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Cybereason MalOp activity

Overview

Cybereason offers a set of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Through the Cybereason platform, all suspicious operations will be gathered in MalOps, a multi-stage visualizations of device activities.

Please find below information available in MalOp activities:

  • the list of affected machines
  • the list of affected users
  • all suspicious network connections
  • all suspicious executions

Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade Cybereason MalOp activity with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.

SEKOIA.IO x Cybereason MalOp activity on ATT&CK Navigator

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

  • Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

  • Effort: elementary
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

  • Effort: master
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

  • Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic Execution

Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: elementary
MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: intermediate
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: advanced
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: elementary
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username

Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: intermediate
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Webshell Execution W3WP Process

Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.

  • Effort: advanced
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Abuse Restoration

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line or registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration).

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

  • Effort: elementary
Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Application logs Cybereason MalOps platform provides activities of MalOps

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category ``
Type info

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO.

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Cybereason|Cybereason|1.0|5|Malop Connection Added|5|CybereasonCEFgeneratorBatchId1=58bc2665-b22f-4345-bd90-3f84be47c8b6 cs1=11.1323449861766643222 CybereasonCEFgeneratorcountry1Name=None dst=3.226.77.3 dpt=443 rt=1629500007043 cs1Label=MalopId",
    "event": {
        "action": "Malop Connection Added",
        "severity": 5,
        "code": "5",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "category": [
            "session"
        ],
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2021-08-20T22:53:27.043000Z",
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Cybereason",
        "product": "Cybereason",
        "version": "1.0"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "3.226.77.3",
        "port": 443,
        "address": "3.226.77.3"
    },
    "cybereason": {
        "event": {
            "id": "58bc2665-b22f-4345-bd90-3f84be47c8b6"
        },
        "cef": {
            "version": "0"
        },
        "malop": {
            "id": "11.1323449861766643222"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "3.226.77.3"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Cybereason|Cybereason|1.0|1|Malop Created|5|rt=1629701622409 deviceCustomDate1=1636629776184 deviceFacility=Under Investigation CybereasonCEFgeneratorBatchId1=078e369b-ea4e-4e98-bc0d-ee71fd40d19d cs1=11.4718101284717793977 cs2=EXTENSION_MANIPULATION cs3=MALICIOUS_INFECTION cs5=maliciousByDualExtensionByFileRootCause cn1=1 cs6=https://yourserver.cybereason.net:8443//#/malop/11.4718101284717793977 cn2=1 cs4=bb9dbdca921d84381c893086f65ffca17120b23d requestContext=flashget3.7.0.1220en.pdf.exe, which has an unknown reputation, has dual extensions, which is hiding the true nature of the process. cs1Label=MalopId cs2Label=MalopDetectionType cs3Label=MalopActivityType cs4Label=MalopHashList cs5Label=DecisionFeatures cs6Label=IncidentLink cn1Label=AffectedMachinesCount cn2Label=AffectedUsersCount cn3Label=isSigned deviceCustomDate1Label=ModifiedTime",
    "event": {
        "action": "Malop Created",
        "severity": 5,
        "code": "1",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "reason": "flashget3.7.0.1220en.pdf.exe, which has an unknown reputation, has dual extensions, which is hiding the true nature of the process.",
        "url": "https://yourserver.cybereason.net:8443//#/malop/11.4718101284717793977",
        "category": [
            "malware"
        ],
        "kind": "alert"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2021-08-23T06:53:42.409000Z",
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Cybereason",
        "product": "Cybereason",
        "version": "1.0"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "bb9dbdca921d84381c893086f65ffca17120b23d"
        }
    },
    "cybereason": {
        "event": {
            "id": "078e369b-ea4e-4e98-bc0d-ee71fd40d19d"
        },
        "cef": {
            "version": "0"
        },
        "malop": {
            "id": "11.4718101284717793977",
            "status": "Under Investigation",
            "detection": {
                "type": "EXTENSION_MANIPULATION"
            },
            "activity": {
                "type": "MALICIOUS_INFECTION"
            },
            "decision": "maliciousByDualExtensionByFileRootCause",
            "counters": {
                "affected_machines": 1,
                "affected_users": 1
            },
            "modified_at": "2021-11-11T11:22:56.184000Z"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "bb9dbdca921d84381c893086f65ffca17120b23d"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Cybereason|Cybereason|1.0|3|Malop Machine Added|5|destinationDnsDomain=desktop-aas6kq7 dst=10.0.2.15 destinationTranslatedAddress=117.99.232.147 CybereasonCEFgeneratorBatchId1=2ac124fd-def2-4073-b408-d3b3f0e764b0 cs1=11.-6654920844431693523 flexString2=True dhost=desktop-aas6kq7 CybereasonCEFgeneratorOSandVersion1=Windows_10 CybereasonCEFgeneratorMachineGuid1=-592942600.1198775089551518743 cfp3=1 rt=1625748509151 cfp2=1 cs1Label=MalopId flexString2Label=isMalicious cfp2Label=isOnline cfp3Label=isOriginalMachine request=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\chand\\\\Downloads\\\\BT_21.40.5_32_Win7.pdf.exe\" deviceProcessName=explorer.exe CybereasonCEFgeneratorChildProcess1=None",
    "event": {
        "action": "Malop Machine Added",
        "severity": 5,
        "code": "3",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2021-07-08T12:48:29.151000Z",
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Cybereason",
        "product": "Cybereason",
        "version": "1.0"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "desktop-aas6kq7",
        "id": "-592942600.1198775089551518743",
        "os": {
            "full": "Windows 10"
        },
        "ip": [
            "10.0.2.15",
            "117.99.232.147"
        ],
        "name": "desktop-aas6kq7"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\Users\\chand\\Downloads\\BT_21.40.5_32_Win7.pdf.exe",
        "parent": {
            "name": "explorer.exe"
        }
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "10.0.2.15",
        "nat": {
            "ip": "117.99.232.147"
        },
        "address": "10.0.2.15"
    },
    "cybereason": {
        "event": {
            "id": "2ac124fd-def2-4073-b408-d3b3f0e764b0"
        },
        "cef": {
            "version": "0"
        },
        "malop": {
            "id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
            "host": {
                "is_online": true,
                "is_original_machine": true,
                "is_malicious": true
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.2.15",
            "117.99.232.147"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "desktop-aas6kq7"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Cybereason|Cybereason|1.0|2|Malop Process Added|5|CybereasonCEFgeneratorBatchId1=2ac124fd-def2-4073-b408-d3b3f0e764b0 cs1=11.-6654920844431693523 cs4=76030baf8e80653b883474f56c06164c33417ece request=\"C:\\\\Users\\\\chand\\\\Downloads\\\\BT_21.40.5_32_Win7.pdf.exe\" flexString2=True cn3=1 reason=indifferent rt=1629700682928 cs1Label=MalopId flexString2Label=isMalicious cs4Label=processSha1 cn3Label=isSigned",
    "event": {
        "action": "Malop Process Added",
        "severity": 5,
        "code": "2",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2021-08-23T06:38:02.928000Z",
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Cybereason",
        "product": "Cybereason",
        "version": "1.0"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "76030baf8e80653b883474f56c06164c33417ece"
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\Users\\chand\\Downloads\\BT_21.40.5_32_Win7.pdf.exe",
        "start": "2021-08-23T06:38:02.928000Z"
    },
    "cybereason": {
        "event": {
            "id": "2ac124fd-def2-4073-b408-d3b3f0e764b0"
        },
        "cef": {
            "version": "0"
        },
        "malop": {
            "id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
            "host": {
                "is_malicious": true
            },
            "file": {
                "is_signed": true
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "76030baf8e80653b883474f56c06164c33417ece"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Cybereason|Cybereason|1.0|6|Malop User Added|5|CybereasonCEFgeneratorBatchId1=2ac124fd-def2-4073-b408-d3b3f0e764b0 cs1=11.-6654920844431693523 dpriv=None dhost=desktop-aas6kq7 CybereasonCEFgeneratorOrganizationName1=INTEGRATION duser=system cs1Label=MalopId",
    "event": {
        "action": "Malop User Added",
        "severity": 5,
        "code": "6",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "kind": "event"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Cybereason",
        "product": "Cybereason",
        "version": "1.0"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "system",
        "domain": "INTEGRATION"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "desktop-aas6kq7",
        "name": "desktop-aas6kq7"
    },
    "cybereason": {
        "event": {
            "id": "2ac124fd-def2-4073-b408-d3b3f0e764b0"
        },
        "cef": {
            "version": "0"
        },
        "malop": {
            "id": "11.-6654920844431693523"
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "desktop-aas6kq7"
        ],
        "user": [
            "system"
        ]
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
cybereason.cef.version keyword The version of the CEF message
cybereason.event.id keyword The identifier of the cybereason event
cybereason.malop.activity.type keyword The phase in the attack lifecycle assigned to the MalOp
cybereason.malop.counters.affected_machines float The number of affected machines
cybereason.malop.counters.affected_users float The number of affected machines
cybereason.malop.decision text The decision feature used to generate the MalOp
cybereason.malop.detection.type keyword The type of the detection used for the MalOp
cybereason.malop.file.is_signed boolean Indicates whether the file is signed
cybereason.malop.host.is_malicious boolean Indicates whether the host is involved in malicious activities
cybereason.malop.host.is_online boolean Indicates whether the host is connected to the Cybereason platform
cybereason.malop.host.is_original_machine boolean Indicates whether the host was detected recently
cybereason.malop.id keyword The identifier of the MalOp
cybereason.malop.modified_at text The modification date of the MalOp
cybereason.malop.status keyword The status of the MalOp
destination.geo.country_name keyword Country name.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.nat.ip ip Destination NAT ip
destination.port long Port of the destination.
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.code keyword Identification code for this event.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.severity long Numeric severity of the event.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.url keyword Event investigation URL
file.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
host.hostname keyword Hostname of the host.
host.id keyword Unique host id.
host.ip ip Host ip addresses.
host.os.full keyword Operating system name, including the version or code name.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
observer.version keyword Observer version.
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.name keyword Process name.
process.parent.name keyword Process name.
process.start date The time the process started.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.

Configure

This setup guide will lead you into forwarding all MalOp activities to SEKOIA.IO.

Create your intake

On SEKOIA.IO, go to the Intakes page and generate a new intake with the Cybereason MalOp Activities format. Keep aside the intake key.

Setup the Syslog collector

Check the Syslog Forwarding documentation to install and set up the syslog collector.

Once the setup has completed, write down the IP address and port. This information will be used in the next step.

Setup the CybeReason CEF Forwarder

Contact the Cybereason Customer Success Manager to get the Cybereason CEF Forwarder.

Connect to the Cybereason Partner Nest and follow these instructions for the installation of the CEF forwarder.

Create a new configuration to forward MalOp activities to the syslog collector: fill host and port with the address and the listening port of the syslog collector.

Start the forwarding

Start the CEF Forwarder with your new configuration

$ cybereason-forwarders/scripts/run_forwarder.sh config/<my new configuration>.json

Enjoy your events

Go to the Events page and wait for your incoming events!