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SonicWall Firewall

Overview

SonicWall firewalls enable you to identify and control all applications that are running on your network. By identifying applications based on their unique signatures rather than ports or protocols, this additional control improves compliance and data leakage prevention.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake SonicWall Firewall. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x SonicWall Firewall on ATT&CK Navigator

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde

Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.

  • Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Aspnet Compiler

Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.

  • Effort: advanced
Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

  • Effort: master
CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2

Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint

Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint

Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server

Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter

The VMware vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection

Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF

Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

  • Effort: master
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests

Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.

  • Effort: advanced
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: master
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

  • Effort: intermediate
Package Manager Alteration

Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software

  • Effort: advanced
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SSH Authorized Key Alteration

The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision.

  • Effort: advanced
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services

Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.

  • Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced
User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

  • Effort: master
User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
DNS records Both DNS queries and responses handled by the SonicWall domain name servers can be recorded.
Host network interface SonicWall produces log about every packets.
Network device logs SonicWall can record traffic logs flowing through their firewall.
Network intrusion detection system The monitoring of the network generates log about prevented intrusions.
Network protocol analysis TCP and UDP packets are analyzed.
Web logs SonicWall produces log about URL access.

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind alert
Category network
Type allowed, denied, error, protocol

Event Samples

Find below few samples of events and how they are normalized by Sekoia.io.

{
    "message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4700|7.0.1-1234-R5678|1154|Application Control Detection Alert|9|cat=0 gcat=3 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=10.0.10.20 spt= 12345 deviceInboundInterface=X1 cs3Label=WAN dmac=12:cc:44:00:66:11 dst=10.0.20.30 dpt=49773 deviceOutboundInterface=X6-V320 cs4Label=WORKSTATION proto=tcp/https in=1240 app=49000 appName=\"General HTTPS\" sid=7900 appcat=\"PROTOCOLS\" appid=1234 catid=77 msg=\"Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version, SID: 7900, AppID: 1200, CatID: 77\" msg=\"Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version\" sid=7800 appcat=\"PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version\" appid=1234 catid=55 cnt=7800123 fw_action=\"NA\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "1154",
        "kind": "alert",
        "reason": "Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version, SID: 7900, AppID: 1200, CatID: 77",
        "severity": 9,
        "type": [
            "protocol"
        ]
    },
    "cef": {
        "event_type": "base event"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "10.0.20.30",
        "bytes": 1240,
        "ip": "10.0.20.30",
        "mac": "12:cc:44:00:66:11",
        "port": 49773
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "ingress": {
                "bytes": 1240
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "application": "General HTTPS",
        "protocol": "https",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X6-V320"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X1"
            }
        },
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall",
        "version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
    },
    "process": {
        "entity_id": "1234"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.10.20",
            "10.0.20.30"
        ]
    },
    "sonicwall": {
        "fw": {
            "appcat": "PROTOCOLS",
            "cat": 0,
            "catid": 77,
            "cnt": 7800123,
            "cs3Label": "WAN",
            "cs4Label": "WORKSTATION",
            "event": {
                "name": "Application Control Detection Alert"
            },
            "gcat": 3,
            "gcatname": "Security Services",
            "priority": "ALERT",
            "sid": 7900
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.0.10.20",
        "ip": "10.0.10.20",
        "mac": "00:11:22:33:44:55",
        "port": 12345
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|537|Connection Closed|4|cat=1024 gcat=6 src=12.3.123.123 spt=40000 deviceInboundInterface=X0-V12 cs3Label=LAN dmac=33:33:33:33:33:33 dst=22.3.4.55 dpt=55 deviceOutboundInterface=X0-V13 cs4Label=LAN proto=udp/dns out=77 in=99 cn2Label=1 cn1Label=1 cn3Label=33333 cs1=\"Default Access Rule\" app=49169 appName=\"General DNS\" cnt=2162123123 fw_action=\"NA\" dpi=0",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "537",
        "severity": 4,
        "type": [
            "protocol"
        ]
    },
    "cef": {
        "event_type": "base event"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "22.3.4.55",
        "bytes": 99,
        "ip": "22.3.4.55",
        "mac": "33:33:33:33:33:33",
        "packets": 1,
        "port": 55
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "egress": {
                "bytes": 77
            },
            "ingress": {
                "bytes": 99
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "application": "General DNS",
        "protocol": "dns",
        "transport": "udp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X0-V13"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X0-V12"
            }
        },
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall",
        "version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "12.3.123.123",
            "22.3.4.55"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "name": "Default Access Rule"
    },
    "sonicwall": {
        "fw": {
            "cat": 1024,
            "cnt": 2162123123,
            "cs3Label": "LAN",
            "cs4Label": "LAN",
            "dpi": false,
            "event": {
                "name": "Connection Closed"
            },
            "gcat": 6,
            "gcatname": "Network",
            "priority": "INFO"
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "12.3.123.123",
        "bytes": 77,
        "ip": "12.3.123.123",
        "packets": 1,
        "port": 40000
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|98|Connection Opened|4|cat=262111 gcat=6 src=10.0.10.20 spt=12345 deviceInboundInterface=X6-V333 cs1Label=123.123.123.123 snpt=12345 dst=123.45.67.123 dpt=123 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 cs2Label=123.45.67.123 dnpt=123 susr=\"ABC\\user\" proto=tcp/https out=12 cs5Label=\"Auto\" app=12345 appName=\"General HTTPS\" cnt=1234567890 fw_action=\"NA\" dpi=0",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "98",
        "severity": 4,
        "type": [
            "protocol"
        ]
    },
    "cef": {
        "event_type": "base event"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "123.45.67.123",
        "ip": "123.45.67.123",
        "nat": {
            "ip": "123.45.67.123",
            "port": 123
        },
        "port": 123
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "egress": {
                "bytes": 12
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "application": "General HTTPS",
        "protocol": "https",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X1"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X6-V333"
            }
        },
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall",
        "version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.10.20",
            "123.123.123.123",
            "123.45.67.123"
        ],
        "user": [
            "user"
        ]
    },
    "sonicwall": {
        "fw": {
            "cat": 262111,
            "cnt": 1234567890,
            "cs5Label": "Auto",
            "dpi": false,
            "event": {
                "name": "Connection Opened"
            },
            "gcat": 6,
            "gcatname": "Network",
            "priority": "INFO"
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.0.10.20",
        "bytes": 12,
        "ip": "10.0.10.20",
        "nat": {
            "ip": "123.123.123.123",
            "port": 12345
        },
        "port": 12345
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "ABC",
        "name": "user"
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4700|7.0.1-5000-R3000|1460|Capture ATP File Transfer Result|5|cat=1 gcat=3 src=10.0.10.20 spt=444 deviceInboundInterface=X6-V333 dst=123.45.67.123  dpt=123 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 proto=tcp/12345 in=1500 msg=\"Gateway Anti-Virus Status: SMB file restart detected. File forwarding to Sandbox truncated for filename: hello.xlsx.\" cnt=123456 fw_action=\"NA\" fileid=\"0b9999999999999999ff99\" filetxstatus=230",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "1460",
        "reason": "Gateway Anti-Virus Status: SMB file restart detected. File forwarding to Sandbox truncated for filename: hello.xlsx.",
        "severity": 5,
        "type": [
            "protocol"
        ]
    },
    "cef": {
        "event_type": "base event"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "123.45.67.123",
        "bytes": 1500,
        "ip": "123.45.67.123",
        "port": 123
    },
    "file": {
        "name": "hello.xlsx"
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "ingress": {
                "bytes": 1500
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X1"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X6-V333"
            }
        },
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall",
        "version": "7.0.1-5000-R3000"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.10.20",
            "123.45.67.123"
        ]
    },
    "sonicwall": {
        "fw": {
            "cat": 1,
            "cnt": 123456,
            "event": {
                "name": "Capture ATP File Transfer Result"
            },
            "fileid": "0b9999999999999999ff99",
            "filetxstatus": 230,
            "gcat": 3,
            "gcatname": "Security Services",
            "priority": "INFO"
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.0.10.20",
        "ip": "10.0.10.20",
        "port": 444
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|1574|Filename Logging|5|cat=0 gcat=3 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=10.0.30.40 spt=12345 deviceInboundInterface=X3-V333 cs3Label=WORKSTATION dmac=66:77:88:99:00:11 dst=22.3.4.55 dpt=444 deviceOutboundInterface=X3-V33 cs4Label=LAN susr=\"USER\" proto=tcp/445 out=32701234 in=31445678 cs5Label=\"Auto\" cs1=\"555 (WORKSTATION->WORK)\" app=9876 msg=\"Filename: FILENAME\" cnt=123456789 fw_action=\"NA\" dpi=1",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "1574",
        "reason": "Filename: FILENAME",
        "severity": 5,
        "type": [
            "protocol"
        ]
    },
    "cef": {
        "event_type": "base event"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "22.3.4.55",
        "bytes": 31445678,
        "ip": "22.3.4.55",
        "mac": "66:77:88:99:00:11",
        "port": 444
    },
    "file": {
        "name": "FILENAME"
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "egress": {
                "bytes": 32701234
            },
            "ingress": {
                "bytes": 31445678
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X3-V33"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X3-V333"
            }
        },
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall",
        "version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.30.40",
            "22.3.4.55"
        ],
        "user": [
            "USER"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "name": "555 (WORKSTATION->WORK)"
    },
    "sonicwall": {
        "fw": {
            "cat": 0,
            "cnt": 123456789,
            "cs3Label": "WORKSTATION",
            "cs4Label": "LAN",
            "cs5Label": "Auto",
            "dpi": true,
            "event": {
                "name": "Filename Logging"
            },
            "gcat": 3,
            "gcatname": "Security Services",
            "priority": "INFO"
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.0.30.40",
        "bytes": 32701234,
        "ip": "10.0.30.40",
        "mac": "00:11:22:33:44:55",
        "port": 12345
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "USER"
    }
}

{
    "message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|97|Syslog Website Accessed|4|cat=1024 gcat=2 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=12.3.123.123 spt=60000 deviceInboundInterface=X0-V123 cs3Label=WORKSTATION cs1Label=123.123.123.123 snpt=12345 dmac=33:33:33:33:33:33 dst=123.3.4.55 dpt=444 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 cs4Label=WAN cs2Label=123.45.67.123 dnpt=444 susr=\"USER\" proto=tcp/https out=1234 in=4567 cs5Label=\"Auto\" cs1=\"WORKSTATIONS -> WEB\" app=2233 request=microsoft.com/ reason=22 Category-\"Computers\" cs6=\"Policy: Default Policy\" cnt=123456789 fw_action=\"drop\" dpi=1",
    "event": {
        "action": "dropped",
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "97",
        "severity": 4,
        "type": [
            "denied"
        ]
    },
    "cef": {
        "event_type": "base event"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "123.3.4.55",
        "bytes": 4567,
        "ip": "123.3.4.55",
        "mac": "33:33:33:33:33:33",
        "nat": {
            "ip": "123.45.67.123",
            "port": 444
        },
        "port": 444
    },
    "host": {
        "network": {
            "egress": {
                "bytes": 1234
            },
            "ingress": {
                "bytes": 4567
            }
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "protocol": "https",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "egress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X1"
            }
        },
        "ingress": {
            "interface": {
                "name": "X0-V123"
            }
        },
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall",
        "version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "12.3.123.123",
            "123.123.123.123",
            "123.3.4.55",
            "123.45.67.123"
        ],
        "user": [
            "USER"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "name": "WORKSTATIONS -> WEB\" app=2233 request=microsoft.com/ reason=22 Category-\"Computers"
    },
    "sonicwall": {
        "fw": {
            "cat": 1024,
            "cnt": 123456789,
            "cs3Label": "WORKSTATION",
            "cs4Label": "WAN",
            "cs5Label": "Auto",
            "cs6": "Policy: Default Policy",
            "dpi": true,
            "event": {
                "name": "Syslog Website Accessed"
            },
            "fw_action": "drop",
            "gcat": 2,
            "gcatname": "Log",
            "priority": "INFO"
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "12.3.123.123",
        "bytes": 1234,
        "ip": "12.3.123.123",
        "mac": "00:11:22:33:44:55",
        "nat": {
            "ip": "123.123.123.123",
            "port": 12345
        },
        "port": 60000
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "USER"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
destination.bytes long Bytes sent from the destination to the source.
destination.domain keyword The domain name of the destination.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.mac keyword MAC address of the destination.
destination.nat.ip ip Destination NAT ip
destination.nat.port long Destination NAT Port
destination.packets long Packets sent from the destination to the source.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
destination.user.id keyword Unique identifier of the user.
destination.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.code keyword Identification code for this event.
event.end date event.end contains the date when the event ended or when the activity was last observed.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.outcome keyword The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.severity long Numeric severity of the event.
event.start date event.start contains the date when the event started or when the activity was first observed.
event.timezone keyword Event time zone.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.inode keyword Inode representing the file in the filesystem.
file.mtime date Last time the file content was modified.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.path keyword Full path to the file, including the file name.
file.size long File size in bytes.
file.type keyword File type (file, dir, or symlink).
host.domain keyword Name of the directory the group is a member of.
host.hostname keyword Hostname of the host.
host.id keyword Unique host id.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
host.network.egress.bytes long The number of bytes sent on all network interfaces.
host.network.ingress.bytes long The number of bytes received on all network interfaces.
http.request.method keyword HTTP request method.
http.request.referrer keyword Referrer for this HTTP request.
log.syslog.facility.name keyword Syslog text-based facility of the event.
network.application keyword Application level protocol name.
observer.egress.interface.name keyword Interface name
observer.ingress.interface.name keyword Interface name
observer.type keyword The type of the observer the data is coming from.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
observer.version keyword Observer version.
process.entity_id keyword Unique identifier for the process.
process.name keyword Process name.
rule.name keyword Rule name
server.ip ip IP address of the server.
service.name keyword Name of the service.
sonicwall.fw.appcat keyword Application Control: Display the application category when Application Control is enabled
sonicwall.fw.cat number Message category (legacy only): Indicates the legacy category number.
sonicwall.fw.catid number Indicates the category ID of the rule
sonicwall.fw.cn1 number Indicates the ICMP type
sonicwall.fw.cn2 number Indicates the ICMP code
sonicwall.fw.cnt number Message count: Indicates the number of times event occurs
sonicwall.fw.cs2 keyword Source VPN policy name: Displays the source VPN policy name of event
sonicwall.fw.cs3 keyword Destination VPN policy name: Displays the destination VPN policy name of event
sonicwall.fw.cs3Label keyword Source zone name: Displays source zone
sonicwall.fw.cs4 keyword Interface Statistics: Display interface statistics
sonicwall.fw.cs4Label keyword Destination zone name
sonicwall.fw.cs5 keyword URL: Applicable only when Network Packet Capture System (NPCS Solera) is enabled, displays URL of an NPCS object
sonicwall.fw.cs5Label keyword Pre-defined string indicating session type: Applies to Syslogs with an associated user session being tracked by the UTM.
sonicwall.fw.cs6 keyword Additional information that is application-dependent
sonicwall.fw.cs6Label keyword Displays the connection duration in seconds; pertains to the activity time of an authenticated user session (such as logout messages)
sonicwall.fw.dpi boolean Indicates that a flow underwent inspection by Deep Packet Inspection.
sonicwall.fw.event.name keyword Name of the event.
sonicwall.fw.fileid keyword URL or MD5 (long URLs may be truncated): File identification or name, which may be in MD5 format or a URL. For example, Capture ATP uses this tag to indicate a file inspected by GAV or CloudAV.
sonicwall.fw.filetxstatus number Capture ATP: File transmission status: Result of file transmission as reportedby Capture ATP.
sonicwall.fw.fw_action keyword URL: Applicable only when Network Packet Capture System (NPCS Solera) is enabled, displays URL of an NPCS object
sonicwall.fw.gcat number Group category: Display event group category number when using Enhanced Syslog
sonicwall.fw.gcatname keyword Group category: Display event group category name when using Enhanced Syslog
sonicwall.fw.ipscat number Displays the IPS category
sonicwall.fw.ipspri number Displays the IPS priority
sonicwall.fw.priority keyword Displays the event priority level
sonicwall.fw.reason number Blocking code: Indicates the CFS block code
sonicwall.fw.sid number Provides either IPS or Anti-Spyware signature ID
source.bytes long Bytes sent from the source to the destination.
source.domain keyword The domain name of the source.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.mac keyword MAC address of the source.
source.nat.ip ip Source NAT ip
source.nat.port long Source NAT port
source.packets long Packets sent from the source to the destination.
source.port long Port of the source.
source.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

Configure

This setup guide will show you how to forward your SonicWall logs to Sekoia.io by means of a syslog transport channel.

Prerequisites

  • Must have GMS server or On-Prem Analytics server installed and configured.
  • Have an Address Object Created on the Firewall for SonicWall Analytics system.
  • Have an internal log concentrator (Rsyslog)

Enable Syslog forwarding for SonicWall 6.5 and 7.X

Info

Only the Syslog format ArcSight is supported by this integration.

Log on your SonicWall appliance and follow this guide to enable syslog forwarding, except for the step 4 : Select Syslog Format as 'Enhanced', you must select Syslog format 'ArcSight' instead.

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format SonicWall Firewall.

Forward logs to Sekoia.io

Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.