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CrowdStrike Falcon

Overview

CrowdStrike Falcon is an Endpoint Detection and Response solution. This setup guide explains how to forward and collect the detections and activity logs of your CrowdStrike EDR to SEKOIA.IO.

Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade CrowdStrike Falcon with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.

SEKOIA.IO x CrowdStrike Falcon on ATT&CK Navigator

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE 2022-1292

The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

  • Effort: advanced
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

  • Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
CrowdStrike Intrusion Detection

CrowdStrike Falcon agent raised an alert for an intrusion detection

  • Effort: advanced
Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: elementary
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine

Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189

  • Effort: elementary
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

  • Effort: master
Formbook Hijacked Process Command

Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.

  • Effort: intermediate
Gpscript Suspicious Parent

Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

  • Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Koadic Execution

Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder

Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.

  • Effort: advanced
Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir

Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.

  • Effort: intermediate
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location

Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username

Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Trickbot Malware Activity

Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Authentication logs activities on the CrowdStrike console is traced including authentication

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind alert, event
Category configuration, intrusion_detection
Type change, info

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO.

{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"customerIDString\":\"46de5283260647ec8f28def00bffd094\",\"offset\":6755,\"eventType\":\"AuthActivityAuditEvent\",\"eventCreationTime\":1657663146099,\"version\":\"1.0\"},\"event\":{\"UserId\":\"foo.bar@sekoia.fr\",\"UserIp\":\"83.199.26.17\",\"OperationName\":\"twoFactorAuthenticate\",\"ServiceName\":\"CrowdStrike Authentication\",\"Success\":true,\"UTCTimestamp\":1657663146099}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ],
        "category": [
            "configuration"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-12T21:59:06.099000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "AuthActivityAuditEvent",
        "operation_name": "twoFactorAuthenticate"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "83.199.26.17",
        "address": "83.199.26.17"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "CrowdStrike Authentication"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "foo.bar@sekoia.fr"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "83.199.26.17"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"customerIDString\":\"46de5283260647ec8f28def00bffd094\",\"offset\":189,\"eventType\":\"DetectionSummaryEvent\",\"eventCreationTime\":1657174538000,\"version\":\"1.0\"},\"event\":{\"ProcessStartTime\":1656688889,\"ProcessEndTime\":0,\"ProcessId\":22164474048,\"ParentProcessId\":22163465296,\"ComputerName\":\"nsewmkzevukn-vm\",\"UserName\":\"Administrator\",\"DetectName\":\"Overwatch Detection\",\"DetectDescription\":\"Falcon Overwatch has identified malicious activity carried out by a suspected or known eCrime operator. This activity has been raised for critical action and should be investigated urgently.\",\"Severity\":5,\"SeverityName\":\"Critical\",\"FileName\":\"explorer.exe\",\"FilePath\":\"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume2\\\\Windows\",\"CommandLine\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Explorer.EXE\",\"SHA256String\":\"249cb3cb46fd875196e7ed4a8736271a64ff2d8132357222a283be53e7232ed3\",\"MD5String\":\"d45bd7c7b7bf977246e9409d63435231\",\"SHA1String\":\"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\"MachineDomain\":\"nsewmkzevukn-vm\"}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "alert",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-07T06:15:38.000000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "DetectionSummaryEvent",
        "detect_description": "Falcon Overwatch has identified malicious activity carried out by a suspected or known eCrime operator. This activity has been raised for critical action and should be investigated urgently."
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "nsewmkzevukn-vm"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "nsewmkzevukn-vm"
    },
    "process": {
        "pid": 22164474048,
        "parent": {
            "pid": 22163465296
        },
        "command_line": "C:\\Windows\\Explorer.EXE",
        "name": "explorer.exe",
        "working_directory": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "md5": "d45bd7c7b7bf977246e9409d63435231",
            "sha256": "249cb3cb46fd875196e7ed4a8736271a64ff2d8132357222a283be53e7232ed3"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "249cb3cb46fd875196e7ed4a8736271a64ff2d8132357222a283be53e7232ed3",
            "d45bd7c7b7bf977246e9409d63435231"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"customerIDString\":\"46de5283260647ec8f28def00bffd094\",\"offset\":733,\"eventType\":\"UserActivityAuditEvent\",\"eventCreationTime\":1657614940000,\"version\":\"1.0\"},\"event\":{\"UserId\":\"foo.bar@sekoia.fr\",\"UserIp\":\"185.162.177.26\",\"OperationName\":\"detection_update\",\"ServiceName\":\"detections\",\"AuditKeyValues\":[{\"Key\":\"detection_id\",\"ValueString\":\"ldt:5418788591a444d1b45c2b39d3b07b50:21483381998\"},{\"Key\":\"new_state\",\"ValueString\":\"closed\"},{\"Key\":\"assigned_to\",\"ValueString\":\"Erwan Chevalier\"},{\"Key\":\"assigned_to_uid\",\"ValueString\":\"foo.bar@sekoia.fr\"}],\"UTCTimestamp\":1657614940}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ],
        "category": [
            "configuration"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-12T08:35:40.000000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "UserActivityAuditEvent",
        "operation_name": "detection_update"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "185.162.177.26",
        "address": "185.162.177.26"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "detections"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "foo.bar@sekoia.fr"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "185.162.177.26"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"detectionIdString\":\"ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109\",\"eventType\":\"Vertex\",\"edge\":{\"sourceVertexId\":\"pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154\",\"type\":\"device\"}},\"event\":{\"id\":\"aid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab\",\"customer_id\":\"5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082\",\"scope\":\"device\",\"object_id\":\"9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab\",\"device_id\":\"9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab\",\"vertex_type\":\"device\",\"timestamp\":\"2022-07-28T15:09:51Z\",\"properties\":{\"AgentLoadFlags\":\"0\",\"AgentLocalTime\":\"2022-07-24T20:09:35.793Z\",\"AgentVersion\":\"6.39.15316.0\",\"BaseTime\":\"663896169\",\"BiosManufacturer\":\"American Megatrends Inc.\",\"BiosReleaseDate\":\"12/07/2018\",\"BiosVersion\":\"090008 \",\"BootArgs\":\" NOEXECUTE=OPTIN  REDIRECT\",\"BootId\":\"7\",\"BootStatusDataAabEnabled\":\"0\",\"BootStatusDataBootAttemptCount\":\"1\",\"BootStatusDataBootGood\":\"1\",\"BootStatusDataBootShutdown\":\"0\",\"BuildNumber\":\"19042\",\"BuildType\":\"3\",\"ChasisManufacturer\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"ChassisType\":\"3\",\"CheckedBuild\":\"0\",\"ComputerName\":\"mycomputer\",\"ConfigBuild\":\"1007.3.0015316.10\",\"ConfigIDBase\":\"65994762\",\"ConfigIDBuild\":\"15316\",\"ConfigIDPlatform\":\"3\",\"ConfigStateHash\":\"2445437569\",\"ConfigurationVersion\":\"10\",\"ConnectTime\":\"2022-07-18T09:47:48.602Z\",\"ConnectType\":\"8\",\"ConnectionCipher\":\"26126\",\"ConnectionCipherStrength\":\"128\",\"ConnectionExchange\":\"44550\",\"ConnectionExchangeStrength\":\"255\",\"ConnectionHash\":\"32780\",\"ConnectionHashStrength\":\"0\",\"ConnectionProtocol\":\"2048\",\"ContextTimeStamp\":\"2022-07-24T20:09:35.793Z\",\"CpuFeaturesMask\":\"7037767758369539\",\"CpuSignature\":\"263921\",\"CpuVendor\":\"0\",\"EffectiveTransmissionClass\":\"2\",\"Entitlements\":\"15\",\"FailedConnectCount\":\"0\",\"InstanceMetadataProvider\":\"2\",\"LocalAddressIP4\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"MachineDomain\":\"\",\"MajorVersion\":\"10\",\"MicrocodeSignature\":\"18446744069414584320\",\"MinorVersion\":\"0\",\"MoboManufacturer\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"MoboProductName\":\"Virtual Machine\",\"NetworkContainmentState\":\"0\",\"PhysicalAddress\":\"3a-c7-6c-b1-81-38\",\"PlatformId\":\"2\",\"PlatformSecuritySettings\":\"0\",\"PlatformSecurityStatus\":\"4294967296\",\"PointerSize\":\"8\",\"PreviousConnectTime\":\"1601-01-01T00:00:00.000Z\",\"ProductSku\":\"48\",\"ProductType\":\"1\",\"ProvisionState\":\"1\",\"RFMState\":\"0\",\"ServicePackMajor\":\"0\",\"ServicePackMinor\":\"0\",\"SideChannelMitigationFlags\":\"29444\",\"SubBuildNumber\":\"1706\",\"SuiteMask\":\"272\",\"SystemManufacturer\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"SystemProductName\":\"Virtual 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}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"detectionIdString\":\"ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109\",\"eventType\":\"Vertex\",\"edge\":{\"sourceVertexId\":\"pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154\",\"type\":\"child_process\"}},\"event\":{\"id\":\"pid:f0e3fbf905c14b88adb500a495f9292f:123456789\",\"customer_id\":\"5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082\",\"scope\":\"device\",\"object_id\":\"123456789\",\"device_id\":\"9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab\",\"vertex_type\":\"process\",\"timestamp\":\"2022-07-30T20:22:29Z\",\"properties\":{\"AllocateVirtualMemoryCount\":\"0\",\"ArchiveFileWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"AsepWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"AuthenticationId\":\"55555555\",\"BinaryExecutableWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"CLICreationCount\":\"0\",\"CommandLine\":\"taskhostw.exe Install $(Arg0)\",\"ConHostId\":\"856\",\"ConHostProcessId\":\"58913928\",\"ConfigBuild\":\"1007.3.0015316.10\",\"ConfigStateHash\":\"2146686153\",\"ContextProcessId\":\"8322695771\",\"ContextThreadId\":\"409412655947\",\"CycleTime\":\"224272919\",\"DirectoryCreatedCount\":\"0\",\"DirectoryEnumeratedCount\":\"0\",\"DnsRequestCount\":\"0\",\"DocumentFileWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"ExeAndServiceCount\":\"0\",\"ExecutableDeletedCount\":\"0\",\"ExitCode\":\"0\",\"FileDeletedCount\":\"0\",\"GenericFileWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"ImageFileName\":\"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume2\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\taskhostw.exe\",\"ImageSubsystem\":\"2\",\"InjectedDllCount\":\"0\",\"InjectedThreadCount\":\"0\",\"IntegrityLevel\":\"8192\",\"KernelTime\":\"468750\",\"MaxThreadCount\":\"8\",\"ModuleLoadCount\":\"25\",\"NetworkBindCount\":\"0\",\"NetworkCapableAsepWriteCount\":\"0\",\"NetworkCloseCount\":\"0\",\"NetworkConnectCount\":\"0\",\"NetworkConnectCountUdp\":\"0\",\"NetworkListenCount\":\"0\",\"NetworkModuleLoadCount\":\"0\",\"NetworkRecvAcceptCount\":\"0\",\"NewExecutableWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"ParentAuthenticationId\":\"81349050\",\"ParentProcessId\":\"58913928\",\"PrivilegedProcessHandleCount\":\"0\",\"ProcessCreateFlags\":\"525316\",\"ProcessEndTime\":\"133027667380241770\",\"ProcessEndTime_formatted\":\"2022-07-20T04:58:58.024177Z\",\"ProcessParameterFlags\":\"24577\",\"ProcessStartTime\":\"133027667360825182\",\"ProcessStartTime_formatted\":\"2022-07-20T04:58:56.082518Z\",\"ProcessSxsFlags\":\"64\",\"ProtectVirtualMemoryCount\":\"0\",\"QueueApcCount\":\"0\",\"RawProcessId\":\"14264\",\"RegKeySecurityDecreasedCount\":\"0\",\"RemovableDiskFileWrittenCount\":\"0\",\"RunDllInvocationCount\":\"0\",\"SHA256HashData\":\"f1e8525fe2fbff523b2e56472231d4ac9aa102ba614694213e59b5eb2590cc15\",\"ScreenshotsTakenCount\":\"0\",\"ScriptEngineInvocationCount\":\"0\",\"ServiceEventCount\":\"0\",\"SessionId\":\"5\",\"SetThreadContextCount\":\"0\",\"SnapshotFileOpenCount\":\"0\",\"SourceProcessId\":\"58913928\",\"SourceThreadId\":\"409387743461\",\"SuspectStackCount\":\"0\",\"SuspiciousCredentialModuleLoadCount\":\"0\",\"SuspiciousDnsRequestCount\":\"0\",\"SuspiciousFontLoadCount\":\"0\",\"SuspiciousRawDiskReadCount\":\"0\",\"Tags\":\"41, 53, 54, 55, 151, 874, 924, 12094627905582, 12094627906234\",\"TokenType\":\"2\",\"UnsignedModuleLoadCount\":\"0\",\"UserMemoryAllocateExecutableCount\":\"0\",\"UserMemoryAllocateExecutableRemoteCount\":\"0\",\"UserMemoryProtectExecutableCount\":\"0\",\"UserMemoryProtectExecutableRemoteCount\":\"0\",\"UserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"UserSidHex\":\"0000000000000000\",\"UserTime\":\"312500\",\"WindowFlags\":\"128\",\"WindowTitle\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\taskhostw.exe\",\"platform\":\"0\",\"processTerminated\":\"true\"}}}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-30T20:22:29.000000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "Vertex",
        "detect_id": "ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109",
        "customer_id": "5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082",
        "host_id": "9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab",
        "vertex_type": "process",
        "scope": "device",
        "object_id": "123456789",
        "edge": {
            "subject_id": "pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154",
            "type": "child_process"
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-0-0"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "taskhostw.exe Install $(Arg0)",
        "executable": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe",
        "name": "taskhostw.exe",
        "title": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\taskhostw.exe",
        "working_directory": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32",
        "pid": 14264,
        "parent": {
            "pid": 58913928
        },
        "exit_code": 0
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "f1e8525fe2fbff523b2e56472231d4ac9aa102ba614694213e59b5eb2590cc15"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "f1e8525fe2fbff523b2e56472231d4ac9aa102ba614694213e59b5eb2590cc15"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\": {\"customerIDString\": \"46de5283260647ec8f28def00bffd094\", \"offset\": 174, \"eventType\": \"AuthActivityAuditEvent\", \"eventCreationTime\": 1657110865303, \"version\": \"1.0\"}, \"event\": {\"UserId\": \"api-client-id:00000000000000000000000000000000\", \"UserIp\": \"185.162.177.26\", \"OperationName\": \"streamStarted\", \"ServiceName\": \"Crowdstrike Streaming API\", \"Success\": true, \"UTCTimestamp\": 1657110865, \"AuditKeyValues\": [{\"Key\": \"partition\", \"ValueString\": \"0\"}, {\"Key\": \"offset\", \"ValueString\": \"-1\"}, {\"Key\": \"appId\", \"ValueString\": \"sio-00000\"}, {\"Key\": \"eventType\", \"ValueString\": \"All event type(s)\"}, {\"Key\": \"APIClientID\", \"ValueString\": \"00000000000000000000000000000000\"}]}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "session"
        ],
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-06T12:34:25.303000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "AuthActivityAuditEvent",
        "operation_name": "streamStarted"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "185.162.177.26",
        "address": "185.162.177.26"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "Crowdstrike Streaming API"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "api-client-id:00000000000000000000000000000000"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "185.162.177.26"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"customerIDString\":\"46de5283260647ec8f28def00bffd094\",\"offset\":200,\"eventType\":\"AuthActivityAuditEvent\",\"eventCreationTime\":1657203917516,\"version\":\"1.0\"},\"event\":{\"UserId\":\"api-client-id:00000000000000000000000000000000\",\"UserIp\":\"185.162.177.26\",\"OperationName\":\"streamStopped\",\"ServiceName\":\"Crowdstrike Streaming API\",\"Success\":true,\"UTCTimestamp\":1657203917,\"AuditKeyValues\":[{\"Key\":\"APIClientID\",\"ValueString\":\"00000000000000000000000000000000\"},{\"Key\":\"partition\",\"ValueString\":\"0\"},{\"Key\":\"offset\",\"ValueString\":\"-1\"},{\"Key\":\"appId\",\"ValueString\":\"sio-00000\"},{\"Key\":\"eventType\",\"ValueString\":\"All event type(s)\"}]}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "session"
        ],
        "type": [
            "stop"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-07T14:25:17.516000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "AuthActivityAuditEvent",
        "operation_name": "streamStopped"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "185.162.177.26",
        "address": "185.162.177.26"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "Crowdstrike Streaming API"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "api-client-id:00000000000000000000000000000000"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "185.162.177.26"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"customerIDString\":\"46de5283260647ec8f28def00bffd094\",\"offset\":747,\"eventType\":\"UserActivityAuditEvent\",\"eventCreationTime\":1657614940000,\"version\":\"1.0\"},\"event\":{\"UserId\":\"foo.bar@sekoia.fr\",\"UserIp\":\"185.162.177.26\",\"OperationName\":\"detection_update\",\"ServiceName\":\"detections\",\"AuditKeyValues\":[{\"Key\":\"detection_id\",\"ValueString\":\"ldt:5418788591a444d1b45c2b39d3b07b50:21482411386\"},{\"Key\":\"new_state\",\"ValueString\":\"closed\"},{\"Key\":\"assigned_to\",\"ValueString\":\"Foo Bar\"},{\"Key\":\"assigned_to_uid\",\"ValueString\":\"foo.bar@sekoia.fr\"}],\"UTCTimestamp\":1657614940}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ],
        "category": [
            "configuration"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-12T08:35:40.000000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "UserActivityAuditEvent",
        "operation_name": "detection_update"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "185.162.177.26",
        "address": "185.162.177.26"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "detections"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "foo.bar@sekoia.fr"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "185.162.177.26"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"detectionIdString\":\"ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109\",\"eventType\":\"Vertex\",\"edge\":{\"sourceVertexId\":\"pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154\",\"type\":\"user\"}},\"event\":{\"customer_id\":\"5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082\",\"device_id\":\"9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab\",\"id\":\"uid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:S-1-0-0\",\"object_id\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"properties\":{\"AuthenticationId\":\"999\",\"AuthenticationPackage\":\"NTLM\",\"ConfigBuild\":\"1007.3.0015316.10\",\"ConfigStateHash\":\"755481218\",\"ContextProcessId\":\"8941136\",\"ContextThreadId\":\"53626098020\",\"LogonDomain\":\"DOMAIN\",\"LogonId\":\"999\",\"LogonServer\":\"\",\"LogonTime\":\"2022-07-18T09:35:00.180Z\",\"LogonType\":\"0\",\"PasswordLastSet\":\"1601-01-01T00:00:00.000Z\",\"RemoteAccount\":\"0\",\"SessionId\":\"0\",\"UserCanonical\":\"\",\"UserFlags\":\"0\",\"UserIsAdmin\":\"0\",\"UserLogonFlags\":\"12\",\"UserName\":\"myuser\",\"UserPrincipal\":\"\",\"UserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"UserSidHex\":\"0000000000000000\"},\"scope\":\"device\",\"timestamp\":\"2022-07-30T20:42:28Z\",\"vertex_type\":\"user\"}}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-30T20:42:28.000000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "Vertex",
        "detect_id": "ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109",
        "customer_id": "5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082",
        "host_id": "9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab",
        "vertex_type": "user",
        "scope": "device",
        "object_id": "S-1-0-0",
        "edge": {
            "subject_id": "pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154",
            "type": "user"
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "DOMAIN",
        "name": "myuser",
        "id": "S-1-0-0"
    },
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "LogonType": "0",
            "LogonId": "999"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "myuser"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"metadata\":{\"detectionIdString\":\"ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109\",\"eventType\":\"Vertex\",\"edge\":{\"sourceVertexId\":\"pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154\",\"type\":\"user_session\"}},\"event\":{\"customer_id\":\"5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082\",\"device_id\":\"9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab\",\"id\":\"uses:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:S-1-0-0|999\",\"object_id\":\"S-1-0-0|999\",\"properties\":{\"AuthenticationId\":\"999\",\"AuthenticationPackage\":\"NTLM\",\"ConfigStateHash\":\"755481218\",\"ContextThreadId\":\"53626098020\",\"LogonDomain\":\"DOMAIN\",\"LogonId\":\"999\",\"LogonServer\":\"\",\"LogonTime\":\"2022-07-18T09:35:00.180Z\",\"LogonType\":\"0\",\"PasswordLastSet\":\"1601-01-01T00:00:00.000Z\",\"RemoteAccount\":\"0\",\"SessionId\":\"0\",\"UserCanonical\":\"\",\"UserFlags\":\"0\",\"UserIsAdmin\":\"0\",\"UserLogonFlags\":\"12\",\"UserName\":\"mysuer\",\"UserPrincipal\":\"\",\"UserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\"},\"scope\":\"device\",\"timestamp\":\"2022-07-30T20:27:27Z\",\"vertex_type\":\"user-session\"}}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-07-30T20:27:27.000000Z",
    "crowdstrike": {
        "event_type": "Vertex",
        "detect_id": "ldt:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17212155109",
        "customer_id": "5d505aca55a145b3bd234c399201f082",
        "host_id": "9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab",
        "vertex_type": "user-session",
        "scope": "device",
        "object_id": "S-1-0-0|999",
        "edge": {
            "subject_id": "pid:9ed90be65f99456c9361141f8cfa39ab:17326818154",
            "type": "user_session"
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "DOMAIN",
        "name": "mysuer",
        "id": "S-1-0-0"
    },
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "LogonType": "0",
            "LogonId": "999"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "mysuer"
        ]
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
action.properties.LogonId keyword The id of the Logon
action.properties.LogonType keyword The type of the Logon
agent.id keyword Unique identifier of this agent.
cloud.account.id keyword The cloud account or organization id.
cloud.instance.id keyword Instance ID of the host machine.
cloud.region keyword Region in which this host, resource, or service is located.
crowdstrike.customer_id keyword Customer ID (cid)
crowdstrike.detect_description keyword A description of what an adversary was trying to do in the environment and guidance on how to begin an investigation.
crowdstrike.detect_id keyword The Detection ID for the detection. Can be used in other APIs, such as Detection Resolution and ThreatGraph.
crowdstrike.edge.subject_id keyword The identifier of a parent vertex in the graph exploration
crowdstrike.edge.type keyword The type of relationship with the subject
crowdstrike.event_type keyword Type of the event
crowdstrike.host_id keyword The crowdstrike identifier of the host
crowdstrike.incident_end date Time of the latest activity in the incident
crowdstrike.incident_id keyword The incident ID of the incident
crowdstrike.incident_start date Time of the first activity in the incident
crowdstrike.object_id keyword The identifier of a vertex
crowdstrike.operation_name keyword Operation name
crowdstrike.scope keyword The scope of a vertex
crowdstrike.state keyword Shows if the incident is still active. open = the incident is still active, closed = the incident is not active
crowdstrike.vertex_type keyword The type of the vertex
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
file.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
host.ip ip Host ip addresses.
host.mac keyword Host MAC addresses.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.end date The time the process ended.
process.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.exit_code long The exit code of the process.
process.name keyword Process name.
process.parent.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.parent.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.parent.name keyword Process name.
process.parent.pid long Process id.
process.parent.working_directory keyword The working directory of the process.
process.pid long Process id.
process.start date The time the process started.
process.title keyword Process title.
process.working_directory keyword The working directory of the process.
service.name keyword Name of the service.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.nat.ip ip Source NAT ip
source.port long Port of the source.
threat.tactic.name keyword Threat tactic.
threat.technique.name keyword Threat technique name.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.id keyword Unique identifier of the user.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user.roles keyword Array of user roles at the time of the event.

Configure

To retrieve the events produced by your Falcon instance, a playbook must be configured with the dedicated trigger "Trigger on Falcon Events". This trigger requires the following API information to connect on the Event Stream of CrowdStrike:

  • the base URL of the API (e.g. https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com)
  • a client identifier
  • a client secret

Important

Use the "API Client & Keys" CrowdStrike configuration panel to create an OAuth2 API client with the Read permission on scope Event Stream and Detection. For Threat Graph, please contact Crowdstrike Support to activate it and create the ID of the legacy Threat Graph API.