Cybereason MalOp
Overview
Cybereason offers a set of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Through the Cybereason platform, all suspicious operations will be gathered in MalOps, a multi-stage visualizations of device activities.
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Related Built-in Rules
Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade Cybereason MalOp with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.
SEKOIA.IO x Cybereason MalOp on ATT&CK Navigator
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: elementary
Cron Files Alteration
Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.
- Effort: advanced
Cybereason EDR Alert
Cybereason EDR telemetry has raised an alert
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
Package Manager Alteration
Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software
- Effort: advanced
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username
Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.
- Effort: elementary
SSH Authorized Key Alteration
The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision
- Effort: advanced
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: elementary
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host
- Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
Data Source | Description |
---|---|
Application logs |
Cybereason MalOps platform provides detections on malicious activities |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
Name | Values |
---|---|
Kind | alert , event |
Category | file , host , intrusion_detection , malware , session |
Type | info |
Event Samples
Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".FileSuspectDetailsModel\",\n \"firstSeen\": 1657923190000,\n \"lastSeen\": 1667946935000,\n \"counter\": 2,\n \"wasEverDetectedInScan\": false,\n \"wasEverDetectedByAccess\": true,\n \"detectionDecisionStatus\": \"DDS_PREVENTED\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"ownerMachineName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"ownerMachineGuid\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n \"sha1String\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"behaviourIdString\": null,\n \"correctedPath\": \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"modifiedTime\": null,\n \"elementDisplayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\"\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"file"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "file_suspect"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"host": {
"id": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
},
"file": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"decision": {
"status_code": "DDS_PREVENTED"
}
}
}
},
"file": {
"path": "c:\\System\\kprocesshacker.sys",
"hash": {
"sha1": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
},
"name": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"directory": "c:\\System"
},
"host": {
"name": "desktop-aaaaaa"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".MachineDetailsModel\",\n \"guid\": \"-576002811.1198775089551518743\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": false,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1668439428578,\n \"adOU\": null,\n \"adOrganization\": null,\n \"adDisplayName\": \"DESKTOP-AAAAAA\",\n \"adDNSHostName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa.example.org\",\n \"adDepartment\": null,\n \"adCompany\": null,\n \"adLocation\": null,\n \"adMachineRole\": null,\n \"pylumId\": \"MARVELCLIENT_INTEGRATION_DESKTOP-AAAAAA_000000000000\",\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"host"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "machine"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"host": {
"id": "-576002811.1198775089551518743",
"is_online": false,
"is_isolated": false
}
}
},
"host": {
"name": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"domain": "desktop-aaaaaa.example.org",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".MachineInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": false,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1668439428578,\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"host"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "machine"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"host": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"is_online": false,
"is_isolated": false
}
}
},
"host": {
"name": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@class\": \".MalopInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\",\n \"displayName\": \"cymulateagent.exe\",\n \"rootCauseElementType\": \"Process\",\n \"primaryRootCauseName\": \"cymulateagent.exe\",\n \"rootCauseElementNamesCount\": 1,\n \"detectionEngines\": [\n \"EDR\"\n ],\n \"detectionTypes\": [\n \"Custom Malware\"\n ],\n \"malopDetectionType\": \"CUSTOM_RULE\",\n \"creationTime\": 1668333388300,\n \"lastUpdateTime\": 1668945737625,\n \"iconBase64\": \"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\",\n \"priority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"group\": \"\",\n \"rootCauseElementHashes\": \"\",\n \"status\": \"Active\",\n \"severity\": \"High\",\n \"machines\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".MachineInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"-576002811.1198775089551518743\",\n \"displayName\": \"win-cybereason\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": true,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1669369715023,\n \"empty\": true\n }\n ],\n \"users\": [\n {\n \"guid\": \"0.2548072792133848559\",\n \"displayName\": \"win-cybereason\\\\administrator\",\n \"admin\": true,\n \"localSystem\": false,\n \"domainUser\": false\n }\n ],\n \"containers\": [],\n \"labels\": [],\n \"decisionStatuses\": [],\n \"malopCloseTime\": null,\n \"closerName\": null,\n \"malopType\": \"CUSTOM_RULE\",\n \"escalated\": false,\n \"malopPriority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"edr\": true,\n \"malopStatus\": \"Active\",\n \"malopSeverity\": \"High\",\n \"closed\": false,\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "alert",
"category": [
"malware"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "malop"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"process": {
"name": "cymulateagent.exe"
},
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"status": "Active",
"priority": "HIGH",
"severity": "High",
"detection": {
"type": "CUSTOM_RULE",
"engines": [
"EDR"
]
},
"root_cause": {
"type": "Process",
"name": "cymulateagent.exe"
},
"is_edr": "true",
"created_at": "2022-11-13T09:56:28.300000Z",
"modified_at": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@class\": \".DetectionMalopDetailsModel\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"displayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"rootCauseElementType\": \"File\",\n \"primaryRootCauseName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"rootCauseElementNamesCount\": 1,\n \"detectionEngines\": [\n \"AntiVirus\"\n ],\n \"detectionTypes\": [\n \"Known malware detected by Cybereason Anti-Malware\"\n ],\n \"malopDetectionType\": \"KNOWN_MALWARE\",\n \"creationTime\": 1668357472339,\n \"lastUpdateTime\": 1668392385000,\n \"iconBase64\": \"\",\n \"priority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"group\": \"\",\n \"rootCauseElementHashes\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"status\": \"Active\",\n \"severity\": \"High\",\n \"machines\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".MachineDetailsModel\",\n \"guid\": \"-576002811.1198775089551518743\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": false,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1668439428578,\n \"adOU\": null,\n \"adOrganization\": null,\n \"adDisplayName\": \"DESKTOP-AAAAAA\",\n \"adDNSHostName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa.example.org\",\n \"adDepartment\": null,\n \"adCompany\": null,\n \"adLocation\": null,\n \"adMachineRole\": null,\n \"pylumId\": \"MARVELCLIENT_INTEGRATION_DESKTOP-AAAAAA_000000000000\",\n \"empty\": true\n }\n ],\n \"users\": [\n {\n \"guid\": \"0.2548072792133848559\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaa\\\\system\",\n \"admin\": false,\n \"localSystem\": false,\n \"domainUser\": false\n }\n ],\n \"containers\": [],\n \"labels\": [],\n \"decisionStatuses\": [\n \"Detected\"\n ],\n \"malopCloseTime\": null,\n \"closerName\": null,\n \"signer\": null,\n \"fileClassificationType\": \"av_detected\",\n \"filePaths\": [\n \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\"\n ],\n \"commandLines\": [],\n \"decodedCommandLines\": [],\n \"detectionValues\": [\n \"Generic.ASP.WebShell.AH.B7A2B560\"\n ],\n \"detectionValueTypes\": [\n \"DVT_FILE\"\n ],\n \"fileHash\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"scriptDetectionTypes\": [],\n \"exploitDetectionTypes\": [],\n \"descriptions\": [\n \"Known malware with file name kprocesshacker.sys was detected\"\n ],\n \"hasAnyScanEvent\": false,\n \"activeProcessesCount\": 0,\n \"totalProcessesCount\": 0,\n \"fileSuspects\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".FileSuspectDetailsModel\",\n \"firstSeen\": 1657923190000,\n \"lastSeen\": 1667946935000,\n \"counter\": 2,\n \"wasEverDetectedInScan\": false,\n \"wasEverDetectedByAccess\": true,\n \"detectionDecisionStatus\": \"DDS_PREVENTED\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"ownerMachineName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"ownerMachineGuid\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n \"sha1String\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"behaviourIdString\": null,\n \"correctedPath\": \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"modifiedTime\": null,\n \"elementDisplayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\"\n }\n ],\n \"processSuspects\": null,\n \"processes\": null,\n \"files\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".FileDetailsModel\",\n \"lastDetectionDecisionStatus\": \"DDS_UNKNOWN\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"ownerMachineName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"ownerMachineGuid\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n \"sha1String\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"correctedPath\": \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"modifiedTime\": null,\n \"elementDisplayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"behaviourIdString\": null,\n \"quarantined\": false\n }\n ],\n \"connections\": null,\n \"timelineEvents\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".MalopStartTimelineEventModel\",\n \"timestamp\": 1657923190000,\n \"data\": {\n \"detectionTypes\": [\n \"Known malware detected by Cybereason Anti-Malware\"\n ],\n \"detectionEngines\": [\n \"AntiVirus\"\n ]\n },\n \"type\": \"malopStart\"\n },\n {\n \"@class\": \".DetectionEventFirstSeenTimelineEventModel\",\n \"timestamp\": 1657923190000,\n \"data\": {\n \"machineName\": \"sthq-mimikatz\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": true,\n \"detectionsCount\": 2,\n \"prevented\": false\n },\n \"type\": \"detectionEventFirstSeen\"\n },\n {\n \"@class\": \".SuspicionTimelineEventModel\",\n \"timestamp\": 1657923198032,\n \"data\": {\n \"suspicion\": \"Malicious by Anti-Malware\",\n \"activityType\": \"MALICIOUS_INFECTION\"\n },\n \"type\": \"suspicion\"\n }\n ],\n \"payloads\": [],\n \"escalated\": false,\n \"edr\": false,\n \"malopStatus\": \"Closed\",\n \"malopSeverity\": \"Low\",\n \"malopType\": \"KNOWN_MALWARE\",\n \"malopPriority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"closed\": false,\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "alert",
"category": [
"malware"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "malop"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-14T02:19:45Z",
"file": {
"name": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"hash": {
"sha1": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
}
},
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"status": "Closed",
"priority": "HIGH",
"severity": "Low",
"detection": {
"type": "KNOWN_MALWARE",
"engines": [
"AntiVirus"
]
},
"root_cause": {
"type": "File",
"name": "kprocesshacker.sys"
},
"is_edr": "false",
"created_at": "2022-11-13T16:37:52.339000Z",
"modified_at": "2022-11-14T02:19:45.000000Z"
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\n \"malopGuid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"timestamp\": \"1668945737625\"},\n \"@class\": \".SuspicionModel\",\n \"guid\": 1495442710604,\n \"name\": \"shellOfNonShellRunnerSuspicion\",\n \"firstTimestamp\": 1447276254985,\n \"evidences\": [\n \"detectedInjectedEvidence\",\n \"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence\",\n \"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence\",\n \"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence\"\n ]\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "suspicion"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"suspicion": {
"id": "1495442710604",
"name": "shellOfNonShellRunnerSuspicion",
"evidences": [
"detectedInjectedEvidence",
"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence",
"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence",
"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence"
]
}
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\n \"malopGuid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"timestamp\": \"1668945737625\"},\n \"@class\": \".SuspicionModel\",\n \"guid\": 1495442710604,\n \"name\": \"T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder : Autorun JavaScript Value\",\n \"firstTimestamp\": 1447276254985,\n \"evidences\": [\n \"detectedInjectedEvidence\",\n \"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence\",\n \"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence\",\n \"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence\"\n ]\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "suspicion"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"suspicion": {
"id": "1495442710604",
"name": "T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder : Autorun JavaScript Value",
"evidences": [
"detectedInjectedEvidence",
"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence",
"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence",
"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence"
]
}
}
},
"threat": {
"technique": {
"id": "T1060",
"name": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".UserInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"0.2548072792133848559\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaa\\\\system\",\n \"admin\": false,\n \"localSystem\": false,\n \"domainUser\": false\n}\n",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"code": "user"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "Cybereason",
"product": "Cybereason"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"user": {
"id": "0.2548072792133848559",
"is_admin": false
}
}
},
"user": {
"name": "system",
"domain": "desktop-aaaaa"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"system"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
Name | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
cybereason.malop.closed_at |
text |
The closing date of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.created_at |
text |
The creation date of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.detection.engines |
keyword |
The list of detection engines |
cybereason.malop.detection.type |
keyword |
The type of the detection used for the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.file.decision.status_code |
keyword |
The status code of the decision about the file |
cybereason.malop.file.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the file in the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.host.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the machine in the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.host.is_isolated |
boolean |
Indicates whether the host is isolated from the network |
cybereason.malop.host.is_online |
boolean |
Indicates whether the host is connected to the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.is_edr |
text |
Indicates whether the MalOp originated from an EDR detection |
cybereason.malop.modified_at |
text |
The modification date of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.priority |
text |
The priority of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.root_cause.name |
keyword |
The name of the root cause of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.root_cause.type |
keyword |
The type of the root cause of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.severity |
text |
The severity of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.status |
keyword |
The status of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.suspicion.evidences |
keyword |
The list of evidences associated to the suspicion |
cybereason.malop.suspicion.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the suspicion |
cybereason.malop.suspicion.name |
keyword |
The name of the suspicion |
cybereason.malop.user.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the user in the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.user.is_admin |
boolean |
Indicates whether the user has admin role |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
host.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the group is a member of. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
host.os.type |
keyword |
Which commercial OS family (one of: linux, macos, unix or windows). |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
process.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
threat.technique.id |
keyword |
Threat technique id. |
threat.technique.name |
keyword |
Threat technique name. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
Configure
This setup guide will lead you into forwarding all MalOp activities to Sekoia.io.
Prerequisites
To forward events produced by Cybereason to Sekoia.io, you will need your Cybereason username and password.
Warning
Please ensure the user has, at least, Analyst L2
rights granted.
Create your intake
On Sekoia.io, go to the Intakes page and generate a new intake with the Cybereason MalOp
format.
Keep aside the intake key.
Pull events
To start pulling events, you have to:
- Go to the playbook page and create a new playbook with the Fetch new events from Cybereason module.
- Set up the module configuration with your Cybereason username and password.
- Set up the trigger configuration with your intake key
- Start the playbook and enjoy your events.