Microsoft 365 Defender

Overview

This Intake was previously called Microsoft Defender for Endpoints.

Microsoft 365 Defender is a unified pre- and post-breach enterprise defense suite that natively coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and applications to provide integrated protection against sophisticated attacks.

This setup guide describes how to forward events produced by Microsoft 365 Defender to Sekoia.io XDR.

Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade Microsoft 365 Defender with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.

SEKOIA.IO x Microsoft 365 Defender on ATT&CK Navigator

AccCheckConsole Executing Dll

Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.

Effort: advanced

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

Effort: elementary

Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

Effort: advanced

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

Effort: intermediate

Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

Effort: advanced

Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

Effort: master

Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

Effort: intermediate

Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: master

BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

Effort: advanced

Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

Effort: elementary

BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

Effort: intermediate

Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

Effort: intermediate

Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

Effort: elementary

CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

Effort: elementary

CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

Effort: intermediate

Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

Effort: intermediate

CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

Effort: intermediate

Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

Effort: master

Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

Effort: advanced

Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

Effort: intermediate

Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

Effort: advanced

Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

Effort: intermediate

Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

Effort: elementary

Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

Effort: intermediate

Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

Effort: advanced

Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

Effort: elementary

Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

Effort: elementary

DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

Effort: intermediate

DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

Effort: elementary

Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

Effort: master

Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

Effort: intermediate

Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

Effort: elementary

Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

Effort: advanced

Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

Effort: elementary

Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

Effort: intermediate

Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

Effort: elementary

Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

Effort: elementary

Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

Effort: advanced

Disabled Service

Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.

Effort: advanced

Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

Effort: advanced

Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

Effort: elementary

Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

Effort: master

Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

Effort: advanced

ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

Effort: intermediate

Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

Effort: elementary

Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

Effort: elementary

Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

Effort: elementary

Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

Effort: advanced

Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

Effort: intermediate

Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

Effort: intermediate

Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

Effort: intermediate

Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

Effort: intermediate

Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

Effort: advanced

Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

Effort: intermediate

Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

Effort: elementary

Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

Effort: advanced

Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

Effort: intermediate

Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

Effort: elementary

Fail2ban Unban IP

An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.

Effort: advanced

File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

Effort: master

FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

Effort: elementary

Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

Effort: intermediate

HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

Effort: intermediate

Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

Effort: advanced

High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

Effort: intermediate

ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

Effort: elementary

IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd

Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.

Effort: intermediate

IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

Effort: elementary

Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

Effort: elementary

Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

Effort: intermediate

Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python

Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.

Effort: advanced

KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

Effort: intermediate

Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

Effort: advanced

Koadic Execution

Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool

Effort: intermediate

Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

Effort: intermediate

Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

Effort: elementary

Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

Effort: elementary

List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

Effort: master

Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

Effort: elementary

MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

Effort: intermediate

MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

Effort: intermediate

MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

Effort: intermediate

MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

Effort: intermediate

Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

Effort: advanced

MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

Effort: intermediate

MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

Effort: intermediate

Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

Effort: elementary

Microsoft 365 Defender Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

Effort: master

Microsoft 365 Defender Cloud App Security Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

Effort: master

Microsoft 365 Defender For Endpoint Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

Effort: master

Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line

Effort: intermediate

Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line.

Effort: master

Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

Effort: elementary

Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

Effort: elementary

Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

Effort: intermediate

Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

Effort: intermediate

Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

Effort: elementary

Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Alert

Microsoft Defender for Office 365 has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

Effort: master

Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

Effort: advanced

Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

Effort: intermediate

Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

Effort: elementary

Mshta Suspicious Child Process

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

Effort: intermediate

NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

Effort: intermediate

Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

Effort: master

NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

Effort: intermediate

Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

Effort: advanced

Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

Effort: intermediate

Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

Effort: elementary

Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

Effort: master

Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

Effort: elementary

Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

Effort: intermediate

Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Effort: intermediate

New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: intermediate

New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

Effort: advanced

Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

Effort: intermediate

Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

Effort: intermediate

NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

Effort: intermediate

NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

Effort: intermediate

Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

Effort: intermediate

OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: intermediate

Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

Effort: advanced

Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

Effort: elementary

Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: intermediate

PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Effort: elementary

Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

Effort: elementary

Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

Effort: elementary

Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

Effort: elementary

Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

Effort: elementary

PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

Effort: intermediate

PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

Effort: elementary

PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

Effort: elementary

PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

Effort: intermediate

PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

Effort: advanced

PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

Effort: intermediate

PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

Effort: advanced

Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

Effort: intermediate

Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

Effort: advanced

Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

Effort: elementary

Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

Effort: elementary

Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

Effort: advanced

ProxyShell Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

Effort: elementary

PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

Effort: advanced

Python Exfiltration Tools

Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker

Effort: advanced

Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

Effort: intermediate

Python Offensive Tools and Packages

Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement

Effort: master

QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

Effort: intermediate

Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

Effort: intermediate

RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: advanced

RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

Effort: advanced

RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

Effort: elementary

RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username

Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.

Effort: elementary

Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

Effort: elementary

Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

Effort: advanced

RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: elementary

Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter

Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).

Effort: master

Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

Effort: advanced

SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

Effort: elementary

SELinux Disabling

An attacker can disable SELinux to make workstation or server compromise easier as it disables several protections.

Effort: intermediate

SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

Effort: intermediate

STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

Effort: intermediate

Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

Effort: elementary

Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

Effort: intermediate

Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

Effort: advanced

Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

Effort: intermediate

SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

Effort: intermediate

SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

Effort: intermediate

Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

Effort: intermediate

SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

Effort: intermediate

Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

Effort: elementary

Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

Effort: advanced

Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

Effort: advanced

Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File

Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

Effort: master

Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

Effort: advanced

Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

Effort: intermediate

Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

Effort: intermediate

System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

Effort: master

UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: intermediate

Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

Effort: elementary

Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

Effort: intermediate

Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: master

Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection

Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.

Effort: intermediate

WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

Effort: intermediate

WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

Effort: elementary

WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

Effort: intermediate

WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

Effort: intermediate

Webshell Execution W3WP Process

Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.

Effort: advanced

WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

Effort: elementary

Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

Effort: elementary

Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

Effort: master

Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

Effort: master

Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

Effort: elementary

Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

Effort: intermediate

Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

Effort: intermediate

Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

Effort: elementary

Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

Effort: advanced

Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

Effort: intermediate

Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

Effort: intermediate

XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

Effort: advanced

XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

Effort: intermediate

xWizard Execution

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.

Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source	Description
`Binary file metadata`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files
`Disk forensics`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices
`File monitoring`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files
`Host network interface`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices
`Kernel drivers`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Loaded DLLs`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Named Pipes`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`PowerShell logs`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Process command-line parameters`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Process monitoring`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Process use of network`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Services`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Windows event logs`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint watch events logs
`Windows Registry`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors the registry
`WMI Objects`	Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
`Email gateway`	Microsoft Defender for O365 monitors emails
`OAuth audit logs`	Microsoft Defender for Cloud App monitors users, entity behavior and activities
`Authentication logs`	Microsoft Defender for Identity monitors users, entity behavior and activities
`Asset management`	Microsoft Defender for Identity monitors users identity and credentials

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name	Values
Kind	`alert`, `enrichment`, `event`
Category	`authentication`, `connection`, `email`, `file`, `host`, `iam`, `network`, `process`, `threat`
Type	`indicator`, `info`

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

test_detection_source.jsontest_device_event.jsontest_device_file_certificate_info.jsontest_device_file_event.jsontest_device_image_load_event.jsontest_device_info_event_add_join.jsontest_device_info_event_hybrid_join.jsontest_device_logon_events.jsontest_device_network_events.jsontest_device_network_info.jsontest_device_process_events.jsontest_device_registry_events.jsontest_local_ip.json

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T22:06:00.6652718Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-AlertInfo\",\"properties\":{\"AlertId\":\"da637977531594995313_968283104\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z\",\"Title\":\"'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented\",\"ServiceSource\":\"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\",\"Category\":\"DefenseEvasion\",\"Severity\":\"Informational\",\"DetectionSource\":\"Antivirus\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"AttackTechniques\":\"\"}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "alert",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "alert_info",
        "category": [
            "threat"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z",
    "service": {
        "name": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
        "type": "Antivirus"
    },
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "alert": {
                "id": "da637977531594995313_968283104",
                "title": "'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented"
            },
            "threat": {
                "category": "DefenseEvasion",
                "severity": "Informational"
            }
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_events",
        "category": [
            "host"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "process": {
        "hash": {
            "md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        },
        "pid": 1664,
        "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
        "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "group1",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "email": "user@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 15532,
            "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\"",
            "--sandboxed-process-id=2",
            "--init-done-notifier=804",
            "--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
            "--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
            "--engine=2"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104061"
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "1.2.3.4",
        "address": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "5.6.7.8",
        "address": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T13:12:14.2082552Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceFileCertificateInfo\",\"properties\":{\"SHA1\":\"4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5\",\"IsSigned\":true,\"IsRootSignerMicrosoft\":true,\"Signer\":\"Microsoft Windows\",\"SignerHash\":\"fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f\",\"Issuer\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\"IssuerHash\":\"580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d\",\"SignatureType\":\"Catalog\",\"IsTrusted\":true,\"CertificateCreationTime\":\"2021-09-02T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateExpirationTime\":\"2022-09-01T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateCountersignatureTime\":\"2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z\",\"CrlDistributionPointUrls\":\"[\\\"http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl\\\"]\",\"CertificateSerialNumber\":\"330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c\",\"DeviceId\":\"db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T13:10:10.7177Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":20370}}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_file_certificate_info",
        "category": [
            "file"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-02T13:10:10.717700Z",
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
        },
        "x509": {
            "serial_number": "330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c",
            "not_after": "2022-09-01T18:23:41Z"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "20370"
            },
            "certificate": {
                "is_signed": true,
                "is_trusted": true,
                "is_root_signer_microsort": true,
                "signature_type": "Catalog",
                "issuer": {
                    "name": "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011",
                    "hash": "580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d"
                },
                "signer": {
                    "name": "Microsoft Windows",
                    "hash": "fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f"
                },
                "crl": {
                    "urls": [
                        "http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl"
                    ]
                },
                "created_at": "2021-09-02T18:23:41Z",
                "counter_signed_at": "2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z"
            }
        }
    },
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    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:05:32.314862Z",
    "destination": {
        "port": 443,
        "ip": "5.6.7.8",
        "address": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "process": {
        "hash": {
            "md5": "4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145",
            "sha1": "2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f",
            "sha256": "1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095"
        },
        "pid": 18288,
        "start": "2023-01-04T14:05:22.807979Z",
        "name": "EXCEL.EXE",
        "command_line": "\"EXCEL.EXE\" \"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx",
        "working_directory": "c:\\program files\\microsoft office\\root\\office16",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "USER",
            "id": "S-1-11-1-11111111-1111111111-111111111-111111111",
            "email": "john.doe@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 23332,
            "name": "explorer.exe",
            "start": "2023-01-04T14:04:35.708037Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "\"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "port": 59985,
        "ip": "1.2.3.4",
        "address": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "ConnectionSuccess",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "e0e5e759-c1e1-4cf9-91d5-c1099ef74614",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"EXCEL.EXE\" \"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 63984520,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "Medium",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft Excel",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "Excel",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "Excel.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft Office",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "16.0.15601.20538",
            "LocalIPType": "Private",
            "RemoteIPType": "Public"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "37827"
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "protocol": "Tcp"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095",
            "2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f",
            "4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:07:34.1999095Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceNetworkInfo\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:04:35.622431Z\",\"ReportId\":13489,\"NetworkAdapterName\":\"{B844C2B6-E379-47C8-A28B-784DF7D3D731}\",\"NetworkAdapterType\":\"Guest\",\"NetworkAdapterStatus\":\"Down\",\"TunnelType\":\"None\",\"ConnectedNetworks\":null,\"DnsAddresses\":\"[\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::1\\\",\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::2\\\",\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::3\\\"]\",\"DefaultGateways\":null,\"MacAddress\":\"C8B29B8AEAAE\",\"IPv4Dhcp\":\"\",\"IPv6Dhcp\":\"\",\"IPAddresses\":\"[{\\\"IPAddress\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"SubnetPrefix\\\":16,\\\"AddressType\\\":\\\"LinkLocal\\\"},{\\\"IPAddress\\\":\\\"ffff::fff:fff:aaa:ccc\\\",\\\"SubnetPrefix\\\":64,\\\"AddressType\\\":\\\"Private\\\"}]\",\"NetworkAdapterVendor\":null,\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_network_info",
        "category": [
            "host"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:04:35.622431Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022",
        "mac": [
            "C8B29B8AEAAE"
        ]
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "13489"
            },
            "observer": {
                "interface": {
                    "name": "{B844C2B6-E379-47C8-A28B-784DF7D3D731}",
                    "type": "Guest",
                    "status": "Down",
                    "dns": [
                        "fff0:0:0:ffff::1",
                        "fff0:0:0:ffff::2",
                        "fff0:0:0:ffff::3"
                    ],
                    "ips": [
                        "{\"AddressType\": \"LinkLocal\", \"IPAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"SubnetPrefix\": 16}",
                        "{\"AddressType\": \"Private\", \"IPAddress\": \"ffff::fff:fff:aaa:ccc\", \"SubnetPrefix\": 64}"
                    ]
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:16:55.5041166Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceProcessEvents\",\"properties\":{\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":133576,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"5d5608654828cf052ba013b3c37cbb61\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"MsMpEng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"services.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\programdata\\\\microsoft\\\\windows defender\\\\platform\\\\4.18.2301.6-0\\\\msmpeng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"MsMpEng.exe\\\"\",\"SHA1\":\"81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa\",\"FileSize\":1592184,\"MD5\":\"17bd5d291205f95eb9ede9e75d5641d7\",\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Platform\\\\4.18.2301.6-0\\\\MpCmdRun.exe\",\"ProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"MpCmdRun.exe\\\" Scan -ScheduleJob -RestrictPrivileges -DailyScan -ScanTrigger 54\",\"FileName\":\"MpCmdRun.exe\",\"ProcessId\":37788,\"InitiatingProcessId\":5456,\"ProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-01-04T14:15:10.3550336Z\",\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-01-03T08:51:29.2692792Z\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"System\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"InitiatingProcessSignatureStatus\":\"Valid\",\"InitiatingProcessSignerType\":\"OsVendor\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":1032,\"ReportId\":104118,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:15:10.4684522Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-01-03T08:51:26.7402415Z\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"AccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"AccountName\":\"system\",\"ProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"ProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"AccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"SHA256\":\"60d88450bc4d6e9bcb83fbcd0342376694dc55eb8f40b0f79580d1df399a7bdf\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":999,\"LogonId\":999,\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"AccountUpn\":null,\"AccountObjectId\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"4.18.2301.6\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"MsMpEng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"MsMpEng.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Antimalware Service Executable\",\"ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"ProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"4.18.2301.6\",\"ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"MpCmdRun\",\"ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"MpCmdRun.exe\",\"ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"ActionType\":\"ProcessCreated\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_process_events",
        "category": [
            "process"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:15:10.468452Z",
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\4.18.2301.6-0\\MpCmdRun.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "17bd5d291205f95eb9ede9e75d5641d7",
            "sha1": "81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa",
            "sha256": "60d88450bc4d6e9bcb83fbcd0342376694dc55eb8f40b0f79580d1df399a7bdf"
        },
        "name": "MpCmdRun.exe",
        "size": 1592184
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "process": {
        "hash": {
            "md5": "5d5608654828cf052ba013b3c37cbb61",
            "sha1": "5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae",
            "sha256": "52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e"
        },
        "pid": 37788,
        "start": "2023-01-04T14:15:10.355033Z",
        "name": "MsMpEng.exe",
        "command_line": "\"MpCmdRun.exe\" Scan -ScheduleJob -RestrictPrivileges -DailyScan -ScanTrigger 54",
        "working_directory": "c:\\programdata\\microsoft\\windows defender\\platform\\4.18.2301.6-0",
        "user": {
            "domain": "NT",
            "name": "System",
            "id": "S-1-1-11"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 1032,
            "name": "services.exe",
            "start": "2023-01-03T08:51:26.740241Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "Scan",
            "-ScheduleJob",
            "-RestrictPrivileges",
            "-DailyScan",
            "-ScanTrigger",
            "54"
        ],
        "code_signature": {
            "status": "Valid",
            "subject_name": "OsVendor"
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT",
        "name": "system"
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "ProcessCreated",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"MsMpEng.exe\"",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 133576,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "999",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Antimalware Service Executable",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "MsMpEng.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "MsMpEng.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "4.18.2301.6",
            "LogonId": "999",
            "AccountSid": "S-1-1-11",
            "ProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
            "ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility",
            "ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "MpCmdRun",
            "ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "MpCmdRun.exe",
            "ProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
            "ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "4.18.2301.6"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104118"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "17bd5d291205f95eb9ede9e75d5641d7",
            "52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e",
            "5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae",
            "5d5608654828cf052ba013b3c37cbb61",
            "60d88450bc4d6e9bcb83fbcd0342376694dc55eb8f40b0f79580d1df399a7bdf",
            "81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa"
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        "user": [
            "system"
        ]
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}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:37:14.9238631Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceRegistryEvents\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"ReportId\":19168,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:35:20.6161937Z\",\"RegistryKey\":\"\",\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueType\":\"None\",\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"PreviousRegistryValueData\":null,\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":445440,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"svchost.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"omadmclient.exe\\\" /serverid \\\"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\\\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-03-01T14:34:55.9883418Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-03-01T09:01:41.8134369Z\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"system\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":2196,\"InitiatingProcessId\":25072,\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"PreviousRegistryKey\":\"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\BCD00000000\\\\Objects\\\\{a5a30fa2-3d06-4e9f-b5f4-a01df9d1fcba}\\\\Elements\",\"PreviousRegistryValueName\":null,\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"ActionType\":\"RegistryKeyDeleted\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"10.0.19041.2193\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"omadmclient\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Host Process for OMA-DM Client\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_registry_events",
        "category": [
            "process"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:35:20.616193Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "process": {
        "hash": {
            "md5": "655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1",
            "sha1": "9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12",
            "sha256": "5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50"
        },
        "pid": 25072,
        "start": "2023-03-01T14:34:55.988341Z",
        "name": "omadmclient.exe",
        "command_line": "\"omadmclient.exe\" /serverid \"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0",
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32",
        "user": {
            "domain": "NT",
            "name": "system",
            "id": "S-1-1-11"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 2196,
            "name": "svchost.exe",
            "start": "2023-03-01T09:01:41.813436Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "/serverid",
            "\"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\"",
            "/lookuptype",
            "1",
            "/initiator",
            "0"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "RegistryKeyDeleted",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"omadmclient.exe\" /serverid \"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 445440,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Host Process for OMA-DM Client",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "omadmclient",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "omadmclient.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "10.0.19041.2193",
            "PreviousRegistryKey": "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\BCD00000000\\Objects\\{a5a30fa2-3d06-4e9f-b5f4-a01df9d1fcba}\\Elements"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "19168"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50",
            "655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1",
            "9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12"
        ]
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}

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"-\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"-\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_events",
        "category": [
            "host"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "process": {
        "hash": {
            "md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        },
        "pid": 1664,
        "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
        "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "group1",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "email": "user@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 15532,
            "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\"",
            "--sandboxed-process-id=2",
            "--init-done-notifier=804",
            "--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
            "--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
            "--engine=2"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104061"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        ]
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name	Type	Description
`@timestamp`	`date`	Date/time when the event originated.
`action.properties.AadDeviceId`	`keyword`	Unique identifier for the device in Azure AD
`action.properties.AccountSid`	`keyword`	Security Identifier (SID) of the account
`action.properties.AccountUPN`	`keyword`	User principal name (UPN) of the account
`action.properties.ActionResult`	`keyword`	Result of the action
`action.properties.ActionTrigger`	`keyword`	Indicates whether an action was triggered by an administrator (manually or through approval of a pending automated action), or by some special mechanism, such as a ZAP or Dynamic Delivery
`action.properties.Application`	`keyword`	Application that performed the recorded action
`action.properties.ApplicationId`	`keyword`	Unique identifier for the application
`action.properties.AttachmentCount`	`number`	Number of attachments in the email
`action.properties.AuthenticationDetails`	`keyword`	List of pass or fail verdicts by email authentication protocols like DMARC, DKIM, SPF or a combination of multiple authentication types (CompAuth)
`action.properties.ConfidenceLevel`	`keyword`	List of confidence levels of any spam or phishing verdicts. For spam, this column shows the spam confidence level (SCL), indicating if the email was skipped (-1), found to be not spam (0,1), found to be spam with moderate confidence (5,6), or found to be spam with high confidence (9). For phishing, this column displays whether the confidence level is "High" or "Low".
`action.properties.Connectors`	`keyword`	Custom instructions that define organizational mail flow and how the email was routed
`action.properties.DeliveryAction`	`keyword`	Delivery action of the email: Delivered, Junked, Blocked, or Replaced
`action.properties.DeliveryLocation`	`keyword`	Location where the email was delivered: Inbox/Folder, On-premises/External, Junk, Quarantine, Failed, Dropped, Deleted items
`action.properties.DestinationDeviceName`	`keyword`	Name of the device running the server application that processed the recorded action
`action.properties.EmailAction`	`keyword`	Final action taken on the email based on filter verdict, policies, and user actions: Move message to junk mail folder, Add X-header, Modify subject, Redirect message, Delete message, send to quarantine, No action taken, Bcc message
`action.properties.EmailClusterId`	`keyword`	Identifier for the group of similar emails clustered based on heuristic analysis of their contents
`action.properties.EmailDirection`	`keyword`	Direction of the email relative to your network: Inbound, Outbound, Intra-org
`action.properties.EmailLanguage`	`keyword`	Detected language of the email content
`action.properties.FileOriginIP`	`keyword`	IP address where the file was downloaded from
`action.properties.FileOriginReferrerUrl`	`keyword`	URL of the web page that links to the downloaded file
`action.properties.FileOriginUrl`	`keyword`	URL where the file was downloaded from
`action.properties.IPCategory`	`keyword`	Additional information about the IP address
`action.properties.IPTags`	`list`	Customer-defined information applied to specific IP addresses and IP address ranges
`action.properties.ISP`	`keyword`	Internet service provider associated with the IP address
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId`	`keyword`	Azure AD object ID of the user account that ran the process responsible for the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	`keyword`	Process commande Line that initiated the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessFileSize`	`long`	Size of the process (image file) that initiated the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel`	`keyword`	Integrity level of the process that initiated the event. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet download. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessLogonId`	`keyword`	Identifier for a logon session of the process that initiated the event. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts.
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessTokenElevation`	`keyword`	Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the process that initiated the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName`	`keyword`	Company name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription`	`keyword`	Description from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName`	`keyword`	Internal file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName`	`keyword`	Original file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName`	`keyword`	Product name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
`action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion`	`keyword`	Product version from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
`action.properties.IsAdminOperation`	`keyword`	Indicates whether the activity was performed by an administrator
`action.properties.IsAnonymousProxy`	`keyword`	Indicates whether the IP address belongs to a known anonymous proxy
`action.properties.IsAzureADJoined`	`boolean`	Boolean indicator of whether machine is joined to the Azure Active Directory
`action.properties.IsAzureInfoProtectionApplied`	`boolean`	Indicates whether the file is encrypted by Azure Information Protection
`action.properties.IsExternalUser`	`boolean`	Indicates whether a user inside the network doesn't belong to the organization's domain
`action.properties.IsImpersonated`	`boolean`	Indicates whether the activity was performed by one user for another (impersonated) user
`action.properties.IsLocalAdmin`	`boolean`	Boolean indicator of whether the user is a local administrator on the machine
`action.properties.JoinType`	`keyword`	The nature of the joint
`action.properties.LocalIPType`	`keyword`	Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast
`action.properties.Location`	`keyword`	City, country, or other geographic location associated with the event
`action.properties.LoggedOnUsers`	`keyword`	List of all users that are logged on the machine at the time of the event in JSON array format
`action.properties.LogonId`	`keyword`	Identifier for a logon session. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts
`action.properties.LogonType`	`keyword`	Type of logon session, specifically:
`action.properties.MachineGroup`	`keyword`	Machine group of the machine. This group is used by role-based access control to determine access to the machine
`action.properties.MergedDeviceIds`	`keyword`	Previous device IDs that have been assigned to the same device
`action.properties.MergedToDeviceId`	`keyword`	The most recent device ID assigned to a device
`action.properties.ObjectId`	`keyword`	Unique identifier of the object that the recorded action was applied to
`action.properties.ObjectName`	`keyword`	Name of the object that the recorded action was applied to
`action.properties.ObjectType`	`keyword`	Type of object, such as a file or a folder, that the recorded action was applied to
`action.properties.OnboardingStatus`	`keyword`	Indicates whether the device is currently onboarded or not to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or if the device is not supported
`action.properties.OrgLevelAction`	`keyword`	Action taken on the email in response to matches to a policy defined at the organizational level
`action.properties.OrgLevelPolicy`	`keyword`	Organizational policy that triggered the action taken on the email
`action.properties.PreviousFileName`	`keyword`	Original name of the file that was renamed as a result of the action
`action.properties.PreviousFolderPath`	`keyword`	Original folder containing the file before the recorded action was applied
`action.properties.PreviousRegistryKey`	`keyword`	Original registry key of the registry value before it was modified
`action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueData`	`keyword`	Original data of the registry value before it was modified
`action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueName`	`keyword`	Original name of the registry value before it was modified
`action.properties.ProcessIntegrityLevel`	`keyword`	Integrity level of the newly created process. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet downloaded. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources
`action.properties.ProcessTokenElevation`	`keyword`	Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the newly created process
`action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName`	`keyword`	Company name from the version information of the newly created process
`action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription`	`keyword`	Description from the version information of the newly created process
`action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName`	`keyword`	Internal file name from the version information of the newly created process
`action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName`	`keyword`	Original file name from the version information of the newly created process
`action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductName`	`keyword`	Product name from the version information of the newly created process
`action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion`	`keyword`	Product version from the version information of the newly created process
`action.properties.Query`	`keyword`	String used to run the query
`action.properties.QueryTarget`	`keyword`	Name of user, group, device, domain, or any other entity type being queried
`action.properties.QueryType`	`keyword`	Type of query, such as QueryGroup, QueryUser, or EnumerateUsers
`action.properties.RawEventData`	`keyword`	Raw event information from the source application or service in JSON format
`action.properties.RecipientObjectId`	`keyword`	Unique identifier for the email recipient in Azure AD
`action.properties.RegistryDeviceTag`	`keyword`	Machine tag added through the registry
`action.properties.RemoteDeviceName`	`keyword`	Name of the machine that performed a remote operation on the affected machine. Depending on the event being reported, this name could be a fully-qualified domain name (FQDN), a NetBIOS name, or a host name without domain information
`action.properties.RemoteIPType`	`keyword`	Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast
`action.properties.RequestAccountSid`	`keyword`	Security Identifier (SID) of the account used to remotely initiate the activity
`action.properties.SenderDisplayName`	`keyword`	Name of the sender displayed in the address book, typically a combination of a given or first name, a middle initial, and a last name or surname
`action.properties.SenderFromDomain`	`keyword`	Sender domain in the FROM header, which is visible to email recipients on their email clients
`action.properties.SenderObjectId`	`keyword`	Unique identifier for the sender's account in Azure AD
`action.properties.SensitivityLabel`	`keyword`	Label applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection
`action.properties.SensitivitySubLabel`	`keyword`	Sublabel applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection; sensitivity sublabels are grouped under sensitivity labels but are treated independently
`action.properties.ServiceSource`	`keyword`	Product or service that provided the alert information
`action.properties.ShareName`	`keyword`	Name of shared folder containing the file
`action.properties.TargetAccountDisplayName`	`keyword`	Display name of the account that the recorded action was applied to
`action.properties.TargetAccountUpn`	`keyword`	User principal name (UPN) of the account that the recorded action was applied to
`action.properties.TargetDeviceName`	`keyword`	Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the device that the recorded action was applied to
`action.properties.UrlCount`	`number`	Number of embedded URLs in the email
`action.properties.UserAgentTags`	`list`	More information provided by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps in a tag in the user agent field. Can have any of the following values: Native client, Outdated browser, Outdated operating system, Robot
`action.properties.UserLevelAction`	`keyword`	Action taken on the email in response to matches to a mailbox policy defined by the recipient
`action.properties.UserLevelPolicy`	`keyword`	End-user mailbox policy that triggered the action taken on the email
`agent.version`	`keyword`	Version of the agent.
`container.id`	`keyword`	Unique container id.
`container.runtime`	`keyword`	Runtime managing this container.
`destination.ip`	`ip`	IP address of the destination.
`destination.port`	`long`	Port of the destination.
`email.from.address`	`keyword`	The email address of the sender, typically from the RFC 5322 From: header field
`email.local_id`	`keyword`	Unique identifier given to the email by the source that created the event
`email.message_id`	`keyword`	Identifier from the RFC 5322 Message-ID: email header that refers to a particular email message
`email.subject`	`keyword`	A brief summary of the topic of the message
`email.to.address`	`keyword`	The email address of recipient
`event.action`	`keyword`	The action captured by the event.
`event.category`	`keyword`	Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
`event.dataset`	`keyword`	Name of the dataset.
`event.kind`	`keyword`	The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
`event.type`	`keyword`	Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
`file.directory`	`keyword`	Directory where the file is located.
`file.hash.md5`	`keyword`	MD5 hash.
`file.hash.sha1`	`keyword`	SHA1 hash.
`file.hash.sha256`	`keyword`	SHA256 hash.
`file.name`	`keyword`	Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
`file.size`	`long`	File size in bytes.
`file.x509.not_after`	`date`	Time at which the certificate is no longer considered valid.
`file.x509.serial_number`	`keyword`	Unique serial number issued by the certificate authority.
`host.architecture`	`keyword`	Operating system architecture.
`host.id`	`keyword`	Unique host id.
`host.mac`	`keyword`	Host MAC addresses.
`host.name`	`keyword`	Name of the host.
`host.os.family`	`keyword`	OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
`host.os.full`	`keyword`	Operating system name, including the version or code name.
`host.os.version`	`keyword`	Operating system version as a raw string.
`host.type`	`keyword`	Type of host.
`microsoft.defender.activity.objects`	`list`	List of objects, such as files or folders, that were involved in the recorded activity
`microsoft.defender.activity.type`	`keyword`	Type of activity that triggered the event
`microsoft.defender.alert.id`	`keyword`	Unique identifier for the alert
`microsoft.defender.alert.title`	`keyword`	The title of the alert
`microsoft.defender.certificate.counter_signed_at`	`keyword`	Date and time the certificate was countersigned
`microsoft.defender.certificate.created_at`	`keyword`	Date and time the certificate was created
`microsoft.defender.certificate.crl.urls`	`keyword`	JSON array listing the URLs of network shares that contain certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
`microsoft.defender.certificate.is_root_signer_microsort`	`boolean`	Indicates whether the signer of the root certificate is Microsoft and if the file is included in Windows operating system
`microsoft.defender.certificate.is_signed`	`boolean`	Indicates whether the file is signed
`microsoft.defender.certificate.is_trusted`	`boolean`	Indicates whether the file is trusted based on the results of the WinVerifyTrust function, which checks for unknown root certificate information, invalid signatures, revoked certificates, and other questionable attributes
`microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.hash`	`keyword`	Unique hash value identifying issuing certificate authority (CA)
`microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.name`	`keyword`	Information about the issuing certificate authority (CA)
`microsoft.defender.certificate.signature_type`	`keyword`	Indicates whether signature information was read as embedded content in the file itself or read from an external catalog file
`microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.hash`	`keyword`	Unique hash value identifying the signer
`microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.name`	`keyword`	Information about the signer of the file
`microsoft.defender.entity.type`	`keyword`	Type of object, such as a file, a process, a device, or a user
`microsoft.defender.evidence.direction`	`keyword`	Indicates whether the entity is the source or the destination of a network connection
`microsoft.defender.evidence.role`	`keyword`	How the entity is involved in an alert, indicating whether it is impacted or is merely related
`microsoft.defender.host.category`	`keyword`	Broader classification that groups certain device types under the following categories: Endpoint, Network device, IoT, Unknown
`microsoft.defender.host.model`	`keyword`	Model name or number of the product from the vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
`microsoft.defender.host.os.build`	`keyword`	Build version of the operating system running on the machine
`microsoft.defender.host.os.version`	`keyword`	Additional information about the OS version, such as the popular name, code name, or version number
`microsoft.defender.host.subtype`	`keyword`	Additional modifier for certain types of devices, for example, a mobile device can be a tablet or a smartphone; only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
`microsoft.defender.host.vendor`	`keyword`	Name of the product vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
`microsoft.defender.network.tunnel.protocol`	`keyword`	Tunneling protocol, if the interface is used for this purpose, for example 6to4, Teredo, ISATAP, PPTP, SSTP, and SSH
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv4`	`keyword`	IPv4 address of DHCP server
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv6`	`keyword`	IPv6 address of DHCP server
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dns`	`keyword`	DNS server addresses in JSON array format
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.gateways`	`keyword`	Default gateway addresses in JSON array format
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.ips`	`keyword`	JSON array containing all the IP addresses assigned to the adapter, along with their respective subnet prefix and IP address space, such as public, private, or link-local
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.name`	`keyword`	Name of the network adapter
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.networks`	`keyword`	Networks that the adapter is connected to. Each JSON array contains the network name, category (public, private or domain), a description, and a flag indicating if it's connected publicly to the internet
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.status`	`keyword`	Operational status of the network adapter. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration
`microsoft.defender.observer.interface.type`	`keyword`	Network adapter type. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration
`microsoft.defender.report.id`	`keyword`	Unique identifier for the event
`microsoft.defender.threat.category`	`keyword`	Type of threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert
`microsoft.defender.threat.detection`	`keyword`	Methods used to detect malware, phishing, or other threats found in the email
`microsoft.defender.threat.family`	`keyword`	Malware family that the suspicious or malicious file or process has been classified under
`microsoft.defender.threat.names`	`keyword`	Detection name for malware or other threats found
`microsoft.defender.threat.severity`	`keyword`	Indicates the potential impact (high, medium, or low) of the threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert
`microsoft.defender.threat.types`	`keyword`	Verdict from the email filtering stack on whether the email contains malware, phishing, or other threats
`network.protocol`	`keyword`	Application protocol name.
`process.args`	`keyword`	Array of process arguments.
`process.code_signature.status`	`keyword`	Additional information about the certificate status.
`process.code_signature.subject_name`	`keyword`	Subject name of the code signer
`process.command_line`	`wildcard`	Full command line that started the process.
`process.hash.md5`	`keyword`	MD5 hash.
`process.hash.sha1`	`keyword`	SHA1 hash.
`process.hash.sha256`	`keyword`	SHA256 hash.
`process.name`	`keyword`	Process name.
`process.parent.name`	`keyword`	Process name.
`process.parent.pid`	`long`	Process id.
`process.parent.start`	`date`	The time the process started.
`process.pid`	`long`	Process id.
`process.start`	`date`	The time the process started.
`process.user.domain`	`keyword`	Domain of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
`process.user.email`	`keyword`	User principal name (UPN) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
`process.user.id`	`keyword`	Security Identifier (SID) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
`process.user.name`	`keyword`	User name of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
`process.working_directory`	`keyword`	The working directory of the process.
`registry.data.strings`	`wildcard`	List of strings representing what was written to the registry.
`registry.data.type`	`keyword`	Standard registry type for encoding contents
`registry.key`	`keyword`	Hive-relative path of keys.
`registry.value`	`keyword`	Name of the value written.
`rule.id`	`keyword`	Rule ID
`rule.name`	`keyword`	Rule name
`service.name`	`keyword`	Name of the service.
`service.type`	`keyword`	The type of the service.
`source.geo.city_name`	`keyword`	City name.
`source.geo.country_iso_code`	`keyword`	Country ISO code.
`source.ip`	`ip`	IP address of the source.
`source.port`	`long`	Port of the source.
`threat.technique.name`	`keyword`	Threat technique name.
`url.domain`	`keyword`	Domain of the url.
`url.original`	`wildcard`	Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
`user.domain`	`keyword`	Name of the directory the user is a member of.
`user.full_name`	`keyword`	User's full name, if available.
`user.id`	`keyword`	Unique identifier of the user.
`user.name`	`keyword`	Short name or login of the user.
`user.roles`	`keyword`	Array of user roles at the time of the event.
`user_agent.original`	`keyword`	Unparsed user_agent string.

Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported

Here is a list of all the Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported by this integration:

Alert Evidence
AlertInfo
DeviceEvents
DeviceFileCertificateInfo
DeviceFileEvent
DeviceImageLoadEvents
DeviceInfo
DeviceLogonEvents
DeviceNetworkEvents
DeviceNetworkInfo
DeviceProcessEvents
DeviceRegistryEvents
EmailAttachmentInfo
EmailEvents
EmailPostDeliveryEvents
EmailUrlInfo
IdentityLogonEvents
IdentityQueryEvents
IdentityDirectoryEvents
CloudAppEvents

Please follow this link to see all the types provided by Microsoft.

Configure

To forward Microsoft 365 Defender events from Microsoft to Sekoia.io you need to send your event to an Azure Event Hub where Sekoia.io will collect the events.

Prerequisite

You must have the following rights to perform the installation:
- Global Administrator or Security Administrator rights on Microsoft 365 Defender
- Contributor write on Azure

Create an Azure Event Hub

Overview

Azure Event Hubs is a cloud-based event streaming platform and event ingestion service provided by Microsoft Azure. It is designed to handle large amounts of event data generated by various applications, devices, and services in real-time. Event Hub enables you to ingest, process, and store events, logs, telemetry data, and other streaming data for further analysis, monitoring, and processing.

This setup guide will show you how to create an Event Hub.

Theses changes have to be made from the Azure Web Portal.

Some resources created during this procedure are needed to connect Sekoia.io to the Event Hub, you can complete the following table to save all the useful informations for later use.

Name	Value	Description	Example
hub_name	To be completed at step 3	Name of the Event Hub	sekoia_event_hub
hub_connection_string	To be completed at step 5	Connection string–primary key	Endpoint=sb://company-eventhub.servicebus.windows.net/;SharedAccessKeyName=sekoiaio;SharedAccessKey=XXXXXX;EntityPath=sekoia_event_hub
hub_consumer_group	To be completed at step 6	Name of the comsumer group	consumergroup_sekoiaio
storage_container_name	To be completed at step 7	Name of your container (same as the Event Hub name)	sekoia_event_hub
storage_connection_string	To be completed at step 8	Storage connection string	DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=sekoiaiocheckpoint;AccountKey=XXXXX

As a prerequisite, you need to choose an existing Resource group, or create a new one (e.g. company-resource-group).

Step 1: Find your Subscription ID

Go to: Home > Cost Management + Billing > Subscriptions.
From there, keep the relevant “Subscription ID” that will be used along the process.

Step 2: Create Event Hub Namespace

Navigate to Home > Event Hubs.
Create an Event Hub Namespace.
Select your Subscription and your Resource group.
Click on create new if you want your Event Hub Namespace in a new Resource group.
Choose a namespace name.
Select a location based on your events location.
Select the pricing tier plan based on your utilisation: Standard or Premimum (We don't recommend to choose the Basic plan due to its limitations.)
Select the throughput units number based on your events, or enable the auto inflate mode:
1 throughput unit can process up to 1 MB per second or 1000 events per second (whichever comes first).

Step 3: Create Event Hub Instance

When your Event Hub Namespace is created you can create an Event Hub inside:
1. Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace.
2. Create an Event Hub.

Info

We advise at least the following values:
- cleanup policy: Delete
- retention time: 168h (7 days)

Info

Carefully store the Event Hub name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 4: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub Namespace

Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace | Shared access policies.
Create a policy (e.g. RootManageSharedAccessKey) with the claims Manage, Send and Listen.

Step 5: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub

Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace > eventhubname | Shared access policies.
Create a policy (e.g. sekoiaio) with the claims Listen.

Once created, click on the policy.

Info

Carefully store the connection string–primary key that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 6: Create a Consumer group

Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace > eventhubname | Consumer groups.
Create a Consumer group (e.g. consumergroup_sekoiaio).

Info

Carefully store the Consumer group name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 7: Create a Storage Account with a container

In order to allow Sekoia.io keep track of the consumed events, the next step consists in creating a dedicated Storage account.

Navigate to Home > Storage accounts.
Create a Storage account.
Select your Subscription and your Resource group.
Choose a Storage account name.
Select a Region.

Info

You must choose the Region used during the Event Hub Namespace creation.
Select your perfomance and redundancy parameters.

Info

We advise at least the following values:
- performance: standard
- redundancy: Geo-Redundancy storage (GRS)

When your storage account is created you can create an container inside.
1. Navigate to Home > Storage accounts > storageaccoutname | containers.
2. Create an container.

Keep the Public Acces Level to Private.

Info

The container name should be the same as the Event Hub name. Carefully store that container name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 8: Retrieve Connection String

You have to retrieve the connection string from Azure Web Portal.

Go to Home > Storage accounts > storageaccoutname | Access Keys.
Click on "Show Keys" on the first Connection String.

Info

Carefully store the Connection String that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Send logs from 365 Defender to Azure Event Hub

When you have an Event Hub follow this guide to send your events from Microsoft 365 Defender to the Event Hub:

Log on to Microsoft 365 Defender portal as a Global Administrator or Security Administrator.
Go to the Streaming API settings page.
Click on Add.
Choose a name for your new settings.
Choose Forward events to Azure Event Hub.
To export the event data to a single Event Hub, enter your Event Hub name and your Event Hub resource ID.
To get your Event Hub resource ID, go to your Azure Event Hub Namespace page on Azure > Properties tab > copy the text under Resource ID: (e.g. /subscriptions/XXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXX/resourceGroups/resourcegroupname/providers/Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/namespacename).
Go to the supported Microsoft 365 Defender event types in event streaming API to review the support status of event types in the Microsoft 365 Streaming API.
Choose the events you want to stream and click Save.

Disclamer

We advise to send one event type by Event Hub, to avoid performance issue with Microsoft 365 Defender events

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Microsoft 365 Defender.

Create and configure a playbook on Sekoia.io to collect logs from an Azure Event Hub

In the playbook section, create a playbook with the Trigger module Consume Eventhub messages in Microsoft Azure technology
Setup Module configuration (= default)
Setup Trigger configuration:
- Event Hub informations: use the table completed during the creation of the Event Hub.
- Intake informations:
  - intake_key = Intake key that can be found on intake page
  - intake_server = https://intake.sekoia.io

Troubleshoot

Go to events page and search events in last 5 minutes by intake key customer.intake_key:"<Your_Intake_Key>"

No events - Please check the configuration and fill the fields with the right information

It is possible to investigate on the tab Run and see the response by clicking on the module

Microsoft 365 Defender

Overview

Event Categories

Event Samples

Extracted Fields

Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported

Configure

Prerequisite

Create an Azure Event Hub

Overview

Step 1: Find your Subscription ID

Step 2: Create Event Hub Namespace

Step 3: Create Event Hub Instance

Step 4: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub Namespace

Step 5: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub

Step 6: Create a Consumer group

Step 7: Create a Storage Account with a container

Step 8: Retrieve Connection String

Further Readings

Send logs from 365 Defender to Azure Event Hub

Further Readings

Create the intake

Create and configure a playbook on Sekoia.io to collect logs from an Azure Event Hub

Troubleshoot

Microsoft 365 Defender

Overview

Related Built-in Rules

Event Categories

Event Samples

Extracted Fields

Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported

Configure

Prerequisite

Create an Azure Event Hub

Overview

Step 1: Find your Subscription ID

Step 2: Create Event Hub Namespace

Step 3: Create Event Hub Instance

Step 4: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub Namespace

Step 5: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub

Step 6: Create a Consumer group

Step 7: Create a Storage Account with a container

Step 8: Retrieve Connection String

Further Readings

Send logs from 365 Defender to Azure Event Hub

Further Readings

Create the intake

Create and configure a playbook on Sekoia.io to collect logs from an Azure Event Hub

Troubleshoot