Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent
Sekoia.io provides its agent for collecting security-related events with a minimal configuration overhead. This agent sends events directly to Sekoia.io.
Disclaimer
Info
The Sekoia.io Endpoint Detection Agent preserves the integrity of logs collected from the operating system event log; it does NOT modify or rewrite logs.
Supported OS versions
The Endpoint Detection Agent supports the following operating systems, on 64-bit versions only:
- Windows 8
- Windows 10
- Windows 11
- Windows Server 2016
- Windows Server 2019
- Windows Server 2022
The agent should support Linux distributions based on a kernel version of 3.10 or newer.
Here's a non-exhaustive list of supported distributions:
- Ubuntu 14.04 and newer
- Debian 8 and newer
- CentOS 7 and newer
- Redhat 7 and newer
Note
The Sekoia.io agent is currently in beta for Mac OS.
- macOS 13 Ventura and newer
New features
To find out about the changes between each version please check the agent's changelog
Prerequisites
The Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent uses the HTTPS protocol to send its events and has an automatic update mechanism. As a prerequisite, it's necessary to open the following streams:
Installation
Disclaimer
Warning
If you want to install this agent on a machine with an EDR in place, please keep in mind that most EDRs perform actions to detect malware or other types of threats. Those actions generate events that our agent collects. This may result in raising false positive alerts from our detection rules of effort levels 3 and 4. Customers need to fine-tune these rules to reduce the occurrence of false positives.
Step 1: Create an intake
The first step to use the agent is to create a new intake associated with the Sekoia.io Agent.
Step 2: Download executable
Use the download link provided in the description of the intake in the application.
Installation
The Endpoint Detection Agent is easy to install on Windows or Linux systems once you create a dedicated intake key on Sekoia.io XDR.
Execute the following commands as an administrator:
.\agent-latest.exe install --intake-key <INTAKE_KEY>
To make sure the agent is successfully installed as a service, run the following command:
Get-Service SEKOIAEndpointAgent
If auditd is running on the machine, you must deactivate it before installing the Linux agent:
sudo systemctl stop auditd
# In case of error "Failed to stop auditd.service: Operation refused"
# try to set "RefuseManualStop" to "no" inside "/usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service"
# reload the systemctl daemon "sudo systemctl daemon-reload"
# and retry "sudo systemctl stop auditd"
sudo systemctl disable auditd
Note
Stop the auditd service to enable the agent to work properly. The disable command is used to allow persistence of the configuration.
Now that auditd is disabled, you can install the agent:
chmod +x ./agent-latest
sudo ./agent-latest install --intake-key <INTAKE_KEY>
To make sure the agent is successfully installed as a service, run the following command:
sudo systemctl status SEKOIAEndpointAgent.service
journald configuration
To get events, the agent pushes rules to the audit framework. By default, journald might listen to the audit socket for events.
To disable audit logging, do the following as root:
# Stop listening to audit events
systemctl stop systemd-journald-audit.socket
# Disable it to avoid future start
systemctl disable systemd-journald-audit.socket
# Masking will prevent starting by other services
systemctl mask systemd-journald-audit.socket
# Restart journald
systemctl restart systemd-journald
A reboot may be necessary if the audit events are still appearing in the logs.
Unzipping SekoiaEndpointAgent.zip Archive
-
Open the Archive: Double-click the file. macOS will automatically open it using the Archive Utility.
-
Extracting Files: Once the Archive Utility opens, the files will be extracted to the same location as the original archive. You can also specify a different location if needed.
Move the application from its download folder to the /Applications directory.
Grant full disk access to SekoiaEndpointAgent by following these steps:
-
Click on the Apple icon on the top left corner of your screen.
-
Select System Preferences.
-
Go to Security & Privacy Preferences > Privacy and click Full Disk Access from the left panel.
-
Tick the checkbox for SekoiaEndpointAgent. If the lock at the bottom left is locked, click it to unlock the Privacy pane.
If you can't find SekoiaEndpointAgent in step 4, do the following:
-
Click the plus (+) icon (at the bottom left corner of the window) and navigate to Applications.
-
In the left panel, find SekoiaEndpointAgent and click Open. Make sure SekoiaEndpointAgent is ticked and then close the window.
-
Now that Full Disk Access is enable, you can install the agent:
sudo /Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOs/SekoiaEndpointAgent install --intake-key <INTAKE_KEY>
To make sure the agent is successfully installed as a service, run the following command:
sudo launchctl print system/SEKOIAEndpointAgent
Once installed, the agent collects, normalizes, and sends event logs to Sekoia.io. The protocol used to send events is HTTPS (443).
Setting the region
It's possible to specify the region the agent will communicate with during the installation.
To do it, append --region <region_name> at the end of the command.
For example, if the agent must communicate with fra2, run the following command:
.\agent-latest.exe install --intake-key <INTAKE_KEY> --region fra2
./agent-latest install --intake-key <INTAKE_KEY> --region fra2
sudo /Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOs/SekoiaEndpointAgent install --intake-key <INTAKE_KEY> --region fra2
Update
Disable automatic update
By default, the agent will be updated automatically. To disable this feature, specify the --disable-auto-update flag during the installation.
Manual update
To update the agent manually, follow the instructions specific to your OS.
Execute the following command as an administrator:
$ProgramFiles\EndpointAgent\agent-latest.exe update
Where $ProgramFiles refers to the path to the Program Files folder, usually c:\Program Files.
The following command must be executed:
sudo /opt/endpoint-agent update
The following command must be executed:
sudo /Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOs/SekoiaEndpointAgent update
Uninstall
To uninstall the agent, follow the instructions specific to your OS.
Since version 0.3.0
To completely uninstall the agent on Windows, you must execute the command using a copy of the running executable. You can either:
- Download the latest version of the agent and use this binary to perform the uninstall
- Copy the running agent located at
$ProgramFiles\EndpointAgent\agent.exe $ProgramFilesrefers to the path to theProgram Filesfolder, usuallyc:\Program Files
Execute the following command as an administrator:
.\agent-latest.exe uninstall
Execute the following command:
sudo /opt/endpoint-agent/agent uninstall
Warning
It is not possible to uninstall the agent by dragging the application into the trash.
Execute the following command:
sudo /Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOs/SekoiaEndpointAgent uninstall
For versions prior to 0.3.0
To remove the service, execute the following commands as an administrator:
.\agent-latest.exe -service stop
.\agent-latest.exe -service uninstall
Then, remove the folders created by the agent:
$ProgramFiles\EndpointAgent- Where
$ProgramFilesrefers to the path to theProgram Filesfolder, usuallyc:\Program Files
- Where
$ProgramData\EndpointAgent- Where
$ProgramDatarefers to the path to theProgramDatafolder, usuallyc:\ProgramData
- Where
Execute the following commands to remove the service:
sudo /opt/endpoint-agent/agent -service stop
sudo /opt/endpoint-agent/agent -service uninstall
Then, remove the folders created by the agent:
sudo rm -rf /opt/endpoint-agent
sudo rm -rf /etc/endpoint-agent
Collect logs in files
Warning
This feature is currently in beta.
Info
This feature allows you to monitor and collect logs from applications like NGINX. The agent automatically collects logs for all system-related events.
The agent offers to send logs contained in files to Sekoia.io.
If you want to enable this feature, follow these steps:
-
Edit the configuration file at:
C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Sekoia.io\EndpointAgent\config.yaml/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml -
Add the following configuration:
logfiles: - filepath: /var/log/nginx/access.log # Path to the file to watch intakekey: {intake key} # Intake key to use to send the events
Warning
It's important to use an intake key from a format that matches the content of the log file.
For example, an intake key from the NGINX format is required for watching NGINX access logs.
If you want to collect multiple source files on the host, just add a new entry in the configuration. For instance:
```yaml
logfiles:
- filepath: /var/log/nginx/access.log # Path to the file to watch
intakekey: {intake key} # Intake key to use to send the events
- filepath: /var/log/mysql/mysql.log
intakekey: {intake key}
```
Warning
Your configuration file must be a valid YAML. An invalid file can prevent the agent from starting.
Once the configuration file is modified, restart the agent:
Execute the following command as an administrator:
Restart-Service SEKOIAEndpointAgent
Execute the following command:
sudo systemctl restart SEKOIAEndpointAgent.service
Execute the following command:
sudo /Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOs/SekoiaEndpointAgent service restart
Using file patterns
It is possible to specify patterns in the filepath attribute to match multiple files.
For example /var/log/nginx/*.log will match all the log files located under /var/log/nginx/.
It is also possible to restrict the allowed matching characters by specifying a range between brackets.
For example, the pattern /var/log/nginx/*[a-z].log will match /var/log/nginx/access.log but not /var/log/nginx/access.2023-02-14.log.
This kind of pattern is particularly useful when log rotation is enabled.
Note
The recursive globstart pattern ** is currently not supported
Retention
The agent sends the host logs through the Internet. The agent saves logs locally on disk in a non-customizable 100 MB memory space if the Internet connection is lost. Once the logs exceed the buffer size, the older logs are replaced by newer ones. When the Internet connection is restored, the older logs are sent to Sekoia.io first.
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Access tokens |
security identifiers are extracted from several events |
Anti-virus |
Windows Defender events are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up |
Authentication logs |
audit logon events are examined in detail |
DLL monitoring |
information about dlls are extracted from several events |
File monitoring |
information about files are extracted from several events |
Host network interface |
Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities |
Loaded DLLs |
Sysmon events provide information on DLL loading |
PowerShell logs |
Windows PowerShell logs are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up |
Process command-line parameters |
Windows Security Auditing logs provide information about process creation |
Process monitoring |
Windows Security Auditing logs are process tracking events |
Process use of network |
Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities |
Windows event logs |
events related to Windows Event logs shutdown or restart are analyzed |
Windows Registry |
registry auditing events are examined in detail |
WMI Objects |
Windows WMI Activity events are analyzed, and events related to WMI process too |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "{\"@timestamp\":\"2023-01-23T09:35:34.99Z\",\"agent\":{\"id\":\"1236c43def406f675318c07468d7b7e0984ba5a406da30251e102b6f2a103b24\",\"version\":\"v0.8.0\"},\"event\":{\"category\":[\"host\"],\"kind\":\"event\",\"reason\":\"Starting Events watcher\",\"provider\":\"SEKOIA-IO-Endpoint\"},\"host\":{\"hostname\":\"raphael-XPS-13-9370\",\"os\":{\"family\":\"linux\"}},\"log\":{\"level\":\"info\",\"logger\":\"SEKOIA-IO-Endpoint\"}, \"error\": {\"message\": \"My error\"}}",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"kind": "event",
"provider": "SEKOIA-IO-Endpoint",
"reason": "Starting Events watcher"
},
"@timestamp": "2023-01-23T09:35:34.990000Z",
"agent": {
"id": "1236c43def406f675318c07468d7b7e0984ba5a406da30251e102b6f2a103b24",
"version": "v0.8.0"
},
"error": {
"message": "My error"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "raphael-XPS-13-9370",
"name": "raphael-XPS-13-9370",
"os": {
"family": "linux"
}
},
"log": {
"level": "info",
"logger": "SEKOIA-IO-Endpoint"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"raphael-XPS-13-9370"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"user\":{\"target\":{\"name\":\"VM-001$@EXAMPLE.LOCAL\",\"domain\":\"EXAMPLE.LOCAL\"}},\"action\":{\"properties\":{\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"IpAddress\":\"::ffff:10.0.30.42\",\"IpPort\":\"57111\",\"Keywords\":\"0x8020000000000000\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{345a31bc-e0d8-4d9b-98e7-d7c27a2404f2}\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{9341bdd5-a0aa-4978-8f7b-36d0c7f5de05}\",\"ServiceName\":\"eXampl-AZRWE-AA00$\",\"ServiceSid\":\"S-1-5-21-2222222-111111111-1197373316-51000\",\"Severity\":\"LOG_ALWAYS\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"Status\":\"0x0\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"EXAMPLE.LOCAL\",\"TargetUserName\":\"VM-1111@EXAMPLE.LOCAL\",\"TicketEncryptionType\":\"0x12\",\"TicketOptions\":\"0x40810000\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\"},\"id\":4769},\"event\":{\"provider\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"code\":4769},\"agent\":{\"id\":\"d6285cf5d51861d13acbb34971e6b72e8e91fbcfcce44cfc5a9f1d45c8f0510c\",\"version\":\"v1.4.0+a903da97d806b129d8f0c5c7d1c4f71cb36849bd\"},\"host\":{\"os\":{\"type\":\"windows\"},\"hostname\":\"eXampl-AZRWE-AAAA\",\"ip\":[\"fe80::76e9:3115:c5b4:aaaa\",\"10.0.11.1\"]},\"source\":{\"address\":\"10.0.11.11\",\"ip\":\"10.0.11.12\"},\"@timestamp\":\"2024-01-19T13:18:38.703193Z\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4769",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"@timestamp": "2024-01-19T13:18:38.703193Z",
"action": {
"id": 4769,
"properties": {
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:10.0.30.42",
"IpPort": "57111",
"Keywords": "0x8020000000000000",
"LogonGuid": "{345a31bc-e0d8-4d9b-98e7-d7c27a2404f2}",
"ProviderGuid": "{9341bdd5-a0aa-4978-8f7b-36d0c7f5de05}",
"ServiceName": "eXampl-AZRWE-AA00$",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-2222222-111111111-1197373316-51000",
"Severity": "LOG_ALWAYS",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0x0",
"TargetDomainName": "EXAMPLE.LOCAL",
"TargetUserName": "VM-1111@EXAMPLE.LOCAL",
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810000",
"TransmittedServices": "-"
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "d6285cf5d51861d13acbb34971e6b72e8e91fbcfcce44cfc5a9f1d45c8f0510c",
"version": "v1.4.0+a903da97d806b129d8f0c5c7d1c4f71cb36849bd"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "eXampl-AZRWE-AAAA",
"ip": [
"10.0.11.1",
"fe80::76e9:3115:c5b4:aaaa"
],
"name": "eXampl-AZRWE-AAAA",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"eXampl-AZRWE-AAAA"
],
"ip": [
"10.0.11.1",
"10.0.11.12",
"fe80::76e9:3115:c5b4:aaaa"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.11.11",
"ip": "10.0.11.12"
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE.LOCAL",
"name": "VM-1111@EXAMPLE.LOCAL"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"user\": {\n \"id\": \"S-1-5-18\",\n \"name\": \"EXPL111$\",\n \"domain\": \"EXAMPLE\"\n },\n \"action\": {\n \"properties\": {\n \"ClientProcessId\": \"10704\",\n \"ClientProcessStartKey\": \"14918173765668009\",\n \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\n \"FQDN\": \"EXPL111.example.org\",\n \"Keywords\": \"0x8020000000000000\",\n \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\n \"RpcCallClientLocality\": \"0\",\n \"Severity\": \"LOG_ALWAYS\",\n \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EXAMPLE\",\n \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3E7\",\n \"SubjectUserName\": \"EXPL111$\",\n \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\",\n \"TaskContent\": \"<?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<Task version=\\\"1.2\\\" xmlns=\\\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\\\">\\r\\n <RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Author>EXAMPLE\\\\master</Author>\\r\\n <Description>d\u00e9ploiement de l'agent SYSMON sur les PC</Description>\\r\\n <URI>\\\\Agent Sysmon</URI>\\r\\n </RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Triggers>\\r\\n <TimeTrigger>\\r\\n <StartBoundary>2024-03-27T10:58:36</StartBoundary>\\r\\n <EndBoundary>2024-03-27T10:59:31</EndBoundary>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n </TimeTrigger>\\r\\n </Triggers>\\r\\n <Principals>\\r\\n <Principal id=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\\r\\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\\\System</UserId>\\r\\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\\r\\n </Principal>\\r\\n </Principals>\\r\\n <Settings>\\r\\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\\r\\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\\r\\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\\r\\n <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>\\r\\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\\r\\n <IdleSettings>\\r\\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\\r\\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\\r\\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\\r\\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\\r\\n </IdleSettings>\\r\\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\\r\\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>PT0S</DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>\\r\\n <Priority>7</Priority>\\r\\n </Settings>\\r\\n <Actions Context=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <Exec>\\r\\n <Command>\\\\\\\\exm-atl-01\\\\netlogon\\\\agent-sysmon\\\\sysmon.exe</Command>\\r\\n <Arguments>-accepteula -i \\\\\\\\exm-atl-01\\\\netlogon\\\\agent-sysmon\\\\sysmonconfig-export.xml</Arguments>\\r\\n </Exec>\\r\\n </Actions>\\r\\n</Task>\",\n \"TaskName\": \"\\\\Agent Sysmon\"\n },\n \"id\": 4698\n },\n \"event\": {\n \"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"code\": 4698\n },\n \"agent\": {\n \"id\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n \"version\": \"v1.5.0+909fc425bc21557bcd09cdd599f43eaeab13b9db\"\n },\n \"host\": {\n \"os\": {\n \"type\": \"windows\"\n },\n \"hostname\": \"EXPL111\",\n \"ip\": [\n \"1.2.3.4\"\n ]\n },\n \"process\": {\n \"parent\": {\n \"pid\": 1188\n }\n },\n \"@timestamp\": \"2024-03-27T09:58:31.8443945Z\"\n}",
"event": {
"code": "4698",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"@timestamp": "2024-03-27T09:58:31.844394Z",
"action": {
"id": 4698,
"properties": {
"ClientProcessId": "10704",
"ClientProcessStartKey": "14918173765668009",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"FQDN": "EXPL111.example.org",
"Keywords": "0x8020000000000000",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"RpcCallClientLocality": "0",
"Severity": "LOG_ALWAYS",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3E7",
"SubjectUserName": "EXPL111$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TaskContent": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Author>EXAMPLE\\master</Author>\r\n <Description>d\u00e9ploiement de l'agent SYSMON sur les PC</Description>\r\n <URI>\\Agent Sysmon</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <TimeTrigger>\r\n <StartBoundary>2024-03-27T10:58:36</StartBoundary>\r\n <EndBoundary>2024-03-27T10:59:31</EndBoundary>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </TimeTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\System</UserId>\r\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>PT0S</DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>\\\\exm-atl-01\\netlogon\\agent-sysmon\\sysmon.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>-accepteula -i \\\\exm-atl-01\\netlogon\\agent-sysmon\\sysmonconfig-export.xml</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>",
"TaskContentNew_Args": "-accepteula -i \\\\exm-atl-01\\netlogon\\agent-sysmon\\sysmonconfig-export.xml",
"TaskContentNew_Command": "\\\\exm-atl-01\\netlogon\\agent-sysmon\\sysmon.exe",
"TaskName": "\\Agent Sysmon"
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
"version": "v1.5.0+909fc425bc21557bcd09cdd599f43eaeab13b9db"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "EXPL111",
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"name": "EXPL111",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"process": {
"parent": {
"pid": 1188
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"EXPL111"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"EXPL111$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "EXPL111$"
}
}
{
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"hostname": "Windows-Desktop",
"ip": [
"10.0.0.13",
"fe80::faea:b73f:ce5:62b3"
],
"name": "Windows-Desktop",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"process": {
"args": [
"/c",
"C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe view /all"
],
"command_line": "\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe\" /c \"C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe view /all\"",
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe",
"name": "cmd.exe",
"parent": {
"args": [
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
],
"command_line": "\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" ",
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 8088
},
"pid": 8432
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"Windows-Desktop"
],
"ip": [
"10.0.0.13",
"fe80::faea:b73f:ce5:62b3"
],
"user": [
"Maurice.Moss"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"process": {
"guid": "417f3e0f-c982-55f7-91b1-da72e895fb49",
"parent_guid": "b9b6af11-3c85-5050-9128-b95723266e37"
}
},
"user": {
"domain": "Windows-Desktop",
"name": "Maurice.Moss"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2022-07-13T17:35:34.7697263Z\", \"agent\": {\"id\": \"d54749e87baf4b60ec7a9e51e16f1ee39f4aeaaf3070da908e0627cd02cf62f7\", \"version\": \"0.1.0\"}, \"action\": {\"id\": 3, \"properties\": {\"Keywords\": \"0x8000000000000020\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{22FB2CD6-0E7B-422B-A0C7-2FAD1FD0E716}\", \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process\", \"StackBase\": \"0xFFFFDF00357DA000\", \"StackLimit\": \"0xFFFFDF00357D4000\", \"StartAddr\": \"0xFFFFF8020AE71320\", \"SubProcessTag\": \"190\", \"TebBase\": \"0x0\", \"UserStackBase\": \"0x0\", \"UserStackLimit\": \"0x0\", \"Win32StartAddr\": \"0xFFFFF8020AE71320\"}}, \"event\": {\"action\": \"remote-thread-created\", \"category\": [\"process\"], \"code\": 8, \"provider\": \"SEKOIA-IO-Endpoint\", \"type\": \"creation\", \"outcome\": \"success\"}, \"host\": {\"hostname\": \"DESKTOP-Q2PN4RP\"}, \"process\": {\"command_line\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s SysMain\", \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"name\": \"svchost.exe\", \"parent\": {\"pid\": 656}, \"pid\": 1356, \"thread\": {\"id\": 1480}, \"args\": [\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"-k\", \"LocalSystemNetworkRestricted\", \"-p\", \"-s\", \"SysMain\"]}, \"sekoiaio\": {\"process\": {\"guid\": \"1d63ca73-6449-5fa9-8ca0-5ed461943a01\"}, \"source_process\": {\"command_line\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s SysMain\", \"executable\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"name\": \"svchost.exe\", \"parent\": {\"pid\": 656}, \"pid\": 1356, \"thread\": {\"id\": 1480}, \"args\": [\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"-k\", \"LocalSystemNetworkRestricted\", \"-p\", \"-s\", \"SysMain\"], \"guid\": \"1d63ca73-6449-5fa9-8ca0-5ed461943a01\"}, \"target_process\": {\"pid\": 4, \"thread\": {\"id\": 5096}, \"guid\": \"4392d6e4-f852-559f-858c-a4351889e3c4\"}}}",
"event": {
"action": "remote-thread-created",
"category": [
"process"
],
"code": "8",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "SEKOIA-IO-Endpoint",
"type": [
"creation"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-07-13T17:35:34.769726Z",
"action": {
"id": 3,
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Keywords": "0x8000000000000020",
"ProviderGuid": "{22FB2CD6-0E7B-422B-A0C7-2FAD1FD0E716}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process",
"StackBase": "0xFFFFDF00357DA000",
"StackLimit": "0xFFFFDF00357D4000",
"StartAddr": "0xFFFFF8020AE71320",
"SubProcessTag": "190",
"TebBase": "0x0",
"UserStackBase": "0x0",
"UserStackLimit": "0x0",
"Win32StartAddr": "0xFFFFF8020AE71320"
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "d54749e87baf4b60ec7a9e51e16f1ee39f4aeaaf3070da908e0627cd02cf62f7",
"version": "0.1.0"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-Q2PN4RP",
"name": "DESKTOP-Q2PN4RP"
},
"process": {
"args": [
"-k",
"-p",
"-s",
"C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"LocalSystemNetworkRestricted",
"SysMain"
],
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s SysMain",
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"name": "svchost.exe",
"parent": {
"pid": 656
},
"pid": 1356,
"thread": {
"id": 1480
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-Q2PN4RP"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"process": {
"guid": "1d63ca73-6449-5fa9-8ca0-5ed461943a01"
},
"source_process": {
"args": [
"-k",
"-p",
"-s",
"C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"LocalSystemNetworkRestricted",
"SysMain"
],
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s SysMain",
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"guid": "1d63ca73-6449-5fa9-8ca0-5ed461943a01",
"name": "svchost.exe",
"parent": {
"pid": 656
},
"pid": 1356,
"thread": {
"id": 1480
}
},
"target_process": {
"guid": "4392d6e4-f852-559f-858c-a4351889e3c4",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 5096
}
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"action\":{\"properties\":{\"Application\":\"\\\\device\\\\harddisk\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.exe\",\"Direction\":\"%%14593\",\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"FilterRTID\":\"72760\",\"Keywords\":\"0x8020000000000000\",\"LayerName\":\"%%14611\",\"LayerRTID\":\"48\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"RemoteMachineID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"RemoteUserID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"Severity\":\"LOG_ALWAYS\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\"},\"id\":5156},\"destination\":{\"address\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"ip\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"port\":1},\"event\":{\"provider\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"code\":5156},\"agent\":{\"id\":\"72d68eb9bacfe73d21ff765b4e81aaec6934169b947daae740666327bd5f5e8c\",\"version\":\"v1.5.0+909fc425bc21557bcd09cdd599f43eaeab13b9db\"},\"host\":{\"os\":{\"type\":\"windows\"},\"hostname\":\"hostname\",\"ip\":[\"5.6.7.8\"]},\"network\":{\"transport\":\"tcp\"},\"process\":{\"pid\":2184},\"source\":{\"address\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"ip\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"port\":2},\"@timestamp\":\"2024-07-19T14:10:28.962733Z\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5156",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"@timestamp": "2024-07-19T14:10:28.962733Z",
"action": {
"id": 5156,
"properties": {
"Application": "\\device\\harddisk\\windows\\system32\\test.exe",
"Direction": "%%14593",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"FilterRTID": "72760",
"Keywords": "0x8020000000000000",
"LayerName": "%%14611",
"LayerRTID": "48",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"RemoteMachineID": "S-1-0-0",
"RemoteUserID": "S-1-0-0",
"Severity": "LOG_ALWAYS",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "72d68eb9bacfe73d21ff765b4e81aaec6934169b947daae740666327bd5f5e8c",
"version": "v1.5.0+909fc425bc21557bcd09cdd599f43eaeab13b9db"
},
"destination": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 1
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname",
"ip": [
"5.6.7.8"
],
"name": "hostname",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp"
},
"process": {
"name": "test.exe",
"pid": 2184
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8",
"port": 2
}
}
{
"message": "{\"user\":{\"target\":{\"id\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"name\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\"},\"id\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"name\":\"SRV-FOO\",\"domain\":\"MY-DOMAIN\"},\"action\":{\"properties\":{\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"Negotiate\",\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"ImpersonationLevel\":\"%%1833\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"Keywords\":\"0x8020000000000000\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Advapi \",\"LogonType\":\"5\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\services.exe\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Severity\":\"LOG_ALWAYS\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"MY-DOMAIN\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3E7\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"SRV-FOO\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x3E7\",\"TargetUserName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"WorkstationName\":\"-\"},\"id\":4624},\"event\":{\"provider\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"code\":4624},\"agent\":{\"id\":\"1193b609e262926e284b6076cab8919b8725fa9f576a22c7e0041edeb04f5c76\",\"version\":\"v1.1.0+5369595aebc1c30ff2c849af30f51e4d9327584f\"},\"host\":{\"os\":{\"type\":\"windows\"},\"hostname\":\"SRV-FOO\"},\"process\":{\"executable\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\services.exe\",\"name\":\"services.exe\",\"pid\":676},\"@timestamp\":\"2023-06-23T08:15:00.4849617Z\"}\n",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_service",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4624",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-06-23T08:15:00.484961Z",
"action": {
"id": 4624,
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationPackageName": "Negotiate",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"ImpersonationLevel": "%%1833",
"IpAddress": "-",
"IpPort": "-",
"KeyLength": "0",
"Keywords": "0x8020000000000000",
"LmPackageName": "-",
"LogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
"LogonProcessName": "Advapi ",
"LogonType": "5",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "LOG_ALWAYS",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "MY-DOMAIN",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3E7",
"SubjectUserName": "SRV-FOO",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
"TargetLogonId": "0x3E7",
"TargetUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"WorkstationName": "-"
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "1193b609e262926e284b6076cab8919b8725fa9f576a22c7e0041edeb04f5c76",
"version": "v1.1.0+5369595aebc1c30ff2c849af30f51e4d9327584f"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "SRV-FOO",
"name": "SRV-FOO",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
"name": "services.exe",
"pid": 676
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SRV-FOO"
],
"user": [
"SRV-FOO"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "Advapi "
}
},
"client": {
"name": "SRV-FOO",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "SRV-FOO",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"user": {
"domain": "MY-DOMAIN",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SRV-FOO",
"target": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"user\":{\"target\":{\"id\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"name\":\"foo-vm\",\"domain\":\"foo-vm\"},\"id\":\"S-1-0-0\"},\"action\":{\"properties\":{\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"NTLM\",\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"FailureReason\":\"%%2313\",\"IpAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"0\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"Keywords\":\"0x8010000000000000\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"NtLmSsp \",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Severity\":\"LOG_ALWAYS\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"Status\":\"0xC000006D\",\"SubStatus\":\"0xC0000064\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"foo-vm\",\"TargetUserName\":\"foo-vm\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"WorkstationName\":\"WIN-FOO\"},\"id\":4625},\"event\":{\"provider\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"code\":4625},\"agent\":{\"id\":\"dd4e2378f7208b8b8557a9b7a725b6d551887b868c72b8cb91668d56eca10c6f\",\"version\":\"v1.1.0+5369595aebc1c30ff2c849af30f51e4d9327584f\"},\"host\":{\"os\":{\"type\":\"windows\"},\"hostname\":\"foo-vm\"},\"source\":{\"address\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"ip\":\"1.1.1.1\"},\"@timestamp\":\"2023-06-23T08:13:49.4015618Z\"}\n",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_network",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4625",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"reason": "user_not_exist",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-06-23T08:13:49.401561Z",
"action": {
"id": 4625,
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"FailureReason": "%%2313",
"IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "0",
"KeyLength": "0",
"Keywords": "0x8010000000000000",
"LmPackageName": "-",
"LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
"LogonType": "3",
"ProcessName": "-",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "LOG_ALWAYS",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0xC000006D",
"SubStatus": "0xC0000064",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetDomainName": "foo-vm",
"TargetUserName": "foo-vm",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"WorkstationName": "WIN-FOO"
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "dd4e2378f7208b8b8557a9b7a725b6d551887b868c72b8cb91668d56eca10c6f",
"version": "v1.1.0+5369595aebc1c30ff2c849af30f51e4d9327584f"
},
"client": {
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "foo-vm",
"name": "foo-vm",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"foo-vm"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "NtLmSsp "
}
},
"client": {
"name": "WIN-FOO",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "foo-vm",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-0-0",
"target": {
"domain": "foo-vm",
"id": "S-1-0-0",
"name": "foo-vm"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2022-06-23T13:10:31.7691464Z\",\"agent\": {\"id\": \"3598e70397f8931e6288d7aa4075d336bee33fa6224627218e7b67587c3a62e9\",\"version\": \"0.1.0\"},\"action\": {\"id\": 1151,\"properties\": {\"AS security intelligence creation time\": \"23/06/2022 03:14:37\",\"AS security intelligence version\": \"1.369.112.0\",\"AV security intelligence creation time\": \"23/06/2022 03:14:37\",\"AV security intelligence version\": \"1.369.112.0\",\"BM state\": \"Activ\u00e9\",\"Engine up-to-date\": \"0\",\"Engine version\": \"1.1.19300.2\",\"IOAV state\": \"Activ\u00e9\",\"Keywords\": \"0x8000000000000000\",\"Last AS security intelligence age\": \"0\",\"Last AV security intelligence age\": \"0\",\"Last full scan age\": \"4294967295\",\"Last full scan end time\": \"01/01/1601 00:00:00\",\"Last full scan source\": \"0\",\"Last full scan start time\": \"01/01/1601 00:00:00\",\"Last quick scan age\": \"1\",\"Last quick scan end time\": \"22/06/2022 10:01:43\",\"Last quick scan source\": \"2\",\"Last quick scan start time\": \"22/06/2022 10:00:16\",\"Latest engine version\": \"1.1.19300.2\",\"Latest platform version\": \"4.18.2205.7\",\"NRI engine version\": \"1.1.19300.2\",\"NRI security intelligence version\": \"1.369.112.0\",\"OA state\": \"Activ\u00e9\",\"Platform up-to-date\": \"1\",\"Platform version\": \"4.18.2205.7\",\"Product Name\": \"Antivirus Microsoft Defender\",\"Product status\": \"0x00080000\",\"ProviderGuid\": \"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\",\"RTP state\": \"Activ\u00e9\",\"Severity\": \"INFO\",\"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\",\"Unused\": \"\"}},\"event\": {\"code\": 1151,\"provider\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\"},\"host\": {\"hostname\": \"test-PC\"}}",
"event": {
"code": "1151",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-23T13:10:31.769146Z",
"action": {
"id": 1151,
"properties": {
"AS security intelligence creation time": "23/06/2022 03:14:37",
"AS security intelligence version": "1.369.112.0",
"AV security intelligence creation time": "23/06/2022 03:14:37",
"AV security intelligence version": "1.369.112.0",
"BM state": "Activ\u00e9",
"Engine up-to-date": "0",
"Engine version": "1.1.19300.2",
"IOAV state": "Activ\u00e9",
"Keywords": "0x8000000000000000",
"Last AS security intelligence age": "0",
"Last AV security intelligence age": "0",
"Last full scan age": "4294967295",
"Last full scan end time": "01/01/1601 00:00:00",
"Last full scan source": "0",
"Last full scan start time": "01/01/1601 00:00:00",
"Last quick scan age": "1",
"Last quick scan end time": "22/06/2022 10:01:43",
"Last quick scan source": "2",
"Last quick scan start time": "22/06/2022 10:00:16",
"Latest engine version": "1.1.19300.2",
"Latest platform version": "4.18.2205.7",
"NRI engine version": "1.1.19300.2",
"NRI security intelligence version": "1.369.112.0",
"OA state": "Activ\u00e9",
"Platform up-to-date": "1",
"Platform version": "4.18.2205.7",
"Product Name": "Antivirus Microsoft Defender",
"Product status": "0x00080000",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"RTP state": "Activ\u00e9",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"Unused": ""
}
},
"agent": {
"id": "3598e70397f8931e6288d7aa4075d336bee33fa6224627218e7b67587c3a62e9",
"version": "0.1.0"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "test-PC",
"name": "test-PC"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"test-PC"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
action.properties.TaskContentNew_Args |
keyword |
|
action.properties.TaskContentNew_Command |
keyword |
|
auditd.data.a1 |
keyword |
argument 1 of syscall |
auditd.data.a2 |
keyword |
argument 2 of syscall |
auditd.data.a3 |
keyword |
argument 3 of syscall |
auditd.data.socket.addr |
keyword |
|
auditd.data.socket.family |
keyword |
|
auditd.data.socket.port |
keyword |
|
auditd.data.syscall |
keyword |
name of the invoked system call that generated the event |
client.geo.country_iso_code |
keyword |
Country ISO code. |
client.ip |
ip |
IP address of the client. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.end |
date |
event.end contains the date when the event ended or when the activity was last observed. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.provider |
keyword |
Source of the event. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.start |
date |
event.start contains the date when the event started or when the activity was first observed. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
host.os.type |
keyword |
Which commercial OS family (one of: linux, macos, unix or windows). |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
sekoiaio.client.name |
keyword |
Name of the client |
sekoiaio.server.name |
keyword |
Name of the server |
sekoiaio.server.os.type |
keyword |
OS type of the server |
user.target.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.target.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.
Events examples
Here's a non-exhaustive list of events the agent can detect:
- Files creation/deletion/rename
- Process lifecycle
- Remote thread execution
- DNS Resolution
- TCP connection
- Powershell commands
- WMI Activity
- NTLM
- Windows Defender events
- Sysmon events if configured
- ...
- Root commands executions
- Files creation/deletion/rename/change
- Process lifecycle
- TCP connection
- Python/Perl commands
- PIP/APT installs
- Cron configuration & scheduled jobs
- Sudoers file changes
- Passwd operations
- Suspicious activity (curl, wireshark, …)
- ...
- Root commands executions
- Files creation/deletion/rename/change
- DNS Resolution
- TCP connection
- PIP/APT installs
- Sudoers file changes
- Passwd operations
- Suspicious activity (curl, wireshark, …)
- ...
Proxy Support
The Sekoia.io agent can use a proxy server for its HTTPS requests if needed. If you want to enable this feature, follow these steps:
-
Edit the configuration file at:
C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Sekoia.io\EndpointAgent\config.yaml/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml -
Add the following line:
HTTPProxyURL: "<PROXY_URL>"
If you want to automate the agent installation with this configuration option, ensure that a config.yaml file with this line is present in the working directory before launching the install command.
The proxy URL should follow the format http://user:pass@host:port.
Optional steps
Install Sysmon
You can collect additional events using Sysmon. When installed, the Sekoia.io Agent will automatically collect Sysmon logs if it hasn't already done so.
Warning
Installing this tool will generate more logs, consuming more CPU resources. Install it on correctly dimensioned equipment or try it on low-risk assets at first.
Sysmon is a Microsoft tool downloadable from microsoft.com. A common installation instruction and configuration file is available on Florian Roth's GitHub. This configuration is an updated (and maintained) version of the SwiftOnSecurity's configuration, which can also be used.
Configure Security log auditing
A proper security log auditing configuration will allow the agent to collect different security-related events.
This document can be followed for an optimal configuration: Configuring Security Log Audit Settings.
Collect DNS resolution events
You can collect DNS resolutions events by enabling it in the agent configuration file:
-
Edit the configuration file at:
/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml -
Add the following configuration:
EnableDNSResolutions: true
Once the configuration file is modified, restart the agent:
sudo systemctl restart SEKOIAEndpointAgent.service
Don't compute hashes for files under a specific directory
To avoid having the agent computing hashes for files located under a specific directory the HashesExcludedPaths option can be added to the agent configuration.
If you want to enable this feature, follow these steps:
-
Edit the configuration file at:
C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Sekoia.io\EndpointAgent\config.yaml/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml/etc/endpoint-agent/config.yaml -
Add the following configuration:
HashesExcludedPaths:
- C:\path\to\ignore`
Once the configuration file is modified, restart the agent:
Execute the following command as an administrator:
Restart-Service SEKOIAEndpointAgent
Execute the following command:
sudo systemctl restart SEKOIAEndpointAgent.service
Additionnal information
Please find options and arguments available for Sekoia Agent by typing
.\agent-latest.exe -h
agent -h
/Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOS/SekoiaEndpointAgent -h
Usage:
.\agent-latest.exe <command> [<args>]
agent-latest <command> [<args>]
/Applications/SekoiaEndpointAgent.app/Contents/MacOS/SekoiaEndpointAgent <command> [<args>]
Options:
| Options | Meaning |
|---|---|
| --help, -h | display this help and exit |
| --version | display version and exit |
Commands:
| Commands | Meaning |
|---|---|
| install | install the agent |
| update | update the agent |
| uninstall | uninstall the agent |
Resources footprint
We monitor the agent metrics and try to keep its footprint as small as possible. Our agent uses, on average, less than 1% of CPU and around 36MB of RAM.
Troubleshoot
The first step to troubleshooting your Sekoia agent installation is to check the logs.
Here are the paths where to find the logs:
C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\SEKOIA.IO\EndpointAgent\logs\agent.log
/var/log/endpoint-agent/agent.log
/var/log/endpoint-agent/agent.log
Note
Please always use the latest Sekoia.io agent version. We recommend activating the update option.
If you need further assistance, provide our team with the following information:
1- Results of the setup request in case of failure (stack trace) + machine configuration
2- Logs of the agent
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent on ATT&CK Navigator
ACLight Discovering Privileged Accounts
Detects use of ACLight tool. This tool aims to discover privileged accounts by scanning the network.
- Effort: advanced
AD Object WriteDAC Access
Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object. This requires Windows Event ID 4662.
- Effort: advanced
AD Privileged Users Or Groups Reconnaissance
Detect privileged users or groups reconnaissance based on 4661 Event ID and known privileged users or groups SIDs. If the user account name is not a known admin it is suspicious.
- Effort: master
AD User Enumeration
Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account. This requires Windows Security Event ID 4662 and could be triggered by some administrators configuring new users.
- Effort: master
AMSI Deactivation Using Registry Key
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable the AMSI provider by deleting the associated registry key.
- Effort: master
APT29 Fake Google Update Service Install
This method detects malicious services mentioned in APT29 report by FireEye. The legitimate path for the Google update service is C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe so the service names and executable locations used by APT29 are specific enough to be detected in log files.
- Effort: elementary
Abusing Azure Browser SSO
Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll
Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.
- Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons
This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.
- Effort: advanced
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
Active Directory Database Dump Via Ntdsutil
Detects the dump of ntdis.dit database by using the utility ntdsutil.exe. NTDS.dit database stores Active Directory data, including passwords hashes for all users in the domain.
- Effort: elementary
Active Directory Delegate To KRBTGT Service
Detects potential persistence installation from an already compromised administrator domain account. The attacker will create a TGT and abuse a service account with the constrained delegation and update it with the krbtgt service. The detection relies on the Event ID 4738.
- Effort: intermediate
Active Directory Replication User Backdoor
Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to regular user or machine account, this technics is often used to give ResetPassword or WriteMembers or DCSync permission(s) for persistency on a domain.
- Effort: intermediate
Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account
Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. It requires a configuration step where the legit service account should be added to the exclusion list.
- Effort: advanced
Active Directory Shadow Credentials
Detects alternative credentials material adding. Attackers can abuse msDS-KeyCredentialLink and create a key pair to obtain a persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer.
- Effort: elementary
Active Directory User Backdoors
Detects scenarios where the attacker controls another user or computer account without having to use their credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Admin Share Access
Detects access to $ADMIN share. The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure. Also be very cautious to previously check if this is not commonly used by your administrators as to remotely manage your computers.
- Effort: master
Admin User RDP Remote Logon
Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.
- Effort: master
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config
- Effort: advanced
Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).
- Effort: elementary
Antivirus Password Dumper Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This detection relies on Windows Defender events logs. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).
- Effort: elementary
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This is only based on Windows Defender events.
- Effort: intermediate
Antivirus Web Shell Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).
- Effort: elementary
Aspnet Compiler
Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.
- Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
Audit CVE Event
Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.
- Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line
Detects use of azureedge in the command line.
- Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
Backup Catalog Deleted
The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.
- Effort: intermediate
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access
Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects
- Effort: intermediate
COM Hijack Via Sdclt
Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using 'sdclt.exe'.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
CVE-2019-0708 Scan
Detects the use of a scanner that discovers targets vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe
Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality
- Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Chafer (APT 39) Activity
Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Check Point Harmony Mobile Application Forbidden
Detects when someone attempts to access/use a forbidden application.
- Effort: master
Cisco Umbrella Threat Detected
Cisco Umbrella has detected a malicious traffic categorized as malware, phishing or adware.
- Effort: intermediate
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands
Detects command lines with suspicious args
- Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon
Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Service Creation Usage
Detects Cobalt Strike usage from an existing beacon when attacker tries to elevate or move laterally through a service creation.
- Effort: elementary
Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
Detects the pipes established by Cobalt Strike to allow a communication between its beacons.
- Effort: master
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking
Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.
- Effort: advanced
Compress Data for Exfiltration via Archiver
Detects data compressed by specific tools.
- Effort: master
Compression Followed By Suppression
Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.
- Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted
Detects computer account deletion.
- Effort: master
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Cookies Deletion
Detects when cookies are deleted by a suspicious process.
- Effort: master
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable
A script has copied a System32 executable.
- Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data
Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Impacket Smbexec
This rule detects the execution of smbexec via the relevant share pattern name
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Internal Kerberos Password Spraying
Detect multiple Kerberos authentication failed on several account from one source
- Effort: master
Correlation Internal Ntlm Password Spraying
Detect multiple NTLM authentication failed on several account from one source
- Effort: master
Correlation Multi Service Disable
The rule detects a high number of services stopped or de-activated in a short period of time.
- Effort: master
Correlation Suspicious Authentication Coercer Behavior
Detect a possible NTLM Relay attack combine with authent coerce
- Effort: intermediate
Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task
Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Credential Dumping By LaZagne
Detects LSASS process access by LaZagne for credential dumping.
- Effort: elementary
Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dumping-Tools Common Named Pipes
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipes. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config
- Effort: master
Credential Harvesting Via Vaultcmd.exe
Detects when the process vaultcmd is used for credential harvesting.
- Effort: advanced
Credentials Extraction
This rule aims to detect the use of a specific command to access some credentials without using mimikatz or another tool.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
Csrss Child Found
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
DC Shadow via Service Principal Name (SPN) creation
Detects DCShadow via new Service Principal Name (SPN) creation
- Effort: intermediate
DCSync Attack
Detects DCSync attack, it is highly likely that the post-exploitation tool Mimikatz was executed.
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Callout DLL Installation
Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL
This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL
This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.
- Effort: intermediate
DLL Load via LSASS Registry Key
Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events. This can be done with Sysmon events 12, 13 and 14 and monitor SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Query For Iplookup
Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.
- Effort: master
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL
This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.
- Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation
Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater
Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.
- Effort: elementary
DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction
Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers
- Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Denied Access To Remote Desktop
Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.
- Effort: intermediate
Detection of default Mimikatz banner
Detection of default Mimikatz banner in powershell events
- Effort: intermediate
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled
Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt
Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events for this specific registry key is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disable Windows Defender Credential Guard
Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Workstation Lock
Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Disabling SmartScreen Via Registry
Detects when a user disables smartscreen.
- Effort: elementary
Discovery Commands Correlation
Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.
- Effort: intermediate
Dism Disabling Windows Defender
Detects windows defender disabled by dism.
- Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent
Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration
Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Dumpert LSASS Process Dumper
Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory
- Effort: elementary
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Dynwrapx Module Loading
Detects the loading of DynamicWrapperX (Dynwrapx). It is used by some malware in their infection chain and could help to detect its usage from vbs/wscript/cscript scripts. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 7).
- Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor
Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom
- Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity
Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity
- Effort: elementary
Enabling Restricted Admin Mode
Detects when the restricted admin mode is enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Eventlog Cleared
Some threat groups tend to delete local EventLogs (Security being the most common one to be deleted) using certain utilities. The EventID 517 is old and 1102 should be used for this instead on newer Windows versions.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Mailbox Export
Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file, from command line or PowerShell script.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.
- Effort: intermediate
Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects a suspicious execution from an uncommon folder
- Effort: master
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp
Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.
- Effort: advanced
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641
Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
- Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262
Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262 through command line or PowerShell script. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.
- Effort: advanced
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine
Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189.
- Effort: elementary
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378.
- Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File
Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.
- Effort: intermediate
External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device
Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB device.
- Effort: advanced
FLTMC command usage
Detects the use of fltmc to list and load/unload a filter driver.
- Effort: advanced
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.
- Effort: master
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Detects the use of chmod to give high level permissions to file that might be binary files. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the fchmodat, chmod and fchmod syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
FlowCloud Malware
Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.
- Effort: elementary
FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading
Detects DLL image load activity as used by the threat group NOBELIUM with the FoggyWeb backdoor loader. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done through the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
Formbook File Creation DB1
Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.
- Effort: intermediate
Formbook Hijacked Process Command
Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.
- Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line
Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.
- Effort: master
GPO Executable Delivery
Detects MSI binaries run through GPOs.
- Effort: intermediate
GitLab CVE-2021-22205
Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.
- Effort: intermediate
Gpresult Usage
Detects when an account uses gpresult to get information on gpo.
- Effort: advanced
Gpscript Suspicious Parent
Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.
- Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility
Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
HTA Infection Chains
Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).
- Effort: intermediate
HTML Smuggling Suspicious Usage
Based on several samples from different botnets, this rule aims at detecting HTML infection chain by looking for HTML created files followed by suspicious files being executed.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
HarfangLab EDR Critical Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a critical level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Critical Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a critical level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR High Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a high level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR High Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a high level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Hlai Engine Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on its hlai engine
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Low Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a low level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Low Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a low level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Medium Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a medium level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Medium Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a medium level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Process Execution Blocked (HL-AI engine)
HarfangLab EDR's machine learning malware detection module (HL-AI) has detected a suspicious binary and blocked its execution. To know more on what caused this alert, you should check the value of the process name and the concerned computer and user.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Suspicious Process Behavior Has Been Detected
HarfangLab EDR has detected a suspicious process behavior based on its detection rule. Check the rule name and description for more information.
- Effort: master
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe
Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
- Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
ISO LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.
- Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel
Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.
- Effort: elementary
Impacket Addcomputer
Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern
- Effort: intermediate
Impacket Secretsdump.py Tool
Detects credential dumping via secretdump of impacket suite.
- Effort: intermediate
Impacket Wmiexec Module
Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.
- Effort: elementary
In-memory PowerShell
Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension and tool such PowerShDll.
- Effort: master
Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs
Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.
- Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets
Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.
- Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Kerberos Pre-Auth Disabled in UAC
The rule identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication
- Effort: elementary
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
LSASS Access From Non System Account
Detects LSASS Access from Non System Account (e.g. Mimikatz)
- Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump
Detects process accessing LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools. The rule requires Sysmon EventID 10 to work as it is based on the GrantedAccess mask.
- Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump File Creation
LSASS memory dump creation using operating systems utilities. Procdump will use process name in output file if no name is specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Lateral Movement Remote Named Pipe
Detects lateral movement and remote exec using named pipe over network. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share enable policy.
- Effort: advanced
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder
Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.
- Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
Load Of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL From Suspicious Process
Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes. Many tools import dbghelp.dll and / or dbgcore.dll to use the MiniDumpWriteDump function. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine. Dumpert from OUTFLANK also uses this.
- Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)
Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: advanced
Logonui Wrong Parent
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Lsass Access Through WinRM
Detects the access of LSASS.exe process through Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol. This is often done using Invoke-Mimikatz -ComputerName command, which uses PSRemoting and therefore WinRM. However, this is not limited to the Mimikatz threat and can be done by other tools as well. This rule needs Process Access monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's event ID 10.
- Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
MMC Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process
- Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement
Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.
- Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution
Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.
- Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir
Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.
- Effort: master
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
Malicious Named Pipe
Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known malware. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and 18).
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
- Effort: advanced
Malicious Service Installations
Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL
Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).
- Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key
Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.
- Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
Many Downloads From Several Binaries
Threat Actors might use all the binaries to download the payload to make sure at least one is present on the target. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the connect syscall using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Metasploit PSExec Service Creation
Detects Metasploit service creation when using the PSExec module. The ImagePath here is usually a malicious command line using powershell.exe and/or cmd.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration Changed
Detects when an feature configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (enabling or disabling real-time protection, etc.)
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable SecurityHealth
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender SecurityHealth through command line, PowerShell scripts, and registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is recommended.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Configuration
Detects when an exclusion configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (adding either a path or process bypass)
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Deleted
Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Tampering Detected
Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Threat Detected
Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft IIS Module Installation
Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash
Detects a crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine process (MsMpEng.exe), which is suspicious and could be related to an attacker disabling the Windows protection.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Office Spawning Script
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Startup Add-In
Detects add-ins that load when Microsoft Word or Excel starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel). The rule requires File Creation logging to work, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Windows Active Directory Module Commandlets
Detects use of commandlets linked to the AD Module.
- Effort: advanced
Mimikatz Basic Commands
Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.
- Effort: elementary
Mimikatz LSASS Memory Access
Detection of in-memory Mimikatz by focusing on processes opening the Local Security Authority (Lsass.exe) process and reading the memory contents of it. This probably means that Mimikatz has been executed on the host, meaning the attacker already has high privileges and is looking to dump credentials, most likely for lateral movement or privilege escalation purposes. The rule requires Sysmon EventID 10 to work as it is based on the GrantedAccess mask.
- Effort: advanced
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution
Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution
Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell
- Effort: intermediate
Mustang Panda Dropper
Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
Narrator Feedback-Hub Persistence
The Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub registry key has been modified which could be done by an attacker for persistence purposes. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13). Careful since the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon's configuration needs to be changed to log for this specifically.
- Effort: master
Net.exe User Account Creation
Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command
- Effort: master
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
Detects changes in Windows Registry key (LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec or RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) which can lead to NetNTLM downgrade attack. The rule requires to log registry keys creation or update, it can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netscan Share Access Artefact
Detects netscan artefact on windows network share - indicate network share discovery.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command
Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).
- Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location
Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Connection Via Certutil
Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Share Discovery
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.
- Effort: master
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
New Or Renamed User Account With '$' In Attribute 'SamAccountName'
Detects possible bypass EDR and SIEM via abnormal user account name.
- Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service from command line
- Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values
Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity
Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Office Application Startup Office Test
Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
- Effort: elementary
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process
In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.
- Effort: advanced
Openfiles Usage
Detects when the command openfiles, to get information on files opened remotely, is used.
- Effort: advanced
Opening Of a Password File
Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.
- Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Password Dumper Activity On LSASS
Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic
Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.
- Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading
Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.
- Effort: elementary
Phosphorus (APT35) Exchange Discovery
According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about its the environment of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers. The command is the following: Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders
- Effort: elementary
Phosphorus Domain Controller Discovery
According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about the Domain Controller. The command is the following: "powershell.exe" /c Get-WMIObject Win32_NTDomain | findstr DomainController
- Effort: intermediate
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: intermediate
Possible RottenPotato Attack
Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential RDP Connection To Non-Domain Host
Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain using RDP (TermSrv). Event ID 8001 corresponds to outgoing NTLM authentication traffic and TermSrv stands for RDP Terminal Services Server. Check if the contacted host is legitimate. To use this detection rule, enable logging of outbound NTLM authentications on all domain controllers, using the following Group Policy (GPO) - Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers -> Define this policy setting: Audit all.
- Effort: master
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation
Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Credential Prompt
Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt (using PromptForCredential), like $Credential = $host.ui.PromptForCredential("Need credentials", "Please enter your user name and password.", "", "NetBiosUserName"). The same result can be obtained by using the Get-Credential function but detecting it will trigger a lot of FP.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed
Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Downgrade Attack
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL
Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32
Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks (PowerSploit...).
- Effort: master
PowerShell NTFS Alternate Data Stream
Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from PowerShell. Needs Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass
This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell Winlogon Helper DLL
Detects modifications to the Winlogon Registry keys, which may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.
- Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified
Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).
- Effort: master
Process Herpaderping
Detection of process herpaderping using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been locked for access. Several processes have been excluded to avoid FPs.
- Effort: master
Process Hollowing Detection
Detection of process hollowing using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been replaced in a process memory.
- Effort: master
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump
Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Protected Storage Service Access
Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. It could identify potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers.
- Effort: master
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Putty Sessions Listing
Detects attempts to list Putty sessions through registry. To fully work, this rule requires to log registry accesses, which can be done with the Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 but for that specific configuration is needed.
- Effort: master
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Python Opening Ports
Detects when the Windows Filtering Platform has permitted Python.exe to listen on a port for incoming connections. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: advanced
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Login From Localhost
Detects RDP login from localhost source address, which may be a tunnelled login to bypass network restrictions.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Port Change Using Powershell
Detects RDP port configuration change using a PowerShell command such as 'Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name PortNumber -Value XXX Restart-Service termservice -force'. Threat actors can change RDP to another port to bypass protections, avoid detection based on the port, or to take full control of the system.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Rare Logonui Child Found
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.
- Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
Rebooting
Detects when forcing a computer to shutdown.
- Effort: master
Reconnaissance Commands Activities
Based on Cynet, Microsoft and Kaspersky analysis of Qakbot, this rule tries to detect some discovery TTPs.
- Effort: intermediate
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Dropped File
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook
- Effort: elementary
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter
Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).
- Effort: master
Registry Key Used By Some Old Agent Tesla Samples
Detects potential use of the RUN registry key to execute some Agent Tesla samples at boot. Prerequisites are to log for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Registry Persistence Using 'Image File Execution' And 'SilentProcessExit' Keys
Detects persistence registry keys. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Enumeration Of Lateral Movement Groups
Detects remote session lists the member of four local groups relevant to lateral movement. This behavior is common in Active Directory mapping tools such as SharpHound.
- Effort: intermediate
Remote File Copy
Detects the use of remote tools that copy files from or to remote systems
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
Remote Privileged Group Enumeration
Detects remote listing of local privileged group. Potential false positives, which should justify alert filters, are service accounts and administrators doing maintenance.
- Effort: advanced
Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility
Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation. This requires Windows Security events logging.
- Effort: master
Remote Service Activity Via SVCCTL Named Pipe
Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe
- Effort: master
Remote System Discovery Via Telnet
Detects use of the protocol telnet to access information.
- Effort: advanced
Remote Task Creation Via ATSVC Named Pipe
Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC Named Pipe. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share policy.
- Effort: intermediate
Rubeus Register New Logon Process
Detects potential use of Rubeus through registering a new logon process. This rule needs the EventID 4611, which can be configured through Group Policies (Audit Security System Extension)
- Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SAM Registry Hive Handle Request
Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive
- Effort: advanced
SCM Database Handle Failure
Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
- Effort: master
SCM Database Privileged Operation
Detects non-system users performing privileged operation on the SCM database
- Effort: master
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
SSH Tunnel Traffic
When a user creates and uses a SSH tunnel in Linux, the sshd process opens sockets to communicate with other machines or ports. With SSH tunneling, the SSH server can be used as a getaway to access internal systems. The traffic will seem to be coming from the SSH server whereas it only acts as a relay for an attacker. By using this technique, an attacker can successfully bypass external firewall rules and gain foothold to your network, allowing him to scan,hunt and attack your internal systems. This rule includes a filter on port 22, this filter is created to avoid false positive when a user is connecting via ssh. If you do not use port 22 for your machines, please create an alert filter.
- Effort: advanced
SSH X11 Forwarding
When a user creates and uses SSH X11 Forwarding in Linux, the sshd process opens sockets to communicate with the client machine via a ssh tunnel. X11 forwarding is used to deport graphic programs on the client side.
- Effort: advanced
STRRAT Scheduled Task
Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'
- Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges
Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent
Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.
- Effort: intermediate
SeEnableDelagationPrivilege Granted To User Or Machine In Active Directory
Detects the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory granted to a user of a computer, it would allow control of other AD user objects
- Effort: elementary
Searchindexer Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.
- Effort: master
Searchprotocolhost Child Found
SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.
- Effort: master
Secure Deletion With SDelete
Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. SDelete is a tool that permits to securely delete files by overwriting them (no recovery possible). Few threat actors are using it to delete traces of their malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration
Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Setuid Or Setgid Usage
Detects the usage of a setuid or a setgid. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the setuid and setgid syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: intermediate
Shadow Copies
Detects command line used to create and list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).
- Effort: master
Sliver DNS Beaconing
Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing
- Effort: intermediate
Smbexec.py Service Installation
Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation
- Effort: elementary
Smss Wrong Parent
Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.
- Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process
Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.
- Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent
Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.
- Effort: master
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL
Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
StoneDrill Service Install
This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky
- Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services
Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: master
Successful Brute Force Login From Internet
Detects a spike of failed login followed by a success one from Internet for a given source and target
- Effort: advanced
Successful Overpass The Hash Attempt
Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
- Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspect Svchost Memory Access
Detects suspect access to svchost process memory such as that used by Invoke-Phantom (v1.0) to kill the winRM windows event logging service.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool
Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Access To Sensitive File Extensions
Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share. This activity could possibly correspond to a malicious one (removing backup, reading sensitive files, etc.).
- Effort: master
Suspicious Certificate Request-adcs Abuse
Detects when a new certificate is requested or granted against Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) using a Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line
Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP
Detects a code page switch in command line
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern
Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell
Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process
Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
Detects suspicious DLL being loaded by an Microsoft Office Product. Considered as suspects are some .NET DLLs, clr.dll, GAC DLL, DSParse (Active Directoryi services API) or Kerberos DLLs which may be loaded by MS Office processes when executing a potentially malicious macro. The prerequisite is to log the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL side loading from ProgramData
Detects suspicious DLL side-loading from C:\ProgramData where the DLL is not signed.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process
Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Driver Loaded
Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious File Name
Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Finger Usage
Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Hangul Word Processor Child Process
Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File
Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Hostname
Detects suspicious hostnames such as ones with kali in it, to detect kali linux default hosts, but also other hostnames commonly used in attacks. List can be improved according to the environment.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Kerberos Ticket
Detect suspicious Kerberos ticket based on on their parameters which suggest that it could be forged.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used
Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. Careful as the 5136 is only on domain controllers and needs to be activated through the Group Policy.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution
Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi
Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line
Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious New Printer Ports In Registry
Detects a suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048. The CVE-2020-1048 consists in gaining persistence, privilege by abusing a flaw in the Print Spooler service to execute a payload whose path is stored in the registry key. To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection
Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL
Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PsExec Execution
Detects execution of PsExec, different from the Sysinternals one. This rule helps to filter out the noise if PsExec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different PsExec client other than Sysinternals one. The prerequisite is to log the Event ID 5145 (by setting "Audit Policy > Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" to Success/Failure).
- Effort: master
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage
catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution
Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious SAM Dump
Detects suspicious SAM dump to AppData repository, as cause by QuarksPwDump and other password dumpers. Logging for Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General Event ID 16 or Sysmon Event ID 11 is needed.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scripting In A WMI Consumer
Detects suspicious scripting in WMI Event Consumers. The rule requires to log WMI Consumers, which can be done through Sysmon's Event IDs 20 and 21.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TGS requests (Kerberoasting)
The rule aims at detecting the Kerberoasting technique, when an attacker requests TGS in order to crack them offline. Toease its task, the attacker requests tickets with weak encryption (such as RC4_HMAC_MD5). The rule therefore detects when an user is requesting 5 TGS for different users in 5 minutes.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter
Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created
Detects the creation of suspicious accounts simliar to ANONYMOUS LOGON, such as using additional spaces. Created as a covering detection for attackers trying to created an ANONYMOUS LOGON account as it is an account named used in internal Windows events and frequently filtered by attackers.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries
Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action
Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
- Effort: advanced
Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack
Detects svchost process hijacking through DLL loading. IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote machine.
- Effort: master
Svchost Modification
Detects the modification of svchost in the registry.
- Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent
Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).
- Effort: master
SysKey Registry Keys Access
Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey. The SysKey allows to decrypt Security Account Mannager (SAM) database entries (from registry or hive) and get NTLM, and sometimes LM hashes of local accounts passwords. Adversaries can calculate the Syskey by using RegOpenKeyEx/RegQueryInfoKey API calls to query the appropriate class info and values from the HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\JD, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Skew1, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\GBG, and HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Data keys.
- Effort: elementary
Sysmon Windows File Block Executable
Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.
- Effort: master
Sysprep On AppData Folder
Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.
- Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
System Network Connections Discovery
Detects system network connections discovery via powershell and cmd.
- Effort: advanced
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
TUN/TAP Driver Installation
Detects the installation of the TUN or TAP driver service, this activity could be related to data exfiltration using tunneling techniques. The TUN/TAP Windows Adapter is a network driver that enables some VPN providers to facilitate a VPN connection to their server. TUN/TAP driver is only used by specific VPNs (e.g. OpenVPN, Wireguard), not by thoses based on IKE protocols (e.g. IPsec).
- Effort: intermediate
Taskhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.
- Effort: master
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found
Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: master
Taskhostw Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.
- Effort: master
Transfering Files With Credential Data Via Network Shares
Detects file transfer of sensitive files which contain credential data using network shares.
- Effort: intermediate
Trickbot Malware Activity
Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe.
- Effort: intermediate
TrustedInstaller Impersonation
The rule detects attempts to impersonate TrustedInstaller. TrustedInstaller rights could allow a threat actor to delete or modify protected file or create/delete/modify files in protected folders. This technique is used by threat actors to disable Windows Defender.
- Effort: intermediate
Turla Named Pipes
Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config
- Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper
Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt
Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)
- Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer
Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.
- Effort: intermediate
Unsigned Image Loaded Into LSASS Process
Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process. To activate this rule you need to monitor loaded images into the LSASS process, this can be done with SYSMON Event ID 7.
- Effort: advanced
Ursnif Registry Key
Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
User Added to Local Administrators
Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients
- Effort: master
User Couldn't Call A Privileged Service LsaRegisterLogonProcess
The LsaRegisterLogonProcess function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA. This rule requires to log the Event ID 4673, which can be done by updating the Audit Policy.
- Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI DLL Loaded Via Office
Detects Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) DLL loaded via Office process. This activity may correspond to VBA macro executing WMI commands, which is highly suspicious. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done with the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
WMI Event Subscription
Detects creation of WMI event subscription persistence method
- Effort: advanced
WMI Fingerprint Commands
Detects attacker fingerprint activities based on the correlation of specific WMIC commands. This has been observed with Aurora malware.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Command Line Event Consumer
Detects WMI command line event consumers.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the /FORMAT argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). The rule requires to log Loaded DLLs to work properly, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 7.
- Effort: master
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool
WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.
- Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Web Application Launching Shell
Detects when a web application launches a shell.
- Effort: master
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
Werfault DLL Injection
Werfault DLL search order look first in the current file, which lets an attacker use th legitimate exe to run its own DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Deactivation Using PowerShell Script
Detects attempts to deactivate Windows Defender with PowerShell using ScriptBlockLogging.
- Effort: master
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking
Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done with Sysmon's Event IDs 12 and 13.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
The rule identify creation of new scheduled task who run suspicious or dangerous command
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Suspicious Service Creation
Detects the creation of a new suspicious service - attacker could use MSRPC to create a remote service
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Update LolBins
This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.
- Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent
Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Winlogon wrong parent
Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Winrshost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.
- Effort: master
Winword Document Droppers
Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Suspicious Commands
Detects suspicious commands used by the process wmic to get informations on the system.
- Effort: advanced
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).
- Effort: master
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack
Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
- Effort: intermediate
ZIP LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ZIP download followed by a child-process of explorer, followed by multiple Windows processes.This is widely used as an infection chain mechanism.
- Effort: advanced
xWizard Execution
Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.
- Effort: master