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Palo Alto Cortex EDR

Overview

Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) is an advanced Endpoint Detection and Response solution offering real-time threat detection, investigation, and response capabilities, empowering organizations to proactively defend against sophisticated cyber threats across their endpoints.

This setup guide shows how to forward EDR alerts collected on the Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) platform to Sekoia.io.

Warning

Important note - This format is currently in beta. We highly value your feedback to improve its performance.

Collected events

This integration collects the following events:

  • alerts
  • telemetry events related to the alerts.

Supported versions

This integration was tested against the following versions:

  • Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) 3.8

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) [BETA]. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) [BETA] on ATT&CK Navigator

AccCheckConsole Executing Dll

Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.

  • Effort: advanced
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Aspnet Compiler

Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.

  • Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.

  • Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line

Detects use of azureedge in the command line.

  • Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

  • Effort: elementary
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Container Credential Access

Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Dism Disabling Windows Defender

Detects windows defender disabled by dism.

  • Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount

Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp

Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Fail2ban Unban IP

An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.

  • Effort: advanced
FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

  • Effort: elementary
Formbook File Creation DB1

Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd

Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute

Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload

Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search

Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems

  • Effort: intermediate
List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: elementary
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

  • Effort: advanced
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: master
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: master
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

  • Effort: intermediate
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: master
Package Manager Alteration

Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software

  • Effort: advanced
Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) Alert Not Blocked (High Severity)

A Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) agent has raised an alert of high severity that was not blocked.

  • Effort: master
Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) Alert Not Blocked (Low Severity)

A Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) agent has raised an alert of low severity that was not blocked.

  • Effort: master
Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) Alert Not Blocked (Medium Severity)

A Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) agent has raised an alert of medium severity that was not blocked.

  • Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic

Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.

  • Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages

Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement

  • Effort: master
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
SSH Authorized Key Alteration

The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision

  • Effort: advanced
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Sliver DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool

Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP

Detects a code page switch in command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File

Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage

catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Network device logs Palo Alto can record traffic events flowing through their firewall

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind alert, event
Category file, host, intrusion_detection, network, process, registry
Type change, connection, info

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

{
    "message": "{\"external_id\":\"c2c51d03-65db\",\"severity\":\"low\",\"matching_status\":\"MATCHED\",\"end_match_attempt_ts\":null,\"local_insert_ts\":170619,\"last_modified_ts\":null,\"bioc_indicator\":null,\"matching_service_rule_id\":\"03bb2cd4-a667-11ea-9d88-820e27035801\",\"attempt_counter\":0,\"bioc_category_enum_key\":null,\"case_id\":9991,\"is_whitelisted\":false,\"starred\":false,\"deduplicate_tokens\":null,\"filter_rule_id\":null,\"mitre_technique_id_and_name\":[\"T1111 - Ex Protocol\"],\"mitre_tactic_id_and_name\":[\"TA1111 - Exfiltration\"],\"agent_version\":null,\"agent_ip_addresses_v6\":null,\"agent_device_domain\":null,\"agent_fqdn\":null,\"agent_os_type\":\"NO_HOST\",\"agent_os_sub_type\":null,\"agent_data_collection_status\":null,\"mac\":null,\"is_pcap\":false,\"alert_type\":\"Unclassified\",\"resolution_status\":\"STATUS_010_NEW\",\"resolution_comment\":null,\"dynamic_fields\":null,\"tags\":[\"AB:AB_test\",\"CD:CD_test\",\"EF:EF_test\"],\"malicious_urls\":null,\"alert_id\":\"555555555\",\"detection_timestamp\":1706191461294,\"name\":\"Large Upload (Generic)\",\"category\":\"Exfiltration\",\"endpoint_id\":\"70c7fce471074\",\"description\":\"great decription for this event\",\"host_ip\":[\"1.2.3.4\"],\"host_name\":\"2023-2024\",\"mac_addresses\":null,\"source\":\"XDR Analytics\",\"action\":\"DETECTED\",\"action_pretty\":\"Detected\",\"original_tags\":[\"AB:AB_test\",\"CD:CD_test\",\"EF:EF_test\"]}",
    "event": {
        "action": "DETECTED",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "dataset": "alert",
        "kind": "alert",
        "outcome": "MATCHED",
        "reason": "great decription for this event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-25T14:04:21.294000Z",
    "host": {
        "id": "70c7fce471074",
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ],
        "name": "2023-2024",
        "os": {
            "name": "NO_HOST"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Palo Alto Cortex XDR",
        "vendor": "Palo Alto"
    },
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "category": "Exfiltration",
                    "externalID": "c2c51d03-65db",
                    "id": "555555555",
                    "name": "Large Upload (Generic)",
                    "ruleID": {
                        "matching_service": "03bb2cd4-a667-11ea-9d88-820e27035801"
                    },
                    "severity": "low"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"agent_install_type\":\"STANDARD\",\"agent_host_boot_time\":1705666417130,\"event_sub_type\":6,\"module_id\":null,\"association_strength\":50,\"dst_association_strength\":null,\"story_id\":null,\"event_id\":\"AAABjURO4G7\",\"event_type\":\"File Event\",\"event_timestamp\":1706248036508,\"actor_process_instance_id\":\"HkgJADgfvcM\",\"actor_process_image_path\":\"/sbin/ttest_path\",\"actor_process_image_name\":\"ttest_path\",\"actor_process_command_line\":\"/bin/sh /sbin/ttest_path quicktest 5.15.0-00-generic\",\"actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"actor_process_image_sha256\":\"a1c3a3d3522ff153a4\",\"actor_process_image_md5\":\"a05c639f4dcadbccca\",\"actor_process_causality_id\":\"WS8JAHldrcqM\",\"actor_causality_id\":\"WS8JAHldrcqM\",\"actor_process_os_pid\":600000,\"actor_thread_thread_id\":600000,\"causality_actor_process_image_name\":\"apt.systemd.daily\",\"causality_actor_process_command_line\":\"/bin/sh /usr/lib/apt/apt.systemd.daily install\",\"causality_actor_process_image_path\":\"/usr/lib/apt/apt.systemd.daily\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"causality_actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"causality_actor_causality_id\":\"WS8JAHldrcqM\",\"causality_actor_process_execution_time\":1706247959464,\"causality_actor_process_image_md5\":\"21aa2d5f5e7c2047dd\",\"causality_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"366f4cca90841c6ebef199c24ed3e\",\"action_file_path\":\"/test/60-test.rules\",\"action_file_name\":\"60-test.rules\",\"action_file_md5\":null,\"action_file_sha256\":null,\"action_file_macro_sha256\":null,\"action_registry_data\":null,\"action_registry_key_name\":null,\"action_registry_value_name\":null,\"action_registry_full_key\":null,\"action_local_ip\":null,\"action_local_ip_v6\":null,\"action_local_port\":null,\"action_remote_ip\":null,\"action_remote_ip_v6\":null,\"action_remote_port\":null,\"action_external_hostname\":null,\"action_country\":\"UNKNOWN\",\"action_process_instance_id\":null,\"action_process_causality_id\":null,\"action_process_image_name\":null,\"action_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_process_image_command_line\":null,\"action_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"action_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_effective_username\":null,\"os_actor_process_instance_id\":\"HkgJADgfvcMVdnc\",\"os_actor_process_image_path\":\"/sbin/ttest_path\",\"os_actor_process_image_name\":\"image_name\",\"os_actor_process_command_line\":\"/bin/sh /sbin/ttest_path quicktest 5.15.0-00-generic\",\"os_actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"os_actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"a1c3a3d3522ff153a457684b49c\",\"os_actor_process_causality_id\":\"WS8JAHldrcqM\",\"os_actor_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_os_pid\":608286,\"os_actor_thread_thread_id\":608286,\"fw_app_id\":null,\"fw_interface_from\":null,\"fw_interface_to\":null,\"fw_rule\":null,\"fw_rule_id\":null,\"fw_device_name\":null,\"fw_serial_number\":null,\"fw_url_domain\":null,\"fw_email_subject\":null,\"fw_email_sender\":null,\"fw_email_recipient\":null,\"fw_app_subcategory\":null,\"fw_app_category\":null,\"fw_app_technology\":null,\"fw_vsys\":null,\"fw_xff\":null,\"fw_misc\":null,\"fw_is_phishing\":\"N/A\",\"dst_agent_id\":null,\"dst_causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"dns_query_name\":null,\"dst_action_external_hostname\":null,\"dst_action_country\":null,\"dst_action_external_port\":null,\"contains_featured_host\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_user\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_ip\":\"NO\",\"image_name\":null,\"image_id\":null,\"container_id\":null,\"container_name\":null,\"namespace\":null,\"cluster_name\":null,\"referenced_resource\":null,\"operation_name\":null,\"identity_sub_type\":null,\"identity_type\":null,\"project\":null,\"cloud_provider\":null,\"resource_type\":null,\"resource_sub_type\":null,\"user_agent\":null,\"user_name\":\"JDOE\", \"alert_id\":\"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "file"
        ],
        "dataset": "File Event",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-26T05:47:16.508000Z",
    "file": {
        "name": "60-test.rules",
        "path": "/test/60-test.rules"
    },
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "/bin/sh /sbin/ttest_path quicktest 5.15.0-00-generic",
        "executable": "/sbin/ttest_path",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "a05c639f4dcadbccca",
            "sha256": "a1c3a3d3522ff153a4"
        },
        "name": "ttest_path",
        "pid": 600000,
        "thread": {
            "id": 600000
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "a05c639f4dcadbccca",
            "a1c3a3d3522ff153a4"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"agent_install_type\":\"STANDARD\",\"agent_host_boot_time\":null,\"event_sub_type\":null,\"module_id\":null,\"association_strength\":40,\"dst_association_strength\":40,\"story_id\":\"MzAyOTQzMzI3\",\"event_id\":\"MzAyOTQzMzI3\",\"event_type\":\"Network Connections\",\"event_timestamp\":1706177317000,\"actor_process_instance_id\":null,\"actor_process_image_path\":null,\"actor_process_image_name\":null,\"actor_process_command_line\":null,\"actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"actor_process_image_sha256\":null,\"actor_process_image_md5\":null,\"actor_process_causality_id\":null,\"actor_causality_id\":null,\"actor_process_os_pid\":null,\"actor_thread_thread_id\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_name\":null,\"causality_actor_process_command_line\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_path\":null,\"causality_actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"causality_actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"causality_actor_causality_id\":null,\"causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_md5\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_file_path\":null,\"action_file_name\":null,\"action_file_md5\":null,\"action_file_sha256\":null,\"action_file_macro_sha256\":null,\"action_registry_data\":null,\"action_registry_key_name\":null,\"action_registry_value_name\":null,\"action_registry_full_key\":null,\"action_local_ip\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"action_local_ip_v6\":null,\"action_local_port\":55555,\"action_remote_ip\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"action_remote_ip_v6\":null,\"action_remote_port\":444,\"action_external_hostname\":null,\"action_country\":\"UNKNOWN\",\"action_process_instance_id\":null,\"action_process_causality_id\":null,\"action_process_image_name\":null,\"action_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_process_image_command_line\":null,\"action_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"action_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_effective_username\":null,\"os_actor_process_instance_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_path\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_name\":null,\"os_actor_process_command_line\":null,\"os_actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"os_actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_sha256\":null,\"os_actor_process_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_os_pid\":null,\"os_actor_thread_thread_id\":null,\"fw_app_id\":\"app-id-555\",\"fw_interface_from\":\"vpn\",\"fw_interface_to\":\"outside\",\"fw_rule\":\"VPN-TEST-RULE\",\"fw_rule_id\":\"f4a0e637-b6bf-4894\",\"fw_device_name\":\"VPN-TEST-0000\",\"fw_serial_number\":\"01545100\",\"fw_url_domain\":null,\"fw_email_subject\":null,\"fw_email_sender\":null,\"fw_email_recipient\":null,\"fw_app_subcategory\":\"storage-backup\",\"fw_app_category\":\"business-systems\",\"fw_app_technology\":\"client-server\",\"fw_vsys\":\"vsys1\",\"fw_xff\":null,\"fw_misc\":\"2024\",\"fw_is_phishing\":\"No\",\"dst_agent_id\":\"431983ee6afd4892b\",\"dst_causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"dns_query_name\":null,\"dst_action_external_hostname\":null,\"dst_action_country\":\"-\",\"dst_action_external_port\":null,\"contains_featured_host\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_user\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_ip\":\"NO\",\"image_name\":null,\"image_id\":null,\"container_id\":null,\"container_name\":null,\"namespace\":null,\"cluster_name\":null,\"referenced_resource\":null,\"operation_name\":null,\"identity_sub_type\":null,\"identity_type\":null,\"project\":null,\"cloud_provider\":null,\"resource_type\":null,\"resource_sub_type\":null,\"user_agent\":null,\"user_name\":\"JDOE\", \"alert_id\":\"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "dataset": "Network Connections",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-25T10:08:37Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4",
        "port": 444
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "outside"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "vpn"
            }
        },
        "name": "VPN-TEST-0000",
        "serial_number": "01545100"
    },
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "event": {
                    "firewall": {
                        "app": {
                            "category": "business-systems",
                            "subcategory": "storage-backup",
                            "technology": "client-server"
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "f4a0e637-b6bf-4894",
        "name": "VPN-TEST-RULE"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4",
        "port": 55555
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"agent_install_type\":\"STANDARD\",\"agent_host_boot_time\":1706175924115,\"event_sub_type\":1,\"module_id\":null,\"association_strength\":50,\"dst_association_strength\":null,\"story_id\":null,\"event_id\":\"AAABjUARS\",\"event_type\":\"Process Execution\",\"event_timestamp\":1706176891325,\"actor_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPdXhxnqQ\",\"actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\test\\\\cmd.exe\",\"actor_process_image_name\":\"cmd.exe\",\"actor_process_command_line\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\test\\\\cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all  >> \\\"C:\\\\test\\\\Desktop\\\\DisplayLink Support Files\\\\test_Logs_110048\\\"\\\\Network.txt\",\"actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"actor_process_image_sha256\":\"e9ef013238495bffce\",\"actor_process_image_md5\":\"d3348ac2130c7e75\",\"actor_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPdVLYEm4AA\",\"actor_causality_id\":\"AdpPdVLYEm4AA\",\"actor_process_os_pid\":11111,\"actor_thread_thread_id\":5555,\"causality_actor_process_image_name\":\"Windows_test.exe\",\"causality_actor_process_command_line\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\Desktop\\\\Windows_test.exe\\\" \",\"causality_actor_process_image_path\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\Desktop\\\\Windows_test.exe\\\"\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"TEST(UK) LIMITED\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"causality_actor_causality_id\":\"AdpPdVLYEm\",\"causality_actor_process_execution_time\":1706176828371,\"causality_actor_process_image_md5\":\"9d1513d5dda226e51a69\",\"causality_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"c1498056c06206beaef8b7d1fd749\",\"action_file_path\":null,\"action_file_name\":null,\"action_file_md5\":null,\"action_file_sha256\":null,\"action_file_macro_sha256\":null,\"action_registry_data\":null,\"action_registry_key_name\":null,\"action_registry_value_name\":null,\"action_registry_full_key\":null,\"action_local_ip\":null,\"action_local_ip_v6\":null,\"action_local_port\":null,\"action_remote_ip\":null,\"action_remote_ip_v6\":null,\"action_remote_port\":null,\"action_external_hostname\":null,\"action_country\":\"UNKNOWN\",\"action_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPdXiC3NMAA\",\"action_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPdVLYEm4AA\",\"action_process_image_name\":\"ipconfig.exe\",\"action_process_image_sha256\":\"87b036c720fbd5e63355b9920a2864f\",\"action_process_image_command_line\":\"ipconfig  /all \",\"action_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"action_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"os_actor_effective_username\":null,\"os_actor_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPdXhxnqQA\",\"os_actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TEST\\\\cmd.exe\",\"os_actor_process_image_name\":\"cmd.exe\",\"os_actor_process_command_line\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\TEST\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all  >> \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\Desktop\\\\Network_Statistics.txt\",\"os_actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"os_actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"os_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"e9ef013238495bffce7459\",\"os_actor_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPdVLYEm\",\"os_actor_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_os_pid\":11111,\"os_actor_thread_thread_id\":5555,\"fw_app_id\":null,\"fw_interface_from\":null,\"fw_interface_to\":null,\"fw_rule\":null,\"fw_rule_id\":null,\"fw_device_name\":null,\"fw_serial_number\":null,\"fw_url_domain\":null,\"fw_email_subject\":null,\"fw_email_sender\":null,\"fw_email_recipient\":null,\"fw_app_subcategory\":null,\"fw_app_category\":null,\"fw_app_technology\":null,\"fw_vsys\":null,\"fw_xff\":null,\"fw_misc\":null,\"fw_is_phishing\":\"N/A\",\"dst_agent_id\":null,\"dst_causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"dns_query_name\":null,\"dst_action_external_hostname\":null,\"dst_action_country\":null,\"dst_action_external_port\":null,\"contains_featured_host\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_user\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_ip\":\"NO\",\"image_name\":null,\"image_id\":null,\"container_id\":null,\"container_name\":null,\"namespace\":null,\"cluster_name\":null,\"referenced_resource\":null,\"operation_name\":null,\"identity_sub_type\":null,\"identity_type\":null,\"project\":null,\"cloud_provider\":null,\"resource_type\":null,\"resource_sub_type\":null,\"user_agent\":null,\"user_name\":\"JDOE\", \"alert_id\":\"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "dataset": "Process Execution",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-25T10:01:31.325000Z",
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\test\\cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all  >> \"C:\\test\\Desktop\\DisplayLink Support Files\\test_Logs_110048\"\\Network.txt",
        "executable": "C:\\test\\cmd.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "d3348ac2130c7e75",
            "sha256": "e9ef013238495bffce"
        },
        "name": "cmd.exe",
        "pid": 11111,
        "thread": {
            "id": 5555
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "d3348ac2130c7e75",
            "e9ef013238495bffce"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"agent_install_type\":\"STANDARD\",\"agent_host_boot_time\":1706175420000,\"event_sub_type\":4,\"module_id\":null,\"association_strength\":50,\"dst_association_strength\":null,\"story_id\":null,\"event_id\":\"AAABjUAMJJz95I1\",\"event_type\":\"Registry Event\",\"event_timestamp\":1706176550000,\"actor_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPdK0F6GEAABu\",\"actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\test\\\\testexec.exe\",\"actor_process_image_name\":\"msiexec.exe\",\"actor_process_command_line\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\test\\\\testexec.exe /V\",\"actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"actor_process_image_sha256\":\"8ca4b8b7a2f8e6e7d1df1ae46437fc\",\"actor_process_image_md5\":\"3a8464f2cecdf1d894\",\"actor_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPdK0F6GEAAB\",\"actor_causality_id\":\"AdpPdK0F6GEAAB\",\"actor_process_os_pid\":7000,\"actor_thread_thread_id\":10000,\"causality_actor_process_image_name\":\"testexec.exe\",\"causality_actor_process_command_line\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\test\\\\testexec.exe /V\",\"causality_actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\test\\\\testexec.exe\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"causality_actor_causality_id\":\"AdpPdK0F6GEAABu\",\"causality_actor_process_execution_time\":1706176540000,\"causality_actor_process_image_md5\":\"3a8464f2cecdf1d89430c\",\"causality_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"8ca4b8b7a2f8e6e7d1df1ae46437fc\",\"action_file_path\":null,\"action_file_name\":null,\"action_file_md5\":null,\"action_file_sha256\":null,\"action_file_macro_sha256\":null,\"action_registry_data\":\"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\TEST\\\\TESTCNA.exe\",\"action_registry_key_name\":\"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\TEST\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\",\"action_registry_value_name\":\"SrvTEST\",\"action_registry_full_key\":null,\"action_local_ip\":null,\"action_local_ip_v6\":null,\"action_local_port\":null,\"action_remote_ip\":null,\"action_remote_ip_v6\":null,\"action_remote_port\":null,\"action_external_hostname\":null,\"action_country\":\"UNKNOWN\",\"action_process_instance_id\":null,\"action_process_causality_id\":null,\"action_process_image_name\":null,\"action_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_process_image_command_line\":null,\"action_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"action_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_effective_username\":null,\"os_actor_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPdK0F6GEAAB\",\"os_actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\test\\\\testexec.exe\",\"os_actor_process_image_name\":\"msiexec.exe\",\"os_actor_process_command_line\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\test\\\\testexec.exe /V\",\"os_actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"os_actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"os_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"8ca4b8b7a2f8e6e7d1df1ae46437fc\",\"os_actor_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPdK0F6GEAA\",\"os_actor_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_os_pid\":7000,\"os_actor_thread_thread_id\":10000,\"fw_app_id\":null,\"fw_interface_from\":null,\"fw_interface_to\":null,\"fw_rule\":null,\"fw_rule_id\":null,\"fw_device_name\":null,\"fw_serial_number\":null,\"fw_url_domain\":null,\"fw_email_subject\":null,\"fw_email_sender\":null,\"fw_email_recipient\":null,\"fw_app_subcategory\":null,\"fw_app_category\":null,\"fw_app_technology\":null,\"fw_vsys\":null,\"fw_xff\":null,\"fw_misc\":null,\"fw_is_phishing\":\"N/A\",\"dst_agent_id\":null,\"dst_causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"dns_query_name\":null,\"dst_action_external_hostname\":null,\"dst_action_country\":null,\"dst_action_external_port\":null,\"contains_featured_host\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_user\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_ip\":\"NO\",\"image_name\":null,\"image_id\":null,\"container_id\":null,\"container_name\":null,\"namespace\":null,\"cluster_name\":null,\"referenced_resource\":null,\"operation_name\":null,\"identity_sub_type\":null,\"identity_type\":null,\"project\":null,\"cloud_provider\":null,\"resource_type\":null,\"resource_sub_type\":null,\"user_agent\":null,\"user_name\":\"JDOE\", \"alert_id\":\"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "registry"
        ],
        "dataset": "Registry Event",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-25T09:55:50Z",
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\test\\testexec.exe /V",
        "executable": "C:\\Windows\\test\\testexec.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "3a8464f2cecdf1d894",
            "sha256": "8ca4b8b7a2f8e6e7d1df1ae46437fc"
        },
        "name": "msiexec.exe",
        "pid": 7000,
        "thread": {
            "id": 10000
        }
    },
    "registry": {
        "value": "SrvTEST"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "3a8464f2cecdf1d894",
            "8ca4b8b7a2f8e6e7d1df1ae46437fc"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"agent_install_type\":\"STANDARD\",\"agent_host_boot_time\":1706168000000,\"event_sub_type\":2,\"module_id\":null,\"association_strength\":50,\"dst_association_strength\":null,\"story_id\":null,\"event_id\":\"AAABjUAlDCOX3\",\"event_type\":\"RPC Call\",\"event_timestamp\":1706178186400,\"actor_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPeHj9O58AAD\",\"actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Mozilla Firefox\\\\firefox.exe\",\"actor_process_image_name\":\"firefox.exe\",\"actor_process_command_line\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Mozilla Firefox\\\\firefox.exe\\\" --backgroundtask defaultagent register-task 814FC20000000\",\"actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Mozilla Corporation\",\"actor_process_image_sha256\":\"b1db5b7c78315f35da07a4d26f86\",\"actor_process_image_md5\":\"b835293fa5848e7a7bd19\",\"actor_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPeHj9O58\",\"actor_causality_id\":\"AdpPeHj9O58\",\"actor_process_os_pid\":15000,\"actor_thread_thread_id\":16000,\"causality_actor_process_image_name\":\"firefox.exe\",\"causality_actor_process_command_line\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Mozilla Firefox\\\\firefox.exe\\\" --backgroundtask defaultagent register-task 814FC20F31C36B2\",\"causality_actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\JDOE\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Mozilla Firefox\\\\firefox.exe\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Mozilla Corporation\",\"causality_actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"causality_actor_causality_id\":\"AdpPeHj9O58A\",\"causality_actor_process_execution_time\":1706178180534,\"causality_actor_process_image_md5\":\"b835293fa5848e7a7\",\"causality_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"b1db5b7c78315f35da07a4d26f86adccc8\",\"action_file_path\":null,\"action_file_name\":null,\"action_file_md5\":null,\"action_file_sha256\":null,\"action_file_macro_sha256\":null,\"action_registry_data\":null,\"action_registry_key_name\":null,\"action_registry_value_name\":null,\"action_registry_full_key\":null,\"action_local_ip\":null,\"action_local_ip_v6\":null,\"action_local_port\":null,\"action_remote_ip\":null,\"action_remote_ip_v6\":null,\"action_remote_port\":null,\"action_external_hostname\":null,\"action_country\":\"UNKNOWN\",\"action_process_instance_id\":null,\"action_process_causality_id\":null,\"action_process_image_name\":null,\"action_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_process_image_command_line\":null,\"action_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"action_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_effective_username\":null,\"os_actor_process_instance_id\":\"AdpPYPT27pIAAA\",\"os_actor_process_image_path\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\TEST\\\\test.exe\",\"os_actor_process_image_name\":\"svchost.exe\",\"os_actor_process_command_line\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\TEST\\\\test.exe -k run -p -s Schedule\",\"os_actor_process_signature_status\":\"Signed\",\"os_actor_process_signature_vendor\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"os_actor_process_image_sha256\":\"f13de58416730d210dab465b242e9c94\",\"os_actor_process_causality_id\":\"AdpPYPT27pIA\",\"os_actor_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_os_pid\":1777,\"os_actor_thread_thread_id\":14444,\"fw_app_id\":null,\"fw_interface_from\":null,\"fw_interface_to\":null,\"fw_rule\":null,\"fw_rule_id\":null,\"fw_device_name\":null,\"fw_serial_number\":null,\"fw_url_domain\":null,\"fw_email_subject\":null,\"fw_email_sender\":null,\"fw_email_recipient\":null,\"fw_app_subcategory\":null,\"fw_app_category\":null,\"fw_app_technology\":null,\"fw_vsys\":null,\"fw_xff\":null,\"fw_misc\":null,\"fw_is_phishing\":\"N/A\",\"dst_agent_id\":null,\"dst_causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"dns_query_name\":null,\"dst_action_external_hostname\":null,\"dst_action_country\":null,\"dst_action_external_port\":null,\"contains_featured_host\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_user\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_ip\":\"NO\",\"image_name\":null,\"image_id\":null,\"container_id\":null,\"container_name\":null,\"namespace\":null,\"cluster_name\":null,\"referenced_resource\":null,\"operation_name\":null,\"identity_sub_type\":null,\"identity_type\":null,\"project\":null,\"cloud_provider\":null,\"resource_type\":null,\"resource_sub_type\":null,\"user_agent\":null,\"user_name\":\"JDOE\", \"alert_id\":\"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "dataset": "RPC Call",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-25T10:23:06.400000Z",
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\JDOE\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe\" --backgroundtask defaultagent register-task 814FC20000000",
        "executable": "C:\\Users\\JDOE\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "b835293fa5848e7a7bd19",
            "sha256": "b1db5b7c78315f35da07a4d26f86"
        },
        "name": "firefox.exe",
        "pid": 15000,
        "thread": {
            "id": 16000
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "b1db5b7c78315f35da07a4d26f86",
            "b835293fa5848e7a7bd19"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"agent_install_type\":\"NA\",\"agent_host_boot_time\":null,\"event_sub_type\":1,\"module_id\":null,\"association_strength\":32,\"dst_association_strength\":32,\"story_id\":\"MzY1MjMyMjkyMT\",\"event_id\":\"MzY1MjMyMjkyMT\",\"event_type\":\"VPN\",\"event_timestamp\":1706183000000,\"actor_process_instance_id\":null,\"actor_process_image_path\":null,\"actor_process_image_name\":null,\"actor_process_command_line\":null,\"actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"actor_process_image_sha256\":null,\"actor_process_image_md5\":null,\"actor_process_causality_id\":null,\"actor_causality_id\":null,\"actor_process_os_pid\":null,\"actor_thread_thread_id\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_name\":null,\"causality_actor_process_command_line\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_path\":null,\"causality_actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"causality_actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"causality_actor_causality_id\":null,\"causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_md5\":null,\"causality_actor_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_file_path\":null,\"action_file_name\":null,\"action_file_md5\":null,\"action_file_sha256\":null,\"action_file_macro_sha256\":null,\"action_registry_data\":null,\"action_registry_key_name\":null,\"action_registry_value_name\":null,\"action_registry_full_key\":null,\"action_local_ip\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"action_local_ip_v6\":null,\"action_local_port\":null,\"action_remote_ip\":null,\"action_remote_ip_v6\":null,\"action_remote_port\":null,\"action_external_hostname\":null,\"action_country\":\"FR\",\"action_process_instance_id\":null,\"action_process_causality_id\":null,\"action_process_image_name\":null,\"action_process_image_sha256\":null,\"action_process_image_command_line\":null,\"action_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"action_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_effective_username\":null,\"os_actor_process_instance_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_path\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_name\":null,\"os_actor_process_command_line\":null,\"os_actor_process_signature_status\":\"N/A\",\"os_actor_process_signature_vendor\":null,\"os_actor_process_image_sha256\":null,\"os_actor_process_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_causality_id\":null,\"os_actor_process_os_pid\":null,\"os_actor_thread_thread_id\":null,\"fw_app_id\":null,\"fw_interface_from\":null,\"fw_interface_to\":null,\"fw_rule\":null,\"fw_rule_id\":null,\"fw_device_name\":null,\"fw_serial_number\":\"015451000000000\",\"fw_url_domain\":null,\"fw_email_subject\":null,\"fw_email_sender\":null,\"fw_email_recipient\":null,\"fw_app_subcategory\":null,\"fw_app_category\":null,\"fw_app_technology\":null,\"fw_vsys\":null,\"fw_xff\":null,\"fw_misc\":null,\"fw_is_phishing\":\"N/A\",\"dst_agent_id\":\"32ec5200-e206-4ef0\",\"dst_causality_actor_process_execution_time\":null,\"dns_query_name\":null,\"dst_action_external_hostname\":null,\"dst_action_country\":\"-\",\"dst_action_external_port\":null,\"contains_featured_host\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_user\":\"NO\",\"contains_featured_ip\":\"NO\",\"image_name\":null,\"image_id\":null,\"container_id\":null,\"container_name\":null,\"namespace\":null,\"cluster_name\":null,\"referenced_resource\":null,\"operation_name\":null,\"identity_sub_type\":null,\"identity_type\":null,\"project\":null,\"cloud_provider\":null,\"resource_type\":null,\"resource_sub_type\":null,\"user_agent\":null,\"user_name\":\"JDOE\", \"alert_id\":\"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "dataset": "VPN",
        "kind": "event",
        "type": [
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-01-25T11:43:20Z",
    "observer": {
        "serial_number": "015451000000000"
    },
    "paloalto": {
        "cortex": {
            "xdr": {
                "alert": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
agent.name keyword Custom name of the agent.
agent.version keyword Version of the agent.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
dns.question.name keyword The name being queried.
email.sender.address keyword Address of the message sender.
email.subject keyword The subject of the email message.
email.to.address keyword Email address of recipient
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.dataset keyword Name of the dataset.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.outcome keyword The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.provider keyword Source of the event.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.path keyword Full path to the file, including the file name.
host.id keyword Unique host id.
host.ip ip Host ip addresses.
host.mac keyword Host MAC addresses.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
host.os.name keyword Operating system name, without the version.
observer.egress.interface.name keyword Interface name
observer.ingress.interface.name keyword Interface name
observer.name keyword Custom name of the observer.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.serial_number keyword Observer serial number.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.category keyword Cortex alert category
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.externalID keyword Cortex alert external ID
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.id keyword Cortex alert ID
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.name keyword Cortex alert name
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.ruleID.filter keyword Cortex alert filter rule id
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.ruleID.matching_service keyword Cortex alert matching service rule id
paloalto.cortex.xdr.alert.severity keyword Cortex alert severity
paloalto.cortex.xdr.event.firewall.app.category keyword Cortex firewall app category
paloalto.cortex.xdr.event.firewall.app.subcategory keyword Cortex firewall app subcategory
paloalto.cortex.xdr.event.firewall.app.technology keyword Cortex firewall app technology
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
process.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
process.name keyword Process name.
process.pid long Process id.
process.thread.id long Thread ID.
registry.key keyword Hive-relative path of keys.
registry.path keyword Full path, including hive, key and value
registry.value keyword Name of the value written.
rule.id keyword Rule ID
rule.name keyword Rule name
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.port long Port of the source.
url.domain keyword Domain of the url.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.

Create API Key

Before using the Cortex XDR connector, you must generate an API key in Cortex XDR. For that you need to follow steps bellow :

  1. Within Cortex XDR, click Settings.
  2. Click Configurations.

    Configuration Page

  3. In the Configurations menu, select API Keys, which appears in the Integrations section.

  4. In the API Keys window, click +New Key button to create a new API key. And the Generate API Key window will open.

    Api Key Page

  5. Select the Standard Security Level.

  6. Select a role for the API key. After selecting the role, click Generate.

    Generation Button

  7. After you’ve generated the key, copy the API key value presented and keep it secure.

  8. Return to the API Keys window, and select the API key you just generated. Also make note of the API key ID, which appears in the API Keys table.

    Info

    • You will need also the Fqdn which is a unique host and domain name associated with each tenant. When you generate the API Key and Key ID, you are assigned an individual Fqdn.

Configure

Create the intake

  1. Go to the Intake page and create a new Palo Alto Cortex XDR (EDR) intake.
  2. Copy the associated Intake key ( You will use it in the playbook part )

Pull events

  1. Go to the Playbook page.
  2. Click on + PLAYBOOK and choose Create a playbook from scratch.
  3. Give it a name and a description and click on Next.
  4. In Choose a trigger, select the Fetch Alerts from Cortex.
  5. Click on the Fetch Alerts from Cortex module on the right sidebar and in the Module Configuration section, select Create new configuration.
  6. Write a name and paste the API Key, API Key ID and Fqdn, then click on Save.
  7. In the Trigger Configuration section, click on Create new configuration.
  8. Write a name, choose a frequency - Default is 60 -, paste the intake_key associated to your Fetch Alerts from Cortex intake and click on Save.
  9. On the top right corner, start the Playbook. You should see monitoring messages in the Trigger Logs section.
  10. Check on the Events page that the Cortex logs are being received.

Further Readings