Log Insight Windows

Overview

Vendor:
Supported environment:
Version compatibility:
Detection based on: Telemetry
Supported application or feature: Microsoft Windows is a popular operating system developed by Microsoft since 1985.

It's available in three variants:

Windows for desktop/laptop computers, tablets and smartphones
Windows Server for servers
Windows PE as a lightweight version.

Configure

As of now, the main solution to collect Windows logs with Log Insight leverages the Rsyslog recipe. Please share your experiences with other recipes by editing this documentation.

Rsyslog

Please refer to the documentation of Linux to forward events to your rsyslog server. The reader can consult the Rsyslog Transport documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.

Raw Events Samples

In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.

account_modificationlogoff_messlogon_messlogon_mess_frpass_chprocess2

Un compte d’utilisateur a été modifié.#015#012#015#012Sujet :#015#012#011ID de sécurité :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN$#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#011ID d’ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#015#012Compte cible :#015#012#011ID de sécurité :#011#011S-1-5-21-241366212-796369622-1890169025-500#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#015#012Attributs modifiés :#015#012#011Nom du compte SAM :#011USERNAME#015#012#011Nom complet :#011#011<valeur non définie>#015#012#011Nom principal de l’utilisateur :#011-#015#012#011Répertoire de base :#011#011<valeur non définie>#015#012#011Lecteur de base :#011#011<valeur non définie>#015#012#011Chemin d’accès au script :#011#011<valeur non définie>#015#012#011Chemin d’accès au profil :#011#011<valeur non définie>#015#012#011Stations de travail utilisateurs :#011<valeur non définie>#015#012#011Dernière modification du mot de passe le :#01110/06/2020 14:27:09#015#012#011Le compte expire le :#011#011<jamais>#015#012#011ID de groupe principal :#011513#015#012#011Délégué autorisé :#011-#015#012#011Ancienne valeur UAC :#011#0110x210#015#012#011Nouvelle valeur UAC :#011#0110x210#015#012#011Contrôle du compte d’utilisateur :#011-#015#012#011Paramètres utilisateur :#011-#015#012#011Historique SID :#011#011-#015#012#011Horaire d’accès :#011#011Tout#015#012#015#012Informations supplémentaires :#015#012#011Privilèges:#011#011-

An account was logged off.#015#012#015#012Subject:#015#012#011Security ID:#011#011S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000#015#012#011Account Name:#011#011username#015#012#011Account Domain:#011#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Logon ID:#011#0110x523d454d#015#012#015#012Logon Type:#011#011#0115#015#012#015#012This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.

An account was successfully logged on.#015#012#015#012Subject:#015#012#011Security ID:#011#011S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000#015#012#011Account Name:#011#011username#015#012#011Account Domain:#011#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Logon ID:#011#0110x1bc9bbee#015#012#015#012Logon Type:#011#011#0115#015#012#015#012New Logon:#015#012#011Security ID:#011#011S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000#015#012#011Account Name:#011#011username#015#012#011Account Domain:#011#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Logon ID:#011#0110x222c4f34#015#012#011Logon GUID:#011#011{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}#015#012#015#012Process Information:#015#012#011Process ID:#011#0110x5df8#015#012#011Process Name:#011#011C:\ABSciex\drm\xGate.exe#015#012#015#012Network Information:#015#012#011Workstation Name:#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Source Network Address:#011-#015#012#011Source Port:#011#011-#015#012#015#012Detailed Authentication Information:#015#012#011Logon Process:#011#011Advapi  #015#012#011Authentication Package:#011Negotiate#015#012#011Transited Services:#011-#015#012#011Package Name (NTLM only):#011-#015#012#011Key Length:#011#0110#015#012#015#012This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.#015#012#015#012The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.#015#012#015#012The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).#015#012#015#012The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.#015#012#015#012The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.#015#012#015#012The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.#015#012#011- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.#015#012#011- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.#015#012#011- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.#015#012#011- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.

L’ouverture de session d’un compte s’est correctement déroulée.#015#012#015#012Sujet :#015#012#011ID de sécurité :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME$#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#011ID d’ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#015#012Type d’ouverture de session :#011#011#0115#015#012#015#012Nouvelle ouverture de session :#015#012#011ID de sécurité :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011Système#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011AUTORITE NT#015#012#011ID d’ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#011GUID d’ouverture de session :#011#011{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}#015#012#015#012Informations sur le processus :#015#012#011ID du processus :#011#0110x1d0#015#012#011Nom du processus :#011#011C:\Windows\System32\services.exe#015#012#015#012Informations sur le réseau :#015#012#011Nom de la station de travail :#011#015#012#011Adresse du réseau source :#011-#015#012#011Port source :#011#011-#015#012#015#012Informations détaillées sur l’authentification :#015#012#011Processus d’ouverture de session :#011#011Advapi  #015#012#011Package d’authentification :#011Negotiate#015#012#011Services en transit :#011-#015#012#011Nom du package (NTLM uniquement) :#011-#015#012#011Longueur de la clé :#011#0110#015#012#015#012Cet événement est généré lors de la création d’une ouverture de session. Il est généré sur l’ordinateur sur lequel l’ouverture de session a été effectuée.#015#012#015#012Le champ Objet indique le compte sur le système local qui a demandé l’ouverture de session. Il s’agit le plus souvent d’un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.#015#012#015#012Le champ Type d’ouverture de session indique le type d’ouverture de session qui s’est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (réseau).#015#012#015#012Le champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a été créée, par exemple, le compte qui s’est connecté.#015#012#015#012Les champs relatifs au réseau indiquent la provenance d’une demande d’ouverture de session à distance. Le nom de la station de travail n’étant pas toujours disponible, peut être laissé vide dans certains cas.#015#012#015#012Les champs relatifs aux informations d’authentification fournissent des détails sur cette demande d’ouverture de session spécifique.#015#012#011- Le GUID d’ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir à associer cet événement à un événement KDC .#015#012#011- Les services en transit indiquent les services intermédiaires qui ont participé à cette demande d’ouverture de session.#015#012#011- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a été utilisé parmi les protocoles NTLM.#015#012#011- La longueur de la clé indique la longueur de la clé de session générée

Une tentative de réinitialisation de mot de passe d’un compte a été effectuée.#015#012#015#012Sujet :#015#012#011ID de sécurité :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME$#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#011ID d’ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#015#012Compte cible :#015#012#011ID de sécurité :#011#011S-1-5-21-1563151732-852262966-262546994-500#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN

Démarrage de Self-Service Plug-in (utilisateur=CORPDOMAIN\user.name).

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Windows Log Insight. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Windows Log Insight on ATT&CK Navigator

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

Effort: master

Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

Effort: master

Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde

Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.

Effort: elementary

AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

Effort: elementary

Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

Effort: advanced

Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

Effort: master

Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

Effort: master

Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

Effort: master

Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

Effort: advanced

Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

Effort: intermediate

Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

Effort: master

Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

Effort: advanced

Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

Effort: advanced

HackTools Suspicious Names

Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.

Effort: elementary

Impacket Addcomputer

Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern

Effort: intermediate

Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.

Effort: advanced

MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

Effort: intermediate

Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

Effort: advanced

Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Effort: intermediate

NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

Effort: advanced

Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

Effort: intermediate

PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Effort: elementary

Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

Effort: intermediate

PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

Effort: advanced

RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

Effort: advanced

RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

Effort: elementary

Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

Effort: master

Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

Effort: master

Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

Effort: advanced

Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

Effort: advanced

System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.

Effort: master

User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

Effort: master

User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source	Description
`Access tokens`	security identifiers are extracted from several events
`Authentication logs`	audit logon events are examined in detail

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

account_modification.jsonlogoff_mess.jsonlogon_mess.jsonlogon_mess_fr.jsonpass_ch.jsonprocess2.json

{
    "message": "Un compte d\u2019utilisateur a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9.#015#012#015#012Sujet :#015#012#011ID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN$#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#011ID d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#015#012Compte cible :#015#012#011ID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :#011#011S-1-5-21-241366212-796369622-1890169025-500#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#015#012Attributs modifi\u00e9s :#015#012#011Nom du compte SAM :#011USERNAME#015#012#011Nom complet :#011#011<valeur non d\u00e9finie>#015#012#011Nom principal de l\u2019utilisateur :#011-#015#012#011R\u00e9pertoire de base :#011#011<valeur non d\u00e9finie>#015#012#011Lecteur de base :#011#011<valeur non d\u00e9finie>#015#012#011Chemin d\u2019acc\u00e8s au script :#011#011<valeur non d\u00e9finie>#015#012#011Chemin d\u2019acc\u00e8s au profil :#011#011<valeur non d\u00e9finie>#015#012#011Stations de travail utilisateurs :#011<valeur non d\u00e9finie>#015#012#011Derni\u00e8re modification du mot de passe le :#01110/06/2020 14:27:09#015#012#011Le compte expire le :#011#011<jamais>#015#012#011ID de groupe principal :#011513#015#012#011D\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9 autoris\u00e9 :#011-#015#012#011Ancienne valeur UAC :#011#0110x210#015#012#011Nouvelle valeur UAC :#011#0110x210#015#012#011Contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur :#011-#015#012#011Param\u00e8tres utilisateur :#011-#015#012#011Historique SID :#011#011-#015#012#011Horaire d\u2019acc\u00e8s :#011#011Tout#015#012#015#012Informations suppl\u00e9mentaires :#015#012#011Privil\u00e8ges:#011#011-",
    "event": {
        "code": "4738",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4738,
        "name": "Un compte d\u2019utilisateur a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9.",
        "properties": {
            "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-241366212-796369622-1890169025-500",
            "name": "USERNAME",
            "type": "targetedUser"
        },
        "target": "user",
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
            "id": "0x3e7",
            "name": "CORPDOMAIN$",
            "sid": "S-1-5-18"
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "An account was logged off.#015#012#015#012Subject:#015#012#011Security ID:#011#011S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000#015#012#011Account Name:#011#011username#015#012#011Account Domain:#011#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Logon ID:#011#0110x523d454d#015#012#015#012Logon Type:#011#011#0115#015#012#015#012This event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
    "event": {
        "code": "4634",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4634,
        "name": "An account was logged off.",
        "properties": {
            "logon_type": 5,
            "type": "targetedUser"
        },
        "target": "user",
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "COMPUTERNAME-PC",
            "id": "0x523d454d",
            "name": "username",
            "sid": "S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000"
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "An account was successfully logged on.#015#012#015#012Subject:#015#012#011Security ID:#011#011S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000#015#012#011Account Name:#011#011username#015#012#011Account Domain:#011#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Logon ID:#011#0110x1bc9bbee#015#012#015#012Logon Type:#011#011#0115#015#012#015#012New Logon:#015#012#011Security ID:#011#011S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000#015#012#011Account Name:#011#011username#015#012#011Account Domain:#011#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Logon ID:#011#0110x222c4f34#015#012#011Logon GUID:#011#011{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}#015#012#015#012Process Information:#015#012#011Process ID:#011#0110x5df8#015#012#011Process Name:#011#011C:\\ABSciex\\drm\\xGate.exe#015#012#015#012Network Information:#015#012#011Workstation Name:#011COMPUTERNAME-PC#015#012#011Source Network Address:#011-#015#012#011Source Port:#011#011-#015#012#015#012Detailed Authentication Information:#015#012#011Logon Process:#011#011Advapi  #015#012#011Authentication Package:#011Negotiate#015#012#011Transited Services:#011-#015#012#011Package Name (NTLM only):#011-#015#012#011Key Length:#011#0110#015#012#015#012This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.#015#012#015#012The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.#015#012#015#012The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).#015#012#015#012The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.#015#012#015#012The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.#015#012#015#012The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.#015#012#011- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.#015#012#011- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.#015#012#011- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.#015#012#011- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4624",
        "outcome": "success",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4624,
        "name": "An account was successfully logged on.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "domain": "COMPUTERNAME-PC",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000",
            "logon_guid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
            "logon_id": "0x222c4f34",
            "logon_type": 5,
            "name": "username",
            "type": "targetedUser"
        },
        "target": "user",
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": "0x5df8",
        "name": "C:\\ABSciex\\drm\\xGate.exe"
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "C:\\ABSciex\\drm\\xGate.exe"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "COMPUTERNAME-PC",
            "id": "0x1bc9bbee",
            "name": "username",
            "sid": "S-1-5-21-1494196517-2992400115-1379426628-1000"
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "L\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte s\u2019est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.#015#012#015#012Sujet :#015#012#011ID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME$#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#011ID d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#015#012Type d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#011#0115#015#012#015#012Nouvelle ouverture de session :#015#012#011ID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011Syst\u00e8me#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011AUTORITE NT#015#012#011ID d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#011GUID d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#011{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}#015#012#015#012Informations sur le processus :#015#012#011ID du processus :#011#0110x1d0#015#012#011Nom du processus :#011#011C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe#015#012#015#012Informations sur le r\u00e9seau :#015#012#011Nom de la station de travail :#011#015#012#011Adresse du r\u00e9seau source :#011-#015#012#011Port source :#011#011-#015#012#015#012Informations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l\u2019authentification :#015#012#011Processus d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#011Advapi  #015#012#011Package d\u2019authentification :#011Negotiate#015#012#011Services en transit :#011-#015#012#011Nom du package (NTLM uniquement) :#011-#015#012#011Longueur de la cl\u00e9 :#011#0110#015#012#015#012Cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lors de la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une ouverture de session. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l\u2019ordinateur sur lequel l\u2019ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.#015#012#015#012Le champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session. Il s\u2019agit le plus souvent d\u2019un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.#015#012#015#012Le champ Type d\u2019ouverture de session indique le type d\u2019ouverture de session qui s\u2019est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).#015#012#015#012Le champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, par exemple, le compte qui s\u2019est connect\u00e9.#015#012#015#012Les champs relatifs au r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance d\u2019une demande d\u2019ouverture de session \u00e0 distance. Le nom de la station de travail n\u2019\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut \u00eatre laiss\u00e9 vide dans certains cas.#015#012#015#012Les champs relatifs aux informations d\u2019authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.#015#012#011- Le GUID d\u2019ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir \u00e0 associer cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement KDC .#015#012#011- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session.#015#012#011- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.#015#012#011- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "4624",
        "outcome": "success",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4624,
        "name": "L\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte s\u2019est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.",
        "outcome": "success",
        "properties": {
            "domain": "AUTORITE NT",
            "id": "S-1-5-18",
            "logon_guid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
            "logon_id": "0x3e7",
            "logon_type": 5,
            "name": "Syst\u00e8me",
            "type": "targetedUser"
        },
        "target": "user",
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "process": {
        "id": "0x1d0",
        "name": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe"
    },
    "sekoiaio": {
        "authentication": {
            "process": {
                "name": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe"
            }
        },
        "server": {
            "os": {
                "type": "windows"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
            "id": "0x3e7",
            "name": "USERNAME$",
            "sid": "S-1-5-18"
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "Une tentative de r\u00e9initialisation de mot de passe d\u2019un compte a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.#015#012#015#012Sujet :#015#012#011ID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :#011#011S-1-5-18#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME$#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN#015#012#011ID d\u2019ouverture de session :#011#0110x3e7#015#012#015#012Compte cible :#015#012#011ID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :#011#011S-1-5-21-1563151732-852262966-262546994-500#015#012#011Nom du compte :#011#011USERNAME#015#012#011Domaine du compte :#011#011CORPDOMAIN",
    "event": {
        "code": "4724",
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "action": {
        "id": 4724,
        "name": "Une tentative de r\u00e9initialisation de mot de passe d\u2019un compte a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.",
        "properties": {
            "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
            "id": "S-1-5-21-1563151732-852262966-262546994-500",
            "name": "USERNAME",
            "type": "targetedUser"
        },
        "target": "user",
        "type": "Security"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "user": {
        "target": {
            "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
            "id": "0x3e7",
            "name": "USERNAME$",
            "sid": "S-1-5-18"
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "D\u00e9marrage de Self-Service Plug-in (utilisateur=CORPDOMAIN\\user.name).",
    "event": {
        "outcome": "success"
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "D\u00e9marrage de Self-Service Plug-in",
        "properties": {
            "type": "targetedUser"
        },
        "target": "user"
    },
    "os": {
        "family": "windows",
        "platform": "windows"
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "user.name"
        ]
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
        "name": "user.name"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name	Type	Description
`action.properties.domain`	`keyword`
`action.properties.id`	`keyword`
`action.properties.logon_guid`	`keyword`
`action.properties.logon_id`	`keyword`
`action.properties.logon_type`	`number`
`action.properties.name`	`keyword`
`action.properties.target`	`keyword`
`action.properties.type`	`keyword`
`action.target`	`keyword`
`event.code`	`keyword`	Identification code for this event.
`event.outcome`	`keyword`	The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy.
`process.id`	`keyword`
`process.name`	`keyword`	Process name.
`user.domain`	`keyword`	Name of the directory the user is a member of.
`user.id`	`keyword`	Unique identifier of the user.
`user.name`	`keyword`	Short name or login of the user.
`user.sid`	`keyword`
`user.target.domain`	`keyword`	Name of the directory the user is a member of.
`user.target.id`	`keyword`	Unique identifier of the user.
`user.target.name`	`keyword`	Short name or login of the user.
`user.target.sid`	`keyword`

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.