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Trend Micro Cloud One / Deep Security

Overview

Trend Micro Deep Security / Workload Security detect malware, vulnerabilities and some other threats. It protect your physical and virtual servers as well as, your cloud and containers instances.

Benefit from SEKOIA.IO built-in rules and upgrade Trend Micro Cloud One / Deep Security with the following detection capabilities out-of-the-box.

SEKOIA.IO x Trend Micro Cloud One / Deep Security on ATT&CK Navigator

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: elementary
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic Execution

Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool

  • Effort: intermediate
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: elementary
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: master
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

  • Effort: intermediate
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: advanced
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: elementary
Package Manager Alteration

Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software

  • Effort: advanced
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages

Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement

  • Effort: master
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
SSH Authorized Key Alteration

The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision

  • Effort: advanced
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Abuse Restoration

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line or registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration).

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Authentication logs Trend Micro Deep Security produce logs describing authentication events
File monitoring Trend Micro Deep Security monitor changes made on the host and on the appplications
Network intrusion detection system Trend Micro Deep Security monitor the network traffic to prevent intrusions
Network protocol analysis Trend Micro Deep Security monitor the network traffic and maintains event logs for audit
Web proxy Trend Micro Deep Security monitor HTTP traffic to block malicious payloads and communication with C&C.

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind event
Category authentication, intrusion_detection
Type start

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by SEKOIA.IO.

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|<Agent version>|4000000|Eicar_test_file|6|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=hostname cn2=205 cn2Label=Quarantine File Size cs6=ContainerImageName | ContainerName | ContainerID cs6Label=Container filePath=C:\\Users\\trend\\Desktop\\eicar.exe act=Delete result=Delete msg=Realtime TrendMicroDsMalwareTarget=N/A TrendMicroDsMalwareTargetType=N/A TrendMicroDsFileMD5=44D88612FEA8A8F36DE82E1278ABB02F TrendMicroDsFileSHA1=3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140 TrendMicroDsFileSHA256=275A021BBFB6489E54D471899F7DB9D1663FC695EC2FE2A2C4538AABF651FD0F TrendMicroDsDetectionConfidence=95 TrendMicroDsRelevantDetectionNames=Ransom_CERBER.BZC;Ransom_CERBER.C;Ransom_CRYPNISCA.SM",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 6,
        "action": "Delete",
        "reason": "Realtime"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "<Agent version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "4000000"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "TrendMicroDsRelevantDetectionNames": [
            "Ransom_CERBER.BZC",
            "Ransom_CERBER.C",
            "Ransom_CRYPNISCA.SM"
        ],
        "TrendMicroDsDetectionConfidence": "95",
        "TrendMicroDsMalwareTargetType": "N/A",
        "TrendMicroDsMalwareTarget": "N/A",
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "container": {
        "name": "ContainerImageName | ContainerName | ContainerID"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1",
        "name": "hostname"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "275A021BBFB6489E54D471899F7DB9D1663FC695EC2FE2A2C4538AABF651FD0F",
            "sha1": "3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140",
            "md5": "44D88612FEA8A8F36DE82E1278ABB02F"
        },
        "size": 205,
        "path": "C:\\Users\\trend\\Desktop\\eicar.exe"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "Eicar_test_file"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "275A021BBFB6489E54D471899F7DB9D1663FC695EC2FE2A2C4538AABF651FD0F",
            "3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140",
            "44D88612FEA8A8F36DE82E1278ABB02F"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|20.0.677|1011466|Apache HTTP Server 'mod_sed' Denial Of Service Vulnerability (CVE-2022-30522)|6|cn1=318 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=foo.bar.fr TrendMicroDsTenant=Primary TrendMicroDsTenantId=0 dmac=22:22:22:22:22:22 smac=11:11:11:11:11:11 TrendMicroDsFrameType=IP src=2.2.2.2 dst=1.1.1.1 in=0 cs3=DF 0 cs3Label=Fragmentation Bits proto=TCP spt=58407 dpt=443 cs2=ACK cs2Label=TCP Flags cnt=2 act=IDS:Reset cn3=0 cn3Label=DPI Packet Position cs5=0 cs5Label=DPI Stream Position  cs1=\"CVE-2022-30522\" cs1Label=DPI Note cs6=0 cs6Label=DPI Flags\n\n",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 6,
        "action": "IDS:Reset",
        "reason": "Apache HTTP Server 'mod_sed' Denial Of Service Vulnerability (CVE-2022-30522)"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "20.0.677"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "1011466"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "2.2.2.2",
        "mac": "11:11:11:11:11:11",
        "port": 58407,
        "address": "2.2.2.2"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "1.1.1.1",
        "port": 443,
        "mac": "22:22:22:22:22:22",
        "address": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "ingress": {
                "bytes": 0
            }
        },
        "id": "318",
        "name": "foo.bar.fr"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "TrendMicroDsFrameType": "IP",
        "TrendMicroDsTenantId": "0",
        "TrendMicroDsTenant": "Primary",
        "FragmentationBits": "DF 0",
        "TCPFlags": [
            "ACK"
        ],
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "Apache HTTP Server 'mod_sed' Denial Of Service Vulnerability (CVE-2022-30522)"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1",
            "2.2.2.2"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|10.2.229|6001200|AppControl detectOnly|6|cn1=202 cn1Label=Host ID dvc=192.168.33.128 TrendMicroDsTenant=Primary TrendMicroDsTenantId=0 fileHash=80D4AC182F97D2AB48EE4310AC51DA5974167C596D133D64A83107B9069745E0 suser=root suid=0 act=detectOnly filePath=/home/user1/Desktop/Directory1//heartbeatSync.sh fsize=20 aggregationType=0 repeatCount=1 cs1=notWhitelisted cs1Label=actionReason cs2=0CC9713BA896193A527213D9C94892D41797EB7C cs2Label=sha1 cs3=7EA8EF10BEB2E9876D4D7F7E5A46CF8D cs3Label=md5",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 6,
        "action": "detectOnly",
        "reason": "notWhitelisted"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "10.2.229"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "6001200"
    },
    "file": {
        "size": 20,
        "hash": {
            "sha1": "0CC9713BA896193A527213D9C94892D41797EB7C",
            "md5": "7EA8EF10BEB2E9876D4D7F7E5A46CF8D"
        },
        "path": "/home/user1/Desktop/Directory1//heartbeatSync.sh"
    },
    "source": {
        "user": {
            "name": "root"
        }
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "TrendMicroDsTenantId": "0",
        "TrendMicroDsTenant": "Primary",
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "202",
        "ip": "192.168.33.128"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "AppControl detectOnly"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "0CC9713BA896193A527213D9C94892D41797EB7C",
            "7EA8EF10BEB2E9876D4D7F7E5A46CF8D"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "192.168.33.128"
        ],
        "user": [
            "root"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|50.0.1063|7000000|Device Control DeviceControl|6|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=test-hostname TrendMicroDsTenant=tenantName TrendMicroDsTenantId=1 device=deviceName processName=processName1 fileName=/tmp/some_path2 vendor=vendorName serial=aaaa-bbbb-cccc model=modelName computerName=computerName domainName=computerDomain deviceType=0 permission=0",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 6,
        "reason": "Device Control DeviceControl"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "50.0.1063"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "7000000"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "TrendMicroDsTenantId": "1",
        "TrendMicroDsTenant": "tenantName",
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1",
        "name": "test-hostname"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "Device Control DeviceControl"
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|<Agent version>|20|Log for TCP Port 80|0|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvc=hostname act=Log dmac=00:50:56:F5:7F:47 smac=00:0C:29:EB:35:DE TrendMicroDsFrameType=IP src=192.168.126.150 dst=72.14.204.147 out=1019 cs3=DF MF cs3Label=Fragmentation Bits proto=TCP spt=49617 dpt=80 cs2=0x00 ACK PSH cs2Label=TCP Flags cnt=1 TrendMicroDsPacketData=AFB...",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "action": "Log",
        "reason": "Log for TCP Port 80"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "<Agent version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "20",
        "name": "Log-only Firewall rule"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "192.168.126.150",
        "mac": "00:0C:29:EB:35:DE",
        "port": 49617,
        "address": "192.168.126.150"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "72.14.204.147",
        "port": 80,
        "mac": "00:50:56:F5:7F:47",
        "address": "72.14.204.147"
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "egress": {
                "bytes": 1019
            }
        },
        "id": "1"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "TrendMicroDsFrameType": "IP",
        "FragmentationBits": "DF MF",
        "TCPFlags": [
            "0x00",
            "ACK",
            "PSH"
        ],
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "Log for TCP Port 80"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "192.168.126.150",
            "72.14.204.147"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|<Agent version>|30|New Integrity Monitoring Rule|6|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=hostname act=updated filePath=c:\\windows\\message.dll suser=admin sproc=C:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe msg=lastModified,sha1,size",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 6,
        "action": "updated",
        "reason": "lastModified,sha1,size"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "<Agent version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "30",
        "name": "Custom Integrity Monitoring rule"
    },
    "source": {
        "user": {
            "name": "admin"
        }
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1",
        "name": "hostname"
    },
    "process": {
        "name": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe"
    },
    "file": {
        "path": "c:\\windows\\message.dll"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "New Integrity Monitoring Rule"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|<Agent version>|1001111|Test Intrusion Prevention Rule|3|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=hostname dmac=00:50:56:F5:7F:47 smac=00:0C:29:EB:35:DE TrendMicroDsFrameType=IP src=192.168.126.150 dst=72.14.204.105 out=1093 cs3=DF MF cs3Label=Fragmentation Bits proto=TCP spt=49786 dpt=80 cs2=0x00 ACK PSH cs2Label=TCP Flags cnt=1 act=IDS:Reset cn3=10 cn3Label=Intrusion Prevention Packet Position cs5=10 cs5Label=Intrusion Prevention Stream Position cs6=8 cs6Label=Intrusion Prevention Flags TrendMicroDsPacketData=R0VUIC9zP3...",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 3,
        "action": "IDS:Reset",
        "reason": "Test Intrusion Prevention Rule"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "<Agent version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "1001111"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "192.168.126.150",
        "mac": "00:0C:29:EB:35:DE",
        "port": 49786,
        "address": "192.168.126.150"
    },
    "destination": {
        "ip": "72.14.204.105",
        "port": 80,
        "mac": "00:50:56:F5:7F:47",
        "address": "72.14.204.105"
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "egress": {
                "bytes": 1093
            }
        },
        "id": "1",
        "name": "hostname"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "TrendMicroDsFrameType": "IP",
        "IntrusionPreventionStreamPosition": "10",
        "IntrusionPreventionFlags": "8",
        "FragmentationBits": "DF MF",
        "TCPFlags": [
            "0x00",
            "ACK",
            "PSH"
        ],
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "Test Intrusion Prevention Rule"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "192.168.126.150",
            "72.14.204.105"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|<Agent version>|3002795|Microsoft Windows Events|8|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=hostname cs1Label=LI Description cs1=Multiple Windows Logon Failures fname=Security src=127.0.0.1 duser=(no user) shost=WIN-RM6HM42G65V msg=WinEvtLog Security: AUDIT_FAILURE(4625): Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing: (no user): no domain: WIN-RM6HM42G65V: An account failed to log on. Subject: ..",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 8,
        "reason": "WinEvtLog Security: AUDIT_FAILURE(4625): Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing: (no user): no domain: WIN-RM6HM42G65V: An account failed to log on. Subject: .."
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "<Agent version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "3002795"
    },
    "file": {
        "name": "Security"
    },
    "source": {
        "ip": "127.0.0.1",
        "address": "127.0.0.1"
    },
    "destination": {
        "user": {
            "name": "(no user)"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "WIN-RM6HM42G65V",
        "id": "1",
        "name": "hostname"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "LogInspectionDescription": "Multiple Windows Logon Failures",
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "Microsoft Windows Events"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "WIN-RM6HM42G65V"
        ],
        "user": [
            "(no user)"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "127.0.0.1"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Workload Security Manager|<Workload Security version>|600|User Signed In|3|src=10.52.116.160 suser=admin target=admin msg=User signed in from 2001:db8::5",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 3,
        "reason": "User signed in from 2001:db8::5"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Workload Security Manager",
        "version": "<Workload Security version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "600"
    },
    "source": {
        "user": {
            "name": "admin"
        },
        "ip": "10.52.116.160",
        "address": "10.52.116.160"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "User Signed In"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.52.116.160"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Deep Security Agent|<Agent version>|5000000|WebReputation|5|cn1=1 cn1Label=Host ID dvchost=hostname request=example.com msg=Blocked By Admin",
    "event": {
        "kind": "event",
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ],
        "severity": 5,
        "reason": "Blocked By Admin"
    },
    "observer": {
        "vendor": "Trend Micro",
        "type": "Deep Security Agent",
        "version": "<Agent version>"
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "5000000"
    },
    "url": {
        "original": "example.com",
        "path": "example.com"
    },
    "trendmicro": {
        "ResourceType": "Other"
    },
    "host": {
        "id": "1",
        "name": "hostname"
    },
    "cef": {
        "Name": "WebReputation"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
container.name keyword Container name.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.mac keyword MAC address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
destination.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.risk_score_norm float Normalized risk score or priority of the event (0-100).
event.severity long Numeric severity of the event.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.hash.md5 keyword MD5 hash.
file.hash.sha1 keyword SHA1 hash.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.path keyword Full path to the file, including the file name.
file.size long File size in bytes.
host.hostname keyword Hostname of the host.
host.id keyword Unique host id.
host.ip ip Host ip addresses.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
host.network.egress.bytes long The number of bytes sent on all network interfaces.
host.network.ingress.bytes long The number of bytes received on all network interfaces.
network.protocol keyword Application protocol name.
observer.type keyword The type of the observer the data is coming from.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
observer.version keyword Observer version.
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.name keyword Process name.
rule.id keyword Rule ID
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.mac keyword MAC address of the source.
source.port long Port of the source.
source.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
trendmicro.FragmentationBits keyword Fragmentation Bits
trendmicro.IntrusionPreventionFlags keyword Intrusion Prevention Flags
trendmicro.IntrusionPreventionStreamPosition keyword Intrusion Prevention Stream Position
trendmicro.LogInspectionDescription keyword
trendmicro.ResourceTypeId keyword Resource Type identifier
trendmicro.TCPFlags keyword TCP Flags
trendmicro.TrendMicroDsRelevantDetectionNames keyword
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.

Configure

In this guide, you will configure your Security Manager to forward events through syslog.

Prerequisites

An internal syslog concentrator is required to collect and forward events to SEKOIA.IO.

Enable Syslog forwarding

To enable syslog forwarding, for Trend Micro Deep Security, please follow this guide. For Trend Micro Workload Security, please refer to this documentation

Log on your Security console. Provide the IP and the listening port (514) of the log concentrator and select CEF as the event format.

Direct forwarding

If the concentrator and all your agents are on the same network or could communicate safely (VPN, ...), select the transport protocol UDP and ask your agents to send events Directly to the syslog server. Apply the changes.

Indirect forwarding

If your agents should forward events over untrusted network, select the transport protocol TLS and ask your agents to send events Via the Workload Security Manager. Generate and add a certificate to the log concentrator. Apply the changes and test the connection.

For the first connection, the manager should display the error message "Accept Server Certificate?". Check the certificate and click OK to accept it. Test the connection again; it should succeed. If not, please see the "Troubleshoot event forwarding" section on the Trend-Micro documentation.

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Trend Micro Deep Security / Workload Security.

Transport to SEKOIA.IO

Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to SEKOIA.IO.