Cybereason MalOp
Overview
Cybereason offers a set of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Through the Cybereason platform, all suspicious operations will be gathered in MalOps, a multi-stage visualizations of device activities.
- Vendor: Cybereason
- Plan: Defend Core & Defend Prime
- Supported environment: SaaS
- Detection based on: Alert
Warning
If your tenant uses an allowlist to authorize connections, please ensure that Sekoia.io's IPs are allowed. See our FAQ to get our IPs.
Configure
This setup guide will lead you into forwarding all MalOp activities to Sekoia.io.
Prerequisites
To forward events produced by Cybereason to Sekoia.io, you will need your Cybereason username and password.
Warning
Please ensure the user has, at least, Analyst L2 rights granted.
Create your intake
On Sekoia.io, go to the Intakes page and generate a new intake with the Cybereason MalOp format.
Keep aside the intake key.
Pull events
To start pulling events, you have to:
- Go to the playbook page and create a new playbook with the Fetch new events from Cybereason module.
- Set up the module configuration with your Cybereason username and password.
- Set up the trigger configuration with your intake key
- Start the playbook and enjoy your events.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
{
"metadata": {
"malopGuid": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"timestamp": 1668945737625
},
"@class": ".FileSuspectDetailsModel",
"firstSeen": 1657923190000,
"lastSeen": 1667946935000,
"counter": 2,
"wasEverDetectedInScan": false,
"wasEverDetectedByAccess": true,
"detectionDecisionStatus": "DDS_PREVENTED",
"guid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"ownerMachineName": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"ownerMachineGuid": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"sha1String": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
"behaviourIdString": null,
"correctedPath": "c:\\System\\kprocesshacker.sys",
"modifiedTime": null,
"elementDisplayName": "kprocesshacker.sys"
}
{
"metadata": {
"malopGuid": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"timestamp": 1668945737625
},
"@class": ".MachineDetailsModel",
"guid": "-576002811.1198775089551518743",
"displayName": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"osType": "WINDOWS",
"connected": false,
"isolated": false,
"lastConnected": 1668439428578,
"adOU": null,
"adOrganization": null,
"adDisplayName": "DESKTOP-AAAAAA",
"adDNSHostName": "desktop-aaaaaa.example.org",
"adDepartment": null,
"adCompany": null,
"adLocation": null,
"adMachineRole": null,
"pylumId": "MARVELCLIENT_INTEGRATION_DESKTOP-AAAAAA_000000000000",
"empty": true
}
{
"metadata": {
"malopGuid": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"timestamp": 1668945737625
},
"@class": ".MachineInboxModel",
"guid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"displayName": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"osType": "WINDOWS",
"connected": false,
"isolated": false,
"lastConnected": 1668439428578,
"empty": true
}
{
"@class": ".MalopInboxModel",
"guid": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"displayName": "cymulateagent.exe",
"rootCauseElementType": "Process",
"primaryRootCauseName": "cymulateagent.exe",
"rootCauseElementNamesCount": 1,
"detectionEngines": [
"EDR"
],
"detectionTypes": [
"Custom Malware"
],
"malopDetectionType": "CUSTOM_RULE",
"creationTime": 1668333388300,
"lastUpdateTime": 1668945737625,
"iconBase64": "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",
"priority": "HIGH",
"group": "",
"rootCauseElementHashes": "",
"status": "Active",
"severity": "High",
"machines": [
{
"@class": ".MachineInboxModel",
"guid": "-576002811.1198775089551518743",
"displayName": "win-cybereason",
"osType": "WINDOWS",
"connected": true,
"isolated": false,
"lastConnected": 1669369715023,
"empty": true
}
],
"users": [
{
"guid": "0.2548072792133848559",
"displayName": "win-cybereason\\administrator",
"admin": true,
"localSystem": false,
"domainUser": false
}
],
"containers": [],
"labels": [],
"decisionStatuses": [],
"malopCloseTime": null,
"closerName": null,
"malopType": "CUSTOM_RULE",
"escalated": false,
"malopPriority": "HIGH",
"edr": true,
"malopStatus": "Active",
"malopSeverity": "High",
"closed": false,
"empty": true
}
{
"@class": ".DetectionMalopDetailsModel",
"guid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"displayName": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"rootCauseElementType": "File",
"primaryRootCauseName": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"rootCauseElementNamesCount": 1,
"detectionEngines": [
"AntiVirus"
],
"detectionTypes": [
"Known malware detected by Cybereason Anti-Malware"
],
"malopDetectionType": "KNOWN_MALWARE",
"creationTime": 1668357472339,
"lastUpdateTime": 1668392385000,
"iconBase64": "",
"priority": "HIGH",
"group": "",
"rootCauseElementHashes": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
"status": "Active",
"severity": "High",
"machines": [
{
"@class": ".MachineDetailsModel",
"guid": "-576002811.1198775089551518743",
"displayName": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"osType": "WINDOWS",
"connected": false,
"isolated": false,
"lastConnected": 1668439428578,
"adOU": null,
"adOrganization": null,
"adDisplayName": "DESKTOP-AAAAAA",
"adDNSHostName": "desktop-aaaaaa.example.org",
"adDepartment": null,
"adCompany": null,
"adLocation": null,
"adMachineRole": null,
"pylumId": "MARVELCLIENT_INTEGRATION_DESKTOP-AAAAAA_000000000000",
"empty": true
}
],
"users": [
{
"guid": "0.2548072792133848559",
"displayName": "desktop-aaaaa\\system",
"admin": false,
"localSystem": false,
"domainUser": false
}
],
"containers": [],
"labels": [],
"decisionStatuses": [
"Detected"
],
"malopCloseTime": null,
"closerName": null,
"signer": null,
"fileClassificationType": "av_detected",
"filePaths": [
"c:\\System\\kprocesshacker.sys"
],
"commandLines": [],
"decodedCommandLines": [],
"detectionValues": [
"Generic.ASP.WebShell.AH.B7A2B560"
],
"detectionValueTypes": [
"DVT_FILE"
],
"fileHash": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
"scriptDetectionTypes": [],
"exploitDetectionTypes": [],
"descriptions": [
"Known malware with file name kprocesshacker.sys was detected"
],
"hasAnyScanEvent": false,
"activeProcessesCount": 0,
"totalProcessesCount": 0,
"fileSuspects": [
{
"@class": ".FileSuspectDetailsModel",
"firstSeen": 1657923190000,
"lastSeen": 1667946935000,
"counter": 2,
"wasEverDetectedInScan": false,
"wasEverDetectedByAccess": true,
"detectionDecisionStatus": "DDS_PREVENTED",
"guid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"ownerMachineName": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"ownerMachineGuid": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"sha1String": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
"behaviourIdString": null,
"correctedPath": "c:\\System\\kprocesshacker.sys",
"modifiedTime": null,
"elementDisplayName": "kprocesshacker.sys"
}
],
"processSuspects": null,
"processes": null,
"files": [
{
"@class": ".FileDetailsModel",
"lastDetectionDecisionStatus": "DDS_UNKNOWN",
"guid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"ownerMachineName": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"ownerMachineGuid": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"sha1String": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
"correctedPath": "c:\\System\\kprocesshacker.sys",
"modifiedTime": null,
"elementDisplayName": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"behaviourIdString": null,
"quarantined": false
}
],
"connections": null,
"timelineEvents": [
{
"@class": ".MalopStartTimelineEventModel",
"timestamp": 1657923190000,
"data": {
"detectionTypes": [
"Known malware detected by Cybereason Anti-Malware"
],
"detectionEngines": [
"AntiVirus"
]
},
"type": "malopStart"
},
{
"@class": ".DetectionEventFirstSeenTimelineEventModel",
"timestamp": 1657923190000,
"data": {
"machineName": "sthq-mimikatz",
"osType": "WINDOWS",
"connected": true,
"detectionsCount": 2,
"prevented": false
},
"type": "detectionEventFirstSeen"
},
{
"@class": ".SuspicionTimelineEventModel",
"timestamp": 1657923198032,
"data": {
"suspicion": "Malicious by Anti-Malware",
"activityType": "MALICIOUS_INFECTION"
},
"type": "suspicion"
}
],
"payloads": [],
"escalated": false,
"edr": false,
"malopStatus": "Closed",
"malopSeverity": "Low",
"malopType": "KNOWN_MALWARE",
"malopPriority": "HIGH",
"closed": false,
"empty": true
}
{
"metadata": {
"malopGuid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"timestamp": "1668945737625"
},
"@class": ".SuspicionModel",
"guid": 1495442710604,
"name": "shellOfNonShellRunnerSuspicion",
"firstTimestamp": 1447276254985,
"evidences": [
"detectedInjectedEvidence",
"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence",
"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence",
"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence"
]
}
{
"metadata": {
"malopGuid": "11.7498520112250262440",
"timestamp": "1668945737625"
},
"@class": ".SuspicionModel",
"guid": 1495442710604,
"name": "T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder : Autorun JavaScript Value",
"firstTimestamp": 1447276254985,
"evidences": [
"detectedInjectedEvidence",
"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence",
"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence",
"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence"
]
}
{
"metadata": {
"malopGuid": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"timestamp": 1668945737625
},
"@class": ".UserInboxModel",
"guid": "0.2548072792133848559",
"displayName": "desktop-aaaaa\\system",
"admin": false,
"localSystem": false,
"domainUser": false
}
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Cybereason EDR. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Cybereason EDR on ATT&CK Navigator
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Cybereason EDR Alert
Cybereason EDR telemetry has raised an alert
- Effort: master
Cybereason EDR Malware Detection
Cybereason EDR telemetry has detected a malware
- Effort: master
Discovery Commands Correlation
Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
HTA Infection Chains
Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).
- Effort: intermediate
HTML Smuggling Suspicious Usage
Based on several samples from different botnets, this rule aims at detecting HTML infection chain by looking for HTML created files followed by suspicious files being executed.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ISO LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.
- Effort: intermediate
Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs
Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process
In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.
- Effort: advanced
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
ZIP LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ZIP download followed by a child-process of explorer, followed by multiple Windows processes.This is widely used as an infection chain mechanism.
- Effort: advanced
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Application logs |
Cybereason MalOps platform provides detections on malicious activities |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | alert |
| Category | file, host, intrusion_detection, malware, session |
| Type | info |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".FileSuspectDetailsModel\",\n \"firstSeen\": 1657923190000,\n \"lastSeen\": 1667946935000,\n \"counter\": 2,\n \"wasEverDetectedInScan\": false,\n \"wasEverDetectedByAccess\": true,\n \"detectionDecisionStatus\": \"DDS_PREVENTED\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"ownerMachineName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"ownerMachineGuid\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n \"sha1String\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"behaviourIdString\": null,\n \"correctedPath\": \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"modifiedTime\": null,\n \"elementDisplayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\"\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"file"
],
"code": "file_suspect",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"file": {
"decision": {
"status_code": "DDS_PREVENTED"
},
"id": "11.7498520112250262440"
},
"host": {
"id": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
},
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523"
}
},
"file": {
"directory": "c:\\System",
"hash": {
"sha1": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
},
"name": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"path": "c:\\System\\kprocesshacker.sys"
},
"host": {
"name": "desktop-aaaaaa"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".MachineDetailsModel\",\n \"guid\": \"-576002811.1198775089551518743\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": false,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1668439428578,\n \"adOU\": null,\n \"adOrganization\": null,\n \"adDisplayName\": \"DESKTOP-AAAAAA\",\n \"adDNSHostName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa.example.org\",\n \"adDepartment\": null,\n \"adCompany\": null,\n \"adLocation\": null,\n \"adMachineRole\": null,\n \"pylumId\": \"MARVELCLIENT_INTEGRATION_DESKTOP-AAAAAA_000000000000\",\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"code": "machine",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"host": {
"id": "-576002811.1198775089551518743",
"is_isolated": false,
"is_online": false
},
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523"
}
},
"host": {
"domain": "desktop-aaaaaa.example.org",
"name": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".MachineInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": false,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1668439428578,\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"code": "machine",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"host": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"is_isolated": false,
"is_online": false
},
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523"
}
},
"host": {
"name": "desktop-aaaaaa",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@class\": \".MalopInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\",\n \"displayName\": \"cymulateagent.exe\",\n \"rootCauseElementType\": \"Process\",\n \"primaryRootCauseName\": \"cymulateagent.exe\",\n \"rootCauseElementNamesCount\": 1,\n \"detectionEngines\": [\n \"EDR\"\n ],\n \"detectionTypes\": [\n \"Custom Malware\"\n ],\n \"malopDetectionType\": \"CUSTOM_RULE\",\n \"creationTime\": 1668333388300,\n \"lastUpdateTime\": 1668945737625,\n \"iconBase64\": \"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\",\n \"priority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"group\": \"\",\n \"rootCauseElementHashes\": \"\",\n \"status\": \"Active\",\n \"severity\": \"High\",\n \"machines\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".MachineInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"-576002811.1198775089551518743\",\n \"displayName\": \"win-cybereason\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": true,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1669369715023,\n \"empty\": true\n }\n ],\n \"users\": [\n {\n \"guid\": \"0.2548072792133848559\",\n \"displayName\": \"win-cybereason\\\\administrator\",\n \"admin\": true,\n \"localSystem\": false,\n \"domainUser\": false\n }\n ],\n \"containers\": [],\n \"labels\": [],\n \"decisionStatuses\": [],\n \"malopCloseTime\": null,\n \"closerName\": null,\n \"malopType\": \"CUSTOM_RULE\",\n \"escalated\": false,\n \"malopPriority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"edr\": true,\n \"malopStatus\": \"Active\",\n \"malopSeverity\": \"High\",\n \"closed\": false,\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"code": "malop",
"kind": "alert",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"created_at": "2022-11-13T09:56:28.300000Z",
"detection": {
"engines": [
"EDR"
],
"type": "CUSTOM_RULE"
},
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"is_edr": "true",
"modified_at": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"priority": "HIGH",
"root_cause": {
"name": "cymulateagent.exe",
"type": "Process"
},
"severity": "High",
"status": "Active"
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
},
"process": {
"name": "cymulateagent.exe"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"@class\": \".DetectionMalopDetailsModel\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"displayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"rootCauseElementType\": \"File\",\n \"primaryRootCauseName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"rootCauseElementNamesCount\": 1,\n \"detectionEngines\": [\n \"AntiVirus\"\n ],\n \"detectionTypes\": [\n \"Known malware detected by Cybereason Anti-Malware\"\n ],\n \"malopDetectionType\": \"KNOWN_MALWARE\",\n \"creationTime\": 1668357472339,\n \"lastUpdateTime\": 1668392385000,\n \"iconBase64\": \"\",\n \"priority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"group\": \"\",\n \"rootCauseElementHashes\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"status\": \"Active\",\n \"severity\": \"High\",\n \"machines\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".MachineDetailsModel\",\n \"guid\": \"-576002811.1198775089551518743\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": false,\n \"isolated\": false,\n \"lastConnected\": 1668439428578,\n \"adOU\": null,\n \"adOrganization\": null,\n \"adDisplayName\": \"DESKTOP-AAAAAA\",\n \"adDNSHostName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa.example.org\",\n \"adDepartment\": null,\n \"adCompany\": null,\n \"adLocation\": null,\n \"adMachineRole\": null,\n \"pylumId\": \"MARVELCLIENT_INTEGRATION_DESKTOP-AAAAAA_000000000000\",\n \"empty\": true\n }\n ],\n \"users\": [\n {\n \"guid\": \"0.2548072792133848559\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaa\\\\system\",\n \"admin\": false,\n \"localSystem\": false,\n \"domainUser\": false\n }\n ],\n \"containers\": [],\n \"labels\": [],\n \"decisionStatuses\": [\n \"Detected\"\n ],\n \"malopCloseTime\": null,\n \"closerName\": null,\n \"signer\": null,\n \"fileClassificationType\": \"av_detected\",\n \"filePaths\": [\n \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\"\n ],\n \"commandLines\": [],\n \"decodedCommandLines\": [],\n \"detectionValues\": [\n \"Generic.ASP.WebShell.AH.B7A2B560\"\n ],\n \"detectionValueTypes\": [\n \"DVT_FILE\"\n ],\n \"fileHash\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"scriptDetectionTypes\": [],\n \"exploitDetectionTypes\": [],\n \"descriptions\": [\n \"Known malware with file name kprocesshacker.sys was detected\"\n ],\n \"hasAnyScanEvent\": false,\n \"activeProcessesCount\": 0,\n \"totalProcessesCount\": 0,\n \"fileSuspects\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".FileSuspectDetailsModel\",\n \"firstSeen\": 1657923190000,\n \"lastSeen\": 1667946935000,\n \"counter\": 2,\n \"wasEverDetectedInScan\": false,\n \"wasEverDetectedByAccess\": true,\n \"detectionDecisionStatus\": \"DDS_PREVENTED\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"ownerMachineName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"ownerMachineGuid\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n \"sha1String\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"behaviourIdString\": null,\n \"correctedPath\": \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"modifiedTime\": null,\n \"elementDisplayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\"\n }\n ],\n \"processSuspects\": null,\n \"processes\": null,\n \"files\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".FileDetailsModel\",\n \"lastDetectionDecisionStatus\": \"DDS_UNKNOWN\",\n \"guid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"ownerMachineName\": \"desktop-aaaaaa\",\n \"ownerMachineGuid\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n \"sha1String\": \"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n \"correctedPath\": \"c:\\\\System\\\\kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"modifiedTime\": null,\n \"elementDisplayName\": \"kprocesshacker.sys\",\n \"behaviourIdString\": null,\n \"quarantined\": false\n }\n ],\n \"connections\": null,\n \"timelineEvents\": [\n {\n \"@class\": \".MalopStartTimelineEventModel\",\n \"timestamp\": 1657923190000,\n \"data\": {\n \"detectionTypes\": [\n \"Known malware detected by Cybereason Anti-Malware\"\n ],\n \"detectionEngines\": [\n \"AntiVirus\"\n ]\n },\n \"type\": \"malopStart\"\n },\n {\n \"@class\": \".DetectionEventFirstSeenTimelineEventModel\",\n \"timestamp\": 1657923190000,\n \"data\": {\n \"machineName\": \"sthq-mimikatz\",\n \"osType\": \"WINDOWS\",\n \"connected\": true,\n \"detectionsCount\": 2,\n \"prevented\": false\n },\n \"type\": \"detectionEventFirstSeen\"\n },\n {\n \"@class\": \".SuspicionTimelineEventModel\",\n \"timestamp\": 1657923198032,\n \"data\": {\n \"suspicion\": \"Malicious by Anti-Malware\",\n \"activityType\": \"MALICIOUS_INFECTION\"\n },\n \"type\": \"suspicion\"\n }\n ],\n \"payloads\": [],\n \"escalated\": false,\n \"edr\": false,\n \"malopStatus\": \"Closed\",\n \"malopSeverity\": \"Low\",\n \"malopType\": \"KNOWN_MALWARE\",\n \"malopPriority\": \"HIGH\",\n \"closed\": false,\n \"empty\": true\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"code": "malop",
"kind": "alert",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-14T02:19:45Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"created_at": "2022-11-13T16:37:52.339000Z",
"detection": {
"engines": [
"AntiVirus"
],
"type": "KNOWN_MALWARE"
},
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"is_edr": "false",
"modified_at": "2022-11-14T02:19:45.000000Z",
"priority": "HIGH",
"root_cause": {
"name": "kprocesshacker.sys",
"type": "File"
},
"severity": "Low",
"status": "Closed"
}
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"sha1": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
},
"name": "kprocesshacker.sys"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\n \"malopGuid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"timestamp\": \"1668945737625\"},\n \"@class\": \".SuspicionModel\",\n \"guid\": 1495442710604,\n \"name\": \"shellOfNonShellRunnerSuspicion\",\n \"firstTimestamp\": 1447276254985,\n \"evidences\": [\n \"detectedInjectedEvidence\",\n \"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence\",\n \"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence\",\n \"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence\"\n ]\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"code": "suspicion",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"suspicion": {
"evidences": [
"detectedInjectedEvidence",
"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence",
"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence",
"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence"
],
"id": "1495442710604",
"name": "shellOfNonShellRunnerSuspicion"
}
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\n \"malopGuid\": \"11.7498520112250262440\",\n \"timestamp\": \"1668945737625\"},\n \"@class\": \".SuspicionModel\",\n \"guid\": 1495442710604,\n \"name\": \"T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder : Autorun JavaScript Value\",\n \"firstTimestamp\": 1447276254985,\n \"evidences\": [\n \"detectedInjectedEvidence\",\n \"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence\",\n \"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence\",\n \"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence\"\n ]\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"code": "suspicion",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.7498520112250262440",
"suspicion": {
"evidences": [
"detectedInjectedEvidence",
"highUnresolvedToResolvedRateEvidence",
"hostingInjectedThreadEvidence",
"manyUnresolvedRecordNotExistsEvidence"
],
"id": "1495442710604",
"name": "T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder : Autorun JavaScript Value"
}
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
},
"threat": {
"technique": {
"id": "T1060",
"name": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"metadata\": {\"malopGuid\": \"11.-6654920844431693523\", \"timestamp\": 1668945737625},\n \"@class\": \".UserInboxModel\",\n \"guid\": \"0.2548072792133848559\",\n \"displayName\": \"desktop-aaaaa\\\\system\",\n \"admin\": false,\n \"localSystem\": false,\n \"domainUser\": false\n}\n",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"code": "user",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-11-20T12:02:17.625000Z",
"cybereason": {
"malop": {
"id": "11.-6654920844431693523",
"user": {
"id": "0.2548072792133848559",
"is_admin": false
}
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Cybereason",
"vendor": "Cybereason"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"system"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "desktop-aaaaa",
"name": "system"
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
cybereason.malop.closed_at |
text |
The closing date of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.created_at |
text |
The creation date of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.detection.engines |
keyword |
The list of detection engines |
cybereason.malop.detection.type |
keyword |
The type of the detection used for the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.file.decision.status_code |
keyword |
The status code of the decision about the file |
cybereason.malop.file.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the file in the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.host.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the machine in the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.host.is_isolated |
boolean |
Indicates whether the host is isolated from the network |
cybereason.malop.host.is_online |
boolean |
Indicates whether the host is connected to the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.is_edr |
text |
Indicates whether the MalOp originated from an EDR detection |
cybereason.malop.modified_at |
text |
The modification date of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.priority |
text |
The priority of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.root_cause.name |
keyword |
The name of the root cause of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.root_cause.type |
keyword |
The type of the root cause of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.severity |
text |
The severity of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.status |
keyword |
The status of the MalOp |
cybereason.malop.suspicion.evidences |
keyword |
The list of evidences associated to the suspicion |
cybereason.malop.suspicion.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the suspicion |
cybereason.malop.suspicion.name |
keyword |
The name of the suspicion |
cybereason.malop.user.id |
keyword |
The identifier of the user in the Cybereason platform |
cybereason.malop.user.is_admin |
boolean |
Indicates whether the user has admin role |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
host.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the group is a member of. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
host.os.type |
keyword |
Which commercial OS family (one of: linux, macos, unix or windows). |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
process.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
threat.technique.id |
keyword |
Threat technique id. |
threat.technique.name |
keyword |
Threat technique name. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.