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Microsoft Defender for Endpoints

Overview

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is an enterprise endpoint security platform designed to help enterprise networks prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to advanced threats.

This setup guide describes how to forward events produced by Microsoft Defender for Endpoints to SEKOIA.IO XDR.

Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade Microsoft Defender for Endpoints with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.

SEKOIA.IO x Microsoft Defender for Endpoints on ATT&CK Navigator

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

  • Effort: elementary
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

  • Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft 365 Defender Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Cloud App Security Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender For Endpoint Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Office 365 Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Office 365. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: elementary
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username

Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

  • Effort: elementary
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter

Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Disabled

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line or registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration).

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Binary file metadata Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files
Disk forensics Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices
File monitoring Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors files
Host network interface Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors devices
Kernel drivers Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Loaded DLLs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Named Pipes Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
PowerShell logs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Process command-line parameters Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Process monitoring Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Process use of network Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Services Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes
Windows event logs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint watch events logs
Windows Registry Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors the registry
WMI Objects Microsoft Defender for Endpoint monitors processes

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind alert, enrichment, event
Category authentication, connection, email, file, host, iam, network, process, threat
Type indicator, info

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO.

{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T22:06:00.6652718Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-AlertInfo\",\"properties\":{\"AlertId\":\"da637977531594995313_968283104\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T22:04:16.134644Z\",\"Title\":\"'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented\",\"ServiceSource\":\"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\",\"Category\":\"DefenseEvasion\",\"Severity\":\"Informational\",\"DetectionSource\":\"Antivirus\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"AttackTechniques\":\"\"}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "alert",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "alert_info",
        "category": [
            "threat"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-02T22:06:00.665271Z",
    "service": {
        "name": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
        "type": "Antivirus"
    },
    "action": {
        "properties": {
            "ServiceSource": "Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "alert": {
                "id": "da637977531594995313_968283104",
                "title": "'Lodi' unwanted software was prevented"
            },
            "threat": {
                "category": "DefenseEvasion",
                "severity": "Informational"
            }
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_events",
        "category": [
            "host"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:28:59.512717Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "process": {
        "pid": 1664,
        "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z",
        "executable": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "group1",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "email": "user@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 15532,
            "executable": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\"",
            "--sandboxed-process-id=2",
            "--init-done-notifier=804",
            "--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
            "--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
            "--engine=2"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104061"
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "1.2.3.4",
        "address": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "5.6.7.8",
        "address": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-02T13:12:14.2082552Z\",\"tenantId\":\"16ed4fbf-027f-47b3-8d1a-a342781dd2d2\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceFileCertificateInfo\",\"properties\":{\"SHA1\":\"4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5\",\"IsSigned\":true,\"IsRootSignerMicrosoft\":true,\"Signer\":\"Microsoft Windows\",\"SignerHash\":\"fe51e838a087bb561bbb2dd9ba20143384a03b3f\",\"Issuer\":\"Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011\",\"IssuerHash\":\"580a6f4cc4e4b669b9ebdc1b2b3e087b80d0678d\",\"SignatureType\":\"Catalog\",\"IsTrusted\":true,\"CertificateCreationTime\":\"2021-09-02T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateExpirationTime\":\"2022-09-01T18:23:41Z\",\"CertificateCountersignatureTime\":\"2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z\",\"CrlDistributionPointUrls\":\"[\\\"http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl\\\"]\",\"CertificateSerialNumber\":\"330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c\",\"DeviceId\":\"db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-02T13:10:10.7177Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":20370}}\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_file_certificate_info",
        "category": [
            "file"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-02T13:12:14.208255Z",
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
        },
        "x509": {
            "serial_number": "330000033c89c66a7b45bb1fbd00000000033c",
            "not_after": "2022-09-01T18:23:41Z"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "db1b7a6a38796c8d49f7746d3ab2252b53b45c80",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "20370"
            },
            "certificate": {
                "is_signed": true,
                "is_trusted": true,
                "is_root_signer_microsort": true,
                "signature_type": "Catalog",
                "issuer": "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011",
                "signer": "Microsoft Windows",
                "crl": {
                    "urls": [
                        "http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crl"
                    ]
                },
                "created_at": "2021-09-02T18:23:41Z",
                "counter_signed_at": "2022-07-06T05:55:26.23Z"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "4334f41d684200d1a52c977417f5ba1eba4969b5"
        ]
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}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:49:40.4279379Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceFileEvents\",\"properties\":{\"PreviousFileName\":null,\"FileName\":\"OneDriveFileLauncher.exe\",\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USER\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\OneDrive\\\\22.161.0731.0002\",\"PreviousFolderPath\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"FileOriginReferrerUrl\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"SensitivityLabel\":null,\"SensitivitySubLabel\":null,\"IsAzureInfoProtectionApplied\":null,\"ShareName\":null,\"RequestSourceIP\":null,\"RequestSourcePort\":null,\"RequestProtocol\":null,\"RequestAccountName\":null,\"RequestAccountDomain\":null,\"RequestAccountSid\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":null,\"ActionType\":\"FileDeleted\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Microsoft OneDrive\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"22.166.0807.0002\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Microsoft OneDrive (64 bit) Setup\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\microsoft\\\\onedrive\\\\update\\\\onedrivesetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":56824728,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"9a3af3a9ce0217bccce1d161e0b6bfde\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"30204bef93d692fbcbf7475b154e3f65d3aace6f8f030af9e412f3d9e8d9a595\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"8f6ebe4a51ce4b5f76f4d896a6e289e69f91a264\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:46:34.0214941Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":27512,\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe /update /restart /updateSource:ODU /peruser /childprocess /extractFilesWithLessThreadCount /renameReplaceOneDriveExe /renameReplaceODSUExe /removeNonCurrentVersions /enableODSUReportingMode \",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:46:33.5858992Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":588,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"OneDriveSetup.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"Medium\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:46:42.4684081Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":152059}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_file_events",
        "category": [
            "file"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:49:40.427937Z",
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Users\\USER\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\22.161.0731.0002",
        "name": "OneDriveFileLauncher.exe"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "process": {
        "pid": 27512,
        "start": "2022-09-01T07:46:34.0214941Z",
        "executable": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
        "command_line": "OneDriveSetup.exe /update /restart /updateSource:ODU /peruser /childprocess /extractFilesWithLessThreadCount /renameReplaceOneDriveExe /renameReplaceODSUExe /removeNonCurrentVersions /enableODSUReportingMode ",
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\microsoft\\onedrive\\update",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "group1",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "email": "user@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 588,
            "executable": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
            "start": "2022-09-01T07:46:33.5858992Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "/update",
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            "/updateSource:ODU",
            "/peruser",
            "/childprocess",
            "/extractFilesWithLessThreadCount",
            "/renameReplaceOneDriveExe",
            "/renameReplaceODSUExe",
            "/removeNonCurrentVersions",
            "/enableODSUReportingMode",
            ""
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "FileDeleted",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 56824728,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "Medium",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Microsoft OneDrive (64 bit) Setup",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "OneDriveSetup.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Microsoft OneDrive",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "22.166.0807.0002"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "152059"
            }
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:49:37.5372014Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceImageLoadEvents\",\"properties\":{\"FolderPath\":\"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Adobe\\\\8.1\\\\Client\\\\BIN\\\\sscfom.dll\",\"FileSize\":1048576,\"FileName\":\"sscfom.dll\",\"MD5\":\"83fd76962ba443b3d6e317ad73126843\",\"SHA256\":\"14c0592339b02885a8e4cf9724c607afe2a0187348c1aa084db3875ce93be0fe\",\"SHA1\":\"742ef984a8f759090f44838f737d575e283942be\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":null,\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":null,\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\program files (x86)\\\\adobe\\\\8.1\\\\client\\\\bin\\\\autosync.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"autosync.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":66560,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"4617605c67d2a4f8ff7f86042d40011d\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"9ff12db8e1aa2bc6781d1e399ec7a0fd38278dee8f2b5ece7403f2bab009dbe7\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"1181891a21a785f05de6f40a3c635534ade13262\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":null,\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:47:58.182445Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":15584,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"autosync.exe\\\" /c C:\\\\PROGRA~2\\\\adobe\\\\8.1\\\\Client\\\\bin\\\\fra\\\\adobe.cfg /c \\\" usa\\\"\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T07:47:17.01345Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":2548,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"explorer.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel\":\"Medium\",\"InitiatingProcessTokenElevation\":\"TokenElevationTypeDefault\",\"DeviceId\":\"4b35a092f1578f0a6f1b7dbf9e90465563781043\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"Windows 10 - remediate threats automatically\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:47:58.6161271Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":3758,\"ActionType\":\"ImageLoaded\"}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_image_load_events",
        "category": [
            "process"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:49:37.537201Z",
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\8.1\\Client\\BIN\\sscfom.dll",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "83fd76962ba443b3d6e317ad73126843",
            "sha1": "742ef984a8f759090f44838f737d575e283942be",
            "sha256": "14c0592339b02885a8e4cf9724c607afe2a0187348c1aa084db3875ce93be0fe"
        },
        "name": "sscfom.dll",
        "size": 1048576
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "4b35a092f1578f0a6f1b7dbf9e90465563781043",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "process": {
        "pid": 15584,
        "start": "2022-09-01T07:47:58.182445Z",
        "executable": "autosync.exe",
        "command_line": "\"autosync.exe\" /c C:\\PROGRA~2\\adobe\\8.1\\Client\\bin\\fra\\adobe.cfg /c \" usa\"",
        "working_directory": "c:\\program files (x86)\\adobe\\8.1\\client\\bin",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "group1",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "email": "user@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 2548,
            "executable": "explorer.exe",
            "start": "2022-09-01T07:47:17.01345Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "/c",
            "C:\\PROGRA~2\\adobe\\8.1\\Client\\bin\\fra\\adobe.cfg",
            "/c",
            "\"",
            "usa\""
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "ImageLoaded",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 66560,
            "InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel": "Medium",
            "InitiatingProcessTokenElevation": "TokenElevationTypeDefault"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "3758"
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "14c0592339b02885a8e4cf9724c607afe2a0187348c1aa084db3875ce93be0fe",
            "742ef984a8f759090f44838f737d575e283942be",
            "83fd76962ba443b3d6e317ad73126843"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"time\":\"2022-09-01T07:28:59.5127177Z\",\"tenantId\":\"5ac3ff49-0e19-4600-9ad1-333e64e3b5cc\",\"operationName\":\"Publish\",\"category\":\"AdvancedHunting-DeviceEvents\",\"properties\":{\"AccountSid\":null,\"AccountDomain\":null,\"AccountName\":null,\"LogonId\":null,\"FileName\":null,\"FolderPath\":null,\"MD5\":null,\"SHA1\":null,\"FileSize\":null,\"SHA256\":null,\"ProcessCreationTime\":null,\"ProcessTokenElevation\":null,\"RemoteUrl\":null,\"RegistryKey\":null,\"RegistryValueName\":null,\"RegistryValueData\":null,\"RemoteDeviceName\":null,\"FileOriginIP\":null,\"FileOriginUrl\":null,\"LocalIP\":\"-\",\"LocalPort\":null,\"RemoteIP\":\"-\",\"RemotePort\":null,\"ProcessId\":null,\"ProcessCommandLine\":null,\"AdditionalFields\":\"{\\\"BaseAddress\\\":2098738167808,\\\"RegionSize\\\":262144,\\\"ProtectionMask\\\":64}\",\"ActionType\":\"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName\":\"Google\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion\":\"102.286.200\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool_exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription\":\"Software Reporter Tool\",\"InitiatingProcessFolderPath\":\"c:\\\\users\\\\USER\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\google\\\\chrome\\\\user data\\\\swreporter\\\\102.286.200\\\\software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"InitiatingProcessFileSize\":14687048,\"InitiatingProcessMD5\":\"51a9cac9c4e8da44ffd7502be17604ee\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA256\":\"6fe5e57df8d132eaf06f9134461dd172e36cf01679f13eb0f6e70c1f21b18323\",\"InitiatingProcessSHA1\":\"44543e0c6f30415c670c1322e61ca68602d58708\",\"InitiatingProcessLogonId\":121834210,\"InitiatingProcessAccountSid\":\"S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\":\"intranet\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountName\":\"group1\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountUpn\":\"user@example.org\",\"InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId\":\"9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2\",\"InitiatingProcessCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z\",\"InitiatingProcessId\":1664,\"InitiatingProcessCommandLine\":\"\\\"software_reporter_tool.exe\\\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\\\"\\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\\\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2\",\"InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime\":\"2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z\",\"InitiatingProcessParentId\":15532,\"InitiatingProcessParentFileName\":\"software_reporter_tool.exe\",\"DeviceId\":\"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\"AppGuardContainerId\":\"\",\"MachineGroup\":\"UnassignedGroup\",\"Timestamp\":\"2022-09-01T07:09:47.4980566Z\",\"DeviceName\":\"test.lab\",\"ReportId\":104061}}",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "dataset": "device_events",
        "category": [
            "host"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-09-01T07:28:59.512717Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "name": "test.lab"
    },
    "process": {
        "pid": 1664,
        "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.7887846Z",
        "executable": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
        "command_line": "\"software_reporter_tool.exe\" --use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\" --sandboxed-process-id=2 --init-done-notifier=804 --sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=********** --mojo-platform-channel-handle=780 --engine=2",
        "working_directory": "c:\\users\\USER\\appdata\\local\\google\\chrome\\user data\\swreporter\\102.286.200",
        "user": {
            "domain": "intranet",
            "name": "group1",
            "id": "S-1-00-1-1111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444444444",
            "email": "user@example.org"
        },
        "parent": {
            "pid": 15532,
            "executable": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "start": "2022-09-01T06:56:23.595229Z"
        },
        "args": [
            "--use-crash-handler-with-id=\"\\\\.\\pipe\\crashpad_11111_XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\"",
            "--sandboxed-process-id=2",
            "--init-done-notifier=804",
            "--sandbox-mojo-pipe-token=**********",
            "--mojo-platform-channel-handle=780",
            "--engine=2"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "type": "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall",
        "properties": {
            "InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId": "9d6c8861-bc27-4c1c-b5d7-aa00401d0fd2",
            "InitiatingProcessFileSize": 14687048,
            "InitiatingProcessLogonId": "121834210",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName": "Google",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName": "software_reporter_tool_exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName": "software_reporter_tool.exe",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName": "Software Reporter Tool",
            "InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion": "102.286.200"
        }
    },
    "microsoft": {
        "defender": {
            "report": {
                "id": "104061"
            }
        }
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
action.properties.AadDeviceId keyword Unique identifier for the device in Azure AD
action.properties.AccountSid keyword Security Identifier (SID) of the account
action.properties.AccountUPN keyword User principal name (UPN) of the account
action.properties.ActionResult keyword Result of the action
action.properties.ActionTrigger keyword Indicates whether an action was triggered by an administrator (manually or through approval of a pending automated action), or by some special mechanism, such as a ZAP or Dynamic Delivery
action.properties.Application keyword Application that performed the recorded action
action.properties.ApplicationId keyword Unique identifier for the application
action.properties.AttachmentCount number Number of attachments in the email
action.properties.AuthenticationDetails keyword List of pass or fail verdicts by email authentication protocols like DMARC, DKIM, SPF or a combination of multiple authentication types (CompAuth)
action.properties.ConfidenceLevel keyword List of confidence levels of any spam or phishing verdicts. For spam, this column shows the spam confidence level (SCL), indicating if the email was skipped (-1), found to be not spam (0,1), found to be spam with moderate confidence (5,6), or found to be spam with high confidence (9). For phishing, this column displays whether the confidence level is "High" or "Low".
action.properties.Connectors keyword Custom instructions that define organizational mail flow and how the email was routed
action.properties.DeliveryAction keyword Delivery action of the email: Delivered, Junked, Blocked, or Replaced
action.properties.DeliveryLocation keyword Location where the email was delivered: Inbox/Folder, On-premises/External, Junk, Quarantine, Failed, Dropped, Deleted items
action.properties.DestinationDeviceName keyword Name of the device running the server application that processed the recorded action
action.properties.EmailAction keyword Final action taken on the email based on filter verdict, policies, and user actions: Move message to junk mail folder, Add X-header, Modify subject, Redirect message, Delete message, send to quarantine, No action taken, Bcc message
action.properties.EmailClusterId keyword Identifier for the group of similar emails clustered based on heuristic analysis of their contents
action.properties.EmailDirection keyword Direction of the email relative to your network: Inbound, Outbound, Intra-org
action.properties.EmailLanguage keyword Detected language of the email content
action.properties.FileOriginIP keyword IP address where the file was downloaded from
action.properties.FileOriginReferrerUrl keyword URL of the web page that links to the downloaded file
action.properties.FileOriginUrl keyword URL where the file was downloaded from
action.properties.IPCategory keyword Additional information about the IP address
action.properties.IPTags list Customer-defined information applied to specific IP addresses and IP address ranges
action.properties.ISP keyword Internet service provider associated with the IP address
action.properties.InitiatingProcessAccountObjectId keyword Azure AD object ID of the user account that ran the process responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessFileSize long Size of the process (image file) that initiated the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel keyword Integrity level of the process that initiated the event. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet download. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources
action.properties.InitiatingProcessLogonId keyword Identifier for a logon session of the process that initiated the event. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts.
action.properties.InitiatingProcessTokenElevation keyword Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the process that initiated the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName keyword Company name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription keyword Description from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName keyword Internal file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName keyword Original file name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName keyword Product name from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductVersion keyword Product version from the version information of the process (image file) responsible for the event
action.properties.IsAdminOperation keyword Indicates whether the activity was performed by an administrator
action.properties.IsAnonymousProxy keyword Indicates whether the IP address belongs to a known anonymous proxy
action.properties.IsAzureADJoined boolean Boolean indicator of whether machine is joined to the Azure Active Directory
action.properties.IsAzureInfoProtectionApplied boolean Indicates whether the file is encrypted by Azure Information Protection
action.properties.IsExternalUser boolean Indicates whether a user inside the network doesn't belong to the organization's domain
action.properties.IsImpersonated boolean Indicates whether the activity was performed by one user for another (impersonated) user
action.properties.IsLocalAdmin boolean Boolean indicator of whether the user is a local administrator on the machine
action.properties.LocalIPType keyword Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast
action.properties.Location keyword City, country, or other geographic location associated with the event
action.properties.LoggedOnUsers keyword List of all users that are logged on the machine at the time of the event in JSON array format
action.properties.LogonId keyword Identifier for a logon session. This identifier is unique on the same machine only between restarts
action.properties.LogonType keyword Type of logon session, specifically:
action.properties.MachineGroup keyword Machine group of the machine. This group is used by role-based access control to determine access to the machine
action.properties.MergedDeviceIds keyword Previous device IDs that have been assigned to the same device
action.properties.MergedToDeviceId keyword The most recent device ID assigned to a device
action.properties.ObjectId keyword Unique identifier of the object that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.ObjectName keyword Name of the object that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.ObjectType keyword Type of object, such as a file or a folder, that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.OnboardingStatus keyword Indicates whether the device is currently onboarded or not to Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or if the device is not supported
action.properties.OrgLevelAction keyword Action taken on the email in response to matches to a policy defined at the organizational level
action.properties.OrgLevelPolicy keyword Organizational policy that triggered the action taken on the email
action.properties.PreviousFileName keyword Original name of the file that was renamed as a result of the action
action.properties.PreviousFolderPath keyword Original folder containing the file before the recorded action was applied
action.properties.PreviousRegistryKey keyword Original registry key of the registry value before it was modified
action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueData keyword Original data of the registry value before it was modified
action.properties.PreviousRegistryValueName keyword Original name of the registry value before it was modified
action.properties.ProcessIntegrityLevel keyword Integrity level of the newly created process. Windows assigns integrity levels to processes based on certain characteristics, such as if they were launched from an internet downloaded. These integrity levels influence permissions to resources
action.properties.ProcessTokenElevation keyword Token type indicating the presence or absence of User Access Control (UAC) privilege elevation applied to the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName keyword Company name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription keyword Description from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName keyword Internal file name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName keyword Original file name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductName keyword Product name from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.ProcessVersionInfoProductVersion keyword Product version from the version information of the newly created process
action.properties.Query keyword String used to run the query
action.properties.QueryTarget keyword Name of user, group, device, domain, or any other entity type being queried
action.properties.QueryType keyword Type of query, such as QueryGroup, QueryUser, or EnumerateUsers
action.properties.RawEventData keyword Raw event information from the source application or service in JSON format
action.properties.RecipientObjectId keyword Unique identifier for the email recipient in Azure AD
action.properties.RegistryDeviceTag keyword Machine tag added through the registry
action.properties.RemoteDeviceName keyword Name of the machine that performed a remote operation on the affected machine. Depending on the event being reported, this name could be a fully-qualified domain name (FQDN), a NetBIOS name, or a host name without domain information
action.properties.RemoteIPType keyword Type of IP address, for example Public, Private, Reserved, Loopback, Teredo, FourToSixMapping, and Broadcast
action.properties.RequestAccountSid keyword Security Identifier (SID) of the account used to remotely initiate the activity
action.properties.SenderDisplayName keyword Name of the sender displayed in the address book, typically a combination of a given or first name, a middle initial, and a last name or surname
action.properties.SenderFromDomain keyword Sender domain in the FROM header, which is visible to email recipients on their email clients
action.properties.SenderObjectId keyword Unique identifier for the sender's account in Azure AD
action.properties.SensitivityLabel keyword Label applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection
action.properties.SensitivitySubLabel keyword Sublabel applied to an email, file, or other content to classify it for information protection; sensitivity sublabels are grouped under sensitivity labels but are treated independently
action.properties.ServiceSource keyword Product or service that provided the alert information
action.properties.ShareName keyword Name of shared folder containing the file
action.properties.TargetAccountDisplayName keyword Display name of the account that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.TargetAccountUpn keyword User principal name (UPN) of the account that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.TargetDeviceName keyword Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the device that the recorded action was applied to
action.properties.UrlCount number Number of embedded URLs in the email
action.properties.UserAgentTags list More information provided by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps in a tag in the user agent field. Can have any of the following values: Native client, Outdated browser, Outdated operating system, Robot
action.properties.UserLevelAction keyword Action taken on the email in response to matches to a mailbox policy defined by the recipient
action.properties.UserLevelPolicy keyword End-user mailbox policy that triggered the action taken on the email
agent.version keyword Version of the agent.
container.id keyword Unique container id.
container.runtime keyword Runtime managing this container.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
email.from.address keyword The email address of the sender, typically from the RFC 5322 From: header field
email.local_id keyword Unique identifier given to the email by the source that created the event
email.message_id keyword Identifier from the RFC 5322 Message-ID: email header that refers to a particular email message
email.subject keyword A brief summary of the topic of the message
email.to.address keyword The email address of recipient
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.dataset keyword Name of the dataset.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.directory keyword Directory where the file is located.
file.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
file.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.size long File size in bytes.
file.x509.not_after date Time at which the certificate is no longer considered valid.
file.x509.serial_number keyword Unique serial number issued by the certificate authority.
host.architecture keyword Operating system architecture.
host.id keyword Unique host id.
host.mac keyword Host MAC addresses.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
host.os.family keyword OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows).
host.os.full keyword Operating system name, including the version or code name.
host.os.version keyword Operating system version as a raw string.
host.type keyword Type of host.
microsoft.defender.activity.objects list List of objects, such as files or folders, that were involved in the recorded activity
microsoft.defender.activity.type keyword Type of activity that triggered the event
microsoft.defender.alert.id keyword Unique identifier for the alert
microsoft.defender.alert.title keyword The title of the alert
microsoft.defender.certificate.counter_signed_at keyword Date and time the certificate was countersigned
microsoft.defender.certificate.created_at keyword Date and time the certificate was created
microsoft.defender.certificate.crl.urls keyword JSON array listing the URLs of network shares that contain certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_root_signer_microsort boolean Indicates whether the signer of the root certificate is Microsoft and if the file is included in Windows operating system
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_signed boolean Indicates whether the file is signed
microsoft.defender.certificate.is_trusted boolean Indicates whether the file is trusted based on the results of the WinVerifyTrust function, which checks for unknown root certificate information, invalid signatures, revoked certificates, and other questionable attributes
microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer keyword Information about the issuing certificate authority (CA)
microsoft.defender.certificate.issuer.hash keyword Unique hash value identifying issuing certificate authority (CA)
microsoft.defender.certificate.signature_type keyword Indicates whether signature information was read as embedded content in the file itself or read from an external catalog file
microsoft.defender.certificate.signer keyword Information about the signer of the file
microsoft.defender.certificate.signer.hash keyword Unique hash value identifying the signer
microsoft.defender.entity.type keyword Type of object, such as a file, a process, a device, or a user
microsoft.defender.evidence.direction keyword Indicates whether the entity is the source or the destination of a network connection
microsoft.defender.evidence.role keyword How the entity is involved in an alert, indicating whether it is impacted or is merely related
microsoft.defender.host.category keyword Broader classification that groups certain device types under the following categories: Endpoint, Network device, IoT, Unknown
microsoft.defender.host.model keyword Model name or number of the product from the vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
microsoft.defender.host.os.build keyword Build version of the operating system running on the machine
microsoft.defender.host.os.version keyword Additional information about the OS version, such as the popular name, code name, or version number
microsoft.defender.host.subtype keyword Additional modifier for certain types of devices, for example, a mobile device can be a tablet or a smartphone; only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
microsoft.defender.host.vendor keyword Name of the product vendor or manufacturer, only available if device discovery finds enough information about this attribute
microsoft.defender.network.tunnel.protocol keyword Tunneling protocol, if the interface is used for this purpose, for example 6to4, Teredo, ISATAP, PPTP, SSTP, and SSH
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv4 keyword IPv4 address of DHCP server
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dhcp.ipv6 keyword IPv6 address of DHCP server
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.dns keyword DNS server addresses in JSON array format
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.gateways keyword Default gateway addresses in JSON array format
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.ips keyword JSON array containing all the IP addresses assigned to the adapter, along with their respective subnet prefix and IP address space, such as public, private, or link-local
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.name keyword Name of the network adapter
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.networks keyword Networks that the adapter is connected to. Each JSON array contains the network name, category (public, private or domain), a description, and a flag indicating if it's connected publicly to the internet
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.status keyword Operational status of the network adapter. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration
microsoft.defender.observer.interface.type keyword Network adapter type. For the possible values, refer to this enumeration
microsoft.defender.report.id keyword Unique identifier for the event
microsoft.defender.threat.category keyword Type of threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert
microsoft.defender.threat.detection keyword Methods used to detect malware, phishing, or other threats found in the email
microsoft.defender.threat.family keyword Malware family that the suspicious or malicious file or process has been classified under
microsoft.defender.threat.names keyword Detection name for malware or other threats found
microsoft.defender.threat.severity keyword Indicates the potential impact (high, medium, or low) of the threat indicator or breach activity identified by the alert
microsoft.defender.threat.types keyword Verdict from the email filtering stack on whether the email contains malware, phishing, or other threats
network.protocol keyword Application protocol name.
process.args keyword Array of process arguments.
process.code_signature.status keyword Additional information about the certificate status.
process.code_signature.subject_name keyword Subject name of the code signer
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
process.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
process.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
process.parent.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.parent.pid long Process id.
process.parent.start date The time the process started.
process.pid long Process id.
process.start date The time the process started.
process.user.domain keyword Domain of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.user.email keyword User principal name (UPN) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.user.id keyword Security Identifier (SID) of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.user.name keyword User name of the account that ran the process responsible for the event
process.working_directory keyword The working directory of the process.
registry.data.strings wildcard List of strings representing what was written to the registry.
registry.data.type keyword Standard registry type for encoding contents
registry.key keyword Hive-relative path of keys.
registry.value keyword Name of the value written.
rule.id keyword Rule ID
rule.name keyword Rule name
service.name keyword Name of the service.
service.type keyword The type of the service.
source.geo.city_name keyword City name.
source.geo.country_iso_code keyword Country ISO code.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.port long Port of the source.
threat.technique.name keyword Threat technique name.
url.domain keyword Domain of the url.
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.full_name keyword User's full name, if available.
user.id keyword Unique identifier of the user.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user.roles keyword Array of user roles at the time of the event.
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

Configure

Prerequisites

To forward events to SEKOIA.IO, please follow this guide to create an EventHubs namespace with an EventHubs that enable the data streaming on the hub.

Once the data streaming is configured, in your EventHubs, go to Setting > Shared access policies. Create a new policy with the option Listen then copy the Connection string-primary key.

Create a Storage accounts or use an existing one. Go to Data storage > containers and create a new container. Then go to Security + networking > Access keys and copy the key1 Connection string

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Microsoft Defender for Endpoints.

Pull events

Go to the playbook page and create a new playbook with the Consume Eventhub messages module.

Set up the trigger configuration with the EventHub's Connection string-primary key, the hub name, the consumer group, the storage's Connection string-primary key and the container name.

Start the playbook and enjoy your events.

Further Readings