Trend Micro Apex One
Overview
- Vendor:
- Supported environment:
- Version compatibility:
- Detection based on: Alert, Telemetry
- Supported application or feature:
Trend Micro Apex One is Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solution that detects and protects your endpoints against threats.
This integration supports the following log types:
- Application Control violations
- Attack Discovery detections
- Behavior Monitoring detections
- C&C Callback
- Content Violation
- Data Loss Prevention
- Device Control violations
- Suspicious File detections
- Network Content Inspection
- Virus/Malware detections
- Spyware/Grayware detections
- Predictive Machine Learning detections
- Virtual Analyzer detections
- Web Violation
- Engine Update Status
- Pattern Update Status
Warning
This format is in beta
Configure
In this guide, you will configure your Apex Central to forward detection through syslog.
Prerequisites
An internal syslog concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.
Enable Syslog forwarding
To enable syslog forwarding:
- Log to Apex Central
- Go to
Administration > Settings > Syslog Settings - Select the checkbox
Enable syslog forwarding - Provide the IP, listening port and the protocol of our syslog concentrator
- Select
CEFas the log format - Configure the frequency of the log forwarding
- Select the log types to forward according to the list of supported log types:
- Application Control violations
- Attack Discovery detections
- Behavior Monitoring detections
- C&C Callback
- Content Violation
- Data Loss Prevention
- Device Control violations
- Suspicious File detections
- Network Content Inspection
- Virus/Malware detections
- Spyware/Grayware detections
- Predictive Machine Learning detections
- Virtual Analyzer detections
- Web Violation
- Engine Update Status
- Pattern Update Status
- Click
Test Connectionto validate the configuration - Click
Save
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Trend Micro Apex One.
Forward logs to Sekoia.io
Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700211|Attack Discovery Detections|3|deviceExternalId=5 rt=Jan 17 2019 03:38:06 GMT+00:00 dhost=VCAC-Window-331 dst=10.201.86.150 customerExternalID=8c1e2d8f-a03b-47ea-aef8-5aeab99ea697 cn1Label=SLF_RiskLevel cn1=0 cn2Label=SLF_PatternNumber cn2=30.1012.00 cs1Label=SLF_RuleID cs1=powershell invoke expression cat=point of entry cs2Label=SLF_ADEObjectGroup_Info_1 cs2=process - powershell.exe - {#012 "META_FILE_MD5" : "7353f60b1739074eb17c5f4dddefe239",#012 "META_FILE_NAME" : "powershell.exe",#012 "META_FILE_SHA1" : "6cbce4a295c163791b60fc23d285e6d84f28ee4c",#012 "META_FILE_SHA2" : "de96a6e69944335375dc1ac238336066889d9ffc7d73628ef4fe1b1b160ab32c",#012 "META_PATH" : "c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\windowspowershell\\\\v1.0\\\\",#012 "META_PROCESS_CMD" : [ "powershell iex test2" ],#012 "META_PROCESS_PID" : 10924,#012 "META_SIGNER" : "microsoft windows",#012 "META_SIGNER_VALIDATION" : true,#012 "META_USER_USER_NAME" : "Administrator",#012 "META_USER_USER_SERVERNAME" : "VCAC-WINDOW-331",#012 "OID" : 1#012}#012
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|BM:1000|Behavior Monitoring|3|rt=Aug 16 2017 05:00:40 GMT+00:00 dvchost=localhost cn1Label=Risk_Level cn1=1 cs2Label=Policy cs2=1000 sproc=C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\rundll32.exe cn2Label=Event_Type cn2=4 cs1Label=Target cs1=HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\COM+ act=3 cn3Label=Operation cn3=302 shost=shost1 src=10.0.76.40 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|CnC:Block|CnC Callback|3|deviceExternalId=12 rt=Oct 11 2017 06:34:09 GMT+00:00 cat=1756 deviceFacility=Apex One cs2Label=EI_ProductVersion cs2=11.0 shost=ApexOneClient01 src=10.201.86.187 cs3Label=SLF_DomainName cs3=DOMAIN act=Block cn1Label=SLF_CCCA_RiskLevel cn1=1 cn2Label=SLF_CCCA_DetectionSource cn2=1 cn3Label=SLF_CCCA_DestinationFormat cn3=1 dst=10.201.86.195 deviceProcessName=C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700106|Data Loss Prevention|3|cs3Label=Product_Entity/Endpoint cs3=Sample_Host dvchost=Sampledvchost cs2Label=Policy cs2=N/A cn1Label=Product cn1=15 rt=Oct 13 2017 02:54:04 GMT+00:00 src=10.0.9.34 smac=34-E6-D7-84-BC-7F shost=shost1 cs4Label=Incident_Source_(AD_Account) cs4=12467 filePath=D:\\2. DRIVER\\drivers WIN7\\Drivers\\DP_CardReader_14032.7z\\O2Micro\\FORCED\\6x86\\ fname=O2MDFvst.INF cs5Label=Rule cs5=SAMPLE RULE SET cs6Label=Template cs6=Apex One policy cn3Label=Channel cn3=0 cn2Label=Action cn2=4 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700107|Device Access Control|3|rt=Aug 16 2017 04:49:15 GMT+00:00 cs1Label=Product_Entity/Endpoint cs1=Sample_Host shost=shost1 dvchost=localhost cn1Label=Product cn1=15 sproc=C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe fname=F:\\Autorun.inf cn2Label=Device_Type cn2=0 cn3Label=Permission cn3=3 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|EAC:1|Endpoint Application Control Violation Information|3|deviceExternalId=39 rt=Jun 27 2012 03:14:03 GMT+00:00 cs1Label=Version cs1=1.299.00 suser=TMCM\\QA cs2Label=ApplicationControlEvent_ClientIPAddress_V4 cs2=0.0.0.0 cn1Label=Connection_Status cn1=0 fileHash=c0869b72C5606D22D92A6AC986686BB87485A25b fname=P2P_TEST.exe cs3Label=Command cs3=C:\\P2P_TEST.exe duser=QA cs4Label=Rule cs4=Test cs5Label=Policy cs5=TestPolicy act=Blocked deviceFacility=Trend Micro Endpoint Application Control
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|800102|Engine Update Status|3|rt=Apr 20 2017 12:04:34 GMT+00:00 shost=shost1 cs2Label=Product/Endpoint_IP cs2=10.0.17.6 cn1Label=Connection_Status cn1=100 cn2Label=Engine cn2=4096 cs5Label=Engine_Version cs5=9.950.1006 cn3Label=Engine_Status cn3=1 cs6Label=AUComponent_Type cs6=1 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700211|Managed Product Logon/Logoff Events|3|deviceExternalId=11 shost=SMEX01 deviceFacility=ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange cs1Label=Product_Version cs1=14 cn1Label=Command_Status cn1=110 msg=A user withthe Administrator role(s) has logged on. Detail Information :UserName:TEST2013\\administrator,IP address:10.204.166.127,EventType:Log in/out,SourceType:SMEX UI.
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|NCIE:Pass|Suspicious Connection|3|deviceExternalId=1 rt=Oct 11 2017 06:34:06 GMT+00:00 cat=1756 deviceFacility=Apex One deviceProcessName=C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost-1.exe act=Pass src=10.201.86.152 dst=10.69.81.64 spt=54594 dpt=80 deviceDirection=None cn1Label=SLF_PatternType cn1=2 cs2Label=NCIE_ThreatName cs2=Malicious_identified_CnC_querying_on_UDP_detected
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|800101|Pattern Update Status|3|rt=Nov 02 2017 12:46:44 GMT+00:00 shost=shost1 cs1Label=Operating_System cs1=Windows 7 cs2Label=Product/Endpoint_IP cs2=10.0.7.20 cs3Label=Update_Agent cs3=0 cs4Label=Domain cs4=Default cn1Label=Connection_Status cn1=100 cn2Label=Pattern/Rule cn2=2048 cs5Label=Pattern/Rule_Version cs5=1548 cn3Label=Pattern/Rule_Status cn3=1 cs6Label=AUComponent_Type cs6=2 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|PML:File cleaned|virusa|3|deviceFacility=1 dvchost=Sample_Host cs2Label=DetectionName cs2=virusa suser=Sample\\Administrator cn2Label=DetectionType cn2=0 filePath=C:\\WindowsFILENAME deviceCustomDate1Label=FileCreationDate deviceCustomDate1=Nov 03 2016 08:58:03 GMT+00:00 sproc=notepad.exe cs4Label=ProcessCommandLine cs4=notepad.exe -test duser=admin app=2 cs3Label=InfectionLocation cs3=http://10.0.0.1/ dst=10.0.17.6 cn3Label=Confidence cn3=82 act=21
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|VAD|VAN_RANSOMWARE.umxxhelloransom_abc|3|deviceExternalId=2 rt=Mar 22 2018 08:23:23 GMT+00:00 deviceFacility=Apex One dvchost=OSCE01 dhost=Isolate-ClientA dst=0.0.0.0 app=1 sourceServiceNameTest1@trend.com.tw destinationServiceName=Test2@tmcm.extbeta.com;Test3@tmcm.extbeta.com sproc=VA fileHash=3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140 fname=C:\\\\QA_Log.zip request=http://127.1.1.1 cs1Label=Security_Threat cs1=VAN_RANSOMWARE.umxxhelloransom_abc cn1Label=Risk_Level cn1=0 cs2Label=Threat_Categories cs2=Anti-security, self-preservation cs3Label=Cloud_Service_Vendor cs3=Google Drive
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|MS:0|This is a policy name|3|deviceExternalId=90045 rt=Sep 17 2018 01:27:42 GMT+00:00 dhost=user@test.com duser=user@test.com act=0 cs2Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs2=3.2 cs3Label=SL_FilterType cs3=0 cs5Label=CLF_ReasonCodeSource cs5=20 cs6Label=SL_MessageAction cs6=0 cat=1705 dvchost=ApexOneClient01 cn1Label=CLF_ServerityCode cn1=2 fname=NE_AEP.1550 msg=plain_qp_no8_av1u_NE_AEP.1550 shost=user2@test.com suser=user2@test.com deviceFacility=Deep Discovery Email Inspector src=10.206.155.122
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|Spyware Detected|Spyware Detected|3|deviceExternalId=15 rt=2023-03-13 13:05:13 cnt=1 dhost=mymachine.local cn1Label=PatternType cn1=1073741840 cs1Label=VirusName cs1=HKTL_MIMIKATZ64 cs2Label=EngineVersion cs2=6.2.4063 cs5Label=ActionResult cs5=Accès refusé cs6Label=PatternVersion cs6=2603 cat=1727 dvchost=zettiz.manage.trendmicro.com fname=C:\\Users\\adminuser\\Downloads\\mimikatz_trunk.KYaAbNAv.zip.part(x64\\mimidrv.sys) filePath=C:\\Users\\adminuser\\Downloads\\mimikatz_trunk.KYaAbNAv.zip.part(x64\\mimidrv.sys) dst=10.0.4.5 TMCMLogDetectedIP=10.0.4.5 TMCMLogDetectedHost=mymachine.local deviceFacility=Apex One fileHash=4112EF95386EA4D1131BE7C600D49A310E9D8F5B duser=adminuser cn2Label=SpywareHostDetail_ScanType cn2=11 cn3Label=SpywareHostDetail_RiskType cn3=0 ApexCentralHost=Apex Central as a Service devicePayloadId=70003A0D208D-A9F111ED-C19F-EAC6-541C TMCMdevicePlatform=Windows 10 10.0 (Build 19044) deviceNtDomain=N/A dntdom=Workgroup\\
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|Spyware Detected|Spyware Detected|3|deviceExternalId=3 rt=Oct 06 2017 08:39:46 GMT+00:00 cnt=1 dhost=ApexOneClient01 cn1Label=PatternType cn1=1073741840 cs1Label=VirusName cs1=ADW_OPENCANDY cs2Label=EngineVersion cs2=6.2.3027 cs5Label=ActionResult cs5=Reboot system successfully cs6Label=PatternVersion cs6=1297 cat=1727 dvchost=ApexOneClient01 fname=F:\\Malware\\psas\\rsrc2.bin filePath=F:\\Malware\\psas\\rsrc2.bin dst=50.8.1.1 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|FH:Log|Suspicious Files|3|deviceExternalId=1 rt=Nov 15 2016 02:47:21 GMT+00:00 cat=1766 deviceFacility=Apex One cn1Label=SLF_ProductVersion cn1=11 dst=10.201.86.151 dhost=APEX-ONE-CLIENT-1 cs2Label=SLF_TrueFileType cs2=SLF_TrueFileType fileHash=D6712CAE5EC821F910E14945153AE7871AA536CA cs3Label=SLF_FileSource cs3=C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\017545113A434757C5F0F13095DBBF138BD76A40;0x36D572AE cn2Label=SLF_SourceType cn2=0 act=Log cn3Label=SLF_ScanType cn3=1
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|MS:0|This is a policy name|3|deviceExternalId=90045 rt=Sep 17 2018 01:27:42 GMT+00:00 dhost=user@test.com duser=user@test.com act=0 cs2Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs2=3.2 cs3Label=SL_FilterType cs3=0 cs5Label=CLF_ReasonCodeSource cs5=20 cs6Label=SL_MessageAction cs6=0 cat=1705 dvchost=ApexOneClient01 cn1Label=CLF_ServerityCode cn1=2 fname=NE_AEP.1550 msg=plain_qp_no8_av1u_NE_AEP.1550 shost=user2@test.com suser=user2@test.com deviceFacility=Deep Discovery Email Inspector src=10.206.155.122
0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|AV:File cleaned|Trojan.Win32.FRS.VSNW03G24|3|deviceExternalId=3541 rt=Sep 02 2024 07:28:21 GMT+00:00 cnt=1 dhost=host TMCMLogDetectedHost=host duser=host\\username act=File cleaned cn1Label=Pattern cn1=1956500 cn2Label=Second_Action cn2=1 cs1Label=VLF_FunctionCode cs1=Scheduled Scan cs2Label=Engine cs2=1.2.3.4 cs3Label=Product_Version cs3=14.0 cs4Label=CLF_ReasonCode cs4=virus log cs5Label=First_Action_Result cs5=File cleaned cs6Label=Second_Action_Result cs6=N/A cat=1703 dvchost=host.test.trendmicro.com cn3Label=Overall_Risk_Rating cn3=0 fname=filename.rb filePath=C:\\path\\to\\the\\file\\ dst=5.6.7.8 TMCMLogDetectedIP=5.6.7.8 fileHash=ABCDE0123456789ABCDE deviceFacility=Apex One ApexCentralHost=Standard Endpoint Protection Manager devicePayloadId=ABCDEF012345-67890ABC-DEF1-2345-6789 TMCMdevicePlatform=Windows 10 10.0 (Build 19045) deviceNtDomain=N/A dntdom=Workgroup\\
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|AV:File renamed|JS_EXPLOIT.SMDN|3|deviceExternalId=104 rt=Feb 18 2016 14:34:00 GMT+00:00 cnt=1 dhost=ApexOneClient01 duser=Admin004 act=File renamed cn1Label=VLF_PatternNumber cn1=920500 cn2Label=VLF_SecondAction cn2=3 cs1Label=VLF_FunctionCode cs1=Manual Scan cs2Label=VLF_EngineVersion cs2=9.500.1005 cs3Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs3=10.6 cs4Label=CLF_ReasonCode cs4=virus log cs5Label=VLF_FirstActionResult cs5=File renamed cs6Label=VLF_SecondActionResult cs6=N/A cat=1703 dvchost=ApexOneServer01 cn3Label=CLF_ServerityCode cn3=2 fname=0348C693056617D34FC5B5BAB4643885FEE5FEDF;0xD5D56AC2 filePath=C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop\\trend_test_virus\\Trojans\\ msg=BMAC Schedule of Events.xls shost=ABC-OSCE-WKS12 suser=ABC-OSCE-WKS12 dst=10.201.129.24 deviceFacility=Apex One
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|AV:Fichier nettoyé|WORM_GAMARUE.ITK|3|deviceExternalId=7 rt=2023-03-15 13:23:47 cnt=1 dhost=mymachine.local TMCMLogDetectedHost=mymachine.local duser=mymachine.local\\adminuser act=Fichier nettoyé cn1Label=VLF_PatternNumber cn1=1831100 cn2Label=VLF_SecondAction cn2=1 cs1Label=VLF_FunctionCode cs1=Scan en temps réel cs2Label=VLF_EngineVersion cs2=22.580.1004 cs3Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs3=14.0 cs4Label=CLF_ReasonCode cs4=virus log cs5Label=VLF_FirstActionResult cs5=Fichier nettoyé cs6Label=VLF_SecondActionResult cs6=N/A cat=1703 dvchost=zettiz.manage.trendmicro.com cn3Label=SummaryToExport_OverallRiskRating cn3=1 fname=5f4b0aa22ce65b30fb232421673fad4c126970928207ade256d3bfee33dc3687 filePath=C:\\Users\\adminuser\\Downloads\\5f4b0aa22ce65b30fb232421673fad4c126970928207ade256d3bfee33dc3687\\ dst=10.0.4.5 TMCMLogDetectedIP=10.0.4.5 deviceFacility=Apex One ApexCentralHost=Apex Central as a Service reason=G devicePayloadId=70003A0D208D-A9F111ED-C334-C056-44DE TMCMdevicePlatform=Windows 10 10.0 (Build 19044) deviceNtDomain=N/A dntdom=Workgroup\\
CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|WB:7|7|3|deviceExternalId=38 rt=Nov 15 2017 08:43:57 GMT+00:00 app=17 cntLabel=AggregatedCount cnt=1 dpt=80 act=1 src=10.1.128.46 cs1Label=SLF_PolicyName cs1=External User Policy deviceDirection=2 cat=7 dvchost=ApexOneClient08 fname=test.txt request=http://www.violetsoft.net/counter/insert.php?dbserver\=db1&c_pcode\=25&c_pid\=funpop1&c_kind\=4&c_mac\=FE-ED-BE-EF-0C-E1 deviceFacility=Apex One shost=ABC-HOST-WKS12
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Trend Micro Apex One. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Trend Micro Apex One on ATT&CK Navigator
ACLight Discovering Privileged Accounts
Detects use of ACLight tool. This tool aims to discover privileged accounts by scanning the network.
- Effort: advanced
AMSI Deactivation Using Registry Key
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable the AMSI provider by deleting the associated registry key.
- Effort: master
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll
Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.
- Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group
Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system.
- Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.
- Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line
Detects use of azureedge in the command line.
- Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
Burp Suite Tool Detected
Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).
- Effort: intermediate
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
COM Hijack Via Sdclt
Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using 'sdclt.exe'.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE
Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access
Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read
Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability
Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe
Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality
- Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon
Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking
Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.
- Effort: advanced
Compress Data for Exfiltration via Archiver
Detects data compressed by specific tools.
- Effort: master
Compression Followed By Suppression
Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.
- Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted
Detects computer account deletion.
- Effort: master
Container Credential Access
Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Cookies Deletion
Detects when cookies are deleted by a suspicious process.
- Effort: master
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable
A script has copied a System32 executable.
- Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data
Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Multi Service Disable
The rule detects a high number of services stopped or de-activated in a short period of time.
- Effort: master
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Credential Harvesting Via Vaultcmd.exe
Detects when the process vaultcmd is used for credential harvesting.
- Effort: advanced
Cron Files Alteration
Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation. To ensure full performance on this rule, auditbeat intake must be configure with the module file_integrity containing path mentionned in the pattern.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
DHCP Callout DLL Installation
Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Query For Iplookup
Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.
- Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation
Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers
This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.
- Effort: elementary
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled
Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disable Windows Defender Credential Guard
Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: intermediate
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Discord Suspicious Download
Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Discovery Commands Correlation
Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.
- Effort: intermediate
Dism Disabling Windows Defender
Detects windows defender disabled by dism.
- Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount
Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot
- Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration
Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
- Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: master
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Elevated Shell Launched By Browser
Detects when openwith.exe is launched with privileges followed by a browser launching an elevated shell. Related to the CVE-2024-38014.
- Effort: master
Elise Backdoor
Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom
- Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity
Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity
- Effort: elementary
Enabling Restricted Admin Mode
Detects when the restricted admin mode is enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History
Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history.
- Effort: advanced
EvilProxy Phishing Domain
Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Mailbox Export
Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file, from command line or PowerShell script.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp
Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.
- Effort: advanced
Explorer Process Executing HTA File
Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.
- Effort: intermediate
Fail2ban Unban IP
An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.
- Effort: advanced
Formbook File Creation DB1
Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.
- Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line
Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.
- Effort: master
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Gpresult Usage
Detects when an account uses gpresult to get information on gpo.
- Effort: advanced
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility
Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
HTA Infection Chains
Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).
- Effort: advanced
HTML Smuggling Suspicious Usage
Based on several samples from different botnets, this rule aims at detecting HTML infection chain by looking for HTML created files followed by suspicious files being executed.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe
Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
- Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
ISO LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.
- Effort: intermediate
Impacket Addcomputer
Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern
- Effort: intermediate
Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs
Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.
- Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python
Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.
- Effort: advanced
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets
Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.
- Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command
Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module
- Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder
Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.
- Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute
Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload
Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Nohup Exec
Detects suspicious usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search
Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems
- Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)
Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: advanced
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL
Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).
- Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key
Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.
- Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable SecurityHealth
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender SecurityHealth through command line, PowerShell scripts, and registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is recommended.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft IIS Module Installation
Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Office Macro Security Registry Modifications
Detects registry changes allowing an attacker to make Microsoft Office products runs Macros without warning. Events are collected either from ETW/Sysmon/EDR depending of the integration.
- Effort: master
Mimikatz Basic Commands
Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.
- Effort: elementary
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution
Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution
Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.
- Effort: elementary
Mustang Panda Dropper
Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation
Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command
- Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command
Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).
- Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Connection Via Certutil
Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Share Discovery
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.
- Effort: master
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service from command line
- Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values
Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: advanced
Ntfsinfo Usage
Detects when the command ntfsinfo is used. An attacker can access to information on the volume from NTFS and have a directory dump of NTFS files.
- Effort: advanced
Office Application Startup Office Test
Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
- Effort: elementary
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process
In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.
- Effort: advanced
Openfiles Usage
Detects when the command openfiles, to get information on files opened remotely, is used.
- Effort: advanced
Opening Of a Password File
Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.
- Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: master
Package Manager Alteration
Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software. To ensure full performance on this rule, auditbeat intake must be configure with the module file_integrity containing path mentionned in the pattern.
- Effort: advanced
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic
Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.
- Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading
Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.
- Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension
Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension
- Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation
Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed
Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Downgrade Attack
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL
Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32
Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass
This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump
Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths
Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Putty Sessions Listing
Detects attempts to list Putty sessions through registry. To fully work, this rule requires to log registry accesses, which can be done with the Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 but for that specific configuration is needed.
- Effort: master
Python Exfiltration Tools
Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Python Offensive Tools and Packages
Track installation and usage of offensive python packages and project that are used for lateral movement
- Effort: master
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification
Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL
Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.
- Effort: elementary
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
Reconnaissance Commands Activities
Based on Cynet, Microsoft and Kaspersky analysis of Qakbot, this rule tries to detect some discovery TTPs.
- Effort: intermediate
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
Remote System Discovery Via Telnet
Detects use of the protocol telnet to access information.
- Effort: advanced
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
SSH Authorized Key Alteration
The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision.
- Effort: advanced
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges
Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.
- Effort: elementary
SecurityScorecard Vulnerability Assessment Scanner New Issues
Raises an alert when SecurityScorecard Vulnerability Assessment Scanner find new issues.
- Effort: master
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Shadow Copies
Detects command line used to create and list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).
- Effort: master
Shell PID Injection
Detects when shells PID are listed and injected in another process. It can be performed to reuse sudo token related to shell in order to elevate privilege and maintain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services
Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: master
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool
Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line
Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.
- Effort: master
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP
Detects a code page switch in command line
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern
Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process
Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services
Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Email Attachment Received
Detects email containing a suspicious file as an attachment, based on its extension.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious File Name
Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Finger Usage
Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File
Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution
Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line
Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage
catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution
Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TOR Gateway
Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign
Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter
Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries
Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action
Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
- Effort: advanced
Sysprep On AppData Folder
Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.
- Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
System Network Connections Discovery
Detects system network connections discovery via powershell and cmd.
- Effort: advanced
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request
Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind
- Effort: advanced
Trend Micro Apex One Data Loss Prevention Alert
Trend Micro Apex One has raised an alert for data loss prevention.
- Effort: master
Trend Micro Apex One Intrusion Detection Alert
Trend Micro Apex One has raised an alert for an intrusion detection.
- Effort: master
Trend Micro Apex One Malware Alert
Trend Micro Apex One has detected a malware.
- Effort: master
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt
Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Fingerprint Commands
Detects attacker fingerprint activities based on the correlation of specific WMIC commands. This has been observed with Aurora malware.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool
WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.
- Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Suspicious Commands
Detects suspicious commands used by the process wmic to get informations on the system.
- Effort: advanced
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack
Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
- Effort: intermediate
ZIP LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ZIP download followed by a child-process of explorer, followed by multiple Windows processes.This is widely used as an infection chain mechanism.
- Effort: advanced
xWizard Execution
Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Authentication logs |
Trend Micro Deep Security produce logs describing authentication events |
File monitoring |
Trend Micro Deep Security monitor changes made on the host and on the appplications |
Network intrusion detection system |
Trend Micro Deep Security monitor the network traffic to prevent intrusions |
Network protocol analysis |
Trend Micro Deep Security monitor the network traffic and maintains event logs for audit |
Web proxy |
Trend Micro Deep Security monitor HTTP traffic to block malicious payloads and communication with C&C. |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | alert |
| Category | authentication, configuration, email, file, intrusion_detection, malware, network, process |
| Type | change, info |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700211|Attack Discovery Detections|3|deviceExternalId=5 rt=Jan 17 2019 03:38:06 GMT+00:00 dhost=VCAC-Window-331 dst=10.201.86.150 customerExternalID=8c1e2d8f-a03b-47ea-aef8-5aeab99ea697 cn1Label=SLF_RiskLevel cn1=0 cn2Label=SLF_PatternNumber cn2=30.1012.00 cs1Label=SLF_RuleID cs1=powershell invoke expression cat=point of entry cs2Label=SLF_ADEObjectGroup_Info_1 cs2=process - powershell.exe - {#012 \"META_FILE_MD5\" : \"7353f60b1739074eb17c5f4dddefe239\",#012 \"META_FILE_NAME\" : \"powershell.exe\",#012 \"META_FILE_SHA1\" : \"6cbce4a295c163791b60fc23d285e6d84f28ee4c\",#012 \"META_FILE_SHA2\" : \"de96a6e69944335375dc1ac238336066889d9ffc7d73628ef4fe1b1b160ab32c\",#012 \"META_PATH\" : \"c:\\\\\\\\windows\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\windowspowershell\\\\\\\\v1.0\\\\\\\\\",#012 \"META_PROCESS_CMD\" : [ \"powershell iex test2\" ],#012 \"META_PROCESS_PID\" : 10924,#012 \"META_SIGNER\" : \"microsoft windows\",#012 \"META_SIGNER_VALIDATION\" : true,#012 \"META_USER_USER_NAME\" : \"Administrator\",#012 \"META_USER_USER_SERVERNAME\" : \"VCAC-WINDOW-331\",#012 \"OID\" : 1#012}#012",
"event": {
"category": [
"intrusion_detection"
],
"dataset": "Attack Discovery Detections",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2019-01-17T03:38:06Z",
"destination": {
"address": "10.201.86.150",
"ip": "10.201.86.150"
},
"host": {
"name": "VCAC-Window-331"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.201.86.150"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "700211",
"name": "powershell invoke expression",
"ruleset": "point of entry"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|BM:1000|Behavior Monitoring|3|rt=Aug 16 2017 05:00:40 GMT+00:00 dvchost=localhost cn1Label=Risk_Level cn1=1 cs2Label=Policy cs2=1000 sproc=C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\rundll32.exe cn2Label=Event_Type cn2=4 cs1Label=Target cs1=HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\\\\COM+ act=3 cn3Label=Operation cn3=302 shost=shost1 src=10.0.76.40 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"action": "Terminate",
"category": [
"process"
],
"dataset": "Behavior Monitoring",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-08-16T05:00:40Z",
"host": {
"name": "localhost"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\rundll32.exe"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.0.76.40"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "BM:1000",
"name": "Threat behavior analysis"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.76.40",
"ip": "10.0.76.40"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"behavior": {
"target": "HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\\\\COM+"
},
"event_type": "Registry"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|CnC:Block|CnC Callback|3|deviceExternalId=12 rt=Oct 11 2017 06:34:09 GMT+00:00 cat=1756 deviceFacility=Apex One cs2Label=EI_ProductVersion cs2=11.0 shost=ApexOneClient01 src=10.201.86.187 cs3Label=SLF_DomainName cs3=DOMAIN act=Block cn1Label=SLF_CCCA_RiskLevel cn1=1 cn2Label=SLF_CCCA_DetectionSource cn2=1 cn3Label=SLF_CCCA_DestinationFormat cn3=1 dst=10.201.86.195 deviceProcessName=C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Internet Explorer\\\\iexplore.exe",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"dataset": "CnC Callback",
"severity": 3,
"type": "info"
},
"@timestamp": "2017-10-11T06:34:09Z",
"destination": {
"address": "10.201.86.195",
"ip": "10.201.86.195"
},
"host": {
"name": "ApexOneClient01"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Internet Explorer\\\\iexplore.exe",
"name": "iexplore.exe",
"working_directory": "C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Internet Explorer\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DOMAIN"
],
"ip": [
"10.201.86.187",
"10.201.86.195"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "CnC:Block"
},
"source": {
"address": "DOMAIN",
"domain": "DOMAIN",
"ip": "10.201.86.187"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700106|Data Loss Prevention|3|cs3Label=Product_Entity/Endpoint cs3=Sample_Host dvchost=Sampledvchost cs2Label=Policy cs2=N/A cn1Label=Product cn1=15 rt=Oct 13 2017 02:54:04 GMT+00:00 src=10.0.9.34 smac=34-E6-D7-84-BC-7F shost=shost1 cs4Label=Incident_Source_(AD_Account) cs4=12467 filePath=D:\\\\2. DRIVER\\\\drivers WIN7\\\\Drivers\\\\DP_CardReader_14032.7z\\\\O2Micro\\\\FORCED\\\\6x86\\\\ fname=O2MDFvst.INF cs5Label=Rule cs5=SAMPLE RULE SET cs6Label=Template cs6=Apex One policy cn3Label=Channel cn3=0 cn2Label=Action cn2=4 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"action": "Passed",
"category": [
"email"
],
"dataset": "Data Loss Prevention",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-10-13T02:54:04Z",
"destination": {
"address": "Sampledvchost",
"domain": "Sampledvchost"
},
"file": {
"name": "O2MDFvst.INF",
"path": "D:\\\\2. DRIVER\\\\drivers WIN7\\\\Drivers\\\\DP_CardReader_14032.7z\\\\O2Micro\\\\FORCED\\\\6x86"
},
"host": {
"name": "shost1"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"Sampledvchost",
"shost1"
],
"ip": [
"10.0.9.34"
],
"user": [
"12467"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "700106",
"name": "SAMPLE RULE SET",
"ruleset": "SAMPLE RULE SET"
},
"source": {
"address": "shost1",
"domain": "shost1",
"ip": "10.0.9.34",
"mac": "34-E6-D7-84-BC-7F"
},
"user": {
"name": "12467"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700107|Device Access Control|3|rt=Aug 16 2017 04:49:15 GMT+00:00 cs1Label=Product_Entity/Endpoint cs1=Sample_Host shost=shost1 dvchost=localhost cn1Label=Product cn1=15 sproc=C:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe fname=F:\\\\Autorun.inf cn2Label=Device_Type cn2=0 cn3Label=Permission cn3=3 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"category": [
"file"
],
"dataset": "Device Access Control",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-08-16T04:49:15Z",
"destination": {
"address": "localhost",
"domain": "localhost"
},
"file": {
"name": "F:\\\\Autorun.inf"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
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]
},
"rule": {
"id": "700107"
},
"source": {
"address": "shost1",
"domain": "shost1"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"DeviceType": "USB storage device",
"Permission": "List device content only"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|EAC:1|Endpoint Application Control Violation Information|3|deviceExternalId=39 rt=Jun 27 2012 03:14:03 GMT+00:00 cs1Label=Version cs1=1.299.00 suser=TMCM\\\\QA cs2Label=ApplicationControlEvent_ClientIPAddress_V4 cs2=0.0.0.0 cn1Label=Connection_Status cn1=0 fileHash=c0869b72C5606D22D92A6AC986686BB87485A25b fname=P2P_TEST.exe cs3Label=Command cs3=C:\\\\P2P_TEST.exe duser=QA cs4Label=Rule cs4=Test cs5Label=Policy cs5=TestPolicy act=Blocked deviceFacility=Trend Micro Endpoint Application Control",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"dataset": "Endpoint Application Control Violation Information",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2012-06-27T03:14:03Z",
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "C:\\\\P2P_TEST.exe",
"executable": "P2P_TEST.exe",
"hash": {
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}
},
"related": {
"hash": [
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"ip": [
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],
"user": [
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},
"rule": {
"id": "EAC:1",
"name": "Test",
"ruleset": "TestPolicy"
},
"source": {
"address": "0.0.0.0",
"ip": "0.0.0.0",
"user": {
"name": "TMCM\\\\QA"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "QA"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|800102|Engine Update Status|3|rt=Apr 20 2017 12:04:34 GMT+00:00 shost=shost1 cs2Label=Product/Endpoint_IP cs2=10.0.17.6 cn1Label=Connection_Status cn1=100 cn2Label=Engine cn2=4096 cs5Label=Engine_Version cs5=9.950.1006 cn3Label=Engine_Status cn3=1 cs6Label=AUComponent_Type cs6=1 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"category": [
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],
"dataset": "Engine Update Status",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-04-20T12:04:34Z",
"host": {
"name": "shost1"
},
"observer": {
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"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
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},
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},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.17.6",
"ip": "10.0.17.6"
},
"trendmicro": {
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"Engine_Status": "In use"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|700211|Managed Product Logon/Logoff Events|3|deviceExternalId=11 shost=SMEX01 deviceFacility=ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange cs1Label=Product_Version cs1=14 cn1Label=Command_Status cn1=110 msg=A user withthe Administrator role(s) has logged on. Detail Information :UserName:TEST2013\\\\administrator,IP address:10.204.166.127,EventType:Log in/out,SourceType:SMEX UI.",
"event": {
"category": [
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],
"dataset": "Managed Product Logon/Logoff Events",
"reason": "A user withthe Administrator role(s) has logged on. Detail Information :UserName:TEST2013\\\\administrator,IP address:10.204.166.127,EventType:Log in/out,SourceType:SMEX UI.",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"host": {
"name": "SMEX01"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"title": "ScanMail for Microsoft Exchange"
},
"rule": {
"id": "700211"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|NCIE:Pass|Suspicious Connection|3|deviceExternalId=1 rt=Oct 11 2017 06:34:06 GMT+00:00 cat=1756 deviceFacility=Apex One deviceProcessName=C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost-1.exe act=Pass src=10.201.86.152 dst=10.69.81.64 spt=54594 dpt=80 deviceDirection=None cn1Label=SLF_PatternType cn1=2 cs2Label=NCIE_ThreatName cs2=Malicious_identified_CnC_querying_on_UDP_detected",
"event": {
"action": "Pass",
"category": [
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],
"code": "1756",
"dataset": "Suspicious Connection",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-10-11T06:34:06Z",
"destination": {
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"ip": "10.69.81.64",
"port": 80
},
"observer": {
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"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost-1.exe"
},
"related": {
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},
"rule": {
"id": "NCIE:Pass"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.201.86.152",
"ip": "10.201.86.152",
"port": 54594
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
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}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|800101|Pattern Update Status|3|rt=Nov 02 2017 12:46:44 GMT+00:00 shost=shost1 cs1Label=Operating_System cs1=Windows 7 cs2Label=Product/Endpoint_IP cs2=10.0.7.20 cs3Label=Update_Agent cs3=0 cs4Label=Domain cs4=Default cn1Label=Connection_Status cn1=100 cn2Label=Pattern/Rule cn2=2048 cs5Label=Pattern/Rule_Version cs5=1548 cn3Label=Pattern/Rule_Status cn3=1 cs6Label=AUComponent_Type cs6=2 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"category": [
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],
"dataset": "Pattern Update Status",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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},
"@timestamp": "2017-11-02T12:46:44Z",
"host": {
"ip": "10.0.7.20",
"name": "shost1",
"os": {
"name": "Windows 7"
}
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
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},
"rule": {
"id": "2048"
},
"trendmicro": {
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"Pattern_RuleStatus": "1 version old"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|PML:File cleaned|virusa|3|deviceFacility=1 dvchost=Sample_Host cs2Label=DetectionName cs2=virusa suser=Sample\\\\Administrator cn2Label=DetectionType cn2=0 filePath=C:\\\\WindowsFILENAME deviceCustomDate1Label=FileCreationDate deviceCustomDate1=Nov 03 2016 08:58:03 GMT+00:00 sproc=notepad.exe cs4Label=ProcessCommandLine cs4=notepad.exe -test duser=admin app=2 cs3Label=InfectionLocation cs3=http://10.0.0.1/ dst=10.0.17.6 cn3Label=Confidence cn3=82 act=21",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"dataset": "virusa",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\",
"name": "WindowsFILENAME",
"path": "C:\\\\WindowsFILENAME"
},
"host": {
"ip": "10.0.17.6"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "notepad.exe -test",
"executable": "notepad.exe"
},
"related": {
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"user": [
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},
"rule": {
"id": "PML:File cleaned"
},
"url": {
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"original": "http://10.0.0.1/",
"path": "/",
"port": 80,
"scheme": "http"
},
"user": {
"name": "Sample\\\\Administrator",
"target": {
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]
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|VAD|VAN_RANSOMWARE.umxxhelloransom_abc|3|deviceExternalId=2 rt=Mar 22 2018 08:23:23 GMT+00:00 deviceFacility=Apex One dvchost=OSCE01 dhost=Isolate-ClientA dst=0.0.0.0 app=1 sourceServiceNameTest1@trend.com.tw destinationServiceName=Test2@tmcm.extbeta.com;Test3@tmcm.extbeta.com sproc=VA fileHash=3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140 fname=C:\\\\\\\\QA_Log.zip request=http://127.1.1.1 cs1Label=Security_Threat cs1=VAN_RANSOMWARE.umxxhelloransom_abc cn1Label=Risk_Level cn1=0 cs2Label=Threat_Categories cs2=Anti-security, self-preservation cs3Label=Cloud_Service_Vendor cs3=Google Drive",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"dataset": "VAN_RANSOMWARE.umxxhelloransom_abc",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2018-03-22T08:23:23Z",
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\\\\\",
"hash": {
"sha1": "3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140"
},
"name": "QA_Log.zip",
"path": "C:\\\\\\\\QA_Log.zip"
},
"host": {
"name": "Isolate-ClientA"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"process": {
"name": "VA"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"3395856CE81F2B7382DEE72602F798B642F14140"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "VAD"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"Cloud_Service_Vendor": "Google Drive",
"Risk_Level": 0,
"Security_Threat": "VAN_RANSOMWARE.umxxhelloransom_abc",
"Threat_Categories": "Anti-security, self-preservation"
}
},
"url": {
"domain": "127.1.1.1",
"original": "http://127.1.1.1",
"port": 80,
"scheme": "http"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|MS:0|This is a policy name|3|deviceExternalId=90045 rt=Sep 17 2018 01:27:42 GMT+00:00 dhost=user@test.com duser=user@test.com act=0 cs2Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs2=3.2 cs3Label=SL_FilterType cs3=0 cs5Label=CLF_ReasonCodeSource cs5=20 cs6Label=SL_MessageAction cs6=0 cat=1705 dvchost=ApexOneClient01 cn1Label=CLF_ServerityCode cn1=2 fname=NE_AEP.1550 msg=plain_qp_no8_av1u_NE_AEP.1550 shost=user2@test.com suser=user2@test.com deviceFacility=Deep Discovery Email Inspector src=10.206.155.122",
"event": {
"action": "Unknown",
"category": [
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],
"code": "20",
"dataset": "This is a policy name",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2018-09-17T01:27:42Z",
"email": {
"from": {
"address": [
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]
},
"subject": "plain_qp_no8_av1u_NE_AEP.1550",
"to": {
"address": [
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]
}
},
"file": {
"name": "NE_AEP.1550"
},
"host": {
"name": "ApexOneClient01"
},
"observer": {
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"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
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},
"rule": {
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"ruleset": "1705"
},
"source": {
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"ip": "10.206.155.122"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"SL_FilterType": "Unknown",
"SL_MessageAction": "Unknown"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|Spyware Detected|Spyware Detected|3|deviceExternalId=15 rt=2023-03-13 13:05:13 cnt=1 dhost=mymachine.local cn1Label=PatternType cn1=1073741840 cs1Label=VirusName cs1=HKTL_MIMIKATZ64 cs2Label=EngineVersion cs2=6.2.4063 cs5Label=ActionResult cs5=Acc\u00e8s refus\u00e9 cs6Label=PatternVersion cs6=2603 cat=1727 dvchost=zettiz.manage.trendmicro.com fname=C:\\\\Users\\\\adminuser\\\\Downloads\\\\mimikatz_trunk.KYaAbNAv.zip.part(x64\\\\mimidrv.sys) filePath=C:\\\\Users\\\\adminuser\\\\Downloads\\\\mimikatz_trunk.KYaAbNAv.zip.part(x64\\\\mimidrv.sys) dst=10.0.4.5 TMCMLogDetectedIP=10.0.4.5 TMCMLogDetectedHost=mymachine.local deviceFacility=Apex One fileHash=4112EF95386EA4D1131BE7C600D49A310E9D8F5B duser=adminuser cn2Label=SpywareHostDetail_ScanType cn2=11 cn3Label=SpywareHostDetail_RiskType cn3=0 ApexCentralHost=Apex Central as a Service devicePayloadId=70003A0D208D-A9F111ED-C19F-EAC6-541C TMCMdevicePlatform=Windows 10 10.0 (Build 19044) deviceNtDomain=N/A dntdom=Workgroup\\\\ ",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"dataset": "Spyware Detected",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-03-13T13:05:13Z",
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\\\Users\\\\adminuser\\\\Downloads\\\\mimikatz_trunk.KYaAbNAv.zip.part(x64\\",
"hash": {
"sha1": "4112EF95386EA4D1131BE7C600D49A310E9D8F5B"
},
"name": "mimidrv.sys)",
"path": "C:\\\\Users\\\\adminuser\\\\Downloads\\\\mimikatz_trunk.KYaAbNAv.zip.part(x64\\\\mimidrv.sys)"
},
"host": {
"name": "mymachine.local"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
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],
"ip": [
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],
"user": [
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]
},
"rule": {
"id": "Spyware Detected"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.4.5",
"ip": "10.0.4.5"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"VirusName": "HKTL_MIMIKATZ64"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "adminuser"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|Spyware Detected|Spyware Detected|3|deviceExternalId=3 rt=Oct 06 2017 08:39:46 GMT+00:00 cnt=1 dhost=ApexOneClient01 cn1Label=PatternType cn1=1073741840 cs1Label=VirusName cs1=ADW_OPENCANDY cs2Label=EngineVersion cs2=6.2.3027 cs5Label=ActionResult cs5=Reboot system successfully cs6Label=PatternVersion cs6=1297 cat=1727 dvchost=ApexOneClient01 fname=F:\\\\Malware\\\\psas\\\\rsrc2.bin filePath=F:\\\\Malware\\\\psas\\\\rsrc2.bin dst=50.8.1.1 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"category": [
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],
"dataset": "Spyware Detected",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-10-06T08:39:46Z",
"file": {
"directory": "F:\\\\Malware\\\\psas\\",
"name": "rsrc2.bin",
"path": "F:\\\\Malware\\\\psas\\\\rsrc2.bin"
},
"host": {
"name": "ApexOneClient01"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"50.8.1.1"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "Spyware Detected"
},
"source": {
"address": "50.8.1.1",
"ip": "50.8.1.1"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"VirusName": "ADW_OPENCANDY"
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|FH:Log|Suspicious Files|3|deviceExternalId=1 rt=Nov 15 2016 02:47:21 GMT+00:00 cat=1766 deviceFacility=Apex One cn1Label=SLF_ProductVersion cn1=11 dst=10.201.86.151 dhost=APEX-ONE-CLIENT-1 cs2Label=SLF_TrueFileType cs2=SLF_TrueFileType fileHash=D6712CAE5EC821F910E14945153AE7871AA536CA cs3Label=SLF_FileSource cs3=C:\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Desktop\\\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\\\017545113A434757C5F0F13095DBBF138BD76A40;0x36D572AE cn2Label=SLF_SourceType cn2=0 act=Log cn3Label=SLF_ScanType cn3=1",
"event": {
"action": "Log",
"category": [
"malware"
],
"dataset": "Suspicious Files",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
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]
},
"@timestamp": "2016-11-15T02:47:21Z",
"file": {
"directory": "C:\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Desktop\\\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\",
"hash": {
"sha1": "D6712CAE5EC821F910E14945153AE7871AA536CA"
},
"name": "017545113A434757C5F0F13095DBBF138BD76A40;0x36D572AE",
"path": "C:\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Desktop\\\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\\\BT-SHA1-SAMPLE\\\\017545113A434757C5F0F13095DBBF138BD76A40;0x36D572AE"
},
"host": {
"name": "APEX-ONE-CLIENT-1"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
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],
"ip": [
"10.201.86.151"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "FH:Log"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.201.86.151",
"ip": "10.201.86.151"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|MS:0|This is a policy name|3|deviceExternalId=90045 rt=Sep 17 2018 01:27:42 GMT+00:00 dhost=user@test.com duser=user@test.com act=0 cs2Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs2=3.2 cs3Label=SL_FilterType cs3=0 cs5Label=CLF_ReasonCodeSource cs5=20 cs6Label=SL_MessageAction cs6=0 cat=1705 dvchost=ApexOneClient01 cn1Label=CLF_ServerityCode cn1=2 fname=NE_AEP.1550 msg=plain_qp_no8_av1u_NE_AEP.1550 shost=user2@test.com suser=user2@test.com deviceFacility=Deep Discovery Email Inspector src=10.206.155.122",
"event": {
"action": "Unknown",
"category": [
"email"
],
"code": "20",
"dataset": "This is a policy name",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2018-09-17T01:27:42Z",
"email": {
"from": {
"address": [
"user2@test.com"
]
},
"subject": "plain_qp_no8_av1u_NE_AEP.1550",
"to": {
"address": [
"user@test.com"
]
}
},
"file": {
"name": "NE_AEP.1550"
},
"host": {
"name": "ApexOneClient01"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.206.155.122"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "MS:0",
"ruleset": "1705"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.206.155.122",
"ip": "10.206.155.122"
},
"trendmicro": {
"apexone": {
"SL_FilterType": "Unknown",
"SL_MessageAction": "Unknown"
}
}
}
{
"message": "0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|AV:File cleaned|Trojan.Win32.FRS.VSNW03G24|3|deviceExternalId=3541 rt=Sep 02 2024 07:28:21 GMT+00:00 cnt=1 dhost=host TMCMLogDetectedHost=host duser=host\\\\username act=File cleaned cn1Label=Pattern cn1=1956500 cn2Label=Second_Action cn2=1 cs1Label=VLF_FunctionCode cs1=Scheduled Scan cs2Label=Engine cs2=1.2.3.4 cs3Label=Product_Version cs3=14.0 cs4Label=CLF_ReasonCode cs4=virus log cs5Label=First_Action_Result cs5=File cleaned cs6Label=Second_Action_Result cs6=N/A cat=1703 dvchost=host.test.trendmicro.com cn3Label=Overall_Risk_Rating cn3=0 fname=filename.rb filePath=C:\\\\path\\\\to\\\\the\\\\file\\\\ dst=5.6.7.8 TMCMLogDetectedIP=5.6.7.8 fileHash=ABCDE0123456789ABCDE deviceFacility=Apex One ApexCentralHost=Standard Endpoint Protection Manager devicePayloadId=ABCDEF012345-67890ABC-DEF1-2345-6789 TMCMdevicePlatform=Windows 10 10.0 (Build 19045) deviceNtDomain=N/A dntdom=Workgroup\\\\\n",
"event": {
"action": "File cleaned",
"category": [
"malware"
],
"dataset": "Trojan.Win32.FRS.VSNW03G24",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2024-09-02T07:28:21Z",
"destination": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8"
},
"file": {
"hash": {
"sha1": "ABCDE0123456789ABCDE"
},
"name": "filename.rb",
"path": "C:\\\\path\\\\to\\\\the\\\\file"
},
"host": {
"name": "host"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"ABCDE0123456789ABCDE"
],
"hosts": [
"host.test.trendmicro.com"
],
"ip": [
"5.6.7.8"
],
"user": [
"username"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "AV:File cleaned"
},
"server": {
"domain": "host.test.trendmicro.com"
},
"user": {
"domain": "host",
"name": "username"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|AV:File renamed|JS_EXPLOIT.SMDN|3|deviceExternalId=104 rt=Feb 18 2016 14:34:00 GMT+00:00 cnt=1 dhost=ApexOneClient01 duser=Admin004 act=File renamed cn1Label=VLF_PatternNumber cn1=920500 cn2Label=VLF_SecondAction cn2=3 cs1Label=VLF_FunctionCode cs1=Manual Scan cs2Label=VLF_EngineVersion cs2=9.500.1005 cs3Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs3=10.6 cs4Label=CLF_ReasonCode cs4=virus log cs5Label=VLF_FirstActionResult cs5=File renamed cs6Label=VLF_SecondActionResult cs6=N/A cat=1703 dvchost=ApexOneServer01 cn3Label=CLF_ServerityCode cn3=2 fname=0348C693056617D34FC5B5BAB4643885FEE5FEDF;0xD5D56AC2 filePath=C:\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Desktop\\\\trend_test_virus\\\\Trojans\\\\ msg=BMAC Schedule of Events.xls shost=ABC-OSCE-WKS12 suser=ABC-OSCE-WKS12 dst=10.201.129.24 deviceFacility=Apex One",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"code": "virus log",
"dataset": "JS_EXPLOIT.SMDN",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2016-02-18T14:34:00Z",
"file": {
"name": "0348C693056617D34FC5B5BAB4643885FEE5FEDF;0xD5D56AC2",
"path": "C:\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\Desktop\\\\trend_test_virus\\\\Trojans"
},
"host": {
"name": "ApexOneClient01"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.201.129.24"
],
"user": [
"Admin004"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "AV:File renamed"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.201.129.24",
"ip": "10.201.129.24"
},
"user": {
"name": "Admin004"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|AV:Fichier nettoy\u00e9|WORM_GAMARUE.ITK|3|deviceExternalId=7 rt=2023-03-15 13:23:47 cnt=1 dhost=mymachine.local TMCMLogDetectedHost=mymachine.local duser=mymachine.local\\\\adminuser act=Fichier nettoy\u00e9 cn1Label=VLF_PatternNumber cn1=1831100 cn2Label=VLF_SecondAction cn2=1 cs1Label=VLF_FunctionCode cs1=Scan en temps r\u00e9el cs2Label=VLF_EngineVersion cs2=22.580.1004 cs3Label=CLF_ProductVersion cs3=14.0 cs4Label=CLF_ReasonCode cs4=virus log cs5Label=VLF_FirstActionResult cs5=Fichier nettoy\u00e9 cs6Label=VLF_SecondActionResult cs6=N/A cat=1703 dvchost=zettiz.manage.trendmicro.com cn3Label=SummaryToExport_OverallRiskRating cn3=1 fname=5f4b0aa22ce65b30fb232421673fad4c126970928207ade256d3bfee33dc3687 filePath=C:\\\\Users\\\\adminuser\\\\Downloads\\\\5f4b0aa22ce65b30fb232421673fad4c126970928207ade256d3bfee33dc3687\\\\ dst=10.0.4.5 TMCMLogDetectedIP=10.0.4.5 deviceFacility=Apex One ApexCentralHost=Apex Central as a Service reason=G devicePayloadId=70003A0D208D-A9F111ED-C334-C056-44DE TMCMdevicePlatform=Windows 10 10.0 (Build 19044) deviceNtDomain=N/A dntdom=Workgroup\\\\",
"event": {
"category": [
"malware"
],
"code": "virus log",
"dataset": "WORM_GAMARUE.ITK",
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-03-15T13:23:47Z",
"file": {
"name": "5f4b0aa22ce65b30fb232421673fad4c126970928207ade256d3bfee33dc3687",
"path": "C:\\\\Users\\\\adminuser\\\\Downloads\\\\5f4b0aa22ce65b30fb232421673fad4c126970928207ade256d3bfee33dc3687"
},
"host": {
"name": "mymachine.local"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.0.4.5"
],
"user": [
"mymachine.local\\\\adminuser"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "AV:Fichier nettoy\u00e9"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.4.5",
"ip": "10.0.4.5"
},
"user": {
"name": "mymachine.local\\\\adminuser"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Trend Micro|Apex Central|2019|WB:7|7|3|deviceExternalId=38 rt=Nov 15 2017 08:43:57 GMT+00:00 app=17 cntLabel=AggregatedCount cnt=1 dpt=80 act=1 src=10.1.128.46 cs1Label=SLF_PolicyName cs1=External User Policy deviceDirection=2 cat=7 dvchost=ApexOneClient08 fname=test.txt request=http://www.violetsoft.net/counter/insert.php?dbserver\\=db1&c_pcode\\=25&c_pid\\=funpop1&c_kind\\=4&c_mac\\=FE-ED-BE-EF-0C-E1 deviceFacility=Apex One shost=ABC-HOST-WKS12",
"event": {
"action": "Pass",
"category": [
"network"
],
"dataset": "7",
"severity": 3,
"type": [
"allowed"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2017-11-15T08:43:57Z",
"destination": {
"port": 80
},
"file": {
"name": "test.txt"
},
"host": {
"name": "ApexOneClient08"
},
"network": {
"direction": "Outbound"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Apex Central",
"vendor": "Trend Micro",
"version": "2019"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.1.128.46"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "WB:7",
"ruleset": "External User Policy"
},
"source": {
"address": "10.1.128.46",
"ip": "10.1.128.46"
},
"url": {
"domain": "www.violetsoft.net",
"original": "http://www.violetsoft.net/counter/insert.php?dbserver\\=db1&c_pcode\\=25&c_pid\\=funpop1&c_kind\\=4&c_mac\\=FE-ED-BE-EF-0C-E1",
"path": "/counter/insert.php",
"port": 80,
"query": "dbserver\\=db1&c_pcode\\=25&c_pid\\=funpop1&c_kind\\=4&c_mac\\=FE-ED-BE-EF-0C-E1",
"registered_domain": "violetsoft.net",
"scheme": "http",
"subdomain": "www",
"top_level_domain": "net"
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
destination.address |
keyword |
Destination network address. |
destination.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the destination. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
email.from.address |
keyword |
The sender's email address. |
email.subject |
keyword |
The subject of the email message. |
email.to.address |
keyword |
Email address of recipient |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.dataset |
keyword |
Name of the dataset. |
event.end |
date |
event.end contains the date when the event ended or when the activity was last observed. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.severity |
long |
Numeric severity of the event. |
event.start |
date |
event.start contains the date when the event started or when the activity was first observed. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.directory |
keyword |
Directory where the file is located. |
file.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
file.size |
long |
File size in bytes. |
host.ip |
ip |
Host ip addresses. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
host.os.name |
keyword |
Operating system name, without the version. |
network.direction |
keyword |
Direction of the network traffic. |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
observer.version |
keyword |
Observer version. |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.title |
keyword |
Process title. |
process.working_directory |
keyword |
The working directory of the process. |
rule.id |
keyword |
Rule ID |
rule.name |
keyword |
Rule name |
rule.ruleset |
keyword |
Rule ruleset |
server.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the server. |
source.address |
keyword |
Source network address. |
source.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the source. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.mac |
keyword |
MAC address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
source.user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
trendmicro.apexone.Cloud_Service_Vendor |
keyword |
Names the cloud service vendor or provider associated with an event or data. This offers insights into which cloud environments are involved. |
trendmicro.apexone.Connection_Status |
number |
Indicates the current connection status for a component or module within the Trend Micro environment. Useful for network and connectivity monitoring. |
trendmicro.apexone.Engine |
keyword |
Refers to the specific Trend Micro detection or processing engine utilized during an event. This provides insights into the underlying mechanism or methodology. |
trendmicro.apexone.NCIE_ThreatName |
keyword |
Provides the name of the threat as recognized by Trend Micro's Network Content Inspection Engine (NCIE). This aids in threat identification and classification. |
trendmicro.apexone.Pattern_RuleVersion |
keyword |
Displays the version number of the pattern rule in use. This can be utilized to ensure that the latest and most effective rules are applied. |
trendmicro.apexone.Risk_Level |
number |
Specifies the risk severity or level assigned to a particular threat or event. It helps in understanding the criticality and potential impact. |
trendmicro.apexone.Security_Threat |
keyword |
Represents a specific security threat or risk as identified by Trend Micro. This assists in threat categorization and response prioritization. |
trendmicro.apexone.Threat_Categories |
keyword |
Classifies the type or category of a threat, such as malware, phishing, ransomware, etc. This categorization aids in response strategies and understanding threat landscapes. |
trendmicro.apexone.VirusName |
keyword |
Provides the specific name of a virus as detected by Trend Micro. This is fundamental for virus identification and subsequent mitigation strategies. |
trendmicro.apexone.behavior.target |
keyword |
|
url.original |
wildcard |
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.target.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.