Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.
{
"message": "{\"time\": \"2023-09-28T16:17:08.7649196Z\", \"tenantId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"operationName\": \"Publish\", \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-AlertEvidence\", \"properties\": {\"Timestamp\": \"2023-09-28T16:15:29.9227997Z\", \"AlertId\": \"dadca6b5e5-5ab9-4a96-9dbb-ba2f8e7756e3_1\", \"EntityType\": \"Process\", \"EvidenceRole\": \"Related\", \"SHA1\": \"f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e\", \"SHA256\": \"eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232\", \"RemoteIP\": null, \"LocalIP\": null, \"RemoteUrl\": null, \"AccountName\": null, \"AccountDomain\": null, \"AccountSid\": null, \"AccountObjectId\": null, \"DeviceId\": null, \"ThreatFamily\": null, \"EvidenceDirection\": null, \"AdditionalFields\": \"{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"1\\\",\\\"ProcessId\\\":\\\"19060\\\",\\\"CommandLine\\\":\\\"splwow64.exe 8192\\\",\\\"ElevationToken\\\":\\\"Default\\\",\\\"CreationTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:28.7714877Z\\\",\\\"ImageFile\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"2\\\",\\\"Directory\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"splwow64.exe\\\",\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"3\\\",\\\"DnsDomain\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"HostName\\\":\\\"vm0242\\\",\\\"NetBiosName\\\":\\\"vm0242.example.org\\\",\\\"OSFamily\\\":\\\"Windows\\\",\\\"OSVersion\\\":\\\"10.0\\\",\\\"IsDomainJoined\\\":true,\\\"IpInterfaces\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"4\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"10.11.22.33\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"5\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"22b0:8f31:eff3:7b6e:3277:2f79:ca62:7ec0\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"6\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"127.0.0.1\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"7\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"::1\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"}],\\\"RemediationProviders\\\":[{\\\"RemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"RemediationDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"remediation-provider\\\"}],\\\"LastRemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"ThreatAnalysisSummary\\\":[{\\\"AnalyzersResult\\\":[],\\\"Verdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"AnalysisDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\"}],\\\"LastVerdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"Metadata\\\":{\\\"MachineEnrichmentInfo\\\":\\\"{\\\\\\\"MachineId\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"7e7a44995a4d4f09be53dce4fe9eb1db\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"HostName\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"vm0242\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"DnsDomain\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"example.org\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"IpAddress\\\\\\\":null,\\\\\\\"FoundBy\\\\\\\":[3],\\\\\\\"LastSeen\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"2023-09-28T06:59:18.6059012Z\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"RbacGroupId\\\\\\\":0,\\\\\\\"MachineTagsJson\\\\\\\":null,\\\\\\\"MachineGroup\\\\\\\":null,\\\\\\\"OsPlatform\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"Windows10\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"SenseClientVersion\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"10.8570.19045.3448\\\\\\\"}\\\"},\\\"Asset\\\":true,\\\"DetailedRoles\\\":[\\\"PrimaryDevice\\\"],\\\"RbacScopes\\\":{\\\"ScopesPerType\\\":{\\\"MachineGroupIds\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"Any\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"0\\\"]},\\\"Workloads\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"All\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"Mdatp\\\"]}}},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"host\\\",\\\"LeadingHost\\\":true,\\\"Role\\\":0,\\\"MachineId\\\":\\\"7e7a44995a4d4f09be53dce4fe9eb1db\\\",\\\"MachineIdType\\\":3,\\\"HostMachineId\\\":null,\\\"DetectionStatus\\\":\\\"Detected\\\",\\\"SuspicionLevel\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"EnrichmentType\\\":\\\"MachineIpInterfacesEnrichment\\\",\\\"IsIoc\\\":false,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"6JC4Lo9GK4MkdUKN6MFPCSfA/no=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"E890B82E8F462B832475428DE8C14F0927C0FE7A\\\"},\\\"SizeInBytes\\\":163840,\\\"FileHashes\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"8\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"SHA1\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"9\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"MD5\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"9b77f02583b95c7c5fe59ab2884f2817\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"10\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"SHA256\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"}],\\\"CreatedTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-22T07:12:05.262923Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"file\\\",\\\"LsHash\\\":\\\"6fe9d57dbf6d9a5a77d9a667ebddf556df977bda6ef576dd7e67b5ae5e95665db77e9bd9fefbdeaae6ba9f55a56eae99b5ef9fa6bdaebfa7b95a5bd9f9df7bfa\\\",\\\"IsPe\\\":true,\\\"LastAccessTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:28.8773106Z\\\",\\\"LastWriteTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-22T07:12:05.2726183Z\\\",\\\"Publisher\\\":\\\"Microsoft Corporation\\\",\\\"KnownPrevalence\\\":151790,\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-08-22T17:20:03.9270115\\\"},\\\"Account\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"11\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"mgarcia\\\",\\\"NTDomain\\\":\\\"EXAMPLE\\\",\\\"UPNSuffix\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"Sid\\\":\\\"S-1-5-21-111111111-222222222-333333333-44444\\\",\\\"AadUserId\\\":\\\"cccf9f83-f960-467d-ab75-69cbee32c59e\\\",\\\"IsDomainJoined\\\":true,\\\"RemediationProviders\\\":[{\\\"RemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"RemediationDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"remediation-provider\\\"}],\\\"LastRemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"ThreatAnalysisSummary\\\":[{\\\"AnalyzersResult\\\":[],\\\"Verdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"AnalysisDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\"}],\\\"LastVerdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"Asset\\\":true,\\\"RbacScopes\\\":{\\\"ScopesPerType\\\":{\\\"MachineGroupIds\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"Any\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"0\\\"]},\\\"Workloads\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"All\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"Mdatp\\\"]}}},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"account\\\",\\\"UserPrincipalName\\\":\\\"jane.doe@example.org\\\",\\\"Role\\\":0,\\\"ReferenceId\\\":\\\"b64e0541-4393-41d6-8d18-8be31b30daee:ae2bc63238bc\\\",\\\"DetectionStatus\\\":\\\"Detected\\\",\\\"SuspicionLevel\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"IsIoc\\\":true,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"rRAMCzzVjzarq8zZIW8y9uZLSWg=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"AD100C0B3CD58F36ABABCCD9216F32F6E64B4968\\\"},\\\"ParentProcess\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"12\\\",\\\"ProcessId\\\":\\\"12636\\\",\\\"CreationTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:23.5645558Z\\\",\\\"ImageFile\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"13\\\",\\\"Directory\\\":\\\"\\\\\\\\Device\\\\\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\\\\\Adobe\\\\\\\\Acrobat Reader DC\\\\\\\\Reader\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"AcroRd32.exe\\\",\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"file\\\"},\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"CreatedTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:23.5645558Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"process\\\"},\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"CreatedTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:28.7714877Z\\\",\\\"RemediationProviders\\\":[{\\\"RemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"RemediationDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"remediation-provider\\\"}],\\\"LastRemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"ThreatAnalysisSummary\\\":[{\\\"AnalyzersResult\\\":[],\\\"Verdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"AnalysisDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\"}],\\\"LastVerdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"RbacScopes\\\":{\\\"ScopesPerType\\\":{\\\"MachineGroupIds\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"Any\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"0\\\"]},\\\"Workloads\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"All\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"Mdatp\\\"]}}},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"process\\\",\\\"ReferenceId\\\":\\\"b64e0541-4393-41d6-8d18-8be31b30daee:12b768c23b3c\\\",\\\"DetectionStatus\\\":\\\"Detected\\\",\\\"SuspicionLevel\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"IsIoc\\\":true,\\\"Role\\\":1,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"Hzs5K5cl+LUGa+UuGO44Y6a9Z9I=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"1F3B392B9725F8B5066BE52E18EE3863A6BD67D2\\\"}\", \"MachineGroup\": null, \"NetworkMessageId\": null, \"ServiceSource\": \"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\", \"FileName\": \"splwow64.exe\", \"FolderPath\": \"C:\\\\Windows\", \"ProcessCommandLine\": \"splwow64.exe 8192\", \"EmailSubject\": null, \"ApplicationId\": null, \"Application\": null, \"DeviceName\": null, \"FileSize\": 163840, \"RegistryKey\": null, \"RegistryValueName\": null, \"RegistryValueData\": null, \"AccountUpn\": null, \"OAuthApplicationId\": null, \"Categories\": \"[\\\"InitialAccess\\\"]\", \"Title\": \"Executable content from email blocked\", \"AttackTechniques\": \"[\\\"Masquerading (T1036)\\\",\\\"Taint Shared Content (T1080)\\\",\\\"User Execution (T1204)\\\",\\\"System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218)\\\",\\\"Internal Spearphishing (T1534)\\\",\\\"Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)\\\",\\\"Spearphishing via Service (T1566.003)\\\"]\", \"DetectionSource\": \"Antivirus\", \"Severity\": \"Low\"}, \"Tenant\": \"DefaultTenant\"}",
"event": {
"category": [
"threat"
],
"dataset": "alert_evidence",
"kind": "enrichment",
"type": [
"indicator"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-28T16:15:29.922799Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"
}
},
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\Windows",
"hash": {
"sha1": "f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e",
"sha256": "eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232"
},
"name": "splwow64.exe",
"size": 163840
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"alert": {
"id": "dadca6b5e5-5ab9-4a96-9dbb-ba2f8e7756e3_1",
"severity": "Low",
"title": "Executable content from email blocked"
},
"entity": {
"type": "Process"
},
"evidence": {
"role": "Related"
},
"threat": {
"severity": "Low"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"8192"
],
"command_line": "splwow64.exe 8192"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232",
"f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e"
]
},
"service": {
"name": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
"type": "Antivirus"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\": \"2023-09-26T13:04:41.9797846Z\", \"tenantId\": \"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\", \"operationName\": \"Publish\", \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-AlertEvidence\", \"properties\": {\"Timestamp\": \"2023-09-26T13:03:18Z\", \"AlertId\": \"fa72d6f6a8-39e7-2681-d400-08dbbe90c56e\", \"EntityType\": \"MailMessage\", \"EvidenceRole\": \"Related\", \"SHA1\": null, \"SHA256\": null, \"RemoteIP\": null, \"LocalIP\": null, \"RemoteUrl\": null, \"AccountName\": null, \"AccountDomain\": null, \"AccountSid\": null, \"AccountObjectId\": null, \"DeviceId\": null, \"ThreatFamily\": null, \"EvidenceDirection\": null, \"AdditionalFields\": \"{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"1\\\",\\\"Recipient\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.org\\\",\\\"Sender\\\":\\\"no-reply@example.org\\\",\\\"SenderIP\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"P2Sender\\\":\\\"no-reply@example.org\\\",\\\"ReceivedDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-26T13:02:18Z\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageId\\\":\\\"4081b089-aecd-48de-af84-12c499929a12\\\",\\\"InternetMessageId\\\":\\\"<e1ea248a-f53f-4f1b-a601-5b2f1fbad48cbc0bb8d-bd55-466f-92ec-46cc66108821b@intranet.domain>\\\",\\\"Subject\\\":\\\"My little subject\\\",\\\"StartTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-26T13:01:18Z\\\",\\\"EndTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-26T13:03:18Z\\\",\\\"EntitySources\\\":[\\\"Alert\\\"],\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailMessage\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":null,\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"0001-01-01T00:00:00\\\",\\\"SourceEntityType\\\":\\\"MalwareFamily\\\",\\\"SourceEntityId\\\":\\\"e93240a2-06fe-40fa-8224-16a01d087268-1\\\",\\\"SourceThreatType\\\":\\\"Phish, Malicious\\\",\\\"SourceThreatName\\\":\\\"Phish, Malicious\\\",\\\"Role\\\":1,\\\"AttachmentCount\\\":0,\\\"UrlCount\\\":0,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"XI3qGjU8yzWpxMk1QhDqq5R13s4=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"5C8DEA1A353CCB35A9C4C9354210EAAB9475DECE\\\"}\", \"MachineGroup\": null, \"NetworkMessageId\": \"4081b089-aecd-48de-af84-12c499929a12\", \"ServiceSource\": \"Microsoft Defender for Office 365\", \"FileName\": null, \"FolderPath\": null, \"ProcessCommandLine\": null, \"EmailSubject\": \"My little subject\", \"ApplicationId\": null, \"Application\": null, \"DeviceName\": null, \"FileSize\": null, \"RegistryKey\": null, \"RegistryValueName\": null, \"RegistryValueData\": null, \"AccountUpn\": null, \"OAuthApplicationId\": null, \"Categories\": \"[\\\"InitialAccess\\\"]\", \"Title\": \"Phish delivered due to an IP allow policy\", \"AttackTechniques\": \"[\\\"Phishing (T1566)\\\"]\", \"DetectionSource\": \"Microsoft Defender for Office 365\", \"Severity\": \"Informational\"}, \"Tenant\": \"DefaultTenant\"}",
"event": {
"category": [
"threat"
],
"dataset": "alert_evidence",
"kind": "enrichment",
"type": [
"indicator"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-26T13:03:18Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"AttachmentCount": 0,
"ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365",
"UrlCount": 0
}
},
"email": {
"local_id": "4081b089-aecd-48de-af84-12c499929a12",
"message_id": "e1ea248a-f53f-4f1b-a601-5b2f1fbad48cbc0bb8d-bd55-466f-92ec-46cc66108821b@intranet.domain",
"sender": {
"address": "no-reply@example.org"
},
"subject": "My little subject",
"to": {
"address": [
"john.doe@example.org"
]
}
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"alert": {
"id": "fa72d6f6a8-39e7-2681-d400-08dbbe90c56e",
"severity": "Informational",
"title": "Phish delivered due to an IP allow policy"
},
"entity": {
"type": "MailMessage"
},
"evidence": {
"role": "Related"
},
"threat": {
"severity": "Informational"
}
}
},
"service": {
"name": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365",
"type": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2024-03-13T12:57:23.9020375Z\",\"tenantId\":\"07313d70-2f20-4c3c-847a-ecbcfc20afd1\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-AlertEvidence\",\"properties\":{\"Timestamp\":\"2024-03-13T12:57:00Z\",\"AlertId\":\"eb85e8e3-670c-43d7-95f3-c57c91b80a1d\",\"EntityType\":\"Mailbox\",\"EvidenceRole\":\"Impacted\",\"SHA1\":\"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\"SHA256\":\"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"AccountName\":\"john.doe\",\"AccountDomain\":\"example\",\"AccountSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-333333\",\"AccountObjectId\":\"356eaca4-b5d5-4c9f-9cea-f566e4ec7570\",\"DeviceId\":null,\"ThreatFamily\":null,\"EvidenceDirection\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"MailboxPrimaryAddress\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.com\\\",\\\"DisplayName\\\":\\\"DOEJohn\\\",\\\"Upn\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.com\\\",\\\"AadId\\\":\\\"cb2b1d48-3c0c-4eeb-bf05-2245a6e7aa38\\\",\\\"RiskLevel\\\":\\\"None\\\",\\\"StartTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2024-03-13T12:55:00Z\\\",\\\"EndTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2024-03-13T12:57:00Z\\\",\\\"EntitySources\\\":[\\\"Alert\\\"],\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailbox\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:UserEntity:68b329da9893e34099c7d8ad5cb9c940\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"0001-01-01T00:00:00\\\",\\\"SourceEntityType\\\":\\\"MalwareFamily\\\",\\\"SourceEntityId\\\":\\\"b8ed97e9-82ed-49b2-bf20-ebc413349655\\\",\\\"SourceThreatType\\\":\\\"Phish,Malicious\\\",\\\"SourceThreatName\\\":\\\"Phish,Malicious\\\",\\\"UserSid\\\":\\\"S-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-333333\\\",\\\"AccountName\\\":\\\"john.doe\\\",\\\"DomainName\\\":\\\"example\\\",\\\"Role\\\":0,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"P/0zPBzZgl+0ob6ZK60I7fmCbPU=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"3FFD333C1CD9825FB4A1BE992BAD08EDF9826CF5\\\"}\",\"MachineGroup\":null,\"NetworkMessageId\":null,\"ServiceSource\":\"MicrosoftDefenderforOffice365\",\"FileName\":\"splwow64.exe\",\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\Windows\",\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"EmailSubject\":null,\"ApplicationId\":null,\"Application\":null,\"DeviceName\":null,\"FileSize\":13,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"AccountUpn\":\"john.doe@example.com\",\"OAuthApplicationId\":null,\"Categories\":\"[\\\"InitialAccess\\\"]\",\"Title\":\"PhishdeliveredduetoanETRoverride\",\"AttackTechniques\":\"[\\\"Phishing(T1566)\\\"]\",\"DetectionSource\":\"MicrosoftDefenderforOffice365\",\"Severity\":\"Informational\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}",
"event": {
"category": [
"threat"
],
"dataset": "alert_evidence",
"kind": "enrichment",
"type": [
"indicator"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2024-03-13T12:57:00Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"AccountSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-333333",
"AccountUPN": "john.doe@example.com",
"ServiceSource": "MicrosoftDefenderforOffice365"
}
},
"destination": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8"
},
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\Windows",
"hash": {
"sha1": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
"sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
},
"name": "splwow64.exe",
"size": 13
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"alert": {
"id": "eb85e8e3-670c-43d7-95f3-c57c91b80a1d",
"severity": "Informational",
"title": "PhishdeliveredduetoanETRoverride"
},
"entity": {
"type": "Mailbox"
},
"evidence": {
"role": "Impacted"
},
"threat": {
"severity": "Informational"
}
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
],
"user": [
"john.doe"
]
},
"service": {
"name": "MicrosoftDefenderforOffice365",
"type": "MicrosoftDefenderforOffice365"
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"domain": "example",
"id": "356eaca4-b5d5-4c9f-9cea-f566e4ec7570",
"name": "john.doe"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\": \"2023-09-29T11:45:09.7408937Z\", \"tenantId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"operationName\": \"Publish\", \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-CloudAppEvents\", \"properties\": {\"ActionType\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"ApplicationId\": 11161, \"AccountDisplayName\": \"airinvestigation\", \"AccountObjectId\": null, \"AccountId\": \"airinvestigation\", \"DeviceType\": null, \"OSPlatform\": null, \"IPAddress\": null, \"IsAnonymousProxy\": null, \"CountryCode\": null, \"City\": null, \"ISP\": null, \"UserAgent\": null, \"IsAdminOperation\": false, \"ActivityObjects\": [{\"Type\": \"Account\", \"Role\": \"Actor\", \"Name\": \"airinvestigation\", \"Id\": \"airinvestigation\", \"ApplicationId\": 11161, \"ApplicationInstance\": 0}], \"AdditionalFields\": {}, \"ActivityType\": \"Basic\", \"ObjectName\": null, \"ObjectType\": null, \"ObjectId\": null, \"AppInstanceId\": 0, \"AccountType\": \"Regular\", \"IsExternalUser\": false, \"IsImpersonated\": false, \"IPTags\": null, \"IPCategory\": null, \"UserAgentTags\": null, \"RawEventData\": {\"Actions\": [], \"CreationTime\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\", \"Data\": 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\"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\", \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\", \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\", \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"RecordType\": 64, \"RunningTime\": 6762, \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\", \"Status\": \"Remediated\", \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserType\": 4, \"Version\": 1, \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"}, \"ReportId\": 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"event": {
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"dataset": "cloud_app_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-29T11:40:30Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"Application": "Microsoft 365",
"ApplicationId": "11161",
"IsAdminOperation": "false",
"IsExternalUser": false,
"IsImpersonated": false,
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NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"BodyFingerprintBin1,P2SenderDomain\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"BodyFingerprintBin1;P2SenderDomain;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"4011247127;organization.com;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:4d298ccfc6e344df8a199c74a5466290\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:28\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"13\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageIds\\\":[\\\"5a65b4e6-c8f3-468b-8ee6-4c7f817e6bfa\\\"],\\\"CountByThreatType\\\":{\\\"HighConfPhish\\\":1,\\\"Phish\\\":0,\\\"Malware\\\":0,\\\"Spam\\\":0},\\\"CountByProtectionStatus\\\":{\\\"Blocked\\\":1},\\\"CountByDeliveryLocation\\\":{\\\"Quarantine\\\":1},\\\"Query\\\":\\\"( (( (Subject:\\\\\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"\\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\"\\\\\\\" with you.\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (SenderIp:\\\\\\\"1.2.3.4\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (AntispamDirection:\\\\\\\"1\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (ContentType: 1) )) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:PhishEdu) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"Subject,SenderIp,AntispamDirection\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"Subject;SenderIp;AntispamDirection;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\" with you.;1.2.3.4;1;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:cb4c1a4b96883fbdb1dad10b231cfa00\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:28\\\"}],\\\"LogCreationTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T11:36:50.0093899Z\\\",\\\"MachineName\\\":\\\"DBAEUR03BG403\\\",\\\"SourceTemplateType\\\":\\\"Threat_Single\\\",\\\"Category\\\":\\\"ThreatManagement\\\",\\\"SourceAlertType\\\":\\\"System\\\"}\", \"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\", \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\", \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\", \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"RecordType\": 64, \"RunningTime\": 6762, \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\", \"Status\": \"Remediated\", \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserType\": 4, \"Version\": 1, \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"}"
},
"type": "AirInvestigationData"
},
"email": {
"attachments": [
{
"file": {
"hash": {
"sha256": "EC7D1FD05AE26420DE1E51F2F315E07F9A4AF5A4A81AD43BDDE7C70EF45ADE68"
},
"name": "pix.png"
}
}
]
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"activity": {
"objects": [
{
"ApplicationId": 11161,
"ApplicationInstance": 0,
"Id": "airinvestigation",
"Name": "airinvestigation",
"Role": "Actor",
"Type": "Account"
}
],
"type": "Basic"
},
"investigation": {
"id": "urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
"name": "Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
"status": "Remediated",
"type": "ZappedFileInvestigation"
},
"report": {
"id": "60913494_11161_8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5"
}
}
},
"user": {
"full_name": "airinvestigation"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"time\": \"2023-09-29T11:45:09.7408937Z\",\n \"tenantId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\",\n \"operationName\": \"Publish\",\n \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-CloudAppEvents\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"ActionType\": \"AirInvestigationData\",\n \"ApplicationId\": 11161,\n \"AccountDisplayName\": \"airinvestigation\",\n \"AccountObjectId\": null,\n \"AccountId\": \"airinvestigation\",\n \"DeviceType\": null,\n \"OSPlatform\": null,\n \"IPAddress\": null,\n \"IsAnonymousProxy\": null,\n \"CountryCode\": null,\n \"City\": null,\n \"ISP\": null,\n \"UserAgent\": null,\n \"IsAdminOperation\": false,\n \"ActivityObjects\": [\n {\n \"Type\": \"Account\",\n \"Role\": \"Actor\",\n \"Name\": \"airinvestigation\",\n \"Id\": \"airinvestigation\",\n \"ApplicationId\": 11161,\n \"ApplicationInstance\": 0\n }\n ],\n \"AdditionalFields\": {},\n \"ActivityType\": \"Basic\",\n \"ObjectName\": null,\n \"ObjectType\": null,\n \"ObjectId\": null,\n \"AppInstanceId\": 0,\n \"AccountType\": \"Regular\",\n \"IsExternalUser\": false,\n \"IsImpersonated\": false,\n \"IPTags\": null,\n \"IPCategory\": null,\n \"UserAgentTags\": null,\n \"RawEventData\": {\n \"Actions\": [],\n \"CreationTime\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\",\n \"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\",\n \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\",\n \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\",\n \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\",\n \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\",\n \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\",\n \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\",\n \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\",\n \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\",\n \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\",\n \"RecordType\": 64,\n \"RunningTime\": 6762,\n \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\",\n \"Status\": \"Remediated\",\n \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\",\n \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\",\n \"UserType\": 4,\n \"Version\": 1,\n \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"\n },\n \"ReportId\": \"60913494_11161_8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\",\n \"Timestamp\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\",\n \"Application\": \"Microsoft 365\"\n },\n \"Tenant\": \"DefaultTenant\"\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"dataset": "cloud_app_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-29T11:40:30Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"Application": "Microsoft 365",
"ApplicationId": "11161",
"IsAdminOperation": "false",
"IsExternalUser": false,
"IsImpersonated": false,
"RawEventData": "{\"Actions\": [], \"CreationTime\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\", \"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\", \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\", \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\", \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"RecordType\": 64, \"RunningTime\": 6762, \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\", \"Status\": \"Remediated\", \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserType\": 4, \"Version\": 1, \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"}"
},
"type": "AirInvestigationData"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"activity": {
"objects": [
{
"ApplicationId": 11161,
"ApplicationInstance": 0,
"Id": "airinvestigation",
"Name": "airinvestigation",
"Role": "Actor",
"Type": "Account"
}
],
"type": "Basic"
},
"investigation": {
"id": "urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
"name": "Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
"status": "Remediated",
"type": "ZappedFileInvestigation"
},
"report": {
"id": "60913494_11161_8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5"
}
}
},
"user": {
"full_name": "airinvestigation"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T22:06:00.6652718Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-AlertInfo\",\"properties\":{\"AlertId\":\"da637977531594995313_968283104\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z\",\"Title\":\"'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented\",\"ServiceSource\":\"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\",\"Category\":\"DefenseEvasion\",\"Severity\":\"Informational\",\"DetectionSource\":\"Antivirus\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"AttackTechniques\":\"\"}}",
"event": {
"category": [
"threat"
],
"dataset": "alert_info",
"kind": "alert",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"
}
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"alert": {
"id": "da637977531594995313_968283104",
"severity": "Informational",
"title": "'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented"
},
"threat": {
"category": "DefenseEvasion",
"severity": "Informational"
}
}
},
"service": {
"name": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
"type": "Antivirus"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"dataset": "device_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
"InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
"InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
},
"type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall"
},
"destination": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8"
},
"host": {
"id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"name": "test.lab"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "104061"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"--engine=2",
"--init-done-notifier=804",
"--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
"--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
"--sandboxed-process-id=2",
"--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
],
"command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
},
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"pid": 15532,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
},
"pid": 1664,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
"user": {
"domain": "intranet",
"email": "user@example.org",
"id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
"name": "group1"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T13:12:14.2082552Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceFileCertificateInfo\",\"properties\":{\"SHA1\":\"4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5\",\"IsSigned\":true,\"IsRootSignerMicrosoft\":true,\"Signer\":\"Microsoft Windows\",\"SignerHash\":\"fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f\",\"Issuer\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\"IssuerHash\":\"580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d\",\"SignatureType\":\"Catalog\",\"IsTrusted\":true,\"CertificateCreationTime\":\"2021-09-02T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateExpirationTime\":\"2022-09-01T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateCountersignatureTime\":\"2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z\",\"CrlDistributionPointUrls\":\"[\\\"http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl\\\"]\",\"CertificateSerialNumber\":\"330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c\",\"DeviceId\":\"db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T13:10:10.7177Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":20370}}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"file"
],
"dataset": "device_file_certificate_info",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-09-02T13:10:10.717700Z",
"file": {
"hash": {
"sha1": "4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
},
"x509": {
"not_after": "2022-09-01T18:23:41Z",
"serial_number": "330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c"
}
},
"host": {
"id": "db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80",
"name": "test.lab"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"certificate": {
"counter_signed_at": "2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z",
"created_at": "2021-09-02T18:23:41Z",
"crl": {
"urls": [
"http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl"
]
},
"is_root_signer_microsort": true,
"is_signed": true,
"is_trusted": true,
"issuer": {
"hash": "580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d",
"name": "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011"
},
"signature_type": "Catalog",
"signer": {
"hash": "fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f",
"name": "Microsoft Windows"
}
},
"report": {
"id": "20370"
}
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
]
}
}
{
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},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "37827"
}
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "Tcp"
},
"process": {
"args": [
"\"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx"
],
"command_line": "\"EXCEL.EXE\" \"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx",
"executable": "c:\\program files\\microsoft office\\root\\office16\\excel.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145",
"sha1": "2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f",
"sha256": "1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095"
},
"name": "EXCEL.EXE",
"parent": {
"name": "explorer.exe",
"pid": 23332,
"start": "2023-01-04T14:04:35.708037Z"
},
"pid": 18288,
"start": "2023-01-04T14:05:22.807979Z",
"user": {
"domain": "intranet",
"email": "john.doe@example.org",
"id": "S-1-11-1-11111111-1111111111-111111111-111111111",
"name": "USER"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\program files\\microsoft office\\root\\office16"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095",
"2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f",
"4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 59985
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:07:34.1999095Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceNetworkInfo\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:04:35.622431Z\",\"ReportId\":13489,\"NetworkAdapterName\":\"{B844C2B6-E379-47C8-A28B-784DF7D3D731}\",\"NetworkAdapterType\":\"Guest\",\"NetworkAdapterStatus\":\"Down\",\"TunnelType\":\"None\",\"ConnectedNetworks\":null,\"DnsAddresses\":\"[\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::1\\\",\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::2\\\",\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::3\\\"]\",\"DefaultGateways\":null,\"MacAddress\":\"C8B29B8AEAAE\",\"IPv4Dhcp\":\"\",\"IPv6Dhcp\":\"\",\"IPAddresses\":\"[{\\\"IPAddress\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"SubnetPrefix\\\":16,\\\"AddressType\\\":\\\"LinkLocal\\\"},{\\\"IPAddress\\\":\\\"ffff::fff:fff:aaa:ccc\\\",\\\"SubnetPrefix\\\":64,\\\"AddressType\\\":\\\"Private\\\"}]\",\"NetworkAdapterVendor\":null,\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"dataset": "device_network_info",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:04:35.622431Z",
"host": {
"id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
"mac": [
"C8B29B8AEAAE"
],
"name": "ml022"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"observer": {
"interface": {
"dns": [
"fff0:0:0:ffff::1",
"fff0:0:0:ffff::2",
"fff0:0:0:ffff::3"
],
"ips": [
"{\"AddressType\": \"LinkLocal\", \"IPAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"SubnetPrefix\": 16}",
"{\"AddressType\": \"Private\", \"IPAddress\": \"ffff::fff:fff:aaa:ccc\", \"SubnetPrefix\": 64}"
],
"name": "{B844C2B6-E379-47C8-A28B-784DF7D3D731}",
"status": "Down",
"type": "Guest"
}
},
"report": {
"id": "13489"
}
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:16:55.5041166Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceProcessEvents\",\"properties\":{\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":133576,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"5d5608654828cf052ba013b3c37cbb61\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"MsMpEng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"services.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\programdata\\\\microsoft\\\\windows defender\\\\platform\\\\4.18.2301.6-0\\\\msmpeng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"MsMpEng.exe\\\"\",\"SHA1\":\"81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa\",\"FileSize\":1592184,\"MD5\":\"17bd5d291205f95eb9ede9e75d5641d7\",\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\4.18.2301.6-0\\\\MpCmdRun.exe\",\"ProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"MpCmdRun.exe\\\" Scan -ScheduleJob -RestrictPrivileges -DailyScan -ScanTrigger 54\",\"FileName\":\"MpCmdRun.exe\",\"ProcessId\":37788,\"InitiatingProcessId\":5456,\"ProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-01-04T14:15:10.3550336Z\",\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-01-03T08:51:29.2692792Z\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"System\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"InitiatingProcessSignatureStatus\":\"Valid\",\"InitiatingProcessSignerType\":\"OsVendor\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":1032,\"ReportId\":104118,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:15:10.4684522Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-01-03T08:51:26.7402415Z\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"AccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"AccountName\":\"system\",\"ProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"ProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"AccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"SHA256\":\"60d88450bc4d6e9bcb83fbcd0342376694dc55eb8f40b0f79580d1df399a7bdf\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":999,\"LogonId\":999,\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"AccountUpn\":null,\"AccountObjectId\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"4.18.2301.6\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"MsMpEng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"MsMpEng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Antimalware Service Executable\",\"ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"ProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"4.18.2301.6\",\"ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"MpCmdRun\",\"ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"MpCmdRun.exe\",\"ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"ActionType\":\"ProcessCreated\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"dataset": "device_process_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:15:10.468452Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"AccountSid": "S-1-1-11",
"InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"MsMpEng.exe\"",
"InitiatingProcessFileSize": 133576,
"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
"InitiatingProcessLogonId": "999",
"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Antimalware Service Executable",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "MsMpEng.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "MsMpEng.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "4.18.2301.6",
"LogonId": "999",
"ProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
"ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
"ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility",
"ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "MpCmdRun",
"ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "MpCmdRun.exe",
"ProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "4.18.2301.6"
},
"type": "ProcessCreated"
},
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\4.18.2301.6-0\\MpCmdRun.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "17bd5d291205f95eb9ede9e75d5641d7",
"sha1": "81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa",
"sha256": "60d88450bc4d6e9bcb83fbcd0342376694dc55eb8f40b0f79580d1df399a7bdf"
},
"name": "MpCmdRun.exe",
"size": 1592184
},
"host": {
"id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
"name": "ml022"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "104118"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"-DailyScan",
"-RestrictPrivileges",
"-ScanTrigger",
"-ScheduleJob",
"54",
"Scan"
],
"code_signature": {
"status": "Valid",
"subject_name": "OsVendor"
},
"command_line": "\"MpCmdRun.exe\" Scan -ScheduleJob -RestrictPrivileges -DailyScan -ScanTrigger 54",
"executable": "c:\\programdata\\microsoft\\windows defender\\platform\\4.18.2301.6-0\\msmpeng.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "5d5608654828cf052ba013b3c37cbb61",
"sha1": "5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae",
"sha256": "52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e"
},
"name": "MsMpEng.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "services.exe",
"pid": 1032,
"start": "2023-01-03T08:51:26.740241Z"
},
"pid": 37788,
"start": "2023-01-04T14:15:10.355033Z",
"user": {
"domain": "NT",
"id": "S-1-1-11",
"name": "System"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\programdata\\microsoft\\windows defender\\platform\\4.18.2301.6-0"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"17bd5d291205f95eb9ede9e75d5641d7",
"52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e",
"5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae",
"5d5608654828cf052ba013b3c37cbb61",
"60d88450bc4d6e9bcb83fbcd0342376694dc55eb8f40b0f79580d1df399a7bdf",
"81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa"
],
"user": [
"system"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT",
"name": "system"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:37:14.9238631Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceRegistryEvents\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"ReportId\":19168,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:35:20.6161937Z\",\"RegistryKey\":\"\",\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueType\":\"None\",\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"PreviousRegistryValueData\":null,\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":445440,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"svchost.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"omadmclient.exe\\\" /serverid \\\"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\\\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-03-01T14:34:55.9883418Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-03-01T09:01:41.8134369Z\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"system\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":2196,\"InitiatingProcessId\":25072,\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"PreviousRegistryKey\":\"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\BCD00000000\\\\Objects\\\\{a5a30fa2-3d06-4e9f-b5f4-a01df9d1fcba}\\\\Elements\",\"PreviousRegistryValueName\":null,\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"ActionType\":\"RegistryKeyDeleted\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"10.0.19041.2193\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"omadmclient\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Host Process for OMA-DM Client\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"dataset": "device_registry_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:35:20.616193Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"omadmclient.exe\" /serverid \"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0",
"InitiatingProcessFileSize": 445440,
"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Host Process for OMA-DM Client",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "omadmclient",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "omadmclient.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "10.0.19041.2193",
"PreviousRegistryKey": "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\BCD00000000\\Objects\\{a5a30fa2-3d06-4e9f-b5f4-a01df9d1fcba}\\Elements"
},
"type": "RegistryKeyDeleted"
},
"host": {
"id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
"name": "ml022"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "19168"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"\"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\"",
"/initiator",
"/lookuptype",
"/serverid",
"0",
"1"
],
"command_line": "\"omadmclient.exe\" /serverid \"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0",
"executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\omadmclient.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1",
"sha1": "9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12",
"sha256": "5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50"
},
"name": "omadmclient.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 2196,
"start": "2023-03-01T09:01:41.813436Z"
},
"pid": 25072,
"start": "2023-03-01T14:34:55.988341Z",
"user": {
"domain": "NT",
"id": "S-1-1-11",
"name": "system"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50",
"655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1",
"9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-EmailEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
"event": {
"category": [
"email"
],
"dataset": "email_events",
"type": [
"denied",
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
"InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
"InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
},
"type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall"
},
"destination": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8"
},
"host": {
"id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"name": "test.lab"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "104061"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"--engine=2",
"--init-done-notifier=804",
"--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
"--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
"--sandboxed-process-id=2",
"--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
],
"command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
},
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"pid": 15532,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
},
"pid": 1664,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
"user": {
"domain": "intranet",
"email": "user@example.org",
"id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
"name": "group1"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
}
}
{
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"--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
],
"command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
},
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"pid": 15532,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
},
"pid": 1664,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
"user": {
"domain": "intranet",
"email": "user@example.org",
"id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
"name": "group1"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-IdentityQueryEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
"event": {
"category": [
"iam"
],
"dataset": "identity_query_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
"InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
"InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
},
"type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall"
},
"destination": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8"
},
"host": {
"id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"name": "test.lab"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "104061"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"--engine=2",
"--init-done-notifier=804",
"--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
"--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
"--sandboxed-process-id=2",
"--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
],
"command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
},
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"pid": 15532,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
},
"pid": 1664,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
"user": {
"domain": "intranet",
"email": "user@example.org",
"id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
"name": "group1"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"-\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"-\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"dataset": "device_events",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
"InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
"InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
},
"type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall"
},
"host": {
"id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"name": "test.lab"
},
"microsoft": {
"defender": {
"report": {
"id": "104061"
}
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"--engine=2",
"--init-done-notifier=804",
"--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
"--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
"--sandboxed-process-id=2",
"--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
],
"command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
"executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
},
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"parent": {
"name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
"pid": 15532,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
},
"pid": 1664,
"start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
"user": {
"domain": "intranet",
"email": "user@example.org",
"id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
"name": "group1"
},
"working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
action.properties.AadDeviceId |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the device in Azure AD |
action.properties.AccountSid |
keyword |
Security Identifier (SID) of the account |
action.properties.AccountUPN |
keyword |
User principal name (UPN) of the account |
action.properties.ActionResult |
keyword |
Result of the action |
action.properties.ActionTrigger |
keyword |
Indicates whether an action was triggered by an administrator (manually or through approval of a pending automated action), or by some special mechanism, such as a ZAP or Dynamic Delivery |
action.properties.Application |
keyword |
Application that performed the recorded action |
action.properties.ApplicationId |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the application |
action.properties.AttachmentCount |
number |
Number of attachments in the email |
action.properties.AuthenticationDetails |
keyword |
List of pass or fail verdicts by email authentication protocols like DMARC, DKIM, SPF or a combination of multiple authentication types (CompAuth) |
action.properties.ConfidenceLevel |
keyword |
List of confidence levels of any spam or phishing verdicts. For spam, this column shows the spam confidence level (SCL), indicating if the email was skipped (-1), found to be not spam (0,1), found to be spam with moderate confidence (5,6), or found to be spam with high confidence (9). For phishing, this column displays whether the confidence level is "High" or "Low". |
action.properties.Connectors |
keyword |
Custom instructions that define organizational mail flow and how the email was routed |
action.properties.DeliveryAction |
keyword |
Delivery action of the email: Delivered, Junked, Blocked, or Replaced |
action.properties.DeliveryLocation |
keyword |
Location where the email was delivered: Inbox/Folder, On-premises/External, Junk, Quarantine, Failed, Dropped, Deleted items |
action.properties.DestinationDeviceName |
keyword |
Name of the device running the server application that processed the recorded action |
action.properties.EmailAction |
keyword |
Final action taken on the email based on filter verdict, policies, and user actions: Move message to junk mail folder, Add X-header, Modify subject, Redirect message, Delete message, send to quarantine, No action taken, Bcc message |
action.properties.EmailClusterId |
keyword |
Identifier for the group of similar emails clustered based on heuristic analysis of their contents |
action.properties.EmailDirection |
keyword |
Direction of the email relative to your network: Inbound, Outbound, Intra-org |
action.properties.EmailLanguage |
keyword |
Detected language of the email content |
action.properties.FileOriginIP |
keyword |
IP address where the file was downloaded from |
action.properties.FileOriginReferrerUrl |
keyword |
URL of the web page that links to the downloaded file |
action.properties.FileOriginUrl |
keyword |
URL where the file was downloaded from |
action.properties.IPCategory |
keyword |
Additional information about the IP address |
action.properties.IPTags |
list |
Customer-defined information applied to specific IP addresses and IP address ranges |
action.properties.ISP |
keyword |
Internet service provider associated with the IP address |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId |
keyword |
Azure AD object ID of the user account that ran the process responsible for the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessCommandLine |
keyword |
Process commande Line that initiated the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessFileSize |
long |
Size of the process (image file) that initiated the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel |
keyword |
Integrity level of the process that initiated the event. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet download. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessLogonId |
keyword |
Identifier for a logon session of the process that initiated the event. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts. |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessTokenElevation |
keyword |
Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the process that initiated the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName |
keyword |
Company name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription |
keyword |
Description from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName |
keyword |
Internal file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName |
keyword |
Original file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName |
keyword |
Product name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event |
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion |
keyword |
Product version from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event |
action.properties.IsAdminOperation |
keyword |
Indicates whether the activity was performed by an administrator |
action.properties.IsAnonymousProxy |
keyword |
Indicates whether the IP address belongs to a known anonymous proxy |
action.properties.IsAzureADJoined |
boolean |
Boolean indicator of whether machine is joined to the Azure Active Directory |
action.properties.IsAzureInfoProtectionApplied |
boolean |
Indicates whether the file is encrypted by Azure Information Protection |
action.properties.IsExternalUser |
boolean |
Indicates whether a user inside the network doesn't belong to the organization's domain |
action.properties.IsImpersonated |
boolean |
Indicates whether the activity was performed by one user for another (impersonated) user |
action.properties.IsLocalAdmin |
boolean |
Boolean indicator of whether the user is a local administrator on the machine |
action.properties.JoinType |
keyword |
The nature of the joint |
action.properties.LocalIPType |
keyword |
Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast |
action.properties.Location |
keyword |
City, country, or other geographic location associated with the event |
action.properties.LoggedOnUsers |
keyword |
List of all users that are logged on the machine at the time of the event in JSON array format |
action.properties.LogonId |
keyword |
Identifier for a logon session. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts |
action.properties.LogonType |
keyword |
Type of logon session, specifically: |
action.properties.MachineGroup |
keyword |
Machine group of the machine. This group is used by role-based access control to determine access to the machine |
action.properties.MergedDeviceIds |
keyword |
Previous device IDs that have been assigned to the same device |
action.properties.MergedToDeviceId |
keyword |
The most recent device ID assigned to a device |
action.properties.ObjectId |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the object that the recorded action was applied to |
action.properties.ObjectName |
keyword |
Name of the object that the recorded action was applied to |
action.properties.ObjectType |
keyword |
Type of object, such as a file or a folder, that the recorded action was applied to |
action.properties.OnboardingStatus |
keyword |
Indicates whether the device is currently onboarded or not to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or if the device is not supported |
action.properties.OrgLevelAction |
keyword |
Action taken on the email in response to matches to a policy defined at the organizational level |
action.properties.OrgLevelPolicy |
keyword |
Organizational policy that triggered the action taken on the email |
action.properties.PreviousFileName |
keyword |
Original name of the file that was renamed as a result of the action |
action.properties.PreviousFolderPath |
keyword |
Original folder containing the file before the recorded action was applied |
action.properties.PreviousRegistryKey |
keyword |
Original registry key of the registry value before it was modified |
action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueData |
keyword |
Original data of the registry value before it was modified |
action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueName |
keyword |
Original name of the registry value before it was modified |
action.properties.ProcessIntegrityLevel |
keyword |
Integrity level of the newly created process. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet downloaded. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources |
action.properties.ProcessTokenElevation |
keyword |
Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the newly created process |
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName |
keyword |
Company name from the version information of the newly created process |
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription |
keyword |
Description from the version information of the newly created process |
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName |
keyword |
Internal file name from the version information of the newly created process |
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName |
keyword |
Original file name from the version information of the newly created process |
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductName |
keyword |
Product name from the version information of the newly created process |
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion |
keyword |
Product version from the version information of the newly created process |
action.properties.Query |
keyword |
String used to run the query |
action.properties.QueryTarget |
keyword |
Name of user, group, device, domain, or any other entity type being queried |
action.properties.QueryType |
keyword |
Type of query, such as QueryGroup, QueryUser, or EnumerateUsers |
action.properties.RawEventData |
keyword |
Raw event information from the source application or service in JSON format |
action.properties.RecipientObjectId |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the email recipient in Azure AD |
action.properties.RegistryDeviceTag |
keyword |
Machine tag added through the registry |
action.properties.RemoteDeviceName |
keyword |
Name of the machine that performed a remote operation on the affected machine. Depending on the event being reported, this name could be a fully-qualified domain name (FQDN), a NetBIOS name, or a host name without domain information |
action.properties.RemoteIPType |
keyword |
Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast |
action.properties.RequestAccountSid |
keyword |
Security Identifier (SID) of the account used to remotely initiate the activity |
action.properties.SenderDisplayName |
keyword |
Name of the sender displayed in the address book, typically a combination of a given or first name, a middle initial, and a last name or surname |
action.properties.SenderFromDomain |
keyword |
Sender domain in the FROM header, which is visible to email recipients on their email clients |
action.properties.SenderObjectId |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the sender's account in Azure AD |
action.properties.SensitivityLabel |
keyword |
Label applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection |
action.properties.SensitivitySubLabel |
keyword |
Sublabel applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection; sensitivity sublabels are grouped under sensitivity labels but are treated independently |
action.properties.ServiceSource |
keyword |
Product or service that provided the alert information |
action.properties.ShareName |
keyword |
Name of shared folder containing the file |
action.properties.TargetAccountDisplayName |
keyword |
Display name of the account that the recorded action was applied to |
action.properties.TargetAccountUpn |
keyword |
User principal name (UPN) of the account that the recorded action was applied to |
action.properties.TargetDeviceName |
keyword |
Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the device that the recorded action was applied to |
action.properties.UrlCount |
number |
Number of embedded URLs in the email |
action.properties.UserAgentTags |
list |
More information provided by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps in a tag in the user agent field. Can have any of the following values: Native client, Outdated browser, Outdated operating system, Robot |
action.properties.UserLevelAction |
keyword |
Action taken on the email in response to matches to a mailbox policy defined by the recipient |
action.properties.UserLevelPolicy |
keyword |
End-user mailbox policy that triggered the action taken on the email |
agent.version |
keyword |
Version of the agent. |
container.id |
keyword |
Unique container id. |
container.runtime |
keyword |
Runtime managing this container. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
email.attachments |
nested |
List of objects describing the attachments. |
email.from.address |
keyword |
The email address of the sender, typically from the RFC 5322 From: header field |
email.local_id |
keyword |
Unique identifier given to the email by the source that created the event |
email.message_id |
keyword |
Identifier from the RFC 5322 Message-ID: email header that refers to a particular email message |
email.sender.address |
keyword |
Address of the message sender. |
email.subject |
keyword |
A brief summary of the topic of the message |
email.to.address |
keyword |
The email address of recipient |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.dataset |
keyword |
Name of the dataset. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.directory |
keyword |
Directory where the file is located. |
file.hash.md5 |
keyword |
MD5 hash. |
file.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
file.hash.sha256 |
keyword |
SHA256 hash. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.size |
long |
File size in bytes. |
file.x509.not_after |
date |
Time at which the certificate is no longer considered valid. |
file.x509.serial_number |
keyword |
Unique serial number issued by the certificate authority. |
host.architecture |
keyword |
Operating system architecture. |
host.id |
keyword |
Unique host id. |
host.mac |
keyword |
Host MAC addresses. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
host.os.family |
keyword |
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows). |
host.os.full |
keyword |
Operating system name, including the version or code name. |
host.os.version |
keyword |
Operating system version as a raw string. |
host.type |
keyword |
Type of host. |
microsoft.defender.activity.objects |
list |
List of objects, such as files or folders, that were involved in the recorded activity |
microsoft.defender.activity.type |
keyword |
Type of activity that triggered the event |
microsoft.defender.alert.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the alert |
microsoft.defender.alert.severity |
keyword |
The severity of the alert |
microsoft.defender.alert.title |
keyword |
The title of the alert |
microsoft.defender.certificate.counter_signed_at |
keyword |
Date and time the certificate was countersigned |
microsoft.defender.certificate.created_at |
keyword |
Date and time the certificate was created |
microsoft.defender.certificate.crl.urls |
keyword |
JSON array listing the URLs of network shares that contain certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) |
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_root_signer_microsort |
boolean |
Indicates whether the signer of the root certificate is Microsoft and if the file is included in Windows operating system |
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_signed |
boolean |
Indicates whether the file is signed |
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_trusted |
boolean |
Indicates whether the file is trusted based on the results of the WinVerifyTrust function, which checks for unknown root certificate information, invalid signatures, revoked certificates, and other questionable attributes |
microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.hash |
keyword |
Unique hash value identifying issuing certificate authority (CA) |
microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.name |
keyword |
Information about the issuing certificate authority (CA) |
microsoft.defender.certificate.signature_type |
keyword |
Indicates whether signature information was read as embedded content in the file itself or read from an external catalog file |
microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.hash |
keyword |
Unique hash value identifying the signer |
microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.name |
keyword |
Information about the signer of the file |
microsoft.defender.entity.type |
keyword |
Type of object, such as a file, a process, a device, or a user |
microsoft.defender.evidence.direction |
keyword |
Indicates whether the entity is the source or the destination of a network connection |
microsoft.defender.evidence.role |
keyword |
How the entity is involved in an alert, indicating whether it is impacted or is merely related |
microsoft.defender.host.category |
keyword |
Broader classification that groups certain device types under the following categories: Endpoint, Network device, IoT, Unknown |
microsoft.defender.host.model |
keyword |
Model name or number of the product from the vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute |
microsoft.defender.host.os.build |
keyword |
Build version of the operating system running on the machine |
microsoft.defender.host.os.version |
keyword |
Additional information about the OS version, such as the popular name, code name, or version number |
microsoft.defender.host.subtype |
keyword |
Additional modifier for certain types of devices, for example, a mobile device can be a tablet or a smartphone; only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute |
microsoft.defender.host.vendor |
keyword |
Name of the product vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute |
microsoft.defender.investigation.id |
keyword |
Investigation id |
microsoft.defender.investigation.name |
keyword |
Investigation name |
microsoft.defender.investigation.status |
keyword |
Investigation status |
microsoft.defender.investigation.type |
keyword |
Investigation type |
microsoft.defender.network.tunnel.protocol |
keyword |
Tunneling protocol, if the interface is used for this purpose, for example 6to4, Teredo, ISATAP, PPTP, SSTP, and SSH |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv4 |
keyword |
IPv4 address of DHCP server |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv6 |
keyword |
IPv6 address of DHCP server |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dns |
keyword |
DNS server addresses in JSON array format |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.gateways |
keyword |
Default gateway addresses in JSON array format |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.ips |
keyword |
JSON array containing all the IP addresses assigned to the adapter, along with their respective subnet prefix and IP address space, such as public, private, or link-local |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.name |
keyword |
Name of the network adapter |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.networks |
keyword |
Networks that the adapter is connected to. Each JSON array contains the network name, category (public, private or domain), a description, and a flag indicating if it's connected publicly to the internet |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.status |
keyword |
Operational status of the network adapter. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration |
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.type |
keyword |
Network adapter type. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration |
microsoft.defender.report.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the event |
microsoft.defender.threat.category |
keyword |
Type of threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert |
microsoft.defender.threat.detection |
keyword |
Methods used to detect malware, phishing, or other threats found in the email |
microsoft.defender.threat.family |
keyword |
Malware family that the suspicious or malicious file or process has been classified under |
microsoft.defender.threat.names |
keyword |
Detection name for malware or other threats found |
microsoft.defender.threat.severity |
keyword |
Indicates the potential impact (high, medium, or low) of the threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert |
microsoft.defender.threat.types |
keyword |
Verdict from the email filtering stack on whether the email contains malware, phishing, or other threats |
network.protocol |
keyword |
Application protocol name. |
process.args |
keyword |
Array of process arguments. |
process.code_signature.status |
keyword |
Additional information about the certificate status. |
process.code_signature.subject_name |
keyword |
Subject name of the code signer |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.hash.md5 |
keyword |
MD5 hash. |
process.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
process.hash.sha256 |
keyword |
SHA256 hash. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.parent.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.parent.pid |
long |
Process id. |
process.parent.start |
date |
The time the process started. |
process.pid |
long |
Process id. |
process.start |
date |
The time the process started. |
process.user.domain |
keyword |
Domain of the account that ran the process responsible for the event |
process.user.email |
keyword |
User principal name (UPN) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event |
process.user.id |
keyword |
Security Identifier (SID) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event |
process.user.name |
keyword |
User name of the account that ran the process responsible for the event |
process.working_directory |
keyword |
The working directory of the process. |
registry.data.strings |
wildcard |
List of strings representing what was written to the registry. |
registry.data.type |
keyword |
Standard registry type for encoding contents |
registry.key |
keyword |
Hive-relative path of keys. |
registry.value |
keyword |
Name of the value written. |
rule.id |
keyword |
Rule ID |
rule.name |
keyword |
Rule name |
service.name |
keyword |
Name of the service. |
service.type |
keyword |
The type of the service. |
source.geo.city_name |
keyword |
City name. |
source.geo.country_iso_code |
keyword |
Country ISO code. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
threat.technique.name |
keyword |
Threat technique name. |
url.domain |
keyword |
Domain of the url. |
url.original |
wildcard |
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.full_name |
keyword |
User's full name, if available. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.roles |
keyword |
Array of user roles at the time of the event. |
user_agent.original |
keyword |
Unparsed user_agent string. |
Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported
Here is a list of all the Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported by this integration:
- Alert Evidence
- AlertInfo
- DeviceEvents
- DeviceFileCertificateInfo
- DeviceFileEvent
- DeviceImageLoadEvents
- DeviceInfo
- DeviceLogonEvents
- DeviceNetworkEvents
- DeviceNetworkInfo
- DeviceProcessEvents
- DeviceRegistryEvents
- EmailAttachmentInfo
- EmailEvents
- EmailPostDeliveryEvents
- EmailUrlInfo
- IdentityLogonEvents
- IdentityQueryEvents
- IdentityDirectoryEvents
- CloudAppEvents
Please follow this link to see all the types provided by Microsoft.
Configure
To forward Microsoft 365 Defender events from Microsoft to Sekoia.io you need to send your event to an Azure Event Hub where Sekoia.io will collect the events.
Prerequisite
You must have the following rights to perform the installation:
- Global Administrator or Security Administrator rights on Microsoft 365 Defender
- Contributor write on Azure
Azure Event Hubs is a cloud-based event streaming platform and event ingestion service provided by Microsoft Azure. It is designed to handle large amounts of event data generated by various applications, devices, and services in real-time. Event Hubs enables you to ingest, process, and store events, logs, telemetry data, and other streaming data for further analysis, monitoring, and processing. Two ways are suggested in order to set up everything you need to forward your events on Sekoia.io.
If you are not an expert and want an easy way to configure the ressources on Azure, we recommend to use to Automatic way as it is easier to set up.
These two ways will create an Azure Event Hub and a Storage Account.
Use the template to create the ressources
To get started, click on the button below and fill the form on Azure to set up the required environment for Sekoia
Some fields must be filled in.
Project details
- Subscription: select the Azure subscription you want to use
- Resource Group: select or create a new Resource Group. A Resource Group is a container that holds related resources
Instance details
- Region: select the appropriated region
- Project Name: give a name for this project. Here is how the names of the resources will be affected by this project name
| Ressource | Name |
|---|---|
| Event Hub Namespace | <project_name>ehns |
| Event Hub | <project_name>eh |
| Shared Access Policy | <project_name>ap |
| Consumer Group | <project_name>cp |
| Storage Account | <project_name>sa |
- Event Hub Sku: Select the messaging tier for Event Hub Namespace between
Basic,StandardorPremium. We do not recommendBasicmodel due to its limitation. Please follow this Microsoft web page to get more information avec the different messaging tier. - Troughput Unit: A unit gives you up to 1 MB/s or 1,000 events per second (whichever comes first) per Event Hub Namespace. Please adapt it to your need.
- Enable Auto Inflate: When checked, the Auto-inflate feature of Event Hubs automatically scales up by increasing the number of troughput units, to meet usage needs.
- Auto Inflate Maximum Throughput Unit: When Enable Auto Inflate is checked, you can specify the maximum throughput units you allow.
- Partition Count: The number of event hub partitions. Microsoft recommends a maximum throughput of 1 MB/s per partition. Unless you plan to add more Event hubs to the Event Hub Namespace, the Partition Count and Throughput Unit variables should have the same values.
- Retention Time: How long you will keep events in the Event hub in days.
Use the output variables to create a Sekoia playbook
When the message Your deployment is complete is displayed, click on Outputs.
Keep these 5 pieces of information displayed carefully, it will used to configure the Trigger Configuration of the Sekoia playbook.
Overview
This setup guide will show you how to create an Event Hub manually.
Theses changes have to be made from the Azure Web Portal.
Some resources created during this procedure are needed to connect Sekoia.io to the Event Hub, you can complete the following table to save all the useful informations for later use.
| Name | Value | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| hub_name | To be completed at step 3 | Name of the Event Hub | sekoia_event_hub |
| hub_connection_string | To be completed at step 5 | Connection string–primary key | Endpoint=sb://company-eventhub.servicebus.windows.net/;SharedAccessKeyName=sekoiaio;SharedAccessKey=XXXXXX;EntityPath=sekoia_event_hub |
| hub_consumer_group | To be completed at step 6 | Name of the comsumer group | consumergroup_sekoiaio |
| storage_container_name | To be completed at step 7 | Name of your container | sekoiaio |
| storage_connection_string | To be completed at step 8 | Storage connection string | DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=sekoiaiocheckpoint;AccountKey=XXXXX |
As a prerequisite, you need to choose an existing Resource group, or create a new one (e.g. company-resource-group).
Step 1: Find your Subscription ID
- Go to: Home > Cost Management + Billing > Subscriptions.
- From there, keep the relevant “Subscription ID” that will be used along the process.
Step 2: Create Event Hub Namespace
- Navigate to Home > Event Hubs.
- Create an Event Hub Namespace.
- Select your Subscription and your Resource group.
Click on create new if you want your Event Hub Namespace in a new Resource group. - Choose a namespace name.
- Select a location based on your events location.
- Select the pricing tier plan based on your utilisation: Standard or Premimum (We don't recommend to choose the Basic plan due to its limitations.)
- Select the throughput units number based on your events, or enable the auto inflate mode:
1 throughput unit can process up to 1 MB per second or 1000 events per second (whichever comes first).
Step 3: Create Event Hub Instance
When your Event Hub Namespace is created you can create an Event Hub inside:
1. Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace.
2. Create an Event Hub.
Info
We advise at least the following values:
- cleanup policy: Delete
- retention time: 168h (7 days)
Info
Carefully store the Event Hub name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.
Step 4: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub
- Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace > eventhubname | Shared access policies.
-
Create a policy (e.g.
sekoiaio) with the claimsListen.
-
Once created, click on the policy.
Info
Carefully store the connection string–primary key that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.
Step 5: Create a Consumer group
- Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace > eventhubname | Consumer groups.
- Create a Consumer group (e.g.
consumergroup_sekoiaio).
Info
Carefully store the Consumer group name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.
Step 6: Create a Storage Account with a container
In order to allow Sekoia.io keep track of the consumed events, the next step consists in creating a dedicated Storage account.
- Navigate to Home > Storage accounts.
- Create a Storage account.
- Select your Subscription and your Resource group.
- Choose a Storage account name.
-
Select a Region.
Info
You must choose the Region used during the Event Hub Namespace creation.
-
Select your perfomance and redundancy parameters.
Info
We advise at least the following values:
- performance: standard
- redundancy: Geo-Redundancy storage (GRS)
When your storage account is created you can create an container inside.
1. Navigate to Home > Storage accounts > storageaccoutname | containers.
2. Create an container.
Keep the Public Acces Level to Private.
Info
The container name should be the same as the Event Hub name. Carefully store that container name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.
Step 7: Retrieve Connection String
You have to retrieve the connection string from Azure Web Portal.
- Go to Home > Storage accounts > storageaccoutname | Access Keys.
- Click on "Show Keys" on the first Connection String.
Info
Carefully store the Connection String that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.
Further Readings
Send logs from 365 Defender to Azure Event Hub
When you have an Event Hub follow this guide to send your events from Microsoft 365 Defender to the Event Hub:
- Open the Microsoft 365 Security App portal as a Global Administrator or Security Administrator.
- On the left panel, select Settings.
- Select Microsoft Defender XDR.
- In General, click on Streaming API and click on + Add.
- Choose Forward events to Azure Event Hub.
- To export the event data to a single Event Hub, enter your Event Hub name and your Event Hub Namespace resource ID. Be sure to take the event hub namespace ID and not the event hub ID.
- To get your Event Hub Namespace resource ID, go to your Azure Event Hub Namespace page on Azure > Properties tab > copy the text under Resource ID:
(e.g.
/subscriptions/XXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXX/resourceGroups/resourcegroupname/providers/Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/namespacename). - Go to the supported Microsoft 365 Defender event types in event streaming API to review the support status of event types in the Microsoft 365 Streaming API.
- Choose the events you want to stream and click Save.
Disclamer
Be sure to size your eventhub ressources accordingly to the number of EPS you have (number of eventhubs, throughput, partitions...) See the Further readings section in order to estimate the number of event per second Microsoft 365 Defender can be on your instance.
Further Readings
- Estimating initial Event Hub capacity
- Configure Microsoft 365 Defender to stream Advanced Hunting events to your Azure Event Hub
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Microsoft 365 Defender.
Create and configure a playbook on Sekoia.io to collect logs from an Azure Event Hub
- In the playbook section, create a playbook with the Trigger module Consume Eventhub messages in Microsoft Azure technology
- Setup Module configuration (= default)
- Setup Trigger configuration:
- Event Hub informations: use the table completed during the creation of the Event Hub.
- Intake informations:
- intake_key = Intake key that can be found on intake page
- intake_server =
https://intake.sekoia.io
Troubleshoot
Go to events page and search events in last 5 minutes by intake key customer.intake_key:"<Your_Intake_Key>"
No events - Please check the configuration and fill the fields with the right information
- It is possible to investigate on the tab Run and see the response by clicking on the module
