IBM AIX
Overview
AIX (Advanced Interactive eXecutive), is a series of proprietary Unix operating systems developed and sold by IBM for several of its computer platforms.
Related Built-in Rules
Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade IBM AIX with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.
SEKOIA.IO x IBM AIX on ATT&CK Navigator
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group
Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system
- Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe
Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon
Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: elementary
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data
Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.
- Effort: elementary
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Disabled Service
Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration
Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor
Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom
- Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity
Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity
- Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History
Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history
- Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export
Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File
Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.
- Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility
Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe
Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
- Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python
Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.
- Effort: advanced
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic Execution
Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
- Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
List Shadow Copies
Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).
- Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: elementary
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution
Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution
Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation
Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command
- Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command
Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).
- Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service from command line
- Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
Opening Of a Password File
Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.
- Effort: advanced
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: elementary
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL
Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32
Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell
- Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Python Exfiltration Tools
Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages
Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement
- Effort: master
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username
Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.
- Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SELinux Disabling
An attacker can disable SELinux to make workstation or server compromise easier as it disables several protections.
- Effort: intermediate
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges
Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process
Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Finger Usage
Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution
Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line
Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter
Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Sysprep On AppData Folder
Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.
- Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host
- Effort: master
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)
- Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Abuse Restoration
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disable Scheduled Tasks
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line or registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration).
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.
- Effort: elementary
Windows Defender History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack
Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Authentication logs |
From system module, login dataset retrieve User logins, logouts, and system boots |
File monitoring |
The file metricset sends events when a file is changed (created, updated, or deleted) on disk. The events contain file metadata and hashes |
Process monitoring |
Process dataset retrieve Started and stopped processes |
Process use of network |
Scket dataset retrieve Opened and Closed sockets |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | event |
| Category | process |
| Type | `` |
Event Samples
Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO.
{
"message": "AUD_It audit Pipin root OK 16 sep 2022 15:42:41.885007 No associated roles cmd: 1 arg: 0",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "AUD_It"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"process": {
"args": "0",
"user": {
"name": "root"
},
"command_line": "1"
},
"user": {
"name": "audit"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"audit"
]
}
}
{
"message": "AUD_Proc cron root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:10:00.924334 No associated roles pid: 0 cmd: 5",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "AUD_Proc"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "cron",
"pid": 0,
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CRON_Finish cron root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:00:00.861158 No associated roles user = root pid = 3932756 time = Sun Sep 25 23:00:00 2022",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "CRON_Finish"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "cron",
"pid": 3932756,
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CRON_Start cron root root OK 17 sep 2022 00:00:00.139458 No associated roles event = start cron job cmd = /usr/share/centrifydc/bin/logrotate.sh 2>&1 >> /var/log/centrify_logrotate.log time = Sat Sep 17 00:00:00 2022",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "CRON_Start"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "cron",
"user": {
"name": "root"
},
"command_line": "cron /usr/share/centrifydc/bin/logrotate.sh 2>&1 >> /var/log/centrify_logrotate.log"
}
}
{
"message": "FILE_Link dad root root OK 31 jul 2022 14:02:33.696402 No associated roles linkname /usr/bin/cdax/bsh filename /usr/bin/cdax/ksh93",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FILE_Link"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/usr/bin/cdax/ksh93",
"target_path": "/usr/bin/cdax/bsh"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "dad"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"dad"
]
}
}
{
"message": "filename /bin/cdax/ksh FILE_Link dad root root OK 31 jul 2022 15:02:33.597401 No associated roles",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FILE_Link"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/bin/cdax/ksh"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "dad"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"dad"
]
}
}
{
"message": " FILE_Pipe Pipin root admin OK 10 Nov 2022 09:21:53.955363 No associated roles read: 7 write: 8",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FILE_Pipe"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "admin"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "FILE_Read tar Pipin root OK 10 Nov 2022 09:30:12.229710 No associated roles file descriptor = 1635083369 filename = t object read event detected /app1/coresec/active/BEKAL-CORE-01S.p12",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FILE_Read"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "t"
},
"group": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"process": {
"name": "tar",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "FILE_Rename BESClient root root OK 25 sep 2022 22:33:21.081155 No associated roles frompath: /var/opt/BESClient/besclient.config.tmp topath: /var/opt/BESClient/besclient.config",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FILE_Rename"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": " /var/opt/BESClient/besclient.config",
"path": "/var/opt/BESClient/besclient.config.tmp"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "BESClient"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"BESClient"
]
}
}
{
"message": "SRC_Start srcmstr root root OK 21 sep 2022 00:00:08.467005 No associated roles syslog_ng",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "SRC_Start"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "syslog_ng"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "srcmstr",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "FILE_Unlink Pipin root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:14:20.756159 No associated roles filename /var/adm/nim/glock",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FILE_Unlink"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/var/adm/nim/glock"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "FS_Chroot sshd root root OK 23 sep 2022 17:14:21.748158 No associated roles change root directory to: /var/empty",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FS_Chroot"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/var/empty"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "sshd",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "FS_Mkdir Pipin root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:04:23.825394 No associated roles mode: 755 dir: /var/adm/nim/6292044",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FS_Mkdir"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"directory": "/var/adm/nim/6292044"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "FS_Rmdir rm root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:14:20.859389 No associated roles remove of directory: /var/adm/nim/6292046",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "FS_Rmdir"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"directory": "/var/adm/nim/6292046"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "rm",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_Adjtime xntpd root root OK 25 sep 2022 21:57:37.226128 No associated roles old time: 01 jan 1970 01:00:00.1664135, delta: 226172812:0",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_Adjtime"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "xntpd",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_Execute sh root Pipin FAIL 22 Nov 2022 10:20:32.056053 No associated roles euid: 503 egid: 403 epriv: 0:0 name sh -c /app/DB2/11.1/instance/db2iset -i Pipin DB2AUTOSTART 2>&1 ",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_Execute"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "FAIL"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "-c"
},
"group": {
"name": "root",
"id": "403"
},
"process": {
"name": "sh",
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"command_line": "sh -c /app/DB2/11.1/instance/db2iset -i Pipin DB2AUTOSTART 2>&1 "
},
"user": {
"id": "503"
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_Kill rsyslogd root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:14:20.816166 No associated roles pid: 3605020, sig: 22",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_Kill"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "rsyslogd",
"pid": 3605020,
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_LoadError perl5.28.1 root root FAIL 25 sep 2022 23:12:21.397204 No associated roles flags: 80, libpath: , file: /usr/lib/nls/loc/C C C C C C",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_LoadError"
},
"action": {
"target": "process"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "perl5.28.1",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_RealGID rm_mlcache_file root root OK 25 sep 2022 21:13:31.584159 No associated roles old rgid: 0, new gid: 0, which: egid",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_RealGID"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "rm_mlcache_file",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_SetGroups cron root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:00:00.835203 No associated roles group set: system,bin,sys,security,cron,audit,lp,ivmgr,apache",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_SetGroups"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "cron",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_SetUserIDs db2fm root db2inst1 OK 22 Nov 2022 14:19:42.790048 No associated roles effect: 503, real: 503, saved: -1, login: -1#012",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_SetUserIDs"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "db2inst1"
},
"process": {
"name": "db2fm",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_SetUserIDs db2fm root db2inst1 OK 22 Nov 2022 14:19:42.790048 No associated roles effect: 503, real: 503, saved: -1, login: -1012",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_SetUserIDs"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "db2inst1"
},
"process": {
"name": "db2fm",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "PROC_Sysconfig exportfs root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:14:20.836155 No associated roles 3",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "PROC_Sysconfig"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "exportfs",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "S_PASSWD_READ cron root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:10:00.924334 No associated roles audit object read event detected /etc/security/passwd",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "S_PASSWD_READ"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/etc/security/passwd"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "cron"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"cron"
]
}
}
{
"message": "S_USER_WRITE vi Pipin root OK 21 sep 2022 10:26:12.893117 No associated roles audit object write event detected /etc/security/user",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "S_USER_WRITE"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/etc/security/user"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "vi"
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "TCP_kaccept Pipin root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:09:25.544152 No associated roles fd14 Port 10.30.134.100 1022 kx5frsip01-a nimaux",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "TCP_kaccept"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"source": {
"port": 1022,
"ip": "10.30.134.100",
"address": "10.30.134.100"
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.30.134.100"
],
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "TCP_kbind Pipin root root OK 25 sep 2022 23:14:20.826159 No associated roles fd11 /dev/.SRC-unix/SRC0006292046YEya",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "TCP_kbind"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/dev/.SRC-unix/SRC0006292046YEya"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "TCP_klisten Pipin root root OK 31 jul 2022 10:21:24.798402 0 fd15 qlimit 1",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "TCP_klisten"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
{
"message": "flags: 80, libpath: , file: /usr/lib/security/DCE USER_Login sshd root root OK 29 jul 2022 09:58:03.091427 No associated roles",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "USER_Login"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"file": {
"name": "/usr/lib/security/DCE"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "sshd",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
}
{
"message": "USER_Login db2ckpw root Pipin OK 22 Nov 2022 13:41:34.586022 No associated roles user: Pipin tty: #012",
"event": {
"kind": "event",
"category": [
"process"
],
"action": "USER_Login"
},
"action": {
"target": "process",
"status": "OK"
},
"observer": {
"vendor": "IBM"
},
"group": {
"name": "root"
},
"process": {
"name": "db2ckpw",
"tty": {
"char_device": {
"major": 12
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "Pipin"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"Pipin"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
action.status |
keyword |
The status of the action |
action.target |
keyword |
The target of the action. This field is mandatory for STIX2 compliance |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.directory |
keyword |
Directory where the file is located. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
file.target_path |
keyword |
Target path for symlinks. |
group.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform. |
group.name |
keyword |
Name of the group. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
process.args |
keyword |
Array of process arguments. |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.pid |
long |
Process id. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
Configure
In this guide, you will configure the gateway to forward events to syslog.
Prerequisites
An internal syslog concentrator is required to collect and forward events to SEKOIA.IO.
Enable Syslog forwarding
Follow this guide to enable syslog forwarding for audit events
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format IBM AIX.
Send logs to SEKOIA.IO
Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to SEKOIA.IO.