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Windows

Overview

Microsoft Windows is a widely used operating system that has been developed by Microsoft since 1985.

This page will provide you with two methods for collecting and forwarding Windows logs to Sekoia.io.

  • The first method involves using the NXLog agent to send logs directly from the Windows machine to Sekoia.io.

  • The second method involves using NXLog to forward logs from an internal log concentrator to Sekoia.io.

Additionally, this documentation will offer guidance on collecting and forwarding logs from sensitive assets, such as Domain Controllers, without requiring the installation of a third-party agent.

Warning

Please be advised that this documentation assumes the use of the 64-bit version of NXLog. If you are using the 32-bit version, it is crucial that you replace all references to C:\Program Files\nxlog\ in the commands and configuration files with C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog\. Failure to make this adjustment may result in errors.

Warning

Please be advised that collecting Windows events with NXLog on certain Windows languages that contain accents (such as French for "Système" keyword), are not correctly encoded by NXLog and results in an error of interpreation on our product. In such case, please consider the installation of our agent on the supported OS).

Windows Event logs

On Microsoft Windows workstations and servers, most of the important hardward and software activities that are relevant for security detection and analysis, are logged into three files:

  • Application: for Windows components such as drivers and built-in interface elements
  • System: records events related to programs installed on a system
  • Security: records events related to security (such as logon attempts and ressource access)

Those logs a readable locally in the Windows Event Viewer, in the section Windows Logs.

If you want to improve detection and analysis, you may want to enable Sysmon.

Sysmon is a Microsoft tool you can download on their website. A common installation instruction and configuration file is available on Florian Roth's Github. This configuration is an updated (and maintained) version of the SwiftOnSecurity's configuration, which can also be used.

Warning

Please be aware that installing this tool may generate additional logs, resulting in increased consumption of CPU resources. It is important to ensure that the equipment on which the tool is installed is appropriately sized and has sufficient resources to handle the additional workload. We recommend that you first test the installation on lower-risk assets before deploying it on more critical systems.

You will find dedicated NXLog configuration file for Sysmon usage in this section.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Windows. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Windows on ATT&CK Navigator

AD Object WriteDAC Access

Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object. This requires Windows Event ID 4662.

  • Effort: advanced
AD Privileged Users Or Groups Reconnaissance

Detect privileged users or groups reconnaissance based on 4661 Event ID and known privileged users or groups SIDs. If the user account name is not a known admin it is suspicious.

  • Effort: master
AD User Enumeration

Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account. This requires Windows Security Event ID 4662 and could be triggered by some administrators configuring new users.

  • Effort: master
AMSI Deactivation Using Registry Key

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable the AMSI provider by deleting the associated registry key.

  • Effort: master
APT29 Fake Google Update Service Install

This method detects malicious services mentioned in APT29 report by FireEye. The legitimate path for the Google update service is C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe so the service names and executable locations used by APT29 are specific enough to be detected in log files.

  • Effort: elementary
Abusing Azure Browser SSO

Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll

Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.

  • Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Active Directory Database Dump Via Ntdsutil

Detects the dump of ntdis.dit database by using the utility ntdsutil.exe. NTDS.dit database stores Active Directory data, including passwords hashes for all users in the domain.

  • Effort: elementary
Active Directory Delegate To KRBTGT Service

Detects potential persistence installation from an already compromised administrator domain account. The attacker will create a TGT and abuse a service account with the constrained delegation and update it with the krbtgt service. The detection relies on the Event ID 4738.

  • Effort: intermediate
Active Directory Replication User Backdoor

Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to regular user or machine account, this technics is often used to give ResetPassword or WriteMembers or DCSync permission(s) for persistency on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account

Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. It requires a configuration step where the legit service account should be added to the exclusion list.

  • Effort: advanced
Active Directory Shadow Credentials

Detects alternative credentials material adding. Attackers can abuse msDS-KeyCredentialLink and create a key pair to obtain a persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer.

  • Effort: elementary
Active Directory User Backdoors

Detects scenarios where the attacker controls another user or computer account without having to use their credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration

Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.

  • Effort: advanced
Admin Share Access

Detects access to $ADMIN share. The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure. Also be very cautious to previously check if this is not commonly used by your administrators as to remotely manage your computers.

  • Effort: master
Admin User RDP Remote Logon

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

  • Effort: master
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config

  • Effort: advanced
Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Antivirus Password Dumper Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This detection relies on Windows Defender events logs. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts

Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This is only based on Windows Defender events.

  • Effort: intermediate
Antivirus Web Shell Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Aspnet Compiler

Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.

  • Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.

  • Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line

Detects use of azureedge in the command line.

  • Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
Backup Catalog Deleted

The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

  • Effort: elementary
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner)

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE 2022-1292

The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

  • Effort: master
CVE-2019-0708 Scan

Detects the use of a scanner that discovers targets vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

  • Effort: advanced
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

  • Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Service Creation Usage

Detects Cobalt Strike usage from an existing beacon when attacker tries to elevate or move laterally through a service creation.

  • Effort: elementary
Cobalt Strike Named Pipes

Detects the pipes established by Cobalt Strike to allow a communication between its beacons.

  • Effort: master
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

  • Effort: master
Container Credential Access

Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable

A script has copied a System32 executable.

  • Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing

Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls

  • Effort: intermediate
CreateRemoteThread Common Process Injection

Detects a possible process injection through CreateRemoteThread() which is spotted by EventID 8 from Sysmon and several EDRs. This rule has a list of process commonly being injected by the attackers that should be updated regularly.

  • Effort: advanced
Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files

Process with well-known names (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation.

  • Effort: intermediate
Credential Dumping By LaZagne

Detects LSASS process access by LaZagne for credential dumping.

  • Effort: elementary
Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution

Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Credential Dumping-Tools Common Named Pipes

Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipes. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config

  • Effort: master
Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
DC Shadow via Service Principal Name (SPN) creation

Detects DCShadow via new Service Principal Name (SPN) creation

  • Effort: intermediate
DCSync Attack

Detects DCSync attack, it is highly likely that the post-exploitation tool Mimikatz was executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

  • Effort: intermediate
DLL Load via LSASS Registry Key

Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events. This can be done with Sysmon events 12, 13 and 14 and monitor SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

  • Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

  • Effort: elementary
DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction

Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers

  • Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Denied Access To Remote Desktop

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Detection of default Mimikatz banner

Detection of default Mimikatz banner in powershell events

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt

Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events for this specific registry key is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Windows Defender Credential Guard

Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Dism Disabling Windows Defender

Detects windows defender disabled by dism.

  • Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount

Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Non-Legitimate TLDs

Detects file downloads from non-legitimate TLDs. Additional legitimates TLDs should be filtered according to the business habits.

  • Effort: master
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Dumpert LSASS Process Dumper

Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory

  • Effort: elementary
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynwrapx Module Loading

Detects the loading of DynamicWrapperX (Dynwrapx). It is used by some malware in their infection chain and could help to detect its usage from vbs/wscript/cscript scripts. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 7).

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Eventlog Cleared

Some threat groups tend to delete local EventLogs (Security being the most common one to be deleted) using certain utilities. The EventID 517 is old and 1102 should be used for this instead on newer Windows versions.

  • Effort: intermediate
EvilProxy Phishing Domain

Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

  • Effort: intermediate
Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects a suspicious execution from an uncommon folder

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp

Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine

Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189

  • Effort: elementary
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: advanced
External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device

Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB device.

  • Effort: advanced
Fail2ban Unban IP

An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.

  • Effort: advanced
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

  • Effort: master
FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

  • Effort: elementary
FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading

Detects DLL image load activity as used by the threat group NOBELIUM with the FoggyWeb backdoor loader. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done through the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Formbook File Creation DB1

Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Formbook Hijacked Process Command

Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.

  • Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line

Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments

  • Effort: master
GPO Executable Delivery

Detects MSI binaries run through GPOs.

  • Effort: intermediate
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
GitLab CVE-2021-22205

Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.

  • Effort: intermediate
Gpscript Suspicious Parent

Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names

Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.

  • Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
HarfangLab EDR Critical Level Rule Detection

HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a critical level rule (not using hlai engine)

  • Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR High Level Rule Detection

HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a high level rule (not using hlai engine)

  • Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Hlai Engine Detection

HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on its hlai engine

  • Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Low Level Rule Detection

HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a low level rule (not using hlai engine)

  • Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Medium Level Rule Detection

HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a medium level rule (not using hlai engine)

  • Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Process Execution Blocked (HL-AI engine)

HarfangLab EDR's machine learning malware detection module (HL-AI) has detected a suspicious binary and blocked its execution. To know more on what caused this alert, you should check the value of the process name and the concerned computer and user.

  • Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Suspicious Process Behavior Has Been Detected

HarfangLab EDR has detected a suspicious process behavior based on its detection rule. Check the rule name and description for more information.

  • Effort: master
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd

Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.

  • Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Addcomputer

Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern

  • Effort: intermediate
Impacket Secretsdump.py Tool

Detects credential dumping via secretdump of impacket suite.

  • Effort: intermediate
Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

  • Effort: elementary
In-memory PowerShell

Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension and tool such PowerShDll.

  • Effort: master
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets

Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.

  • Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
LSASS Access From Non System Account

Detects LSASS Access from Non System Account (e.g. Mimikatz)

  • Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump

Detects process accessing LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools. The rule requires Sysmon EventID 10 to work as it is based on the GrantedAccess mask.

  • Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump File Creation

LSASS memory dump creation using operating systems utilities. Procdump will use process name in output file if no name is specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lateral Movement - Remote Named Pipe

Detects lateral movement and remote exec using named pipe over network. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share enable policy.

  • Effort: advanced
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder

Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.

  • Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute

Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload

Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search

Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems

  • Effort: intermediate
List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: elementary
Load Of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL From Suspicious Process

Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes. Many tools import dbghelp.dll and / or dbgcore.dll to use the MiniDumpWriteDump function. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine. Dumpert from OUTFLANK also uses this.

  • Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)

Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: advanced
Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Lsass Access Through WinRM

Detects the access of LSASS.exe process through Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol. This is often done using Invoke-Mimikatz -ComputerName command, which uses PSRemoting and therefore WinRM. However, this is not limited to the Mimikatz threat and can be done by other tools as well. This rule needs Process Access monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's event ID 10.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir

Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.

  • Effort: master
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

  • Effort: advanced
Malicious Named Pipe

Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known malware. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and 18).

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks

  • Effort: advanced
Malicious Service Installations

Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL

Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.

  • Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Metasploit PSExec Service Creation

Detects Metasploit service creation when using the PSExec module. The ImagePath here is usually a malicious command line using powershell.exe and/or cmd.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration Changed

Detects when an feature configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (enabling or disabling real-time protection, etc.)

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable SecurityHealth

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender SecurityHealth through command line and registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is recommended.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Configuration

Detects when an exclusion configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (adding either a path or process bypass)

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Deleted

Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Tampering Detected

Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash

Detects a crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine process (MsMpEng.exe), which is suspicious and could be related to an attacker disabling the Windows protection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Startup Add-In

Detects add-ins that load when Microsoft Word or Excel starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel). The rule requires File Creation logging to work, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: elementary
Mimikatz Basic Commands

Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.

  • Effort: elementary
Mimikatz LSASS Memory Access

Detection of in-memory Mimikatz by focusing on processes opening the Local Security Authority (Lsass.exe) process and reading the memory contents of it. This probably means that Mimikatz has been executed on the host, meaning the attacker already has high privileges and is looking to dump credentials, most likely for lateral movement or privilege escalation purposes. The rule requires Sysmon EventID 10 to work as it is based on the GrantedAccess mask.

  • Effort: advanced
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: intermediate
Mustang Panda Dropper

Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Narrator Feedback-Hub Persistence

The Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub registry key has been modified which could be done by an attacker for persistence purposes. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13). Careful since the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon's configuration needs to be changed to log for this specifically.

  • Effort: master
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack

Detects changes in Windows Registry key (LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec or RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) which can lead to NetNTLM downgrade attack. The rule requires to log registry keys creation or update, it can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location

Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Connection Via Certutil

Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.

  • Effort: master
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Or Renamed User Account With '$' In Attribute 'SamAccountName'

Detects possible bypass EDR and SIEM via abnormal user account name.

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: master
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Office Application Startup Office Test

Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.

  • Effort: elementary
OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process

In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.

  • Effort: elementary
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Dumper Activity On LSASS

Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic

Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.

  • Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
Phosphorus (APT35) Exchange Discovery

According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about its the environment of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers. The command is the following: Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders

  • Effort: elementary
Phosphorus Domain Controller Discovery

According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about the Domain Controller. The command is the following: "powershell.exe" /c Get-WMIObject Win32_NTDomain | findstr DomainController

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible RottenPotato Attack

Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)

Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Potential RDP Connection To Non-Domain Host

Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain using RDP (TermSrv). Event ID 8001 corresponds to outgoing NTLM authentication traffic and TermSrv stands for RDP Terminal Services Server. Check if the contacted host is legitimate. To use this detection rule, enable logging of outbound NTLM authentications on all domain controllers, using the following Group Policy (GPO) - Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers -> Define this policy setting: Audit all.

  • Effort: master
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell - NTFS Alternate Data Stream

Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from PowerShell. Needs Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Credential Prompt

Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt (using PromptForCredential) ex: $Credential = $host.ui.PromptForCredential("Need credentials", "Please enter your user name and password.", "", "NetBiosUserName") The same result can be obtained by using the Get-Credential function but detecting it will trigger a lot of FP

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed

Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration)

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks (PowerSploit...)

  • Effort: master
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass

This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell Winlogon Helper DLL

Detects modifications to the Winlogon Registry keys, which may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.

  • Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified

Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).

  • Effort: master
Process Herpaderping

Detection of process herpaderping using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been locked for access. Several processes have been excluded to avoid FPs.

  • Effort: master
Process Hollowing Detection

Detection of process hollowing using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been replaced in a process memory.

  • Effort: master
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump

Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
Protected Storage Service Access

Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. It could identify potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers.

  • Effort: master
ProxyShell Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Putty Sessions Listing

Detects attempts to list Putty sessions through registry. To fully work, this rule requires to log registry accesses, which can be done with the Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 but for that specific configuration is needed.

  • Effort: master
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Python Opening Ports

Detects when the Windows Filtering Platform has permitted Python.exe to listen on a port for incoming connections. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: advanced
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Login From Localhost

Detects RDP login from localhost source address, which may be a tunnelled login to bypass network restrictions.

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Port Change Using Powershell

Detects RDP port configuration change using a PowerShell command such as 'Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name PortNumber -Value XXX Restart-Service termservice -force'. Threat actors can change RDP to another port to bypass protections, avoid detection based on the port, or to take full control of the system.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Dropped File

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook

  • Effort: elementary
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter

Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).

  • Effort: master
Registry Key Used By Some Old Agent Tesla Samples

Detects potential use of the RUN registry key to execute some Agent Tesla samples at boot. Prerequisites are to log for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Registry Persistence Using 'Image File Execution' And 'SilentProcessExit' Keys

Detects persistence registry keys. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Privileged Group Enumeration

Detects remote listing of local privileged group. Potential false positives, which should justify alert filters, are service accounts and administrators doing maintenance.

  • Effort: advanced
Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility

Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation. This requires Windows Security events logging.

  • Effort: master
Remote Service Activity Via SVCCTL Named Pipe

Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe

  • Effort: advanced
Remote Task Creation Via ATSVC Named Pipe

Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC Named Pipe. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share policy.

  • Effort: intermediate
Rubeus Register New Logon Process

Detects potential use of Rubeus through registering a new logon process. This rule needs the EventID 4611, which can be configured through Group Policies (Audit Security System Extension)

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
Ryuk Ransomware Command Line

Detects Ryuk Ransomware - Command lines stop services.

  • Effort: elementary
Ryuk Ransomware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by the Ryuk ransomware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the command line (reg add).

  • Effort: intermediate
SAM Registry Hive Handle Request

Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive

  • Effort: advanced
SCM Database Handle Failure

Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.

  • Effort: master
SCM Database Privileged Operation

Detects non-system users performing privileged operation on the SCM database

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
SeEnableDelagationPrivilege Granted To User Or Machine In Active Directory

Detects the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory granted to a user of a computer, it would allow control of other AD user objects

  • Effort: elementary
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: advanced
Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: advanced
Secure Deletion With SDelete

Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. SDelete is a tool that permits to securely delete files by overwriting them (no recovery possible). Few threat actors are using it to delete traces of their malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Sliver DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing

  • Effort: intermediate
Smbexec.py Service Installation

Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation

  • Effort: elementary
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: advanced
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: advanced
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
StoneDrill Service Install

This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky

  • Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services

Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: master
Successful Overpass The Hash Attempt

Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspect Svchost Memory Access

Detects suspect access to svchost process memory such as that used by Invoke-Phantom (v1.0) to kill the winRM windows event logging service.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool

Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Access To Sensitive File Extensions

Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share. This activity could possibly correspond to a malicious one (removing backup, reading sensitive files, etc.).

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP

Detects a code page switch in command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loaded Via Office Applications

Detects suspicious DLL being loaded by an Microsoft Office Product. Considered as suspects are some .NET DLLs, clr.dll, GAC DLL, DSParse (Active Directoryi services API) or Kerberos DLLs which may be loaded by MS Office processes when executing a potentially malicious macro. The prerequisite is to log the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL side loading from ProgramData

Detects suspicious DLL side-loading from C:\ProgramData where the DLL is not signed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution

Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File

Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Hostname

Detects suspicious hostnames such as ones with kali in it, to detect kali linux default hosts, but also other hostnames commonly used in attacks. List can be improved according to the environment.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used

Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. Careful as the 5136 is only on domain controllers and needs to be activated through the Group Policy.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious New Printer Ports In Registry

Detects a suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048. The CVE-2020-1048 consists in gaining persistence, privilege by abusing a flaw in the Print Spooler service to execute a payload whose path is stored in the registry key. To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection

Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PsExec Execution

Detects execution of PsExec, different from the Sysinternals one. This rule helps to filter out the noise if PsExec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different PsExec client other than Sysinternals one. The prerequisite is to log the Event ID 5145 (by setting "Audit Policy > Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" to Success/Failure).

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage

catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious SAM Dump

Detects suspicious SAM dump to AppData repository, as cause by QuarksPwDump and other password dumpers. Logging for Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General Event ID 16 or Sysmon Event ID 11 is needed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scripting In A WMI Consumer

Detects suspicious scripting in WMI Event Consumers. The rule requires to log WMI Consumers, which can be done through Sysmon's Event IDs 20 and 21.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created

Detects the creation of suspicious accounts simliar to ANONYMOUS LOGON, such as using additional spaces. Created as a covering detection for attackers trying to created an ANONYMOUS LOGON account as it is an account named used in internal Windows events and frequently filtered by attackers.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries

Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced
Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack

Detects svchost process hijacking through DLL loading. IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote machine.

  • Effort: master
Svchost Modification

Detects the modification of svchost in the registry.

  • Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
SysKey Registry Keys Access

Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey. The SysKey allows to decrypt Security Account Mannager (SAM) database entries (from registry or hive) and get NTLM, and sometimes LM hashes of local accounts passwords. Adversaries can calculate the Syskey by using RegOpenKeyEx/RegQueryInfoKey API calls to query the appropriate class info and values from the HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\JD, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Skew1, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\GBG, and HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Data keys.

  • Effort: elementary
Sysmon Windows File Block Executable

Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.

  • Effort: master
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master
TUN/TAP Driver Installation

Detects the installation of the TUN or TAP driver service, this activity could be related to data exfiltration using tunneling techniques. The TUN/TAP Windows Adapter is a network driver that enables some VPN providers to facilitate a VPN connection to their server. TUN/TAP driver is only used by specific VPNs (e.g. OpenVPN, Wireguard), not by thoses based on IKE protocols (e.g. IPsec).

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: advanced
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced
Transfering Files With Credential Data Via Network Shares

Detects file transfer of sensitive files which contain credential data using network shares.

  • Effort: intermediate
TrevorC2 HTTP Communication

Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.

  • Effort: elementary
Trickbot Malware Activity

Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe

  • Effort: intermediate
TrustedInstaller Impersonation

The rule detects attempts to impersonate TrustedInstaller. TrustedInstaller rights could allow a threat actor to delete or modify protected file or create/delete/modify files in protected folders. This technique is used by threat actors to disable Windows Defender.

  • Effort: elementary
Turla Named Pipes

Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config

  • Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer

Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.

  • Effort: intermediate
Unsigned Image Loaded Into LSASS Process

Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process. To activate this rule you need to monitor loaded images into the LSASS process, this can be done with SYSMON Event ID 7.

  • Effort: advanced
Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

  • Effort: master
User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master
User Added to Local Administrators

Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients

  • Effort: master
User Couldn't Call A Privileged Service LsaRegisterLogonProcess

The LsaRegisterLogonProcess function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA. This rule requires to log the Event ID 4673, which can be done by updating the Audit Policy.

  • Effort: master
Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection

Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.

  • Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI DLL Loaded Via Office

Detects Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) DLL loaded via Office process. This activity may correspond to VBA macro executing WMI commands, which is highly suspicious. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done with the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
WMI Event Subscription

Detects creation of WMI event subscription persistence method

  • Effort: advanced
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Command Line Event Consumer

Detects WMI command line event consumers.

  • Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: intermediate
WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries

Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the /FORMAT argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). The rule requires to log Loaded DLLs to work properly, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 7.

  • Effort: master
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool

WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential

Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master
Webshell Execution W3WP Process

Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.

  • Effort: advanced
Werfault DLL Injection

Werfault DLL search order look first in the current file, which lets an attacker use th legitimate exe to run its own DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Deactivation Using PowerShell Script

Detects attempts to deactivate Windows Defender with PowerShell using ScriptBlockLogging.

  • Effort: master
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking

Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done with Sysmon's Event IDs 12 and 13.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: advanced
Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: advanced
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Access tokens security identifiers are extracted from several events
Anti-virus Windows Defender events are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up
Authentication logs audit logon events are examined in detail
DLL monitoring information about dlls are extracted from several events
File monitoring information about files are extracted from several events
Host network interface Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities
Loaded DLLs Sysmon events provide information on DLL loading
PowerShell logs Windows PowerShell logs are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up
Process command-line parameters Windows Security Auditing logs provide information about process creation
Process monitoring Windows Security Auditing logs are process tracking events
Process use of network Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities
Windows event logs events related to Windows Event logs shutdown or restart are analyzed
Windows Registry registry auditing events are examined in detail
WMI Objects Windows WMI Activity events are analyzed, and events related to WMI process too

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-07-27 12:58:38\", \"Hostname\": \"local.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9223372036854775808, \"EventType\": \"INFO\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 1117, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 0, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 11190, \"ActivityID\": \"{0E8E4EFB-F7EC-487F-BE78-82B11D0D3DB7}\", \"ProcessID\": 12848, \"ThreadID\": 11792, \"Channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\", \"Domain\": \"NT AUTHORITY\", \"AccountName\": \"SYSTEM\", \"UserID\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"AccountType\": \"User\", \"Product Name\": \"Microsoft Defender Antivirus\", \"Product Version\": \"4.18.23050.9\", \"Detection ID\": \"{FEEEC80B-1F6D-4B88-81F9-19C54AF3F889}\", \"Detection Time\": \"2023-07-27T10:58:19.035Z\", \"Threat ID\": \"2147780199\", \"Threat Name\": \"Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml\", \"Severity ID\": \"5\", \"Severity Name\": \"Severe\", \"Category ID\": \"8\", \"Category Name\": \"Trojan\", \"FWLink\": \"https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&amp;name=Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml&amp;threatid=2147780199&amp;enterprise=0\", \"Status Code\": \"3\", \"State\": \"2\", \"Source ID\": \"2\", \"Source Name\": \"System\", \"Process Name\": \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Cybereason ActiveProbe\\\\minionhost.exe\", \"Detection User\": \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\", \"Path\": \"file:_C:\\\\Users\\\\john-doe\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Cache\\\\Cache_Data\\\\f_221f56\", \"Origin ID\": \"1\", \"Origin Name\": \"Local machine\", \"Execution ID\": \"1\", \"Execution Name\": \"Suspended\", \"Type ID\": \"8\", \"Type Name\": \"FastPath\", \"Pre Execution Status\": \"0\", \"Action ID\": \"2\", \"Action Name\": \"Quarantine\", \"Error Code\": \"0x00000000\", \"Error Description\": \"The operation completed successfully. \", \"Post Clean Status\": \"0\", \"Additional Actions ID\": \"0\", \"Additional Actions String\": \"No additional actions required\", \"Remediation User\": \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\", \"Security intelligence Version\": \"AV: 1.393.1459.0, AS: 1.393.1459.0, NIS: 1.393.1459.0\", \"Engine Version\": \"AM: 1.1.23060.1005, NIS: 1.1.23060.1005\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-07-27 13:03:23\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"in\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "1117",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 1117,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "SYSTEM",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "AdditionalActionsID": "0",
            "AdditionalActionsString": "No additional actions required",
            "DetectionUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "ErrorCode": "0x00000000",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Execution Name": "Suspended",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "Path": "file:_C:\\Users\\john-doe\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Cache\\Cache_Data\\f_221f56",
            "ProcessName": "C:\\Program Files\\Cybereason ActiveProbe\\minionhost.exe",
            "ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
            "Task": 0,
            "ThreatName": "Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml"
        },
        "record_id": 11190,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "local.example.org",
        "name": "local.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "local.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 12848,
        "pid": 12848,
        "thread": {
            "id": 11792
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "local.example.org"
        ],
        "user": [
            "SYSTEM"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "SYSTEM"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:33\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": 36028797018963968, \"EventType\": \"WARNING\", \"SeverityValue\": 3, \"Severity\": \"WARNING\", \"EventID\": 39, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{3FD9DA1A-5A54-46C5-9A26-9BD7C0685056}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 0, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1673393, \"ProcessID\": 0, \"ThreadID\": 0, \"Channel\": \"System\", \"Message\": \"Le centre de distribution de cl\\u00e9s (KDC) a rencontr\\u00e9 un certificat utilisateur valide mais qui n\\u2019a pas pu \\u00eatre mapp\\u00e9 \\u00e0 un utilisateur de mani\\u00e8re s\\u00e9curis\\u00e9e (par exemple via un mappage explicite, un mappage d\\u2019approbation de cl\\u00e9 ou un SID). Ces certificats doivent \\u00eatre remplac\\u00e9s ou mapp\\u00e9s directement \\u00e0 l\\u2019utilisateur via un mappage explicite. Consultez https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 pour en savoir plus.\\r\\n\\r\\n  Utilisateur : JDOE\\r\\n  Sujet du certificat :\\u00e9metteur de certificat  @@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\\r\\n  :num\\u00e9ro de s\\u00e9rie du certificat  EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\\r\\n  :empreinte de certificat  78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\\r\\n  : A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\\r\\n\", \"AccountName\": \"JDOE\", \"Subject\": \"@@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\", \"Issuer\": \"EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\", \"SerialNumber\": \"78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\", \"Thumbprint\": \"A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "39",
        "message": "Le centre de distribution de cl\u00e9s (KDC) a rencontr\u00e9 un certificat utilisateur valide mais qui n\u2019a pas pu \u00eatre mapp\u00e9 \u00e0 un utilisateur de mani\u00e8re s\u00e9curis\u00e9e (par exemple via un mappage explicite, un mappage d\u2019approbation de cl\u00e9 ou un SID). Ces certificats doivent \u00eatre remplac\u00e9s ou mapp\u00e9s directement \u00e0 l\u2019utilisateur via un mappage explicite. Consultez https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 pour en savoir plus.\r\n\r\n  Utilisateur : JDOE\r\n  Sujet du certificat :\u00e9metteur de certificat  @@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\r\n  :num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat  EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\r\n  :empreinte de certificat  78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\r\n  : A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\r\n",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 39,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "JDOE",
            "EventType": "WARNING",
            "Issuer": "EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification",
            "Keywords": "36028797018963968",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{3FD9DA1A-5A54-46C5-9A26-9BD7C0685056}",
            "Severity": "WARNING",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center",
            "Task": 0
        },
        "record_id": 1673393,
        "type": "System"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "warning"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 0,
        "pid": 0,
        "thread": {
            "id": 0
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-01-07 14:09:58\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":6416,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":13316,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":16859866,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":6432,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A new external device was recognized by the system.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tHOSTFOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nDevice ID:\\tSCSI\\\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\\\5&e55476b&0&000100\\r\\n\\r\\nDevice Name:\\tVMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\\r\\n\\r\\nClass ID:\\t\\t{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\\r\\n\\r\\nClass Name:\\tDiskDrive\\r\\n\\r\\nVendor IDs:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tGenDisk\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nCompatible IDs:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\Disk\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\RAW\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nLocation Information:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"Category\":\"Plug and Play Events\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"HOSTFOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"DeviceId\":\"SCSI\\\\Disk&amp;Ven_VMware&amp;Prod_Virtual_disk\\\\5&amp;e55476b&amp;0&amp;000100\",\"DeviceDescription\":\"VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\",\"ClassId\":\"{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\",\"ClassName\":\"DiskDrive\",\"VendorIds\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tGenDisk\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"CompatibleIds\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\Disk\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\RAW\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"LocationInformation\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-01-07 14:09:59\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "6416",
        "message": "A new external device was recognized by the system.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTFOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nDevice ID:\tSCSI\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\5&e55476b&0&000100\r\n\r\nDevice Name:\tVMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\r\n\r\nClass ID:\t\t{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\r\n\r\nClass Name:\tDiskDrive\r\n\r\nVendor IDs:\t\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__\r\n\t\tSCSI\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tGenDisk\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\r\nCompatible IDs:\t\r\n\t\tSCSI\\Disk\r\n\t\tSCSI\\RAW\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\r\nLocation Information:\t\r\n\t\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\r\n\t\t",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 6416,
        "name": "A new external device was recognized by the system.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Plug and Play Events",
            "ClassName": "DiskDrive",
            "DeviceDescription": "VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "HOSTFOO$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "Task": 13316
        },
        "record_id": 16859866,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "HOSTFOO",
        "name": "HOSTFOO"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "HOSTFOO",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 4,
        "pid": 4,
        "thread": {
            "id": 6432
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "HOSTFOO"
        ],
        "user": [
            "HOSTFOO$"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "KEY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "HOSTFOO$"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\",\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Hostname\":\"vm-foo\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"Severity\":\"Info\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"VM-FOO$\",\"EventID\":\"4625\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"CORPDOMAIN\",\"ProcessId\":\"0x354\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Schannel\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\"}",
    "event": {
        "action": "authentication_network",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4625",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4625,
        "name": "An account failed to log on",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "IpAddress": "-",
            "IpPort": "-",
            "LogonProcessName": "Schannel",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
            "Severity": "Info",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "CORPDOMAIN",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "VM-FOO$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0"
        },
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "vm-foo",
        "name": "vm-foo"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "vm-foo",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
        "name": "lsass.exe",
        "working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "vm-foo"
        ],
        "user": [
            "VM-FOO$"
        ]
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "Schannel"
            }
        },
        "client": {
            "name": "vm-foo",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "name": "vm-foo",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "VM-FOO$",
        "target": {
            "id": "S-1-0-0"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-10-04 10:24:15\",\"Hostname\":\"foo.net\",\"Keywords\":-9218868437227405312,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":4625,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12544,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3443172796,\"ProcessID\":704,\"ThreadID\":9992,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"\u00c9chec d\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte.\\r\\n\\r\\nSujet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nType d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nCompte pour lequel l\u2019ouverture de session a \u00e9chou\u00e9 :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tFooSSO\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tFOO\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur l\u2019\u00e9chec :\\r\\n\\tRaison de l\u2019\u00e9chec :\\t\\tNom d\u2019utilisateur inconnu ou mot de passe incorrect.\\r\\n\\t\u00c9tat :\\t\\t\\t0xC000006D\\r\\n\\tSous-\u00e9tat :\\t\\t0xC0000064\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le processus :\\r\\n\\tID du processus de l\u2019appelant :\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tNom du processus de l\u2019appelant :\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tNom de la station de travail :\\tFOO-AD1\\r\\n\\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tPort source :\\t\\t60917\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l\u2019authentification :\\r\\n\\tProcessus d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\tNtLmSsp \\r\\n\\tPackage d\u2019authentification :\\tNTLM\\r\\n\\tServices en transit :\\t-\\r\\n\\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\\t-\\r\\n\\tLongueur de cl\u00e9 :\\t\\t0\\r\\n\\r\\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une demande d\u2019ouverture de session \u00e9choue. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l\u2019ordinateur sur lequel l\u2019acc\u00e8s a \u00e9t\u00e9 tent\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session. Il s\u2019agit le plus souvent d\u2019un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Type d\u2019ouverture de session indique le type d\u2019ouverture de session qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le processus indiquent quel est le compte et le processus sur le syst\u00e8me qui ont demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance de la demande d\u2019ouverture de session distante. Le nom de la station de travail n\u2019\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut rester vide dans certains cas.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d\u2019authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\\r\\n\\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\t- Le nom du package indique quel a \u00e9t\u00e9 le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\\r\\n\\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.\",\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TargetUserName\":\"FooSSO\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"FOO\",\"Status\":\"0xc000006d\",\"FailureReason\":\"%%2313\",\"SubStatus\":\"0xc0000064\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"NtLmSsp \",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"NTLM\",\"WorkstationName\":\"FOO-AD1\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"IpAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"60917\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-10-04 10:24:16\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "action": "authentication_network",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4625",
        "message": "\u00c9chec d\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte.\r\n\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\t-\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\t-\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nType d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nCompte pour lequel l\u2019ouverture de session a \u00e9chou\u00e9 :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tFooSSO\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tFOO\r\n\r\nInformations sur l\u2019\u00e9chec :\r\n\tRaison de l\u2019\u00e9chec :\t\tNom d\u2019utilisateur inconnu ou mot de passe incorrect.\r\n\t\u00c9tat :\t\t\t0xC000006D\r\n\tSous-\u00e9tat :\t\t0xC0000064\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du processus de l\u2019appelant :\t0x0\r\n\tNom du processus de l\u2019appelant :\t-\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tNom de la station de travail :\tFOO-AD1\r\n\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort source :\t\t60917\r\n\r\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l\u2019authentification :\r\n\tProcessus d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\tNtLmSsp \r\n\tPackage d\u2019authentification :\tNTLM\r\n\tServices en transit :\t-\r\n\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\t-\r\n\tLongueur de cl\u00e9 :\t\t0\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une demande d\u2019ouverture de session \u00e9choue. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l\u2019ordinateur sur lequel l\u2019acc\u00e8s a \u00e9t\u00e9 tent\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session. Il s\u2019agit le plus souvent d\u2019un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\r\n\r\nLe champ Type d\u2019ouverture de session indique le type d\u2019ouverture de session qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le processus indiquent quel est le compte et le processus sur le syst\u00e8me qui ont demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance de la demande d\u2019ouverture de session distante. Le nom de la station de travail n\u2019\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut rester vide dans certains cas.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d\u2019authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session.\r\n\t- Le nom du package indique quel a \u00e9t\u00e9 le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\r\n\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "reason": "user_not_exist",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4625,
        "name": "An account failed to log on",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
            "Category": "Logon",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
            "IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
            "IpPort": "60917",
            "KeyLength": "0",
            "Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
            "LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProcessName": "-",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Status": "0xc000006d",
            "SubStatus": "0xc0000064",
            "SubjectDomainName": "-",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
            "SubjectUserName": "-",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetDomainName": "FOO",
            "TargetUserName": "FooSSO",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "Task": 12544,
            "WorkstationName": "FOO-AD1"
        },
        "record_id": 3443172796,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "client": {
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "foo.net",
        "name": "foo.net"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "foo.net",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 704,
        "pid": 704,
        "thread": {
            "id": 9992
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "foo.net"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1"
        ]
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "NtLmSsp "
            }
        },
        "client": {
            "name": "FOO-AD1",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "name": "foo.net",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-0-0",
        "target": {
            "domain": "FOO",
            "id": "S-1-0-0",
            "name": "FooSSO"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 14:40:12\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4670, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 13570, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1711795990, \"ProcessID\": 4, \"ThreadID\": 5708, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Les autorisations sur un objet ont \\u00e9t\\u00e9 modifi\\u00e9es.\\r\\n\\r\\nSujet\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tID de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9\\u00a0:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte\\u00a0:\\t\\tJDOE\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte\\u00a0:\\t\\tEXAMPLE\\r\\n\\tID d\\u2019ouverture de session\\u00a0:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nObjet\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tServeur de l\\u2019objet\\u00a0:\\tSecurity\\r\\n\\tType d\\u2019objet\\u00a0:\\tToken\\r\\n\\tNom de l\\u2019objet\\u00a0:\\t-\\r\\n\\tID du handle\\u00a0:\\t0x2214\\r\\n\\r\\nProcessus\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tID du processus\\u00a0:\\t0x3f8\\r\\n\\tNom du processus\\u00a0:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nModification des autorisations\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tDescripteur de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9 d\\u2019origine\\u00a0:\\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\\r\\n\\tNouveau descripteur de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9\\u00a0:\\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)\", \"Category\": \"Modification de la strat\\u00e9gie d\\u2019autorisation\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"JDOE\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EXAMPLE\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\", \"ObjectServer\": \"Security\", \"ObjectType\": \"Token\", \"ObjectName\": \"-\", \"HandleId\": \"0x2214\", \"OldSd\": \"D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\", \"NewSd\": \"D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)\", \"ProcessName\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 14:40:15\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4670",
        "message": "Les autorisations sur un objet ont \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nSujet\u00a0:\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte\u00a0:\t\tJDOE\r\n\tDomaine du compte\u00a0:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session\u00a0:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObjet\u00a0:\r\n\tServeur de l\u2019objet\u00a0:\tSecurity\r\n\tType d\u2019objet\u00a0:\tToken\r\n\tNom de l\u2019objet\u00a0:\t-\r\n\tID du handle\u00a0:\t0x2214\r\n\r\nProcessus\u00a0:\r\n\tID du processus\u00a0:\t0x3f8\r\n\tNom du processus\u00a0:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nModification des autorisations\u00a0:\r\n\tDescripteur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d\u2019origine\u00a0:\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\r\n\tNouveau descripteur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0:\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4670,
        "name": "Permissions on an object were changed",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Modification de la strat\u00e9gie d\u2019autorisation",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "HandleId": "0x2214",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "NewSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)",
            "ObjectName": "-",
            "ObjectServer": "Security",
            "ObjectType": "Token",
            "OldSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "JDOE",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "Task": 13570
        },
        "record_id": 1711795990,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
        "id": 4,
        "name": "svchost.exe",
        "pid": 4,
        "thread": {
            "id": 5708
        },
        "working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "EXAMPLE",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "JDOE"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4768, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14339, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 2089533206, \"ProcessID\": 660, \"ThreadID\": 4536, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Un ticket d\\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 demand\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le compte\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tNom du compte\\u00a0:\\t\\\\JDOE\\r\\n\\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni\\u00a0:\\tlocal.example.org\\r\\n\\tID de l\\u2019utilisateur\\u00a0:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le service\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tNom du service\\u00a0:\\t\\tkrbtgt\\r\\n\\tID du service\\u00a0:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\\u00e9seau\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tAdresse du client\\u00a0:\\t\\t::ffff:55.99.99.6\\r\\n\\tPort client\\u00a0:\\t\\t61359\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations suppl\\u00e9mentaires\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tOptions du ticket\\u00a0:\\t\\t0x40810010\\r\\n\\tCode de r\\u00e9sultat\\u00a0:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tType de chiffrement du ticket\\u00a0:\\t0x12\\r\\n\\tType de pr\\u00e9-authentification\\u00a0:\\t15\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le certificat\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tNom de l\\u2019\\u00e9metteur du certificat\\u00a0:\\t\\tEXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\\r\\n\\tNum\\u00e9ro de s\\u00e9rie du certificat\\u00a0:\\t78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\\r\\n\\t Empreinte num\\u00e9rique du certificat\\u00a0:\\t\\t32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\\r\\n\\r\\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 utilis\\u00e9 pour la pr\\u00e9-authentification.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes types de pr\\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\\u00e9sultats sont d\\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.\", \"Category\": \"Service d\\u2019authentification Kerberos\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"TargetUserName\": \"JDOE\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"local.example.org\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\", \"ServiceName\": \"krbtgt\", \"ServiceSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\", \"TicketOptions\": \"0x40810010\", \"Status\": \"0x0\", \"TicketEncryptionType\": \"0x12\", \"PreAuthType\": \"15\", \"IpAddress\": \"::ffff:55.99.99.6\", \"IpPort\": \"61359\", \"CertIssuerName\": \"EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\", \"CertSerialNumber\": \"78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\", \"CertThumbprint\": \"32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:59:11\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4768",
        "message": "Un ticket d\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9.\r\n\r\nInformations sur le compte\u00a0:\r\n\tNom du compte\u00a0:\t\\JDOE\r\n\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni\u00a0:\tlocal.example.org\r\n\tID de l\u2019utilisateur\u00a0:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\r\n\r\nInformations sur le service\u00a0:\r\n\tNom du service\u00a0:\t\tkrbtgt\r\n\tID du service\u00a0:\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau\u00a0:\r\n\tAdresse du client\u00a0:\t\t::ffff:55.99.99.6\r\n\tPort client\u00a0:\t\t61359\r\n\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires\u00a0:\r\n\tOptions du ticket\u00a0:\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tCode de r\u00e9sultat\u00a0:\t\t0x0\r\n\tType de chiffrement du ticket\u00a0:\t0x12\r\n\tType de pr\u00e9-authentification\u00a0:\t15\r\n\r\nInformations sur le certificat\u00a0:\r\n\tNom de l\u2019\u00e9metteur du certificat\u00a0:\t\tEXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\r\n\tNum\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat\u00a0:\t78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\r\n\t Empreinte num\u00e9rique du certificat\u00a0:\t\t32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\r\n\r\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 pour la pr\u00e9-authentification.\r\n\r\nLes types de pr\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\u00e9sultats sont d\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4768,
        "name": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Service d\u2019authentification Kerberos",
            "CertIssuerName": "EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification",
            "CertSerialNumber": "78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A",
            "CertThumbprint": "32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "IpAddress": "::ffff:55.99.99.6",
            "IpPort": "61359",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "PreAuthType": "15",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "ServiceName": "krbtgt",
            "ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Status": "0x0",
            "TargetDomainName": "local.example.org",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444",
            "TargetUserName": "JDOE",
            "Task": 14339,
            "TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
            "TicketOptions": "0x40810010"
        },
        "record_id": 2089533206,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 660,
        "pid": 660,
        "thread": {
            "id": 4536
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "55.99.99.6"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "::ffff:55.99.99.6",
        "ip": "55.99.99.6"
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "local.example.org",
            "name": "JDOE"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-30 08:58:21\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9218868437227405312, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_FAILURE\", \"SeverityValue\": 4, \"Severity\": \"ERROR\", \"EventID\": 4768, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14339, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 971339700, \"ProcessID\": 572, \"ThreadID\": 8432, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Un ticket d\\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 demand\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le compte :\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tjdoe\\r\\n\\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni :\\tlocal.example.org\\r\\n\\tID de l\\u2019utilisateur :\\t\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le service :\\r\\n\\tNom du service :\\t\\tkrbtgt/local.example.org\\r\\n\\tID du service :\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tAdresse du client :\\t\\t::ffff:10.24.20.7\\r\\n\\tPort client :\\t\\t49681\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations suppl\\u00e9mentaires :\\r\\n\\tOptions du ticket :\\t\\t0x40810010\\r\\n\\tCode de r\\u00e9sultat :\\t\\t0x4B\\r\\n\\tType de chiffrement du ticket :\\t0xFFFFFFFF\\r\\n\\tType de pr\\u00e9-authentification :\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le certificat :\\r\\n\\tNom de l\\u2019\\u00e9metteur du certificat :\\t\\tCN=INDSI218\\r\\n\\tNum\\u00e9ro de s\\u00e9rie du certificat :\\t01\\r\\n\\t Empreinte num\\u00e9rique du certificat :\\t\\t4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\\r\\n\\r\\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 utilis\\u00e9 pour la pr\\u00e9-authentification.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes types de pr\\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\\u00e9sultats sont d\\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.\", \"Category\": \"Service d\\u2019authentification Kerberos\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"TargetUserName\": \"jdoe\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"local.example.org\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"ServiceName\": \"krbtgt/local.example.org\", \"ServiceSid\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"TicketOptions\": \"0x40810010\", \"Status\": \"0x4b\", \"TicketEncryptionType\": \"0xffffffff\", \"PreAuthType\": \"-\", \"IpAddress\": \"::ffff:55.99.99.7\", \"IpPort\": \"49681\", \"CertIssuerName\": \"CN=INDSI218\", \"CertSerialNumber\": \"01\", \"CertThumbprint\": \"4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-30 08:58:24\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog10\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4768",
        "message": "Un ticket d\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9.\r\n\r\nInformations sur le compte :\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tjdoe\r\n\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni :\tlocal.example.org\r\n\tID de l\u2019utilisateur :\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\r\nInformations sur le service :\r\n\tNom du service :\t\tkrbtgt/local.example.org\r\n\tID du service :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tAdresse du client :\t\t::ffff:10.24.20.7\r\n\tPort client :\t\t49681\r\n\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires :\r\n\tOptions du ticket :\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tCode de r\u00e9sultat :\t\t0x4B\r\n\tType de chiffrement du ticket :\t0xFFFFFFFF\r\n\tType de pr\u00e9-authentification :\t-\r\n\r\nInformations sur le certificat :\r\n\tNom de l\u2019\u00e9metteur du certificat :\t\tCN=INDSI218\r\n\tNum\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat :\t01\r\n\t Empreinte num\u00e9rique du certificat :\t\t4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\r\n\r\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 pour la pr\u00e9-authentification.\r\n\r\nLes types de pr\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\u00e9sultats sont d\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4768,
        "name": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Service d\u2019authentification Kerberos",
            "CertIssuerName": "CN=INDSI218",
            "CertSerialNumber": "01",
            "CertThumbprint": "4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
            "IpAddress": "::ffff:55.99.99.7",
            "IpPort": "49681",
            "Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "PreAuthType": "-",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "ServiceName": "krbtgt/local.example.org",
            "ServiceSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Status": "0x4b",
            "TargetDomainName": "local.example.org",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetUserName": "jdoe",
            "Task": 14339,
            "TicketEncryptionType": "0xffffffff",
            "TicketOptions": "0x40810010"
        },
        "record_id": 971339700,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 572,
        "pid": 572,
        "thread": {
            "id": 8432
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "55.99.99.7"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "::ffff:55.99.99.7",
        "ip": "55.99.99.7"
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "local.example.org",
            "name": "jdoe"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-01-29 10:10:59\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":-9218868437227405312,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":4825,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12551,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":5298486139,\"ProcessID\":1400,\"ThreadID\":1996,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tUser Name:\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tDomain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t0x67D43768\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tClient Address:\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.\",\"Category\":\"Other Logon/Logoff Events\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"AccountName\":\"USERFOO\",\"AccountDomain\":\"KEY\",\"LogonID\":\"0x67d43768\",\"ClientAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-01-29 10:11:00\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4825",
        "message": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tUser Name:\tUSERFOO\r\n\tDomain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t0x67D43768\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t1.1.1.1\r\n\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4825,
        "name": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "USERFOO",
            "Category": "Other Logon/Logoff Events",
            "ClientAddress": "1.1.1.1",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
            "Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Task": 12551
        },
        "record_id": 5298486139,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "HOSTFOO",
        "name": "HOSTFOO"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "HOSTFOO",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 1400,
        "pid": 1400,
        "thread": {
            "id": 1996
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "HOSTFOO"
        ],
        "user": [
            "USERFOO"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "HOSTFOO",
        "name": "USERFOO"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-09-13 09:24:22\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4929, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14083, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 652068049, \"ActivityID\": \"{0AFF6AA6-47D0-416B-8F6B-5931182E4C30}\", \"ProcessID\": 592, \"ThreadID\": 760, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed.\\r\\n\\r\\nDestination DRA:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nSource DRA:\\t-\\r\\nSource Address:\\t6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\\r\\nNaming Context:\\tDC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nOptions:\\t\\t16640\\r\\nStatus Code:\\t0\", \"Category\": \"Detailed Directory Service Replication\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"DestinationDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"SourceDRA\": \"-\", \"SourceAddr\": \"6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\", \"NamingContext\": \"DC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\", \"Options\": \"16640\", \"StatusCode\": \"0\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-09-13 09:38:52\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"SecurityLog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4929",
        "message": "An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed.\r\n\r\nDestination DRA:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nSource DRA:\t-\r\nSource Address:\t6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\r\nNaming Context:\tDC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions:\t\t16640\r\nStatus Code:\t0",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4929,
        "name": "An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Detailed Directory Service Replication",
            "DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "NamingContext": "DC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceDRA": "-",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Task": 14083
        },
        "record_id": 652068049,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 592,
        "pid": 592,
        "thread": {
            "id": 760
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4932, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 1, \"Task\": 14082, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1672200421, \"ActivityID\": \"{E2C58E0C-C3FA-0001-9D8E-C5E2FAC3D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 596, \"ThreadID\": 3620, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"La synchronisation d\\u2019un r\\u00e9plica d\\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory a commenc\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nDRA de destination\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nDRA source\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nContexte de nommage\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nOptions\\u00a0:\\t\\t524307\\r\\nID de la session\\u00a0:\\t437014\\r\\nUSN de d\\u00e9marrage\\u00a0:\\t239636074\", \"Category\": \"R\\u00e9plication du service d\\u2019annuaire\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"DestinationDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"SourceDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"NamingContext\": \"DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\", \"Options\": \"524307\", \"SessionID\": \"437014\", \"StartUSN\": \"239636074\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:36\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4932",
        "message": "La synchronisation d\u2019un r\u00e9plica d\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory a commenc\u00e9.\r\n\r\nDRA de destination\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nDRA source\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nContexte de nommage\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions\u00a0:\t\t524307\r\nID de la session\u00a0:\t437014\r\nUSN de d\u00e9marrage\u00a0:\t239636074",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4932,
        "name": "Synchronization of a replica of an Active Directory naming context has begun",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "R\u00e9plication du service d\u2019annuaire",
            "DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "NamingContext": "DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "SessionID": "437014",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "StartUSN": "239636074",
            "Task": 14082
        },
        "record_id": 1672200421,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 596,
        "pid": 596,
        "thread": {
            "id": 3620
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4933, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 1, \"Task\": 14082, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1672200422, \"ActivityID\": \"{E2C58E0C-C3FA-0001-9D8E-C5E2FAC3D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 596, \"ThreadID\": 3620, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"La synchronisation d\\u2019un r\\u00e9plica d\\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory s\\u2019est termin\\u00e9e.\\r\\n\\r\\nDRA de destination\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nDRA source\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nContexte de nommage\\u00a0:\\tDC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nOptions\\u00a0:\\t\\t524307\\r\\nID de session\\u00a0:\\t437014\\r\\nUSN de fin\\u00a0:\\t239636088\\r\\nCode d\\u2019\\u00e9tat\\u00a0:\\t0\", \"Category\": \"R\\u00e9plication du service d\\u2019annuaire\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"DestinationDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"SourceDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"NamingContext\": \"DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\", \"Options\": \"524307\", \"SessionID\": \"437014\", \"EndUSN\": \"239636088\", \"StatusCode\": \"0\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:36\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4933",
        "message": "La synchronisation d\u2019un r\u00e9plica d\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory s\u2019est termin\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nDRA de destination\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nDRA source\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nContexte de nommage\u00a0:\tDC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions\u00a0:\t\t524307\r\nID de session\u00a0:\t437014\r\nUSN de fin\u00a0:\t239636088\r\nCode d\u2019\u00e9tat\u00a0:\t0",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4933,
        "name": "Synchronization of a replica of an Active Directory naming context has ended",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "R\u00e9plication du service d\u2019annuaire",
            "DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
            "EndUSN": "239636088",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "NamingContext": "DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "SessionID": "437014",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Task": 14082
        },
        "record_id": 1672200422,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 596,
        "pid": 596,
        "thread": {
            "id": 3620
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ]
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-10-26 12:34:55\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 5136, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14081, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 3509403758, \"ProcessID\": 724, \"ThreadID\": 868, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Un objet du service d\\u2019annuaire a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 modifi\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nSujet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tSyst\\u00e8me\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tAUTORITE NT\\r\\n\\tID d\\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x16CDFB96\\r\\n\\r\\nService d\\u2019annuaire :\\r\\n\\tNom :\\texample.org\\r\\n\\tType :\\tServices de domaine Active Directory\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nObjet :\\r\\n\\tDN :\\tDC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\n\\tGUID :\\t{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\\r\\n\\tClasse :\\tdnsNode\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nAttribut :\\r\\n\\tNom complet LDAP :\\tdNSTombstoned\\r\\n\\tSyntaxe (OID) :\\t2.5.5.8\\r\\n\\tValeur :\\tFALSE\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nOp\\u00e9ration :\\r\\n\\tType :\\tFinance\\r\\n\\tID de corr\\u00e9lation :\\t{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\\r\\n\\tID de corr\\u00e9lation d\\u2019application :\\t-\", \"Category\": \"Directory Service Changes\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"OpCorrelationID\": \"{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\", \"AppCorrelationID\": \"-\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"Syst\\u00e8me\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"AUTORITE NT\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x16cdfb96\", \"DSName\": \"example.org\", \"DSType\": \"%%14676\", \"ObjectDN\": \"DC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\", \"ObjectGUID\": \"{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\", \"ObjectClass\": \"dnsNode\", \"AttributeLDAPDisplayName\": \"dNSTombstoned\", \"AttributeSyntaxOID\": \"2.5.5.8\", \"AttributeValue\": \"FALSE\", \"OperationType\": \"%%14674\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-10-26 12:34:56\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog3\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "5136",
        "message": "Un objet du service d\u2019annuaire a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9.\r\n\t\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tSyst\u00e8me\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tAUTORITE NT\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x16CDFB96\r\n\r\nService d\u2019annuaire :\r\n\tNom :\texample.org\r\n\tType :\tServices de domaine Active Directory\r\n\t\r\nObjet :\r\n\tDN :\tDC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\r\n\tGUID :\t{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\r\n\tClasse :\tdnsNode\r\n\t\r\nAttribut :\r\n\tNom complet LDAP :\tdNSTombstoned\r\n\tSyntaxe (OID) :\t2.5.5.8\r\n\tValeur :\tFALSE\r\n\t\r\nOp\u00e9ration :\r\n\tType :\tFinance\r\n\tID de corr\u00e9lation :\t{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\r\n\tID de corr\u00e9lation d\u2019application :\t-",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 5136,
        "name": "A directory service object was modified",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AttributeLDAPDisplayName": "dNSTombstoned",
            "AttributeValue": "FALSE",
            "Category": "Directory Service Changes",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "ObjectClass": "dnsNode",
            "ObjectDN": "DC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org",
            "ObjectGUID": "{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "OperationType": "%%14674",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x16cdfb96",
            "SubjectUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "Task": 14081
        },
        "record_id": 3509403758,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 724,
        "pid": 724,
        "thread": {
            "id": 868
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "user": [
            "Syst\u00e8me"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "Syst\u00e8me"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-08-23 11:20:47\",\"Hostname\":\"VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427912192,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":514,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EB79061A-A566-4698-9119-3ED2807060E7}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":5,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1285844,\"ProcessID\":2580,\"ThreadID\":3344,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer/Audit\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"The zone mail.corp.net was updated. The MasterServers setting has been set to 1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2. [virtualization instance: .].\",\"Category\":\"ZONE_OP\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Zone\":\"mail.corp.net\",\"PropertyKey\":\"MasterServers\",\"NewValue\":\"1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2\",\"VirtualizationID\":\".\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-08-23 11:20:48\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_other\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "514",
        "message": "The zone mail.corp.net was updated. The MasterServers setting has been set to 1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2. [virtualization instance: .].",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 514,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "SYSTEM",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Category": "ZONE_OP",
            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Keywords": "4611686018427912192",
            "NewValue": "1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{EB79061A-A566-4698-9119-3ED2807060E7}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer",
            "Task": 5,
            "Zone": "mail.corp.net"
        },
        "record_id": 1285844,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer/Audit"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL",
        "name": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 2580,
        "pid": 2580,
        "thread": {
            "id": 3344
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL"
        ],
        "user": [
            "SYSTEM"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "SYSTEM"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\",\"Hostname\":\"foo.net\",\"Keywords\":1152921504606846976,\"EventType\":\"VERBOSE\",\"SeverityValue\":1,\"Severity\":\"DEBUG\",\"EventID\":5408,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":764816422,\"ActivityID\":\"{D938DD9B-F8EF-4227-A505-1169A1E3873E}\",\"ProcessID\":5440,\"ThreadID\":8428,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"{\\\"EventTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\\\",\\\"Hostname\\\":\\\"foo.net\\\",\\\"Keywords\\\":1152921504606846976,\\\"EventType\\\":\\\"VERBOSE\\\",\\\"SeverityValue\\\":1,\\\"Severity\\\":\\\"DEBUG\\\",\\\"EventID\\\":5408,\\\"SourceName\\\":\\\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering\\\",\\\"ProviderGuid\\\":\\\"{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}\\\",\\\"Version\\\":0,\\\"Task\\\":0,\\\"OpcodeValue\\\":0,\\\"RecordNumber\\\":764816422,\\\"ActivityID\\\":\\\"{D938DD9B-F8EF-4227-A505-1169A1E3873E}\\\",\\\"ProcessID\\\":5440,\\\"ThreadID\\\":8428,\\\"Channel\\\":\\\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose\\\",\\\"Domain\\\":\\\"NT AUTHORITY\\\",\\\"AccountName\\\":\\\"SYSTEM\\\",\\\"UserID\\\":\\\"S-1-5-18\\\",\\\"AccountType\\\":\\\"User\\\",\\\"Message\\\":\\\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\\\r\\\\n\\\",\\\"Opcode\\\":\\\"Info\\\",\\\"LogString\\\":\\\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\\\r\\\\n\\\",\\\"EventReceivedTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\\\",\\\"SourceModuleName\\\":\\\"eventlog\\\",\\\"SourceModuleType\\\":\\\"im_msvistalog\\\"}\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"LogString\":\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}\n",
    "event": {
        "code": "5408",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 5408,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "SYSTEM",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "EventType": "VERBOSE",
            "Keywords": "1152921504606846976",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}",
            "Severity": "DEBUG",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering",
            "Task": 0
        },
        "record_id": 764816422,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "foo.net",
        "name": "foo.net"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "foo.net",
        "level": "debug"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 5440,
        "pid": 5440,
        "thread": {
            "id": 8428
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "foo.net"
        ],
        "user": [
            "SYSTEM"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "SYSTEM"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-10-05 23:50:40\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":36028797018963968,\"EventType\":\"ERROR\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":56,\"SourceName\":\"TermDD\",\"Task\":0,\"RecordNumber\":930150,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"System\",\"Message\":\"The Terminal Server security layer detected an error in the protocol stream and has disconnected the client. Client IP: 1.1.1.1.\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-10-18 09:34:39\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "56",
        "message": "The Terminal Server security layer detected an error in the protocol stream and has disconnected the client. Client IP: 1.1.1.1.",
        "provider": "TermDD"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 56,
        "properties": {
            "EventType": "ERROR",
            "Keywords": "36028797018963968",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "TermDD",
            "Task": 0
        },
        "record_id": 930150,
        "type": "System"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "HOSTFOO",
        "name": "HOSTFOO"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "HOSTFOO",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 0,
        "pid": 0,
        "thread": {
            "id": 0
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "HOSTFOO"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-10-26 13:11:01\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 6272, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 2, \"Task\": 12552, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1674356873, \"ActivityID\": \"{0320A758-C2C2-0002-9DA7-2003C2C2D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 788, \"ThreadID\": 7392, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Network Policy Server granted access to a user.\\r\\n\\r\\nUser:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\thost/l4523.example.org\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t\\tEX1\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\tEX1\\\\L4523\\r\\n\\r\\nClient Machine:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tCalled Station Identifier:\\t\\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\\r\\n\\tCalling Station Identifier:\\t\\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\\r\\n\\r\\nNAS:\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv4 Address:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv6 Address:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNAS Identifier:\\t\\t\\tELEBEYCOBI\\r\\n\\tNAS Port-Type:\\t\\t\\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\\r\\n\\tNAS Port:\\t\\t\\t8\\r\\n\\r\\nRADIUS Client:\\r\\n\\tClient Friendly Name:\\t\\tELEBEYCOBI\\r\\n\\tClient IP Address:\\t\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\r\\nAuthentication Details:\\r\\n\\tConnection Request Policy Name:\\tSecure Wireless Connections\\r\\n\\tNetwork Policy Name:\\t\\tSecure Wifi Computer\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Provider:\\t\\tWindows\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Server:\\t\\tauth.example.org\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Type:\\t\\tPEAP\\r\\n\\tEAP Type:\\t\\t\\tMicrosoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\\r\\n\\tAccount Session Identifier:\\t\\t111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\\r\\n\\tLogging Results:\\t\\t\\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\\r\\n\", \"Category\": \"Network Policy Server\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"host/l4523.example.org\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EX1\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName\": \"EX1\\\\L4523\", \"SubjectMachineSID\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"SubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"CalledStationID\": \"0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\", \"CallingStationID\": \"a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\", \"NASIPv4Address\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"NASIPv6Address\": \"-\", \"NASIdentifier\": \"ELEBEYCOBI\", \"NASPortType\": \"Wireless - IEEE 802.11\", \"NASPort\": \"8\", \"ClientName\": \"ELEBEYCOBI\", \"ClientIPAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"ProxyPolicyName\": \"Secure Wireless Connections\", \"NetworkPolicyName\": \"Secure Wifi Computer\", \"AuthenticationProvider\": \"Windows\", \"AuthenticationServer\": \"auth.example.org\", \"AuthenticationType\": \"PEAP\", \"EAPType\": \"Microsoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\", \"AccountSessionIdentifier\": \"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\", \"LoggingResult\": \"Accounting information was written to the local log file.\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-10-26 13:11:01\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "6272",
        "message": "Network Policy Server granted access to a user.\r\n\r\nUser:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\thost/l4523.example.org\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t\tEX1\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\tEX1\\L4523\r\n\r\nClient Machine:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\t-\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\t-\r\n\tCalled Station Identifier:\t\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\r\n\tCalling Station Identifier:\t\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\r\n\r\nNAS:\r\n\tNAS IPv4 Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tNAS IPv6 Address:\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Identifier:\t\t\tELEBEYCOBI\r\n\tNAS Port-Type:\t\t\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\r\n\tNAS Port:\t\t\t8\r\n\r\nRADIUS Client:\r\n\tClient Friendly Name:\t\tELEBEYCOBI\r\n\tClient IP Address:\t\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\nAuthentication Details:\r\n\tConnection Request Policy Name:\tSecure Wireless Connections\r\n\tNetwork Policy Name:\t\tSecure Wifi Computer\r\n\tAuthentication Provider:\t\tWindows\r\n\tAuthentication Server:\t\tauth.example.org\r\n\tAuthentication Type:\t\tPEAP\r\n\tEAP Type:\t\t\tMicrosoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\r\n\tAccount Session Identifier:\t\t111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\r\n\tLogging Results:\t\t\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\r\n",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 6272,
        "name": "Network Policy Server granted access to a user",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AuthenticationProvider": "Windows",
            "AuthenticationServer": "auth.example.org",
            "AuthenticationType": "PEAP",
            "Category": "Network Policy Server",
            "ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
            "ClientName": "ELEBEYCOBI",
            "EAPType": "Microsoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "NASIdentifier": "ELEBEYCOBI",
            "NASPort": "8",
            "NASPortType": "Wireless - IEEE 802.11",
            "NetworkPolicyName": "Secure Wifi Computer",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "ProxyPolicyName": "Secure Wireless Connections",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "EX1",
            "SubjectUserName": "host/l4523.example.org",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
            "Task": 12552
        },
        "record_id": 1674356873,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 788,
        "pid": 788,
        "thread": {
            "id": 7392
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "user": [
            "host/l4523.example.org"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "EX1",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
        "name": "host/l4523.example.org"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-10-26 14:42:27\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9218868437227405312, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_FAILURE\", \"SeverityValue\": 4, \"Severity\": \"ERROR\", \"EventID\": 6273, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 2, \"Task\": 12552, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 783949626, \"ActivityID\": \"{7C2CEDDA-C2C3-0003-04EE-2C7CC3C2D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 760, \"ThreadID\": 3448, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Network Policy Server denied access to a user.\\r\\n\\r\\nContact the Network Policy Server administrator for more information.\\r\\n\\r\\nUser:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\tjdoe\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t\\tEX1\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\texample.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\\r\\n\\r\\nClient Machine:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tCalled Station Identifier:\\t\\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\\r\\n\\tCalling Station Identifier:\\t\\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\\r\\n\\r\\nNAS:\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv4 Address:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv6 Address:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNAS Identifier:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNAS Port-Type:\\t\\t\\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\\r\\n\\tNAS Port:\\t\\t\\t29\\r\\n\\r\\nRADIUS Client:\\r\\n\\tClient Friendly Name:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tClient IP Address:\\t\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\r\\nAuthentication Details:\\r\\n\\tConnection Request Policy Name:\\tSecure Wireless Connections\\r\\n\\tNetwork Policy Name:\\t\\tConnections to other access servers\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Provider:\\t\\tWindows\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Server:\\t\\tauth.example.org\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Type:\\t\\tEAP\\r\\n\\tEAP Type:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Session Identifier:\\t\\t1111111111111111111111111111111111\\r\\n\\tLogging Results:\\t\\t\\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\\r\\n\\tReason Code:\\t\\t\\t66\\r\\n\\tReason:\\t\\t\\t\\tThe user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\\r\\n\", \"Category\": \"Network Policy Server\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"jdoe\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EX1\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName\": \"example.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\", \"SubjectMachineSID\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"SubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"CalledStationID\": \"0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\", \"CallingStationID\": \"a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\", \"NASIPv4Address\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"NASIPv6Address\": \"-\", \"NASIdentifier\": \"-\", \"NASPortType\": \"Wireless - IEEE 802.11\", \"NASPort\": \"29\", \"ClientName\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"ClientIPAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"ProxyPolicyName\": \"Secure Wireless Connections\", \"NetworkPolicyName\": \"Connections to other access servers\", \"AuthenticationProvider\": \"Windows\", \"AuthenticationServer\": \"auth.example.org\", \"AuthenticationType\": \"EAP\", \"EAPType\": \"-\", \"AccountSessionIdentifier\": \"1111111111111111111111111111111111\", \"ReasonCode\": \"66\", \"Reason\": \"The user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\", \"LoggingResult\": \"Accounting information was written to the local log file.\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-10-26 14:42:33\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "6273",
        "message": "Network Policy Server denied access to a user.\r\n\r\nContact the Network Policy Server administrator for more information.\r\n\r\nUser:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\tjdoe\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t\tEX1\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\texample.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\r\n\r\nClient Machine:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\t-\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\t-\r\n\tCalled Station Identifier:\t\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\r\n\tCalling Station Identifier:\t\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\r\n\r\nNAS:\r\n\tNAS IPv4 Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tNAS IPv6 Address:\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Identifier:\t\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Port-Type:\t\t\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\r\n\tNAS Port:\t\t\t29\r\n\r\nRADIUS Client:\r\n\tClient Friendly Name:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tClient IP Address:\t\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\nAuthentication Details:\r\n\tConnection Request Policy Name:\tSecure Wireless Connections\r\n\tNetwork Policy Name:\t\tConnections to other access servers\r\n\tAuthentication Provider:\t\tWindows\r\n\tAuthentication Server:\t\tauth.example.org\r\n\tAuthentication Type:\t\tEAP\r\n\tEAP Type:\t\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Session Identifier:\t\t1111111111111111111111111111111111\r\n\tLogging Results:\t\t\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\r\n\tReason Code:\t\t\t66\r\n\tReason:\t\t\t\tThe user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\r\n",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 6273,
        "name": "Network Policy Server denied access to a user",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "AuthenticationProvider": "Windows",
            "AuthenticationServer": "auth.example.org",
            "AuthenticationType": "EAP",
            "Category": "Network Policy Server",
            "ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
            "ClientName": "1.2.3.4",
            "EAPType": "-",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
            "Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
            "NASIdentifier": "-",
            "NASPort": "29",
            "NASPortType": "Wireless - IEEE 802.11",
            "NetworkPolicyName": "Connections to other access servers",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "ProxyPolicyName": "Secure Wireless Connections",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "EX1",
            "SubjectUserName": "jdoe",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
            "Task": 12552
        },
        "record_id": 783949626,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "name": "hostname.example.org"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostname.example.org",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 760,
        "pid": 760,
        "thread": {
            "id": 3448
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "hostname.example.org"
        ],
        "user": [
            "jdoe"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "EX1",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
        "name": "jdoe"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-07 17:51:22\", \"Hostname\": \"local\", \"Keywords\": -922355554775808, \"EventType\": \"INFO\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 7, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{77777-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\", \"Version\": 3, \"Task\": 7, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 13717971, \"ProcessID\": 4916, \"ThreadID\": 6372, \"Channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\", \"Domain\": \"AUTORITE NT\", \"AccountName\": \"Syst\\u00e8me\", \"UserID\": \"S-1-5-99\", \"AccountType\": \"User\", \"Message\": \"Image loaded:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\\r\\nProcessGuid: {9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\\r\\nProcessId: 15368\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\r\\nImageLoaded: C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\stage\\\\Teams.exe\\r\\nFileVersion: -\\r\\nDescription: -\\r\\nProduct: -\\r\\nCompany: -\\r\\nOriginalFileName: -\\r\\nHashes: -\\r\\nSigned: failed: Invalid hash\\r\\nSignature: -\\r\\nSignatureStatus: -\\r\\nUser: myuser\", \"Category\": \"Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"RuleName\": \"-\", \"UtcTime\": \"2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\", \"ProcessGuid\": \"{9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\", \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\", \"ImageLoaded\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\stage\\\\Teams.exe\", \"FileVersion\": \"-\", \"Description\": \"-\", \"Product\": \"-\", \"Company\": \"-\", \"OriginalFileName\": \"-\", \"Hashes\": \"-\", \"Signed\": \"failed: Invalid hash\", \"Signature\": \"-\", \"SignatureStatus\": \"-\", \"User\": \"myuser\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-07 17:51:23\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"evtx_win\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "7",
        "message": "Image loaded:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\r\nProcessGuid: {9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\r\nProcessId: 15368\r\nImage: C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\r\nImageLoaded: C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe\r\nFileVersion: -\r\nDescription: -\r\nProduct: -\r\nCompany: -\r\nOriginalFileName: -\r\nHashes: -\r\nSigned: failed: Invalid hash\r\nSignature: -\r\nSignatureStatus: -\r\nUser: myuser",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-08-07T15:51:22.721000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 7,
        "name": "Image loaded",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Category": "Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)",
            "Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Image": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
            "ImageLoaded": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe",
            "Keywords": "-922355554775808",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProcessGuid": "{9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}",
            "ProviderGuid": "{77777-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "Signature": "-",
            "SignatureStatus": "-",
            "Signed": "failed: Invalid hash",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
            "Task": 7,
            "User": "myuser"
        },
        "record_id": 13717971,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    },
    "dll": {
        "path": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "local",
        "name": "local"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "local",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "executable": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
        "id": 15368,
        "name": "Teams.exe",
        "pid": 15368,
        "thread": {
            "id": 6372
        },
        "working_directory": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "local"
        ],
        "user": [
            "myuser"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
        "id": "S-1-5-99",
        "name": "myuser"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-08-22 14:58:41\",\"Hostname\":\"hostfoo\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":1,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":1,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":4244505,\"ProcessID\":2932,\"ThreadID\":3956,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Process Create:\\\\r\\\\nRuleName: -\\\\r\\\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\\\\r\\\\nProcessGuid: {478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\\\\r\\\\nProcessId: 5524\\\\r\\\\nImage: C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\\\\\v1.0\\\\\\\\powershell.exe\\\\r\\\\nFileVersion: 10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\\\\r\\\\nDescription: Windows PowerShell\\\\r\\\\nProduct: Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\\\\r\\\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\\\r\\\\nOriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE\\\\r\\\\nCommandLine: powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\\\\r\\\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\\\\r\\\\nLogonGuid: {478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\\\\r\\\\nLogonId: 0x3E7\\\\r\\\\nTerminalSessionId: 0\\\\r\\\\nIntegrityLevel: System\\\\r\\\\nHashes: SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\\\\r\\\\nParentProcessGuid: {478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\\\\r\\\\nParentProcessId: 1776\\\\r\\\\nParentImage: C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\\\\r\\\\nParentCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\\\" service --run --name nscp\\\\r\\\\nParentUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\",\"Category\":\"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"RuleName\":\"-\",\"UtcTime\":\"2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\\\\\v1.0\\\\\\\\powershell.exe\",\"FileVersion\":\"10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\",\"Description\":\"Windows PowerShell\",\"Product\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"Company\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"OriginalFileName\":\"PowerShell.EXE\",\"CommandLine\":\"powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\",\"CurrentDirectory\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\\",\"User\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\",\"LogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"TerminalSessionId\":\"0\",\"IntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"Hashes\":\"SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\",\"ParentProcessGuid\":\"{478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\",\"ParentProcessId\":\"1776\",\"ParentImage\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\",\"ParentCommandLine\":\"\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\\\" service --run --name nscp\",\"ParentUser\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-08-22 14:58:42\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "1",
        "message": "Process Create:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\\r\\nProcessGuid: {478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\\r\\nProcessId: 5524\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\r\\nFileVersion: 10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\\r\\nDescription: Windows PowerShell\\r\\nProduct: Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\\r\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\r\\nOriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE\\r\\nCommandLine: powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\\r\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\r\\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\nLogonGuid: {478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\\r\\nLogonId: 0x3E7\\r\\nTerminalSessionId: 0\\r\\nIntegrityLevel: System\\r\\nHashes: SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\\r\\nParentProcessGuid: {478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\\r\\nParentProcessId: 1776\\r\\nParentImage: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\\r\\nParentCommandLine: \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\" service --run --name nscp\\r\\nParentUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "reason": "Windows PowerShell"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-08-22T12:58:41.279000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 1,
        "name": "Process creation",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "SYSTEM",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Image": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ParentImage": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe",
            "ProcessGuid": "{478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}",
            "ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
            "Task": 1,
            "User": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM"
        },
        "record_id": 4244505,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "hostfoo",
        "name": "hostfoo"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "hostfoo",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1",
        "executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "b3ad5364cf04b6ab05616dd483aaf618",
            "sha1": "e5b0a0f4a59d6d5377332eece20f8f3df5cebe4e",
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        },
        "id": 2932,
        "name": "powershell.exe",
        "parent": {
            "command_line": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe service --run --name nscp",
            "executable": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe",
            "name": "nscp.exe",
            "working_directory": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\"
        },
        "pid": 2932,
        "ppid": "1776",
        "thread": {
            "id": 3956
        },
        "working_directory": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\"
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    "related": {
        "hash": [
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            "e5b0a0f4a59d6d5377332eece20f8f3df5cebe4e"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "hostfoo"
        ],
        "user": [
            "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-09-13 16:15:44\",\"Hostname\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"Keywords\":-9182839640208441000,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":1201,\"SourceName\":\"AD FS Auditing\",\"Task\":3,\"RecordNumber\":1012533579,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Domain\":\"KEY\",\"AccountName\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"The Federation Service failed to issue a valid token. See XML for failure details. \\r\\n\\r\\nActivity ID: bc38fffc-f8ab-42f2-b5e3-69fabf2e20e6 \\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Data \\r\\nXML: <?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"utf-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\\\" xmlns:xsi=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\\\" xsi:type=\\\"AppTokenAudit\\\">\\r\\n  <AuditType>AppToken</AuditType>\\r\\n  <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\\r\\n  <FailureType>GenericError</FailureType>\\r\\n  <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\\r\\n  <ContextComponents>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"ResourceAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\\r\\n      <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\\r\\n      <UserId>firstname.lastname@example.org</UserId>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"AuthNAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\\r\\n      <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\\r\\n      <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\\r\\n      <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\\r\\n      <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\\r\\n      <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\\r\\n      <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\\r\\n      <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"ProtocolAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\\r\\n      <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"RequestAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\\r\\n      <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\\r\\n      <NetworkLocation>Extranet</NetworkLocation>\\r\\n      <IpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\\r\\n      <ForwardedIpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</ForwardedIpAddress>\\r\\n      <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\\r\\n      <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\\r\\n      <ProxyServer>proxy-server</ProxyServer>\\r\\n      <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36</UserAgentString>\\r\\n      <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n  </ContextComponents>\\r\\n</AuditBase>\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-09-13 16:15:45\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "1201",
        "message": "The Federation Service failed to issue a valid token. See XML for failure details. \r\n\r\nActivity ID: bc38fffc-f8ab-42f2-b5e3-69fabf2e20e6 \r\n\r\nAdditional Data \r\nXML: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-16\"?>\r\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"AppTokenAudit\">\r\n  <AuditType>AppToken</AuditType>\r\n  <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\r\n  <FailureType>GenericError</FailureType>\r\n  <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\r\n  <ContextComponents>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"ResourceAuditComponent\">\r\n      <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\r\n      <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\r\n      <UserId>firstname.lastname@example.org</UserId>\r\n    </Component>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"AuthNAuditComponent\">\r\n      <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\r\n      <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\r\n      <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\r\n      <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\r\n      <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\r\n      <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\r\n      <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\r\n      <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\r\n    </Component>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"ProtocolAuditComponent\">\r\n      <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\r\n      <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\r\n    </Component>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"RequestAuditComponent\">\r\n      <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\r\n      <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\r\n      <NetworkLocation>Extranet</NetworkLocation>\r\n      <IpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\r\n      <ForwardedIpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</ForwardedIpAddress>\r\n      <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\r\n      <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\r\n      <ProxyServer>proxy-server</ProxyServer>\r\n      <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36</UserAgentString>\r\n      <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\r\n    </Component>\r\n  </ContextComponents>\r\n</AuditBase>",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "AD FS Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 1201,
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "<REDACTED>",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Domain": "KEY",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
            "Keywords": "-9182839640208441000",
            "ProxyServer": "proxy-server",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "AD FS Auditing",
            "Task": 3
        },
        "record_id": 1012533579,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "<REDACTED>",
        "name": "<REDACTED>"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "<REDACTED>",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 0,
        "pid": 0,
        "thread": {
            "id": 0
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "<REDACTED>"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1"
        ],
        "user": [
            "<REDACTED>"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "KEY",
        "email": "firstname.lastname@example.org",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000",
        "name": "<REDACTED>"
    },
    "user_agent": {
        "device": {
            "name": "Samsung SM-A217F"
        },
        "name": "Chrome Mobile WebView",
        "original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36",
        "os": {
            "name": "Android",
            "version": "11"
        },
        "version": "94.0.4606"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-09-20 15:54:13\",\"Hostname\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"Keywords\":-9182839640208441000,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":1203,\"SourceName\":\"AD FS Auditing\",\"Task\":3,\"RecordNumber\":959944122,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Domain\":\"KEY\",\"AccountName\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"The Federation Service failed to validate a new credential. See XML for failure details. \\r\\n\\r\\nActivity ID: d404fc6c-c19c-40d7-a4fb-e8ebeb1bfc56 \\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Data \\r\\nXML: <?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"utf-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\\\" xmlns:xsi=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\\\" xsi:type=\\\"FreshCredentialAudit\\\">\\r\\n  <AuditType>FreshCredentials</AuditType>\\r\\n  <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\\r\\n  <FailureType>CredentialValidationError</FailureType>\\r\\n  <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\\r\\n  <ContextComponents>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"ResourceAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\\r\\n      <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\\r\\n      <UserId>username@example.org</UserId>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"AuthNAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\\r\\n      <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\\r\\n      <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\\r\\n      <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\\r\\n      <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\\r\\n      <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\\r\\n      <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\\r\\n      <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"ProtocolAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\\r\\n      <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n    <Component xsi:type=\\\"RequestAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n      <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\\r\\n      <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\\r\\n      <NetworkLocation>Intranet</NetworkLocation>\\r\\n      <IpAddress>1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\\r\\n      <ForwardedIpAddress />\\r\\n      <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\\r\\n      <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\\r\\n      <ProxyServer>N/A</ProxyServer>\\r\\n      <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044</UserAgentString>\\r\\n      <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\\r\\n    </Component>\\r\\n  </ContextComponents>\\r\\n</AuditBase>\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-09-20 15:54:15\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "1203",
        "message": "The Federation Service failed to validate a new credential. See XML for failure details. \r\n\r\nActivity ID: d404fc6c-c19c-40d7-a4fb-e8ebeb1bfc56 \r\n\r\nAdditional Data \r\nXML: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-16\"?>\r\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"FreshCredentialAudit\">\r\n  <AuditType>FreshCredentials</AuditType>\r\n  <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\r\n  <FailureType>CredentialValidationError</FailureType>\r\n  <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\r\n  <ContextComponents>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"ResourceAuditComponent\">\r\n      <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\r\n      <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\r\n      <UserId>username@example.org</UserId>\r\n    </Component>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"AuthNAuditComponent\">\r\n      <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\r\n      <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\r\n      <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\r\n      <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\r\n      <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\r\n      <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\r\n      <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\r\n      <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\r\n    </Component>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"ProtocolAuditComponent\">\r\n      <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\r\n      <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\r\n    </Component>\r\n    <Component xsi:type=\"RequestAuditComponent\">\r\n      <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\r\n      <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\r\n      <NetworkLocation>Intranet</NetworkLocation>\r\n      <IpAddress>1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\r\n      <ForwardedIpAddress />\r\n      <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\r\n      <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\r\n      <ProxyServer>N/A</ProxyServer>\r\n      <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044</UserAgentString>\r\n      <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\r\n    </Component>\r\n  </ContextComponents>\r\n</AuditBase>",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "AD FS Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 1203,
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "<REDACTED>",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Domain": "KEY",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
            "Keywords": "-9182839640208441000",
            "Severity": "ERROR",
            "SourceName": "AD FS Auditing",
            "Task": 3
        },
        "record_id": 959944122,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "<REDACTED>",
        "name": "<REDACTED>"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "<REDACTED>",
        "level": "error"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 0,
        "pid": 0,
        "thread": {
            "id": 0
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "<REDACTED>"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1"
        ],
        "user": [
            "<REDACTED>"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "KEY",
        "email": "username@example.org",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000",
        "name": "<REDACTED>"
    },
    "user_agent": {
        "device": {
            "name": "Other"
        },
        "name": "Edge",
        "original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044",
        "os": {
            "name": "Windows",
            "version": "10"
        },
        "version": "18.19044"
    }
}
{
    "message": " {\"EventTime\":\"2011-03-02 01:40:47\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427387904,\"EventType\":\"WARNING\",\"SeverityValue\":3,\"Severity\":\"WARNING\",\"EventID\":61,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":2,\"RecordNumber\":18732,\"ActivityID\":\"{5B327F5A-B797-4B7E-AB05-11A0E98A15AF}\",\"ProcessID\":5796,\"ThreadID\":12472,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3  l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.\",\"Opcode\":\"Arr\u00c3\u00aater\",\"transferId\":\"{5b327f5a-b797-4b7e-ab05-11a0e98a15af}\",\"name\":\"Font Download\",\"Id\":\"{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}\",\"url\":\"https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json\",\"hr\":\"2147954402\",\"fileTime\":\"1601-01-01T00:00:00.0000000Z\",\"fileLength\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"bytesTotal\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"bytesTransferred\":\"0\",\"peerProtocolFlags\":\"0\",\"bytesTransferredFromPeer\":\"0\",\"AdditionalInfoHr\":\"0\",\"PeerContextInfo\":\"0\",\"bandwidthLimit\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan\":\"false\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-03-02 01:40:48\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "61",
        "message": "BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3  l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 61,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "BytesTotal": "-1",
            "Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "EventType": "WARNING",
            "Id": "{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}",
            "Keywords": "4611686018427387904",
            "OpcodeValue": 2,
            "ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
            "Severity": "WARNING",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
            "Task": 0,
            "bytesTransferred": "0"
        },
        "record_id": 18732,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "fs.microsoft.com",
        "domain": "fs.microsoft.com",
        "size_in_char": 16
    },
    "file": {
        "name": "Font Download",
        "size": -1
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
        "name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
        "level": "warning"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 5796,
        "pid": 5796,
        "thread": {
            "id": 12472
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PCFOO.corp.net",
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        ],
        "user": [
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    "url": {
        "domain": "fs.microsoft.com",
        "full": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
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        "path": "/fs/windows/config.json",
        "port": 443,
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        "scheme": "https",
        "subdomain": "fs",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
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    "user": {
        "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "Syst\u00e8me"
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}
{
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            "AccountType": "User",
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            "EventType": "INFO",
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        "domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
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    },
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    },
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        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
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        "pid": 7908,
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            "userXYZ"
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    "url": {
        "domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
        "full": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
        "original": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
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}
{
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    "event": {
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        "message": "BITS stopped transferring the sharpbitsTestX.zip transfer job that is associated with the https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip URL. The status code is 0x0.",
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    "action": {
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        "name": "BITS has stopped transferring the BITS Transfer job",
        "properties": {
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            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Id": "{c10c39b1-5f4e-47bc-a848-dc7505233471}",
            "Keywords": "4611686018427387904",
            "OpcodeValue": 2,
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            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
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        "record_id": 206,
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    "destination": {
        "address": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
        "domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
        "size_in_char": 37
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    "file": {
        "name": "sharpbitsTestX.zip",
        "path": "sharpbitsTestX.zip",
        "size": 524444
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR",
        "name": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR"
    },
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        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 7908,
        "pid": 7908,
        "thread": {
            "id": 2432
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
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            "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net"
        ],
        "user": [
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        ]
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
        "full": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
        "original": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
        "path": "/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
        "port": 443,
        "registered_domain": "windows.net",
        "scheme": "https",
        "subdomain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core",
        "top_level_domain": "net"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "SYSTEM"
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}
{
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    "action": {
        "id": 1116,
        "name": "The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "AdditionalActionsID": "0",
            "AdditionalActionsString": "No additional actions required",
            "DetectionUser": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\r1",
            "Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "ErrorCode": "0x00000000",
            "EventType": "WARNING",
            "Execution Name": "%%813",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "Path": "file:_C:\\Users\\r1\\Downloads\\tmp2\\tmp2\\Win32\\mimidrv.sys",
            "ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
            "ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
            "Severity": "WARNING",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
            "Task": 0,
            "ThreatName": "HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha"
        },
        "record_id": 424,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "level": "warning"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 2484,
        "pid": 2484,
        "thread": {
            "id": 9244
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
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        "user": [
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    "user": {
        "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "Syst\u00e8me"
    }
}
{
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    "event": {
        "code": "1151",
        "message": "Rapport d'int\u00e9grit\u00e9 du client Endpoint Protection (heure UTC)\u00a0: \r\n \tVersion de plateforme\u00a0:  4.18.2011.6\r\n \tVersion de moteur\u00a0:  1.1.19900.2\r\n \tVersion du moteur du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0:  1.1.19900.2\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Antivirus\u00a0:  1.381.814.0\r\n \tVersion de la la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0:  1.381.814.0\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0:  1.381.814.0\r\n \t\u00c9tat RTP\u00a0:  Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat OA\u00a0:  Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat OAV\u00a0:  Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat BM\u00a0:  Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0:  1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0:  1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0:  1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0:  4294967295\r\n \tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0:  21/12/2012 01:50:25\r\n \tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0:  21/12/2012 01:50:26\r\n \tHeure de d\u00e9but la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0:  21/12/2012 10:30:01\r\n \tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0:  21/12/2012 10:40:38\r\n \tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0:  2\r\n \tHeure de d\u00e9but de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0:  01/01/1601 00:00:00\r\n \tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0:  01/01/1601 00:00:00\r\n \tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0:  0\r\n \tStatut du produit\u00a0:  0x00080000\r\n",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 1151,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "LastASSecurityIntelligenceAge": "1",
            "LastAVSecurityIntelligenceAge": "1",
            "LastFullScanAge": "4294967295",
            "LastQuickScanAge": "1",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
            "Task": 0
        },
        "record_id": 215,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 5472,
        "pid": 5472,
        "thread": {
            "id": 5596
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
        ],
        "user": [
            "Syst\u00e8me"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "Syst\u00e8me"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-09-13 09:20:39\",\"Hostname\":\"lb-foobar\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5007,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1166,\"ProcessID\":3532,\"ThreadID\":5956,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\\r\\n \\tOld value: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\Processes\\\\powershell.exe = 0x0\\r\\n \\tNew value: \",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Product Name\":\"Microsoft Defender Antivirus\",\"Product Version\":\"4.18.2108.7\",\"Old Value\":\"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\Processes\\\\powershell.exe = 0x0\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-09-13 09:20:41\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog6\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "5007",
        "message": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\r\n \tOld value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\powershell.exe = 0x0\r\n \tNew value: ",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 5007,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "SYSTEM",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "Old Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\powershell.exe = 0x0",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
            "Task": 0
        },
        "record_id": 1166,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "lb-foobar",
        "name": "lb-foobar"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "lb-foobar",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 3532,
        "pid": 3532,
        "thread": {
            "id": 5956
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "lb-foobar"
        ],
        "user": [
            "SYSTEM"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "SYSTEM"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-06-02 15:04:18\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":0,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4103,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":106,\"OpcodeValue\":20,\"RecordNumber\":712900,\"ActivityID\":\"{260C9E3C-4B0F-0002-DC86-2D260F4BD701}\",\"ProcessID\":22244,\"ThreadID\":16456,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nContexte :\\r\\n        Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\\r\\n        Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\\r\\n        Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n        ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\\r\\n        Application h\u00f4te = C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\\r\\n        Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n        ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\\r\\n        ID de pipeline = 1\\r\\n        Nom de commande = Select-Object\\r\\n        Type de commande = Cmdlet\\r\\n        Nom du script = \\r\\n        Chemin de la commande = \\r\\n        Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\\r\\n        Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\\\Syst\u00e8me\\r\\n        Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \\r\\n        ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline\",\"Opcode\":\"\u00c0 utiliser lorsque l'op\u00e9ration ex\u00e9cute uniquement une m\u00e9thode\",\"ContextInfo\":\"        Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\\r\\n        Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\\r\\n        Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n        ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\\r\\n        Application h\u00f4te = C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\\r\\n        Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n        ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\\r\\n        ID de pipeline = 1\\r\\n        Nom de commande = Select-Object\\r\\n        Type de commande = Cmdlet\\r\\n        Nom du script = \\r\\n        Chemin de la commande = \\r\\n        Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence\u00a0= 138\\r\\n        Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\\\Syst\u00e8me\\r\\n        Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \\r\\n        ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\",\"Payload\":\"CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-06-02 15:04:18\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4103",
        "message": "CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\r\n\r\n\r\nContexte :\r\n        Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n        Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n        Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\r\n        ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\r\n        Application h\u00f4te = C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n        Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\r\n        ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\r\n        ID de pipeline = 1\r\n        Nom de commande = Select-Object\r\n        Type de commande = Cmdlet\r\n        Nom du script = \r\n        Chemin de la commande = \r\n        Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\r\n        Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n        Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n        ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\r\n\r\n",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4103,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Category": "Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline",
            "ContextInfo": "        Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n        Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n        Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\r\n        ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\r\n        Application h\u00f4te = C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n        Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\r\n        ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\r\n        ID de pipeline = 1\r\n        Nom de commande = Select-Object\r\n        Type de commande = Cmdlet\r\n        Nom du script = \r\n        Chemin de la commande = \r\n        Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\r\n        Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n        Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n        ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
            "Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "HostApplication": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname",
            "HostName": "ConsoleHost",
            "Keywords": "0",
            "OpcodeValue": 20,
            "Payload": "CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\r\n",
            "ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
            "Task": 106
        },
        "record_id": 712900,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
        "name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 22244,
        "name": "powershell.exe",
        "pid": 22244,
        "thread": {
            "id": 16456
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PCFOO.corp.net"
        ],
        "user": [
            "Syst\u00e8me"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "Syst\u00e8me"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-21 09:17:49\", \"Hostname\": \"dcclient-vm\", \"Keywords\": -9223372036854775808, \"EventType\": \"INFO\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 5007, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 0, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 4178, \"ProcessID\": 3292, \"ThreadID\": 5848, \"Channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\", \"Domain\": \"NT AUTHORITY\", \"AccountName\": \"SYSTEM\", \"UserID\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"AccountType\": \"User\", \"Message\": \"Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\\r\\n \\tOld value: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x5\\r\\n \\tNew value: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x4\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"Product Name\": \"Microsoft Defender Antivirus\", \"Product Version\": \"4.18.2202.4\", \"Old Value\": \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x5\", \"New Value\": \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x4\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2022-03-18 14:42:03\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog6\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "5007",
        "message": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\r\n \tOld value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x5\r\n \tNew value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x4",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 5007,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "SYSTEM",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "New Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x4",
            "Old Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x5",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
            "Task": 0
        },
        "record_id": 4178,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "dcclient-vm",
        "name": "dcclient-vm"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "dcclient-vm",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 3292,
        "pid": 3292,
        "thread": {
            "id": 5848
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "dcclient-vm"
        ],
        "user": [
            "SYSTEM"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "SYSTEM"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-05-22 15:37:23\",\"Hostname\":\"FOOBAZ11\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4768,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":14339,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":26287385371,\"ProcessID\":1796,\"ThreadID\":17268,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.\\r\\n\\r\\nAccount Information:\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tFOO$\\r\\n\\tSupplied Realm Name:\\tKEY.HOSTFOO.INT\\r\\n\\tUser ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\\r\\n\\r\\nService Information:\\r\\n\\tService Name:\\t\\tkrbtgt\\r\\n\\tService ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tClient Address:\\t\\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tClient Port:\\t\\t65016\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tTicket Options:\\t\\t0x40810010\\r\\n\\tResult Code:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tTicket Encryption Type:\\t0x12\\r\\n\\tPre-Authentication Type:\\t2\\r\\n\\r\\nCertificate Information:\\r\\n\\tCertificate Issuer Name:\\t\\t\\r\\n\\tCertificate Serial Number:\\t\\r\\n\\tCertificate Thumbprint:\\t\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\\r\\n\\r\\nPre-authentication types, ticket options, encryption types and result codes are defined in RFC 4120.\",\"Category\":\"Kerberos Authentication Service\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserName\":\"FOO$\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"KEY.HOSTFOO.INT\",\"TargetSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\",\"ServiceName\":\"krbtgt\",\"ServiceSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\",\"TicketOptions\":\"0x40810010\",\"Status\":\"0x0\",\"TicketEncryptionType\":\"0x12\",\"PreAuthType\":\"2\",\"IpAddress\":\"::ffff:1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"65016\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-05-22 15:37:24\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4768",
        "message": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.\r\n\r\nAccount Information:\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOO$\r\n\tSupplied Realm Name:\tKEY.HOSTFOO.INT\r\n\tUser ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\r\n\r\nService Information:\r\n\tService Name:\t\tkrbtgt\r\n\tService ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\r\n\tClient Port:\t\t65016\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tTicket Options:\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tResult Code:\t\t0x0\r\n\tTicket Encryption Type:\t0x12\r\n\tPre-Authentication Type:\t2\r\n\r\nCertificate Information:\r\n\tCertificate Issuer Name:\t\t\r\n\tCertificate Serial Number:\t\r\n\tCertificate Thumbprint:\t\t\r\n\r\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\r\n\r\nPre-authentication types, ticket options, encryption types and result codes are defined in RFC 4120.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4768,
        "name": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Kerberos Authentication Service",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "IpAddress": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
            "IpPort": "65016",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "PreAuthType": "2",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "ServiceName": "krbtgt",
            "ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "Status": "0x0",
            "TargetDomainName": "KEY.HOSTFOO.INT",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436",
            "TargetUserName": "FOO$",
            "Task": 14339,
            "TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
            "TicketOptions": "0x40810010"
        },
        "record_id": 26287385371,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
        "name": "FOOBAZ11"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 1796,
        "pid": 1796,
        "thread": {
            "id": 17268
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "FOOBAZ11"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "KEY.HOSTFOO.INT",
            "name": "FOO$"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-05-16 11:55:18\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223354444668731392,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":8001,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Store\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{9C2A37F3-E5FD-5CAE-BCD1-43DAFEEE1FF0}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":8001,\"OpcodeValue\":14,\"RecordNumber\":4644,\"ProcessID\":2368,\"ThreadID\":836,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Store/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"AccountName\":\"UserFoo\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-1695726573-3959282566-3642579326-1001\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Skipping license manager: PFN Microsoft.Messaging_2.15.20002.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\r\\nFunction: InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\\r\\nSource: enduser\\\\winstore\\\\licensemanager\\\\apisethost\\\\activationapis.cpp (205)\",\"Category\":\"LM\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Function\":\"InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\",\"Source\":\"enduser\\\\winstore\\\\licensemanager\\\\apisethost\\\\activationapis.cpp\",\"Line Number\":\"205\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-05-16 11:55:20\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "8001",
        "message": "Skipping license manager: PFN Microsoft.Messaging_2.15.20002.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe\r\nFunction: InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\r\nSource: enduser\\winstore\\licensemanager\\apisethost\\activationapis.cpp (205)",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Store"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 8001,
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "UserFoo",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Category": "LM",
            "Domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Keywords": "-9223354444668731392",
            "OpcodeValue": 14,
            "ProviderGuid": "{9C2A37F3-E5FD-5CAE-BCD1-43DAFEEE1FF0}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "Source": "enduser\\winstore\\licensemanager\\apisethost\\activationapis.cpp",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Store",
            "Task": 8001
        },
        "record_id": 4644,
        "type": "Microsoft-Windows-Store/Operational"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 2368,
        "pid": 2368,
        "thread": {
            "id": 836
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
        ],
        "user": [
            "UserFoo"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1695726573-3959282566-3642579326-1001",
        "name": "UserFoo"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:15\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4634,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12545,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":47121546,\"ProcessID\":560,\"ThreadID\":2172,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An account was logged off.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tAD\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3912391A\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.\",\"Category\":\"Logoff\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\",\"TargetUserName\":\"USERFOO\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AD\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x3912391a\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4634",
        "message": "An account was logged off.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tAD\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3912391A\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4634,
        "name": "An account was logged off",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Logoff",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "TargetDomainName": "AD",
            "TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
            "Task": 12545
        },
        "record_id": 47121546,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
        "name": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 560,
        "pid": 560,
        "thread": {
            "id": 2172
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "AD",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
            "name": "USERFOO"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-06-18 15:28:23\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4624,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":12544,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":10457874880,\"ProcessID\":744,\"ThreadID\":2352,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An account was successfully logged on.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nImpersonation Level:\\t\\tImpersonation\\r\\n\\r\\nNew Logon:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tSVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0xFBEE0744\\r\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tWorkstation Name:\\tV-FOO\\r\\n\\tSource Network Address:\\t-\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nDetailed Authentication Information:\\r\\n\\tLogon Process:\\t\\tNtLmSsp \\r\\n\\tAuthentication Package:\\tNTLM\\r\\n\\tTransited Services:\\t-\\r\\n\\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\\tNTLM V2\\r\\n\\tKey Length:\\t\\t128\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\\r\\n\\r\\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\\r\\n\\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\\r\\n\\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.\",\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\",\"TargetUserName\":\"SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0xfbee0744\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"NtLmSsp \",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"NTLM\",\"WorkstationName\":\"V-FOO\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"LmPackageName\":\"NTLM V2\",\"KeyLength\":\"128\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"ImpersonationLevel\":\"%%1833\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-06-18 15:28:24\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "action": "authentication_network",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4624",
        "message": "An account was successfully logged on.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nImpersonation Level:\t\tImpersonation\r\n\r\nNew Logon:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tSVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xFBEE0744\r\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\t-\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tWorkstation Name:\tV-FOO\r\n\tSource Network Address:\t-\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t-\r\n\r\nDetailed Authentication Information:\r\n\tLogon Process:\t\tNtLmSsp \r\n\tAuthentication Package:\tNTLM\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\tNTLM V2\r\n\tKey Length:\t\t128\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\r\n\r\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\r\n\r\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\r\n\r\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\r\n\r\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\r\n\r\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\r\n\r\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\r\n\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\r\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\r\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\r\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4624,
        "name": "An account was successfully logged on",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
            "Category": "Logon",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "IpAddress": "-",
            "IpPort": "-",
            "KeyLength": "128",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProcessName": "-",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "-",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
            "SubjectUserName": "-",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetDomainName": "KEY",
            "TargetUserName": "SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701",
            "Task": 12544,
            "WorkstationName": "V-FOO"
        },
        "record_id": 10457874880,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "V-FOO",
        "name": "V-FOO"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "V-FOO",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 744,
        "pid": 744,
        "thread": {
            "id": 2352
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "V-FOO"
        ]
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "NtLmSsp "
            }
        },
        "client": {
            "name": "V-FOO",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "name": "V-FOO",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-0-0",
        "target": {
            "domain": "KEY",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701",
            "name": "SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-04-12 17:42:04\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4624,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":12544,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":504041,\"ActivityID\":\"{593B242C-183A-44F2-8977-2A836ABEC213}\",\"ProcessID\":996,\"ThreadID\":1920,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"L'ouverture de session d'un compte s'est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.\\r\\n\\r\\nObjet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tPCFOO$\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tFOOBAR\\r\\n\\tID d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations d'ouverture de session :\\r\\n\\tType d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t9\\r\\n\\tMode administrateur restreint :\\t-\\r\\n\\tCompte virtuel :\\t\\tNon\\r\\n\\tJeton \u00e9lev\u00e9 :\\t\\tOui\\r\\n\\r\\nNiveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 :\\t\\tEmprunt d\u2019identit\u00e9\\r\\n\\r\\nNouvelle ouverture de session :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tSyst\u00e8me\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tAUTORITE NT\\r\\n\\tID d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x7E767BC\\r\\n\\tID d'ouverture de session li\u00e9e :\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tNom du compte r\u00e9seau :\\tsvc_admin_sccm\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte r\u00e9seau :\\tFOOBAR\\r\\n\\tGUID d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le processus :\\r\\n\\tID du processus :\\t\\t0x2780\\r\\n\\tNom du processus :\\t\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\CCM\\\\CcmExec.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tNom de la station de travail :\\t-\\r\\n\\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\\t-\\r\\n\\tPort source :\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l'authentification :\\r\\n\\tProcessus d'ouverture de session :\\t\\tAdvapi  \\r\\n\\tPackage d'authentification :\\tNegotiate\\r\\n\\tServices en transit :\\t-\\r\\n\\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\\t-\\r\\n\\tLongueur de la cl\u00e9 :\\t\\t0\\r\\n\\r\\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lors de la cr\u00e9ation d'une ouverture de session. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l'ordinateur sur lequel l'ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l'ouverture de session. Il s'agit le plus souvent d'un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Type d'ouverture de session indique le type d'ouverture de session qui s'est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, par exemple, le compte qui s'est connect\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs au r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance d'une demande d'ouverture de session \u00e0 distance. Le nom de la station de travail n'\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut \u00eatre laiss\u00e9 vide dans certains cas.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ du niveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 indique la port\u00e9e de l'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 que peut prendre un processus dans la session d'ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d'authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d'ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\\r\\n\\t- Le GUID d'ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir \u00e0 associer cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement KDC .\\r\\n\\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d'ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\t- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\\r\\n\\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.\",\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"PCFOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"FOOBAR\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TargetUserName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x7e767bc\",\"LogonType\":\"9\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Advapi  \",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"Negotiate\",\"WorkstationName\":\"-\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\CCM\\\\CcmExec.exe\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"ImpersonationLevel\":\"%%1833\",\"RestrictedAdminMode\":\"-\",\"TargetOutboundUserName\":\"svc_admin_sccm\",\"TargetOutboundDomainName\":\"FOOBAR\",\"VirtualAccount\":\"%%1843\",\"TargetLinkedLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"ElevatedToken\":\"%%1842\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-04-12 17:42:06\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "action": "authentication_alternative_credentials",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4624",
        "message": "L'ouverture de session d'un compte s'est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nObjet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tPCFOO$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tFOOBAR\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session :\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nInformations d'ouverture de session :\r\n\tType d'ouverture de session :\t\t9\r\n\tMode administrateur restreint :\t-\r\n\tCompte virtuel :\t\tNon\r\n\tJeton \u00e9lev\u00e9 :\t\tOui\r\n\r\nNiveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 :\t\tEmprunt d\u2019identit\u00e9\r\n\r\nNouvelle ouverture de session :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tSyst\u00e8me\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tAUTORITE NT\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session :\t\t0x7E767BC\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session li\u00e9e :\t\t0x0\r\n\tNom du compte r\u00e9seau :\tsvc_admin_sccm\r\n\tDomaine du compte r\u00e9seau :\tFOOBAR\r\n\tGUID d'ouverture de session :\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du processus :\t\t0x2780\r\n\tNom du processus :\t\tC:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tNom de la station de travail :\t-\r\n\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\t-\r\n\tPort source :\t\t-\r\n\r\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l'authentification :\r\n\tProcessus d'ouverture de session :\t\tAdvapi  \r\n\tPackage d'authentification :\tNegotiate\r\n\tServices en transit :\t-\r\n\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\t-\r\n\tLongueur de la cl\u00e9 :\t\t0\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lors de la cr\u00e9ation d'une ouverture de session. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l'ordinateur sur lequel l'ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l'ouverture de session. Il s'agit le plus souvent d'un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\r\n\r\nLe champ Type d'ouverture de session indique le type d'ouverture de session qui s'est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\r\n\r\nLe champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, par exemple, le compte qui s'est connect\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs au r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance d'une demande d'ouverture de session \u00e0 distance. Le nom de la station de travail n'\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut \u00eatre laiss\u00e9 vide dans certains cas.\r\n\r\nLe champ du niveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 indique la port\u00e9e de l'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 que peut prendre un processus dans la session d'ouverture de session.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d'authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d'ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\t- Le GUID d'ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir \u00e0 associer cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement KDC .\r\n\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d'ouverture de session.\r\n\t- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\r\n\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4624,
        "name": "An account was successfully logged on",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AuthenticationPackageName": "Negotiate",
            "Category": "Logon",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "IpAddress": "-",
            "IpPort": "-",
            "KeyLength": "0",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "LogonProcessName": "Advapi  ",
            "LogonType": "9",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "FOOBAR",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "PCFOO$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "TargetDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
            "TargetOutboundDomainName": "FOOBAR",
            "TargetOutboundUserName": "svc_admin_sccm",
            "TargetUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "Task": 12544,
            "WorkstationName": "-"
        },
        "record_id": 504041,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
        "name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "executable": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
        "id": 996,
        "name": "CcmExec.exe",
        "pid": 996,
        "thread": {
            "id": 1920
        },
        "working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PCFOO.corp.net"
        ],
        "user": [
            "PCFOO$"
        ]
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "Advapi  "
            }
        },
        "client": {
            "name": "PCFOO.corp.net",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "name": "PCFOO.corp.net",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "FOOBAR",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "PCFOO$",
        "target": {
            "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "id": "S-1-5-18",
            "name": "Syst\u00e8me"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:15\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4634,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12545,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":47121546,\"ProcessID\":560,\"ThreadID\":2172,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An account was logged off.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tAD\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3912391A\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.\",\"Category\":\"Logoff\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\",\"TargetUserName\":\"USERFOO\",\"ComputerName\":\"FoobarComputer\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AD\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x3912391a\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "4634",
        "message": "An account was logged off.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tAD\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3912391A\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4634,
        "name": "An account was logged off",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "Category": "Logoff",
            "ComputerName": "FoobarComputer",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "TargetDomainName": "AD",
            "TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
            "Task": 12545
        },
        "record_id": 47121546,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
        "name": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 560,
        "pid": 560,
        "thread": {
            "id": 2172
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "AD",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
            "name": "USERFOO"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-04-24 00:06:15\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5145,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12811,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":23997037887,\"ProcessID\":776,\"ThreadID\":784,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tBAZ256$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0xA62B3A8AE\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\t\\r\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\tFile\\r\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t51042\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nShare Information:\\r\\n\\tShare Name:\\t\\t\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\\r\\n\\tShare Path:\\t\\t\\\\??\\\\D:\\\\ActiveDirectory\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol\\r\\n\\tRelative Target Name:\\tKEY.ACME.COM\\\\POLICIES\\\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\\\MACHINE\\r\\n\\r\\nAccess Request Information:\\r\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x100081\\r\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tSYNCHRONIZE\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadAttributes\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\nAccess Check Results:\\r\\n\\tSYNCHRONIZE:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadAttributes:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Detailed File Share\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"BAZ256$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0xa62b3a8ae\",\"ObjectType\":\"File\",\"IpAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"51042\",\"ShareName\":\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\",\"ShareLocalPath\":\"\\\\??\\\\D:\\\\ActiveDirectory\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol\",\"RelativeTargetName\":\"KEY.ACME.COM\\\\POLICIES\\\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\\\MACHINE\",\"AccessMask\":\"0x100081\",\"AccessList\":\"%%1541\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"AccessReason\":\"%%1541:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-04-24 00:06:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "5145",
        "message": "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\r\n\t\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tBAZ256$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xA62B3A8AE\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\t\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tFile\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t51042\r\n\t\r\nShare Information:\r\n\tShare Name:\t\t\\\\*\\SYSVOL\r\n\tShare Path:\t\t\\??\\D:\\ActiveDirectory\\SYSVOL\\sysvol\r\n\tRelative Target Name:\tKEY.ACME.COM\\POLICIES\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\MACHINE\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x100081\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tSYNCHRONIZE\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\nAccess Check Results:\r\n\tSYNCHRONIZE:\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes:\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 5145,
        "name": "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AccessList": "%%1541\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4416\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4423\r\n\t\t\t\t",
            "AccessMask": "0x100081",
            "AccessReason": "%%1541:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4416:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4423:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t",
            "Accesses": "\t\tSYNCHRONIZE\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes",
            "Category": "Detailed File Share",
            "EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
            "IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
            "IpPort": "51042",
            "Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
            "ObjectType": "File",
            "OpcodeValue": 0,
            "ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
            "RelativeTargetName": "KEY.ACME.COM\\POLICIES\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\MACHINE",
            "Severity": "INFO",
            "ShareLocalPath": "\\??\\D:\\ActiveDirectory\\SYSVOL\\sysvol",
            "ShareName": "\\\\*\\SYSVOL",
            "SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
            "SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0xa62b3a8ae",
            "SubjectUserName": "BAZ256$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016",
            "Task": 12811
        },
        "record_id": 23997037887,
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "V-FOO",
        "name": "V-FOO"
    },
    "log": {
        "hostname": "V-FOO",
        "level": "info"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": 776,
        "pid": 776,
        "thread": {
            "id": 784
        }
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "V-FOO"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1"
        ],
        "user": [
            "BAZ256$"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "KEY",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016",
        "name": "BAZ256$"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-05-17 11:52:46\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":3,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":3,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":51,\"ProcessID\":3912,\"ThreadID\":532,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Network connection detected:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\\r\\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\\r\\nProcessId: 4200\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\\r\\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\UserFoo\\r\\nProtocol: tcp\\r\\nInitiated: true\\r\\nSourceIsIpv6: false\\r\\nSourceIp: 1.1.1.1\\r\\nSourceHostname: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\\r\\nSourcePort: 49718\\r\\nSourcePortName: \\r\\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\\r\\nDestinationIp: 1.1.1.1\\r\\nDestinationHostname: \\r\\nDestinationPort: 443\\r\\nDestinationPortName: https\",\"Category\":\"Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\",\"User\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\UserFoo\",\"Protocol\":\"tcp\",\"Initiated\":\"true\",\"SourceIsIpv6\":\"false\",\"SourceIp\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"SourceHostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\",\"SourcePort\":\"49718\",\"DestinationIsIpv6\":\"false\",\"DestinationIp\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"DestinationPort\":\"443\",\"DestinationPortName\":\"https\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-05-17 11:52:46\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
    "event": {
        "code": "3",
        "message": "Network connection detected:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\r\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\r\nProcessId: 4200\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\r\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\UserFoo\r\nProtocol: tcp\r\nInitiated: true\r\nSourceIsIpv6: false\r\nSourceIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nSourceHostname: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\r\nSourcePort: 49718\r\nSourcePortName: \r\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\r\nDestinationIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nDestinationHostname: \r\nDestinationPort: 443\r\nDestinationPortName: https",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-05-17T09:52:38.882000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 3,
        "name": "Network connection",
        "properties": {
            "AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "AccountType": "User",
            "Category": "Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect)",
            "DestinationPort": "443",
            "Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "EventType": "INFO",
            "Image": "C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
            "Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
            "OpcodeValue":