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Broadcom Edge SWG

Overview

Broadcom Edge Security Web Gateway provides comprehensive protection for web traffic, offering advanced threat detection and prevention capabilities, along with granular policy controls, to safeguard organizations against evolving cyber threats at the network edge.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Broadcom Edge Secure Web Gateway. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Broadcom Edge Secure Web Gateway on ATT&CK Navigator

Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2

Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2018-13379. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2018. It is exploited by APT threat actors as well as cybercriminals. The exploitation of this CVE lead an unauthenticated user to get full access to FortiOS system file through SSL VPN via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. The exploit read /dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession file, that contains login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects FortiOS 5.6.3 to 5.6.7 and FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint

Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Pulse Secure vulnerability CVE-2019-11510. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2019. It is exploited by diverse threat actors, leading sometimes in ransomware deployement among these groups: Maze, Conti, Egregor, DoppelPaymer, NetWalker and REvil. But also APT actors such as APT29. The exploitation of this CVE allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to compromise a vulnerable VPN server. The attacker may be able to gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials. It may also be possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on each VPN client as it successfully connects to the VPN server. The exploit reads /etc/passwd file to get access to login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 products.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-19781 Citrix NetScaler (ADC)

Detects CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempt against Citrix NetScaler (ADC), Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Attack.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-2725 Oracle Weblogic Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of a deserialization vulnerability in Oracle Weblogic Server, CVE-2019-2725. This vulnerability affects versions 10.X and 12.1.3 of WebLogic that have the components wls9_async_response.war and wls-wsat.war enabled. It is a remote code execution which can be exploited without authentication via HTTP. An HTTP response status code = 202, means the target is vulnerable, the analyst then has to look in depth to check if a webshell has been uploaded or something else has been done.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint

Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server

Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempts

Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter

The VMware vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection

Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF

Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell Attempt

Detects CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell attempt against Microsoft Exchange Server, Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-41773 Apache 2.4.49 Path Traversal

Detects successful exploitation of the Apache Path Traversal CVE-2021-41773.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-43798 Grafana Directory Traversal

Grafana version 8.x has a 0day arbitrary file read (with no fix yet) based on a directory traversal vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests

Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.

  • Effort: advanced
GitLab CVE-2021-22205

Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.

  • Effort: intermediate
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
LokiBot Default C2 URL

Detects default C2 URL for trojan LokiBot

  • Effort: elementary
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)

Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SharePoint Authenticated SSRF

Detects succesful SSRF from an authenticated SharePoint user.

  • Effort: elementary
Sliver DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services

Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Web logs collect network activities from source

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category web
Type access

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

{
    "message": "2024-01-12T09:46:02PROXY01.EXAMPLE.ORG bluecoat - access_log - c-ip=1.2.3.4 rs-Content-Type=\"-\"  cs-auth-groups=- cs-bytes=63 cs-categories=\"none\" cs-host=example.org cs-ip=3.4.5.6 cs-method=CONNECT cs-uri-port=443 cs-uri-scheme=tcp cs-user-agent=\"-\" cs-username=- dnslookup-time=1 duration=0 rs-status=0 rs-version=- s-action=TCP_ACCELERATED s-ip=5.6.7.8 service.name=\"Explicit HTTP\" service.group=\"Standard\" s-supplier-ip=- s-supplier-name=- sc-bytes=39 sc-filter-result=OBSERVED sc-status=200 time-taken=17 x-exception-id=- x-virus-id=- c-url=\"tcp://example.org:443/\" cs-Referer=\"-\" c-cpu=- connect-time=- cs-auth-groups=- cs-headerlength=63 cs-threat-risk=4 r-ip=- r-supplier-ip=- rs-time-taken=- rs-server=- s-connect-type=Unknown s-icap-status=ICAP_NO_MODIFICATION s-sitename=http.proxy s-source-port=0 s-supplier-country=\"None\" sc-Content-Encoding=- sr-Accept-Encoding=identity x-auth-credential-type=- x-cookie-date=Fri,%2012-Jan-24%2009:46:02%20GMT x-cs-certificate-subject=- x-cs-connection-negotiated-cipher=none x-cs-connection-negotiated-cipher-size=- x-cs-connection-negotiated-ssl-version=- x-cs-ocsp-error=- x-cs-Referer-uri=- x-cs-Referer-uri-address=- x-cs-Referer-uri-extension=- x-cs-Referer-uri-host=- x-cs-Referer-uri-hostname=- x-cs-Referer-uri-path=- x-cs-Referer-uri-pathquery=- x-cs-Referer-uri-port=- x-cs-Referer-uri-query=- x-cs-Referer-uri-scheme=- x-cs-Referer-uri-stem=- x-exception-category=- x-exception-category-review-message=- x-exception-company-name=- x-exception-contact=- x-exception-details=- x-exception-header=- x-exception-help=- x-exception-last-error=- x-exception-reason=\"-\" x-exception-sourcefile=- x-exception-sourceline=0 x-exception-summary=- x-icap-error-code=none x-rs-certificate-hostname=- x-rs-certificate-hostname-category=- x-rs-certificate-observed-errors=- x-rs-certificate-subject=- x-rs-certificate-validate-status=- x-rs-connection-negotiated-cipher=none x-rs-connection-negotiated-cipher-size=- x-rs-connection-negotiated-ssl-version=- x-rs-ocsp-error=- cs-uri-extension=- cs-uri-path=/ cs-uri-query=\"-\" c-uri-pathquery=/",
    "event": {
        "action": "TCP_ACCELERATED",
        "category": [
            "web"
        ],
        "dataset": "access_log",
        "duration": 17000000,
        "type": [
            "access"
        ]
    },
    "broadcom": {
        "categories": [
            "none"
        ],
        "threat_risk": {
            "lvl": "4"
        }
    },
    "client": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "bytes": 63,
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "CONNECT"
        },
        "response": {
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "name": "PROXY01.EXAMPLE.ORG",
        "product": "Edge Secure Web Gateway",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Broadcom"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "example.org"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    },
    "server": {
        "bytes": 39,
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "path": "/",
        "port": 443,
        "registered_domain": "example.org",
        "scheme": "tcp",
        "top_level_domain": "org"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
broadcom.categories array
broadcom.data_leak_detected keyword Broadcom data leak detected
broadcom.file_reputation_score keyword Broadcom file reputation score
broadcom.threat_risk.certificate_hostname keyword Broadcom threat risk certificate hostname
broadcom.threat_risk.dns_lvl keyword Broadcom threat risk dns lvl
broadcom.threat_risk.lvl keyword Broadcom threat risk lvl
broadcom.virus_id keyword Broadcom virus id
client.bytes long Bytes sent from the client to the server.
client.ip ip IP address of the client.
client.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
dns.answers object Array of DNS answers.
dns.op_code keyword The DNS operation code that specifies the kind of query in the message.
dns.question.class keyword The class of records being queried.
dns.question.name keyword The name being queried.
dns.question.type keyword The type of record being queried.
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.dataset keyword Name of the dataset.
event.duration long Duration of the event in nanoseconds.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
host.os.full keyword Operating system name, including the version or code name.
http.request.method keyword HTTP request method.
http.request.referrer keyword Referrer for this HTTP request.
http.response.mime_type keyword Mime type of the body of the response.
http.response.status_code long HTTP response status code.
observer.name keyword Custom name of the observer.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.type keyword The type of the observer the data is coming from.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
server.bytes long Bytes sent from the server to the client.
server.ip ip IP address of the server.
tls.server.x509.alternative_names keyword List of subject alternative names (SAN).
url.domain keyword Domain of the url.
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
url.path wildcard Path of the request, such as "/search".
url.port long Port of the request, such as 443.
url.query keyword Query string of the request.
url.scheme keyword Scheme of the url.
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

Configure

This setup guide will show you how to provide an integration between Broadcom Edge Secure Web Gateway events and Sekoia.io.

Prerequisites

An internal log concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.

Set access logs format

  1. In the Management Console, go to Administration > Logging > Access Logging> General
  2. In Log Formats, click Add New Format
  3. Type a format name
  4. Select Custom format string as the format type

  5. Paste the following template in the log fields

    <111>1 $(date)T$(x-bluecoat-hour-utc):$(x-bluecoat-minute-utc):$(x-bluecoat-second-utc)$(s-computername) bluecoat - access_log - date=$(date) time=$(time) c-ip=$(c-ip) c-url=$(quot)$(url)$(quot) cs-Referer=$(quot)$(cs(Referer))$(quot) cs-user-agent=$(quot)$(cs(User-Agent))$(quot) cs-bytes=$(cs-bytes) cs-categories=$(cs-categories) cs-host=$(cs-host) cs-ip=$(cs-ip) cs-threat-risk=$(cs-threat-risk) cs-uri-path=$(cs-uri-path) cs-uri-port=$(cs-uri-port) cs-uri-query=$(quot)$(cs-uri-query)$(quot) cs-uri-scheme=$(cs-uri-scheme) cs-username=$(cs-username) cs-categories=$(cs-categories) cs-referer=$(cs-Referer) rs-content-type=$(quot)$(rs(Content-Type))$(quot) rs-status=$(rs-status) rs-version=$(rs-version) s-action=$(s-action) s-ip=$(s-ip) sc-bytes=$(sc-bytes) sc-status=$(sc-status) rs-content-type=$(rs-Content-Type) time-taken=$(time-taken) x-rs-certificate-hostname=$(x-rs-certificate-hostname) x-virus-id=$(x-virus-id) x-data-leak-detected=$(x-data-leak-detected) x-dns-cs-dns=$(x-dns-cs-dns) x-dns-cs-opcode=$(x-dns-cs-opcode) x-dns-cs-qclass=$(x-dns-cs-qclass) x-dns-cs-qtype=$(x-dns-cs-qtype) x-dns-cs-threat-risk-level=$(x-dns-cs-threat-risk-level) x-dns-rs-a-records=$(x-dns-rs-a-records) x-dns-rs-cname-records=$(x-dns-rs-cname-records) x-dns-rs-ptr-records=$(x-dns-rs-ptr-records) x-dns-rs-rcode-records=$(x-dns-rs-rcode-records)

  6. Test the format

  7. Apply the change

Enable Syslog forwarding

  1. Go to Administration > Logging > Access Logging> General
  2. In Logs, click Add New Log
  3. In Log Setting, type the name of the log and select the format created previously
  4. In Upload client, select custom client
    1. Type log concentration ip address and port as the destination
  5. In Upload Schedule, select continuously for the Upload the access log setting
  6. Apply the change

Create an intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Broadcom Edge Secure Web Gateway.

Forward logs to Sekoia.io

Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.

Further readings