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Winlogbeat

Overview

Winlogbeat is an open-source log collector that ships Windows Event Logs as JSON events.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Elastic Winlogbeat. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Elastic Winlogbeat on ATT&CK Navigator

AMSI Deactivation Using Registry Key

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable the AMSI provider by deleting the associated registry key.

  • Effort: master
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll

Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.

  • Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde

Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.

  • Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system.

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration

Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.

  • Effort: advanced
Admin User RDP Remote Logon

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

  • Effort: master
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts

Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This is only based on Windows Defender events.

  • Effort: intermediate
Aspnet Compiler

Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.

  • Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.

  • Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line

Detects use of azureedge in the command line.

  • Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
Backup Catalog Deleted

The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE 2022-1292

The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

  • Effort: master
CVE-2019-0708 Scan

Detects the use of a scanner that discovers targets vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

  • Effort: advanced
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

  • Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking

Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.

  • Effort: advanced
Compress Data for Exfiltration via Archiver

Detects data compressed by specific tools.

  • Effort: master
Compression Followed By Suppression

Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.

  • Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

  • Effort: master
Container Credential Access

Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Cookies Deletion

Detects when cookies are deleted by a suspicious process.

  • Effort: master
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable

A script has copied a System32 executable.

  • Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Query For Iplookup

Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.

  • Effort: master
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

  • Effort: master
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

  • Effort: elementary
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Disabled Service

Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.

  • Effort: advanced
Disabling SmartScreen Via Registry

Detects when a user disables smartscreen.

  • Effort: elementary
Dism Disabling Windows Defender

Detects windows defender disabled by dism.

  • Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount

Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: master
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Enabling Restricted Admin Mode

Detects when the restricted admin mode is enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history.

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file, from command line or PowerShell script.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp

Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262 through command line or PowerShell script. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine

Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189.

  • Effort: elementary
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: advanced
FLTMC command usage

Detects the use of fltmc to list and load/unload a filter driver.

  • Effort: advanced
Fail2ban Unban IP

An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.

  • Effort: advanced
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

  • Effort: master
FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

  • Effort: elementary
Formbook File Creation DB1

Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Formbook Hijacked Process Command

Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.

  • Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line

Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.

  • Effort: master
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Gpresult Usage

Detects when an account uses gpresult to get information on gpo.

  • Effort: advanced
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names

Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.

  • Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
IIS Module Installation Using AppCmd

Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.

  • Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Addcomputer

Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern

  • Effort: intermediate
Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

  • Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python

Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.

  • Effort: advanced
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets

Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.

  • Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute

Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload

Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Nohup Exec

Detects suspicious usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search

Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems

  • Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: advanced
Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir

Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.

  • Effort: master
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

  • Effort: advanced
Malicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks

  • Effort: advanced
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line or PowerShell scripts.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable SecurityHealth

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender SecurityHealth through command line, PowerShell scripts, and registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is recommended.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Deleted

Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Tampering Detected

Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: intermediate
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location

Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.

  • Effort: master
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values

Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process

In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.

  • Effort: advanced
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: master
Package Manager Alteration

Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software

  • Effort: advanced
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic

Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.

  • Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
Phosphorus (APT35) Exchange Discovery

According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about its the environment of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers. The command is the following: Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders

  • Effort: elementary
Phosphorus Domain Controller Discovery

According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about the Domain Controller. The command is the following: "powershell.exe" /c Get-WMIObject Win32_NTDomain | findstr DomainController

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation

Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Credential Prompt

Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt (using PromptForCredential), like $Credential = $host.ui.PromptForCredential("Need credentials", "Please enter your user name and password.", "", "NetBiosUserName"). The same result can be obtained by using the Get-Credential function but detecting it will trigger a lot of FP.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed

Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks (PowerSploit...).

  • Effort: master
PowerShell NTFS Alternate Data Stream

Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from PowerShell. Needs Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass

This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell Winlogon Helper DLL

Detects modifications to the Winlogon Registry keys, which may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump

Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Python Exfiltration Tools

Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages

Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement

  • Effort: master
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Login From Localhost

Detects RDP login from localhost source address, which may be a tunnelled login to bypass network restrictions.

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Register New Logon Process

Detects potential use of Rubeus through registering a new logon process. This rule needs the EventID 4611, which can be configured through Group Policies (Audit Security System Extension)

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SELinux Disabling

An attacker can disable SELinux to make workstation or server compromise easier as it disables several protections.

  • Effort: intermediate
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
SSH Authorized Key Alteration

The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision.

  • Effort: advanced
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
SeEnableDelagationPrivilege Granted To User Or Machine In Active Directory

Detects the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory granted to a user of a computer, it would allow control of other AD user objects

  • Effort: elementary
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: advanced
Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: advanced
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to create and list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Sliver DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing

  • Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: advanced
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Stop Backup Services

Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: master
Successful Overpass The Hash Attempt

Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool

Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP

Detects a code page switch in command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern

Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Hangul Word Processor Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File

Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage

catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries

Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Sysmon Windows File Block Executable

Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.

  • Effort: master
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: advanced
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced
Trickbot Malware Activity

Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
TrustedInstaller Impersonation

The rule detects attempts to impersonate TrustedInstaller. TrustedInstaller rights could allow a threat actor to delete or modify protected file or create/delete/modify files in protected folders. This technique is used by threat actors to disable Windows Defender.

  • Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master
Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection

Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.

  • Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool

WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.

  • Effort: intermediate
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master
Webshell Execution W3WP Process

Detects possible webshell execution on Windows Servers which is usually a w3wp parent process with the user name DefaultAppPool.

  • Effort: advanced
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Deactivation Using PowerShell Script

Detects attempts to deactivate Windows Defender with PowerShell using ScriptBlockLogging.

  • Effort: master
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: advanced
Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: advanced
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Access tokens security identifiers are extracted from several events
Authentication logs audit logon events are examined in detail
DLL monitoring information about dlls are extracted from several events
File monitoring information about files are extracted from several events
Host network interface Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities
Loaded DLLs Sysmon events provide information on DLL loading
PowerShell logs Windows PowerShell logs are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up
Process command-line parameters Windows Security Auditing logs provide information about process creation
Process monitoring Windows Security Auditing logs are process tracking events
Process use of network Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities
Windows event logs events related to Windows Event logs shutdown or restart are analyzed
Windows Registry registry auditing events are examined in detail
WMI Objects Windows WMI Activity events are analyzed, and events related to WMI process too

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category process
Type info

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\":\"2023-01-31T18:02:52.597Z\",\"@version\":\"1\",\"agent\":{\"ephemeral_id\":\"379a53ae-f8df-4fb9-9968-382db61f6dda\",\"hostname\":\"vm204d\",\"id\":\"9ecce8bd-f6ab-41ac-9936-14f8c2c81242\",\"type\":\"winlogbeat\",\"version\":\"7.0.0\"},\"ecs\":{\"version\":\"1.0.0\"},\"event\":{\"action\":\"Filtering Platform Connection\",\"code\":5156,\"created\":\"2023-01-31T18:02:53.233Z\",\"kind\":\"event\"},\"host\":{\"architecture\":\"x86_64\",\"hostname\":\"vm204d\",\"id\":\"68884df7-2cc9-4c09-a619-e1ccce85ac4e\",\"name\":\"vm204d\",\"os\":{\"build\":\"20348.1487\",\"family\":\"windows\",\"kernel\":\"10.0.20348.1487 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\"name\":\"Windows Server 2022 Datacenter\",\"platform\":\"windows\",\"version\":\"10.0\"}},\"log\":{\"level\":\"information\"},\"message\":\"The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.\\n\\nApplication Information:\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t4\\n\\tApplication Name:\\tSystem\\n\\nNetwork Information:\\n\\tDirection:\\t\\tInbound\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t1.1.1.1\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t58499\\n\\tDestination Address:\\t192.168.240.196\\n\\tDestination Port:\\t\\t445\\n\\tProtocol:\\t\\t6\\n\\tInterface Index:\\t\\t9\\n\\nFilter Information:\\n\\tFilter Origin:\\t\\tUnknown\\n\\tFilter Run-Time ID:\\t71694\\n\\tLayer Name:\\t\\tReceive/Accept\\n\\tLayer Run-Time ID:\\t44\\n\\tRemote User ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\n\\tRemote Machine ID:\\tS-1-0-0\",\"tags\":[\"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"],\"type\":\"winlogbeat\",\"winlog\":{\"api\":\"wineventlog\",\"channel\":\"Security\",\"computer_name\":\"vm204d.example.org\",\"event_data\":{\"Application\":\"System\",\"DestAddress\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"DestPort\":\"445\",\"Direction\":\"%%14592\",\"FilterOrigin\":\"Unknown\",\"FilterRTID\":\"71694\",\"InterfaceIndex\":\"9\",\"LayerName\":\"%%14610\",\"LayerRTID\":\"44\",\"ProcessID\":\"4\",\"Protocol\":\"6\",\"RemoteMachineID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"RemoteUserID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SourceAddress\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"SourcePort\":\"58499\"},\"event_id\":5156,\"keywords\":[\"Audit Success\"],\"opcode\":\"Info\",\"process\":{\"pid\":4,\"thread\":{\"id\":1940}},\"provider_guid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\",\"provider_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"record_id\":614833249,\"task\":\"Filtering Platform Connection\",\"version\":1}}\n",
    "event": {
        "action": "Filtering Platform Connection",
        "code": "5156",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.\n\nApplication Information:\n\tProcess ID:\t\t4\n\tApplication Name:\tSystem\n\nNetwork Information:\n\tDirection:\t\tInbound\n\tSource Address:\t\t1.1.1.1\n\tSource Port:\t\t58499\n\tDestination Address:\t192.168.240.196\n\tDestination Port:\t\t445\n\tProtocol:\t\t6\n\tInterface Index:\t\t9\n\nFilter Information:\n\tFilter Origin:\t\tUnknown\n\tFilter Run-Time ID:\t71694\n\tLayer Name:\t\tReceive/Accept\n\tLayer Run-Time ID:\t44\n\tRemote User ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\n\tRemote Machine ID:\tS-1-0-0"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-31T18:02:52.597000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 5156,
        "properties": {
            "Application": "System",
            "DestAddress": "5.6.7.8",
            "DestPort": "445",
            "Direction": "%%14592",
            "FilterOrigin": "Unknown",
            "FilterRTID": "71694",
            "InterfaceIndex": "9",
            "LayerName": "%%14610",
            "LayerRTID": "44",
            "ProcessID": "4",
            "Protocol": "6",
            "RemoteMachineID": "S-1-0-0",
            "RemoteUserID": "S-1-0-0",
            "SourceAddress": "1.2.3.4",
            "SourcePort": "58499"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "379a53ae-f8df-4fb9-9968-382db61f6dda",
        "id": "9ecce8bd-f6ab-41ac-9936-14f8c2c81242",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "7.0.0"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "vm204d",
        "id": "68884df7-2cc9-4c09-a619-e1ccce85ac4e",
        "name": "vm204d",
        "os": {
            "build": "20348.1487",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.20348.1487 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
            "name": "Windows Server 2022 Datacenter",
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "vm204d"
        ]
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "vm204d.example.org",
        "event_id": "5156",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 4,
            "thread": {
                "id": 1940
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "614833249",
        "task": "Filtering Platform Connection",
        "version": 1
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\":\"2023-06-23T08:15:46.358Z\",\"ecs\":{\"version\":\"1.0.0\"},\"type\":\"winlogbeat\",\"tags\":[\"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"],\"agent\":{\"id\":\"c1e16f64-cfc4-4141-bdc0-71f2a0e45791\",\"ephemeral_id\":\"21a6bd0d-afb5-4e55-827e-5329797579a4\",\"hostname\":\"VM-FOO\",\"version\":\"7.0.0\",\"type\":\"winlogbeat\"},\"host\":{\"os\":{\"build\":\"14393.5921\",\"kernel\":\"10.0.14393.5921 (rs1_release.230504-1649)\",\"version\":\"10.0\",\"name\":\"Windows Server 2016 Datacenter\",\"family\":\"windows\",\"platform\":\"windows\"},\"id\":\"8ea16272-0ba2-4838-b321-1646a493a128\",\"hostname\":\"VM-FOO\",\"architecture\":\"x86_64\",\"name\":\"VM-FOO\"},\"winlog\":{\"process\":{\"pid\":756,\"thread\":{\"id\":13000}},\"event_data\":{\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x2374a6a43\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"TargetUserName\":\"FOO-FARM-ADMIN\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-776561741-920026266-725345543-12737\",\"TargetLinkedLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"ProcessId\":\"0x0\",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"Kerberos\",\"ImpersonationLevel\":\"%%1833\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{FBEAEF6D-F1DA-F8AD-A2B2-A3A9AAC706AD}\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"RestrictedAdminMode\":\"-\",\"VirtualAccount\":\"%%1843\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"WorkstationName\":\"-\",\"TargetOutboundDomainName\":\"-\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"FOOBAR.NET\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"ElevatedToken\":\"%%1842\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TargetOutboundUserName\":\"-\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Kerberos\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"IpPort\":\"-\"},\"activity_id\":\"{DBC05D38-994B-0003-395D-C0DB4B99D901}\",\"record_id\":131091844,\"provider_guid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"opcode\":\"Info\",\"keywords\":[\"Audit Success\"],\"provider_name\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"task\":\"Logon\",\"channel\":\"Security\",\"computer_name\":\"VM-FOO.FOOBAR.NET\",\"version\":2,\"event_id\":4624,\"api\":\"wineventlog\"},\"log\":{\"level\":\"information\"},\"event\":{\"code\":4624,\"kind\":\"event\",\"action\":\"Logon\",\"created\":\"2023-06-23T08:15:47.185Z\"},\"@version\":\"1\",\"message\":\"An account was successfully logged on.\\n\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\n\\nLogon Information:\\n\\tLogon Type:\\t\\t3\\n\\tRestricted Admin Mode:\\t-\\n\\tVirtual Account:\\t\\tNo\\n\\tElevated Token:\\t\\tYes\\n\\nImpersonation Level:\\t\\tImpersonation\\n\\nNew Logon:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-776561741-920026266-725345543-12737\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tFOO-FARM-ADMIN\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tFOOBAR.NET\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x2374A6A43\\n\\tLinked Logon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\n\\tNetwork Account Name:\\t-\\n\\tNetwork Account Domain:\\t-\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{FBEAEF6D-F1DA-F8AD-A2B2-A3A9AAC706AD}\\n\\nProcess Information:\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x0\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\t-\\n\\nNetwork Information:\\n\\tWorkstation Name:\\t-\\n\\tSource Network Address:\\t-\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t-\\n\\nDetailed Authentication Information:\\n\\tLogon Process:\\t\\tKerberos\\n\\tAuthentication Package:\\tKerberos\\n\\tTransited Services:\\t-\\n\\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\\t-\\n\\tKey Length:\\t\\t0\\n\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\\n\\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\\n\\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\\n\\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\\n\\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\\n\\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\\n\\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\\n\\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\\n\\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\\n\\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\\n\\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.\"}",
    "event": {
        "action": "authentication_network",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4624",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "An account was successfully logged on.\n\nSubject:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\n\nLogon Information:\n\tLogon Type:\t\t3\n\tRestricted Admin Mode:\t-\n\tVirtual Account:\t\tNo\n\tElevated Token:\t\tYes\n\nImpersonation Level:\t\tImpersonation\n\nNew Logon:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-776561741-920026266-725345543-12737\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOO-FARM-ADMIN\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tFOOBAR.NET\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x2374A6A43\n\tLinked Logon ID:\t\t0x0\n\tNetwork Account Name:\t-\n\tNetwork Account Domain:\t-\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{FBEAEF6D-F1DA-F8AD-A2B2-A3A9AAC706AD}\n\nProcess Information:\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x0\n\tProcess Name:\t\t-\n\nNetwork Information:\n\tWorkstation Name:\t-\n\tSource Network Address:\t-\n\tSource Port:\t\t-\n\nDetailed Authentication Information:\n\tLogon Process:\t\tKerberos\n\tAuthentication Package:\tKerberos\n\tTransited Services:\t-\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\t-\n\tKey Length:\t\t0\n\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\n\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\n\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\n\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\n\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\n\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\n\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\n\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-06-23T08:15:46.358000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4624,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AuthenticationPackageName": "Kerberos",
            "ElevatedToken": "%%1842",
            "ImpersonationLevel": "%%1833",
            "IpAddress": "-",
            "IpPort": "-",
            "KeyLength": "0",
            "LmPackageName": "-",
            "LogonGuid": "{FBEAEF6D-F1DA-F8AD-A2B2-A3A9AAC706AD}",
            "LogonProcessName": "Kerberos",
            "LogonType": "3",
            "ProcessId": "0x0",
            "ProcessName": "-",
            "RestrictedAdminMode": "-",
            "SubjectDomainName": "-",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
            "SubjectUserName": "-",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TargetDomainName": "FOOBAR.NET",
            "TargetLinkedLogonId": "0x0",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x2374a6a43",
            "TargetOutboundDomainName": "-",
            "TargetOutboundUserName": "-",
            "TargetUserName": "FOO-FARM-ADMIN",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-776561741-920026266-725345543-12737",
            "TransmittedServices": "-",
            "VirtualAccount": "%%1843",
            "WorkstationName": "-"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "21a6bd0d-afb5-4e55-827e-5329797579a4",
        "id": "c1e16f64-cfc4-4141-bdc0-71f2a0e45791",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "7.0.0"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "VM-FOO",
        "id": "8ea16272-0ba2-4838-b321-1646a493a128",
        "name": "VM-FOO",
        "os": {
            "build": "14393.5921",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.14393.5921 (rs1_release.230504-1649)",
            "name": "Windows Server 2016 Datacenter",
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "VM-FOO"
        ]
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "Kerberos"
            }
        },
        "client": {
            "name": "VM-FOO",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "name": "VM-FOO",
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-0-0",
        "target": {
            "domain": "FOOBAR.NET",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-776561741-920026266-725345543-12737",
            "name": "FOO-FARM-ADMIN"
        }
    },
    "winlog": {
        "activity_id": "{dbc05d38-994b-0003-395d-c0db4b99d901}",
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "VM-FOO.FOOBAR.NET",
        "event_id": "4624",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x0",
            "type": "Network"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 756,
            "thread": {
                "id": 13000
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "131091844",
        "task": "Logon",
        "version": 2
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n  \"fields.gdp-redis\": \"3\",\n  \"message\": \"File created:\\nRuleName: technique_id=T1047,technique_name=File System Permissions Weakness\\nUtcTime: 2023-10-19 11:22:01.885\\nProcessGuid: {abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\\nProcessId: 4504\\nImage: C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\\nTargetFilename: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WinBioDatabase\\\\ABCD1234-E5F6-1234-ABCD-0123456789EF.ABC~DE123abcde.TMP\\nCreationUtcTime: 2023-10-19 11:22:01.885\\nUser: USER\\\\Syst\u00e8me\",\n  \"fields\": {\n    \"gdp-version-winlogbeat\": 3.4,\n    \"gdp-sousparc\": \"prod\",\n    \"gdp-version\": \"2.8\",\n    \"gdp-parc\": \"defaut\",\n    \"gdp-config\": \"desktop\",\n    \"gdp-version-sysmon\": 15,\n    \"gdp-indice\": [\n      \"l-desk\",\n      \"l-desk\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"@version\": \"1\",\n  \"log\": {\n    \"level\": \"information\"\n  },\n  \"type\": \"R3\",\n  \"agent\": {\n    \"id\": \"001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01\",\n    \"ephemeral_id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9\",\n    \"name\": \"WB-DK-PC01234567\",\n    \"type\": \"winlogbeat\",\n    \"version\": \"8.8.2\"\n  },\n  \"event\": {\n    \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"action\": \"File created (rule: FileCreate)\",\n    \"created\": \"2023-10-19T11:22:03.054Z\",\n    \"kind\": \"event\",\n    \"code\": \"11\"\n  },\n  \"event_ingest_logstash\": \"2023-10-19T11:22:03.810843Z\",\n  \"fields.gdp-logstash\": \"6\",\n  \"winlog\": {\n    \"process\": {\n      \"thread\": {\n        \"id\": 7408\n      },\n      \"pid\": 4524\n    },\n    \"user\": {\n      \"name\": \"Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"type\": \"Well Known Group\",\n      \"identifier\": \"S-1-2-3\",\n      \"domain\": \"USER\"\n    },\n    \"event_id\": \"11\",\n    \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n    \"record_id\": 5103594,\n    \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"version\": 2,\n    \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n    \"task\": \"File created (rule: FileCreate)\",\n    \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n    \"event_data\": {\n      \"TargetFilename\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WinBioDatabase\\\\ABCD1234-E5F6-1234-ABCD-0123456789EF.ABC~DE123abcde.TMP\",\n      \"UtcTime\": \"2023-10-19 11:22:01.885\",\n      \"User\": \"USER\\\\Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"ProcessId\": \"4504\",\n      \"ProcessGuid\": \"{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\",\n      \"Image\": \"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\",\n      \"CreationUtcTime\": \"2023-10-19 11:22:01.885\",\n      \"RuleName\": \"technique_id=T1047,technique_name=File System Permissions Weakness\"\n    },\n    \"computer_name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"opcode\": \"Informations\"\n  },\n  \"ecs\": {\n    \"version\": \"8.0.0\"\n  },\n  \"host\": {\n    \"id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45\",\n    \"name\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"mac\": [\n      \"00:11:22:33:44:55\",\n      \"AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\",\n      \"A0:B1:C2:D3:E4:F5\",\n      \"66:77:88:99:00:11\",\n      \"01:23:45:67:89:AB\",\n      \"AB:CD:EF:01:23:45\"\n    ],\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"os\": {\n      \"name\": \"Windows 10 Enterprise\",\n      \"platform\": \"windows\",\n      \"version\": \"10.0\",\n      \"kernel\": \"10.0.19041.3448 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n      \"build\": \"19045.3448\",\n      \"type\": \"windows\",\n      \"family\": \"windows\"\n    },\n    \"ip\": [\n      \"a123::b234:c345:d456:e567\",\n      \"8.8.8.8\",\n      \"abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd\",\n      \"1.2.3.4\",\n      \"a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:0123:abcd\",\n      \"10.20.30.40\",\n      \"aabb::ccdd:eeff:0011:2233\",\n      \"0.0.0.0\",\n      \"1122::3344:5566:7788:9900\",\n      \"5.6.7.8\",\n      \"0011::2233:4455:6677:8899\",\n      \"40.30.20.10\"\n    ],\n    \"architecture\": \"x86_64\"\n  },\n  \"@timestamp\": \"2023-10-19T11:22:01.893Z\"\n}",
    "event": {
        "action": "File created (rule: FileCreate)",
        "code": "11",
        "kind": "event",
        "original": "File created:\nRuleName: technique_id=T1047,technique_name=File System Permissions Weakness\nUtcTime: 2023-10-19 11:22:01.885\nProcessGuid: {abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\nProcessId: 4504\nImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetFilename: C:\\Windows\\System32\\WinBioDatabase\\ABCD1234-E5F6-1234-ABCD-0123456789EF.ABC~DE123abcde.TMP\nCreationUtcTime: 2023-10-19 11:22:01.885\nUser: USER\\Syst\u00e8me",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-10-19T11:22:01.893000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 11,
        "properties": {
            "CreationUtcTime": "2023-10-19 11:22:01.885",
            "Image": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
            "ProcessGuid": "{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}",
            "ProcessId": "4504",
            "RuleName": "technique_id=T1047,technique_name=File System Permissions Weakness",
            "TargetFilename": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WinBioDatabase\\ABCD1234-E5F6-1234-ABCD-0123456789EF.ABC~DE123abcde.TMP",
            "User": "USER\\Syst\u00e8me",
            "UtcTime": "2023-10-19 11:22:01.885"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9",
        "id": "001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01",
        "name": "WB-DK-PC01234567",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "8.8.2"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WinBioDatabase",
        "drive_letter": "C",
        "extension": "TMP",
        "name": "ABCD1234-E5F6-1234-ABCD-0123456789EF.ABC~DE123abcde.TMP",
        "path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WinBioDatabase\\ABCD1234-E5F6-1234-ABCD-0123456789EF.ABC~DE123abcde.TMP"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "PC01234567",
        "id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45",
        "ip": [
            "0.0.0.0",
            "1.2.3.4",
            "10.20.30.40",
            "1122::3344:5566:7788:9900",
            "11::2233:4455:6677:8899",
            "40.30.20.10",
            "5.6.7.8",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
            "a123::b234:c345:d456:e567",
            "aabb::ccdd:eeff:11:2233",
            "abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00:11:22:33:44:55",
            "01:23:45:67:89:AB",
            "66:77:88:99:00:11",
            "A0:B1:C2:D3:E4:F5",
            "AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF",
            "AB:CD:EF:01:23:45"
        ],
        "name": "PC01234567",
        "os": {
            "build": "19045.3448",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.19041.3448 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
            "name": "Windows 10 Enterprise",
            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "process": {
        "executable": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
        "name": "svchost.exe"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PC01234567"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "0.0.0.0",
            "1.2.3.4",
            "10.20.30.40",
            "1122::3344:5566:7788:9900",
            "11::2233:4455:6677:8899",
            "40.30.20.10",
            "5.6.7.8",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
            "a123::b234:c345:d456:e567",
            "aabb::ccdd:eeff:11:2233",
            "abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd"
        ]
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "computer_name": "PC01234567.company.com",
        "event_id": "11",
        "opcode": "Informations",
        "process": {
            "pid": 4524,
            "thread": {
                "id": 7408
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "record_id": "5103594",
        "task": "File created (rule: FileCreate)",
        "user": {
            "domain": "USER",
            "identifier": "S-1-2-3",
            "name": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "type": "Well Known Group"
        },
        "version": 2
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n  \"winlog\": {\n    \"event_data\": {\n      \"Product\": \"Microsoft Teams\",\n      \"RuleName\": \"technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading\",\n      \"CommandLine\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\resources\\\\app.test\\\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1 --num-raster-threads=3 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=89 --launch-time-ticks=212569133487 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=6672 --field-trial-handle=1780,i,5843992499021049077,4525004813667802135,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1\",\n      \"FileVersion\": \"1.6.00.27573\",\n      \"ParentCommandLine\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" \",\n      \"LogonGuid\": \"{abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}\",\n      \"ParentProcessGuid\": \"{10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}\",\n      \"Hashes\": \"SHA1=68D25B5F5A57CF5DC0D63644338C04EA906D472B,MD5=89B717809A5A49D19E7E06746982BF0B,SHA256=2024533463DF3C945A74C774858285915FFB4E083031B51B8135BBBF5E8FC5EE,IMPHASH=00590C8FDC1F372F8DB1D3F49D342D34\",\n      \"User\": \"COMPANY\\\\asmithee\",\n      \"ProcessId\": \"4980\",\n      \"LogonId\": \"0x1234abc\",\n      \"ProcessGuid\": \"{10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}\",\n      \"Description\": \"Microsoft Teams\",\n      \"OriginalFileName\": \"Teams.exe\",\n      \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n      \"CurrentDirectory\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\\",\n      \"ParentImage\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n      \"IntegrityLevel\": \"Low\",\n      \"ParentProcessId\": \"1124\",\n      \"Company\": \"Microsoft Corporation\",\n      \"TerminalSessionId\": \"1\",\n      \"UtcTime\": \"2023-10-17 12:03:14.183\",\n      \"ParentUser\": \"COMPANY\\\\asmithee\"\n    },\n    \"task\": \"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\",\n    \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n    \"user\": {\n      \"name\": \"Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"identifier\": \"S-1-2-3\",\n      \"type\": \"Well Known Group\",\n      \"domain\": \"Domain\"\n    },\n    \"event_id\": \"1\",\n    \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n    \"process\": {\n      \"thread\": {\n        \"id\": 5760\n      },\n      \"pid\": 3852\n    },\n    \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n    \"version\": 5,\n    \"computer_name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"record_id\": 9359683,\n    \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"opcode\": \"Informations\"\n  },\n  \"message\": \"Process Create:\\nRuleName: technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading\\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 12:03:14.183\\nProcessGuid: {10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}\\nProcessId: 4980\\nImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\nFileVersion: 1.6.00.27573\\nDescription: Microsoft Teams\\nProduct: Microsoft Teams\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\nOriginalFileName: Teams.exe\\nCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\resources\\\\app.test\\\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1 --num-raster-threads=3 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=89 --launch-time-ticks=212569133487 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=6672 --field-trial-handle=1780,i,5843992499021049077,4525004813667802135,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\\\nUser: COMPANY\\\\asmithee\\nLogonGuid: {abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}\\nLogonId: 0x1234abc\\nTerminalSessionId: 1\\nIntegrityLevel: Low\\nHashes: SHA1=68D25B5F5A57CF5DC0D63644338C04EA906D472B,MD5=89B717809A5A49D19E7E06746982BF0B,SHA256=2024533463DF3C945A74C774858285915FFB4E083031B51B8135BBBF5E8FC5EE,IMPHASH=00590C8FDC1F372F8DB1D3F49D342D34\\nParentProcessGuid: {10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}\\nParentProcessId: 1124\\nParentImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\nParentCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" \\nParentUser: COMPANY\\\\asmithee\",\n  \"event_ingest_logstash\": \"2023-10-17T12:03:18.802068Z\",\n  \"fields.gdp-logstash\": \"6\",\n  \"event\": {\n    \"kind\": \"event\",\n    \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"created\": \"2023-10-17T12:03:17.092Z\",\n    \"code\": \"1\",\n    \"action\": \"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\"\n  },\n  \"@version\": \"1\",\n  \"log\": {\n    \"level\": \"information\"\n  },\n  \"ecs\": {\n    \"version\": \"8.0.0\"\n  },\n  \"@timestamp\": \"2023-10-17T12:03:15.436Z\",\n  \"fields.gdp-redis\": \"2\",\n  \"fields\": {\n    \"gdp-parc\": \"defaut\",\n    \"gdp-version-winlogbeat\": 3.4,\n    \"gdp-indice\": [\n      \"l-desk\",\n      \"l-desk\"\n    ],\n    \"gdp-sousparc\": \"prod\",\n    \"gdp-version\": \"2.8\",\n    \"gdp-config\": \"desktop\",\n    \"gdp-version-sysmon\": 15\n  },\n  \"host\": {\n    \"os\": {\n      \"platform\": \"windows\",\n      \"name\": \"Windows 10 Enterprise\",\n      \"version\": \"10.0\",\n      \"kernel\": \"10.0.19041.3448 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n      \"build\": \"19045.3448\",\n      \"family\": \"windows\",\n      \"type\": \"windows\"\n    },\n    \"mac\": [\n      \"A1-B2-C3-D4-E5-F6\"\n    ],\n    \"name\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45\",\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"architecture\": \"x86_64\",\n    \"ip\": [\n      \"a123::b234:c345:d456:e567\",\n      \"8.8.8.8\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"type\": \"R2\",\n  \"agent\": {\n    \"id\": \"01234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01\",\n    \"name\": \"WB-DK-PC01234567\",\n    \"version\": \"8.8.2\",\n    \"ephemeral_id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9\",\n    \"type\": \"winlogbeat\"\n  }\n}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
        "code": "1",
        "kind": "event",
        "original": "Process Create:\nRuleName: technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 12:03:14.183\nProcessGuid: {10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}\nProcessId: 4980\nImage: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\nFileVersion: 1.6.00.27573\nDescription: Microsoft Teams\nProduct: Microsoft Teams\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\nOriginalFileName: Teams.exe\nCommandLine: \"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Teams\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\resources\\app.test\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1 --num-raster-threads=3 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=89 --launch-time-ticks=212569133487 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=6672 --field-trial-handle=1780,i,5843992499021049077,4525004813667802135,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\\nUser: COMPANY\\asmithee\nLogonGuid: {abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}\nLogonId: 0x1234abc\nTerminalSessionId: 1\nIntegrityLevel: Low\nHashes: SHA1=68D25B5F5A57CF5DC0D63644338C04EA906D472B,MD5=89B717809A5A49D19E7E06746982BF0B,SHA256=2024533463DF3C945A74C774858285915FFB4E083031B51B8135BBBF5E8FC5EE,IMPHASH=00590C8FDC1F372F8DB1D3F49D342D34\nParentProcessGuid: {10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}\nParentProcessId: 1124\nParentImage: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\nParentCommandLine: \"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" \nParentUser: COMPANY\\asmithee",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-10-17T12:03:15.436000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 1,
        "properties": {
            "CommandLine": "\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Teams\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\resources\\app.test\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1 --num-raster-threads=3 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=89 --launch-time-ticks=212569133487 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=6672 --field-trial-handle=1780,i,5843992499021049077,4525004813667802135,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1",
            "Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "CurrentDirectory": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\",
            "Description": "Microsoft Teams",
            "FileVersion": "1.6.00.27573",
            "Hashes": "SHA1=68D25B5F5A57CF5DC0D63644338C04EA906D472B,MD5=89B717809A5A49D19E7E06746982BF0B,SHA256=2024533463DF3C945A74C774858285915FFB4E083031B51B8135BBBF5E8FC5EE,IMPHASH=00590C8FDC1F372F8DB1D3F49D342D34",
            "Image": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
            "IntegrityLevel": "Low",
            "LogonGuid": "{abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}",
            "LogonId": "0x1234abc",
            "OriginalFileName": "Teams.exe",
            "ParentCommandLine": "\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" ",
            "ParentImage": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
            "ParentProcessGuid": "{10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}",
            "ParentProcessId": "1124",
            "ParentUser": "COMPANY\\asmithee",
            "ProcessGuid": "{10fecdba-1234-abcd-0a1b-000000000000}",
            "ProcessId": "4980",
            "Product": "Microsoft Teams",
            "RuleName": "technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading",
            "TerminalSessionId": "1",
            "User": "COMPANY\\asmithee",
            "UtcTime": "2023-10-17 12:03:14.183"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9",
        "id": "01234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01",
        "name": "WB-DK-PC01234567",
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    },
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        "hostname": "PC01234567",
        "id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45",
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        ],
        "name": "PC01234567",
        "os": {
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            "kernel": "10.0.19041.3448 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
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            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "process": {
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        "executable": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
        "hash": {
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            "sha1": "68d25b5f5a57cf5dc0d63644338c04ea906d472b",
            "sha256": "2024533463df3c945a74c774858285915ffb4e083031b51b8135bbbf5e8fc5ee"
        },
        "name": "Teams.exe",
        "parent": {
            "executable": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
            "name": "Teams.exe"
        },
        "pe": {
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            "original_file_name": "Teams.exe"
        },
        "working_directory": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\"
    },
    "related": {
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            "89b717809a5a49d19e7e06746982bf0b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
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        ],
        "ip": [
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        ]
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "computer_name": "PC01234567.company.com",
        "event_id": "1",
        "opcode": "Informations",
        "process": {
            "pid": 3852,
            "thread": {
                "id": 5760
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "record_id": "9359683",
        "task": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
        "user": {
            "domain": "Domain",
            "identifier": "S-1-2-3",
            "name": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "type": "Well Known Group"
        },
        "version": 5
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n  \"winlog\": {\n    \"event_data\": {\n      \"IntegrityLevel\": \"Low\",\n      \"Product\": \"Microsoft Teams\",\n      \"Description\": \"Microsoft Teams\",\n      \"LogonId\": \"0x1234abc\",\n      \"TerminalSessionId\": \"1\",\n      \"FileVersion\": \"1.6.00.27573\",\n      \"LogonGuid\": \"{abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}\",\n      \"Company\": \"Microsoft Corporation\",\n      \"ParentUser\": \"COMPANY\\\\asmithee\"\n    },\n    \"task\": \"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\",\n    \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n    \"user\": {\n      \"name\": \"Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"identifier\": \"S-1-2-3\",\n      \"type\": \"User\",\n      \"domain\": \"DOMAIN\"\n    },\n    \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n    \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n    \"process\": {\n      \"thread\": {\n        \"id\": 7248\n      },\n      \"pid\": 5624\n    },\n    \"event_id\": \"1\",\n    \"version\": 5,\n    \"computer_name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"record_id\": 67177799,\n    \"opcode\": \"Informations\",\n    \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n  },\n  \"message\": \"Process Create:\\nRuleName: technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading\\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 12:05:25.091\\nProcessGuid: {1c03cf6e-7885-652e-190c-00000000fa00}\\nProcessId: 27804\\nImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\nFileVersion: 1.6.00.27573\\nDescription: Microsoft Teams\\nProduct: Microsoft Teams\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\nOriginalFileName: Teams.exe\\nCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\resources\\\\app.test\\\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1.25 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=196 --launch-time-ticks=17880973283 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2520 --field-trial-handle=1808,i,7578868639254466484,17758186584081941877,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\\\nUser: COMPANY\\\\asmithee\\nLogonGuid: {abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}\\nLogonId: 0x1234ABC\\nTerminalSessionId: 1\\nIntegrityLevel: Low\\nHashes: SHA1=68D25B5F5A57CF5DC0D63644338C04EA906D472B,MD5=89B717809A5A49D19E7E06746982BF0B,SHA256=2024533463DF3C945A74C774858285915FFB4E083031B51B8135BBBF5E8FC5EE,IMPHASH=00590C8FDC1F372F8DB1D3F49D342D34\\nParentProcessGuid: {1c03cf6e-331c-652e-b001-00000000fa00}\\nParentProcessId: 17772\\nParentImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\nParentCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" --system-initiated\\nParentUser: COMPANY\\\\asmithee\",\n  \"hash\": {\n    \"sha256\": \"2024533463df3c945a74c774858285915ffb4e083031b51b8135bbbf5e8fc5ee\",\n    \"sha1\": \"68d25b5f5a57cf5dc0d63644338c04ea906d472b\",\n    \"md5\": \"89b717809a5a49d19e7e06746982bf0b\",\n    \"imphash\": \"00590c8fdc1f372f8db1d3f49d342d34\"\n  },\n  \"event_ingest_logstash\": \"2023-10-17T12:05:27.363678Z\",\n  \"fields.gdp-logstash\": \"6\",\n  \"user\": {\n    \"name\": \"asmithee\",\n    \"id\": \"S-1-2-3\",\n    \"domain\": \"COMPANY\"\n  },\n  \"event\": {\n    \"created\": \"2023-10-17T12:05:26.268Z\",\n    \"kind\": \"event\",\n    \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"category\": [\n      \"process\"\n    ],\n    \"code\": \"1\",\n    \"module\": \"sysmon\",\n    \"action\": \"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\",\n    \"type\": [\n      \"start\",\n      \"process_start\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"process\": {\n    \"name\": \"Teams.exe\",\n    \"args\": [\n      \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n      \"--type=renderer\",\n      \"--enable-wer\",\n      \"--user-data-dir=C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\",\n      \"--ms-teams-less-cors=522133263\",\n      \"--app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams\",\n      \"--app-path=C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\resources\\\\app.test\",\n      \"--autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required\",\n      \"--disable-background-timer-throttling\",\n      \"--lang=fr\",\n      \"--device-scale-factor=1.25\",\n      \"--num-raster-threads=4\",\n      \"--enable-main-frame-before-activation\",\n      \"--renderer-client-id=196\",\n      \"--launch-time-ticks=17880973283\",\n      \"--mojo-platform-channel-handle=2520\",\n      \"--field-trial-handle=1808,i,7578868639254466484,17758186584081941877,131072\",\n      \"--enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker\",\n      \"--disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand\",\n      \"/prefetch:1\"\n    ],\n    \"hash\": {\n      \"sha256\": \"2024533463df3c945a74c774858285915ffb4e083031b51b8135bbbf5e8fc5ee\",\n      \"sha1\": \"68d25b5f5a57cf5dc0d63644338c04ea906d472b\",\n      \"md5\": \"89b717809a5a49d19e7e06746982bf0b\"\n    },\n    \"entity_id\": \"{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\",\n    \"command_line\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Roaming\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\resources\\\\app.test\\\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1.25 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=196 --launch-time-ticks=17880973283 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2520 --field-trial-handle=1808,i,7578868639254466484,17758186584081941877,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1\",\n    \"pe\": {\n      \"description\": \"Microsoft Teams\",\n      \"company\": \"Microsoft Corporation\",\n      \"file_version\": \"1.6.00.27573\",\n      \"imphash\": \"00590c8fdc1f372f8db1d3f49d342d34\",\n      \"original_file_name\": \"Teams.exe\",\n      \"product\": \"Microsoft Teams\"\n    },\n    \"parent\": {\n      \"name\": \"Teams.exe\",\n      \"args\": [\n        \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n        \"--system-initiated\"\n      ],\n      \"entity_id\": \"{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\",\n      \"command_line\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\\" --system-initiated\",\n      \"pid\": 17772,\n      \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\"\n    },\n    \"pid\": 27804,\n    \"working_directory\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\\",\n    \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\"\n  },\n  \"@version\": \"1\",\n  \"log\": {\n    \"level\": \"information\"\n  },\n  \"rule\": {\n    \"name\": \"technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading\"\n  },\n  \"related\": {\n    \"hash\": [\n      \"68d25b5f5a57cf5dc0d63644338c04ea906d472b\",\n      \"89b717809a5a49d19e7e06746982bf0b\",\n      \"2024533463df3c945a74c774858285915ffb4e083031b51b8135bbbf5e8fc5ee\",\n      \"00590c8fdc1f372f8db1d3f49d342d34\"\n    ],\n    \"user\": \"asmithee\"\n  },\n  \"ecs\": {\n    \"version\": \"1.12.0\"\n  },\n  \"@timestamp\": \"2023-10-17T12:05:25.091Z\",\n  \"fields\": {\n    \"gdp-version-sysmon\": 13.33,\n    \"gdp-version-winlogbeat\": 2.8,\n    \"gdp-indice\": \"l-desk\",\n    \"gdp-sousparc\": \"prod\",\n    \"gdp-config\": \"desktop\",\n    \"gdp-version\": \"1.16\",\n    \"gdp-parc\": \"defaut\"\n  },\n  \"host\": {\n    \"id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45\",\n    \"name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"mac\": [\n      \"00:11:22:33:44:55\",\n      \"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\",\n      \"a0:b1:c2:d3:e4:f5\",\n      \"66:77:88:99:00:11\",\n      \"01:23:45:67:89:ab\",\n      \"ab:cd:ef:01:23:45\"\n    ],\n    \"os\": {\n      \"platform\": \"windows\",\n      \"name\": \"Windows 10 Enterprise\",\n      \"version\": \"10.0\",\n      \"kernel\": \"10.0.19041.3570 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n      \"build\": \"19044.3570\",\n      \"type\": \"windows\",\n      \"family\": \"windows\"\n    },\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"architecture\": \"x86_64\",\n    \"ip\": [\n      \"a123::b234:c345:d456:e567\",\n      \"8.8.8.8\",\n      \"abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd\",\n      \"1.2.3.4\",\n      \"a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:0123:abcd\",\n      \"10.20.30.40\",\n      \"aabb::ccdd:eeff:0011:2233\",\n      \"0.0.0.0\",\n      \"1122::3344:5566:7788:9900\",\n      \"5.6.7.8\",\n      \"0011::2233:4455:6677:8899\",\n      \"40.30.20.10\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"tags\": [\n    \"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"\n  ],\n  \"agent\": {\n    \"id\": \"001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01\",\n    \"name\": \"WB-DK-PC01234567\",\n    \"version\": \"7.17.1\",\n    \"ephemeral_id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9\",\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"type\": \"winlogbeat\"\n  }\n}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
        "category": [
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        ],
        "code": "1",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "sysmon",
        "original": "Process Create:\nRuleName: technique_id=T1036,technique_name=Masquerading\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 12:05:25.091\nProcessGuid: {1c03cf6e-7885-652e-190c-00000000fa00}\nProcessId: 27804\nImage: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\nFileVersion: 1.6.00.27573\nDescription: Microsoft Teams\nProduct: Microsoft Teams\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\nOriginalFileName: Teams.exe\nCommandLine: \"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Teams\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\resources\\app.test\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1.25 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=196 --launch-time-ticks=17880973283 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2520 --field-trial-handle=1808,i,7578868639254466484,17758186584081941877,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\\nUser: COMPANY\\asmithee\nLogonGuid: {abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}\nLogonId: 0x1234ABC\nTerminalSessionId: 1\nIntegrityLevel: Low\nHashes: SHA1=68D25B5F5A57CF5DC0D63644338C04EA906D472B,MD5=89B717809A5A49D19E7E06746982BF0B,SHA256=2024533463DF3C945A74C774858285915FFB4E083031B51B8135BBBF5E8FC5EE,IMPHASH=00590C8FDC1F372F8DB1D3F49D342D34\nParentProcessGuid: {1c03cf6e-331c-652e-b001-00000000fa00}\nParentProcessId: 17772\nParentImage: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\nParentCommandLine: \"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" --system-initiated\nParentUser: COMPANY\\asmithee",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "type": [
            "process_start",
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-10-17T12:05:25.091000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 1,
        "properties": {
            "Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "Description": "Microsoft Teams",
            "FileVersion": "1.6.00.27573",
            "IntegrityLevel": "Low",
            "LogonGuid": "{abcdef01-b1c2-d3c4-1234-123400000000}",
            "LogonId": "0x1234abc",
            "ParentUser": "COMPANY\\asmithee",
            "Product": "Microsoft Teams",
            "TerminalSessionId": "1"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9",
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        "type": "winlogbeat",
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        "hostname": "PC01234567",
        "id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45",
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            "40.30.20.10",
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            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
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            "platform": "windows",
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        }
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            "--device-scale-factor=1.25",
            "--disable-background-timer-throttling",
            "--disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand",
            "--enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker",
            "--enable-main-frame-before-activation",
            "--enable-wer",
            "--field-trial-handle=1808,i,7578868639254466484,17758186584081941877,131072",
            "--lang=fr",
            "--launch-time-ticks=17880973283",
            "--mojo-platform-channel-handle=2520",
            "--ms-teams-less-cors=522133263",
            "--num-raster-threads=4",
            "--renderer-client-id=196",
            "--type=renderer",
            "--user-data-dir=C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Teams",
            "/prefetch:1",
            "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe"
        ],
        "command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" --type=renderer --enable-wer --user-data-dir=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Teams\" --ms-teams-less-cors=522133263 --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.Teams.Teams --app-path=\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\resources\\app.test\" --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-background-timer-throttling --lang=fr --device-scale-factor=1.25 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --renderer-client-id=196 --launch-time-ticks=17880973283 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2520 --field-trial-handle=1808,i,7578868639254466484,17758186584081941877,131072 --enable-features=ContextBridgeMutability,SharedArrayBuffer,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker,WinUseHybridSpellChecker --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,ExtraCookieValidityChecks,ForcedColors,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,WinRetrieveSuggestionsOnlyOnDemand /prefetch:1",
        "entity_id": "{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}",
        "executable": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
        "hash": {
            "md5": "89b717809a5a49d19e7e06746982bf0b",
            "sha1": "68d25b5f5a57cf5dc0d63644338c04ea906d472b",
            "sha256": "2024533463df3c945a74c774858285915ffb4e083031b51b8135bbbf5e8fc5ee"
        },
        "name": "Teams.exe",
        "parent": {
            "args": [
                "--system-initiated",
                "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe"
            ],
            "command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\" --system-initiated",
            "entity_id": "{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}",
            "executable": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
            "name": "Teams.exe",
            "pid": 17772
        },
        "pe": {
            "company": "Microsoft Corporation",
            "description": "Microsoft Teams",
            "file_version": "1.6.00.27573",
            "imphash": "00590c8fdc1f372f8db1d3f49d342d34",
            "original_file_name": "Teams.exe",
            "product": "Microsoft Teams"
        },
        "pid": 27804,
        "working_directory": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "2024533463df3c945a74c774858285915ffb4e083031b51b8135bbbf5e8fc5ee",
            "68d25b5f5a57cf5dc0d63644338c04ea906d472b",
            "89b717809a5a49d19e7e06746982bf0b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "PC01234567"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "0.0.0.0",
            "1.2.3.4",
            "10.20.30.40",
            "1122::3344:5566:7788:9900",
            "11::2233:4455:6677:8899",
            "40.30.20.10",
            "5.6.7.8",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
            "a123::b234:c345:d456:e567",
            "aabb::ccdd:eeff:11:2233",
            "abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd"
        ],
        "user": [
            "asmithee"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "COMPANY",
        "id": "S-1-2-3",
        "name": "asmithee"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "computer_name": "PC01234567.company.com",
        "event_id": "1",
        "opcode": "Informations",
        "process": {
            "pid": 5624,
            "thread": {
                "id": 7248
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "record_id": "67177799",
        "task": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
        "user": {
            "domain": "DOMAIN",
            "identifier": "S-1-2-3",
            "name": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "type": "User"
        },
        "version": 5
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n  \"winlog\": {\n    \"event_data\": {\n      \"TargetObject\": \"target\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\bam\\\\State\\\\UserSettings\\\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n      \"Details\": \"Binary Data\",\n      \"User\": \"COMPANY\\\\asmithee\",\n      \"EventType\": \"SetValue\"\n    },\n    \"task\": \"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\n    \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n    \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n    \"user\": {\n      \"name\": \"Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"identifier\": \"S-1-2-3\",\n      \"type\": \"User\",\n      \"domain\": \"DOMAIN\"\n    },\n    \"event_id\": \"13\",\n    \"process\": {\n      \"thread\": {\n        \"id\": 7248\n      },\n      \"pid\": 5624\n    },\n    \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n    \"version\": 2,\n    \"computer_name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"record_id\": 67193809,\n    \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"opcode\": \"Informations\"\n  },\n  \"message\": \"Registry value set:\\nRuleName: technique_id=T1543,technique_name=Service Creation\\nEventType: SetValue\\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 14:01:17.244\\nProcessGuid: {abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\\nProcessId: 17772\\nImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\nTargetObject: target\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\bam\\\\State\\\\UserSettings\\\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\nDetails: Binary Data\\nUser: COMPANY\\\\asmithee\",\n  \"event_ingest_logstash\": \"2023-10-17T14:01:18.423152Z\",\n  \"fields.gdp-logstash\": \"6\",\n  \"event\": {\n    \"created\": \"2023-10-17T14:01:17.717Z\",\n    \"kind\": \"event\",\n    \"category\": [\n      \"configuration\",\n      \"registry\"\n    ],\n    \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"action\": \"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\n    \"module\": \"sysmon\",\n    \"code\": \"13\",\n    \"type\": [\n      \"change\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"process\": {\n    \"name\": \"Teams.exe\",\n    \"pid\": 17772,\n    \"entity_id\": \"{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\",\n    \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\"\n  },\n  \"@version\": \"1\",\n  \"log\": {\n    \"level\": \"information\"\n  },\n  \"rule\": {\n    \"name\": \"technique_id=T1543,technique_name=Service Creation\"\n  },\n  \"ecs\": {\n    \"version\": \"1.12.0\"\n  },\n  \"@timestamp\": \"2023-10-17T14:01:17.244Z\",\n  \"fields\": {\n    \"gdp-version-sysmon\": 13.33,\n    \"gdp-version-winlogbeat\": 2.8,\n    \"gdp-indice\": \"l-desk\",\n    \"gdp-sousparc\": \"prod\",\n    \"gdp-version\": \"1.16\",\n    \"gdp-config\": \"desktop\",\n    \"gdp-parc\": \"defaut\"\n  },\n  \"host\": {\n    \"name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"mac\": [\n      \"00:11:22:33:44:55\",\n      \"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\",\n      \"a0:b1:c2:d3:e4:f5\",\n      \"66:77:88:99:00:11\",\n      \"01:23:45:67:89:ab\",\n      \"ab:cd:ef:01:23:45\"\n    ],\n    \"os\": {\n      \"name\": \"Windows 10 Enterprise\",\n      \"platform\": \"windows\",\n      \"version\": \"10.0\",\n      \"kernel\": \"10.0.19041.3570 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n      \"build\": \"19044.3570\",\n      \"type\": \"windows\",\n      \"family\": \"windows\"\n    },\n    \"id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45\",\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"architecture\": \"x86_64\",\n    \"ip\": [\n      \"a123::b234:c345:d456:e567\",\n      \"8.8.8.8\",\n      \"abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd\",\n      \"1.2.3.4\",\n      \"a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:0123:abcd\",\n      \"10.20.30.40\",\n      \"aabb::ccdd:eeff:0011:2233\",\n      \"0.0.0.0\",\n      \"1122::3344:5566:7788:9900\",\n      \"5.6.7.8\",\n      \"0011::2233:4455:6677:8899\",\n      \"40.30.20.10\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"registry\": {\n    \"key\": \"System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\bam\\\\State\\\\UserSettings\\\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n    \"path\": \"target\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\bam\\\\State\\\\UserSettings\\\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\asmithee\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\",\n    \"hive\": \"target\",\n    \"value\": \"Teams.exe\"\n  },\n  \"tags\": [\n    \"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"\n  ],\n  \"agent\": {\n    \"id\": \"001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01\",\n    \"name\": \"WB-DK-PC01234567\",\n    \"version\": \"7.17.1\",\n    \"ephemeral_id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9\",\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"type\": \"winlogbeat\"\n  }\n}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
        "category": [
            "configuration",
            "registry"
        ],
        "code": "13",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "sysmon",
        "original": "Registry value set:\nRuleName: technique_id=T1543,technique_name=Service Creation\nEventType: SetValue\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 14:01:17.244\nProcessGuid: {abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\nProcessId: 17772\nImage: C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\nTargetObject: target\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\nDetails: Binary Data\nUser: COMPANY\\asmithee",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-10-17T14:01:17.244000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 13,
        "properties": {
            "Details": "Binary Data",
            "EventType": "SetValue",
            "TargetObject": "target\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
            "User": "COMPANY\\asmithee"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9",
        "id": "001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01",
        "name": "WB-DK-PC01234567",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "7.17.1"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "PC01234567",
        "id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45",
        "ip": [
            "0.0.0.0",
            "1.2.3.4",
            "10.20.30.40",
            "1122::3344:5566:7788:9900",
            "11::2233:4455:6677:8899",
            "40.30.20.10",
            "5.6.7.8",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
            "a123::b234:c345:d456:e567",
            "aabb::ccdd:eeff:11:2233",
            "abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00:11:22:33:44:55",
            "01:23:45:67:89:ab",
            "66:77:88:99:00:11",
            "a0:b1:c2:d3:e4:f5",
            "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff",
            "ab:cd:ef:01:23:45"
        ],
        "name": "PC01234567.company.com",
        "os": {
            "build": "19044.3570",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.19041.3570 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
            "name": "Windows 10 Enterprise",
            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "process": {
        "entity_id": "{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}",
        "executable": "C:\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
        "name": "Teams.exe",
        "pid": 17772
    },
    "registry": {
        "data": {
            "strings": "Binary Data"
        },
        "hive": "target",
        "key": "target\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current",
        "path": "target\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings\\S-1-2-3-4-012345678-123456789-876543210-12345\\\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\asmithee\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
        "value": "Teams.exe"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PC01234567"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "0.0.0.0",
            "1.2.3.4",
            "10.20.30.40",
            "1122::3344:5566:7788:9900",
            "11::2233:4455:6677:8899",
            "40.30.20.10",
            "5.6.7.8",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
            "a123::b234:c345:d456:e567",
            "aabb::ccdd:eeff:11:2233",
            "abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd"
        ],
        "user": [
            "asmithee"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "COMPANY",
        "id": "S-1-2-3",
        "name": "asmithee"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "computer_name": "PC01234567.company.com",
        "event_id": "13",
        "opcode": "Informations",
        "process": {
            "pid": 5624,
            "thread": {
                "id": 7248
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "record_id": "67193809",
        "task": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
        "user": {
            "domain": "DOMAIN",
            "identifier": "S-1-2-3",
            "name": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "type": "User"
        },
        "version": 2
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n  \"winlog\": {\n    \"event_data\": {\n      \"Details\": \"WORD (0x00000000-0x12345678)\",\n      \"TargetObject\": \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Advanced Threat Protection\\\\TelLib\\\\LastSuccessfulUploadTime\",\n      \"User\": \"DOMAIN\\\\Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"EventType\": \"SetValue\"\n    },\n    \"task\": \"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\n    \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n    \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n    \"user\": {\n      \"name\": \"Syst\u00e8me\",\n      \"identifier\": \"S-1-2-3\",\n      \"type\": \"User\",\n      \"domain\": \"DOMAIN\"\n    },\n    \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n    \"process\": {\n      \"thread\": {\n        \"id\": 7248\n      },\n      \"pid\": 5624\n    },\n    \"event_id\": \"13\",\n    \"version\": 2,\n    \"computer_name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"record_id\": 67193778,\n    \"opcode\": \"Informations\",\n    \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n  },\n  \"message\": \"Registry value set:\\nRuleName: technique_id=T1089,technique_name=Disabling Security Tools\\nEventType: SetValue\\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 14:00:56.524\\nProcessGuid: {abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\\nProcessId: 5500\\nImage: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\\\MsSense.exe\\nTargetObject: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Advanced Threat Protection\\\\TelLib\\\\LastSuccessfulUploadTime\\nDetails: WORD (0x00000000-0x12345678)\\nUser: DOMAIN\\\\Syst\u00e8me\",\n  \"event_ingest_logstash\": \"2023-10-17T14:00:59.207219Z\",\n  \"fields.gdp-logstash\": \"6\",\n  \"event\": {\n    \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n    \"created\": \"2023-10-17T14:00:58.520Z\",\n    \"category\": [\n      \"configuration\",\n      \"registry\"\n    ],\n    \"kind\": \"event\",\n    \"action\": \"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\n    \"module\": \"sysmon\",\n    \"code\": \"13\",\n    \"type\": [\n      \"change\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"process\": {\n    \"name\": \"MsSense.exe\",\n    \"pid\": 5500,\n    \"entity_id\": \"{abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\",\n    \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\\\MsSense.exe\"\n  },\n  \"@version\": \"1\",\n  \"log\": {\n    \"level\": \"information\"\n  },\n  \"rule\": {\n    \"name\": \"technique_id=T1089,technique_name=Disabling Security Tools\"\n  },\n  \"ecs\": {\n    \"version\": \"1.12.0\"\n  },\n  \"@timestamp\": \"2023-10-17T14:00:56.524Z\",\n  \"fields\": {\n    \"gdp-parc\": \"defaut\",\n    \"gdp-version-winlogbeat\": 2.8,\n    \"gdp-indice\": \"l-desk\",\n    \"gdp-sousparc\": \"prod\",\n    \"gdp-config\": \"desktop\",\n    \"gdp-version\": \"1.16\",\n    \"gdp-version-sysmon\": 13.33\n  },\n  \"host\": {\n    \"os\": {\n      \"platform\": \"windows\",\n      \"name\": \"Windows 10 Enterprise\",\n      \"version\": \"10.0\",\n      \"kernel\": \"10.0.19041.3570 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\",\n      \"build\": \"19044.3570\",\n      \"type\": \"windows\",\n      \"family\": \"windows\"\n    },\n    \"name\": \"PC01234567.company.com\",\n    \"id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45\",\n    \"mac\": [\n      \"00:11:22:33:44:55\",\n      \"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\",\n      \"a0:b1:c2:d3:e4:f5\",\n      \"66:77:88:99:00:11\",\n      \"01:23:45:67:89:ab\",\n      \"ab:cd:ef:01:23:45\"\n    ],\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"architecture\": \"x86_64\",\n    \"ip\": [\n      \"a123::b234:c345:d456:e567\",\n      \"8.8.8.8\",\n      \"abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd\",\n      \"1.2.3.4\",\n      \"a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:0123:abcd\",\n      \"10.20.30.40\",\n      \"aabb::ccdd:eeff:0011:2233\",\n      \"0.0.0.0\",\n      \"1122::3344:5566:7788:9900\",\n      \"5.6.7.8\",\n      \"0011::2233:4455:6677:8899\",\n      \"40.30.20.10\"\n    ]\n  },\n  \"registry\": {\n    \"key\": \"SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Advanced Threat Protection\\\\TelLib\\\\LastSuccessfulUploadTime\",\n    \"path\": \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Advanced Threat Protection\\\\TelLib\\\\LastSuccessfulUploadTime\",\n    \"hive\": \"HKLM\",\n    \"value\": \"LastSuccessfulUploadTime\"\n  },\n  \"tags\": [\n    \"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"\n  ],\n  \"agent\": {\n    \"id\": \"001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01\",\n    \"name\": \"WB-DK-PC01234567\",\n    \"version\": \"7.17.1\",\n    \"ephemeral_id\": \"a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9\",\n    \"hostname\": \"PC01234567\",\n    \"type\": \"winlogbeat\"\n  }\n}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
        "category": [
            "configuration",
            "registry"
        ],
        "code": "13",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "sysmon",
        "original": "Registry value set:\nRuleName: technique_id=T1089,technique_name=Disabling Security Tools\nEventType: SetValue\nUtcTime: 2023-10-17 14:00:56.524\nProcessGuid: {abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-000000000000}\nProcessId: 5500\nImage: C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\MsSense.exe\nTargetObject: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Advanced Threat Protection\\TelLib\\LastSuccessfulUploadTime\nDetails: WORD (0x00000000-0x12345678)\nUser: DOMAIN\\Syst\u00e8me",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-10-17T14:00:56.524000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 13,
        "properties": {
            "Details": "WORD (0x00000000-0x12345678)",
            "EventType": "SetValue",
            "TargetObject": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Advanced Threat Protection\\TelLib\\LastSuccessfulUploadTime",
            "User": "DOMAIN\\Syst\u00e8me"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-4567-abcd-e4f5a6b7c8d9",
        "id": "001234567-abcd-ef01-2345-6789abcdef01",
        "name": "WB-DK-PC01234567",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "7.17.1"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "PC01234567",
        "id": "a0b1c2d3-0123-abcd-0a1b-abcd0123ef45",
        "ip": [
            "0.0.0.0",
            "1.2.3.4",
            "10.20.30.40",
            "1122::3344:5566:7788:9900",
            "11::2233:4455:6677:8899",
            "40.30.20.10",
            "5.6.7.8",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "a0b1::c2d3:e4f5:123:abcd",
            "a123::b234:c345:d456:e567",
            "aabb::ccdd:eeff:11:2233",
            "abcd::ef01:2345:6789:abcd"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00:11:22:33:44:55",
            "01:23:45:67:89:ab",
            "66:77:88:99:00:11",
            "a0:b1:c2:d3:e4:f5",
            "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff",
            "ab:cd:ef:01:23:45"
        ],
        "name": "PC01234567.company.com",
        "os": {
            "build": "19044.3570",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.19041.3570 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
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        },
        "provider_guid": "{fc65ddd8-d6ef-4962-83d5-6e5cfe9ce148}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog",
        "record_id": "14224",
        "task": "Log clear",
        "user_data": {
            "SubjectDomainName": "WLBEAT",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x50e87",
            "SubjectUserName": "Administrator",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500",
            "xml_name": "LogFileCleared"
        }
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.\\\\n\\\\nSubject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-2-3\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\tSYSTEM\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tDOMAIN\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x41C1B034B\\\\n\\\\tLogon GUID:\\\\t\\\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\\\n\\\\nAccount Whose Credentials Were Used:\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\taccount\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tcompany\\\\n\\\\tLogon GUID:\\\\t\\\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\\\n\\\\nTarget Server:\\\\n\\\\tTarget Server Name:\\\\tTARGET.company.com\\\\n\\\\tAdditional Information:\\\\tTARGET.company.com\\\\n\\\\nProcess Information:\\\\n\\\\tProcess ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x8314\\\\n\\\\tProcess Name:\\\\t\\\\tD:\\\\\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\\\\\Process\\\\\\\\Test\\\\\\\\processname.exe\\\\n\\\\nNetwork Information:\\\\n\\\\tNetwork Address:\\\\t8.8.8.8\\\\n\\\\tPort:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t12345\\\\n\\\\nThis event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account\\\\u2019s credentials.  This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.\", \"type\": \"R2\", \"fields\": {\"gdp-indice\": \"l-serve\", \"gdp-parc\": \"defaut\", \"gdp-config\": \"server\", \"gdp-version-sysmon\": 15, \"gdp-sousparc\": \"prod\", \"gdp-version\": \"2.8\", \"gdp-version-winlogbeat\": 3.4}, \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"8.0.0\"}, \"agent\": {\"name\": \"WB-SRV-HOST01\", \"type\": \"winlogbeat\", \"version\": \"8.8.2\", \"ephemeral_id\": \"06ad3222-a4be-4b59-9958-5f9a657ea9f1\", \"id\": \"2c0cd63b-3836-4620-9eb8-13202bd370a3\"}, \"fields.gdp-redis\": \"2\", \"event\": {\"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"code\": \"4648\", \"action\": \"Logon\", \"created\": \"2023-11-09T09:05:15.197Z\", \"outcome\": \"success\"}, \"winlog\": {\"event_id\": \"4648\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"event_data\": {\"SubjectUserName\": \"SYSTEM\", \"IpPort\": \"12345\", \"TargetInfo\": \"TARGET.company.com\", \"TargetLogonGuid\": \"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\", \"TargetUserName\": \"account\", \"TargetServerName\": \"TARGET.company.com\", \"ProcessName\": \"D:\\\\\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\\\\\Process\\\\\\\\Test\\\\\\\\processname.exe\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-2-3\", \"IpAddress\": \"8.8.8.8\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"company\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"DOMAIN\", \"ProcessId\": \"0x8314\", \"LogonGuid\": \"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x41c1b034b\"}, \"process\": {\"pid\": 848, \"thread\": {\"id\": 22916}}, \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"computer_name\": \"HOST01.company.com\", \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"task\": \"Logon\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"record_id\": 8500947825, \"activity_id\": \"{7E156DC4-0D77-0008-C56D-157E770DDA01}\"}, \"@timestamp\": \"2023-11-09T09:05:14.415Z\", \"host\": {\"name\": \"HOST01\", \"id\": \"abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678\", \"mac\": [\"00-00-00-00-00-00-00-E0\", \"00-11-22-33-44-55\"], \"architecture\": \"x86_64\", \"os\": {\"platform\": \"windows\", \"version\": \"10.0\", \"name\": \"Windows Server 2016 Standard\", \"build\": \"14393.6351\", \"kernel\": \"10.0.14393.6343 (rs1_release.230913-1727)\", \"type\": \"windows\", \"family\": \"windows\"}, \"hostname\": \"HOST01\", \"ip\": [\"1.2.3.4\", \"fe80::abcd:123:456\"]}, \"event_ingest_logstash\": \"2023-11-09T09:05:14.912238Z\", \"fields.gdp-logstash\": \"5\", \"@version\": \"1\"}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Logon",
        "code": "4648",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.\\n\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-2-3\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tSYSTEM\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tDOMAIN\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x41C1B034B\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\n\\nAccount Whose Credentials Were Used:\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\taccount\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tcompany\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\n\\nTarget Server:\\n\\tTarget Server Name:\\tTARGET.company.com\\n\\tAdditional Information:\\tTARGET.company.com\\n\\nProcess Information:\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x8314\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\tD:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Process\\\\Test\\\\processname.exe\\n\\nNetwork Information:\\n\\tNetwork Address:\\t8.8.8.8\\n\\tPort:\\t\\t\\t12345\\n\\nThis event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by explicitly specifying that account\\u2019s credentials.  This most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when using the RUNAS command.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-11-09T09:05:14.415000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4648,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "IpAddress": "8.8.8.8",
            "IpPort": "12345",
            "LogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
            "ProcessId": "0x8314",
            "ProcessName": "D:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Process\\\\Test\\\\processname.exe",
            "SubjectDomainName": "DOMAIN",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x41c1b034b",
            "SubjectUserName": "SYSTEM",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-2-3",
            "TargetDomainName": "company",
            "TargetInfo": "TARGET.company.com",
            "TargetLogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
            "TargetServerName": "TARGET.company.com",
            "TargetUserName": "account"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "06ad3222-a4be-4b59-9958-5f9a657ea9f1",
        "id": "2c0cd63b-3836-4620-9eb8-13202bd370a3",
        "name": "WB-SRV-HOST01",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "8.8.2"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "HOST01",
        "id": "abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678",
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "fe80::abcd:123:456"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00-00-00-00-00-00-00-E0",
            "00-11-22-33-44-55"
        ],
        "name": "HOST01",
        "os": {
            "build": "14393.6351",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.14393.6343 (rs1_release.230913-1727)",
            "name": "Windows Server 2016 Standard",
            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "process": {
        "executable": "D:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Process\\\\Test\\\\processname.exe",
        "name": "processname.exe",
        "pid": 33556
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "HOST01"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "8.8.8.8",
            "fe80::abcd:123:456"
        ],
        "user": [
            "account"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "8.8.8.8",
        "ip": "8.8.8.8",
        "port": 12345
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "company",
        "effective": {
            "domain": "company",
            "name": "account"
        },
        "id": "S-1-2-3",
        "name": "account",
        "target": {
            "domain": "company",
            "name": "account"
        }
    },
    "winlog": {
        "activity_id": "{7e156dc4-0d77-0008-c56d-157e770dda01}",
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "HOST01.company.com",
        "event_id": "4648",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x41c1b034b"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 848,
            "thread": {
                "id": 22916
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "8500947825",
        "task": "Logon"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"tags\": [\"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"], \"event\": {\"original\": \"A new process has been created.\\\\n\\\\nCreator Subject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-1-1\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\tHOST01$\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tCOMPANY\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x3E7\\\\n\\\\nTarget Subject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-0-0\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\t-\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\t-\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x0\\\\n\\\\nProcess Information:\\\\n\\\\tNew Process ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x1d9c\\\\n\\\\tNew Process Name:\\\\tC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\wbem\\\\\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\\\\n\\\\tToken Elevation Type:\\\\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\\\\n\\\\tMandatory Label:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-2-3\\\\n\\\\tCreator Process ID:\\\\t0x2a0\\\\n\\\\tCreator Process Name:\\\\tC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\services.exe\\\\n\\\\tProcess Command Line:\\\\tC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\wbem\\\\\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\\\\n\\\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\\\n\\\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\\\n\\\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\\\n\\\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\", \"action\": \"Process Creation\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"created\": \"2023-11-09T08:43:52.407Z\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"code\": \"4688\"}, \"@version\": \"1\", \"@timestamp\": \"2023-11-09T08:43:51.462Z\", \"message\": \"A new process has been created.\\\\n\\\\nCreator Subject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-1-1\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\tHOST01$\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tCOMPANY\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x3E7\\\\n\\\\nTarget Subject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-0-0\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\t-\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\t-\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x0\\\\n\\\\nProcess Information:\\\\n\\\\tNew Process ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x1d9c\\\\n\\\\tNew Process Name:\\\\tC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\wbem\\\\\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\\\\n\\\\tToken Elevation Type:\\\\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\\\\n\\\\tMandatory Label:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-2-3\\\\n\\\\tCreator Process ID:\\\\t0x2a0\\\\n\\\\tCreator Process Name:\\\\tC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\services.exe\\\\n\\\\tProcess Command Line:\\\\tC:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\wbem\\\\\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\\\\n\\\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\\\n\\\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\\\n\\\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\\\n\\\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\", \"winlog\": {\"computer_name\": \"HOST01.company.test\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"version\": 2, \"event_id\": \"4688\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 4, \"thread\": {\"id\": 17028}}, \"task\": \"Process Creation\", \"event_data\": {\"ParentProcessName\": \"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\services.exe\", \"TokenElevationType\": \"%%1936\", \"MandatoryLabel\": \"S-1-2-3\", \"TargetUserSid\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-1-1\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"COMPANY\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\", \"CommandLine\": \"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\wbem\\\\\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\", \"NewProcessId\": \"0x1d9c\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"-\", \"ProcessId\": \"0x2a0\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"HOST01$\", \"TargetUserName\": \"-\", \"NewProcessName\": \"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\wbem\\\\\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\", \"TargetLogonId\": \"0x0\"}, \"record_id\": 8884538, \"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"opcode\": \"Info\"}, \"host\": {\"hostname\": \"host01\", \"id\": \"abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678\", \"ip\": [\"8.8.8.8\"], \"name\": \"host01\", \"mac\": [\"00-11-22-33-44-55\"], \"architecture\": \"x86_64\", \"os\": {\"build\": \"20348.2031\", \"version\": \"10.0\", \"name\": \"Windows Server 2022 Standard\", \"family\": \"windows\", \"kernel\": \"10.0.20348.2031 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\", \"type\": \"windows\", \"platform\": \"windows\"}}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"8.0.0\"}, \"agent\": {\"type\": \"winlogbeat\", \"ephemeral_id\": \"7ecf606a-ee47-4796-a223-4e6bb827233d\", \"id\": \"65ede6f4-4783-4792-8dc0-8364bc33b7bd\", \"version\": \"8.10.4\", \"name\": \"HOST01\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Process Creation",
        "code": "4688",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A new process has been created.\\n\\nCreator Subject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-1-1\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tHOST01$\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tCOMPANY\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\n\\nTarget Subject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\n\\nProcess Information:\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x1d9c\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\\n\\tMandatory Label:\\t\\tS-1-2-3\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x2a0\\n\\tCreator Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\services.exe\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe\\n\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\n\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\n\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled.  An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator.  An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\n\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled.  The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-11-09T08:43:51.462000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4688,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "CommandLine": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe",
            "MandatoryLabel": "S-1-2-3",
            "NewProcessId": "0x1d9c",
            "NewProcessName": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe",
            "ParentProcessName": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\services.exe",
            "ProcessId": "0x2a0",
            "SubjectDomainName": "COMPANY",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "HOST01$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-1-1",
            "TargetDomainName": "-",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x0",
            "TargetUserName": "-",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
            "TokenElevationType": "%%1936"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "7ecf606a-ee47-4796-a223-4e6bb827233d",
        "id": "65ede6f4-4783-4792-8dc0-8364bc33b7bd",
        "name": "HOST01",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "8.10.4"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "host01",
        "id": "abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678",
        "ip": [
            "8.8.8.8"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00-11-22-33-44-55"
        ],
        "name": "host01",
        "os": {
            "build": "20348.2031",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.20348.2031 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
            "name": "Windows Server 2022 Standard",
            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe",
        "executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiApSrv.exe",
        "name": "WmiApSrv.exe",
        "parent": {
            "executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\services.exe",
            "name": "services.exe",
            "pid": 672
        },
        "pid": 7580
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "host01"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "8.8.8.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "HOST01"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "COMPANY",
        "effective": {
            "domain": "-",
            "id": "S-1-0-0",
            "name": "-"
        },
        "id": "S-1-1-1",
        "name": "HOST01",
        "target": {
            "domain": "-",
            "name": "-"
        }
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "HOST01.company.test",
        "event_id": "4688",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x3e7"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 4,
            "thread": {
                "id": 17028
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "8884538",
        "task": "Process Creation",
        "version": 2
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2019-12-18T16:22:12.3425087Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"changed-computer-account\", \"category\": [\"iam\"], \"code\": \"4742\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"change\", \"admin\"]}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"A computer account was changed.\\n\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tat_adm\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x2E67800\\n\\nComputer Account That Was Changed:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2902\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tTESTCOMPUTEROBJ$\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\n\\nChanged Attributes:\\n\\tSAM Account Name:\\t-\\n\\tDisplay Name:\\t\\t-\\n\\tUser Principal Name:\\t-\\n\\tHome Directory:\\t\\t-\\n\\tHome Drive:\\t\\t-\\n\\tScript Path:\\t\\t-\\n\\tProfile Path:\\t\\t-\\n\\tUser Workstations:\\t-\\n\\tPassword Last Set:\\t-\\n\\tAccount Expires:\\t\\t-\\n\\tPrimary Group ID:\\t-\\n\\tAllowedToDelegateTo:\\t-\\n\\tOld UAC Value:\\t\\t0x85\\n\\tNew UAC Value:\\t\\t0x84\\n\\tUser Account Control:\\t\\n\\t\\tAccount Enabled\\n\\tUser Parameters:\\t-\\n\\tSID History:\\t\\t-\\n\\tLogon Hours:\\t\\t-\\n\\tDNS Host Name:\\t\\t-\\n\\tService Principal Names:\\t-\\n\\nAdditional Information:\\n\\tPrivileges:\\t\\t-\", \"related\": {\"user\": [\"at_adm\"]}, \"user\": {\"domain\": \"TEST\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\", \"name\": \"at_adm\"}, \"winlog\": {\"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computerObject\": {\"domain\": \"TEST\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2902\", \"name\": \"TESTCOMPUTEROBJ$\"}, \"computer_name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\", \"event_data\": {\"AccountExpires\": \"-\", \"AllowedToDelegateTo\": \"-\", \"ComputerAccountChange\": \"-\", \"DisplayName\": \"-\", \"DnsHostName\": \"-\", \"HomeDirectory\": \"-\", \"HomePath\": \"-\", \"LogonHours\": \"-\", \"NewUACList\": [\"USER_PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED\", \"USER_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT\"], \"NewUacValue\": \"0x84\", \"OldUacValue\": \"0x85\", \"PasswordLastSet\": \"-\", \"PrimaryGroupId\": \"-\", \"PrivilegeList\": [\"-\"], \"ProfilePath\": \"-\", \"SamAccountName\": \"-\", \"ScriptPath\": \"-\", \"ServicePrincipalNames\": \"-\", \"SidHistory\": \"-\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"TEST\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x2e67800\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"at_adm\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"TEST\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2902\", \"TargetUserName\": \"TESTCOMPUTEROBJ$\", \"UserAccountControl\": [\"2048\"], \"UserParameters\": \"-\", \"UserPrincipalName\": \"-\", \"UserWorkstations\": \"-\"}, \"event_id\": \"4742\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"id\": \"0x2e67800\"}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 492, \"thread\": {\"id\": 664}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"3699934\", \"task\": \"Computer Account Management\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "changed-computer-account",
        "category": [
            "iam"
        ],
        "code": "4742",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A computer account was changed.\n\nSubject:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\n\tAccount Name:\t\tat_adm\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tTEST\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x2E67800\n\nComputer Account That Was Changed:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2902\n\tAccount Name:\t\tTESTCOMPUTEROBJ$\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tTEST\n\nChanged Attributes:\n\tSAM Account Name:\t-\n\tDisplay Name:\t\t-\n\tUser Principal Name:\t-\n\tHome Directory:\t\t-\n\tHome Drive:\t\t-\n\tScript Path:\t\t-\n\tProfile Path:\t\t-\n\tUser Workstations:\t-\n\tPassword Last Set:\t-\n\tAccount Expires:\t\t-\n\tPrimary Group ID:\t-\n\tAllowedToDelegateTo:\t-\n\tOld UAC Value:\t\t0x85\n\tNew UAC Value:\t\t0x84\n\tUser Account Control:\t\n\t\tAccount Enabled\n\tUser Parameters:\t-\n\tSID History:\t\t-\n\tLogon Hours:\t\t-\n\tDNS Host Name:\t\t-\n\tService Principal Names:\t-\n\nAdditional Information:\n\tPrivileges:\t\t-",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "admin",
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-12-18T16:22:12.342508Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4742,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AccountExpires": "-",
            "AllowedToDelegateTo": "-",
            "ComputerAccountChange": "-",
            "DisplayName": "-",
            "DnsHostName": "-",
            "HomeDirectory": "-",
            "HomePath": "-",
            "LogonHours": "-",
            "NewUACList": [
                "USER_PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED",
                "USER_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT"
            ],
            "NewUacValue": "0x84",
            "OldUacValue": "0x85",
            "PasswordLastSet": "-",
            "PrimaryGroupId": "-",
            "PrivilegeList": [
                "-"
            ],
            "ProfilePath": "-",
            "SamAccountName": "-",
            "ScriptPath": "-",
            "ServicePrincipalNames": "-",
            "SidHistory": "-",
            "SubjectDomainName": "TEST",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x2e67800",
            "SubjectUserName": "at_adm",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794",
            "TargetDomainName": "TEST",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2902",
            "TargetUserName": "TESTCOMPUTEROBJ$",
            "UserAccountControl": [
                "2048"
            ],
            "UserParameters": "-",
            "UserPrincipalName": "-",
            "UserWorkstations": "-"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "at_adm"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "TEST",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794",
        "name": "at_adm"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computerObject": {
            "domain": "TEST",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2902",
            "name": "TESTCOMPUTEROBJ$"
        },
        "computer_name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS",
        "event_data": {
            "NewUACList": [
                "USER_PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED",
                "USER_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT"
            ],
            "UserAccountControl": [
                "2048"
            ]
        },
        "event_id": "4742",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x2e67800"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 492,
            "thread": {
                "id": 664
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "3699934",
        "task": "Computer Account Management"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2019-12-18T16:26:46.8744233Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"added-distribution-group-account\", \"category\": [\"iam\"], \"code\": \"4744\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"group\", \"creation\"]}, \"group\": {\"domain\": \"TEST\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2903\", \"name\": \"testdistlocal\"}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"A security-disabled local group was created.\\n\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tat_adm\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x2E67800\\n\\nNew Group:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2903\\n\\tGroup Name:\\t\\ttestdistlocal\\n\\tGroup Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\n\\nAttributes:\\n\\tSAM Account Name:\\ttestdistlocal\\n\\tSID History:\\t\\t-\\n\\nAdditional Information:\\n\\tPrivileges:\\t\\t-\", \"related\": {\"user\": [\"at_adm\"]}, \"user\": {\"domain\": \"TEST\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\", \"name\": \"at_adm\"}, \"winlog\": {\"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\", \"event_data\": {\"PrivilegeList\": \"-\", \"SamAccountName\": \"testdistlocal\", \"SidHistory\": \"-\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"TEST\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x2e67800\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"at_adm\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"TEST\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2903\", \"TargetUserName\": \"testdistlocal\"}, \"event_id\": \"4744\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"id\": \"0x2e67800\"}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 492, \"thread\": {\"id\": 664}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"3699973\", \"task\": \"Distribution Group Management\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "added-distribution-group-account",
        "category": [
            "iam"
        ],
        "code": "4744",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A security-disabled local group was created.\n\nSubject:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\n\tAccount Name:\t\tat_adm\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tTEST\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x2E67800\n\nNew Group:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2903\n\tGroup Name:\t\ttestdistlocal\n\tGroup Domain:\t\tTEST\n\nAttributes:\n\tSAM Account Name:\ttestdistlocal\n\tSID History:\t\t-\n\nAdditional Information:\n\tPrivileges:\t\t-",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "creation",
            "group"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-12-18T16:26:46.874423Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4744,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "PrivilegeList": "-",
            "SamAccountName": "testdistlocal",
            "SidHistory": "-",
            "SubjectDomainName": "TEST",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x2e67800",
            "SubjectUserName": "at_adm",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794",
            "TargetDomainName": "TEST",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2903",
            "TargetUserName": "testdistlocal"
        }
    },
    "group": {
        "domain": "TEST",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2903",
        "name": "testdistlocal"
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "at_adm"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "TEST",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794",
        "name": "at_adm"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS",
        "event_id": "4744",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x2e67800"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 492,
            "thread": {
                "id": 664
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "3699973",
        "task": "Distribution Group Management"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2019-12-19T08:10:57.4737631Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"changed-distribution-group-account\", \"category\": [\"iam\"], \"code\": \"4750\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"group\", \"change\"]}, \"group\": {\"domain\": \"TEST\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2904\", \"name\": \"testglobal1\"}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"A security-disabled global group was changed.\\n\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tat_adm\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x2E67800\\n\\nGroup:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2904\\n\\tGroup Name:\\t\\ttestglobal1\\n\\tGroup Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\n\\nChanged Attributes:\\n\\tSAM Account Name:\\ttestglobal1\\n\\tSID History:\\t\\t-\\n\\nAdditional Information:\\n\\tPrivileges:\\t\\t-\", \"related\": {\"user\": [\"at_adm\"]}, \"user\": {\"domain\": \"TEST\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\", \"name\": \"at_adm\"}, \"winlog\": {\"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\", \"event_data\": {\"PrivilegeList\": \"-\", \"SamAccountName\": \"testglobal1\", \"SidHistory\": \"-\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"TEST\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x2e67800\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"at_adm\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"TEST\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2904\", \"TargetUserName\": \"testglobal1\"}, \"event_id\": \"4750\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"id\": \"0x2e67800\"}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 492, \"thread\": {\"id\": 664}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"3707550\", \"task\": \"Distribution Group Management\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "changed-distribution-group-account",
        "category": [
            "iam"
        ],
        "code": "4750",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A security-disabled global group was changed.\n\nSubject:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794\n\tAccount Name:\t\tat_adm\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tTEST\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x2E67800\n\nGroup:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2904\n\tGroup Name:\t\ttestglobal1\n\tGroup Domain:\t\tTEST\n\nChanged Attributes:\n\tSAM Account Name:\ttestglobal1\n\tSID History:\t\t-\n\nAdditional Information:\n\tPrivileges:\t\t-",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "change",
            "group"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-12-19T08:10:57.473763Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4750,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "PrivilegeList": "-",
            "SamAccountName": "testglobal1",
            "SidHistory": "-",
            "SubjectDomainName": "TEST",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x2e67800",
            "SubjectUserName": "at_adm",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794",
            "TargetDomainName": "TEST",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2904",
            "TargetUserName": "testglobal1"
        }
    },
    "group": {
        "domain": "TEST",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2904",
        "name": "testglobal1"
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "at_adm"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "TEST",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-2794",
        "name": "at_adm"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS",
        "event_id": "4750",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x2e67800"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 492,
            "thread": {
                "id": 664
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "3707550",
        "task": "Distribution Group Management"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2020-03-31T07:50:27.1681182Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"kerberos-preauth-failed\", \"category\": [\"authentication\"], \"code\": \"4771\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"failure\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"start\"]}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"Kerberos pre-authentication failed.\\n\\nAccount Information:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tMPUIG\\n\\nService Information:\\n\\tService Name:\\t\\tkrbtgt/test.saas\\n\\nNetwork Information:\\n\\tClient Address:\\t\\t::ffff:192.168.5.44\\n\\tClient Port:\\t\\t53366\\n\\nAdditional Information:\\n\\tTicket Options:\\t\\t0x40810010\\n\\tFailure Code:\\t\\t0x12\\n\\tPre-Authentication Type:\\t0\\n\\nCertificate Information:\\n\\tCertificate Issuer Name:\\t\\t\\n\\tCertificate Serial Number: \\t\\n\\tCertificate Thumbprint:\\t\\t\\n\\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\\n\\nPre-authentication types, ticket options and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.\\n\\nIf the ticket was malformed or damaged during transit and could not be decrypted, then many fields in this event might not be present.\", \"related\": {\"ip\": [\"192.168.5.44\"], \"user\": [\"MPUIG\"]}, \"service\": {\"name\": \"krbtgt/test.saas\"}, \"source\": {\"ip\": \"192.168.5.44\", \"port\": 53366}, \"user\": {\"id\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057\", \"name\": \"MPUIG\"}, \"winlog\": {\"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\", \"event_data\": {\"PreAuthType\": \"0\", \"ServiceName\": \"krbtgt/test.saas\", \"Status\": \"0x12\", \"StatusDescription\": \"KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057\", \"TargetUserName\": \"MPUIG\", \"TicketOptions\": \"0x40810010\", \"TicketOptionsDescription\": [\"Renewable-ok\", \"Name-canonicalize\", \"Renewable\", \"Forwardable\"]}, \"event_id\": \"4771\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Failure\"], \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 496, \"thread\": {\"id\": 4552}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"5027836\", \"task\": \"Kerberos Authentication Service\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "kerberos-preauth-failed",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4771",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "Kerberos pre-authentication failed.\n\nAccount Information:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057\n\tAccount Name:\t\tMPUIG\n\nService Information:\n\tService Name:\t\tkrbtgt/test.saas\n\nNetwork Information:\n\tClient Address:\t\t::ffff:192.168.5.44\n\tClient Port:\t\t53366\n\nAdditional Information:\n\tTicket Options:\t\t0x40810010\n\tFailure Code:\t\t0x12\n\tPre-Authentication Type:\t0\n\nCertificate Information:\n\tCertificate Issuer Name:\t\t\n\tCertificate Serial Number: \t\n\tCertificate Thumbprint:\t\t\n\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\n\nPre-authentication types, ticket options and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.\n\nIf the ticket was malformed or damaged during transit and could not be decrypted, then many fields in this event might not be present.",
        "outcome": "failure",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2020-03-31T07:50:27.168118Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4771,
        "outcome": "failure",
        "properties": {
            "PreAuthType": "0",
            "ServiceName": "krbtgt/test.saas",
            "Status": "0x12",
            "StatusDescription": "KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED",
            "TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057",
            "TargetUserName": "MPUIG",
            "TicketOptions": "0x40810010",
            "TicketOptionsDescription": [
                "Forwardable",
                "Name-canonicalize",
                "Renewable",
                "Renewable-ok"
            ]
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "192.168.5.44"
        ],
        "user": [
            "MPUIG"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "krbtgt/test.saas"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.5.44",
        "ip": "192.168.5.44",
        "port": 53366
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057",
        "name": "MPUIG",
        "target": {
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1717121054-434620538-60925301-3057",
            "name": "MPUIG"
        }
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS",
        "event_data": {
            "StatusDescription": "KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED",
            "TicketOptionsDescription": [
                "Forwardable",
                "Name-canonicalize",
                "Renewable",
                "Renewable-ok"
            ]
        },
        "event_id": "4771",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Failure"
        ],
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 496,
            "thread": {
                "id": 4552
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "5027836",
        "task": "Kerberos Authentication Service"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2020-04-01T08:45:42.1873153Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"credential-validated\", \"category\": [\"authentication\"], \"code\": \"4776\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"start\"]}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account.\\n\\nAuthentication Package:\\tMICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0\\nLogon Account:\\tat_adm\\nSource Workstation:\\tEQP01777\\nError Code:\\t0x0\", \"related\": {\"user\": [\"at_adm\"]}, \"user\": {\"name\": \"at_adm\"}, \"winlog\": {\"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS\", \"event_data\": {\"PackageName\": \"MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0\", \"Status\": \"0x0\", \"TargetUserName\": \"at_adm\", \"Workstation\": \"EQP01777\"}, \"event_id\": \"4776\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"failure\": {\"status\": \"Status OK.\"}}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 496, \"thread\": {\"id\": 1864}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"5040222\", \"task\": \"Credential Validation\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "credential-validated",
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4776",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account.\n\nAuthentication Package:\tMICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0\nLogon Account:\tat_adm\nSource Workstation:\tEQP01777\nError Code:\t0x0",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2020-04-01T08:45:42.187315Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4776,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "PackageName": "MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0",
            "Status": "0x0",
            "TargetUserName": "at_adm",
            "Workstation": "EQP01777"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "at_adm"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "at_adm",
        "target": {
            "name": "at_adm"
        }
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "DC_TEST2k12.TEST.SAAS",
        "event_id": "4776",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "failure": {
                "status": "Status OK."
            }
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 496,
            "thread": {
                "id": 1864
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "5040222",
        "task": "Credential Validation"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2023-01-17T21:35:22.347Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"session-reconnected\", \"category\": [\"authentication\", \"session\"], \"code\": \"4778\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"start\"]}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"COMPUTER1.contoso.com\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"related\": {\"ip\": [\"127.0.0.1\"], \"user\": [\"user1\"]}, \"source\": {\"domain\": \"Unknown\", \"ip\": \"127.0.0.1\"}, \"user\": {\"domain\": \"CONTOSO\", \"name\": \"user1\"}, \"winlog\": {\"activity_id\": \"{7261ec5d-29d2-0001-bdec-6172d229d901}\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"COMPUTER1.contoso.com\", \"event_data\": {\"AccountDomain\": \"CONTOSO\", \"AccountName\": \"user1\", \"ClientAddress\": \"127.0.0.1\", \"ClientName\": \"Unknown\", \"LogonID\": \"0x5c7c095\", \"SessionName\": \"Console\"}, \"event_id\": \"4778\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"id\": \"0x5c7c095\"}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 320, \"thread\": {\"id\": 4484}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"6540868\", \"time_created\": \"2023-01-17T21:35:22.347697Z\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "session-reconnected",
        "category": [
            "authentication",
            "session"
        ],
        "code": "4778",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-17T21:35:22.347000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4778,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AccountDomain": "CONTOSO",
            "AccountName": "user1",
            "ClientAddress": "127.0.0.1",
            "ClientName": "Unknown",
            "LogonID": "0x5c7c095",
            "SessionName": "Console"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "COMPUTER1.contoso.com"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "Unknown"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "127.0.0.1"
        ],
        "user": [
            "user1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "Unknown",
        "domain": "Unknown",
        "ip": "127.0.0.1"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "CONTOSO",
        "name": "user1"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "activity_id": "{7261ec5d-29d2-0001-bdec-6172d229d901}",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "COMPUTER1.contoso.com",
        "event_id": "4778",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x5c7c095"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 320,
            "thread": {
                "id": 4484
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "6540868",
        "time_created": "2023-01-17T21:35:22.347697Z"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2020-03-21T23:50:34.347458Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"logged-in-special\", \"category\": [\"iam\"], \"code\": \"4964\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"admin\", \"group\"]}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"WIN-41OB2LO92CR.wlbeat.local\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"message\": \"Special groups have been assigned to a new logon.\\n\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tWIN-41OB2LO92CR$\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tWLBEAT\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\n\\nNew Logon:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tAdministrator\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tWLBEAT\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x1D22ED\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t{c25cdf73-2322-651f-f4fb-db862c0e03a8}\\n\\tSpecial Groups Assigned:\\t\\n\\t\\t%{S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-519}\", \"related\": {\"user\": [\"Administrator\"]}, \"user\": {\"domain\": \"WLBEAT\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500\", \"name\": \"Administrator\"}, \"winlog\": {\"activity_id\": \"{af6b9825-ffd8-0000-2f9a-6bafd8ffd501}\", \"api\": \"wineventlog\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"WIN-41OB2LO92CR.wlbeat.local\", \"event_data\": {\"LogonGuid\": \"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\", \"SidList\": \"\\n\\t\\t%{S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-519}\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"WLBEAT\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"WIN-41OB2LO92CR$\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"WLBEAT\", \"TargetLogonGuid\": \"{c25cdf73-2322-651f-f4fb-db862c0e03a8}\", \"TargetLogonId\": \"0x1d22ed\", \"TargetUserName\": \"Administrator\", \"TargetUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500\"}, \"event_id\": \"4964\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"id\": \"0x3e7\"}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 788, \"thread\": {\"id\": 828}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"68259\", \"task\": \"Special Logon\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "logged-in-special",
        "category": [
            "iam"
        ],
        "code": "4964",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "Special groups have been assigned to a new logon.\n\nSubject:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\n\tAccount Name:\t\tWIN-41OB2LO92CR$\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tWLBEAT\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\n\tLogon GUID:\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\n\nNew Logon:\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500\n\tAccount Name:\t\tAdministrator\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tWLBEAT\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x1D22ED\n\tLogon GUID:\t{c25cdf73-2322-651f-f4fb-db862c0e03a8}\n\tSpecial Groups Assigned:\t\n\t\t%{S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-519}",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "admin",
            "group"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2020-03-21T23:50:34.347458Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 4964,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "LogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
            "SidList": "\n\t\t%{S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-519}",
            "SubjectDomainName": "WLBEAT",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "WIN-41OB2LO92CR$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
            "TargetDomainName": "WLBEAT",
            "TargetLogonGuid": "{c25cdf73-2322-651f-f4fb-db862c0e03a8}",
            "TargetLogonId": "0x1d22ed",
            "TargetUserName": "Administrator",
            "TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "WIN-41OB2LO92CR.wlbeat.local"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "Administrator"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "WLBEAT",
        "id": "S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500",
        "name": "Administrator",
        "target": {
            "domain": "WLBEAT",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-101361758-2486510592-3018839910-500",
            "name": "Administrator"
        }
    },
    "winlog": {
        "activity_id": "{af6b9825-ffd8-0000-2f9a-6bafd8ffd501}",
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "WIN-41OB2LO92CR.wlbeat.local",
        "event_id": "4964",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x1d22ed"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 788,
            "thread": {
                "id": 828
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "68259",
        "task": "Special Logon"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"tags\": [\"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"], \"event\": {\"original\": \"A network share object was accessed.\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nSubject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-2-3-4-5-6-7\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\tUSERNAME$\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tCOMPANY\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x20D8D915\\\\n\\\\nNetwork Information:\\\\t\\\\n\\\\tObject Type:\\\\t\\\\tFile\\\\n\\\\tSource Address:\\\\t\\\\t172.27.221.26\\\\n\\\\tSource Port:\\\\t\\\\t12345\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nShare Information:\\\\n\\\\tShare Name:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\\\\\\\\IPC$\\\\n\\\\tShare Path:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\n\\\\nAccess Request Information:\\\\n\\\\tAccess Mask:\\\\t\\\\t0x1\\\\n\\\\tAccesses:\\\\t\\\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"action\": \"File Share\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"created\": \"2023-11-09T09:07:04.744Z\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"code\": \"5140\"}, \"@version\": \"1\", \"@timestamp\": \"2023-11-09T09:07:03.406Z\", \"message\": \"A network share object was accessed.\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nSubject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-2-3-4-5-6-7\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\tUSERNAME$\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tCOMPANY\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x20D8D915\\\\n\\\\nNetwork Information:\\\\t\\\\n\\\\tObject Type:\\\\t\\\\tFile\\\\n\\\\tSource Address:\\\\t\\\\t172.27.221.26\\\\n\\\\tSource Port:\\\\t\\\\t12345\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nShare Information:\\\\n\\\\tShare Name:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\\\\\\\\IPC$\\\\n\\\\tShare Path:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\n\\\\nAccess Request Information:\\\\n\\\\tAccess Mask:\\\\t\\\\t0x1\\\\n\\\\tAccesses:\\\\t\\\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"winlog\": {\"computer_name\": \"HOST01.company.test\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"process\": {\"pid\": 4, \"thread\": {\"id\": 12216}}, \"event_id\": \"5140\", \"version\": 1, \"task\": \"File Share\", \"event_data\": {\"ObjectType\": \"File\", \"ShareName\": \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\\\\\\\\IPC$\", \"IpPort\": \"12345\", \"AccessList\": \"%%4416\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"USERNAME$\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-2-3-4-5-6-7\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"COMPANY\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x20d8d915\", \"IpAddress\": \"172.27.221.26\", \"AccessMask\": \"0x1\"}, \"record_id\": 21473595, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"api\": \"wineventlog\"}, \"host\": {\"hostname\": \"host01\", \"id\": \"abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678\", \"ip\": [\"8.8.8.8\"], \"name\": \"host01\", \"mac\": [\"00-11-22-33-44-55\"], \"architecture\": \"x86_64\", \"os\": {\"build\": \"20348.1850\", \"version\": \"10.0\", \"name\": \"Windows Server 2022 Standard\", \"family\": \"windows\", \"kernel\": \"10.0.20348.1850 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\", \"type\": \"windows\", \"platform\": \"windows\"}}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"8.0.0\"}, \"agent\": {\"type\": \"winlogbeat\", \"ephemeral_id\": \"1c379f1e-1fd3-4333-80b0-bf3ac6ab4f69\", \"version\": \"8.10.4\", \"id\": \"222ff142-dbdf-42d8-a403-df533d45d5a8\", \"name\": \"HOST01\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "File Share",
        "code": "5140",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A network share object was accessed.\\n\\t\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-2-3-4-5-6-7\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tUSERNAME$\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tCOMPANY\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x20D8D915\\n\\nNetwork Information:\\t\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\tFile\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t172.27.221.26\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t12345\\n\\t\\nShare Information:\\n\\tShare Name:\\t\\t\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\\n\\tShare Path:\\t\\t\\n\\nAccess Request Information:\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x1\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-11-09T09:07:03.406000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 5140,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AccessList": "%%4416\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t",
            "AccessMask": "0x1",
            "IpAddress": "172.27.221.26",
            "IpPort": "12345",
            "ObjectType": "File",
            "ShareName": "\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$",
            "SubjectDomainName": "COMPANY",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x20d8d915",
            "SubjectUserName": "USERNAME$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-2-3-4-5-6-7"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "1c379f1e-1fd3-4333-80b0-bf3ac6ab4f69",
        "id": "222ff142-dbdf-42d8-a403-df533d45d5a8",
        "name": "HOST01",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "8.10.4"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "",
        "name": "",
        "path": "\\",
        "target_path": "\\\\\\\\*\\\\IPC$\\"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "host01",
        "id": "abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678",
        "ip": [
            "8.8.8.8"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00-11-22-33-44-55"
        ],
        "name": "host01",
        "os": {
            "build": "20348.1850",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.20348.1850 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
            "name": "Windows Server 2022 Standard",
            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "host01"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "172.27.221.26",
            "8.8.8.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "USERNAME"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "172.27.221.26",
        "ip": "172.27.221.26",
        "port": 12345
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "COMPANY",
        "id": "S-1-2-3-4-5-6-7",
        "name": "USERNAME"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "HOST01.company.test",
        "event_data": {
            "AccessMaskDescription": [
                "Create Child"
            ]
        },
        "event_id": "5140",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x20d8d915"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 4,
            "thread": {
                "id": 12216
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "21473595",
        "task": "File Share",
        "version": 1
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"tags\": [\"beats_input_codec_plain_applied\"], \"event\": {\"original\": \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nSubject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-5-18\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\thost01$\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tCOMPANY\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x20D93996\\\\n\\\\nNetwork Information:\\\\t\\\\n\\\\tObject Type:\\\\t\\\\tFile\\\\n\\\\tSource Address:\\\\t\\\\t::1\\\\n\\\\tSource Port:\\\\t\\\\t12345\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nShare Information:\\\\n\\\\tShare Name:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\\\\\\\\SYSVOL\\\\n\\\\tShare Path:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\\\\\??\\\\\\\\C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\SYSVOL\\\\\\\\sysvol\\\\n\\\\tRelative Target Name:\\\\tcompany.test\\\\\\\\scripts\\\\\\\\TargetName.cmd\\\\n\\\\nAccess Request Information:\\\\n\\\\tAccess Mask:\\\\t\\\\t0x120089\\\\n\\\\tAccesses:\\\\t\\\\tREAD_CONTROL\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tSYNCHRONIZE\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadEA\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadAttributes\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\nAccess Check Results:\\\\n\\\\tREAD_CONTROL:\\\\tGranted by Ownership\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tSYNCHRONIZE:\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadEA:\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadAttributes:\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"action\": \"Detailed File Share\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"created\": \"2023-11-09T09:09:01.979Z\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"code\": \"5145\"}, \"@version\": \"1\", \"@timestamp\": \"2023-11-09T09:09:01.274Z\", \"message\": \"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nSubject:\\\\n\\\\tSecurity ID:\\\\t\\\\tS-1-5-18\\\\n\\\\tAccount Name:\\\\t\\\\thost01$\\\\n\\\\tAccount Domain:\\\\t\\\\tCOMPANY\\\\n\\\\tLogon ID:\\\\t\\\\t0x20D93996\\\\n\\\\nNetwork Information:\\\\t\\\\n\\\\tObject Type:\\\\t\\\\tFile\\\\n\\\\tSource Address:\\\\t\\\\t::1\\\\n\\\\tSource Port:\\\\t\\\\t12345\\\\n\\\\t\\\\nShare Information:\\\\n\\\\tShare Name:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\\\\\\\\SYSVOL\\\\n\\\\tShare Path:\\\\t\\\\t\\\\\\\\??\\\\\\\\C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\SYSVOL\\\\\\\\sysvol\\\\n\\\\tRelative Target Name:\\\\tcompany.test\\\\\\\\scripts\\\\\\\\TargetName.cmd\\\\n\\\\nAccess Request Information:\\\\n\\\\tAccess Mask:\\\\t\\\\t0x120089\\\\n\\\\tAccesses:\\\\t\\\\tREAD_CONTROL\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tSYNCHRONIZE\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadEA\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadAttributes\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\nAccess Check Results:\\\\n\\\\tREAD_CONTROL:\\\\tGranted by Ownership\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tSYNCHRONIZE:\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadEA:\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\tReadAttributes:\\\\tGranted by\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"host\": {\"hostname\": \"host01\", \"id\": \"abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678\", \"ip\": [\"8.8.8.8\"], \"name\": \"host01\", \"mac\": [\"00-11-22-33-44-55\"], \"architecture\": \"x86_64\", \"os\": {\"build\": \"20348.1850\", \"version\": \"10.0\", \"name\": \"Windows Server 2022 Standard\", \"kernel\": \"10.0.20348.1850 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\", \"family\": \"windows\", \"type\": \"windows\", \"platform\": \"windows\"}}, \"agent\": {\"type\": \"winlogbeat\", \"id\": \"222ff142-dbdf-42d8-a403-df533d45d5a8\", \"version\": \"8.10.4\", \"ephemeral_id\": \"1c379f1e-1fd3-4333-80b0-bf3ac6ab4f69\", \"name\": \"HOST01\"}, \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"8.0.0\"}, \"winlog\": {\"computer_name\": \"host01.company.test\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"channel\": \"Security\", \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"process\": {\"pid\": 4, \"thread\": {\"id\": 6404}}, \"event_id\": \"5145\", \"task\": \"Detailed File Share\", \"event_data\": {\"ShareName\": \"\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\\\\\\\\SYSVOL\", \"IpPort\": \"12345\", \"AccessList\": \"%%1538\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%1541\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%4416\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%4419\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%4423\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"COMPANY\", \"RelativeTargetName\": \"company.test\\\\\\\\scripts\\\\\\\\TargetName.cmd\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x20d93996\", \"AccessMask\": \"0x120089\", \"ObjectType\": \"File\", \"ShareLocalPath\": \"\\\\\\\\??\\\\\\\\C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\SYSVOL\\\\\\\\sysvol\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"host01$\", \"AccessReason\": \"%%1538:\\\\t%%1804\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%1541:\\\\t%%1801\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%4416:\\\\t%%1801\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%4419:\\\\t%%1801\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t%%4423:\\\\t%%1801\\\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\\\n\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\\\\t\", \"IpAddress\": \"::1\"}, \"record_id\": 21474307, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"api\": \"wineventlog\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}}",
    "event": {
        "action": "Detailed File Share",
        "code": "5145",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "original": "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\\n\\t\\nSubject:\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\thost01$\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tCOMPANY\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x20D93996\\n\\nNetwork Information:\\t\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\tFile\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t::1\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t12345\\n\\t\\nShare Information:\\n\\tShare Name:\\t\\t\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\\n\\tShare Path:\\t\\t\\\\??\\\\C:\\\\Windows\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol\\n\\tRelative Target Name:\\tcompany.test\\\\scripts\\\\TargetName.cmd\\n\\nAccess Request Information:\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x120089\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tREAD_CONTROL\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tSYNCHRONIZE\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadEA\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadAttributes\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\nAccess Check Results:\\n\\tREAD_CONTROL:\\tGranted by Ownership\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tSYNCHRONIZE:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadEA:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadAttributes:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-11-09T09:09:01.274000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 5145,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "AccessList": "%%1538\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%1541\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4419\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t",
            "AccessMask": "0x120089",
            "AccessReason": "%%1538:\\t%%1804\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%1541:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4419:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t",
            "IpAddress": "::1",
            "IpPort": "12345",
            "ObjectType": "File",
            "RelativeTargetName": "company.test\\\\scripts\\\\TargetName.cmd",
            "ShareLocalPath": "\\\\??\\\\C:\\\\Windows\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol",
            "ShareName": "\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL",
            "SubjectDomainName": "COMPANY",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x20d93996",
            "SubjectUserName": "host01$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18"
        }
    },
    "agent": {
        "ephemeral_id": "1c379f1e-1fd3-4333-80b0-bf3ac6ab4f69",
        "id": "222ff142-dbdf-42d8-a403-df533d45d5a8",
        "name": "HOST01",
        "type": "winlogbeat",
        "version": "8.10.4"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "\\\\??\\\\C:\\\\Windows\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol",
        "name": "company.test\\\\scripts\\\\TargetName.cmd",
        "path": "\\\\??\\\\C:\\\\Windows\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol\\company.test\\\\scripts\\\\TargetName.cmd",
        "target_path": "\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\\company.test\\\\scripts\\\\TargetName.cmd"
    },
    "host": {
        "architecture": "x86_64",
        "hostname": "host01",
        "id": "abcdefgh-1234-5678-abcd-efgh12345678",
        "ip": [
            "8.8.8.8"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00-11-22-33-44-55"
        ],
        "name": "host01",
        "os": {
            "build": "20348.1850",
            "family": "windows",
            "kernel": "10.0.20348.1850 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
            "name": "Windows Server 2022 Standard",
            "platform": "windows",
            "type": "windows",
            "version": "10.0"
        }
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "host01"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "8.8.8.8",
            "::1"
        ],
        "user": [
            "host01"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "::1",
        "ip": "::1",
        "port": 12345
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "COMPANY",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "host01"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "host01.company.test",
        "event_data": {
            "AccessMaskDescription": [
                "List Object",
                "READ_CONTROL",
                "SYNCHRONIZE"
            ]
        },
        "event_id": "5145",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x20d93996"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 4,
            "thread": {
                "id": 6404
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "21474307",
        "task": "Detailed File Share"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2023-01-17T21:15:02.549Z\", \"ecs\": {\"version\": \"1.12.0\"}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"vault-credentials-were-read\", \"category\": [\"iam\"], \"code\": \"5381\", \"kind\": \"event\", \"module\": \"security\", \"outcome\": \"success\", \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"type\": [\"user\", \"info\"]}, \"host\": {\"name\": \"COMPUTER1.contoso.com\"}, \"log\": {\"level\": \"information\"}, \"related\": {\"user\": [\"COMPUTER1$\"]}, \"user\": {\"domain\": \"CONTOSO\", \"id\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"name\": \"COMPUTER1$\"}, \"winlog\": {\"channel\": \"Security\", \"computer_name\": \"COMPUTER1.contoso.com\", \"event_data\": {\"ClientProcessId\": \"5048\", \"CountOfCredentialsReturned\": \"0\", \"Flags\": \"0\", \"ProcessCreationTime\": \"2023-01-17T21:15:02.4069136Z\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"CONTOSO\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"COMPUTER1$\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\"}, \"event_id\": \"5381\", \"keywords\": [\"Audit Success\"], \"logon\": {\"id\": \"0x3e7\"}, \"opcode\": \"Info\", \"process\": {\"pid\": 772, \"thread\": {\"id\": 820}}, \"provider_guid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"record_id\": \"13342699\", \"time_created\": \"2023-01-17T21:15:02.5490822Z\"}}\n",
    "event": {
        "action": "vault-credentials-were-read",
        "category": [
            "iam"
        ],
        "code": "5381",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "security",
        "outcome": "success",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "type": [
            "info",
            "user"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-01-17T21:15:02.549000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 5381,
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "ClientProcessId": "5048",
            "CountOfCredentialsReturned": "0",
            "Flags": "0",
            "ProcessCreationTime": "2023-01-17T21:15:02.4069136Z",
            "SubjectDomainName": "CONTOSO",
            "SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
            "SubjectUserName": "COMPUTER1$",
            "SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "COMPUTER1.contoso.com"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "COMPUTER1"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "CONTOSO",
        "id": "S-1-5-18",
        "name": "COMPUTER1"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "channel": "Security",
        "computer_name": "COMPUTER1.contoso.com",
        "event_id": "5381",
        "keywords": [
            "Audit Success"
        ],
        "logon": {
            "id": "0x3e7"
        },
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 772,
            "thread": {
                "id": 820
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
        "record_id": "13342699",
        "time_created": "2023-01-17T21:15:02.5490822Z"
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n    \"@timestamp\": \"2019-03-18T16:57:37.933Z\",\n    \"ecs\": {\n      \"version\": \"1.12.0\"\n    },\n    \"event\": {\n      \"category\": [\n        \"configuration\"\n      ],\n      \"code\": \"16\",\n      \"kind\": \"event\",\n      \"module\": \"sysmon\",\n      \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n      \"type\": [\n        \"change\"\n      ]\n    },\n    \"host\": {\n      \"name\": \"vagrant-2012-r2\"\n    },\n    \"log\": {\n      \"level\": \"information\"\n    },\n    \"user\": {\n      \"id\": \"S-1-5-21-3541430928-2051711210-1391384369-1001\"\n    },\n    \"winlog\": {\n      \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n      \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n      \"computer_name\": \"vagrant-2012-r2\",\n      \"event_data\": {\n        \"Configuration\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\vagrant\\\\Downloads\\\\\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\vagrant\\\\Downloads\\\\Sysmon.exe\\\"  -i -n\"\n      },\n      \"event_id\": \"16\",\n      \"opcode\": \"Info\",\n      \"process\": {\n        \"pid\": 4616,\n        \"thread\": {\n          \"id\": 4724\n        }\n      },\n      \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n      \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n      \"record_id\": \"1\",\n      \"user\": {\n        \"identifier\": \"S-1-5-21-3541430928-2051711210-1391384369-1001\"\n      },\n      \"version\": 3\n    }\n  }",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "configuration"
        ],
        "code": "16",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "sysmon",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-03-18T16:57:37.933000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 16,
        "properties": {
            "Configuration": "C:\\Users\\vagrant\\Downloads\\\"C:\\Users\\vagrant\\Downloads\\Sysmon.exe\"  -i -n"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "vagrant-2012-r2"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "information"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "S-1-5-21-3541430928-2051711210-1391384369-1001"
    },
    "winlog": {
        "api": "wineventlog",
        "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
        "computer_name": "vagrant-2012-r2",
        "event_id": "16",
        "opcode": "Info",
        "process": {
            "pid": 4616,
            "thread": {
                "id": 4724
            }
        },
        "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
        "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "record_id": "1",
        "user": {
            "identifier": "S-1-5-21-3541430928-2051711210-1391384369-1001"
        },
        "version": 3
    }
}
{
    "message": "{\n    \"@timestamp\": \"2019-03-18T16:57:37.949Z\",\n    \"ecs\": {\n      \"version\": \"1.12.0\"\n    },\n    \"event\": {\n      \"category\": [\n        \"process\"\n      ],\n      \"code\": \"1\",\n      \"kind\": \"event\",\n      \"module\": \"sysmon\",\n      \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n      \"type\": [\n        \"start\"\n      ]\n    },\n    \"host\": {\n      \"name\": \"vagrant-2012-r2\"\n    },\n    \"log\": {\n      \"level\": \"information\"\n    },\n    \"process\": {\n      \"args\": [\n        \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Sysmon.exe\"\n      ],\n      \"args_count\": 1,\n      \"command_line\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Sysmon.exe\",\n      \"entity_id\": \"{42f11c3b-ce01-5c8f-0000-0010c73e2a00}\",\n      \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Sysmon.exe\",\n      \"hash\": {\n        \"sha1\": \"ac93c3b38e57a2715572933dbcb2a1c2892dbc5e\"\n      },\n      \"name\": \"Sysmon.exe\",\n      \"parent\": {\n        \"args\": [\n          \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\services.exe\"\n        ],\n        \"args_count\": 1,\n        \"command_line\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\services.exe\",\n        \"entity_id\": \"{42f11c3b-6e1a-5c8c-0000-0010f14d0000}\",\n        \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\services.exe\",\n        \"name\": \"services.exe\",\n        \"pid\": 488\n      },\n      \"pe\": {\n        \"company\": \"Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com\",\n        \"description\": \"System activity monitor\",\n        \"file_version\": \"9.01\",\n        \"product\": \"Sysinternals Sysmon\"\n      },\n      \"pid\": 4860,\n      \"working_directory\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\\"\n    },\n    \"related\": {\n      \"hash\": [\n        \"ac93c3b38e57a2715572933dbcb2a1c2892dbc5e\"\n      ],\n      \"user\": [\n        \"SYSTEM\"\n      ]\n    },\n    \"user\": {\n      \"domain\": \"NT AUTHORITY\",\n      \"id\": \"S-1-5-18\",\n      \"name\": \"SYSTEM\"\n    },\n    \"winlog\": {\n      \"api\": \"wineventlog\",\n      \"channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\n      \"computer_name\": \"vagrant-2012-r2\",\n      \"event_data\": {\n        \"Company\": \"Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com\",\n        \"Description\": \"System activity monitor\",\n        \"FileVersion\": \"9.01\",\n        \"IntegrityLevel\": \"System\",\n        \"LogonGuid\": \"{42f11c3b-6e1a-5c8c-0000-0020e7030000}\",\n        \"LogonId\": \"0x3e7\",\n        \"Product\": \"Sysinternals Sysmon\",\n        \"TerminalSessionId\": \"0\"\n      },\n      \"event_id\": \"1\",\n      \"opcode\": \"Info\",\n      \"process\": {\n        \"pid\": 4860,\n        \"thread\": {\n          \"id\": 4516\n        }\n      },\n      \"provider_guid\": \"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}\",\n      \"provider_name\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\n      \"record_id\": \"3\",\n      \"user\": {\n        \"domain\": \"NT AUTHORITY\",\n        \"identifier\": \"S-1-5-18\",\n        \"name\": \"SYSTEM\",\n        \"type\": \"Well Known Group\"\n      },\n      \"version\": 5\n    }\n  }",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "code": "1",
        "kind": "event",
        "module": "sysmon",
        "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-03-18T16:57:37.949000Z",
    "action": {
        "id": 1,
        "properties": {
            "Company": "Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com",
            "Description": "System activity monitor",
            "FileVersion": "9.01",
            "IntegrityLevel": "System",
            "LogonGuid": "{42f11c3b-6e1a-5c8c-0000-0020e7030000}",
            "LogonId": "0x3e7",
            "Product": "Sysinternals Sysmon",
            "TerminalSessionId": "0"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "vagrant-2012-r2"
    },
    "log": {
        "level":