HarfangLab
Overview
HarfangLab is an Endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution certified by ANSSI since 2020. This setup guide shows how to forward events produced by HarfangLab EDR to Sekoia.io.
Related Built-in Rules
Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade HarfangLab with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.
SEKOIA.IO x HarfangLab on ATT&CK Navigator
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll
Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.
- Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group
Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system
- Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.
- Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
Backup Catalog Deleted
The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.
- Effort: intermediate
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access
Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects
- Effort: intermediate
CVE 2022-1292
The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe
Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality
- Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands
Detects command lines with suspicious args
- Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon
Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: elementary
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data
Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Cron Files Alteration
Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.
- Effort: advanced
Csrss Child Found
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL
This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL
This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL
This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.
- Effort: master
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater
Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.
- Effort: elementary
Data Compressed With Rar
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disable Workstation Lock
Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent
Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: elementary
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration
Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor
Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom
- Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity
Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity
- Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History
Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history
- Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export
Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641
Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
- Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262
Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.
- Effort: advanced
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine
Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189
- Effort: elementary
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378
- Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File
Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.
- Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent
Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.
- Effort: elementary
Fail2ban Unban IP
An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.
- Effort: advanced
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses
A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).
- Effort: master
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.
- Effort: master
FlowCloud Malware
Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.
- Effort: elementary
Formbook File Creation DB1
Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.
- Effort: intermediate
Formbook Hijacked Process Command
Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.
- Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility
Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names
Detects the default process name of several HackTools. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
HarfangLab EDR Critical Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a critical level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR High Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a high level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Hlai Engine Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on its hlai engine
- Effort: advanced
HarfangLab EDR Low Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a low level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Medium Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a medium level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Process Execution Blocked
HarfangLab EDR has detected a malicious process execution attempt and has blocked it. To know more on what caused this alert, you should check the value of the process name and the concerned computer and user.
- Effort: elementary
HarfangLab EDR Suspicious Process Behavior Has Been Detected
HarfangLab EDR has detected a suspicious process behavior based on its detection rule. Check the rule name and description for more information.
- Effort: master
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe
Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
- Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd
Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.
- Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel
Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.
- Effort: elementary
Impacket Wmiexec Module
Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.
- Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic Execution
Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
- Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
List Shadow Copies
Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).
- Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: elementary
Logonui Wrong Parent
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: intermediate
MMC Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process
- Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement
Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.
- Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution
Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.
- Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir
Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.
- Effort: intermediate
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Deleted
Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Tampering Detected
Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Threat Detected
Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Mshta JavaScript Execution
Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell
- Effort: intermediate
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation
Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command
- Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command
Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).
- Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location
Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service from command line
- Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent
Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: intermediate
OceanLotus Registry Activity
Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process
In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.
- Effort: elementary
Opening Of a Password File
Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.
- Effort: advanced
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: elementary
Package Manager Alteration
Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software
- Effort: advanced
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading
Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.
- Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)
Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents
Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent
- Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent
Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".
- Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL
Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32
Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell
- Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump
Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages
Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement
- Effort: master
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username
Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.
- Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Rare Logonui Child Found
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.
- Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
SSH Authorized Key Alteration
The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision
- Effort: advanced
STRRAT Scheduled Task
Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'
- Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges
Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent
Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.
- Effort: intermediate
Searchindexer Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.
- Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Child Found
SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.
- Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration
Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Sliver DNS Beaconing
Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing
- Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent
Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process
Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.
- Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent
Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.
- Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL
Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool
Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line
Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell
Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process
Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process
Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Driver Loaded
Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Finger Usage
Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious HWP Child Process
Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File
Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution
Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi
Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line
Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL
Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution
Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter
Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action
Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
- Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent
Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).
- Effort: advanced
Sysmon Windows File Block Executable
Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.
- Effort: master
Sysprep On AppData Folder
Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.
- Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host
- Effort: master
Taskhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.
- Effort: intermediate
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found
Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.
- Effort: intermediate
Trickbot Malware Activity
Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe
- Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper
Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt
Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)
- Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer
Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.
- Effort: elementary
Ursnif Registry Key
Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
Userinit Wrong Parent
Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: intermediate
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
Webshell Execution W3WP Process
Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.
- Effort: advanced
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)
- Effort: elementary
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Windows Update LolBins
This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.
- Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent
Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: intermediate
Winlogon wrong parent
Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.
- Effort: intermediate
Winword Document Droppers
Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent
Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.
- Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent
Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).
- Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack
Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
- Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution
Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Binary file metadata |
to be defined |
Disk forensics |
to be defined |
File monitoring |
to be defined |
Host network interface |
to be defined |
Kernel drivers |
to be defined |
Loaded DLLs |
to be defined |
Named Pipes |
to be defined |
PowerShell logs |
to be defined |
Process command-line parameters |
to be defined |
Process monitoring |
to be defined |
Process use of network |
to be defined |
Services |
to be defined |
Windows event logs |
to be defined |
Windows Registry |
registry auditing events are examined in detail |
WMI Objects |
Windows WMI Activity events are analyzed, and events related to WMI process too |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | alert, event |
| Category | authentication, network, process, web |
| Type | access, connection, info, start |
Event Samples
Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.
{
"message": "{\"aggregation_key\":\"40fd5973a79d4e0f21e689938e5f269d20a3be780949eb6f408d5cb65c6974d1\",\"type\":\"rtlogs\",\"agent\":{\"osversion\":\"10.0.19041\",\"domainname\":\"WORKGROUP\",\"agentid\":\"8cb8fb07-ecb4-4537-8a44-451ef855a874\",\"osproducttype\":\"Windows 10 Pro\",\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"domain\":null},\"level\":\"high\",\"msg\":\"Binary was found malicious by 2 rule(s) with a score of 120\",\"tags\":[],\"rule_name\":\"YARA binary check\",\"process\":{\"signature_info\":{\"root_info\":{\"display_name\":\"\",\"thumbprint\":\"\",\"serial_number\":\"\",\"issuer_name\":\"\"},\"signed_catalog\":false,\"signer_info\":{\"display_name\":\"\",\"thumbprint\":\"\",\"serial_number\":\"\",\"issuer_name\":\"\"},\"signed_authenticode\":false},\"commandline\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\valves\\\\Desktop\\\\mimikatz.exe\\\"\",\"matched_rules_count\":2,\"fake_parent_commandline\":null,\"dont_create_process\":true,\"session\":2,\"pid\":5736,\"process_name\":\"mimikatz.exe\",\"score\":120,\"pe_info\":{\"product_version\":\"2.2.0.0\",\"file_description\":\"mimikatz for Windows\",\"original_filename\":\"mimikatz.exe\",\"internal_name\":\"mimikatz\",\"file_version\":\"2.2.0.0\",\"company_name\":\"Braveheart\",\"legal_copyright\":\"Copyright (c) 2007 - 2020 Braveheart\",\"product_name\":\"mimikatz\"},\"fake_parent_image\":null,\"username\":\"REDACTED\\\\valves\",\"pe_timestamp_int\":1619768223,\"image_name\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\valves\\\\Desktop\\\\mimikatz.exe\",\"parent_integrity_level\":\"High\",\"fake_parent_unique_id\":null,\"status_msg\":\"Binary was found potentially malicious on the endpoint by Yara with a score of 120 , but it is running in alert only mode\",\"log_type\":\"process\",\"logonid\":1121594,\"process_unique_id\":\"ab376ee3-ecb4-4537-1668-00993e12c556\",\"usersid\":\"S-1-5-21-794873159-2603523847-3490392889-500\",\"error_msg\":\"\",\"parent_image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\",\"fake_ppid\":null,\"integrity_level\":\"High\",\"current_directory\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\valves\\\\Desktop\",\"pe_timestamp\":\"2021-04-30T07:37:03.000Z\",\"parent_unique_id\":\"ab376ee3-ecb4-4537-06a4-0031a7bc3d13\",\"pe_imphash\":\"B6BC868F5046CE7764D0627266AF0200\",\"hashes\":{\"md5\":\"46f3fa15de36a0825df4dbfd94614566\",\"sha256\":\"79dd65171cdbc3a1505d11921babf62ffcab4d725ab4a28813c02a6f3a2760ff\",\"sha1\":\"41453d9b0ae75f687c7720373d7586bc0a9d1607\"},\"size\":1430016,\"matched_rules\":[{\"namespace\":\"mimikatz.yar\",\"rulename\":\"mimikatz_clear_string_markers\",\"source\":\"default\"},{\"namespace\":\"mimikatz.yar\",\"rulename\":\"mimikatz_patches_x64\",\"source\":\"default\"}],\"create_time\":\"2021/04/30 13:20:54.315189\",\"parent_commandline\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\\" \",\"rule_revision\":81,\"signed\":false,\"ppid\":1700,\"status\":0},\"alert_time\":\"2021-04-30T13:21:20.704+00:00\",\"alert_subtype\":\"process\",\"execution\":0,\"alert_type\":\"yara\",\"rule_id\":\"YARA binary check\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"@timestamp\":\"2021-04-30T13:21:20.717Z\",\"@event_create_date\":\"2021-04-30T13:21:20.704Z\",\"log_type\":\"alert\",\"status\":\"new\",\"alert_unique_id\":\"bd13fef8-a8fd-4d28-ad97-928a83b96085\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "alert",
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"start"
],
"kind": "alert"
},
"@timestamp": "2021-04-30T13:21:20.704000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "8cb8fb07-ecb4-4537-8a44-451ef855a874",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "WORKGROUP",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.19041",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"harfanglab": {
"level": "high",
"alert_time": "2021-04-30T13:21:20.704+00:00",
"alert_unique_id": "bd13fef8-a8fd-4d28-ad97-928a83b96085",
"alert_subtype": "process",
"execution": 0,
"status": "new",
"aggregation_key": "40fd5973a79d4e0f21e689938e5f269d20a3be780949eb6f408d5cb65c6974d1"
},
"rule": {
"description": "Binary was found malicious by 2 rule(s) with a score of 120",
"name": "YARA binary check",
"category": "yara",
"id": "YARA binary check"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\valves\\Desktop\\mimikatz.exe\"",
"pid": 5736,
"name": "mimikatz.exe",
"pe": {
"description": "mimikatz for Windows",
"original_file_name": "mimikatz.exe",
"file_version": "2.2.0.0",
"company": "Braveheart",
"product": "mimikatz",
"imphash": "B6BC868F5046CE7764D0627266AF0200"
},
"executable": "C:\\Users\\valves\\Desktop\\mimikatz.exe",
"parent": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"command_line": "\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" "
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Users\\valves\\Desktop"
},
"user": {
"name": "REDACTED\\valves"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"md5": "46f3fa15de36a0825df4dbfd94614566",
"sha256": "79dd65171cdbc3a1505d11921babf62ffcab4d725ab4a28813c02a6f3a2760ff",
"sha1": "41453d9b0ae75f687c7720373d7586bc0a9d1607"
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"41453d9b0ae75f687c7720373d7586bc0a9d1607",
"46f3fa15de36a0825df4dbfd94614566",
"79dd65171cdbc3a1505d11921babf62ffcab4d725ab4a28813c02a6f3a2760ff"
],
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
],
"user": [
"REDACTED\\valves"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@version\": \"1\",\n \"agent\": {\n \"agentid\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"distroid\": null,\n \"domainname\": \"domain123\",\n \"ostype\": \"windows\",\n \"hostname\": \"pc123\",\n \"osversion\": \"10.0.19041\",\n \"osproducttype\": \"Windows 10 Pro\",\n \"domain\": null,\n \"version\": \"2.12.6\"\n },\n \"type\": \"rtlogs\",\n \"alert_subtype\": \"process\",\n \"log_type\": \"alert\",\n \"detection_origin\": \"agent\",\n \"tenant\": \"\",\n \"alert_time\": \"2022-03-15T07:26:01.276+00:00\",\n \"alert_type\": \"sigma\",\n \"status\": \"false_positive\",\n \"rule_id\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"@event_create_date\": \"2022-03-15T07:26:01.276Z\",\n \"alert_unique_id\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"level\": \"low\",\n \"aggregation_key\": \"123456\",\n \"@timestamp\": \"2022-03-15T07:26:01.311Z\",\n \"tags\": [\n \"attack.discovery\",\n \"attack.t1057\",\n \"attack.s0057\"\n ],\n \"process\": {\n \"detection_timestamp\": \"2022/03/15 07:24:54.438105\",\n \"process_unique_id\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"parent_integrity_level\": \"Medium\",\n \"log_platform_flag\": 0,\n \"fake_parent_image\": null,\n \"pid\": 11320,\n \"image_name\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\tasklist.exe\",\n \"username\": \"XXX\\\\XXX\",\n \"logonid\": 151210562,\n \"signature_info\": {\n \"signed_authenticode\": false,\n \"signed_catalog\": true,\n \"root_info\": {\n \"thumbprint\": \"3b1efd3a66ea28b16697394703a72ca340a05bd5\",\n \"display_name\": \"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\n \"serial_number\": \"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4339aa\",\n \"issuer_name\": \"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\"\n },\n \"signer_info\": {\n \"thumbprint\": \"f7c2f2c96a328c13cda8cdb57b715bdea2cbd1d9\",\n \"display_name\": \"Microsoft Windows\",\n \"serial_number\": \"33000002ec6579ad1e670890130000000002ec\",\n \"issuer_name\": \"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\"\n }\n },\n \"current_directory\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\EPOS\\\\EPOS Connect\",\n \"error_msg\": \"\",\n \"status_msg\": \"sigma match detected this process but not configured to block it\",\n \"ppid\": 17808,\n \"fake_parent_commandline\": null,\n \"commandline\": \"tasklist\",\n \"signed\": true,\n \"grandparent_integrity_level\": \"Medium\",\n \"log_type\": \"process\",\n \"pe_imphash\": \"19BBD9C4E73C288A3645E163F4B82682\",\n \"create_time\": \"2022-03-15T07:24:54.260Z\",\n \"status\": 0,\n \"parent_image\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\cmd.exe\",\n \"integrity_level\": \"Medium\",\n \"usersid\": \"S-1-5-21-299502267-725345543-82448378-2366\",\n \"pe_info\": {\n \"product_version\": \"10.0.19041.1\",\n \"legal_copyright\": \"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\",\n \"original_filename\": \"tasklist.exe\",\n \"company_name\": \"Microsoft Corporation\",\n \"file_description\": \"Lists the current running tasks\",\n \"file_version\": \"10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n \"internal_name\": \"tasklist.exe\",\n \"product_name\": \"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\"\n },\n \"session\": 3,\n \"pe_timestamp\": \"1994-09-11T16:43:21.000Z\",\n \"parent_unique_id\": \"2332edf8-70c0-43c2-4590-00f912ab3d18\",\n \"process_name\": \"tasklist.exe\",\n \"grandparent_commandline\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\EPOS\\\\EPOS Connect\\\\EPOSConnect.exe 1\",\n \"pe_timestamp_int\": 779301801,\n \"grandparent_image\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\EPOS\\\\EPOS Connect\\\\EPOSConnect.exe\",\n \"parent_commandline\": \"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe /d /s /c tasklist\",\n \"fake_parent_unique_id\": null,\n \"size\": 79360,\n \"fake_ppid\": null,\n \"hashes\": {\n \"sha1\": \"7f50d8c3cf3ec79122a876e969bdb65d939becd0\",\n \"sha256\": \"76eac7b5f53e0d58a98d5a6ddf9c97e19d1462ef65c0035d7798f89988b15ab4\",\n \"md5\": \"0a4448b31ce7f83cb7691a2657f330f1\"\n }\n },\n \"execution\": 0,\n \"rule_name\": \"Discovery: Process list\",\n \"maturity\": \"stable\",\n \"msg\": \"Detects the execution of tasklist.exe, a tool used to gather detailed information about a computer's active processes.\"\n}\n",
"event": {
"dataset": "alert",
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"start"
],
"kind": "alert"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-03-15T07:26:01.276000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "pc123"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "pc123",
"domain": "domain123",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.19041",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "pc123"
},
"harfanglab": {
"level": "low",
"alert_time": "2022-03-15T07:26:01.276+00:00",
"alert_unique_id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"alert_subtype": "process",
"execution": 0,
"status": "false_positive",
"aggregation_key": "123456"
},
"rule": {
"description": "Detects the execution of tasklist.exe, a tool used to gather detailed information about a computer's active processes.",
"name": "Discovery: Process list",
"category": "sigma",
"id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "tasklist",
"pid": 11320,
"name": "tasklist.exe",
"pe": {
"description": "Lists the current running tasks",
"original_file_name": "tasklist.exe",
"file_version": "10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"imphash": "19BBD9C4E73C288A3645E163F4B82682"
},
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\tasklist.exe",
"parent": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\cmd.exe /d /s /c tasklist"
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\EPOS\\EPOS Connect"
},
"user": {
"name": "XXX\\XXX"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"md5": "0a4448b31ce7f83cb7691a2657f330f1",
"sha256": "76eac7b5f53e0d58a98d5a6ddf9c97e19d1462ef65c0035d7798f89988b15ab4",
"sha1": "7f50d8c3cf3ec79122a876e969bdb65d939becd0"
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"0a4448b31ce7f83cb7691a2657f330f1",
"76eac7b5f53e0d58a98d5a6ddf9c97e19d1462ef65c0035d7798f89988b15ab4",
"7f50d8c3cf3ec79122a876e969bdb65d939becd0"
],
"hosts": [
"pc123"
],
"user": [
"XXX\\XXX"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"request_method\":\"POST\",\"response_content\":\"[]\",\"@timestamp\":\"2023-05-09T09:11:09.296679Z\",\"action_title\":\"Login\",\"event\":{\"original\":\"{\\\"log_type\\\":\\\"auditlog\\\",\\\"log_slug\\\":\\\"mfa-authtoken-login-post\\\",\\\"log_creation_date\\\":\\\"2023-05-09T09:11:09.284452+00:00\\\",\\\"action_title\\\":\\\"Login\\\",\\\"log_description\\\":\\\"User User logged in\\\",\\\"username\\\":\\\"AnonymousUser\\\",\\\"ip_address\\\":\\\"10.42.0.36\\\",\\\"user_agent\\\":\\\"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\\\",\\\"request_method\\\":\\\"POST\\\",\\\"request_path\\\":\\\"/api/auth/login/\\\",\\\"request_content\\\":\\\"[username:User]\\\",\\\"response_status_code\\\":\\\"200\\\",\\\"response_status_text\\\":\\\"OK\\\",\\\"response_content\\\":\\\"[]\\\"}\"},\"log_slug\":\"mfa-authtoken-login-post\",\"log_type\":\"auditlog\",\"user_agent\":\"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\",\"request_path\":\"/api/auth/login/\",\"log_creation_date\":\"2023-05-09T09:11:09.284452+00:00\",\"response_status_code\":\"200\",\"response_status_text\":\"OK\",\"log_description\":\"User User logged in\",\"ip_address\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"tenant\":\"6685e0c99733744d\",\"request_content\":\"[username: user]\",\"username\":\"AnonymousUser\",\"@version\":\"1\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "auditlog",
"category": [
"web"
],
"type": [
"access"
],
"kind": "event",
"reason": "User User logged in",
"action": "mfa-authtoken-login-post"
},
"agent": {
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"http": {
"request": {
"method": "POST"
},
"response": {
"status_code": 200
}
},
"url": {
"path": "/api/auth/login/"
},
"user_agent": {
"original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0",
"device": {
"name": "Other"
},
"name": "Firefox",
"version": "102.0",
"os": {
"name": "Windows",
"version": "10"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "AnonymousUser"
},
"source": {
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"address": "1.2.3.4"
},
"organization": {
"id": "6685e0c99733744d"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"AnonymousUser"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{ \"@version\": \"1\", \"log_type\": \"authentication\", \"event_type\": \"login_failure\", \"@timestamp\": \"2023-03-31T06:38:45.597386Z\", \"process_name\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"groups\": [ { \"name\": \"custom-group\", \"id\": \"0dd95277-37da-4ffe-9aec-0fc76beb2e5e\" } ], \"object_type\": \"login\", \"target_username\": \"work-laptop\\\\administrateur\", \"success\": false, \"auth_type\": \"Interactive\", \"technique\": \"Brute Force\", \"source_address\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"windows\": { \"workstation_name\": \"work-laptop\", \"source_sid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"authentication_package_name\": \"Negotiate\", \"event_title\": \"An account failed to log on\", \"event_id\": 4625, \"logon_title\": \"Interactive\", \"target_sid\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"source_logon_id\": 999, \"logon_type\": 2, \"sub_status\": 0, \"process_name\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"logon_process_name\": \"User32\", \"target_logon_id\": 0, \"ip_address\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"status\": 0, \"ip_port\": \"0\" }, \"utc_time\": \"2023-03-31T06:38:42.818Z\", \"source_username\": \"test-domain\\\\work-laptop$\", \"agent\": { \"osversion\": \"10.0.19045\", \"domainname\": \"test-domain\", \"hostname\": \"work-laptop\", \"dnsdomainname\": \"test-domain.local\", \"osproducttype\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"version\": \"2.24.4-post0\", \"ostype\": \"windows\", \"agentid\": \"2e822bcd-52cc-43e7-94fc-5a5d6f38506d\" }, \"auth_status\": \"Status OK\", \"@event_create_date\": \"2023-03-31T06:38:42.818Z\", \"tactic\": \"Credential Access\", \"tenant\": \"50e03aed1dbf33d4\", \"msg\": \"%%2313\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "authentication",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"type": [
"end",
"start"
],
"kind": "event",
"reason": "An account failed to log on",
"code": "4625",
"action": "login"
},
"sekoiaio": {
"server": {
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"@timestamp": "2023-03-31T06:38:42.818000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "2e822bcd-52cc-43e7-94fc-5a5d6f38506d",
"name": "harfanglab",
"version": "2.24.4-post0"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "work-laptop"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "work-laptop",
"domain": "test-domain",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.19045",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "work-laptop"
},
"harfanglab": {
"groups": [
"{\"id\": \"0dd95277-37da-4ffe-9aec-0fc76beb2e5e\", \"name\": \"custom-group\"}"
]
},
"user": {
"roles": "custom-group",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "test-domain\\work-laptop$",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-0-0",
"name": "work-laptop\\administrateur"
}
},
"source": {
"ip": "127.0.0.1",
"address": "127.0.0.1"
},
"process": {
"name": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe"
},
"action": {
"id": 4625,
"outcome": "failure"
},
"organization": {
"id": "50e03aed1dbf33d4"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"work-laptop"
],
"ip": [
"127.0.0.1"
],
"user": [
"test-domain\\work-laptop$"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@version\": \"1\",\n \"query_type\": \"AAAA\",\n \"log_type\": \"dns_resolution\",\n \"agent\": {\n \"osversion\": \"10.0.19045\",\n \"domainname\": \"test-domain\",\n \"hostname\": \"work-laptop\",\n \"dnsdomainname\": \"test-domain.local\",\n \"osproducttype\": \"Windows 10 Pro\",\n \"version\": \"2.24.4-post0\",\n \"ostype\": \"windows\",\n \"agentid\": \"2e822bcd-52cc-43e7-94fc-5a5d6f38506d\"\n },\n \"@timestamp\": \"2023-03-31T06:39:34.483980Z\",\n \"groups\": [\n {\n \"name\": \"custom-group\",\n \"id\": \"0dd95277-37da-4ffe-9aec-0fc76beb2e5e\"\n }\n ],\n \"ip_addresses\": [\n \"152.199.21.118\"\n ],\n \"process_image_path\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\Microsoft.Windows.Search_cw5n1h2txyewy\\\\SearchApp.exe\",\n \"@event_create_date\": \"2023-03-31T06:39:14.570000+00:00\",\n \"requested_name\": \"static-ecst.licdn.com\",\n \"raw_windows_resolver_results\": \"type: 5 cs1404.wpc.epsiloncdn.net;::ffff:152.199.21.118;\",\n \"event\": {\n \"original\": \"{\\\"utc_time\\\":\\\"2023-03-31T06:39:14.570000+00:00\\\",\\\"log_type\\\":\\\"dns_resolution\\\",\\\"requested_name\\\":\\\"static-ecst.licdn.com\\\",\\\"query_type\\\":\\\"AAAA\\\",\\\"status\\\":\\\"success\\\",\\\"ip_addresses\\\":[\\\"152.199.21.118\\\"],\\\"raw_windows_resolver_results\\\":\\\"type: 5 cs1404.wpc.epsiloncdn.net;::ffff:152.199.21.118;\\\",\\\"process_unique_id\\\":\\\"887d1052-52cc-43e7-7c30-00778b2ff016\\\",\\\"process_image_path\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\SystemApps\\\\\\\\Microsoft.Windows.Search_cw5n1h2txyewy\\\\\\\\SearchApp.exe\\\",\\\"pid\\\":12412,\\\"username\\\":\\\"test-domain\\\\\\\\john.doe\\\",\\\"groups\\\":[{\\\"id\\\":\\\"0dd95277-37da-4ffe-9aec-0fc76beb2e5e\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"custom-group\\\"}],\\\"agent\\\":{\\\"hostname\\\":\\\"work-laptop\\\",\\\"domainname\\\":\\\"test-domain\\\",\\\"dnsdomainname\\\":\\\"test-domain.local\\\",\\\"ostype\\\":\\\"windows\\\",\\\"osversion\\\":\\\"10.0.19045\\\",\\\"osproducttype\\\":\\\"Windows 10 Pro\\\",\\\"version\\\":\\\"2.24.4-post0\\\",\\\"agentid\\\":\\\"2e822bcd-52cc-43e7-94fc-5a5d6f38506d\\\"}}\"\n },\n \"tenant\": \"50e03aed1dbf33d4\",\n \"status\": \"success\",\n \"process_unique_id\": \"887d1052-52cc-43e7-7c30-00778b2ff016\",\n \"username\": \"test-domain\\\\john.doe\",\n \"pid\": 12412\n}",
"event": {
"dataset": "dns_resolution",
"category": [
"network"
],
"type": [
"info"
],
"kind": "event"
},
"@timestamp": "2023-03-31T06:39:14.570000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "2e822bcd-52cc-43e7-94fc-5a5d6f38506d",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "work-laptop"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "work-laptop",
"domain": "test-domain",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.19045",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "work-laptop"
},
"harfanglab": {
"groups": [
"{\"id\": \"0dd95277-37da-4ffe-9aec-0fc76beb2e5e\", \"name\": \"custom-group\"}"
]
},
"user": {
"roles": "custom-group",
"name": "test-domain\\john.doe"
},
"process": {
"pid": 12412,
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.Windows.Search_cw5n1h2txyewy\\SearchApp.exe"
},
"dns": {
"question": {
"type": "AAAA",
"name": "static-ecst.licdn.com",
"top_level_domain": "com",
"subdomain": "static-ecst",
"registered_domain": "licdn.com"
}
},
"organization": {
"id": "50e03aed1dbf33d4"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"static-ecst.licdn.com",
"work-laptop"
],
"user": [
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]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"cmdline\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k wusvcs -p\",\"session\":0,\"pid\":3092,\"job_id\":\"c0cbd87c-c793-4af9-9ecf-53739f3f27a5\",\"process_bits\":64,\"@timestamp\":\"2021-05-01T07:49:08.043Z\",\"username\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"log_type\":\"investigation\",\"binaryinfo\":{\"filename\":\"svchost.exe\",\"fullpath\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"binaryinfo\":{\"root_thumbprint\":\"3b1efd3a66ea28b16697394703a72ca340a05bd5\",\"pe_file_version\":\"10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\"filesize\":51696,\"signer_serial_number\":\"33000001a90f2d80c9a929387c0000000001a9\",\"pe_timestamp_int\":3103846143,\"pe_legal_copyright\":\"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\",\"signed_catalog\":false,\"signer_display_name\":\"Microsoft Windows Publisher\",\"sha1\":\"a1385ce20ad79f55df235effd9780c31442aa234\",\"signer_issuer_name\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\"signed_authenticode\":true,\"pe_company_name\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"md5\":\"8a0a29438052faed8a2532da50455756\",\"pe_product_version\":\"10.0.17763.1\",\"pe_internal_name\":\"svchost.exe\",\"pe_timestamp\":\"2068-05-10 03:29:03.000\",\"root_serial_number\":\"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4339aa\",\"pe_imphash\":\"247B9220E5D9B720A82B2C8B5069AD69\",\"sha256\":\"7fd065bac18c5278777ae44908101cdfed72d26fa741367f0ad4d02020787ab6\",\"root_display_name\":\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\"pe_file_description\":\"Host Process for Windows Services\",\"root_issuer_name\":\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\"pe_original_filename\":\"svchost.exe\",\"pe_product_name\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"signed\":true,\"signer_thumbprint\":\"458d803a5cf470dd3f01a475214938d97a5051e8\"},\"fullpath_cmdline\":null},\"job_instance_id\":\"c580fa86-4d9c-4cf0-bebf-24d31fc2ff56\",\"integrity_level\":\"Unknown\",\"item_status\":0,\"agent\":{\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"domainname\":\"WORKGROUP\",\"agentid\":\"77af54c8-910f-455d-b887-87cbc87430a4\",\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Datacenter\",\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"domain\":null},\"object_type\":\"process\",\"mem_working_set\":7553024,\"critical\":true,\"signature_requested\":true,\"create_time\":\"2021-05-01T07:45:59.848Z\",\"name\":\"svchost.exe\",\"maybe_hollow\":false,\"mem_private_bytes\":1777664,\"ppid\":752,\"status\":\"running\",\"exe\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "investigation",
"kind": "event",
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"info"
]
},
"agent": {
"id": "77af54c8-910f-455d-b887-87cbc87430a4",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "WORKGROUP",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Datacenter"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"file": {
"path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"name": "svchost.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "8a0a29438052faed8a2532da50455756",
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"sha256": "7fd065bac18c5278777ae44908101cdfed72d26fa741367f0ad4d02020787ab6"
},
"pe": {
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"file_version": "10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
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}
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"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"event_id\":3,\"dport\":2525,\"tenant\":\"\",\"initiated\":\"true\",\"image_name\":\"E:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\Bin\\\\MSExchangeHMWorker.exe\",\"username\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\",\"saddr\":\"192.168.120.41\",\"agent\":{\"distroid\":null,\"agentid\":\"f43cb847-8227-4104-b77f-7fc849789f8e\",\"domainname\":\"EXAMPLE\",\"ostype\":\"windows\",\"hostname\":\"EXCHANGE\",\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"domain\":null,\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Standard\"},\"is_ipv6\":\"false\",\"sport\":21955,\"pid\":14228,\"direction\":\"out\",\"conn_type\":0,\"daddr\":\"192.168.120.41\",\"@timestamp\":\"2021-11-21T19:38:44.461Z\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"log_type\":\"network\",\"@event_create_date\":\"2021-11-21T19:38:36.820Z\",\"process_unique_id\":\"2d1de721-5d5a-46b2-3794-0097821d2ab7\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "network",
"category": [
"network"
],
"type": [
"connection"
],
"kind": "event"
},
"@timestamp": "2021-11-21T19:38:36.820000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "f43cb847-8227-4104-b77f-7fc849789f8e",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "EXCHANGE"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "EXCHANGE",
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Standard"
},
"name": "EXCHANGE"
},
"destination": {
"ip": "192.168.120.41",
"port": 2525,
"address": "192.168.120.41"
},
"source": {
"ip": "192.168.120.41",
"port": 21955,
"address": "192.168.120.41"
},
"process": {
"pid": 14228,
"executable": "E:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Bin\\MSExchangeHMWorker.exe"
},
"user": {
"name": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"EXCHANGE"
],
"ip": [
"192.168.120.41"
],
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"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"daddr\":\"172.31.9.222\",\"event_id\":3,\"dport\":3389,\"agent\":{\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"domainname\":\"WORKGROUP\",\"agentid\":\"d4e3bf36-929d-4ddf-8526-492e89955808\",\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Datacenter\",\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"domain\":null},\"conn_type\":0,\"pid\":1004,\"sport\":42221,\"is_ipv6\":\"false\",\"username\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\NETWORK SERVICE\",\"@timestamp\":\"2021-05-01T09:55:44.688Z\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"image_name\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"saddr\":\"185.202.2.238\",\"direction\":\"in\",\"initiated\":\"false\",\"log_type\":\"network\",\"@event_create_date\":\"2021-05-01T09:55:30.372Z\",\"process_unique_id\":\"9aad140d-929d-4ddf-03ec-008c68ef14a0\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "network",
"category": [
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],
"type": [
"connection"
],
"kind": "event"
},
"@timestamp": "2021-05-01T09:55:30.372000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "d4e3bf36-929d-4ddf-8526-492e89955808",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "WORKGROUP",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Datacenter"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"destination": {
"ip": "172.31.9.222",
"port": 3389,
"address": "172.31.9.222"
},
"source": {
"ip": "185.202.2.238",
"port": 42221,
"address": "185.202.2.238"
},
"process": {
"pid": 1004,
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe"
},
"user": {
"name": "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
],
"ip": [
"172.31.9.222",
"185.202.2.238"
],
"user": [
"NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"commandline\": \"C:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe /c wmic /namespace:\\\\\\\\root\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\Defender path MSFT_MpComputerStatus get /format:list\",\n \"ppid\": 10420,\n \"grandparent_commandline\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\CentraStage\\\\CagServi.exe\",\n \"usersid\": \"S-1-5-20\",\n \"fake_ppid\": 0,\n \"integrity_level\": \"System\",\n \"parent_commandline\": \"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\CentraStage\\\\AEMAgent\\\\AEMAge.exe\",\n \"signature_info\": {\n \"root_info\": {\n \"serial_number\": \"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4339zz\",\n \"thumbprint_sha256\": \"df545bf919a2499c36983b54cdfc903dfa4f37d3996d8d84b4c31eec6f3c163e\",\n \"thumbprint\": \"3b1efd3a66ea99b16697394703a72ca340a05bd5\",\n \"issuer_name\": \"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2012\",\n \"display_name\": \"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2012\"\n },\n \"signer_info\": {\n \"serial_number\": \"330000038db0bfe1b0ca33b3d987500000038d\",\n \"thumbprint_sha256\": \"555ad75f46a698e6f8fe2f0f2503fb7a7aa25f505c02d9b52755f467a80183a7\",\n \"thumbprint\": \"d2b3b8f120152efc5415a10dbd7723b0c4531f0b\",\n \"issuer_name\": \"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\n \"display_name\": \"Microsoft Windows\"\n },\n \"signed_authenticode\": false,\n \"signed_catalog\": true\n },\n \"pe_imphash\": \"272875E2988E1E430500B852C4FB5E18\",\n \"process_name\": \"cmd.exe\",\n \"grandparent_integrity_level\": \"System\",\n \"pe_timestamp_int\": 3788242003,\n \"groups\": [\n {\n \"name\": \"Group 1\",\n \"id\": \"16314dd0-e911-4350-bd96-8363a69d33c9\"\n }\n ],\n \"@Version\": \"1\",\n \"session\": 0,\n \"@event_create_date\": \"2023-02-20T14:48:58.984Z\",\n \"log_type\": \"process\",\n \"signed\": true,\n \"image_name\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\",\n \"fake_parent_commandline\": \"\",\n \"@timestamp\": \"2023-02-20T14:50:04.011333Z\",\n \"parent_unique_id\": \"572c3308-18a0-4435-8fa4-e02e909cd099\",\n \"event\": {\n \"original\": \"{\\\"commandline\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\windows\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\cmd.exe /c wmic /namespace:\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\root\\\\\\\\Microsoft\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\Defender path LDKD_MpComputerStatus get /format:list\\\",\\\"create_time\\\":\\\"2023/04/20 14:48:58.984\\\",\\\"current_directory\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\ProgramData\\\\\\\\CentraStage\\\\\\\\AEMAge\\\\\\\\\\\",\\\"hashes\\\":{\\\"md5\\\":\\\"8a2122e8554dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee\\\",\\\"sha1\\\":\\\"f1efb0fddc665e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d\\\",\\\"sha256\\\":\\\"b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e4456e377406e65963366c874450\\\"},\\\"image_name\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\cmd.exe\\\",\\\"log_type\\\":\\\"process\\\",\\\"parent_commandline\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\ProgramData\\\\\\\\CentraStage\\\\\\\\AEMAge\\\\\\\\AEMAge.exe\\\",\\\"parent_image\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\ProgramData\\\\\\\\CentraStage\\\\\\\\AEMAgent\\\\\\\\AEMAge.exe\\\",\\\"parent_unique_id\\\":\\\"572c3308-18a0-4435-8fa4-e02e909cd099\\\",\\\"pid\\\":13824,\\\"ppid\\\":10547,\\\"process_name\\\":\\\"cmd.exe\\\",\\\"process_unique_id\\\":\\\"43c20ef1-03c4-4af5-0036-00d767b57302\\\",\\\"size\\\":289792,\\\"username\\\":\\\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\\\",\\\"grandparent_image\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\\\\\Centrage\\\\\\\\CagSer.exe\\\",\\\"grandparent_commandline\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\\\\\Centra\\\\\\\\CagServ.exe\\\",\\\"usersid\\\":\\\"S-1-5-87\\\",\\\"integrity_level\\\":\\\"System\\\",\\\"session\\\":0,\\\"logonid\\\":999,\\\"parent_integrity_level\\\":\\\"System\\\",\\\"grandparent_integrity_level\\\":\\\"System\\\",\\\"fake_ppid\\\":0,\\\"fake_parent_image\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"fake_parent_commandline\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"pe_info\\\":{\\\"company_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft Corporation\\\",\\\"file_description\\\":\\\"Windows Command Processor\\\",\\\"file_version\\\":\\\"10.0.19041.746 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\\\",\\\"internal_name\\\":\\\"cmd\\\",\\\"legal_copyright\\\":\\\"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\\\",\\\"original_filename\\\":\\\"Cmd.Exe\\\",\\\"pe_timestamp\\\":\\\"2090-01-16 09:26:43.000\\\",\\\"product_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\\\",\\\"product_version\\\":\\\"10.0.19041.746\\\"},\\\"signed\\\":true,\\\"signature_info\\\":{\\\"signer_info\\\":{\\\"serial_number\\\":\\\"330000038db0bfe1b0ca33b3d400000058748d\\\",\\\"thumbprint\\\":\\\"d2b3b8f124652efc5415a10dbd7723b0c9542f0b\\\",\\\"thumbprint_sha256\\\":\\\"974ad75f46a698e6f8fe2f0f2503fb7a7aa61f505c02d9b52755f467a80183a7\\\",\\\"issuer_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\\\",\\\"display_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft Windows\\\"},\\\"root_info\\\":{\\\"serial_number\\\":\\\"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4024aa\\\",\\\"thumbprint\\\":\\\"3b1efd3a66ea28b16697394703a72ca965a05bd5\\\",\\\"thumbprint_sha256\\\":\\\"df545bf014a2439c36983b54cdfc903dfa4f37d3741d8d84b4c31eec6f3c163e\\\",\\\"issuer_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2012\\\",\\\"display_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\\\"},\\\"signed_authenticode\\\":false,\\\"signed_catalog\\\":true},\\\"pe_timestamp_int\\\":3788242003,\\\"pe_timestamp\\\":\\\"2090-01-16 09:26:43.000\\\",\\\"pe_imphash\\\":\\\"272245E2988E1E430500B852C4FB5E99\\\",\\\"log_platform_flag\\\":0,\\\"groups\\\":[{\\\"id\\\":\\\"572c3308-18a0-4435-8fa4-e02e909cd099\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"Group 1\\\"}],\\\"agent\\\":{\\\"agentid\\\":\\\"7bba20c2-03c4-4af5-9b27-9e7aab902c85\\\",\\\"hostname\\\":\\\"SFRTAOA\\\",\\\"domain\\\":null,\\\"domainname\\\":\\\"EXAMPLE\\\",\\\"dnsdomainname\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"ostype\\\":\\\"windows\\\",\\\"osversion\\\":\\\"9.0.19544\\\",\\\"distroid\\\":null,\\\"osproducttype\\\":\\\"Windows 10 Pro\\\",\\\"version\\\":\\\"2.25.4-posy4\\\",\\\"additional_info\\\":null}}\"\n },\n \"parent_integrity_level\": \"System\",\n \"pid\": 13824,\n \"grandparent_image\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Centra\\\\CagServ.exe\",\n \"hashes\": {\n \"md5\": \"8a2122e8162dbef04620b9c3e0b6cdee\",\n \"sha1\": \"f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f89a54700e4e7984d55d\",\n \"sha256\": \"b99d74d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450\"\n },\n \"log_platform_flag\": 0,\n \"tenant\": \"0198bff0ef04d4a8\",\n \"size\": 289792,\n \"username\": \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\",\n \"agent\": {\n \"hostname\": \"SFRTAOA\",\n \"osversion\": \"10.0.19044\",\n \"version\": \"2.25.4-post0\",\n \"domainname\": \"EXAMPLE\",\n \"distroid\": null,\n \"additional_info\": null,\n \"agentid\": \"7bba20c2-03c4-4af5-9b27-9e7aab977c85\",\n \"osproducttype\": \"Windows 10 Pro\",\n \"dnsdomainname\": \"example.org\",\n \"ostype\": \"windows\",\n \"domain\": null\n },\n \"parent_image\": \"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Centra\\\\AEMAge\\\\AEMAge.exe\",\n \"pe_timestamp\": \"2090-01-16T09:26:43.000Z\",\n \"logonid\": 545,\n \"fake_parent_image\": \"\",\n \"process_unique_id\": \"653d2616-2068-48fa-9f89-83e4e546d8e5\",\n \"pe_info\": {\n \"legal_copyright\": \"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\",\n \"company_name\": \"Microsoft Corporation\",\n \"original_filename\": \"Cmd.Exe\",\n \"pe_timestamp\": \"2090-01-16T09:26:43.000Z\",\n \"product_name\": \"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\n \"product_version\": \"10.0.19041.746\",\n \"internal_name\": \"cmd\",\n \"file_description\": \"Windows Command Processor\",\n \"file_version\": \"10.0.19041.746 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\"\n },\n \"current_directory\": \"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\CentraStage\\\\AEMAgent\\\\\"\n}",
"event": {
"dataset": "process",
"category": [
"process"
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"type": [
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],
"kind": "event"
},
"@timestamp": "2023-02-20T14:48:58.984000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "7bba20c2-03c4-4af5-9b27-9e7aab977c85",
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},
"log": {
"hostname": "SFRTAOA"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "SFRTAOA",
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"os": {
"version": "10.0.19044",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "SFRTAOA"
},
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},
"user": {
"roles": "Group1",
"name": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
},
"process": {
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"file_version": "10.0.19041.746 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"imphash": "272875E2988E1E430500B852C4FB5E18"
},
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"parent": {
"executable": "C:\\ProgramData\\Centra\\AEMAge\\AEMAge.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\ProgramData\\CentraStage\\AEMAgent\\AEMAge.exe",
"name": "AEMAge.exe"
},
"working_directory": "C:\\ProgramData\\CentraStage\\AEMAgent\\"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
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],
"hosts": [
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],
"user": [
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]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"tenant\":\"\",\"usersid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"hashes\":{\"sha256\":\"100af46c952e58105dbc51eb92510f6990377a3ffc57e82074a8bfb64c56c529\",\"md5\":\"4c7a9a333afb2b0896b4e8a948e58b79\",\"sha1\":\"948febd5456420916256fcc94e3ed19aafe5390b\"},\"status_msg\":\"\",\"username\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\",\"agent\":{\"distroid\":null,\"agentid\":\"f43cb847-8227-4104-b77f-7fc849789f8e\",\"domainname\":\"NIVURA\",\"ostype\":\"windows\",\"hostname\":\"EXCHANGE\",\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"domain\":null,\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Standard\"},\"status\":0,\"fake_ppid\":null,\"integrity_level\":\"System\",\"signed\":true,\"signature_info\":{\"signed_catalog\":true,\"signer_info\":{\"display_name\":\"Microsoft Windows\",\"issuer_name\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\"serial_number\":\"33000002ed2c45e4c145cf48440000000002ed\",\"thumbprint\":\"312860d2047eb81f8f58c29ff19ecdb4c634cf6a\"},\"root_info\":{\"display_name\":\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\"issuer_name\":\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\"serial_number\":\"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4339aa\",\"thumbprint\":\"3b1efd3a66ea28b16697394703a72ca340a05bd5\"},\"signed_authenticode\":false},\"parent_commandline\":\"E:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\Bin\\\\Microsoft.Exchange.Diagnostics.Service.exe\",\"@timestamp\":\"2021-11-21T20:03:15.736Z\",\"parent_image\":\"E:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\Bin\\\\Microsoft.Exchange.Diagnostics.Service.exe\",\"log_type\":\"process\",\"current_directory\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\",\"pe_imphash\":\"6043170F48FA2A2802231975BB43BBDA\",\"process_unique_id\":\"2d1de721-5d5a-46b2-5ae8-00feb4cdcf56\",\"size\":53760,\"log_platform_flag\":0,\"commandline\":\"relog.exe E:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\Logging\\\\Diagnostics\\\\PerformanceLogsToBeProcessed\\\\ExchangeDiagnosticsPerformanceLog_11212058.blg -f csv -o E:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\Logging\\\\Diagnostics\\\\PerformanceLogsToBeProcessed\\\\ExchangeDiagnosticsPerformanceLog_11212058.csvtmp -y\",\"session\":0,\"process_name\":\"relog.exe\",\"image_name\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\relog.exe\",\"parent_integrity_level\":\"System\",\"fake_parent_commandline\":null,\"pe_timestamp_int\":2652523548,\"error_msg\":\"\",\"parent_unique_id\":\"2d1de721-5d5a-46b2-0c78-009ac6cf01ea\",\"pid\":23272,\"ppid\":3192,\"fake_parent_image\":null,\"@event_create_date\":\"2021-11-21T20:03:08.226Z\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"pe_timestamp\":\"2054-01-20T12:05:48.000Z\",\"fake_parent_unique_id\":null,\"pe_info\":{\"product_version\":\"10.0.17763.1\",\"company_name\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"product_name\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"internal_name\":\"Relog.exe\",\"file_description\":\"Performance Relogging Utility\",\"legal_copyright\":\"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\",\"file_version\":\"10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\"original_filename\":\"Relog.exe\"},\"logonid\":999}",
"event": {
"dataset": "process",
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"start"
],
"kind": "event"
},
"@timestamp": "2021-11-21T20:03:08.226000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "f43cb847-8227-4104-b77f-7fc849789f8e",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "EXCHANGE"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "EXCHANGE",
"domain": "NIVURA",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Standard"
},
"name": "EXCHANGE"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "relog.exe E:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\Diagnostics\\PerformanceLogsToBeProcessed\\ExchangeDiagnosticsPerformanceLog_11212058.blg -f csv -o E:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\Diagnostics\\PerformanceLogsToBeProcessed\\ExchangeDiagnosticsPerformanceLog_11212058.csvtmp -y",
"pid": 23272,
"name": "relog.exe",
"pe": {
"description": "Performance Relogging Utility",
"original_file_name": "Relog.exe",
"file_version": "10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"imphash": "6043170F48FA2A2802231975BB43BBDA"
},
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\relog.exe",
"parent": {
"executable": "E:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Bin\\Microsoft.Exchange.Diagnostics.Service.exe",
"command_line": "E:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Bin\\Microsoft.Exchange.Diagnostics.Service.exe",
"name": "Microsoft.Exchange.Diagnostics.Service.exe"
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\system32"
},
"user": {
"name": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"md5": "4c7a9a333afb2b0896b4e8a948e58b79",
"sha256": "100af46c952e58105dbc51eb92510f6990377a3ffc57e82074a8bfb64c56c529",
"sha1": "948febd5456420916256fcc94e3ed19aafe5390b"
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"100af46c952e58105dbc51eb92510f6990377a3ffc57e82074a8bfb64c56c529",
"4c7a9a333afb2b0896b4e8a948e58b79",
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],
"hosts": [
"EXCHANGE"
],
"user": [
"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@version\": \"1\",\n \"agent\": {\n \"agentid\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"distroid\": null,\n \"domainname\": \"domain123\",\n \"ostype\": \"windows\",\n \"hostname\": \"pc123\",\n \"osversion\": \"10.0.19041\",\n \"osproducttype\": \"Windows 10 Pro\",\n \"domain\": null,\n \"version\": \"2.12.6\"\n },\n \"type\": \"rtlogs\",\n \"alert_subtype\": \"process\",\n \"log_type\": \"alert\",\n \"detection_origin\": \"agent\",\n \"tenant\": \"\",\n \"alert_time\": \"2022-03-15T07:26:01.276+00:00\",\n \"alert_type\": \"sigma\",\n \"status\": \"false_positive\",\n \"rule_id\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"@event_create_date\": \"2022-03-15T07:26:01.276Z\",\n \"alert_unique_id\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"level\": \"low\",\n \"aggregation_key\": \"123456\",\n \"@timestamp\": \"2022-03-15T07:26:01.311Z\",\n \"tags\": [\n \"attack.discovery\",\n \"attack.t1057\",\n \"attack.s0057\"\n ],\n \"process\": {\n \"detection_timestamp\": \"2022/03/15 07:24:54.438105\",\n \"process_unique_id\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"parent_integrity_level\": \"Medium\",\n \"log_platform_flag\": 0,\n \"fake_parent_image\": null,\n \"pid\": 11320,\n \"image_name\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\tasklist.exe\",\n \"username\": \"XXX\\\\XXX\",\n \"logonid\": 151210562,\n \"signature_info\": {\n \"signed_authenticode\": false,\n \"signed_catalog\": true,\n \"root_info\": {\n \"thumbprint\": \"3b1efd3a66ea28b16697394703a72ca340a05bd5\",\n \"display_name\": \"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\n \"serial_number\": \"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4339aa\",\n \"issuer_name\": \"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\"\n },\n \"signer_info\": {\n \"thumbprint\": \"f7c2f2c96a328c13cda8cdb57b715bdea2cbd1d9\",\n \"display_name\": \"Microsoft Windows\",\n \"serial_number\": \"33000002ec6579ad1e670890130000000002ec\",\n \"issuer_name\": \"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\"\n }\n },\n \"current_directory\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\EPOS\\\\EPOS Connect\",\n \"error_msg\": \"\",\n \"status_msg\": \"sigma match detected this process but not configured to block it\",\n \"ppid\": 17808,\n \"fake_parent_commandline\": null,\n \"commandline\": \"tasklist\",\n \"signed\": true,\n \"grandparent_integrity_level\": \"Medium\",\n \"log_type\": \"process\",\n \"pe_imphash\": \"19BBD9C4E73C288A3645E163F4B82682\",\n \"create_time\": \"2022-03-15T07:24:54.260Z\",\n \"status\": 0,\n \"parent_image\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\cmd.exe\",\n \"integrity_level\": \"Medium\",\n \"usersid\": \"S-1-5-21-299502267-725345543-82448378-2366\",\n \"pe_info\": {\n \"product_version\": \"10.0.19041.1\",\n \"legal_copyright\": \"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\",\n \"original_filename\": \"tasklist.exe\",\n \"company_name\": \"Microsoft Corporation\",\n \"file_description\": \"Lists the current running tasks\",\n \"file_version\": \"10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n \"internal_name\": \"tasklist.exe\",\n \"product_name\": \"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\"\n },\n \"session\": 3,\n \"pe_timestamp\": \"1994-09-11T16:43:21.000Z\",\n \"parent_unique_id\": \"2332edf8-70c0-43c2-4590-00f912ab3d18\",\n \"process_name\": \"tasklist.exe\",\n \"grandparent_commandline\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\EPOS\\\\EPOS Connect\\\\EPOSConnect.exe 1\",\n \"pe_timestamp_int\": 779301801,\n \"grandparent_image\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\EPOS\\\\EPOS Connect\\\\EPOSConnect.exe\",\n \"parent_commandline\": \"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe /d /s /c tasklist\",\n \"fake_parent_unique_id\": null,\n \"size\": 79360,\n \"fake_ppid\": null,\n \"hashes\": {\n \"sha1\": \"7f50d8c3cf3ec79122a876e969bdb65d939becd0\",\n \"sha256\": \"76eac7b5f53e0d58a98d5a6ddf9c97e19d1462ef65c0035d7798f89988b15ab4\",\n \"md5\": \"0a4448b31ce7f83cb7691a2657f330f1\"\n }\n },\n \"execution\": 0,\n \"rule_name\": \"Discovery: Process list\",\n \"maturity\": \"stable\",\n \"msg\": \"Detects the execution of tasklist.exe, a tool used to gather detailed information about a computer's active processes.\"\n}\n",
"event": {
"dataset": "alert",
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"start"
],
"kind": "alert"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-03-15T07:26:01.276000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "pc123"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "pc123",
"domain": "domain123",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.19041",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "pc123"
},
"harfanglab": {
"level": "low",
"alert_time": "2022-03-15T07:26:01.276+00:00",
"alert_unique_id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"alert_subtype": "process",
"execution": 0,
"status": "false_positive",
"aggregation_key": "123456"
},
"rule": {
"description": "Detects the execution of tasklist.exe, a tool used to gather detailed information about a computer's active processes.",
"name": "Discovery: Process list",
"category": "sigma",
"id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "tasklist",
"pid": 11320,
"name": "tasklist.exe",
"pe": {
"description": "Lists the current running tasks",
"original_file_name": "tasklist.exe",
"file_version": "10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"imphash": "19BBD9C4E73C288A3645E163F4B82682"
},
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\tasklist.exe",
"parent": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\cmd.exe /d /s /c tasklist"
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\EPOS\\EPOS Connect"
},
"user": {
"name": "XXX\\XXX"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"md5": "0a4448b31ce7f83cb7691a2657f330f1",
"sha256": "76eac7b5f53e0d58a98d5a6ddf9c97e19d1462ef65c0035d7798f89988b15ab4",
"sha1": "7f50d8c3cf3ec79122a876e969bdb65d939becd0"
}
},
"related": {
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"7f50d8c3cf3ec79122a876e969bdb65d939becd0"
],
"hosts": [
"pc123"
],
"user": [
"XXX\\XXX"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"signature_info\":{\"root_info\":{\"display_name\":\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\",\"thumbprint\":\"3b1efd3a66ea28b16697394703a72ca340a05bd5\",\"serial_number\":\"28cc3a25bfba44ac449a9b586b4339aa\",\"issuer_name\":\"Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010\"},\"signed_catalog\":true,\"signer_info\":{\"display_name\":\"Microsoft Windows\",\"thumbprint\":\"ae9c1ae54763822eec42474983d8b635116c8452\",\"serial_number\":\"33000001c422b2f79b793dacb20000000001c4\",\"issuer_name\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\"},\"signed_authenticode\":false},\"commandline\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding\",\"fake_parent_commandline\":null,\"session\":0,\"pid\":4028,\"process_name\":\"WmiPrvSE.exe\",\"pe_info\":{\"product_version\":\"10.0.17763.1\",\"file_description\":\"WMI Provider Host\",\"original_filename\":\"Wmiprvse.exe\",\"internal_name\":\"Wmiprvse.exe\",\"file_version\":\"10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\"company_name\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"legal_copyright\":\"\u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\",\"product_name\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\"},\"fake_parent_image\":null,\"@timestamp\":\"2021-05-02T19:52:34.492Z\",\"username\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\NETWORK SERVICE\",\"pe_timestamp_int\":3717952540,\"@version\":\"1\",\"image_name\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiPrvSE.exe\",\"parent_integrity_level\":\"System\",\"fake_parent_unique_id\":null,\"status_msg\":\"\",\"log_type\":\"process\",\"logonid\":996,\"process_unique_id\":\"9aad140d-929d-4ddf-0fbc-006fa79b94af\",\"usersid\":\"S-1-5-20\",\"error_msg\":\"\",\"parent_image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"fake_ppid\":null,\"integrity_level\":\"System\",\"agent\":{\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"domainname\":\"WORKGROUP\",\"agentid\":\"d4e3bf36-929d-4ddf-8526-492e89955808\",\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Datacenter\",\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"domain\":null},\"current_directory\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\",\"pe_timestamp\":\"2087-10-25T20:35:40.000Z\",\"parent_unique_id\":\"9aad140d-929d-4ddf-0358-002a32b395aa\",\"pe_imphash\":\"CFECEDC01015A4FD1BAACAC9E592D88B\",\"hashes\":{\"md5\":\"06c66ff5ccdc2d22344a3eb761a4d38a\",\"sha256\":\"b5c78bef3883e3099f7ef844da1446db29107e5c0223b97f29e7fafab5527f15\",\"sha1\":\"67c25c8f28b5fa7f5baa85bf1d2726aed48e9cf0\"},\"size\":489472,\"parent_commandline\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p\",\"@event_create_date\":\"2021-05-02T19:52:24.083Z\",\"signed\":true,\"ppid\":856,\"status\":0}",
"event": {
"dataset": "process",
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"start"
],
"kind": "event"
},
"@timestamp": "2021-05-02T19:52:24.083000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "d4e3bf36-929d-4ddf-8526-492e89955808",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "WORKGROUP",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Datacenter"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding",
"pid": 4028,
"name": "WmiPrvSE.exe",
"pe": {
"description": "WMI Provider Host",
"original_file_name": "Wmiprvse.exe",
"file_version": "10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"imphash": "CFECEDC01015A4FD1BAACAC9E592D88B"
},
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
"parent": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p",
"name": "svchost.exe"
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\system32"
},
"user": {
"name": "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"md5": "06c66ff5ccdc2d22344a3eb761a4d38a",
"sha256": "b5c78bef3883e3099f7ef844da1446db29107e5c0223b97f29e7fafab5527f15",
"sha1": "67c25c8f28b5fa7f5baa85bf1d2726aed48e9cf0"
}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"06c66ff5ccdc2d22344a3eb761a4d38a",
"67c25c8f28b5fa7f5baa85bf1d2726aed48e9cf0",
"b5c78bef3883e3099f7ef844da1446db29107e5c0223b97f29e7fafab5527f15"
],
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
],
"user": [
"NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"user_data\": {},\n \"@timestamp\": \"2023-05-16T08:45:22.407186Z\",\n \"process_id\": 0,\n \"@event_create_date\": \"2023-05-16T08:46:54.000Z\",\n \"type\": \"wineventlog\",\n \"source_name\": \"Windows Error Reporting\",\n \"thread_id\": 0,\n \"event\": {\n \"original\": \"{\\\"computer_name\\\":\\\"SARTE03.example.org\\\",\\\"event_date\\\":\\\"2023/05/16 08:46:54.000\\\",\\\"event_id\\\":1001,\\\"keywords\\\":[\\\"EventlogClassic\\\"],\\\"level\\\":\\\"INFORMATION\\\",\\\"log_name\\\":\\\"Application\\\",\\\"log_type\\\":\\\"eventlog\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"wineventlog\\\",\\\"user\\\":{\\\"domain\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"identifier\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"unknown\\\"},\\\"event_data\\\":{\\\"param7\\\":\\\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\\\",\\\"param10\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"param12\\\":\\\"AutomaticUpdates\\\",\\\"param0\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"param16\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"param4\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"param8\\\":\\\"Scan\\\",\\\"param13\\\":\\\"{581473F3-A4DC-4D00-8245-D203EAA9B5A9}\\\",\\\"param15\\\":\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\WindowsUpdate.log\\\\r\\\\nC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\SoftwareDistribution\\\\\\\\ReportingEvents.log\\\",\\\"param9\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"param11\\\":\\\"8024500b\\\",\\\"param20\\\":\\\"262144\\\",\\\"param6\\\":\\\"80072ee2\\\",\\\"param2\\\":\\\"WindowsUpdateFailure3\\\",\\\"param3\\\":\\\"Non disponible\\\",\\\"param21\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"param1\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"param17\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"param18\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"param14\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"param5\\\":\\\"7.9.9600.19915\\\",\\\"param19\\\":\\\"3e7b694e-4cf1-45cc-93ff-f30da6e8f683\\\"},\\\"process_id\\\":0,\\\"record_number\\\":26500965,\\\"source_name\\\":\\\"Windows Error Reporting\\\",\\\"thread_id\\\":0,\\\"user_data\\\":{},\\\"groups\\\":[{\\\"id\\\":\\\"bced64f1-9d22-4001-9425-604e45a14d66\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"Group 1\\\"}],\\\"destination\\\":\\\"syslog\\\",\\\"agent\\\":{\\\"agentid\\\":\\\"adbd57f0-3bf7-4b33-9845-eb489b1b0eea\\\",\\\"hostname\\\":\\\"SARTE03\\\",\\\"domain\\\":null,\\\"domainname\\\":\\\"EXA_0342\\\",\\\"dnsdomainname\\\":\\\"ipline.ovh\\\",\\\"ostype\\\":\\\"windows\\\",\\\"osversion\\\":\\\"6.3.9600\\\",\\\"distroid\\\":null,\\\"osproducttype\\\":\\\"Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard\\\",\\\"version\\\":\\\"2.25.13-post0\\\",\\\"additional_info\\\":null}}\"\n },\n \"event_data\": {\n \"param11\": \"8024500b\",\n \"param8\": \"Scan\",\n \"param7\": \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\",\n \"param12\": \"AutomaticUpdates\",\n \"param13\": \"{581473F3-A4DC-4D00-8245-D203EAA9B5A9}\",\n \"param18\": \"0\",\n \"param16\": \"\",\n \"param1\": \"0\",\n \"param17\": \"\",\n \"param0\": \"\",\n \"param4\": \"0\",\n \"param10\": \"0\",\n \"param19\": \"3e7b694e-4cf1-45cc-93ff-f30da6e8f683\",\n \"param15\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\WindowsUpdate.log\\r\\nC:\\\\Windows\\\\SoftwareDistribution\\\\ReportingEvents.log\",\n \"param20\": \"262144\",\n \"param2\": \"WindowsUpdateFailure3\",\n \"param21\": \"\",\n \"param14\": \"0\",\n \"param5\": \"7.9.9600.19915\",\n \"param9\": \"0\",\n \"param6\": \"80072ee2\",\n \"param3\": \"Non disponible\"\n },\n \"@version\": \"1\",\n \"keywords\": [\n \"EventlogClassic\"\n ],\n \"destination\": \"syslog\",\n \"log_name\": \"Application\",\n \"log_type\": \"eventlog\",\n \"user\": {\n \"name\": \"\",\n \"domain\": \"\",\n \"identifier\": \"\",\n \"type\": \"unknown\"\n },\n \"agent\": {\n \"agentid\": \"adbd57f0-3bf7-4b33-9845-eb489b1b0eea\",\n \"hostname\": \"SARTE03\",\n \"osversion\": \"6.3.9600\",\n \"additional_info\": null,\n \"osproducttype\": \"Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard\",\n \"domain\": null,\n \"version\": \"2.25.13-post0\",\n \"dnsdomainname\": \"example.org\",\n \"ostype\": \"windows\",\n \"distroid\": null,\n \"domainname\": \"EXA_0342\"\n },\n \"level\": \"INFORMATION\",\n \"event_id\": 1001,\n \"groups\": [\n {\n \"id\": \"bced64f1-9d22-4001-9425-604e45a14d66\",\n \"name\": \"Group 1\"\n }\n ],\n \"tenant\": \"8029547657723b01\",\n \"computer_name\": \"SARTE03.example.org\",\n \"record_number\": 26500965\n}",
"event": {
"dataset": "eventlog",
"kind": "event",
"type": [
"info"
],
"provider": "Windows Error Reporting",
"code": "1001"
},
"@timestamp": "2023-05-16T08:46:54Z",
"agent": {
"id": "adbd57f0-3bf7-4b33-9845-eb489b1b0eea",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "SARTE03"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "SARTE03",
"domain": "EXA_0342",
"os": {
"version": "6.3.9600",
"full": "Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard"
},
"name": "SARTE03"
},
"harfanglab": {
"groups": [
"{\"id\": \"bced64f1-9d22-4001-9425-604e45a14d66\", \"name\": \"Group 1\"}"
]
},
"user": {
"roles": "Group1"
},
"action": {
"properties": {
"param11": "8024500b",
"param8": "Scan",
"param7": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"param12": "AutomaticUpdates",
"param13": "{581473F3-A4DC-4D00-8245-D203EAA9B5A9}",
"param18": "0",
"param16": "",
"param1": "0",
"param17": "",
"param0": "",
"param4": "0",
"param10": "0",
"param19": "3e7b694e-4cf1-45cc-93ff-f30da6e8f683",
"param15": "C:\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate.log\r\nC:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents.log",
"param20": "262144",
"param2": "WindowsUpdateFailure3",
"param21": "",
"param14": "0",
"param5": "7.9.9600.19915",
"param9": "0",
"param6": "80072ee2",
"param3": "Non disponible"
},
"id": 1001
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SARTE03"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"level\": \"LOG_ALWAYS\",\n \"@Version\": \"1\",\n \"@event_create_date\": \"2023-04-20T14:48:59.809Z\",\n \"groups\": [\n {\n \"name\": \"Group 1\",\n \"id\": \"954bc41c-bfae-4d24-9606-add4e1ab4280\"\n },\n {\n \"name\": \"Group 2\",\n \"id\": \"a9458e5a-fbd1-466a-8e0a-d25c2948aa61\"\n }\n ],\n \"source_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"log_type\": \"eventlog\",\n \"event_data\": {\n \"IpPort\": \"17780\",\n \"ProcessName\": \"-\",\n \"SubjectDomainName\": \"-\",\n \"TargetUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-11111111111-111111111111-11111111-111\",\n \"LogonProcessName\": \"Kerbe\",\n \"RestrictedAdminMode\": \"-\",\n \"LogonType\": \"3\",\n \"ElevatedToken\": \"%%1842\",\n \"TargetOutboundDomainName\": \"-\",\n \"SubjectUserName\": \"-\",\n \"AuthenticationPackageName\": \"Kerberos\",\n \"VirtualAccount\": \"%%1843\",\n \"WorkstationName\": \"-\",\n \"IpAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n \"LogonGuid\": \"{7B5ACC17-5CED-4A2D-ABCB-BECAE6799395}\",\n \"TargetLinkedLogonId\": \"0x0\",\n \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x0\",\n \"TransmittedServices\": \"-\",\n \"TargetLogonId\": \"0x6accabcc3\",\n \"TargetDomainName\": \"example.org\",\n \"TargetOutboundUserName\": \"-\",\n \"LmPackageName\": \"-\",\n \"TargetUserName\": \"john.doe$\",\n \"ProcessId\": \"0x0\",\n \"ImpersonationLevel\": \"%%1833\",\n \"KeyLength\": \"0\",\n \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-0-0\"\n },\n \"@timestamp\": \"2023-04-20T14:49:02.914471Z\",\n \"thread_id\": 11111,\n \"provider_guid\": \"4d8dc5df-a605-4c76-b699-bc72464a8114\",\n \"event\": {\n \"original\": \"{\\\"computer_name\\\":\\\"sfreort.gosis.lan\\\",\\\"event_date\\\":\\\"2023/04/20 14:48:59.809\\\",\\\"event_id\\\":4624,\\\"keywords\\\":[\\\"AuditSuccess\\\",\\\"ReservedKeyword63\\\"],\\\"level\\\":\\\"LOG_ALWAYS\\\",\\\"log_name\\\":\\\"Security\\\",\\\"log_type\\\":\\\"eventlog\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"wineventlog\\\",\\\"user\\\":{\\\"domain\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"identifier\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"unknown\\\"},\\\"event_data\\\":{\\\"TargetLinkedLogonId\\\":\\\"0x0\\\",\\\"LogonType\\\":\\\"3\\\",\\\"SubjectUserSid\\\":\\\"S-1-0-0\\\",\\\"ProcessId\\\":\\\"0x0\\\",\\\"TargetLogonId\\\":\\\"0x6accabcc3\\\",\\\"TargetOutboundDomainName\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"LogonProcessName\\\":\\\"Kerberos\\\",\\\"SubjectLogonId\\\":\\\"0x0\\\",\\\"LmPackageName\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"RestrictedAdminMode\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"KeyLength\\\":\\\"0\\\",\\\"ImpersonationLevel\\\":\\\"%%1833\\\",\\\"SubjectDomainName\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"AuthenticationPackageName\\\":\\\"Kerbes\\\",\\\"WorkstationName\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"VirtualAccount\\\":\\\"%%1843\\\",\\\"IpAddress\\\":\\\"1.2.3.4\\\",\\\"LogonGuid\\\":\\\"{7B5ACC17-5CED-4A2D-ABCB-BECAE6799395}\\\",\\\"TargetOutboundUserName\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"TargetUserSid\\\":\\\"S-1-5-21-11111111111-111111111111-11111111-111\\\",\\\"TargetDomainName\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"SubjectUserName\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"TransmittedServices\\\":\\\"-\\\",\\\"ElevatedToken\\\":\\\"%%1842\\\",\\\"IpPort\\\":\\\"17780\\\",\\\"TargetUserName\\\":\\\"john.doe$\\\",\\\"ProcessName\\\":\\\"-\\\"},\\\"process_id\\\":772,\\\"provider_guid\\\":\\\"54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d\\\",\\\"record_number\\\":1069291078,\\\"source_name\\\":\\\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\\\",\\\"thread_id\\\":29956,\\\"user_data\\\":{},\\\"groups\\\":[{\\\"id\\\":\\\"2dccd722-6db5-4727-88d2-042b0d8655c3\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"Group 1\\\"},{\\\"id\\\":\\\"a9458e5a-fbd1-466a-8e0a-d25c2955aa61\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"Group 2\\\"}],\\\"destination\\\":\\\"sys\\\",\\\"agent\\\":{\\\"agentid\\\":\\\"ef3cd644-1867-4917-ac79-148c2ccd55d5\\\",\\\"hostname\\\":\\\"sfreart\\\",\\\"domain\\\":null,\\\"domainname\\\":\\\"EXAMPLE\\\",\\\"dnsdomainname\\\":\\\"example.org\\\",\\\"ostype\\\":\\\"windows\\\",\\\"osversion\\\":\\\"10.0.14393\\\",\\\"distroid\\\":null,\\\"osproducttype\\\":\\\"Windows Server 2016 Standard\\\",\\\"version\\\":\\\"2.25.4-post0\\\",\\\"additional_info\\\":null}}\"\n },\n \"type\": \"wineventlog\",\n \"keywords\": [\n \"AuditSuccess\",\n \"ReservedKeyword63\"\n ],\n \"tenant\": \"2222222222222222\",\n \"destination\": \"sys\",\n \"agent\": {\n \"hostname\": \"sfreort\",\n \"osversion\": \"10.0.14393\",\n \"version\": \"2.25.4-post0\",\n \"domainname\": \"EXAMPLE\",\n \"distroid\": null,\n \"additional_info\": null,\n \"agentid\": \"3f17a3fe-3490-4b8f-8de4-9dcdf92c68b0\",\n \"osproducttype\": \"Windows Server 2016 Standard\",\n \"dnsdomainname\": \"example.org\",\n \"ostype\": \"windows\",\n \"domain\": null\n },\n \"log_name\": \"Security\",\n \"event_id\": 4624,\n \"user\": {\n \"name\": \"\",\n \"identifier\": \"\",\n \"domain\": \"\",\n \"type\": \"unknown\"\n },\n \"user_data\": {},\n \"computer_name\": \"sfreort.example.org\",\n \"process_id\": 772,\n \"record_number\": 1069291078\n}",
"event": {
"dataset": "eventlog",
"kind": "event",
"type": [
"info",
"start"
],
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"code": "4624",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"action": "authentication_network"
},
"sekoiaio": {
"client": {
"os": {
"type": "windows"
},
"name": "sfreort",
"user": {
"id": "S-1-0-0"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "sfreort",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"@timestamp": "2023-04-20T14:48:59.809000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "3f17a3fe-3490-4b8f-8de4-9dcdf92c68b0",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "sfreort"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "sfreort",
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.14393",
"full": "Windows Server 2016 Standard"
},
"name": "sfreort"
},
"harfanglab": {
"groups": [
"{\"id\": \"954bc41c-bfae-4d24-9606-add4e1ab4280\", \"name\": \"Group 1\"}",
"{\"id\": \"a9458e5a-fbd1-466a-8e0a-d25c2948aa61\", \"name\": \"Group 2\"}"
]
},
"user": {
"roles": "Group1,Group2",
"target": {
"name": "john.doe$",
"domain": "example.org",
"id": "S-1-5-21-11111111111-111111111111-11111111-111"
}
},
"action": {
"properties": {
"IpPort": "17780",
"ProcessName": "-",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-11111111111-111111111111-11111111-111",
"LogonProcessName": "Kerbe",
"RestrictedAdminMode": "-",
"LogonType": "3",
"ElevatedToken": "%%1842",
"TargetOutboundDomainName": "-",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"AuthenticationPackageName": "Kerberos",
"VirtualAccount": "%%1843",
"WorkstationName": "-",
"IpAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"LogonGuid": "{7B5ACC17-5CED-4A2D-ABCB-BECAE6799395}",
"TargetLinkedLogonId": "0x0",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x6accabcc3",
"TargetDomainName": "example.org",
"TargetOutboundUserName": "-",
"LmPackageName": "-",
"TargetUserName": "john.doe$",
"ProcessId": "0x0",
"ImpersonationLevel": "%%1833",
"KeyLength": "0",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0"
},
"id": 4624,
"outcome": "success"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"sfreort"
]
},
"server": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE"
},
"client": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE"
},
"process": {
"name": "Kerbe"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"tenant\":\"\",\"type\":\"wineventlog\",\"@event_create_date\":\"2021-11-21T13:11:49.837Z\",\"log_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"event_data\":{\"param1\":\"7092\",\"param2\":\"DefaultAppDomain\"},\"agent\":{\"osversion\":\"10.0.19041\",\"hostname\":\"DESKTOP-9U3171J\",\"ostype\":\"windows\",\"agentid\":\"f43cb847-8227-4104-b77f-7fc849789f8e\",\"osproducttype\":\"Windows 10 Pro\",\"domainname\":\"WORKGROUP\",\"distroid\":null,\"domain\":null},\"keywords\":[],\"log_type\":\"eventlog\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"source_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"@timestamp\":\"2021-11-21T13:12:10.929Z\",\"process_id\":7092,\"task\":null,\"level\":\"Information\",\"provider_guid\":\"{A1A1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"user\":{\"name\":\"oliver\",\"type\":\"User\",\"domain\":\"DESKTOP-9U3171J\",\"identifier\":\"S-1-5-21-975228105-2966123187-4141390122-1001\"},\"record_number\":104780,\"computer_name\":\"DESKTOP-9U3171J\",\"thread_id\":6744,\"event_id\":53504,\"opcode\":null,\"user_data\":{}}",
"event": {
"dataset": "eventlog",
"kind": "event",
"type": [
"info"
],
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"code": "53504"
},
"@timestamp": "2021-11-21T13:11:49.837000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "f43cb847-8227-4104-b77f-7fc849789f8e",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-9U3171J"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-9U3171J",
"domain": "WORKGROUP",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.19041",
"full": "Windows 10 Pro"
},
"name": "DESKTOP-9U3171J"
},
"action": {
"properties": {
"param1": "7092",
"param2": "DefaultAppDomain"
},
"id": 53504
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-9U3171J"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"log_name\":\"Security\",\"type\":\"wineventlog\",\"source_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"event_id\":4625,\"provider_guid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"level\":\"Information\",\"opcode\":null,\"agent\":{\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"domainname\":\"WORKGROUP\",\"agentid\":\"77af54c8-910f-455d-b887-87cbc87430a4\",\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Datacenter\",\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"domain\":null},\"user\":null,\"event_date\":\"2021-05-08T12:18:58.996Z\",\"process_id\":760,\"@timestamp\":\"2021-05-08T12:19:10.711Z\",\"user_data\":{},\"@version\":\"1\",\"event_data\":{\"IpPort\":\"0\",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"NTLM\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"SubStatus\":\"0xc000006a\",\"IpAddress\":\"166.88.151.58\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"FailureReason\":\"%%2313\",\"WorkstationName\":\"-\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"NtLmSsp \",\"TargetUserName\":\"ADMINISTRATOR\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"TargetDomainName\":null,\"Status\":\"0xc000006d\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"ProcessId\":\"0x0\"},\"keywords\":[\"Audit Failure\"],\"task\":null,\"record_number\":5089212,\"thread_id\":1768,\"log_type\":\"eventlog\",\"computer_name\":\"REDACTED\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "eventlog",
"kind": "event",
"type": [
"info",
"start"
],
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"code": "4625",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"action": "authentication_network"
},
"sekoiaio": {
"client": {
"os": {
"type": "windows"
},
"name": "REDACTED",
"user": {
"id": "S-1-0-0"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "REDACTED",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "77af54c8-910f-455d-b887-87cbc87430a4",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "WORKGROUP",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Datacenter"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"action": {
"properties": {
"IpPort": "0",
"AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"SubStatus": "0xc000006a",
"IpAddress": "166.88.151.58",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"FailureReason": "%%2313",
"WorkstationName": "-",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
"TargetUserName": "ADMINISTRATOR",
"ProcessName": "-",
"TargetDomainName": null,
"Status": "0xc000006d",
"LmPackageName": "-",
"KeyLength": "0",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"LogonType": "3",
"ProcessId": "0x0"
},
"id": 4625,
"outcome": "failure"
},
"user": {
"target": {
"name": "ADMINISTRATOR",
"id": "S-1-0-0"
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
]
},
"server": {
"domain": "WORKGROUP"
},
"client": {
"domain": "WORKGROUP"
},
"process": {
"name": "NtLmSsp "
}
}
{
"message": "{\"computer_name\":\"REDACTED\",\"process_id\":3464,\"provider_guid\":\"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\",\"type\":\"wineventlog\",\"log_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\",\"task\":null,\"user\":{\"identifier\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"type\":\"User\",\"name\":\"Syst\u00e8me\"},\"log_type\":\"eventlog\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"tenant\":\"\",\"keywords\":[],\"@event_create_date\":\"2022-01-03T05:44:57.331Z\",\"thread_id\":23768,\"record_number\":2300,\"event_id\":1116,\"event_data\":{\"Unused4\":null,\"Threat Name\":\"Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-11882.SMK\",\"Post Clean Status\":\"0\",\"Product Version\":\"4.18.2111.5\",\"Detection Time\":\"2022-01-03T05:44:57.284Z\",\"Detection User\":\"AUTORITE NT\\\\Syst\u00e8me\",\"Status Code\":\"1\",\"Origin ID\":\"1\",\"Category ID\":\"30\",\"FWLink\":\"https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-11882.SMK!MTB&threatid=2147772194&enterprise=0\",\"Path\":\"file:_C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Avast\\\\Amex\\\\temp\\\\TMMSG_45AD4A29-D7BD-AE8F-FFBC-4115652291C2\",\"Process Name\":\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Avast\\\\Amex\\\\AMEX_secondary.exe\",\"Origin Name\":\"Ordinateur local\",\"Execution ID\":\"1\",\"Remediation User\":null,\"Status Description\":null,\"Category Name\":\"Attaque\",\"Type Name\":\"Concret\",\"State\":\"1\",\"Pre Execution Status\":\"0\",\"Type ID\":\"0\",\"Action Name\":\"Non applicable\",\"Unused6\":null,\"Additional Actions String\":\"No additional actions required\",\"Threat ID\":\"2147772194\",\"Execution Name\":\"Suspendu\",\"Severity ID\":\"5\",\"Error Description\":\"L\u2019op\u00e9ration a r\u00e9ussi. \",\"Engine Version\":\"AM: 1.1.18800.4, NIS: 1.1.18800.4\",\"Unused3\":null,\"Detection ID\":\"{2E51DC7F-A01D-4E9E-94C8-782C63D85C6E}\",\"Security intelligence Version\":\"AV: 1.355.1292.0, AS: 1.355.1292.0, NIS: 1.355.1292.0\",\"Product Name\":\"Antivirus Microsoft Defender\",\"Unused\":null,\"Action ID\":\"9\",\"Source ID\":\"3\",\"Additional Actions ID\":\"0\",\"Source Name\":\"Protection en temps r\u00e9el\",\"Unused5\":null,\"Severity Name\":\"Grave\",\"Error Code\":\"0x00000000\",\"Unused2\":null},\"level\":\"Warning\",\"source_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\",\"opcode\":null,\"@timestamp\":\"2022-01-03T05:45:12.816Z\",\"user_data\":{},\"agent\":{\"agentid\":\"06d70013-58c7-46e3-9231-452a383af90b\",\"domain\":null,\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2019 Datacenter\",\"ostype\":\"windows\",\"osversion\":\"10.0.17763\",\"version\":\"2.12.2\",\"domainname\":\"REDACTED\",\"distroid\":null,\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\"}}",
"event": {
"dataset": "eventlog",
"kind": "event",
"type": [
"info"
],
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"code": "1116"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-01-03T05:44:57.331000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "06d70013-58c7-46e3-9231-452a383af90b",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "REDACTED",
"os": {
"version": "10.0.17763",
"full": "Windows Server 2019 Datacenter"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"action": {
"properties": {
"Unused4": null,
"Threat Name": "Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-11882.SMK",
"Post Clean Status": "0",
"Product Version": "4.18.2111.5",
"Detection Time": "2022-01-03T05:44:57.284Z",
"Detection User": "AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00e8me",
"Status Code": "1",
"Origin ID": "1",
"Category ID": "30",
"FWLink": "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-11882.SMK!MTB&threatid=2147772194&enterprise=0",
"Path": "file:_C:\\Program Files\\Avast\\Amex\\temp\\TMMSG_45AD4A29-D7BD-AE8F-FFBC-4115652291C2",
"Process Name": "C:\\Program Files\\Avast\\Amex\\AMEX_secondary.exe",
"Origin Name": "Ordinateur local",
"Execution ID": "1",
"Remediation User": null,
"Status Description": null,
"Category Name": "Attaque",
"Type Name": "Concret",
"State": "1",
"Pre Execution Status": "0",
"Type ID": "0",
"Action Name": "Non applicable",
"Unused6": null,
"Additional Actions String": "No additional actions required",
"Threat ID": "2147772194",
"Execution Name": "Suspendu",
"Severity ID": "5",
"Error Description": "L\u2019op\u00e9ration a r\u00e9ussi. ",
"Engine Version": "AM: 1.1.18800.4, NIS: 1.1.18800.4",
"Unused3": null,
"Detection ID": "{2E51DC7F-A01D-4E9E-94C8-782C63D85C6E}",
"Security intelligence Version": "AV: 1.355.1292.0, AS: 1.355.1292.0, NIS: 1.355.1292.0",
"Product Name": "Antivirus Microsoft Defender",
"Unused": null,
"Action ID": "9",
"Source ID": "3",
"Additional Actions ID": "0",
"Source Name": "Protection en temps r\u00e9el",
"Unused5": null,
"Severity Name": "Grave",
"Error Code": "0x00000000",
"Unused2": null
},
"id": 1116
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"provider_guid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"task\":null,\"opcode\":null,\"agent\":{\"distroid\":null,\"hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"ostype\":\"windows\",\"domain\":null,\"osproducttype\":\"Windows Server 2012 Standard\",\"agentid\":\"aa7cf2c6-5c46-45c4-b918-ba5cd7082e53\",\"osversion\":\"6.2.9200\",\"domainname\":\"REDACTED\",\"version\":\"2.19.5\"},\"@event_create_date\":\"2022-11-14T08:41:03.066Z\",\"level\":\"Information\",\"destination\":\"syslog\",\"record_number\":1475418032,\"keywords\":[\"Audit Success\"],\"event_id\":5145,\"computer_name\":\"REDACTED.LOCAL\",\"tenant\":\"\",\"type\":\"wineventlog\",\"log_name\":\"Security\",\"process_id\":720,\"@version\":\"1\",\"thread_id\":728,\"event_data\":{\"SubjectDomainName\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"IpAddress\":\"10.84.128.186\",\"ShareLocalPath\":null,\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-7\",\"AccessList\":\"%%1538\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%1541\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4417\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4418\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4419\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4420\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4424\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"ShareName\":\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\",\"AccessReason\":\"-\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"ANONYMOUS LOGON\",\"ObjectType\":\"File\",\"IpPort\":\"50846\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3ad88f7f3\",\"AccessMask\":\"0x12019f\",\"RelativeTargetName\":\"NETLOGON\"},\"log_type\":\"eventlog\",\"@timestamp\":\"2022-11-14T08:41:05.337Z\",\"user_data\":{},\"user\":null,\"source_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\"}",
"event": {
"dataset": "eventlog",
"kind": "event",
"type": [
"info"
],
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"code": "5145"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-14T08:41:03.066000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "aa7cf2c6-5c46-45c4-b918-ba5cd7082e53",
"name": "harfanglab"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"domain": "REDACTED",
"os": {
"version": "6.2.9200",
"full": "Windows Server 2012 Standard"
},
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"action": {
"properties": {
"SubjectDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
"IpAddress": "10.84.128.186",
"ShareLocalPath": null,
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-7",
"AccessList": "%%1538\n\t\t\t\t%%1541\n\t\t\t\t%%4416\n\t\t\t\t%%4417\n\t\t\t\t%%4418\n\t\t\t\t%%4419\n\t\t\t\t%%4420\n\t\t\t\t%%4423\n\t\t\t\t%%4424\n\t\t\t\t",
"ShareName": "\\\\*\\IPC$",
"AccessReason": "-",
"SubjectUserName": "ANONYMOUS LOGON",
"ObjectType": "File",
"IpPort": "50846",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3ad88f7f3",
"AccessMask": "0x12019f",
"RelativeTargetName": "NETLOGON"
},
"id": 5145
},
"user": {
"name": "ANONYMOUS LOGON",
"domain": "AUTORITE NT"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
],
"user": [
"ANONYMOUS LOGON"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
action.properties |
object |
A detailed set of attributes associated with a specific action, typically involving user authentication or a network event. It contains the following keys: |
agent.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of this agent. |
agent.name |
keyword |
Custom name of the agent. |
agent.version |
keyword |
Version of the agent. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
dns.question.name |
keyword |
The name being queried. |
dns.question.type |
keyword |
The type of record being queried. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.dataset |
keyword |
Name of the dataset. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.provider |
keyword |
Source of the event. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.hash.md5 |
keyword |
MD5 hash. |
file.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
file.hash.sha256 |
keyword |
SHA256 hash. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
file.pe.company |
keyword |
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time. |
file.pe.description |
keyword |
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time. |
file.pe.file_version |
keyword |
Process name. |
file.pe.imphash |
keyword |
A hash of the imports in a PE file. |
file.pe.original_file_name |
keyword |
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time. |
file.pe.product |
keyword |
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time. |
harfanglab.aggregation_key |
keyword |
The key to the events aggregation |
harfanglab.alert_subtype |
keyword |
The subtype of the alert |
harfanglab.alert_time |
keyword |
The timestamp of the alert |
harfanglab.alert_unique_id |
keyword |
The identifier of the alert |
harfanglab.execution |
long |
Execution time |
harfanglab.groups |
keyword |
harfanglab groups |
harfanglab.level |
keyword |
The risk level associated to the alert |
harfanglab.process.powershell.command |
keyword |
The powershell command executed |
harfanglab.status |
keyword |
The status of the alert |
host.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the group is a member of. |
host.hostname |
keyword |
Hostname of the host. |
host.os.full |
keyword |
Operating system name, including the version or code name. |
host.os.version |
keyword |
Operating system version as a raw string. |
http.request.method |
keyword |
HTTP request method. |
http.response.status_code |
long |
HTTP response status code. |
organization.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the organization. |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.parent.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.parent.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.parent.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.pe.company |
keyword |
Internal company name of the file, provided at compile-time. |
process.pe.description |
keyword |
Internal description of the file, provided at compile-time. |
process.pe.file_version |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.pe.imphash |
keyword |
A hash of the imports in a PE file. |
process.pe.original_file_name |
keyword |
Internal name of the file, provided at compile-time. |
process.pe.product |
keyword |
Internal product name of the file, provided at compile-time. |
process.pid |
long |
Process id. |
process.working_directory |
keyword |
The working directory of the process. |
registry.hive |
keyword |
Abbreviated name for the hive. |
registry.key |
keyword |
Hive-relative path of keys. |
registry.path |
keyword |
Full path, including hive, key and value |
registry.value |
keyword |
Name of the value written. |
rule.category |
keyword |
Rule category |
rule.description |
keyword |
Rule description |
rule.id |
keyword |
Rule ID |
rule.name |
keyword |
Rule name |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
url.path |
wildcard |
Path of the request, such as "/search". |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.roles |
keyword |
Array of user roles at the time of the event. |
user.target.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.target.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.target.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user_agent.original |
keyword |
Unparsed user_agent string. |
Configure
Pre-requisite
HarfangLab must setup OpenSSL to the server for protocol TCP/SSL to be available.
Steps
In Sekoia.io
Create a new HarfangLab intake on Sekoia.io.
In HarfangLab
-
Navigate to
Administration>Configuration, and switch to theConnectorstab. -
In the
Syslog connectorpanel, select the logs you want to export:
-
Configure the Syslog information with the following details and by replacing
YOUR_INTAKE_KEYwith the Intake key previously generated in Sekoia.io:- Host:
intake.sekoia.io - Port:
10514 - App name: name of your choice - NO SPACES
- Source host: name of your choice NO SPACES
- Structured data:
[SEKOIA@53288 intake_key="YOUR_INTAKE_KEY"]- please replaceYOUR_INTAKE_KEYvariable with your intake key generated in Sekoia.io. - Protocol:
TCP/SSL - RFC :
RFC5424
- Host:
-
Finally select the
Protocoloption:TCP/SSL, leave the other options to default.
Warning
Do not insert spaces in App name or Source host. These fields are part of the Syslog header and spaces will break the format.
