Skip to content

Built-in detection rules

SEKOIA.IO provides built-in detection rules to illuminate intrusions, adversarial behaviours and suspicious activity escalation chains so you can immediately take steps to remediate. Built-in rules can be customized to your context and according to your security posture.

For Windows-related rules, SEKOIA.IO automatically produces this regularly updated list of the needed EventIDs by rule but also globally as some statistics are provided.

Rules catalog includes 609 built-in detection rules (last update on 2022-12-05).

Reconnaissance

Gather Victim Network Information

Internet Scanner

Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP.

  • Effort: master
Internet Scanner Target

Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP and group by target address.

  • Effort: master

Active Scanning

Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner)

  • Effort: intermediate
CloudFlare Firewall Block Rule

Detects when one of CloudFlare Firewall rule (previously WAF's custom rule or managed rule) blocked an HTTP request

  • Effort: master
CloudFlare HTTP Requests Rule Block Or Drop

Detects when one of CloudFlare Web Application Firewall (WAF) Managed rule blocked or dropped an HTTP request. It requires only CloudFlare HTTP requests logs.

  • Effort: master
Cloudflare WAF Correlation Alerts

Detection of multiple alerts (more than 5) triggered by the same source by Cloudflare detection rules

  • Effort: intermediate
Internet Scanner

Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP.

  • Effort: master
Internet Scanner Target

Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP and group by target address.

  • Effort: master

Resource Development

Acquire Infrastructure

Azure Active Directory Abnormal Token

Detects when Azure Active Directory indicates that there are abnormal characteristics in the token such as an unusual token lifetime or a token that is played from an unfamiliar location. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Anonymous IP

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies sign-ins from a risky IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: advanced
Azure Active Directory Impossible Travel

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies two user activities (a single or multiple sessions) originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it would have taken the user to travel from the first location to the second. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Leaked Credentials

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies that the user's valid credentials have been leaked. This sharing is typically done by posting publicly on the dark web, paste sites, or by trading and selling the credentials on the black market. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Malicious IP

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies a malicious IP address. An IP address is considered malicious based on high failure rates because of invalid credentials received from the IP address or other IP reputation sources. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Password Spray

Detects when Azure Active Directory indicates that multiple usernames are attacked using common passwords in a unified brute force manner to gain unauthorized access. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Sign-in From Unlikely Country

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Suspicious Browser

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Suspicious IP

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies a suspicious IP address. An IP address is considered suspicious based on high failure rates because of invalid credentials received from the IP address or other IP reputation sources. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Suspicious Inbox Forwarding

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies suspicious email forwarding rules, for example, if a user created an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Threat Intelligence

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies a sign-in activity that is unusual for the given user or is consistent with known attack patterns based on Microsoft's internal and external threat intelligence sources. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Token Issuer Anomaly

Detects when Azure Active Directory indicates that The SAML token issuer for the associated SAML token is potentially compromised. The claims included in the token are unusual or match known attacker patterns. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: advanced
Azure Active Directory Unfamiliar Features

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies sign-ins with characteristics that deviate from past sign-in properties. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force Successful On AzureAD

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on AzureAD and succeeded to login.

  • Effort: advanced
Login Failed Brute-Force On AzureAD

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on AzureAD and failed every time.

  • Effort: advanced

Compromise Infrastructure

Azure Active Directory Abnormal Token

Detects when Azure Active Directory indicates that there are abnormal characteristics in the token such as an unusual token lifetime or a token that is played from an unfamiliar location. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Anonymous IP

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies sign-ins from a risky IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: advanced
Azure Active Directory Impossible Travel

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies two user activities (a single or multiple sessions) originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it would have taken the user to travel from the first location to the second. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Leaked Credentials

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies that the user's valid credentials have been leaked. This sharing is typically done by posting publicly on the dark web, paste sites, or by trading and selling the credentials on the black market. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Malicious IP

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies a malicious IP address. An IP address is considered malicious based on high failure rates because of invalid credentials received from the IP address or other IP reputation sources. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Password Spray

Detects when Azure Active Directory indicates that multiple usernames are attacked using common passwords in a unified brute force manner to gain unauthorized access. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Sign-in From Unlikely Country

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Suspicious Browser

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Suspicious IP

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies a suspicious IP address. An IP address is considered suspicious based on high failure rates because of invalid credentials received from the IP address or other IP reputation sources. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Suspicious Inbox Forwarding

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies suspicious email forwarding rules, for example, if a user created an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: master
Azure Active Directory Threat Intelligence

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies a sign-in activity that is unusual for the given user or is consistent with known attack patterns based on Microsoft's internal and external threat intelligence sources. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Azure Active Directory Token Issuer Anomaly

Detects when Azure Active Directory indicates that The SAML token issuer for the associated SAML token is potentially compromised. The claims included in the token are unusual or match known attacker patterns. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: advanced
Azure Active Directory Unfamiliar Features

Detects when Azure Active Directory identifies sign-ins with characteristics that deviate from past sign-in properties. To use this feature, you must have an Azure Active Directory Premium P2 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/identity-protection/overview-identity-protection).

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force Successful On AzureAD

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on AzureAD and succeeded to login.

  • Effort: advanced
Login Failed Brute-Force On AzureAD

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on AzureAD and failed every time.

  • Effort: advanced

Obtain Capabilities

Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary

Initial Access

Valid Accounts

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Admin User RDP Remote Logon

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

  • Effort: master
Brute-Force On Fortinet Firewall Login

Spots many failed attempts to log on an administration interface.

  • Effort: master
Denied Access To Remote Desktop

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
Fortinet Firewall Successful External Login

Detects succesfull access to administration console of firewall from another IP address than 127.0.0.1. Prerequisites, check that the firewall logs format corresponds to the rule

  • Effort: master
Google Cloud Audit Account Suspended

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify a user account suspended for a suspicious activity

  • Effort: intermediate
Google Cloud Audit Attack Warning

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify an attack warning such as the famous "Government-backed attack".

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force On Firewall

Detects successful access to administration console of a firewall after several failure.

  • Effort: advanced
User Added to Local Administrators

Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients

  • Effort: intermediate

Replication Through Removable Media

External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device

Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB device.

  • Effort: advanced

External Remote Services

Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master

Exploit Public-Facing Application

CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2

Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2018-13379. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2018. It is exploited by APT threat actors as well as cybercriminals. The exploitation of this CVE lead an unauthenticated user to get full access to FortiOS system file through SSL VPN via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. The exploit read /dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession file, that contains login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects FortiOS 5.6.3 to 5.6.7 and FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint

Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604)

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Pulse Secure vulnerability CVE-2019-11510. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2019. It is exploited by diverse threat actors, leading sometimes in ransomware deployement. Among these groups: Maze, Conti, Egregor, DoppelPaymer, NetWalker and REvil. But also APT actors such as APT29. The exploitation of this CVE allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to compromise a vulnerable VPN server. The attacker may be able to gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials. It may also be possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on each VPN client as it successfully connects to the VPN server. The exploit reads /etc/passwd file to get access to login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 products.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-19781 Citrix Netscaler

Detects CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempt against Citrix Netscaler, Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Attack

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-2725 Oracle Weblogic Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of a deserialization vulnerability in Oracle Weblogic Server, CVE-2019-2725. This vulnerability affects versions 10.X and 12.1.3 of WebLogic that have the components wls9_async_response.war and wls-wsat.war enabled. It is a remote code execution which can be exploited without authentication via HTTP. An HTTP response status code = 202, means the target is vulnerable, the analyst then has to look in depth to check if a webshell has been uploaded or something else has been done.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint

Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server

Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952)

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempts

Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection

Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-22986 F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Unauthenticated RCE

Detects successful exploitation of the F5 BIG-IP vulnerability CVE-2021-22986.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF

Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-34527 - PrintNightmare - Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
CVE-2021-41773 Apache 2.4.49 Path Traversal

Detects successful exploitation of the Apache Path Traversal CVE-2021-41773.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-43798 Grafana Directory Traversal

Grafana version 8.x has a 0day arbitrary file read (with no fix yet) based on a directory traversal vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine

Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189

  • Effort: elementary
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
GitLab CVE-2021-22205

Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate

Hardware Additions

External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device

Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB device.

  • Effort: advanced

Phishing

Cisco Umbrella Threat Detected

Cisco Umbrella has detected a malicious traffic categorized as malware, phishing or adware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Download Files From Non-Legitimate TLDs

Detects file downloads from non-legitimate TLDs. Additional legitimates TLDs should be filtered according to the business habits.

  • Effort: master
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Email Classified As Malware But Allowed (Proofpoint)

An email was classified as malware with a threat score greater than 0 by ProofPoint TAP but was not blocked. The threshold on the Threat Score has been defined to avoid a high amount of false positives.

  • Effort: advanced
Email Classified As Phishing But Allowed (Proofpoint)

An email was classified as phishing with a threat score greater than 50 by ProofPoint TAP but was not blocked. The threshold on the Threat Score has been defined to avoid a high amount of false positives.

  • Effort: advanced
Email Classified As Spam But Allowed (Proofpoint)

An email was classified as spam with a threat score greater than 50 by ProofPoint TAP but was not blocked. The threshold on the Threat Score has been defined to avoid a high amount of false positives.

  • Effort: advanced
Malware Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a malware contained in the message.

  • Effort: master
Multiple Authentication On Office 365 Portal From Two IP Addresses

Detection of login events from two IP addresses within 3mn, as it could happen if someone got phished with a tool like Evilginx2.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 Anti-Phishing Policy Deletion

Detects when the anti-phishing policy is removed from Office 365. By default, Office 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. This policy specifies the phishing protections to enable or disable, and the actions to apply options.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Anti-Phishing Rule Deletion

Detects the deactivation of the anti-phishing rule from Office 365. The anti-phishing rule specifies the priority and recipient filters (who the policy applies to) for an anti-phish policy.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 AtpDetection

Detects when an AtpDetection (Advanced Threat Protection) event from the Office365 ThreatIntelligence service is raised. AtpDetection is a service which secures emails, attachments, and files by scanning them for threats.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 DLP Policy Removed

Detects when a DLP (Data Loss Prevention) policy is removed in Office 365. DLP policies defines which resources can be shared and with whom, preventing sensitive information from being leaked.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Detection Velocity

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies two user activities (a single or multiple sessions) originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it would have taken the user to travel from the first location to the second. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Inbox Hiding

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies that a suspicious inbox rule was set on a user’s inbox. This may indicate that the user account is compromised, and that the mailbox is being used to distribute spam and malware in your organization. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS New Country

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies a sign-in from a country where it has never connected. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Repeated Delete

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Repeated Failed Login

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies a large number of failed login attempts which may indicate a brute-force attempt. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Risky IP

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies sign-ins from a risky IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MailBoxAuditBypassAssociation Option Implementation

Detects the implementation of a MailBoxAuditBypassAssociation option in Office 365. This option is used when you configure a user or computer account to bypass mailbox audit logging, access or actions taken by the user or computer account to any mailbox isn't logged.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Malware Filter Policy Removed

Detects when a malware policy has been deleted in Office 365. A malware filter policy is used to alert administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Malware Filter Rule Deletion

Detects when a malware filter rule has been deleted in Office 365. The malware filter rule specifies the priority and recipient filters (who the policy applies to) for a malware filter policy.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Malware Uploaded On OneDrive

Detects when Office 365 identifies a malicious file uploaded to OneDrive. Attackers can use this method to propagate through the network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 Malware Uploaded On SharePoint

Detects when Office 365 identifies a malicious file uploaded to SharePoint. Attackers can use this method to propagate through the network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 Mass Download By A Single User

Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a single user performs more than 50 downloads within 1 minute.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Potential Ransomware Activity Detected

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a user has uploaded files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Safe Attachment Rule Disabled

Detects when the safe attachment rule has been deleted in Office 365. Safe Attachments is a feature in Microsoft Defender for Office 365 that opens email attachments in a special hypervisor environment to detect malicious activity.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Safelinks Disabled

Detects when a safelink rule has been deleted in Office 365. Safe Links is a feature in Defender for Office 365 that provides URL scanning and rewriting of inbound email messages in mail flow, and time-of-click verification of URLs and links in email messages and other locations.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Unusual Volume Of File Deletion

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files.

  • Effort: master
Phishing Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a phishing attempt.

  • Effort: master
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Retarus Email Security Threat Detected (CxO Or Patient Zero Detection)

Cx0 fraud and Patient Zero Detection alerts detected by Retarus Email Security. CxO Fraud Detection uses algorithms that identify from-spoofing and domain-spoofing, to detect falsified sender addresses (e.g. from high level executives - CEO, CFO...). Patient Zero Detection® uses a digital fingerprint to identify emails containing malware that have already been delivered.

  • Effort: advanced
Retarus Email Security Threat Detected (MultiScan)

Antivirus MultiScan alerts detected by Retarus Email Security. AntiVirus MultiScan automatically scans incoming and outgoing emails and file attachments for viruses with up to four virus scanners and uses heuristic analysis to protect from unknown malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Retarus Email Security Threat Detected (Sandboxing)

Sandboxing alerts detected by Retarus Email Security. Sandboxing subjects specific file attachments to an in-depth analysis. Retarus uses a sandboxing solution from the specialized and highly respected third-party provider Palo Alto Networks for this advanced threat assessment. Emails identified as infected are either deleted or quarantined, and the intended recipient is notified.

  • Effort: elementary
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Scam Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365, has detected a scam e-mail.

  • Effort: master
Spam Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365, has detected a spam e-mail.

  • Effort: master
Spearphishing (CEO Fraud) Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a spearphishing attempt with CEO fraud thematic. Impersonation of CEO or senior management members requesting urgent money transfer, usually on an unknown RIB.

  • Effort: master
Spearphishing (Gift Cards Fraud) Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a spear-phishing attempt with gift-cards fraud thematic. Executive impersonation requesting a money transfer to set up gift-cards for employees. Confidentiality and discretion are usually implied.

  • Effort: master
Spearphishing (Initial Contact Fraud) Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a spearphishing attempt with initial contact fraud thematic. Do not contains any malicious content or specific actions other than a request to reply to the email. “Are you available?”. The main goal is to incite a reply that could register the sending address as a known and legitimate address.

  • Effort: master
Spearphishing (Lawyer Fraud) Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a spearphishing attempt with lawyer fraud thematic. Impersonation of lawyers and lawyers' firms. The main goal is to make sure the victims will not raise awareness around them. Confidentiality restrictions are implied.

  • Effort: master
Spearphishing (W2 Fraud) Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a spearphishing attempt with W2 fraud thematic. Executive or HR impersonation phishing for social security numbers or tax identification numbers. Collected data are generally used for identity theft schemes.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services

Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Email Attachment Received

Detects email containing an .exe|.dll|.ps1|.bat|.hta attachment. Most of the time files send by mail like this are malware.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate

Execution

Windows Management Instrumentation

Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Wmiexec Module

Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.

  • Effort: elementary
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets

Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi

Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI DLL Loaded Via Office

Detects Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) DLL loaded via Office process. This activity may correspond to VBA macro executing WMI commands, which is highly suspicious. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done with the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool

WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate

Scheduled Task/Job

BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
Remote Task Creation Via ATSVC Named Pipe

Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC Named Pipe. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share policy.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate

Command and Scripting Interpreter

AWS EC2 Startup Script Changed

Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM everytime the specific instances are booted up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe

Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config

  • Effort: advanced
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
CrowdStrike Intrusion Detection

CrowdStrike Falcon agent raised an alert for an intrusion detection

  • Effort: advanced
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Default User www data User Compromised

User www_data by default cannot log and use a shell, any syscall of type execve induce user compromise

  • Effort: master
Detection of default Mimikatz banner

Detection of default Mimikatz banner in powershell events

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine

Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189

  • Effort: elementary
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

  • Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line

Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments

  • Effort: master
In-memory PowerShell

Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension and tool such PowerShDll.

  • Effort: master
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python

Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.

  • Effort: advanced
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets

Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.

  • Effort: elementary
Koadic Execution

Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Login Brute-Force Successful On SentinelOne Management Console

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on the SentinelOne Management Console and succeeded to login.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks

  • Effort: advanced
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL

Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Outbreak

Spots a peak of malware detection by windows defender on this perimeter.

  • Effort: advanced
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft 365 Defender Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Cloud App Security Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender For Endpoint Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Office 365 Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Office 365. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Mustang Panda Dropper

Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell - NTFS Alternate Data Stream

Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from PowerShell. Needs Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Credential Prompt

Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt (using PromptForCredential) ex: $Credential = $host.ui.PromptForCredential("Need credentials", "Please enter your user name and password.", "", "NetBiosUserName") The same result can be obtained by using the Get-Credential function but detecting it will trigger a lot of FP

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks (PowerSploit...)

  • Effort: master
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell

  • Effort: advanced
Python Offensive Tools and Packages

Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement

  • Effort: master
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Raw Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using sh and or bash commands

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO EICAR Detection

Detects observables in SEKOIA.IO CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: elementary
SentinelOne Agent Disabled

A SentinelOne agent has been disabled according to SentinelOne logs.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne Custom Rule Alert

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat related to a Custom Rule and raised an alert for it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Malicious Threat Detected And Mitigated Preemptively

A SentinelOne agent has detected a malicious threat which has been mitigated preemptively.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Malicious Threat Not Mitigated

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat but did not mitigate it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne SSO User Added

A SSO User was added.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Suspicious Threat Not Mitigated (Medium Confidence)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a medium confidence level (suspicious) but did not mitigate it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Detected (Malicious)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a high confidence level (malicious).

  • Effort: elementary
SentinelOne Threat Detected (Suspicious)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a medium confidence level (suspicious).

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Kill Success

A SentinelOne agent has detected and killed a threat (usually kills the malicious process).

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Failed

A SentinelOne agent has failed to quarantine a threat.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Success

A SentinelOne agent has detected and quarantined a threat with success.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Remediate Success

A SentinelOne agent has remediated a threat.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne User Failed To Log In To The Management Console

A user has failed to log in to the management console.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne User Logged In To The Management Console

A user has logged in to the management console.

  • Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loaded Via Office Applications

Detects suspicious DLL being loaded by an Microsoft Office Product. Considered as suspects are some .NET DLLs, clr.dll, GAC DLL, DSParse (Active Directoryi services API) or Kerberos DLLs which may be loaded by MS Office processes when executing a potentially malicious macro. The prerequisite is to log the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Scripting In A WMI Consumer

Detects suspicious scripting in WMI Event Consumers. The rule requires to log WMI Consumers, which can be done through Sysmon's Event IDs 20 and 21.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.

  • Effort: advanced
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
Trickbot Malware Activity

Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe

  • Effort: intermediate
Turla Named Pipes

Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config

  • Effort: elementary
WMI DLL Loaded Via Office

Detects Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) DLL loaded via Office process. This activity may correspond to VBA macro executing WMI commands, which is highly suspicious. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done with the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool

WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

  • Effort: intermediate
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate

Scripting

Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary

Rundll32

PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate

PowerShell

In-memory PowerShell

Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension and tool such PowerShDll.

  • Effort: master

Shared Modules

FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading

Detects DLL image load activity as used by the threat group NOBELIUM with the FoggyWeb backdoor loader. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done through the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master

CMSTP

CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate

Exploitation for Client Execution

Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Antivirus Password Dumper Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This detection relies on Windows Defender events logs. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts

Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This is only based on Windows Defender events.

  • Effort: elementary
Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Non-Legitimate TLDs

Detects file downloads from non-legitimate TLDs. Additional legitimates TLDs should be filtered according to the business habits.

  • Effort: master
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious HWP Child Process

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious New Printer Ports In Registry

Detects a suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048. The CVE-2020-1048 consists in gaining persistence, privilege by abusing a flaw in the Print Spooler service to execute a payload whose path is stored in the registry key. To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master

User Execution

Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: elementary
CrowdStrike Intrusion Detection

CrowdStrike Falcon agent raised an alert for an intrusion detection

  • Effort: advanced
Download Files From Non-Legitimate TLDs

Detects file downloads from non-legitimate TLDs. Additional legitimates TLDs should be filtered according to the business habits.

  • Effort: master
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641

Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641

  • Effort: elementary
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
HarfangLab Process Execution Blocked

HarfangLab EDR has detected a malicious process execution attempt and has blocked it. To know more on what caused this alert, you should check the value of the process name and the concerned computer and user.

  • Effort: elementary
HarfangLab Suspicious Process Behavior Has Been Detected

HarfangLab EDR has detected a suspicious process behavior based on its detection rule. Check the rule name and description for more information.

  • Effort: master
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Login Brute-Force Successful On SentinelOne Management Console

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on the SentinelOne Management Console and succeeded to login.

  • Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir

Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL

Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Detected By Vade For M365

Vade Secure product Vade for M365 has detected a malware contained in the message.

  • Effort: master
Malware Outbreak

Spots a peak of malware detection by windows defender on this perimeter.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft 365 Defender Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Cloud App Security Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender For Endpoint Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Office 365 Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Office 365. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Spawning Script

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 Anti-Phishing Policy Deletion

Detects when the anti-phishing policy is removed from Office 365. By default, Office 365 includes built-in features that help protect users from phishing attacks. This policy specifies the phishing protections to enable or disable, and the actions to apply options.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Anti-Phishing Rule Deletion

Detects the deactivation of the anti-phishing rule from Office 365. The anti-phishing rule specifies the priority and recipient filters (who the policy applies to) for an anti-phish policy.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 AtpDetection

Detects when an AtpDetection (Advanced Threat Protection) event from the Office365 ThreatIntelligence service is raised. AtpDetection is a service which secures emails, attachments, and files by scanning them for threats.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 DLP Policy Removed

Detects when a DLP (Data Loss Prevention) policy is removed in Office 365. DLP policies defines which resources can be shared and with whom, preventing sensitive information from being leaked.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Detection Velocity

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies two user activities (a single or multiple sessions) originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it would have taken the user to travel from the first location to the second. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Inbox Hiding

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies that a suspicious inbox rule was set on a user’s inbox. This may indicate that the user account is compromised, and that the mailbox is being used to distribute spam and malware in your organization. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS New Country

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies a sign-in from a country where it has never connected. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Repeated Delete

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Repeated Failed Login

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies a large number of failed login attempts which may indicate a brute-force attempt. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MCAS Risky IP

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies sign-ins from a risky IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN. To use this feature, you must have an Office 365 E5 license (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/get-started?culture=fr-fr&country=FR).

  • Effort: master
Office 365 MailBoxAuditBypassAssociation Option Implementation

Detects the implementation of a MailBoxAuditBypassAssociation option in Office 365. This option is used when you configure a user or computer account to bypass mailbox audit logging, access or actions taken by the user or computer account to any mailbox isn't logged.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Malware Filter Policy Removed

Detects when a malware policy has been deleted in Office 365. A malware filter policy is used to alert administrators that an internal user sent a message that contained malware.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Malware Filter Rule Deletion

Detects when a malware filter rule has been deleted in Office 365. The malware filter rule specifies the priority and recipient filters (who the policy applies to) for a malware filter policy.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Malware Uploaded On OneDrive

Detects when Office 365 identifies a malicious file uploaded to OneDrive. Attackers can use this method to propagate through the network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 Malware Uploaded On SharePoint

Detects when Office 365 identifies a malicious file uploaded to SharePoint. Attackers can use this method to propagate through the network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Office 365 Mass Download By A Single User

Identifies when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a single user performs more than 50 downloads within 1 minute.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Potential Ransomware Activity Detected

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security reports that a user has uploaded files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Safe Attachment Rule Disabled

Detects when the safe attachment rule has been deleted in Office 365. Safe Attachments is a feature in Microsoft Defender for Office 365 that opens email attachments in a special hypervisor environment to detect malicious activity.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Safelinks Disabled

Detects when a safelink rule has been deleted in Office 365. Safe Links is a feature in Defender for Office 365 that provides URL scanning and rewriting of inbound email messages in mail flow, and time-of-click verification of URLs and links in email messages and other locations.

  • Effort: master
Office 365 Unusual Volume Of File Deletion

Detects when Microsoft Cloud App Security identifies that a user has deleted an unusually large volume of files.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne Agent Disabled

A SentinelOne agent has been disabled according to SentinelOne logs.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne Custom Rule Alert

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat related to a Custom Rule and raised an alert for it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Malicious Threat Detected And Mitigated Preemptively

A SentinelOne agent has detected a malicious threat which has been mitigated preemptively.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Malicious Threat Not Mitigated

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat but did not mitigate it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne SSO User Added

A SSO User was added.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Suspicious Threat Not Mitigated (Medium Confidence)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a medium confidence level (suspicious) but did not mitigate it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Detected (Malicious)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a high confidence level (malicious).

  • Effort: elementary
SentinelOne Threat Detected (Suspicious)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a medium confidence level (suspicious).

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Kill Success

A SentinelOne agent has detected and killed a threat (usually kills the malicious process).

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Failed

A SentinelOne agent has failed to quarantine a threat.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Success

A SentinelOne agent has detected and quarantined a threat with success.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Remediate Success

A SentinelOne agent has remediated a threat.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne User Failed To Log In To The Management Console

A user has failed to log in to the management console.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne User Logged In To The Management Console

A user has logged in to the management console.

  • Effort: master
Sophos EDR Application Blocked

Sophos EDR detected a potentially malicious application and blocked it.

  • Effort: master
Sophos EDR Application Detected

Sophos EDR detected a potentially malicious application.

  • Effort: master
Sophos EDR CorePUA Clean

Sophos EDR detected a potentially unwanted application and cleaned it.

  • Effort: master
Sophos EDR CorePUA Detection

Sophos EDR detected a potentially unwanted application.

  • Effort: master
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL Loaded Via Office Applications

Detects suspicious DLL being loaded by an Microsoft Office Product. Considered as suspects are some .NET DLLs, clr.dll, GAC DLL, DSParse (Active Directoryi services API) or Kerberos DLLs which may be loaded by MS Office processes when executing a potentially malicious macro. The prerequisite is to log the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Outlook Child Process

Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
Symantec EPP Event Blocked

Symantec EPP blocked an action. Careful when activating this rule, it generates lots of events that are not always relevant for detection.

  • Effort: master
Symantec EPP Event Cleaned

Symantec EPP had cleaned action. Careful when activating this rule, it generates lots of events that are not always relevant for detection.

  • Effort: master
Symantec EPP Event Quarantined

Symantec EPP had a quarantined action. Careful when activating this rule, it generates lots of events that are not always relevant for detection.

  • Effort: master
Symantec EPP Event Terminate

Symantec EPP had a process terminate action. Careful when activating this rule, it generates lots of events that are not always relevant for detection.

  • Effort: master
Sysmon Windows File Block Executable

Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.

  • Effort: master
Vectra General Threat Detection

Vectra Cognito detected a potential threat. This is a very generic rule to raise as much alerts as possible from Vectra detections however RECONNAISSANCE and INFO categories have been removed to avoid spamming.

  • Effort: master
Windows Defender Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Winword Document Droppers

Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary

System Services

Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution

Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CrowdStrike Intrusion Detection

CrowdStrike Falcon agent raised an alert for an intrusion detection

  • Effort: advanced
Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: elementary
Gpscript Suspicious Parent

Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force Successful On SentinelOne Management Console

A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on the SentinelOne Management Console and succeeded to login.

  • Effort: intermediate
Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Service Installations

Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Outbreak

Spots a peak of malware detection by windows defender on this perimeter.

  • Effort: advanced
Metasploit PSExec Service Creation

Detects Metasploit service creation when using the PSExec module. The ImagePath here is usually a malicious command line using powershell.exe and/or cmd.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft 365 Defender Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Cloud App Security Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Cloud App Security. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender For Endpoint Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft 365 Defender Office 365 Alert

Microsoft 365 Defender has raised an alert for Office 365. The alert info and evidence events are grouped with the similarity into the same SEKOIA.IO alert.

  • Effort: master
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Agent Disabled

A SentinelOne agent has been disabled according to SentinelOne logs.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne Custom Rule Alert

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat related to a Custom Rule and raised an alert for it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Malicious Threat Detected And Mitigated Preemptively

A SentinelOne agent has detected a malicious threat which has been mitigated preemptively.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Malicious Threat Not Mitigated

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat but did not mitigate it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne SSO User Added

A SSO User was added.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Suspicious Threat Not Mitigated (Medium Confidence)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a medium confidence level (suspicious) but did not mitigate it.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Detected (Malicious)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a high confidence level (malicious).

  • Effort: elementary
SentinelOne Threat Detected (Suspicious)

A SentinelOne agent has detected a threat with a medium confidence level (suspicious).

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Kill Success

A SentinelOne agent has detected and killed a threat (usually kills the malicious process).

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Failed

A SentinelOne agent has failed to quarantine a threat.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Quarantine Success

A SentinelOne agent has detected and quarantined a threat with success.

  • Effort: advanced
SentinelOne Threat Mitigation Report Remediate Success

A SentinelOne agent has remediated a threat.

  • Effort: intermediate
SentinelOne User Failed To Log In To The Management Console

A user has failed to log in to the management console.

  • Effort: master
SentinelOne User Logged In To The Management Console

A user has logged in to the management console.

  • Effort: master
Smbexec.py Service Installation

Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation

  • Effort: elementary
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process

Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PsExec Execution

Detects execution of PsExec, different from the Sysinternals one. This rule helps to filter out the noise if PsExec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different PsExec client other than Sysinternals one. The prerequisite is to log the Event ID 5145 (by setting "Audit Policy > Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" to Success/Failure).

  • Effort: master
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Command Line Event Consumer

Detects WMI command line event consumers.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Update LolBins

This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: intermediate

Persistence

Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)

Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: advanced

Scheduled Task/Job

BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
Remote Task Creation Via ATSVC Named Pipe

Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC Named Pipe. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share policy.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Malware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.

  • Effort: master
Ryuk Ransomware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by the Ryuk ransomware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the command line (reg add).

  • Effort: intermediate

Valid Accounts

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Admin User RDP Remote Logon

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

  • Effort: master
Brute-Force On Fortinet Firewall Login

Spots many failed attempts to log on an administration interface.

  • Effort: master
Denied Access To Remote Desktop

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
Fortinet Firewall Successful External Login

Detects succesfull access to administration console of firewall from another IP address than 127.0.0.1. Prerequisites, check that the firewall logs format corresponds to the rule

  • Effort: master
Google Cloud Audit Account Suspended

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify a user account suspended for a suspicious activity

  • Effort: intermediate
Google Cloud Audit Attack Warning

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify an attack warning such as the famous "Government-backed attack".

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force On Firewall

Detects successful access to administration console of a firewall after several failure.

  • Effort: advanced
User Added to Local Administrators

Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients

  • Effort: intermediate

Account Manipulation

AWS IAM Failed User Creation

Detects an attemp to create a user account where the result is an explicit denied.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS IAM Password Policy Updated

Detects an update to the password policy. This could be an attempt to lower accounts security level.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS IAM Policy Changed

Detects change on AWS IAM Policy

  • Effort: master
AWS Root ConsoleLogin

Detects a login with a root account on AWS portal. It is a best practice to avoid root account usage for daily tasks and to create an IAM admin user.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Attempt

Detects when a request in success or failure is made to transfer a domain name to an other AWS account

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled

Detects when the transfer lock feature is disabled on a domain name handled by AWS Route 53 service.

  • Effort: elementary
Active Directory Delegate To KRBTGT Service

Detects potential persistence installation from an already compromised administrator domain account. The attacker will create a TGT and abuse a service account with the constrained delegation and update it with the krbtgt service. The detection relies on the Event ID 4738.

  • Effort: intermediate
Active Directory Replication User Backdoor

Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to regular user or machine account, this technics is often used to give ResetPassword or WriteMembers or DCSync permission(s) for persistency on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Active Directory User Backdoors

Detects scenarios where the attacker controls another user or computer account without having to use their credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system

  • Effort: advanced
Azure Active Directory Self Service Password Reset In Failure

Detects self-service password reset in failure for various reasons (except licence or policy ones)

  • Effort: master
Mimikatz Basic Commands

Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.

  • Effort: elementary
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified

Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).

  • Effort: advanced
SSH Authorized Key Alteration

The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision

  • Effort: advanced
SeEnableDelagationPrivilege Granted To User Or Machine In Active Directory

Detects the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory granted to a user of a computer, it would allow control of other AD user objects

  • Effort: elementary
User Added to Local Administrators

Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients

  • Effort: intermediate

Web Shell

Antivirus Web Shell Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary

Component Object Model Hijacking

Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master

External Remote Services

Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master

Create Account

CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
Local Account Created

Detects local user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

  • Effort: master
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created

Detects the creation of suspicious accounts simliar to ANONYMOUS LOGON, such as using additional spaces. Created as a covering detection for attackers trying to created an ANONYMOUS LOGON account as it is an account named used in internal Windows events and frequently filtered by attackers.

  • Effort: elementary

Office Application Startup

IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Office Startup Add-In

Detects add-ins that load when Microsoft Word or Excel starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel). The rule requires File Creation logging to work, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: elementary
Office Application Startup Office Test

Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.

  • Effort: elementary

BITS Jobs

BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced

Server Software Component

Antivirus Web Shell Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell Attempt

Detects CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell attempt against Microsoft Exchange Server, Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.

  • Effort: advanced
Default User www data User Compromised

User www_data by default cannot log and use a shell, any syscall of type execve induce user compromise

  • Effort: master
Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
ProxyLogon Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master

Create or Modify System Process

APT29 Fake Google Update Service Install

This method detects malicious services mentioned in APT29 report by FireEye. The legitimate path for the Google update service is C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe so the service names and executable locations used by APT29 are specific enough to be detected in log files.

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Service Creation Usage

Detects Cobalt Strike usage from an existing beacon when attacker tries to elevate or move laterally through a service creation.

  • Effort: elementary
Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: elementary
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
Gpscript Suspicious Parent

Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Service Installations

Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: intermediate
StoneDrill Service Install

This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Command Line Event Consumer

Detects WMI command line event consumers.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: intermediate

Event Triggered Execution

COM Hijack Via Sdclt

Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using sdclt.exe .

  • Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Registry Persistence Using 'Image File Execution' And 'SilentProcessExit' Keys

Detects persistence registry keys. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Scripting In A WMI Consumer

Detects suspicious scripting in WMI Event Consumers. The rule requires to log WMI Consumers, which can be done through Sysmon's Event IDs 20 and 21.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Event Subscription

Detects creation of WMI event subscription persistence method

  • Effort: advanced
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
DLL Load via LSASS Registry Key

Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events. This can be done with Sysmon events 12, 13 and 14 and monitor SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.

  • Effort: master
Narrator Feedback-Hub Persistence

The Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub registry key has been modified which could be done by an attacker for persistence purposes. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13). Careful since the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon's configuration needs to be changed to log for this specifically.

  • Effort: master
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Winlogon Helper DLL

Detects modifications to the Winlogon Registry keys, which may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.

  • Effort: intermediate
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
Registry Key Used By Some Old Agent Tesla Samples

Detects potential use of the RUN registry key to execute some Agent Tesla samples at boot. Prerequisites are to log for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Ryuk Ransomware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by the Ryuk ransomware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the command line (reg add).

  • Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced

Modify Authentication Process

KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate

Hijack Execution Flow

DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

  • Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL side loading from ProgramData

Detects suspicious DLL side-loading from C:\ProgramData where the DLL is not signed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack

Detects svchost process hijacking through DLL loading. IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote machine.

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking

Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done with Sysmon's Event IDs 12 and 13.

  • Effort: advanced

Privilege Execution

Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)

Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: advanced

Scheduled Task/Job

BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cron Files Alteration

Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
Remote Task Creation Via ATSVC Named Pipe

Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC Named Pipe. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share policy.

  • Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task

Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent

Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate

Process Injection

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Named Pipes

Detects the pipes established by Cobalt Strike to allow a communication between its beacons.

  • Effort: master
CreateRemoteThread Common Process Injection

Detects a possible process injection through CreateRemoteThread() which is spotted by EventID 8 from Sysmon and several EDRs. This rule has a list of process commonly being injected by the attackers that should be updated regularly.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynwrapx Module Loading

Detects the loading of DynamicWrapperX (Dynwrapx). It is used by some malware in their infection chain and could help to detect its usage from vbs/wscript/cscript scripts. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 7).

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
Malicious Named Pipe

Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known malware. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and 18).

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Herpaderping

Detection of process herpaderping using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been locked for access. Several processes have been excluded to avoid FPs.

  • Effort: master
Process Hollowing Detection

Detection of process hollowing using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been replaced in a process memory.

  • Effort: master
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: intermediate

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-4034 Polkit's pkexec

Detection of Polkit's pkexec exploit

  • Effort: intermediate
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious New Printer Ports In Registry

Detects a suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048. The CVE-2020-1048 consists in gaining persistence, privilege by abusing a flaw in the Print Spooler service to execute a payload whose path is stored in the registry key. To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master

Valid Accounts

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Admin User RDP Remote Logon

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

  • Effort: master
Brute-Force On Fortinet Firewall Login

Spots many failed attempts to log on an administration interface.

  • Effort: master
Denied Access To Remote Desktop

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
Fortinet Firewall Successful External Login

Detects succesfull access to administration console of firewall from another IP address than 127.0.0.1. Prerequisites, check that the firewall logs format corresponds to the rule

  • Effort: master
Google Cloud Audit Account Suspended

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify a user account suspended for a suspicious activity

  • Effort: intermediate
Google Cloud Audit Attack Warning

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify an attack warning such as the famous "Government-backed attack".

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force On Firewall

Detects successful access to administration console of a firewall after several failure.

  • Effort: advanced
User Added to Local Administrators

Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients

  • Effort: intermediate

Web Shell

Antivirus Web Shell Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary

Access Token Manipulation

Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Possible RottenPotato Attack

Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.

  • Effort: intermediate

Domain Policy Modification

Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified

Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).

  • Effort: advanced

Create or Modify System Process

APT29 Fake Google Update Service Install

This method detects malicious services mentioned in APT29 report by FireEye. The legitimate path for the Google update service is C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe so the service names and executable locations used by APT29 are specific enough to be detected in log files.

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Service Creation Usage

Detects Cobalt Strike usage from an existing beacon when attacker tries to elevate or move laterally through a service creation.

  • Effort: elementary
Csrss Child Found

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent

Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: elementary
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
Gpscript Suspicious Parent

Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Logonui Wrong Parent

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Service Installations

Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Logonui Child Found

Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.

  • Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found

Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Child Found

SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process

Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: intermediate
StoneDrill Service Install

This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell

Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found

Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Userinit Wrong Parent

Userinit.exe is a key process in the Windows operating system. On boot-up it manages the different start up sequences needed, such as establishing network connection and starting up the Windows shell. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Command Line Event Consumer

Detects WMI command line event consumers.

  • Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent

Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winlogon wrong parent

Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Winrshost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.

  • Effort: intermediate
Winword wrong parent

Word is a well known Windows process used to read documents. Some malicious process could use it to run malicious code. The rule tries to detect winword.exe launched with a suspect parent process name.

  • Effort: advanced
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: intermediate

Event Triggered Execution

COM Hijack Via Sdclt

Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using sdclt.exe .

  • Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Registry Persistence Using 'Image File Execution' And 'SilentProcessExit' Keys

Detects persistence registry keys. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage

Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Scripting In A WMI Consumer

Detects suspicious scripting in WMI Event Consumers. The rule requires to log WMI Consumers, which can be done through Sysmon's Event IDs 20 and 21.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Event Subscription

Detects creation of WMI event subscription persistence method

  • Effort: advanced
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
DLL Load via LSASS Registry Key

Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events. This can be done with Sysmon events 12, 13 and 14 and monitor SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems.

  • Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.

  • Effort: master
Narrator Feedback-Hub Persistence

The Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub registry key has been modified which could be done by an attacker for persistence purposes. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13). Careful since the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon's configuration needs to be changed to log for this specifically.

  • Effort: master
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Winlogon Helper DLL

Detects modifications to the Winlogon Registry keys, which may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.

  • Effort: intermediate
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder

Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
Registry Key Used By Some Old Agent Tesla Samples

Detects potential use of the RUN registry key to execute some Agent Tesla samples at boot. Prerequisites are to log for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Ryuk Ransomware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by the Ryuk ransomware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the command line (reg add).

  • Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration

Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

  • Effort: intermediate
COM Hijack Via Sdclt

Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using sdclt.exe .

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Capabilities Discovery

Linux capabilities are special attributes in the Linux kernel that grant processes and binary executables specific privileges that are normally reserved for processes whose effective user ID is 0 (The root user, and only the root user, has UID 0). This rule aims to detect discovery of such capabilities on the Linux system.

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer

Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.

  • Effort: elementary
Unusual Process Executed in Temporary Directory

Identifies processes running in a temporary folder. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware.

  • Effort: master

Hijack Execution Flow

DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

  • Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL side loading from ProgramData

Detects suspicious DLL side-loading from C:\ProgramData where the DLL is not signed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack

Detects svchost process hijacking through DLL loading. IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote machine.

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking

Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done with Sysmon's Event IDs 12 and 13.

  • Effort: advanced

Defense Evasion

Obfuscated Files or Information

PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework

  • Effort: advanced
Secure Deletion With SDelete

Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. SDelete is a tool that permits to securely delete files by overwriting them (no recovery possible). Few threat actors are using it to delete traces of their malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.

  • Effort: advanced

Masquerading

Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects a suspicious execution from an uncommon folder

  • Effort: master
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262

Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
Formbook Hijacked Process Command

Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.

  • Effort: intermediate
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder

Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.

  • Effort: advanced
New Or Renamed User Account With '$' In Attribute 'SamAccountName'

Detects possible bypass EDR and SIEM via abnormal user account name.

  • Effort: intermediate
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: advanced

Process Injection

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Named Pipes

Detects the pipes established by Cobalt Strike to allow a communication between its beacons.

  • Effort: master
CreateRemoteThread Common Process Injection

Detects a possible process injection through CreateRemoteThread() which is spotted by EventID 8 from Sysmon and several EDRs. This rule has a list of process commonly being injected by the attackers that should be updated regularly.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynwrapx Module Loading

Detects the loading of DynamicWrapperX (Dynwrapx). It is used by some malware in their infection chain and could help to detect its usage from vbs/wscript/cscript scripts. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 7).

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Wrong Parent

Detects suspicious spawning of explorer.exe process created by the rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe. This behaviour is abnormal. Malware injecting itself into the explorer.exe process is quite common, in order to evade process-based defenses.

  • Effort: elementary
Malicious Named Pipe

Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known malware. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and 18).

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Herpaderping

Detection of process herpaderping using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been locked for access. Several processes have been excluded to avoid FPs.

  • Effort: master
Process Hollowing Detection

Detection of process hollowing using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been replaced in a process memory.

  • Effort: master
Searchindexer Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.

  • Effort: intermediate
Smss Wrong Parent

Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent

Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL

Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost Wrong Parent

Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).

  • Effort: advanced
Taskhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Taskhostw Wrong Parent

Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmiprvse Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wmiprvse process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The wmiprvse.exe process (wmiprvse stands for Microsoft Windows Management Instrumentation) is a generic process for managing clients on Windows. It is initialized the first time a client application connects and allows you to monitor system resources. This requires Windows command line logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent

Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).

  • Effort: intermediate

Scripting

Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary

Indicator Removal

AWS KMS CMK Key Deleted

Detects when a CMK is deleted or scheduled for deletion

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history

  • Effort: advanced
Eventlog Cleared

Some threat groups tend to delete local EventLogs (Security being the most common one to be deleted) using certain utilities. The EventID 517 is old and 1102 should be used for this instead on newer Windows versions.

  • Effort: intermediate
Secure Deletion With SDelete

Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. SDelete is a tool that permits to securely delete files by overwriting them (no recovery possible). Few threat actors are using it to delete traces of their malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender History Deleted

Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: master
Windows Defender History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Tampering Detected

Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.

  • Effort: intermediate

Valid Accounts

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Admin User RDP Remote Logon

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

  • Effort: master
Brute-Force On Fortinet Firewall Login

Spots many failed attempts to log on an administration interface.

  • Effort: master
Denied Access To Remote Desktop

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Failed Logon Source From Public IP Addresses

A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. The sekoia.tags are used to filter internal Ipv4 addresses (10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 127.0.0.0/8 169.254.0.0/16 192.168.0.0/16).

  • Effort: master
Fortinet Firewall Successful External Login

Detects succesfull access to administration console of firewall from another IP address than 127.0.0.1. Prerequisites, check that the firewall logs format corresponds to the rule

  • Effort: master
Google Cloud Audit Account Suspended

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify a user account suspended for a suspicious activity

  • Effort: intermediate
Google Cloud Audit Attack Warning

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify an attack warning such as the famous "Government-backed attack".

  • Effort: intermediate
Login Brute-Force On Firewall

Detects successful access to administration console of a firewall after several failure.

  • Effort: advanced
User Added to Local Administrators

Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients

  • Effort: intermediate

Rundll32

PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate

Disabling Security Tools

AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted

Detects when an attacker is trying to evade defenses by deleting a GuardDuty detector

  • Effort: elementary

Modify Registry

Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt

Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events for this specific registry key is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Disable Workstation Lock

Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.

  • Effort: elementary
FlowCloud Malware

Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.

  • Effort: elementary
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack

Detects changes in Windows Registry key (LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec or RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) which can lead to NetNTLM downgrade attack. The rule requires to log registry keys creation or update, it can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
OceanLotus Registry Activity

Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Port Change Using Powershell

Detects RDP port configuration change using a PowerShell command such as 'Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name PortNumber -Value XXX Restart-Service termservice -force'. Threat actors can change RDP to another port to bypass protections, avoid detection based on the port, or to take full control of the system.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed

Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility

Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation. This requires Windows Security events logging.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution

Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious New Printer Ports In Registry

Detects a suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048. The CVE-2020-1048 consists in gaining persistence, privilege by abusing a flaw in the Print Spooler service to execute a payload whose path is stored in the registry key. To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Ursnif Registry Key

Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential

Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary

Component Object Model Hijacking

Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master

Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution

MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate

Access Token Manipulation

Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Possible RottenPotato Attack

Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.

  • Effort: intermediate

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

FromBase64String Command Line

Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate

CMSTP

CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate

BITS Jobs

BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced

Indirect Command Execution

CVE 2022-1292

The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.

  • Effort: advanced

Rogue Domain Controller

DC Shadow via Service Principal Name (SPN) creation

Detects DCShadow via new Service Principal Name (SPN) creation

  • Effort: intermediate

Exploitation for Defense Evasion

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash

Detects a crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine process (MsMpEng.exe), which is suspicious and could be related to an attacker disabling the Windows protection.

  • Effort: intermediate
SharePoint Authenticated SSRF

Detects succesful SSRF from an authenticated SharePoint user.

  • Effort: elementary

System Binary Proxy Execution

CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

  • Effort: master
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Dynwrapx Module Loading

Detects the loading of DynamicWrapperX (Dynwrapx). It is used by some malware in their infection chain and could help to detect its usage from vbs/wscript/cscript scripts. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 7).

  • Effort: advanced
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel

Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.

  • Effort: elementary
MOFComp Execution

Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL

Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).

  • Effort: elementary
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL

Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution

Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate

XSL Script Processing

WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries

Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the /FORMAT argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). The rule requires to log Loaded DLLs to work properly, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 7.

  • Effort: master
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate

File and Directory Permissions Modification

AD Object WriteDAC Access

Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object. This requires Windows Event ID 4662.

  • Effort: elementary
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.

  • Effort: master
File and Directory Permissions Modification

Detects the use of chmod to give high level permissions to file that might be binary files

  • Effort: advanced
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary

Domain Policy Modification

Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified

Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).

  • Effort: advanced

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access

Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects

  • Effort: intermediate
COM Hijack Via Sdclt

Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using sdclt.exe .

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Capabilities Discovery

Linux capabilities are special attributes in the Linux kernel that grant processes and binary executables specific privileges that are normally reserved for processes whose effective user ID is 0 (The root user, and only the root user, has UID 0). This rule aims to detect discovery of such capabilities on the Linux system.

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper

Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer

Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.

  • Effort: elementary
Unusual Process Executed in Temporary Directory

Identifies processes running in a temporary folder. This is sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware.

  • Effort: master

Use Alternate Authentication Material

Abusing Azure Browser SSO

Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Potential RDP Connection To Non-Domain Host

Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain using RDP (TermSrv). Event ID 8001 corresponds to outgoing NTLM authentication traffic and TermSrv stands for RDP Terminal Services Server. Check if the contacted host is legitimate. To use this detection rule, enable logging of outbound NTLM authentications on all domain controllers, using the following Group Policy (GPO) - Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers -> Define this policy setting: Audit all.

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
Successful Overpass The Hash Attempt

Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.

  • Effort: intermediate

Subvert Trust Controls

Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate

Modify Authentication Process

KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate

Impair Defenses

AWS CloudTrail Important Change

Detects disabling, deleting and updating of a Trail source which could be done by some attackers trying to masquerade their activity.

  • Effort: advanced
AWS Config Disable Channel/Recorder

Detects AWS Config Service disabling channel or recorder

  • Effort: elementary
AWS Disable MFA

Detects a user disabling the multi factor authentication mechanism for its account. It could be a sign of malicious activity.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS EC2 Security Group Modified

Detects when an AWS EC2 security group has been modified

  • Effort: master
AWS EventBridge Rule Disabled Or Deleted

Detects when an attacker is trying to evade defenses by deleting or disabling EventBridge rules

  • Effort: master
AWS GuardDuty Detector Suspended

Detects the suspension of the GuardDuty service

  • Effort: elementary
AWS GuardDuty Disruption

Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS Remove Flow logs

Detects when an attacker is removing Flow Logs to cover their tracks

  • Effort: elementary
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt

Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events for this specific registry key is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Windows Defender Credential Guard

Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Disabled Service

Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.

  • Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Loss Of Parsing

Spots the loss of events parsing by SEKOIA.IO, could indicate a loss of valid events flow. The strategy is to focus on less frequent event to limit the impact of the skewness in the count distribution law.

  • Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash

Detects a crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine process (MsMpEng.exe), which is suspicious and could be related to an attacker disabling the Windows protection.

  • Effort: intermediate
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack

Detects changes in Windows Registry key (LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec or RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) which can lead to NetNTLM downgrade attack. The rule requires to log registry keys creation or update, it can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location

Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware

  • Effort: intermediate
Package Manager Alteration

Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Anti Debug Checking

Entries in /proc/self/status are used by malware to checks if current process is being debug

  • Effort: master
Python Opening Ports

Detects when the Windows Filtering Platform has permitted Python.exe to listen on a port for incoming connections. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Ryuk Ransomware Command Line

Detects Ryuk Ransomware - Command lines stop services.

  • Effort: elementary
SELinux Disabling

An attacker can disable SELinux to make workstation or server compromise easier as it disables several protections.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspect Svchost Memory Access

Detects suspect access to svchost process memory such as that used by Invoke-Phantom (v1.0) to kill the winRM windows event logging service.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Driver Loaded

Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Windows Defender Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Configuration Changed

Detects when an feature configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (enabling or disabling real-time protection, etc.)

  • Effort: master
Windows Defender Deactivation Using PowerShell Script

Detects attempts to deactivate Windows Defender with PowerShell using ScriptBlockLogging.

  • Effort: master
Windows Defender Disabled

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line or registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration).

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Exclusion Configuration

Detects when an exclusion configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (adding either a path or process bypass)

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender scan and updates. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Defender Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Tampering Detected

Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.

  • Effort: intermediate
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master

Hide Artifacts

Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell - NTFS Alternate Data Stream

Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from PowerShell. Needs Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)

  • Effort: advanced

Hijack Execution Flow

DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

  • Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: advanced
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378

Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL side loading from ProgramData

Detects suspicious DLL side-loading from C:\ProgramData where the DLL is not signed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack

Detects svchost process hijacking through DLL loading. IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote machine.

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking

Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done with Sysmon's Event IDs 12 and 13.

  • Effort: advanced

Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure

AWS EC2 Subnet Deleted

Detects when an attacker is destroying an EC2 subnet.

  • Effort: master
AWS ECS Cluster Deleted

Detects when an attacker is destroying an AWS ECS Cluster

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS IAM Failed User Creation

Detects an attemp to create a user account where the result is an explicit denied.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS IAM Password Policy Updated

Detects an update to the password policy. This could be an attempt to lower accounts security level.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS IAM Policy Changed

Detects change on AWS IAM Policy

  • Effort: master
AWS Root ConsoleLogin

Detects a login with a root account on AWS portal. It is a best practice to avoid root account usage for daily tasks and to create an IAM admin user.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Attempt

Detects when a request in success or failure is made to transfer a domain name to an other AWS account

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled

Detects when the transfer lock feature is disabled on a domain name handled by AWS Route 53 service.

  • Effort: elementary

Network Boundary Bridging

Loss Of Parsing

Spots the loss of events parsing by SEKOIA.IO, could indicate a loss of valid events flow. The strategy is to focus on less frequent event to limit the impact of the skewness in the count distribution law.

  • Effort: master
SharePoint Authenticated SSRF

Detects succesful SSRF from an authenticated SharePoint user.

  • Effort: elementary

Credential Access

OS Credential Dumping

Access Denied On Sensitive Files

An access has been denied while opening or editing sensitives files.

  • Effort: advanced
Active Directory Database Dump Via Ntdsutil

Detects the dump of ntdis.dit database by using the utility ntdsutil.exe. NTDS.dit database stores Active Directory data, including passwords hashes for all users in the domain.

  • Effort: elementary
Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account

Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. It requires a configuration step where the legit service account should be added to the exclusion list.

  • Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files

Process with well-known names (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation.

  • Effort: intermediate
Credential Dumping By LaZagne

Detects LSASS process access by LaZagne for credential dumping.

  • Effort: elementary
Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution

Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Credential Dumping-Tools Common Named Pipes

Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipes. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config

  • Effort: master
DCSync Attack

Detects DCSync attack, it is highly likely that the post-exploitation tool Mimikatz was executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction

Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers

  • Effort: intermediate
Dumpert LSASS Process Dumper

Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory

  • Effort: elementary
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Process Names

Detects the default process name of several HackTools. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Secretsdump.py Tool

Detects credential dumping via secretdump of impacket suite.

  • Effort: intermediate
LSASS Access From Non System Account

Detects LSASS Access from Non System Account (e.g. Mimikatz)

  • Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump

Detects process accessing LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools

  • Effort: intermediate
LSASS Memory Dump File Creation

LSASS memory dump creation using operating systems utilities. Procdump will use process name in output file if no name is specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Load Of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL From Suspicious Process

Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes. Many tools import dbghelp.dll and / or dbgcore.dll to use the MiniDumpWriteDump function. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine. Dumpert from OUTFLANK also uses this.

  • Effort: advanced
Lsass Access Through WinRM

Detects the access of LSASS.exe process through Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol. This is often done using Invoke-Mimikatz -ComputerName command, which uses PSRemoting and therefore WinRM. However, this is not limited to the Mimikatz threat and can be done by other tools as well. This rule needs Process Access monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's event ID 10.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Service Installations

Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Mimikatz Basic Commands

Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.

  • Effort: elementary
Mimikatz LSASS Memory Access

Detection of in-memory Mimikatz by focusing on processes opening the Local Security Authority (Lsass.exe) process and reading the memory contents of it. This probably means that Mimikatz has been executed on the host, meaning the attacker already has high privileges and is looking to dump credentials, most likely for lateral movement or privilege escalation purposes.

  • Effort: intermediate
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack

Detects changes in Windows Registry key (LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec or RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) which can lead to NetNTLM downgrade attack. The rule requires to log registry keys creation or update, it can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Dumper Activity On LSASS

Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific proces memory. This techinique is widlely used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dumping From proc Filesystem

Attacker might want to leverage their permission on the system or steal authentication to third parties software, website, etc.. To do so, attacker might try to dump memory of interesting process, for instance ftp-server or web server to dig for authentication login and password.

  • Effort: master
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Dropped File

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook

  • Effort: elementary
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SAM Registry Hive Handle Request

Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious SAM Dump

Detects suspicious SAM dump to AppData repository, as cause by QuarksPwDump and other password dumpers. Logging for Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General Event ID 16 or Sysmon Event ID 11 is needed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Transfering Files With Credential Data Via Network Shares

Detects file transfer of sensitive files which contain credential data using network shares.

  • Effort: intermediate
Unsigned Image Loaded Into LSASS Process

Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process. To activate this rule you need to monitor loaded images into the LSASS process, this can be done with SYSMON Event ID 7.

  • Effort: advanced
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential

Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary

Network Sniffing

Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

  • Effort: elementary

Brute Force

Brute-Force On Fortinet Firewall Login

Spots many failed attempts to log on an administration interface.

  • Effort: master
Fortinet Firewall Login In Failure

Detects failed login attemps on firewall administration rule. Prerequisites, check that the firewall logs format corresponds to the rule

  • Effort: master
Fortinet Firewall Successful External Login

Detects succesfull access to administration console of firewall from another IP address than 127.0.0.1. Prerequisites, check that the firewall logs format corresponds to the rule

  • Effort: master
Login Brute-Force On Firewall

Detects successful access to administration console of a firewall after several failure.

  • Effort: advanced
Password Change Brute-Force On AzureAD

A change of password has failed on Azure Active Directory, 5 times for the same user

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Reset Error Brute-Force On AzureAD

A reset of password has failed on Azure Active Directory, 5 times within the same entity.

  • Effort: intermediate

Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

Multiple Authentication On Office 365 Portal From Two IP Addresses

Detection of login events from two IP addresses within 3mn, as it could happen if someone got phished with a tool like Evilginx2.

  • Effort: intermediate

Exploitation for Credential Access

Abusing Azure Browser SSO

Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary

Steal Application Access Token

Abusing Azure Browser SSO

Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master

Unsecured Credentials

Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Google Cloud Audit 2FA Disabled

Detects when Google Cloud Audit notify the 2FA deactivation for a user account.

  • Effort: intermediate
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility

Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation. This requires Windows Security events logging.

  • Effort: master
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced

Credentials from Password Stores

Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs

Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary

Modify Authentication Process

KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate

Adversary-in-the-Middle

Multiple Authentication On Office 365 Portal From Two IP Addresses

Detection of login events from two IP addresses within 3mn, as it could happen if someone got phished with a tool like Evilginx2.

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible RottenPotato Attack

Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.

  • Effort: intermediate

Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Rubeus Register New Logon Process

Detects potential use of Rubeus through registering a new logon process. This rule needs the EventID 4611, which can be configured through Group Policies (Audit Security System Extension)

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection

Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.

  • Effort: advanced
User Couldn't Call A Privileged Service LsaRegisterLogonProcess

The LsaRegisterLogonProcess function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA. This rule requires to log the Event ID 4673, which can be done by updating the Audit Policy.

  • Effort: master

Discovery

System Service Discovery

PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
SCM Database Handle Failure

Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.

  • Effort: master
SCM Database Privileged Operation

Detects non-system users performing privileged operation on the SCM database

  • Effort: master

Query Registry

Putty Sessions Listing

Detects attempts to list Putty sessions through registry. To fully work, this rule requires to log registry accesses, which can be done with the Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 but for that specific configuration is needed.

  • Effort: master
Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility

Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation. This requires Windows Security events logging.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
SysKey Registry Keys Access

Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey. The SysKey allows to decrypt Security Account Mannager (SAM) database entries (from registry or hive) and get NTLM, and sometimes LM hashes of local accounts passwords. Adversaries can calculate the Syskey by using RegOpenKeyEx/RegQueryInfoKey API calls to query the appropriate class info and values from the HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\JD, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Skew1, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\GBG, and HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Data keys.

  • Effort: elementary

Remote System Discovery

Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced

System Owner/User Discovery

RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing

Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) and Turla Mosquito (RAT)

  • Effort: elementary

Network Service Discovery

Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master

System Network Connections Discovery

Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands

Detects command lines with suspicious args

  • Effort: advanced
Discovery Commands Correlation

Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.

  • Effort: intermediate

Permission Groups Discovery

Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced

System Information Discovery

Discovery Commands Correlation

Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.

  • Effort: intermediate
List Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host

  • Effort: master

Account Discovery

AD Privileged Users Or Groups Reconnaissance

Detect privileged users or groups reconnaissance based on 4661 Event ID and known privileged users or groups SIDs. If the user account name is not a known admin it is suspicious.

  • Effort: master
AD User Enumeration

Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account. This requires Windows Security Event ID 4662 and could be triggered by some administrators configuring new users.

  • Effort: master
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Discovery Commands Correlation

Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.

  • Effort: intermediate
Phosphorus (APT35) Exchange Discovery

According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about its the environment of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers. The command is the following: Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders

  • Effort: elementary
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced

Network Share Discovery

Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.

  • Effort: master
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced

Domain Trust Discovery

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: intermediate
Phosphorus Domain Controller Discovery

According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about the Domain Controller. The command is the following: "powershell.exe" /c Get-WMIObject Win32_NTDomain | findstr DomainController

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
Trickbot Malware Activity

Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe

  • Effort: intermediate

Software Discovery

WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: intermediate

Lateral Movement

Remote Services

Admin Share Access

Detects access to $ADMIN share. The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure. Also be very cautious to previously check if this is not commonly used by your administrators as to remotely manage your computers.

  • Effort: master
Cobalt Strike Default Service Creation Usage

Detects Cobalt Strike usage from an existing beacon when attacker tries to elevate or move laterally through a service creation.

  • Effort: elementary
Denied Access To Remote Desktop

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lateral Movement - Remote Named Pipe

Detects lateral movement and remote exec using named pipe over network. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share enable policy.

  • Effort: advanced
Lsass Access Through WinRM

Detects the access of LSASS.exe process through Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol. This is often done using Invoke-Mimikatz -ComputerName command, which uses PSRemoting and therefore WinRM. However, this is not limited to the Mimikatz threat and can be done by other tools as well. This rule needs Process Access monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's event ID 10.

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC Spawning Windows Shell

Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process

  • Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement

Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.

  • Effort: intermediate
Protected Storage Service Access

Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. It could identify potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers.

  • Effort: master
RDP Login From Localhost

Detects RDP login from localhost source address, which may be a tunnelled login to bypass network restrictions.

  • Effort: elementary
RDP Port Change Using Powershell

Detects RDP port configuration change using a PowerShell command such as 'Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name PortNumber -Value XXX Restart-Service termservice -force'. Threat actors can change RDP to another port to bypass protections, avoid detection based on the port, or to take full control of the system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Remote Service Activity Via SVCCTL Named Pipe

Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe

  • Effort: advanced
Smbexec.py Service Installation

Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation

  • Effort: elementary

Replication Through Removable Media

External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device

Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB device.

  • Effort: advanced

Exploitation of Remote Services

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-0708 Scan

Detects the use of a scanner that discovers targets vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep.

  • Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter

Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).

  • Effort: master

Use Alternate Authentication Material

Abusing Azure Browser SSO

Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

  • Effort: master
Potential RDP Connection To Non-Domain Host

Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain using RDP (TermSrv). Event ID 8001 corresponds to outgoing NTLM authentication traffic and TermSrv stands for RDP Terminal Services Server. Check if the contacted host is legitimate. To use this detection rule, enable logging of outbound NTLM authentications on all domain controllers, using the following Group Policy (GPO) - Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers -> Define this policy setting: Audit all.

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
Successful Overpass The Hash Attempt

Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.

  • Effort: intermediate

Collection

Data from Local System

AWS EC2 VM Export Failure

Detects attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance. A VM Export might indicate an attempt to extract information from an instance.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Formbook File Creation DB1

Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs

Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.

  • Effort: intermediate

Data from Network Shared Drive

Suspicious Access To Sensitive File Extensions

Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share. This activity could possibly correspond to a malicious one (removing backup, reading sensitive files, etc.).

  • Effort: master

Data Staged

CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced

Email Collection

Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Google Cloud Audit Email Forwarding

Detects when an out of domain email forwarding is enabled on Google Cloud.

  • Effort: advanced
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: elementary

Audio Capture

Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate

Adversary-in-the-Middle

Multiple Authentication On Office 365 Portal From Two IP Addresses

Detection of login events from two IP addresses within 3mn, as it could happen if someone got phished with a tool like Evilginx2.

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible RottenPotato Attack

Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.

  • Effort: intermediate

Archive Collected Data

Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Data Compressed

Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration)

  • Effort: advanced

Command and Control

Data Obfuscation

Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool

Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used

Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. Careful as the 5136 is only on domain controllers and needs to be activated through the Group Policy.

  • Effort: intermediate

Application Layer Protocol

Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)

Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA

  • Effort: elementary
Chafer (APT 39) Activity

Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons. We only keep the a high number of DNS requests to avoid false positives.

  • Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike HTTP Default GET beaconing

Detects GET HTTP queries from known Cobalt Strike beacons (source code 4.3)

  • Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike HTTP Default POST Beaconing

Detects POST HTTP queries from known Cobalt Strike beacons (source code 4.3)

  • Effort: advanced
Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing

Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls

  • Effort: intermediate
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater

Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.

  • Effort: elementary
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests

Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
LokiBot Default C2 URL

Detects default C2 URL for trojan LokiBot

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Potential LokiBot User-Agent

Detects potential LokiBot communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: intermediate
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

  • Effort: elementary
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sliver DNS Beaconing

Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used

Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. Careful as the 5136 is only on domain controllers and needs to be activated through the Group Policy.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries

Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).

  • Effort: advanced
TrevorC2 HTTP Communication

Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.

  • Effort: elementary

Proxy

Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Hostname

Detects suspicious hostnames such as ones with kali in it, to detect kali linux default hosts, but also other hostnames commonly used in attacks. List can be improved according to the environment.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: advanced
TOR Usage

Detects TOR usage, based on the IP address and the destination port (filtered on NTP). TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master

Web Service

Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced

Ingress Tool Transfer

Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs

Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Connection Via Certutil

Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution

Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate

Data Encoding

DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate

Remote Access Software

Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Antivirus Password Dumper Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This detection relies on Windows Defender events logs. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).

  • Effort: elementary
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts

Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This is only based on Windows Defender events.

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master

Non-Standard Port

RDP Port Change Using Powershell

Detects RDP port configuration change using a PowerShell command such as 'Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name PortNumber -Value XXX Restart-Service termservice -force'. Threat actors can change RDP to another port to bypass protections, avoid detection based on the port, or to take full control of the system.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on suspicious network arguments in processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate

Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
SSH Port Binding

When a user uses SSH tunneling in Linux, the sshd process binds sockets to communicate with the client machine via a ssh tunnel. With SSH tunneling, the SSH server can be used as a getaway to access internal systems. The traffic will seem to be coming from the SSH server whereas it only acts as a relay for an attacker. By using this technique, an attacker can successfully bypass external firewall rules. This rule is the most basic one (compared to the other one - SSH Tunnel), however it can detect the -D option in the ssh command if the machine is the client. This rule will detect the port binding (port 6010) when X11 forwarding is used. It will detect -R (server side), -D (client side) -X (server side), -Y (server side) and -L (client side) port binding.

  • Effort: advanced
SSH Tunnel Traffic

When a user creates and uses a SSH tunnel in Linux, the sshd process opens sockets to communicate with other machines or ports. With SSH tunneling, the SSH server can be used as a getaway to access internal systems. The traffic will seem to be coming from the SSH server whereas it only acts as a relay for an attacker. By using this technique, an attacker can successfully bypass external firewall rules and gain foothold to your network, allowing him to scan,hunt and attack your internal systems. This rule includes a filter on port 22, this filter is created to avoid false positive when a user is connecting via ssh. If you do not use port 22 for your machines, please create an alert filter.

  • Effort: advanced
SSH X11 Forwarding

When a user creates and uses SSH X11 Forwarding in Linux, the sshd process opens sockets to communicate with the client machine via a ssh tunnel. X11 forwarding is used to deport graphic programs on the client side.

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment

  • Effort: intermediate

Exfiltration

Automated Exfiltration

AWS RDS Change Master Password

Detects the change of database master password. It may be a part of data exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS RDS Public DB Restore

Detects the recovery of a new public database instance from a snapshot. It may be a part of data exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Python Exfiltration Tools

Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker

  • Effort: advanced

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: elementary
Remote File Copy

Detects the use of remote tools that copy files from or to remote systems

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
TUN/TAP Driver Installation

Detects the installation of the TUN or TAP driver service, this activity could be related to data exfiltration using tunneling techniques. The TUN/TAP Windows Adapter is a network driver that enables some VPN providers to facilitate a VPN connection to their server. TUN/TAP driver is only used by specific VPNs (e.g. OpenVPN, Wireguard), not by thoses based on IKE protocols (e.g. IPsec).

  • Effort: intermediate

Transfer Data to Cloud Account

AWS EC2 VM Export Failure

Detects attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance. A VM Export might indicate an attempt to extract information from an instance.

  • Effort: intermediate

Exfiltration Over Web Service

Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Outgoing Bytes Peak

Spots outgoing bytes traffic peak to detect a data exfiltration.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced

Impact

Data Destruction

AWS ECS Cluster Deleted

Detects when an attacker is destroying an AWS ECS Cluster

  • Effort: intermediate
AWS RDS DB Cluster/Instance Deleted

Detects when an attacker is destroying a RDS Cluster or Instance

  • Effort: advanced
Backup Catalog Deleted

The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Secure Deletion With SDelete

Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. SDelete is a tool that permits to securely delete files by overwriting them (no recovery possible). Few threat actors are using it to delete traces of their malware.

  • Effort: intermediate

Data Encrypted for Impact

RYUK Ransomeware - martinstevens Username

Detects user name "martinstevens". Wizard Spider is used to add the user name "martinstevens" to the AD of its victims. It was observed in several campaigns; in 2019 and 2020.

  • Effort: elementary
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary

Service Stop

Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Disabled Service

Service disabling can be abused by attacker to deny security mecanisms (eg: firewall, EDR, ect) and it is also often used by cryptominer to exploit as much RAM & CPU as possible on infected host.

  • Effort: advanced

Inhibit System Recovery

Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services

Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: master
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary

Endpoint Denial of Service

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability

  • Effort: elementary

Account Access Removal

Local Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified

Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).

  • Effort: advanced