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Microsoft 365 Defender

Overview

This Intake was previously called Microsoft Defender for Endpoints.

Microsoft 365 Defender is a unified pre- and post-breach enterprise defense suite that natively coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and applications to provide integrated protection against sophisticated attacks.

This setup guide describes how to forward events produced by Microsoft 365 Defender to Sekoia.io XDR.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Microsoft 365 Defender. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Microsoft 365 Defender on ATT&CK Navigator

AccCheckConsole Executing Dll

Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.

  • Effort: advanced
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Aspnet Compiler

Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.

  • Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line

Detects use of azureedge in the command line.

  • Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

  • Effort: elementary
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

  • Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Container Credential Access

Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

  • Effort: elementary
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Disabled Service

Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.

  • Effort: advanced
Dism Disabling Windows Defender

Detects windows defender disabled by dism.

  • Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount

Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp

Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: advanced
Fail2ban Unban IP

An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.

  • Effort: advanced
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

  • Effort: master
FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

  • Effort: elementary
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd

Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.

  • Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

  • Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python

Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.

  • Effort: advanced
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute

Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload

Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search

Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems

  • Effort: intermediate
List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: elementary
MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

  • Effort: advanced
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender XDR Alert

Microsoft Defender XDR has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender XDR Cloud App Security Alert

Microsoft Defender XDR has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender XDR Endpoint Alert

Microsoft Defender XDR has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender XDR Office 365 Alert

Microsoft Defender XDR for Office 365 has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same Sekoia.io alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: intermediate
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: master
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic

Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.

  • Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Python Exfiltration Tools

Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages

Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement

  • Effort: master
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter

Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SELinux Disabling

An attacker can disable SELinux to make workstation or server compromise easier as it disables several protections.

  • Effort: intermediate
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP

Detects a code page switch in command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File

Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage

catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection

Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.

  • Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: intermediate
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Webshell Execution W3WP Process

Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.

  • Effort: advanced
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: advanced
Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Binary file metadata Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files
Disk forensics Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices
File monitoring Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files
Host network interface Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices
Kernel drivers Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Loaded DLLs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Named Pipes Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
PowerShell logs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Process command-line parameters Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Process monitoring Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Process use of network Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Services Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Windows event logs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint watch events logs
Windows Registry Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors the registry
WMI Objects Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Email gateway Microsoft Defender for O365 monitors emails
OAuth audit logs Microsoft Defender for Cloud App monitors users, entity behavior and activities
Authentication logs Microsoft Defender for Identity monitors users, entity behavior and activities
Asset management Microsoft Defender for Identity monitors users identity and credentials

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind alert, enrichment, event
Category authentication, connection, email, file, host, iam, intrusion_detection, network, process, threat
Type indicator, info

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

{
    "message": "{\"time\": \"2023-09-28T16:17:08.7649196Z\", \"tenantId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"operationName\": \"Publish\", \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-AlertEvidence\", \"properties\": {\"Timestamp\": \"2023-09-28T16:15:29.9227997Z\", \"AlertId\": \"dadca6b5e5-5ab9-4a96-9dbb-ba2f8e7756e3_1\", \"EntityType\": \"Process\", \"EvidenceRole\": \"Related\", \"SHA1\": \"f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e\", \"SHA256\": \"eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232\", \"RemoteIP\": null, \"LocalIP\": null, \"RemoteUrl\": null, \"AccountName\": null, \"AccountDomain\": null, \"AccountSid\": null, \"AccountObjectId\": null, \"DeviceId\": null, \"ThreatFamily\": null, \"EvidenceDirection\": null, \"AdditionalFields\": \"{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"1\\\",\\\"ProcessId\\\":\\\"19060\\\",\\\"CommandLine\\\":\\\"splwow64.exe 8192\\\",\\\"ElevationToken\\\":\\\"Default\\\",\\\"CreationTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:28.7714877Z\\\",\\\"ImageFile\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"2\\\",\\\"Directory\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"splwow64.exe\\\",\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"3\\\",\\\"DnsDomain\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"HostName\\\":\\\"vm0242\\\",\\\"NetBiosName\\\":\\\"vm0242.example.org\\\",\\\"OSFamily\\\":\\\"Windows\\\",\\\"OSVersion\\\":\\\"10.0\\\",\\\"IsDomainJoined\\\":true,\\\"IpInterfaces\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"4\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"10.11.22.33\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"5\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"22b0:8f31:eff3:7b6e:3277:2f79:ca62:7ec0\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"6\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"127.0.0.1\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"7\\\",\\\"Address\\\":\\\"::1\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"ip\\\"}],\\\"RemediationProviders\\\":[{\\\"RemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"RemediationDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"remediation-provider\\\"}],\\\"LastRemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"ThreatAnalysisSummary\\\":[{\\\"AnalyzersResult\\\":[],\\\"Verdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"AnalysisDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\"}],\\\"LastVerdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"Metadata\\\":{\\\"MachineEnrichmentInfo\\\":\\\"{\\\\\\\"MachineId\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"7e7a44995a4d4f09be53dce4fe9eb1db\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"HostName\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"vm0242\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"DnsDomain\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"example.org\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"IpAddress\\\\\\\":null,\\\\\\\"FoundBy\\\\\\\":[3],\\\\\\\"LastSeen\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"2023-09-28T06:59:18.6059012Z\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"RbacGroupId\\\\\\\":0,\\\\\\\"MachineTagsJson\\\\\\\":null,\\\\\\\"MachineGroup\\\\\\\":null,\\\\\\\"OsPlatform\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"Windows10\\\\\\\",\\\\\\\"SenseClientVersion\\\\\\\":\\\\\\\"10.8570.19045.3448\\\\\\\"}\\\"},\\\"Asset\\\":true,\\\"DetailedRoles\\\":[\\\"PrimaryDevice\\\"],\\\"RbacScopes\\\":{\\\"ScopesPerType\\\":{\\\"MachineGroupIds\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"Any\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"0\\\"]},\\\"Workloads\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"All\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"Mdatp\\\"]}}},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"host\\\",\\\"LeadingHost\\\":true,\\\"Role\\\":0,\\\"MachineId\\\":\\\"7e7a44995a4d4f09be53dce4fe9eb1db\\\",\\\"MachineIdType\\\":3,\\\"HostMachineId\\\":null,\\\"DetectionStatus\\\":\\\"Detected\\\",\\\"SuspicionLevel\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"EnrichmentType\\\":\\\"MachineIpInterfacesEnrichment\\\",\\\"IsIoc\\\":false,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"6JC4Lo9GK4MkdUKN6MFPCSfA/no=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"E890B82E8F462B832475428DE8C14F0927C0FE7A\\\"},\\\"SizeInBytes\\\":163840,\\\"FileHashes\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"8\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"SHA1\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"9\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"MD5\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"9b77f02583b95c7c5fe59ab2884f2817\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"10\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"SHA256\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"}],\\\"CreatedTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-22T07:12:05.262923Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"file\\\",\\\"LsHash\\\":\\\"6fe9d57dbf6d9a5a77d9a667ebddf556df977bda6ef576dd7e67b5ae5e95665db77e9bd9fefbdeaae6ba9f55a56eae99b5ef9fa6bdaebfa7b95a5bd9f9df7bfa\\\",\\\"IsPe\\\":true,\\\"LastAccessTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:28.8773106Z\\\",\\\"LastWriteTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-22T07:12:05.2726183Z\\\",\\\"Publisher\\\":\\\"Microsoft Corporation\\\",\\\"KnownPrevalence\\\":151790,\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-08-22T17:20:03.9270115\\\"},\\\"Account\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"11\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"mgarcia\\\",\\\"NTDomain\\\":\\\"EXAMPLE\\\",\\\"UPNSuffix\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"Sid\\\":\\\"S-1-5-21-111111111-222222222-333333333-44444\\\",\\\"AadUserId\\\":\\\"cccf9f83-f960-467d-ab75-69cbee32c59e\\\",\\\"IsDomainJoined\\\":true,\\\"RemediationProviders\\\":[{\\\"RemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"RemediationDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"remediation-provider\\\"}],\\\"LastRemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"ThreatAnalysisSummary\\\":[{\\\"AnalyzersResult\\\":[],\\\"Verdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"AnalysisDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\"}],\\\"LastVerdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"Asset\\\":true,\\\"RbacScopes\\\":{\\\"ScopesPerType\\\":{\\\"MachineGroupIds\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"Any\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"0\\\"]},\\\"Workloads\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"All\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"Mdatp\\\"]}}},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"account\\\",\\\"UserPrincipalName\\\":\\\"jane.doe@example.org\\\",\\\"Role\\\":0,\\\"ReferenceId\\\":\\\"b64e0541-4393-41d6-8d18-8be31b30daee:ae2bc63238bc\\\",\\\"DetectionStatus\\\":\\\"Detected\\\",\\\"SuspicionLevel\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"IsIoc\\\":true,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"rRAMCzzVjzarq8zZIW8y9uZLSWg=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"AD100C0B3CD58F36ABABCCD9216F32F6E64B4968\\\"},\\\"ParentProcess\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"12\\\",\\\"ProcessId\\\":\\\"12636\\\",\\\"CreationTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:23.5645558Z\\\",\\\"ImageFile\\\":{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"13\\\",\\\"Directory\\\":\\\"\\\\\\\\Device\\\\\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\\\\\Adobe\\\\\\\\Acrobat Reader DC\\\\\\\\Reader\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"AcroRd32.exe\\\",\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"file\\\"},\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"CreatedTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:23.5645558Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"process\\\"},\\\"Host\\\":{\\\"$ref\\\":\\\"3\\\"},\\\"CreatedTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:15:28.7714877Z\\\",\\\"RemediationProviders\\\":[{\\\"RemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"RemediationDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"remediation-provider\\\"}],\\\"LastRemediationState\\\":\\\"Active\\\",\\\"ThreatAnalysisSummary\\\":[{\\\"AnalyzersResult\\\":[],\\\"Verdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"AnalysisDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T16:16:56.6015218Z\\\"}],\\\"LastVerdict\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"RbacScopes\\\":{\\\"ScopesPerType\\\":{\\\"MachineGroupIds\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"Any\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"0\\\"]},\\\"Workloads\\\":{\\\"Mode\\\":\\\"All\\\",\\\"Scopes\\\":[\\\"Mdatp\\\"]}}},\\\"Type\\\":\\\"process\\\",\\\"ReferenceId\\\":\\\"b64e0541-4393-41d6-8d18-8be31b30daee:12b768c23b3c\\\",\\\"DetectionStatus\\\":\\\"Detected\\\",\\\"SuspicionLevel\\\":\\\"Suspicious\\\",\\\"IsIoc\\\":true,\\\"Role\\\":1,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"Hzs5K5cl+LUGa+UuGO44Y6a9Z9I=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"1F3B392B9725F8B5066BE52E18EE3863A6BD67D2\\\"}\", \"MachineGroup\": null, \"NetworkMessageId\": null, \"ServiceSource\": \"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\", \"FileName\": \"splwow64.exe\", \"FolderPath\": \"C:\\\\Windows\", \"ProcessCommandLine\": \"splwow64.exe 8192\", \"EmailSubject\": null, \"ApplicationId\": null, \"Application\": null, \"DeviceName\": null, \"FileSize\": 163840, \"RegistryKey\": null, \"RegistryValueName\": null, \"RegistryValueData\": null, \"AccountUpn\": null, \"OAuthApplicationId\": null, \"Categories\": \"[\\\"InitialAccess\\\"]\", \"Title\": \"Executable content from email blocked\", \"AttackTechniques\": \"[\\\"Masquerading (T1036)\\\",\\\"Taint Shared Content (T1080)\\\",\\\"User Execution (T1204)\\\",\\\"System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218)\\\",\\\"Internal Spearphishing (T1534)\\\",\\\"Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)\\\",\\\"Spearphishing via Service (T1566.003)\\\"]\", \"DetectionSource\": \"Antivirus\", \"Severity\": \"Low\"}, \"Tenant\": \"DefaultTenant\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "threat"
        ],
        "dataset": "alert_evidence",
        "kind": "enrichment",
        "type": [
            "indicator"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-09-28T16:15:29.922799Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"
        }
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Windows",
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e",
            "sha256": "eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232"
        },
        "name": "splwow64.exe",
        "size": 163840
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "alert": {
                "id": "dadca6b5e5-5ab9-4a96-9dbb-ba2f8e7756e3_1",
                "title": "Executable content from email blocked"
            },
            "entity": {
                "type": "Process"
            },
            "evidence": {
                "role": "Related"
            },
            "threat": {
                "severity": "Low"
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "8192"
        ],
        "command_line": "splwow64.exe 8192"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "eb3fd3d0548771153565acd49edf4667a576959b8e265be7c0061017c6479232",
            "f1d50e0d3e0ba197baf152614e0cd94487a1142e"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
        "type": "Antivirus"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\": \"2023-09-26T13:04:41.9797846Z\", \"tenantId\": \"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\", \"operationName\": \"Publish\", \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-AlertEvidence\", \"properties\": {\"Timestamp\": \"2023-09-26T13:03:18Z\", \"AlertId\": \"fa72d6f6a8-39e7-2681-d400-08dbbe90c56e\", \"EntityType\": \"MailMessage\", \"EvidenceRole\": \"Related\", \"SHA1\": null, \"SHA256\": null, \"RemoteIP\": null, \"LocalIP\": null, \"RemoteUrl\": null, \"AccountName\": null, \"AccountDomain\": null, \"AccountSid\": null, \"AccountObjectId\": null, \"DeviceId\": null, \"ThreatFamily\": null, \"EvidenceDirection\": null, \"AdditionalFields\": \"{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"1\\\",\\\"Recipient\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.org\\\",\\\"Sender\\\":\\\"no-reply@example.org\\\",\\\"SenderIP\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"P2Sender\\\":\\\"no-reply@example.org\\\",\\\"ReceivedDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-26T13:02:18Z\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageId\\\":\\\"4081b089-aecd-48de-af84-12c499929a12\\\",\\\"InternetMessageId\\\":\\\"<e1ea248a-f53f-4f1b-a601-5b2f1fbad48cbc0bb8d-bd55-466f-92ec-46cc66108821b@intranet.domain>\\\",\\\"Subject\\\":\\\"My little subject\\\",\\\"StartTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-26T13:01:18Z\\\",\\\"EndTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-26T13:03:18Z\\\",\\\"EntitySources\\\":[\\\"Alert\\\"],\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailMessage\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":null,\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"0001-01-01T00:00:00\\\",\\\"SourceEntityType\\\":\\\"MalwareFamily\\\",\\\"SourceEntityId\\\":\\\"e93240a2-06fe-40fa-8224-16a01d087268-1\\\",\\\"SourceThreatType\\\":\\\"Phish, Malicious\\\",\\\"SourceThreatName\\\":\\\"Phish, Malicious\\\",\\\"Role\\\":1,\\\"AttachmentCount\\\":0,\\\"UrlCount\\\":0,\\\"MergeByKey\\\":\\\"XI3qGjU8yzWpxMk1QhDqq5R13s4=\\\",\\\"MergeByKeyHex\\\":\\\"5C8DEA1A353CCB35A9C4C9354210EAAB9475DECE\\\"}\", \"MachineGroup\": null, \"NetworkMessageId\": \"4081b089-aecd-48de-af84-12c499929a12\", \"ServiceSource\": \"Microsoft Defender for Office 365\", \"FileName\": null, \"FolderPath\": null, \"ProcessCommandLine\": null, \"EmailSubject\": \"My little subject\", \"ApplicationId\": null, \"Application\": null, \"DeviceName\": null, \"FileSize\": null, \"RegistryKey\": null, \"RegistryValueName\": null, \"RegistryValueData\": null, \"AccountUpn\": null, \"OAuthApplicationId\": null, \"Categories\": \"[\\\"InitialAccess\\\"]\", \"Title\": \"Phish delivered due to an IP allow policy\", \"AttackTechniques\": \"[\\\"Phishing (T1566)\\\"]\", \"DetectionSource\": \"Microsoft Defender for Office 365\", \"Severity\": \"Informational\"}, \"Tenant\": \"DefaultTenant\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "threat"
        ],
        "dataset": "alert_evidence",
        "kind": "enrichment",
        "type": [
            "indicator"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-09-26T13:03:18Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "AttachmentCount": 0,
            "ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365",
            "UrlCount": 0
        }
    },
    "email": {
        "local_id": "4081b089-aecd-48de-af84-12c499929a12",
        "message_id": "e1ea248a-f53f-4f1b-a601-5b2f1fbad48cbc0bb8d-bd55-466f-92ec-46cc66108821b@intranet.domain",
        "sender": {
            "address": "no-reply@example.org"
        },
        "subject": "My little subject",
        "to": {
            "address": [
                "john.doe@example.org"
            ]
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "alert": {
                "id": "fa72d6f6a8-39e7-2681-d400-08dbbe90c56e",
                "title": "Phish delivered due to an IP allow policy"
            },
            "entity": {
                "type": "MailMessage"
            },
            "evidence": {
                "role": "Related"
            },
            "threat": {
                "severity": "Informational"
            }
        }
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365",
        "type": "Microsoft Defender for Office 365"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\": \"2023-09-29T11:45:09.7408937Z\", \"tenantId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"operationName\": \"Publish\", \"category\": \"AdvancedHunting-CloudAppEvents\", \"properties\": {\"ActionType\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"ApplicationId\": 11161, \"AccountDisplayName\": \"airinvestigation\", \"AccountObjectId\": null, \"AccountId\": \"airinvestigation\", \"DeviceType\": null, \"OSPlatform\": null, \"IPAddress\": null, \"IsAnonymousProxy\": null, \"CountryCode\": null, \"City\": null, \"ISP\": null, \"UserAgent\": null, \"IsAdminOperation\": false, \"ActivityObjects\": [{\"Type\": \"Account\", \"Role\": \"Actor\", \"Name\": \"airinvestigation\", \"Id\": \"airinvestigation\", \"ApplicationId\": 11161, \"ApplicationInstance\": 0}], \"AdditionalFields\": {}, \"ActivityType\": \"Basic\", \"ObjectName\": null, \"ObjectType\": null, \"ObjectId\": null, \"AppInstanceId\": 0, \"AccountType\": \"Regular\", \"IsExternalUser\": false, \"IsImpersonated\": false, \"IPTags\": null, \"IPCategory\": null, \"UserAgentTags\": null, \"RawEventData\": {\"Actions\": [], \"CreationTime\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\", \"Data\": \"{\\\"Version\\\":\\\"3.0\\\",\\\"VendorName\\\":\\\"Microsoft\\\",\\\"ProviderName\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"AlertType\\\":\\\"4b1820ec-39dc-45f3-abf6-5ee80df51fd2\\\",\\\"StartTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:07:30.656729Z\\\",\\\"EndTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:07:30.656729Z\\\",\\\"TimeGenerated\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:29:39.09Z\\\",\\\"ProcessingEndTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T11:36:50.0093899Z\\\",\\\"Status\\\":\\\"Resolved\\\",\\\"Severity\\\":\\\"Informational\\\",\\\"ConfidenceLevel\\\":\\\"Unknown\\\",\\\"ConfidenceScore\\\":1.0,\\\"IsIncident\\\":false,\\\"ProviderAlertId\\\":\\\"7310d370-60ed-3bb9-d200-08dbc0cb706a\\\",\\\"SystemAlertId\\\":null,\\\"CorrelationKey\\\":\\\"652fe57f-98e6-47df-b298-808b45a00db2\\\",\\\"Investigations\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"1\\\",\\\"Id\\\":\\\"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\\\",\\\"InvestigationStatus\\\":\\\"FullyRemediated\\\"}],\\\"InvestigationIds\\\":[\\\"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\\\"],\\\"Intent\\\":\\\"Probing\\\",\\\"ResourceIdentifiers\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"2\\\",\\\"AadTenantId\\\":\\\"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"AAD\\\"}],\\\"AzureResourceId\\\":null,\\\"WorkspaceId\\\":null,\\\"WorkspaceSubscriptionId\\\":null,\\\"WorkspaceResourceGroup\\\":null,\\\"AgentId\\\":null,\\\"AlertDisplayName\\\":\\\"Email messages containing malicious file removed after delivery\\\",\\\"Description\\\":\\\"Emails with malicious file that were delivered and later removed -V1.0.0.3\\\",\\\"ExtendedLinks\\\":[{\\\"Href\\\":\\\"https://security.microsoft.com/viewalerts?id=7310d370-60ed-3bb9-d200-08dbc0cb706a\\\",\\\"Category\\\":null,\\\"Label\\\":\\\"alert\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"webLink\\\"}],\\\"Metadata\\\":{\\\"CustomApps\\\":null,\\\"GenericInfo\\\":null},\\\"Entities\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"3\\\",\\\"Files\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"4\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"pix.png\\\",\\\"FileHashes\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"5\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"SHA256\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"EC7D1FD05AE26420DE1E51F2F315E07F9A4AF5A4A81AD43BDDE7C70EF45ADE68\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"}],\\\"Type\\\":\\\"file\\\",\\\"MalwareFamily\\\":\\\"Malicious Payload\\\"}],\\\"Recipient\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.com\\\",\\\"Threats\\\":[\\\"ZapPhish\\\",\\\"HighConfPhish\\\"],\\\"Sender\\\":\\\"malicous@organization.com\\\",\\\"P1Sender\\\":\\\"malicious@organization.com\\\",\\\"P1SenderDomain\\\":\\\"organization.com\\\",\\\"SenderIP\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"P2Sender\\\":\\\"malicious@organization.com\\\",\\\"P2SenderDisplayName\\\":\\\"Payroll\\\",\\\"P2SenderDomain\\\":\\\"organization.com\\\",\\\"ReceivedDate\\\":\\\"2023-09-28T22:07:30\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageId\\\":\\\"1f775e39-ff91-4872-a3e1-dd761e41a2ee\\\",\\\"InternetMessageId\\\":\\\"<fe1a8d44-44e2-4120-b913-0b3b0783a7e9@organization.com>\\\",\\\"Subject\\\":\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\" with you.\\\",\\\"AntispamDirection\\\":\\\"Inbound\\\",\\\"DeliveryAction\\\":\\\"Blocked\\\",\\\"ThreatDetectionMethods\\\":[\\\"FileReputation\\\"],\\\"Language\\\":\\\"en\\\",\\\"DeliveryLocation\\\":\\\"Quarantine\\\",\\\"OriginalDeliveryLocation\\\":\\\"Inbox\\\",\\\"PhishConfidenceLevel\\\":\\\"High\\\",\\\"AdditionalActionsAndResults\\\":[\\\"OriginalDelivery: [N/A]\\\",\\\"Zap: [Success: Message moved to quarantine]\\\"],\\\"AuthDetails\\\":[{\\\"Name\\\":\\\"SPF\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"Pass\\\"},{\\\"Name\\\":\\\"DKIM\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"Pass\\\"},{\\\"Name\\\":\\\"DMARC\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"Pass\\\"},{\\\"Name\\\":\\\"Comp Auth\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"pass\\\"}],\\\"SystemOverrides\\\":[],\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailMessage\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailEntity:11111111111111111111111111111111\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:44:12\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"6\\\",\\\"MailboxPrimaryAddress\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.com\\\",\\\"Upn\\\":\\\"john.doe@example.com\\\",\\\"AadId\\\":\\\"170d8411-e4c0-4b27-8ac4-59dbe8db8ccf\\\",\\\"RiskLevel\\\":\\\"None\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailbox\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:UserEntity:11111111111111111111111111111111\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:44:12\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"7\\\",\\\"Name\\\":\\\"pix.png\\\",\\\"FileHashes\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"8\\\",\\\"Algorithm\\\":\\\"SHA256\\\",\\\"Value\\\":\\\"EC7D1FD05AE26420DE1E51F2F315E07F9A4AF5A4A81AD43BDDE7C70EF45ADE68\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"filehash\\\"}],\\\"Type\\\":\\\"file\\\",\\\"MalwareFamily\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:FileEntity:11111111111111111111111111111111\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:44:12\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"9\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageIds\\\":[\\\"fbeee67e-838a-4aae-9653-385094b83fb8\\\"],\\\"CountByThreatType\\\":{\\\"HighConfPhish\\\":1,\\\"Phish\\\":0,\\\"Malware\\\":0,\\\"Spam\\\":0},\\\"CountByProtectionStatus\\\":{\\\"Blocked\\\":1},\\\"CountByDeliveryLocation\\\":{\\\"Quarantine\\\":1},\\\"Query\\\":\\\"( (( (BodyFingerprintBin1:\\\\\\\"4011247127\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (SenderIp:\\\\\\\"1.2.3.4\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (ContentType: 1) )) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:PhishEdu) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"BodyFingerprintBin1,SenderIp\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"BodyFingerprintBin1;SenderIp;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"4011247127;1.2.3.4;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:11111111111111111111111111111111\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:27\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"10\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageIds\\\":[\\\"4c8bc40b-45ac-49d4-9ef3-b2c30a59d754\\\"],\\\"CountByThreatType\\\":{\\\"HighConfPhish\\\":1,\\\"Phish\\\":0,\\\"Malware\\\":0,\\\"Spam\\\":0},\\\"CountByProtectionStatus\\\":{\\\"Blocked\\\":1},\\\"CountByDeliveryLocation\\\":{\\\"Quarantine\\\":1},\\\"Query\\\":\\\"( ((AttachmentFileHash:\\\\\\\"7H0f0FriZCDeHlHy8xXgf5pK9aSoGtQ73efHDvRa3mg=\\\\\\\") AND (ContentType: 1)) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:PhishEdu) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"FileHashThreatIndicator\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"AttachmentFileHash;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:44444444444444444444444444444444\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:27\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"11\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageIds\\\":[\\\"4c8bc40b-45ac-49d4-9ef3-b2c30a59d754\\\"],\\\"CountByThreatType\\\":{\\\"HighConfPhish\\\":1,\\\"Phish\\\":0,\\\"Malware\\\":0,\\\"Spam\\\":0},\\\"CountByProtectionStatus\\\":{\\\"Blocked\\\":1},\\\"CountByDeliveryLocation\\\":{\\\"Quarantine\\\":1},\\\"Query\\\":\\\"( (( (Subject:\\\\\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"\\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\"\\\\\\\" with you.\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (P2SenderDomain:\\\\\\\"organization.com\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (AntispamDirection:\\\\\\\"1\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (ContentType: 1) )) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:PhishEdu) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"Subject,P2SenderDomain,AntispamDirection\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"Subject;P2SenderDomain;AntispamDirection;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\" with you.;organization.com;1;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:11111111111111111111111111111111\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:27\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"12\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageIds\\\":[\\\"36d28877-7954-43fb-9f8f-fe26f23bcf34\\\"],\\\"CountByThreatType\\\":{\\\"HighConfPhish\\\":1,\\\"Phish\\\":0,\\\"Malware\\\":0,\\\"Spam\\\":0},\\\"CountByProtectionStatus\\\":{\\\"Blocked\\\":1},\\\"CountByDeliveryLocation\\\":{\\\"Quarantine\\\":1},\\\"Query\\\":\\\"( (( (BodyFingerprintBin1:\\\\\\\"4011247127\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (P2SenderDomain:\\\\\\\"organization.com\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (ContentType: 1) )) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:PhishEdu) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"BodyFingerprintBin1,P2SenderDomain\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"BodyFingerprintBin1;P2SenderDomain;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"4011247127;organization.com;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:4d298ccfc6e344df8a199c74a5466290\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:28\\\"},{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"13\\\",\\\"NetworkMessageIds\\\":[\\\"5a65b4e6-c8f3-468b-8ee6-4c7f817e6bfa\\\"],\\\"CountByThreatType\\\":{\\\"HighConfPhish\\\":1,\\\"Phish\\\":0,\\\"Malware\\\":0,\\\"Spam\\\":0},\\\"CountByProtectionStatus\\\":{\\\"Blocked\\\":1},\\\"CountByDeliveryLocation\\\":{\\\"Quarantine\\\":1},\\\"Query\\\":\\\"( (( (Subject:\\\\\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"\\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\"\\\\\\\" with you.\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (SenderIp:\\\\\\\"1.2.3.4\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (AntispamDirection:\\\\\\\"1\\\\\\\") ) AND ( (ContentType: 1) )) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:PhishEdu) AND NOT(XmiInfoTenantPolicyFinalVerdictSource:SecOps))\\\",\\\"QueryTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:14:35.7365899Z\\\",\\\"MailCount\\\":1,\\\"IsVolumeAnamoly\\\":false,\\\"ClusterGroup\\\":\\\"Subject,SenderIp,AntispamDirection\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"mailCluster\\\",\\\"ClusterBy\\\":\\\"Subject;SenderIp;AntispamDirection;ContentType\\\",\\\"ClusterByValue\\\":\\\"Doom shared a file \\\\\\\"Payroll entry\\\\\\\" with you.;1.2.3.4;1;1\\\",\\\"Urn\\\":\\\"urn:MailClusterEntity:cb4c1a4b96883fbdb1dad10b231cfa00\\\",\\\"Source\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"FirstSeen\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T10:15:28\\\"}],\\\"LogCreationTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T11:36:50.0093899Z\\\",\\\"MachineName\\\":\\\"DBAEUR03BG403\\\",\\\"SourceTemplateType\\\":\\\"Threat_Single\\\",\\\"Category\\\":\\\"ThreatManagement\\\",\\\"SourceAlertType\\\":\\\"System\\\"}\", \"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\", \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\", \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\", \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"RecordType\": 64, \"RunningTime\": 6762, \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\", \"Status\": \"Remediated\", \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserType\": 4, \"Version\": 1, \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"}, \"ReportId\": \"60913494_11161_8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Timestamp\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\", \"Application\": \"Microsoft 365\"}, \"Tenant\": \"DefaultTenant\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "dataset": "cloud_app_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-09-29T11:40:30Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "Application": "Microsoft 365",
            "ApplicationId": "11161",
            "IsAdminOperation": "false",
            "IsExternalUser": false,
            "IsImpersonated": false,
            "RawEventData": "{\"Actions\": [], \"CreationTime\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\", \"Data\": \"{\\\"Version\\\":\\\"3.0\\\",\\\"VendorName\\\":\\\"Microsoft\\\",\\\"ProviderName\\\":\\\"OATP\\\",\\\"AlertType\\\":\\\"4b1820ec-39dc-45f3-abf6-5ee80df51fd2\\\",\\\"StartTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:07:30.656729Z\\\",\\\"EndTimeUtc\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:07:30.656729Z\\\",\\\"TimeGenerated\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T09:29:39.09Z\\\",\\\"ProcessingEndTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-29T11:36:50.0093899Z\\\",\\\"Status\\\":\\\"Resolved\\\",\\\"Severity\\\":\\\"Informational\\\",\\\"ConfidenceLevel\\\":\\\"Unknown\\\",\\\"ConfidenceScore\\\":1.0,\\\"IsIncident\\\":false,\\\"ProviderAlertId\\\":\\\"7310d370-60ed-3bb9-d200-08dbc0cb706a\\\",\\\"SystemAlertId\\\":null,\\\"CorrelationKey\\\":\\\"652fe57f-98e6-47df-b298-808b45a00db2\\\",\\\"Investigations\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"1\\\",\\\"Id\\\":\\\"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\\\",\\\"InvestigationStatus\\\":\\\"FullyRemediated\\\"}],\\\"InvestigationIds\\\":[\\\"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\\\"],\\\"Intent\\\":\\\"Probing\\\",\\\"ResourceIdentifiers\\\":[{\\\"$id\\\":\\\"2\\\",\\\"AadTenantId\\\":\\\"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\\\",\\\"Type\\\":\\\"AAD\\\"}],\\\"AzureResourceId\\\":null,\\\"WorkspaceId\\\":null,\\\"WorkspaceSubscriptionId\\\":null,\\\"WorkspaceResourceGroup\\\":null,\\\"AgentId\\\":null,\\\"AlertDisplayName\\\":\\\"Email 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\"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\", \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\", \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\", \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"RecordType\": 64, \"RunningTime\": 6762, \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\", \"Status\": \"Remediated\", \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserType\": 4, \"Version\": 1, \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"}"
        },
        "type": "AirInvestigationData"
    },
    "email": {
        "attachments": [
            {
                "file": {
                    "hash": {
                        "sha256": "EC7D1FD05AE26420DE1E51F2F315E07F9A4AF5A4A81AD43BDDE7C70EF45ADE68"
                    },
                    "name": "pix.png"
                }
            }
        ]
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "activity": {
                "objects": [
                    {
                        "ApplicationId": 11161,
                        "ApplicationInstance": 0,
                        "Id": "airinvestigation",
                        "Name": "airinvestigation",
                        "Role": "Actor",
                        "Type": "Account"
                    }
                ],
                "type": "Basic"
            },
            "investigation": {
                "id": "urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
                "name": "Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
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                "type": "ZappedFileInvestigation"
            },
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            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "full_name": "airinvestigation"
    }
}
{
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    "event": {
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "dataset": "cloud_app_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-09-29T11:40:30Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "Application": "Microsoft 365",
            "ApplicationId": "11161",
            "IsAdminOperation": "false",
            "IsExternalUser": false,
            "IsImpersonated": false,
            "RawEventData": "{\"Actions\": [], \"CreationTime\": \"2023-09-29T11:40:30Z\", \"DeepLinkUrl\": \"https://security.microsoft.com/mtp-investigation/urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"EndTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T11:34:37Z\", \"Id\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"InvestigationId\": \"urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationName\": \"Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd\", \"InvestigationType\": \"ZappedFileInvestigation\", \"LastUpdateTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T10:54:43Z\", \"ObjectId\": \"8a7cc032-8634-4117-bae4-371071ce0ce5\", \"Operation\": \"AirInvestigationData\", \"OrganizationId\": \"4b05a653-e372-418d-9bd0-ba2383d1673e\", \"RecordType\": 64, \"RunningTime\": 6762, \"StartTimeUtc\": \"2023-09-29T09:44:07Z\", \"Status\": \"Remediated\", \"UserId\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserKey\": \"AirInvestigation\", \"UserType\": 4, \"Version\": 1, \"Workload\": \"AirInvestigation\"}"
        },
        "type": "AirInvestigationData"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "activity": {
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                    {
                        "ApplicationId": 11161,
                        "ApplicationInstance": 0,
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                        "Name": "airinvestigation",
                        "Role": "Actor",
                        "Type": "Account"
                    }
                ],
                "type": "Basic"
            },
            "investigation": {
                "id": "urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
                "name": "Mail with malicious file is zapped - urn:ZappedFileInvestigation:13e4f3241b8e49faa8c8adcdb3d620dd",
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            },
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            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "full_name": "airinvestigation"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T22:06:00.6652718Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-AlertInfo\",\"properties\":{\"AlertId\":\"da637977531594995313_968283104\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z\",\"Title\":\"'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented\",\"ServiceSource\":\"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\",\"Category\":\"DefenseEvasion\",\"Severity\":\"Informational\",\"DetectionSource\":\"Antivirus\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"AttackTechniques\":\"\"}}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "threat"
        ],
        "dataset": "alert_info",
        "kind": "alert",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "alert": {
                "id": "da637977531594995313_968283104",
                "title": "'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented"
            },
            "threat": {
                "category": "DefenseEvasion",
                "severity": "Informational"
            }
        }
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
        "type": "Antivirus"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
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        "type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104061"
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        "args": [
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            "--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
            "--sandboxed-process-id=2",
            "--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
        ],
        "command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
        "executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
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        "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "pid": 15532,
            "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
        },
        "pid": 1664,
        "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "email": "user@example.org",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "name": "group1"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
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            "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T13:12:14.2082552Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceFileCertificateInfo\",\"properties\":{\"SHA1\":\"4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5\",\"IsSigned\":true,\"IsRootSignerMicrosoft\":true,\"Signer\":\"Microsoft Windows\",\"SignerHash\":\"fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f\",\"Issuer\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\"IssuerHash\":\"580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d\",\"SignatureType\":\"Catalog\",\"IsTrusted\":true,\"CertificateCreationTime\":\"2021-09-02T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateExpirationTime\":\"2022-09-01T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateCountersignatureTime\":\"2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z\",\"CrlDistributionPointUrls\":\"[\\\"http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl\\\"]\",\"CertificateSerialNumber\":\"330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c\",\"DeviceId\":\"db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T13:10:10.7177Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":20370}}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "file"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_file_certificate_info",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-02T13:10:10.717700Z",
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
        },
        "x509": {
            "not_after": "2022-09-01T18:23:41Z",
            "serial_number": "330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "certificate": {
                "counter_signed_at": "2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z",
                "created_at": "2021-09-02T18:23:41Z",
                "crl": {
                    "urls": [
                        "http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl"
                    ]
                },
                "is_root_signer_microsort": true,
                "is_signed": true,
                "is_trusted": true,
                "issuer": {
                    "hash": "580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d",
                    "name": "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011"
                },
                "signature_type": "Catalog",
                "signer": {
                    "hash": "fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f",
                    "name": "Microsoft Windows"
                }
            },
            "report": {
                "id": "20370"
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        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
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}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:49:40.4279379Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceFileEvents\",\"properties\":{\"PreviousFileName\":null,\"FileName\":\"OneDriveFileLauncher.exe\",\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USER\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\OneDrive\\\\22.161.0731.0002\",\"PreviousFolderPath\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"FileOriginReferrerUrl\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"SensitivityLabel\":null,\"SensitivitySubLabel\":null,\"IsAzureInfoProtectionApplied\":null,\"ShareName\":null,\"RequestSourceIP\":null,\"RequestSourcePort\":null,\"RequestProtocol\":null,\"RequestAccountName\":null,\"RequestAccountDomain\":null,\"RequestAccountSid\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":null,\"ActionType\":\"FileDeleted\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft OneDrive\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"22.166.0807.0002\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Microsoft OneDrive (64 bit) Setup\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\microsoft\\\\onedrive\\\\update\\\\onedrivesetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":56824728,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"9a3af3a9ce0217bccce1d161e0b6bfde\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"30204bef93d692fbcbf7475b154e3f65d3aace6f8f030af9e412f3d9e8d9a595\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"8f6ebe4a51ce4b5f76f4d896a6e289e69f91a264\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:46:34.0214941Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":27512,\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe /update /restart /updateSource:ODU /peruser /childprocess /extractFilesWithLessThreadCount /renameReplaceOneDriveExe /renameReplaceODSUExe /removeNonCurrentVersions /enableODSUReportingMode \",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:46:33.5858992Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":588,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"Medium\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:46:42.4684081Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":152059}}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "file"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_file_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:46:42.468408Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "OneDriveSetup.exe /update /restart /updateSource:ODU /peruser /childprocess /extractFilesWithLessThreadCount /renameReplaceOneDriveExe /renameReplaceODSUExe /removeNonCurrentVersions /enableODSUReportingMode ",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 56824728,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "Medium",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft OneDrive (64 bit) Setup",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft OneDrive",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "22.166.0807.0002"
        },
        "type": "FileDeleted"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Users\\USER\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\22.161.0731.0002",
        "name": "OneDriveFileLauncher.exe"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "152059"
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "",
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            "/extractFilesWithLessThreadCount",
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            "/removeNonCurrentVersions",
            "/renameReplaceODSUExe",
            "/renameReplaceOneDriveExe",
            "/restart",
            "/update",
            "/updateSource:ODU"
        ],
        "command_line": "OneDriveSetup.exe /update /restart /updateSource:ODU /peruser /childprocess /extractFilesWithLessThreadCount /renameReplaceOneDriveExe /renameReplaceODSUExe /removeNonCurrentVersions /enableODSUReportingMode ",
        "executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\microsoft\\onedrive\\update\\onedrivesetup.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "9a3af3a9ce0217bccce1d161e0b6bfde",
            "sha1": "8f6ebe4a51ce4b5f76f4d896a6e289e69f91a264",
            "sha256": "30204bef93d692fbcbf7475b154e3f65d3aace6f8f030af9e412f3d9e8d9a595"
        },
        "name": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
            "pid": 588,
            "start": "2022-09-01T07:46:33.585899Z"
        },
        "pid": 27512,
        "start": "2022-09-01T07:46:34.021494Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "email": "user@example.org",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "name": "group1"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\microsoft\\onedrive\\update"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "30204bef93d692fbcbf7475b154e3f65d3aace6f8f030af9e412f3d9e8d9a595",
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}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:49:37.5372014Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceImageLoadEvents\",\"properties\":{\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Adobe\\\\8.1\\\\Client\\\\BIN\\\\sscfom.dll\",\"FileSize\":1048576,\"FileName\":\"sscfom.dll\",\"MD5\":\"83fd76962ba443b3d6e317ad73126843\",\"SHA256\":\"14c0592339b02885a8e4cf9724c607afe2a0187348c1aa084db3875ce93be0fe\",\"SHA1\":\"742ef984a8f759090f44838f737d575e283942be\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":null,\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\program files (x86)\\\\adobe\\\\8.1\\\\client\\\\bin\\\\autosync.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"autosync.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":66560,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"4617605c67d2a4f8ff7f86042d40011d\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"9ff12db8e1aa2bc6781d1e399ec7a0fd38278dee8f2b5ece7403f2bab009dbe7\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"1181891a21a785f05de6f40a3c635534ade13262\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:47:58.182445Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":15584,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"autosync.exe\\\" /c C:\\\\PROGRA~2\\\\adobe\\\\8.1\\\\Client\\\\bin\\\\fra\\\\adobe.cfg /c \\\" usa\\\"\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:47:17.01345Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":2548,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"explorer.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"Medium\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"DeviceId\":\"4b35a092f1578f0a6f1b7dbf9e90465563781043\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:47:58.6161271Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":3758,\"ActionType\":\"ImageLoaded\"}}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_image_load_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:47:58.616127Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"autosync.exe\" /c C:\\PROGRA~2\\adobe\\8.1\\Client\\bin\\fra\\adobe.cfg /c \" usa\"",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 66560,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "Medium",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault"
        },
        "type": "ImageLoaded"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\8.1\\Client\\BIN\\sscfom.dll",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "83fd76962ba443b3d6e317ad73126843",
            "sha1": "742ef984a8f759090f44838f737d575e283942be",
            "sha256": "14c0592339b02885a8e4cf9724c607afe2a0187348c1aa084db3875ce93be0fe"
        },
        "name": "sscfom.dll",
        "size": 1048576
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "4b35a092f1578f0a6f1b7dbf9e90465563781043",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "3758"
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "\"",
            "/c",
            "/c",
            "C:\\PROGRA~2\\adobe\\8.1\\Client\\bin\\fra\\adobe.cfg",
            "usa\""
        ],
        "command_line": "\"autosync.exe\" /c C:\\PROGRA~2\\adobe\\8.1\\Client\\bin\\fra\\adobe.cfg /c \" usa\"",
        "executable": "c:\\program files (x86)\\adobe\\8.1\\client\\bin\\autosync.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "4617605c67d2a4f8ff7f86042d40011d",
            "sha1": "1181891a21a785f05de6f40a3c635534ade13262",
            "sha256": "9ff12db8e1aa2bc6781d1e399ec7a0fd38278dee8f2b5ece7403f2bab009dbe7"
        },
        "name": "autosync.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "explorer.exe",
            "pid": 2548,
            "start": "2022-09-01T07:47:17.013450Z"
        },
        "pid": 15584,
        "start": "2022-09-01T07:47:58.182445Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "email": "user@example.org",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "name": "group1"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\program files (x86)\\adobe\\8.1\\client\\bin"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "1181891a21a785f05de6f40a3c635534ade13262",
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}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-02T17:21:10.6891411Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceInfo\",\"properties\":{\"ClientVersion\":\"10.8295.19041.2311\",\"PublicIP\":\"4.3.2.1\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml-002\",\"DeviceId\":\"9766ea323abe48f9b9d86b4fb3dc6c14\",\"ReportId\":11111,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-02T17:18:18.4028562Z\",\"OSArchitecture\":null,\"OSPlatform\":null,\"OSBuild\":null,\"IsAzureADJoined\":true,\"LoggedOnUsers\":\"[{\\\"UserName\\\":\\\"JOHNDOE\\\",\\\"DomainName\\\":\\\"INTRANET\\\",\\\"Sid\\\":\\\"S-1-11-1-1111111111-1111111111-1111111111-1111111111\\\"}]\",\"RegistryDeviceTag\":null,\"OSVersion\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"[]\",\"AadDeviceId\":\"cc8601ad-6446-4277-b110-9f01e636b653\",\"MergedDeviceIds\":\"\",\"MergedToDeviceId\":\"\",\"Vendor\":\"\",\"Model\":\"\",\"OnboardingStatus\":\"Onboarded\",\"DeviceCategory\":\"Endpoint\",\"DeviceType\":\"Workstation\",\"DeviceSubtype\":null,\"OSVersionInfo\":\"\",\"OSDistribution\":\"\",\"JoinType\":\"AAD Joined\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_info_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-02T17:18:18.402856Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "AadDeviceId": "cc8601ad-6446-4277-b110-9f01e636b653",
            "IsAzureADJoined": true,
            "JoinType": "AAD Joined",
            "LoggedOnUsers": [
                "{\"DomainName\": \"INTRANET\", \"Sid\": \"S-1-11-1-1111111111-1111111111-1111111111-1111111111\", \"UserName\": \"JOHNDOE\"}"
            ],
            "MachineGroup": "UnassignedGroup",
            "OnboardingStatus": "Onboarded"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "version": "10.8295.19041.2311"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "9766ea323abe48f9b9d86b4fb3dc6c14",
        "name": "ml-002",
        "type": "Workstation"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "host": {
                "category": "Endpoint"
            },
            "report": {
                "id": "11111"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "4.3.2.1"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JOHNDOE"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "4.3.2.1",
        "ip": "4.3.2.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "INTRANET",
        "id": "S-1-11-1-1111111111-1111111111-1111111111-1111111111",
        "name": "JOHNDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-02T17:21:10.6890829Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceInfo\",\"properties\":{\"ClientVersion\":\"10.8295.19041.2311\",\"PublicIP\":\"4.3.2.1\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml-002\",\"DeviceId\":\"9766ea323abe48f9b9d86b4fb3dc6c14\",\"ReportId\":22222,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-02T17:16:49.4177838Z\",\"OSArchitecture\":null,\"OSPlatform\":null,\"OSBuild\":null,\"IsAzureADJoined\":true,\"LoggedOnUsers\":\"[]\",\"RegistryDeviceTag\":null,\"OSVersion\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"[]\",\"AadDeviceId\":\"cc8601ad-6446-4277-b110-9f01e636b653\",\"MergedDeviceIds\":\"\",\"MergedToDeviceId\":\"\",\"Vendor\":\"\",\"Model\":\"\",\"OnboardingStatus\":\"Onboarded\",\"DeviceCategory\":\"Endpoint\",\"DeviceType\":\"Workstation\",\"DeviceSubtype\":null,\"OSVersionInfo\":\"\",\"OSDistribution\":\"\",\"JoinType\":\"Hybrid Azure AD Join\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_info_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-02T17:16:49.417783Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "AadDeviceId": "cc8601ad-6446-4277-b110-9f01e636b653",
            "IsAzureADJoined": true,
            "JoinType": "Hybrid Azure AD Join",
            "LoggedOnUsers": [],
            "MachineGroup": "Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically",
            "OnboardingStatus": "Onboarded"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "version": "10.8295.19041.2311"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "9766ea323abe48f9b9d86b4fb3dc6c14",
        "name": "ml-002",
        "type": "Workstation"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "host": {
                "category": "Endpoint"
            },
            "report": {
                "id": "22222"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "4.3.2.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "4.3.2.1",
        "ip": "4.3.2.1"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:26:25.0567375Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceLogonEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountName\":\"dwm-3\",\"AccountDomain\":\"window manager\",\"LogonType\":\"Interactive\",\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"ReportId\":21833,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T13:25:36.1936997Z\",\"AccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11-1-1\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"LogonId\":111111,\"RemoteIP\":\"\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":\"\",\"ActionType\":\"LogonSuccess\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":3660,\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-01-04T13:25:35.9877068Z\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"winlogon.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"0c8b6c1f8c1d248000192e2569735848051b3ce1\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":null,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"f597fa958fd63accc90cb469e7ddc2a5\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"WinLogon.exe -SpecialSession\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"system\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"None\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":null,\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":12776,\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-01-04T13:25:35.9028371Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\smss.exe\",\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"IsLocalLogon\\\":true}\",\"RemoteIPType\":null,\"IsLocalAdmin\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"Protocol\":\"Negotiate\",\"FailureReason\":null,\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":null,\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_logon_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T13:25:36.193699Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "AccountSid": "S-1-1-11-1-1",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "WinLogon.exe -SpecialSession",
            "LogonId": "111111",
            "LogonType": "Interactive"
        },
        "type": "LogonSuccess"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "21833"
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "-SpecialSession"
        ],
        "command_line": "WinLogon.exe -SpecialSession",
        "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "f597fa958fd63accc90cb469e7ddc2a5",
            "sha1": "0c8b6c1f8c1d248000192e2569735848051b3ce1"
        },
        "name": "winlogon.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "smss.exe",
            "pid": 12776,
            "start": "2023-01-04T13:25:35.902837Z"
        },
        "pid": 3660,
        "start": "2023-01-04T13:25:35.987706Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "NT",
            "id": "S-1-1-11",
            "name": "system"
        },
        "working_directory": "C:\\Windows"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "0c8b6c1f8c1d248000192e2569735848051b3ce1",
            "f597fa958fd63accc90cb469e7ddc2a5"
        ],
        "user": [
            "dwm-3"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "window manager",
        "name": "dwm-3"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:07:32.6213639Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceNetworkEvents\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"ReportId\":37827,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:05:32.3148625Z\",\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":443,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":59985,\"Protocol\":\"Tcp\",\"RemoteUrl\":\"www.example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-01-04T14:05:22.8079798Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":18288,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"EXCEL.EXE\\\" \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USER\\\\MyDocument.xslx\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-01-04T14:04:35.708037Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":23332,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"explorer.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f\",\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\program files\\\\microsoft office\\\\root\\\\office16\\\\excel.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"USER\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-11-1-11111111-1111111111-111111111-111111111\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"EXCEL.EXE\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"Medium\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"LocalIPType\":\"Private\",\"RemoteIPType\":\"Public\",\"ActionType\":\"ConnectionSuccess\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"john.doe@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"e0e5e759-c1e1-4cf9-91d5-c1099ef74614\",\"AdditionalFields\":null,\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":63984520,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft Office\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"16.0.15601.20538\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"Excel\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"Excel.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Microsoft Excel\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_network_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:05:32.314862Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "e0e5e759-c1e1-4cf9-91d5-c1099ef74614",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"EXCEL.EXE\" \"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 63984520,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "Medium",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft Excel",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "Excel",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "Excel.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft Office",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "16.0.15601.20538",
            "LocalIPType": "Private",
            "RemoteIPType": "Public"
        },
        "type": "ConnectionSuccess"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8",
        "port": 443
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "37827"
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "protocol": "Tcp"
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "\"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx"
        ],
        "command_line": "\"EXCEL.EXE\" \"C:\\Users\\USER\\MyDocument.xslx",
        "executable": "c:\\program files\\microsoft office\\root\\office16\\excel.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145",
            "sha1": "2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f",
            "sha256": "1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095"
        },
        "name": "EXCEL.EXE",
        "parent": {
            "name": "explorer.exe",
            "pid": 23332,
            "start": "2023-01-04T14:04:35.708037Z"
        },
        "pid": 18288,
        "start": "2023-01-04T14:05:22.807979Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "email": "john.doe@example.org",
            "id": "S-1-11-1-11111111-1111111111-111111111-111111111",
            "name": "USER"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\program files\\microsoft office\\root\\office16"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "1e22c9b2e6562fa32d410bc4957279a46b614eed4cd5f45c200b4a24237bd095",
            "2b684979d6174bad69d895c7d8a852e7b206b95f",
            "4d5b7b6c06159d6b967f2c2c73f10145"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4",
        "port": 59985
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:07:34.1999095Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceNetworkInfo\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:04:35.622431Z\",\"ReportId\":13489,\"NetworkAdapterName\":\"{B844C2B6-E379-47C8-A28B-784DF7D3D731}\",\"NetworkAdapterType\":\"Guest\",\"NetworkAdapterStatus\":\"Down\",\"TunnelType\":\"None\",\"ConnectedNetworks\":null,\"DnsAddresses\":\"[\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::1\\\",\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::2\\\",\\\"fff0:0:0:ffff::3\\\"]\",\"DefaultGateways\":null,\"MacAddress\":\"C8B29B8AEAAE\",\"IPv4Dhcp\":\"\",\"IPv6Dhcp\":\"\",\"IPAddresses\":\"[{\\\"IPAddress\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"SubnetPrefix\\\":16,\\\"AddressType\\\":\\\"LinkLocal\\\"},{\\\"IPAddress\\\":\\\"ffff::fff:fff:aaa:ccc\\\",\\\"SubnetPrefix\\\":64,\\\"AddressType\\\":\\\"Private\\\"}]\",\"NetworkAdapterVendor\":null,\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_network_info",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:04:35.622431Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "mac": [
            "C8B29B8AEAAE"
        ],
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "observer": {
                "interface": {
                    "dns": [
                        "fff0:0:0:ffff::1",
                        "fff0:0:0:ffff::2",
                        "fff0:0:0:ffff::3"
                    ],
                    "ips": [
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                        "{\"AddressType\": \"Private\", \"IPAddress\": \"ffff::fff:fff:aaa:ccc\", \"SubnetPrefix\": 64}"
                    ],
                    "name": "{B844C2B6-E379-47C8-A28B-784DF7D3D731}",
                    "status": "Down",
                    "type": "Guest"
                }
            },
            "report": {
                "id": "13489"
            }
        }
    }
}
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    "event": {
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            "process"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_process_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
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        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:15:10.468452Z",
    "action": {
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            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"MsMpEng.exe\"",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 133576,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "999",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Antimalware Service Executable",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "MsMpEng.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "MsMpEng.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "4.18.2301.6",
            "LogonId": "999",
            "ProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
            "ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility",
            "ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "MpCmdRun",
            "ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "MpCmdRun.exe",
            "ProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
            "ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "4.18.2301.6"
        },
        "type": "ProcessCreated"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\4.18.2301.6-0\\MpCmdRun.exe",
        "hash": {
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            "sha1": "81ea1283c9c328fef3ea93e92dc827f1280b32aa",
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        "name": "ml022"
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    "microsoft": {
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        }
    },
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            "-ScheduleJob",
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            "Scan"
        ],
        "code_signature": {
            "status": "Valid",
            "subject_name": "OsVendor"
        },
        "command_line": "\"MpCmdRun.exe\" Scan -ScheduleJob -RestrictPrivileges -DailyScan -ScanTrigger 54",
        "executable": "c:\\programdata\\microsoft\\windows defender\\platform\\4.18.2301.6-0\\msmpeng.exe",
        "hash": {
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            "sha1": "5bfbb0f965e2761d75a51faacc9db6a146a7c5ae",
            "sha256": "52bd0a4d149f7913b9c3ba111eff1e75188abfcdc54b927390bc3bfad419860e"
        },
        "name": "MsMpEng.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "services.exe",
            "pid": 1032,
            "start": "2023-01-03T08:51:26.740241Z"
        },
        "pid": 37788,
        "start": "2023-01-04T14:15:10.355033Z",
        "user": {
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            "id": "S-1-1-11",
            "name": "System"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\programdata\\microsoft\\windows defender\\platform\\4.18.2301.6-0"
    },
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}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2023-01-04T14:37:14.9238631Z\",\"tenantId\":\"d9eae684-f70a-4ac1-b304-53de40a8db56\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceRegistryEvents\",\"properties\":{\"DeviceId\":\"dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107\",\"DeviceName\":\"ml022\",\"ReportId\":19168,\"Timestamp\":\"2023-01-04T14:35:20.6161937Z\",\"RegistryKey\":\"\",\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueType\":\"None\",\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"PreviousRegistryValueData\":null,\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":445440,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"svchost.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"omadmclient.exe\\\" /serverid \\\"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\\\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2023-03-01T14:34:55.9883418Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2023-03-01T09:01:41.8134369Z\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"system\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"NT\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-1-11\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":2196,\"InitiatingProcessId\":25072,\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"PreviousRegistryKey\":\"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\BCD00000000\\\\Objects\\\\{a5a30fa2-3d06-4e9f-b5f4-a01df9d1fcba}\\\\Elements\",\"PreviousRegistryValueName\":null,\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"ActionType\":\"RegistryKeyDeleted\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":null,\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"10.0.19041.2193\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"omadmclient\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"omadmclient.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Host Process for OMA-DM Client\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\"},\"Tenant\":\"DefaultTenant\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_registry_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-04T14:35:20.616193Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"omadmclient.exe\" /serverid \"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 445440,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "System",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Host Process for OMA-DM Client",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "omadmclient",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "omadmclient.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "10.0.19041.2193",
            "PreviousRegistryKey": "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\BCD00000000\\Objects\\{a5a30fa2-3d06-4e9f-b5f4-a01df9d1fcba}\\Elements"
        },
        "type": "RegistryKeyDeleted"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "dbe5c34434fb4792bea6874dd0b1f107",
        "name": "ml022"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "19168"
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "\"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\"",
            "/initiator",
            "/lookuptype",
            "/serverid",
            "0",
            "1"
        ],
        "command_line": "\"omadmclient.exe\" /serverid \"1F2E9005-CEAB-4280-83A7-8429D26DE773\" /lookuptype 1 /initiator 0",
        "executable": "c:\\windows\\system32\\omadmclient.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1",
            "sha1": "9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12",
            "sha256": "5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50"
        },
        "name": "omadmclient.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "svchost.exe",
            "pid": 2196,
            "start": "2023-03-01T09:01:41.813436Z"
        },
        "pid": 25072,
        "start": "2023-03-01T14:34:55.988341Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "NT",
            "id": "S-1-1-11",
            "name": "system"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\windows\\system32"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "5e7dfefc195fb0286fda79b22d9c9334ed0162d0d3774ca342343df2e4e5df50",
            "655381bd34fa7f6421e3740f1fc3c1b1",
            "9df2bc8901233492b2488de8742a35d3d5c46c12"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"-\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"-\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_events",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:09:47.498056Z",
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessCommandLine": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
        },
        "type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104061"
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "args": [
            "--engine=2",
            "--init-done-notifier=804",
            "--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
            "--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
            "--sandboxed-process-id=2",
            "--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\""
        ],
        "command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
        "executable": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200\\software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "sha1": "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "sha256": "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        },
        "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "pid": 15532,
            "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
        },
        "pid": 1664,
        "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.788784Z",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "email": "user@example.org",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "name": "group1"
        },
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708",
            "51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee",
            "6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323"
        ]
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
action.properties.AadDeviceId keyword Unique identifier for the device in Azure AD
action.properties.AccountSid keyword Security Identifier (SID) of the account
action.properties.AccountUPN keyword User principal name (UPN) of the account
action.properties.ActionResult keyword Result of the action
action.properties.ActionTrigger keyword Indicates whether an action was triggered by an administrator (manually or through approval of a pending automated action), or by some special mechanism, such as a ZAP or Dynamic Delivery
action.properties.Application keyword Application that performed the recorded action
action.properties.ApplicationId keyword Unique identifier for the application
action.properties.AttachmentCount number Number of attachments in the email
action.properties.AuthenticationDetails keyword List of pass or fail verdicts by email authentication protocols like DMARC, DKIM, SPF or a combination of multiple authentication types (CompAuth)
action.properties.ConfidenceLevel keyword List of confidence levels of any spam or phishing verdicts. For spam, this column shows the spam confidence level (SCL), indicating if the email was skipped (-1), found to be not spam (0,1), found to be spam with moderate confidence (5,6), or found to be spam with high confidence (9). For phishing, this column displays whether the confidence level is "High" or "Low".
action.properties.Connectors keyword Custom instructions that define organizational mail flow and how the email was routed
action.properties.DeliveryAction keyword Delivery action of the email: Delivered, Junked, Blocked, or Replaced
action.properties.DeliveryLocation keyword Location where the email was delivered: Inbox/Folder, On-premises/External, Junk, Quarantine, Failed, Dropped, Deleted items
action.properties.DestinationDeviceName keyword Name of the device running the server application that processed the recorded action
action.properties.EmailAction keyword Final action taken on the email based on filter verdict, policies, and user actions: Move message to junk mail folder, Add X-header, Modify subject, Redirect message, Delete message, send to quarantine, No action taken, Bcc message
action.properties.EmailClusterId keyword Identifier for the group of similar emails clustered based on heuristic analysis of their contents
action.properties.EmailDirection keyword Direction of the email relative to your network: Inbound, Outbound, Intra-org
action.properties.EmailLanguage keyword Detected language of the email content
action.properties.FileOriginIP keyword IP address where the file was downloaded from
action.properties.FileOriginReferrerUrl keyword URL of the web page that links to the downloaded file
action.properties.FileOriginUrl keyword URL where the file was downloaded from
action.properties.IPCategory keyword Additional information about the IP address
action.properties.IPTags list Customer-defined information applied to specific IP addresses and IP address ranges
action.properties.ISP keyword Internet service provider associated with the IP address
action.properties.InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId keyword Azure AD object ID of the user account that ran the process responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessCommandLine keyword Process commande Line that initiated the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessFileSize long Size of the process (image file) that initiated the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel keyword Integrity level of the process that initiated the event. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet download. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources
action.properties.InitiatingProcessLogonId keyword Identifier for a logon session of the process that initiated the event. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts.
action.properties.InitiatingProcessTokenElevation keyword Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the process that initiated the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName keyword Company name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription keyword Description from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName keyword Internal file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName keyword Original file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName keyword Product name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion keyword Product version from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.IsAdminOperation keyword Indicates whether the activity was performed by an administrator
action.properties.IsAnonymousProxy keyword Indicates whether the IP address belongs to a known anonymous proxy
action.properties.IsAzureADJoined boolean Boolean indicator of whether machine is joined to the Azure Active Directory
action.properties.IsAzureInfoProtectionApplied boolean Indicates whether the file is encrypted by Azure Information Protection
action.properties.IsExternalUser boolean Indicates whether a user inside the network doesn't belong to the organization's domain
action.properties.IsImpersonated boolean Indicates whether the activity was performed by one user for another (impersonated) user
action.properties.IsLocalAdmin boolean Boolean indicator of whether the user is a local administrator on the machine
action.properties.JoinType keyword The nature of the joint
action.properties.LocalIPType keyword Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast
action.properties.Location keyword City, country, or other geographic location associated with the event
action.properties.LoggedOnUsers keyword List of all users that are logged on the machine at the time of the event in JSON array format
action.properties.LogonId keyword Identifier for a logon session. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts
action.properties.LogonType keyword Type of logon session, specifically:
action.properties.MachineGroup keyword Machine group of the machine. This group is used by role-based access control to determine access to the machine
action.properties.MergedDeviceIds keyword Previous device IDs that have been assigned to the same device
action.properties.MergedToDeviceId keyword The most recent device ID assigned to a device
action.properties.ObjectId keyword Unique identifier of the object that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.ObjectName keyword Name of the object that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.ObjectType keyword Type of object, such as a file or a folder, that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.OnboardingStatus keyword Indicates whether the device is currently onboarded or not to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or if the device is not supported
action.properties.OrgLevelAction keyword Action taken on the email in response to matches to a policy defined at the organizational level
action.properties.OrgLevelPolicy keyword Organizational policy that triggered the action taken on the email
action.properties.PreviousFileName keyword Original name of the file that was renamed as a result of the action
action.properties.PreviousFolderPath keyword Original folder containing the file before the recorded action was applied
action.properties.PreviousRegistryKey keyword Original registry key of the registry value before it was modified
action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueData keyword Original data of the registry value before it was modified
action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueName keyword Original name of the registry value before it was modified
action.properties.ProcessIntegrityLevel keyword Integrity level of the newly created process. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet downloaded. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources
action.properties.ProcessTokenElevation keyword Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName keyword Company name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription keyword Description from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName keyword Internal file name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName keyword Original file name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductName keyword Product name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion keyword Product version from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.Query keyword String used to run the query
action.properties.QueryTarget keyword Name of user, group, device, domain, or any other entity type being queried
action.properties.QueryType keyword Type of query, such as QueryGroup, QueryUser, or EnumerateUsers
action.properties.RawEventData keyword Raw event information from the source application or service in JSON format
action.properties.RecipientObjectId keyword Unique identifier for the email recipient in Azure AD
action.properties.RegistryDeviceTag keyword Machine tag added through the registry
action.properties.RemoteDeviceName keyword Name of the machine that performed a remote operation on the affected machine. Depending on the event being reported, this name could be a fully-qualified domain name (FQDN), a NetBIOS name, or a host name without domain information
action.properties.RemoteIPType keyword Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast
action.properties.RequestAccountSid keyword Security Identifier (SID) of the account used to remotely initiate the activity
action.properties.SenderDisplayName keyword Name of the sender displayed in the address book, typically a combination of a given or first name, a middle initial, and a last name or surname
action.properties.SenderFromDomain keyword Sender domain in the FROM header, which is visible to email recipients on their email clients
action.properties.SenderObjectId keyword Unique identifier for the sender's account in Azure AD
action.properties.SensitivityLabel keyword Label applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection
action.properties.SensitivitySubLabel keyword Sublabel applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection; sensitivity sublabels are grouped under sensitivity labels but are treated independently
action.properties.ServiceSource keyword Product or service that provided the alert information
action.properties.ShareName keyword Name of shared folder containing the file
action.properties.TargetAccountDisplayName keyword Display name of the account that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.TargetAccountUpn keyword User principal name (UPN) of the account that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.TargetDeviceName keyword Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the device that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.UrlCount number Number of embedded URLs in the email
action.properties.UserAgentTags list More information provided by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps in a tag in the user agent field. Can have any of the following values: Native client, Outdated browser, Outdated operating system, Robot
action.properties.UserLevelAction keyword Action taken on the email in response to matches to a mailbox policy defined by the recipient
action.properties.UserLevelPolicy keyword End-user mailbox policy that triggered the action taken on the email
agent.version keyword Version of the agent.
container.id keyword Unique container id.
container.runtime keyword Runtime managing this container.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
email.attachments nested List of objects describing the attachments.
email.from.address keyword The email address of the sender, typically from the RFC 5322 From: header field
email.local_id keyword Unique identifier given to the email by the source that created the event
email.message_id keyword Identifier from the RFC 5322 Message-ID: email header that refers to a particular email message
email.sender.address keyword Address of the message sender.
email.subject keyword A brief summary of the topic of the message
email.to.address keyword The email address of recipient
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.dataset keyword Name of the dataset.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.directory keyword Directory where the file is located.
file.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
file.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.size long File size in bytes.
file.x509.not_after date Time at which the certificate is no longer considered valid.
file.x509.serial_number keyword Unique serial number issued by the certificate authority.
host.architecture keyword Operating system architecture.
host.id keyword Unique host id.
host.mac keyword Host MAC addresses.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
host.os.family keyword OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
host.os.full keyword Operating system name, including the version or code name.
host.os.version keyword Operating system version as a raw string.
host.type keyword Type of host.
microsoft.defender.activity.objects list List of objects, such as files or folders, that were involved in the recorded activity
microsoft.defender.activity.type keyword Type of activity that triggered the event
microsoft.defender.alert.id keyword Unique identifier for the alert
microsoft.defender.alert.title keyword The title of the alert
microsoft.defender.certificate.counter_signed_at keyword Date and time the certificate was countersigned
microsoft.defender.certificate.created_at keyword Date and time the certificate was created
microsoft.defender.certificate.crl.urls keyword JSON array listing the URLs of network shares that contain certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_root_signer_microsort boolean Indicates whether the signer of the root certificate is Microsoft and if the file is included in Windows operating system
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_signed boolean Indicates whether the file is signed
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_trusted boolean Indicates whether the file is trusted based on the results of the WinVerifyTrust function, which checks for unknown root certificate information, invalid signatures, revoked certificates, and other questionable attributes
microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.hash keyword Unique hash value identifying issuing certificate authority (CA)
microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.name keyword Information about the issuing certificate authority (CA)
microsoft.defender.certificate.signature_type keyword Indicates whether signature information was read as embedded content in the file itself or read from an external catalog file
microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.hash keyword Unique hash value identifying the signer
microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.name keyword Information about the signer of the file
microsoft.defender.entity.type keyword Type of object, such as a file, a process, a device, or a user
microsoft.defender.evidence.direction keyword Indicates whether the entity is the source or the destination of a network connection
microsoft.defender.evidence.role keyword How the entity is involved in an alert, indicating whether it is impacted or is merely related
microsoft.defender.host.category keyword Broader classification that groups certain device types under the following categories: Endpoint, Network device, IoT, Unknown
microsoft.defender.host.model keyword Model name or number of the product from the vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
microsoft.defender.host.os.build keyword Build version of the operating system running on the machine
microsoft.defender.host.os.version keyword Additional information about the OS version, such as the popular name, code name, or version number
microsoft.defender.host.subtype keyword Additional modifier for certain types of devices, for example, a mobile device can be a tablet or a smartphone; only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
microsoft.defender.host.vendor keyword Name of the product vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
microsoft.defender.investigation.id keyword Investigation id
microsoft.defender.investigation.name keyword Investigation name
microsoft.defender.investigation.status keyword Investigation status
microsoft.defender.investigation.type keyword Investigation type
microsoft.defender.network.tunnel.protocol keyword Tunneling protocol, if the interface is used for this purpose, for example 6to4, Teredo, ISATAP, PPTP, SSTP, and SSH
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv4 keyword IPv4 address of DHCP server
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv6 keyword IPv6 address of DHCP server
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dns keyword DNS server addresses in JSON array format
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.gateways keyword Default gateway addresses in JSON array format
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.ips keyword JSON array containing all the IP addresses assigned to the adapter, along with their respective subnet prefix and IP address space, such as public, private, or link-local
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.name keyword Name of the network adapter
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.networks keyword Networks that the adapter is connected to. Each JSON array contains the network name, category (public, private or domain), a description, and a flag indicating if it's connected publicly to the internet
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.status keyword Operational status of the network adapter. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.type keyword Network adapter type. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration
microsoft.defender.report.id keyword Unique identifier for the event
microsoft.defender.threat.category keyword Type of threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert
microsoft.defender.threat.detection keyword Methods used to detect malware, phishing, or other threats found in the email
microsoft.defender.threat.family keyword Malware family that the suspicious or malicious file or process has been classified under
microsoft.defender.threat.names keyword Detection name for malware or other threats found
microsoft.defender.threat.severity keyword Indicates the potential impact (high, medium, or low) of the threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert
microsoft.defender.threat.types keyword Verdict from the email filtering stack on whether the email contains malware, phishing, or other threats
network.protocol keyword Application protocol name.
process.args keyword Array of process arguments.
process.code_signature.status keyword Additional information about the certificate status.
process.code_signature.subject_name keyword Subject name of the code signer
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
process.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
process.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
process.name keyword Process name.
process.parent.name keyword Process name.
process.parent.pid long Process id.
process.parent.start date The time the process started.
process.pid long Process id.
process.start date The time the process started.
process.user.domain keyword Domain of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.user.email keyword User principal name (UPN) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.user.id keyword Security Identifier (SID) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.user.name keyword User name of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.working_directory keyword The working directory of the process.
registry.data.strings wildcard List of strings representing what was written to the registry.
registry.data.type keyword Standard registry type for encoding contents
registry.key keyword Hive-relative path of keys.
registry.value keyword Name of the value written.
rule.id keyword Rule ID
rule.name keyword Rule name
service.name keyword Name of the service.
service.type keyword The type of the service.
source.geo.city_name keyword City name.
source.geo.country_iso_code keyword Country ISO code.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.port long Port of the source.
threat.technique.name keyword Threat technique name.
url.domain keyword Domain of the url.
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.full_name keyword User's full name, if available.
user.id keyword Unique identifier of the user.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user.roles keyword Array of user roles at the time of the event.
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported

Here is a list of all the Microsoft 365 Defender event types supported by this integration:

  • Alert Evidence
  • AlertInfo
  • DeviceEvents
  • DeviceFileCertificateInfo
  • DeviceFileEvent
  • DeviceImageLoadEvents
  • DeviceInfo
  • DeviceLogonEvents
  • DeviceNetworkEvents
  • DeviceNetworkInfo
  • DeviceProcessEvents
  • DeviceRegistryEvents
  • EmailAttachmentInfo
  • EmailEvents
  • EmailPostDeliveryEvents
  • EmailUrlInfo
  • IdentityLogonEvents
  • IdentityQueryEvents
  • IdentityDirectoryEvents
  • CloudAppEvents

Please follow this link to see all the types provided by Microsoft.

Configure

To forward Microsoft 365 Defender events from Microsoft to Sekoia.io you need to send your event to an Azure Event Hub where Sekoia.io will collect the events.

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Prerequisite

You must have the following rights to perform the installation:
- Global Administrator or Security Administrator rights on Microsoft 365 Defender
- Contributor write on Azure

Azure Event Hubs is a cloud-based event streaming platform and event ingestion service provided by Microsoft Azure. It is designed to handle large amounts of event data generated by various applications, devices, and services in real-time. Event Hubs enables you to ingest, process, and store events, logs, telemetry data, and other streaming data for further analysis, monitoring, and processing. Two ways are suggested in order to set up everything you need to forward your events on Sekoia.io.

If you are not an expert and want an easy way to configure the ressources on Azure, we recommend to use to Automatic way as it is easier to set up.

These two ways will create an Azure Event Hub and a Storage Account.

Use the template to create the ressources

To get started, click on the button below and fill the form on Azure to set up the required environment for Sekoia Deploy to Azure

Some fields must be filled in.

Project details

  • Subscription: select the Azure subscription you want to use
  • Resource Group: select or create a new Resource Group. A Resource Group is a container that holds related resources

Instance details

  • Region: select the appropriated region
  • Project Name: give a name for this project. Here is how the names of the resources will be affected by this project name
Ressource Name
Event Hub Namespace <project_name>ehns
Event Hub <project_name>eh
Shared Access Policy <project_name>ap
Consumer Group <project_name>cp
Storage Account <project_name>sa
  • Event Hub Sku: Select the messaging tier for Event Hub Namespace between Basic , Standard or Premium. We do not recommend Basic model due to its limitation. Please follow this Microsoft web page to get more information avec the different messaging tier.
  • Troughput Unit: A unit gives you up to 1 MB/s or 1,000 events per second (whichever comes first) per Event Hub Namespace. Please adapt it to your need.
  • Enable Auto Inflate: When checked, the Auto-inflate feature of Event Hubs automatically scales up by increasing the number of troughput units, to meet usage needs.
  • Auto Inflate Maximum Throughput Unit: When Enable Auto Inflate is checked, you can specify the maximum throughput units you allow.
  • Partition Count: The number of event hub partitions. Microsoft recommends a maximum throughput of 1 MB/s per partition. Unless you plan to add more Event hubs to the Event Hub Namespace, the Partition Count and Throughput Unit variables should have the same values.
  • Retention Time: How long you will keep events in the Event hub in days.

Use the output variables to create a Sekoia playbook

When the message Your deployment is complete is displayed, click on Outputs.

Keep these 5 pieces of information displayed carefully, it will used to configure the Trigger Configuration of the Sekoia playbook.

Overview

This setup guide will show you how to create an Event Hub manually.

Theses changes have to be made from the Azure Web Portal.

Some resources created during this procedure are needed to connect Sekoia.io to the Event Hub, you can complete the following table to save all the useful informations for later use.

Name Value Description Example
hub_name To be completed at step 3 Name of the Event Hub sekoia_event_hub
hub_connection_string To be completed at step 5 Connection string–primary key Endpoint=sb://company-eventhub.servicebus.windows.net/;SharedAccessKeyName=sekoiaio;SharedAccessKey=XXXXXX;EntityPath=sekoia_event_hub
hub_consumer_group To be completed at step 6 Name of the comsumer group consumergroup_sekoiaio
storage_container_name To be completed at step 7 Name of your container (same as the Event Hub name) sekoia_event_hub
storage_connection_string To be completed at step 8 Storage connection string DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=sekoiaiocheckpoint;AccountKey=XXXXX

As a prerequisite, you need to choose an existing Resource group, or create a new one (e.g. company-resource-group).

Step 1: Find your Subscription ID

  1. Go to: Home > Cost Management + Billing > Subscriptions.
  2. From there, keep the relevant “Subscription ID” that will be used along the process.
    image

Step 2: Create Event Hub Namespace

  1. Navigate to Home > Event Hubs.
  2. Create an Event Hub Namespace.
  3. Select your Subscription and your Resource group.
    Click on create new if you want your Event Hub Namespace in a new Resource group.
  4. Choose a namespace name.
  5. Select a location based on your events location.
  6. Select the pricing tier plan based on your utilisation: Standard or Premimum (We don't recommend to choose the Basic plan due to its limitations.)
  7. Select the throughput units number based on your events, or enable the auto inflate mode:
    1 throughput unit can process up to 1 MB per second or 1000 events per second (whichever comes first).
    image

Step 3: Create Event Hub Instance

When your Event Hub Namespace is created you can create an Event Hub inside:
1. Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace.
2. Create an Event Hub.

Info

We advise at least the following values:
- cleanup policy: Delete
- retention time: 168h (7 days)

image

Info

Carefully store the Event Hub name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 4: Create “Shared Access Policies” for the Event Hub

  1. Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace > eventhubname | Shared access policies.
  2. Create a policy (e.g. sekoiaio) with the claims Listen.

    image

  3. Once created, click on the policy.


    image

Info

Carefully store the connection string–primary key that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 5: Create a Consumer group

  1. Navigate to Home > Event Hubs > company-eventhubnamespace > eventhubname | Consumer groups.
  2. Create a Consumer group (e.g. consumergroup_sekoiaio).
    image

Info

Carefully store the Consumer group name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 6: Create a Storage Account with a container

In order to allow Sekoia.io keep track of the consumed events, the next step consists in creating a dedicated Storage account.

  1. Navigate to Home > Storage accounts.
  2. Create a Storage account.
  3. Select your Subscription and your Resource group.
  4. Choose a Storage account name.
  5. Select a Region.

    Info

    You must choose the Region used during the Event Hub Namespace creation.

  6. Select your perfomance and redundancy parameters.

    Info

    We advise at least the following values:
    - performance: standard
    - redundancy: Geo-Redundancy storage (GRS)

image

When your storage account is created you can create an container inside.
1. Navigate to Home > Storage accounts > storageaccoutname | containers.
2. Create an container.

Keep the Public Acces Level to Private.

Info

The container name should be the same as the Event Hub name. Carefully store that container name that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Step 7: Retrieve Connection String

You have to retrieve the connection string from Azure Web Portal.

  1. Go to Home > Storage accounts > storageaccoutname | Access Keys.
  2. Click on "Show Keys" on the first Connection String.
    image

Info

Carefully store the Connection String that will be used for sekoia playbook configuration.

Further Readings

Send logs from 365 Defender to Azure Event Hub

When you have an Event Hub follow this guide to send your events from Microsoft 365 Defender to the Event Hub:

  1. Open the Microsoft 365 Security App portal as a Global Administrator or Security Administrator.
  2. On the left panel, select Settings.
  3. Select Microsoft Defender XDR.
  4. In General, click on Streaming API and click on + Add.
  5. Choose Forward events to Azure Event Hub.
  6. To export the event data to a single Event Hub, enter your Event Hub name and your Event Hub Namespace resource ID. Be sure to take the event hub namespace ID and not the event hub ID.
  7. To get your Event Hub Namespace resource ID, go to your Azure Event Hub Namespace page on Azure > Properties tab > copy the text under Resource ID: (e.g. /subscriptions/XXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXX/resourceGroups/resourcegroupname/providers/Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/namespacename).
  8. Go to the supported Microsoft 365 Defender event types in event streaming API to review the support status of event types in the Microsoft 365 Streaming API.
  9. Choose the events you want to stream and click Save.

Disclamer

Be sure to size your eventhub ressources accordingly to the number of EPS you have (number of eventhubs, throughput, partitions...) See the Further readings section in order to estimate the number of event per second Microsoft 365 Defender can be on your instance.

Further Readings

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Microsoft 365 Defender.

Create and configure a playbook on Sekoia.io to collect logs from an Azure Event Hub

  1. In the playbook section, create a playbook with the Trigger module Consume Eventhub messages in Microsoft Azure technology
  2. Setup Module configuration (= default)
  3. Setup Trigger configuration:
    • Event Hub informations: use the table completed during the creation of the Event Hub.
    • Intake informations:
      • intake_key = Intake key that can be found on intake page
      • intake_server = https://intake.sekoia.io
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Troubleshoot

Go to events page and search events in last 5 minutes by intake key customer.intake_key:"<Your_Intake_Key>"

No events - Please check the configuration and fill the fields with the right information

  • It is possible to investigate on the tab Run and see the response by clicking on the module
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