VMWare ESXi
Overview
- Vendor:
- Plan: Defend Core & Defend Prime
- Supported environment:
- Version compatibility:
- Detection based on: Telemetry
- Supported application or feature:
VMware ESXi is a hypervisor and an operation system. It serves virtual computers while running directly on the server hardware
Configure
Prerequisites
An internal log concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.
Enable Syslog forwarding
Browse to the host thank to the vSphere Client inventory and follow this guide to enable the log forwarding to the log concentrator.
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format VMWare ESXi.
Forward logs to Sekoia.io
Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
Disconnected from user root 1.2.3.4 port 33398
Connection closed by authenticating user root 1.2.3.4 port 60292 [preauth]
Received disconnect from 1.2.3.4 port 33398:11: disconnected by user
Accepted publickey for root from 1.2.3.4 port 33398 ssh2: RSA SHA256:qzkqJPyBUdiJUC4i/wbJzkYLTcUWwXRArUT90bUw2E0
info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr opID=esxcli-76-ecbf] Event 975279 : User root@127.0.0.1 logged in as pyvmomi
info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr opID=esxcli-76-ecbf] Event 975279 : User root@127.0.0.1 logged in as pyvmomi Python/3.8.13 (VMkernel; 7.0.3; x86_64)
pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user root
pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc opID=esxcli-a5-20ae] [Auth]: User root
info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Default opID=esxcli-76-ecbf] Accepted password for user root from 127.0.0.1
[GenericCorrelator] 3087878379676us: [vob.user.ssh.session.closed] SSH session was closed for 'root@1.2.3.4'.
[GenericCorrelator] 3087878318715us: [vob.user.ssh.session.opened] SSH session was opened for 'root@1.2.3.4'.
vobd: [GenericCorrelator] 2216526905us: [vob.user.ssh.session.failed] SSH login has failed for 'root@1.2.3.4'.
error hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr] Event 974676 : SSH session was closed for 'root@1.2.3.4'.
info hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr] Event 974676 : SSH session was opened for 'root@1.2.3.4'.
DHCPDISCOVER on vmk1 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 1
Connection from 1.2.3.4 port 33398
Executing 'vsanmgmtd -s -c /etc/vmware/vsan/vsanmgmt-config.xml'
USER root pid 9919303 cmd /bin/hostd-probe.sh ++group=host/vim/vmvisor/hostd-probe/stats/sh
User 'root' running command 'USER=vpxuser python ++group=host/vim/vmvisor/ntnx /get_one_time_password.py'
healthd: info healthd[2100572] [Originator@6876 sub=PluginLauncher] Launching binary: /usr/lib/vmware/healthd/plugins/bin/ssdStorage.py ++group=healthd-plugins,mem=40 -u http://localhost:9996
sshd[2102293]: Invalid user administrator from 1.2.3.4 port 41100
sshd[2102280]: Disconnected from authenticating user root 1.2.3.4 port 21289 [preauth]
error fdm[7599783] [Originator@6876 sub=Cluster opID=SWI-3cc8cdca] stat(/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb/.vSphere-HA/FDM-ffffffff-1111-4444-5555-666666666666-7-9999999-lnpvcr02) failed with Permission denied
Unlocked esx.conf
Event [1201736] [2-3] (fileName = "ds:///vmfs/volumes/63985d53-c3598817-6688-5c6f69e18ad0/HDD01-835/HDD01-835.vmdk", datastore = 'vim.Datastore:d6543eda-9347-4b38-b803-6f5048248ea8:datastore-2809', backingObjectId = "", diskMode = "independent_nonpersistent", split = <unset>, writeThrough = <unset>, thinProvisioned = false, eagerlyScrub = false, uuid = "6000C299-dd5c-07cb-b868-3600b53d2781", contentId = "5c1d0d8547e8b15283e287f5cb18ef5e", changeId = <unset>, parent = null, deltaDiskFormat = <unset>, digestEnabled = false, deltaGrainSize = <unset>, deltaDiskFormatVariant = <unset>, sharing = <unset>, keyId = null, cryptoIntegrityProtectionType = <unset>), deltaDiskFormat = "seSparseFormat", digestEnabled = false, deltaGrainSize = 4, deltaDiskFormatVariant = <unset>, sharing = "sharingNone", keyId = null, cryptoIntegrityProtectionType = <unset>), connectable = null, slotInfo = null, controllerKey = 1000, unitNumber = 3, numaNode = <unset>, capacityInKB = 104857600, capacityInBytes = 107374182400, shar
Using key ID 527683eb-be00-ae48-b12d-06e5cffe4c7e to encrypt
[iscsiCorrelator] 3087813295957us: [vob.iscsi.connection.stopped] iScsi connection 0 stopped for vmhba64:C0:T3
info fdm[7599763] [Originator@6876 sub=Invt opID=SWI-1b24a1a7] Unset _accessible for datastore (/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb)
connection 4:0 (iqn.2010-06.com.nutanix:iscsi-dump-c086c177-a1f4-48be-a3b2-b5f2b6517fa6 if=default addr=1.2.3.4:3260 (TPGT:1 ISID:0x1) (T3 C0)) has recovered (2 attempts)
info hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr opID=233816e0 user=vpxuser] Event 974626 : User vpxuser@10.79.50.22 logged out (login time: Tuesday, 18 April, 2023 07:14:36 AM, number of API invocations: 3, user agent: pyvmomi)
info rhttpproxy[2102807] [Originator@6876 sub=IO.Connection] Failed to shutdown socket; <io_obj p:0x000000f7c12bd0a8, h:23, <TCP '5.6.7.8 : 443'>, <TCP '1.2.3.4 : 39664'>>, e: 104(shutdown: Connection reset by peer)
verbose rhttpproxy[2099165] [Originator@6876 sub=Proxy Req 06028] Connected to localhost:8307 (/sdk) over <io_obj p:0x000000f7c12be288, h:24, <TCP '127.0.0.1 : 29013'>, <TCP '127.0.0.1 : 8307'>>
error kmxa[2098475] [Originator@6876 sub=Libs opID=InitCache-52a74d0e-554c-1fc3-1b1f-bd3c439fd0a3-0] Trust Authority Components not configured.
verbose fdm[7599763] [Originator@6876 sub=Invt opID=SWI-1361339f] Healthstatus of VM /vmfs/volumes/0ced57f7-f5da65c8/ntpnim02/ntpnim02.vmx on live hostId host-103 : true
info hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Libs opID=2338d373 user=vpxuser] NetstackInstanceImpl: congestion control algorithm: newreno
info fdm[7599763] [Originator@6876 sub=Invt opID=SWI-1b24a1a7] Unset _accessible for datastore (/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb)
QuerySerialNumber --- real serial number is 1111222233334444
get_serial_num_of_SATA_SAS_disk---serial num is 1111222233334444
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake VMware ESXi. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x VMware ESXi on ATT&CK Navigator
ACLight Discovering Privileged Accounts
Detects use of ACLight tool. This tool aims to discover privileged accounts by scanning the network.
- Effort: advanced
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line
Detects use of azureedge in the command line.
- Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
COM Hijack Via Sdclt
Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using 'sdclt.exe'.
- Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking
Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.
- Effort: advanced
Compression Followed By Suppression
Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.
- Effort: advanced
Container Credential Access
Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable
A script has copied a System32 executable.
- Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Multi Service Disable
The rule detects a high number of services stopped or de-activated in a short period of time.
- Effort: master
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Credentials Extraction
This rule aims to detect the use of a specific command to access some credentials without using mimikatz or another tool.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
DHCP Callout DLL Installation
Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation
Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled
Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Discovery Commands Correlation
Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.
- Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: master
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line
Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.
- Effort: master
HTA Infection Chains
Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).
- Effort: intermediate
HTML Smuggling Suspicious Usage
Based on several samples from different botnets, this rule aims at detecting HTML infection chain by looking for HTML created files followed by suspicious files being executed.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
ISO LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.
- Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets
Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.
- Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload
Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process
- Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)
Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: advanced
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL
Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).
- Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key
Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.
- Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Mimikatz Basic Commands
Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.
- Effort: elementary
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution
Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.
- Effort: elementary
Mustang Panda Dropper
Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Network Share Discovery
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.
- Effort: master
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent
Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values
Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: advanced
Office Application Startup Office Test
Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
- Effort: elementary
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents
Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent
- Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent
Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".
- Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation
Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed
Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass
This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification
Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
Reconnaissance Commands Activities
Based on Cynet, Microsoft and Kaspersky analysis of Qakbot, this rule tries to detect some discovery TTPs.
- Effort: intermediate
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services
Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: master
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern
Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious File Name
Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt
Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Fingerprint Commands
Detects attacker fingerprint activities based on the correlation of specific WMIC commands. This has been observed with Aurora malware.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool
WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.
- Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
ZIP LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ZIP download followed by a child-process of explorer, followed by multiple Windows processes.This is widely used as an infection chain mechanism.
- Effort: advanced
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Application logs |
collect activities from the hypervisor |
Network device logs |
collect network activities from the hypervisor |
Authentication logs |
collect audit log from the hypervisor |
DNS records |
collect information about DNS communication |
Process use of network |
collect network activites from the hypervisor |
Services |
collect activities from the hypervisor |
System calls |
collect activities from the hypervisor |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | `` |
| Category | ["authentication"], ["configuration"], ["file"], ["network"], ["process"], ["session"], session |
| Type | ["info"], end, start |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "Disconnected from user root 1.2.3.4 port 33398",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 33398
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": " Connection closed by authenticating user root 1.2.3.4 port 60292 [preauth]",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 60292
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "Received disconnect from 1.2.3.4 port 33398:11: disconnected by user",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 33398
}
}
{
"message": "Accepted publickey for root from 1.2.3.4 port 33398 ssh2: RSA SHA256:qzkqJPyBUdiJUC4i/wbJzkYLTcUWwXRArUT90bUw2E0",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 33398
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr opID=esxcli-76-ecbf] Event 975279 : User root@127.0.0.1 logged in as pyvmomi",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"127.0.0.1"
],
"user": [
"pyvmomi",
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"ip": "127.0.0.1",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "pyvmomi"
}
}
{
"message": "info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr opID=esxcli-76-ecbf] Event 975279 : User root@127.0.0.1 logged in as pyvmomi Python/3.8.13 (VMkernel; 7.0.3; x86_64)",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"127.0.0.1"
],
"user": [
"pyvmomi",
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"ip": "127.0.0.1",
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
},
"user": {
"name": "pyvmomi"
},
"user_agent": {
"device": {
"name": "Other"
},
"name": "Other",
"original": "Python/3.8.13 (VMkernel; 7.0.3; x86_64)",
"os": {
"name": "Other"
}
}
}
{
"message": "pam_unix(sshd:session): session closed for user root",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc opID=esxcli-a5-20ae] [Auth]: User root",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "info hostd[2099656] [Originator@6876 sub=Default opID=esxcli-76-ecbf] Accepted password for user root from 127.0.0.1",
"event": {
"category": [
"configuration"
],
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"127.0.0.1"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"ip": "127.0.0.1"
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": " [GenericCorrelator] 3087878379676us: [vob.user.ssh.session.closed] SSH session was closed for 'root@1.2.3.4'.",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": " [GenericCorrelator] 3087878318715us: [vob.user.ssh.session.opened] SSH session was opened for 'root@1.2.3.4'.",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "vobd: [GenericCorrelator] 2216526905us: [vob.user.ssh.session.failed] SSH login has failed for 'root@1.2.3.4'.",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"outcome": "failure",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": " error hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr] Event 974676 : SSH session was closed for 'root@1.2.3.4'.",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "info hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr] Event 974676 : SSH session was opened for 'root@1.2.3.4'.",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": " DHCPDISCOVER on vmk1 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 1",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"255.255.255.255"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "255.255.255.255",
"ip": "255.255.255.255",
"port": 67
}
}
{
"message": "Connection from 1.2.3.4 port 33398",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"type": [
"connection"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 33398
}
}
{
"message": "Executing 'vsanmgmtd -s -c /etc/vmware/vsan/vsanmgmt-config.xml'",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "vsanmgmtd -s -c /etc/vmware/vsan/vsanmgmt-config.xml"
}
}
{
"message": "USER root pid 9919303 cmd /bin/hostd-probe.sh ++group=host/vim/vmvisor/hostd-probe/stats/sh",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "/bin/hostd-probe.sh ++group=host/vim/vmvisor/hostd-probe/stats/sh",
"pid": 9919303
},
"related": {
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "User 'root' running command 'USER=vpxuser python ++group=host/vim/vmvisor/ntnx /get_one_time_password.py'",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "USER=vpxuser python ++group=host/vim/vmvisor/ntnx /get_one_time_password.py"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "healthd: info healthd[2100572] [Originator@6876 sub=PluginLauncher] Launching binary: /usr/lib/vmware/healthd/plugins/bin/ssdStorage.py ++group=healthd-plugins,mem=40 -u http://localhost:9996",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "/usr/lib/vmware/healthd/plugins/bin/ssdStorage.py ++group=healthd-plugins,mem=40 -u http://localhost:9996"
}
}
{
"message": "sshd[2102293]: Invalid user administrator from 1.2.3.4 port 41100",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"outcome": "failure",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"administrator"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 41100
},
"user": {
"name": "administrator"
}
}
{
"message": "sshd[2102280]: Disconnected from authenticating user root 1.2.3.4 port 21289 [preauth]",
"event": {
"category": [
"session"
],
"outcome": "success",
"type": [
"end"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"root"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 21289
},
"user": {
"name": "root"
}
}
{
"message": "error fdm[7599783] [Originator@6876 sub=Cluster opID=SWI-3cc8cdca] stat(/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb/.vSphere-HA/FDM-ffffffff-1111-4444-5555-666666666666-7-9999999-lnpvcr02) failed with Permission denied",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"outcome": "failed",
"reason": "Permission denied",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"host": {
"name": "fdm"
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": "Unlocked esx.conf",
"event": {
"category": [
"file"
],
"reason": "Unlocked",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"file": {
"name": "esx.conf"
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " Event [1201736] [2-3] (fileName = \"ds:///vmfs/volumes/63985d53-c3598817-6688-5c6f69e18ad0/HDD01-835/HDD01-835.vmdk\", datastore = 'vim.Datastore:d6543eda-9347-4b38-b803-6f5048248ea8:datastore-2809', backingObjectId = \"\", diskMode = \"independent_nonpersistent\", split = <unset>, writeThrough = <unset>, thinProvisioned = false, eagerlyScrub = false, uuid = \"6000C299-dd5c-07cb-b868-3600b53d2781\", contentId = \"5c1d0d8547e8b15283e287f5cb18ef5e\", changeId = <unset>, parent = null, deltaDiskFormat = <unset>, digestEnabled = false, deltaGrainSize = <unset>, deltaDiskFormatVariant = <unset>, sharing = <unset>, keyId = null, cryptoIntegrityProtectionType = <unset>), deltaDiskFormat = \"seSparseFormat\", digestEnabled = false, deltaGrainSize = 4, deltaDiskFormatVariant = <unset>, sharing = \"sharingNone\", keyId = null, cryptoIntegrityProtectionType = <unset>), connectable = null, slotInfo = null, controllerKey = 1000, unitNumber = 3, numaNode = <unset>, capacityInKB = 104857600, capacityInBytes = 107374182400, shar",
"event": {
"category": [
"file"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"file": {
"name": "ds:///vmfs/volumes/63985d53-c3598817-6688-5c6f69e18ad0/HDD01-835/HDD01-835.vmdk"
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": "Using key ID 527683eb-be00-ae48-b12d-06e5cffe4c7e to encrypt",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "encrypt",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"wmware": {
"esxi": {
"key": {
"id": "527683eb-be00-ae48-b12d-06e5cffe4c7e"
}
}
}
}
{
"message": " [iscsiCorrelator] 3087813295957us: [vob.iscsi.connection.stopped] iScsi connection 0 stopped for vmhba64:C0:T3",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "iScsi connection 0 stopped for vmhba64:C0:T3",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " info fdm[7599763] [Originator@6876 sub=Invt opID=SWI-1b24a1a7] Unset _accessible for datastore (/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb)",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Unset _accessible for datastore (/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb)",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " connection 4:0 (iqn.2010-06.com.nutanix:iscsi-dump-c086c177-a1f4-48be-a3b2-b5f2b6517fa6 if=default addr=1.2.3.4:3260 (TPGT:1 ISID:0x1) (T3 C0)) has recovered (2 attempts)",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"reason": "has recovered (2 attempts)",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " info hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Vimsvc.ha-eventmgr opID=233816e0 user=vpxuser] Event 974626 : User vpxuser@10.79.50.22 logged out (login time: Tuesday, 18 April, 2023 07:14:36 AM, number of API invocations: 3, user agent: pyvmomi)",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Event 974626 : User vpxuser@10.79.50.22 logged out (login time: Tuesday, 18 April, 2023 07:14:36 AM, number of API invocations: 3, user agent: pyvmomi)",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " info rhttpproxy[2102807] [Originator@6876 sub=IO.Connection] Failed to shutdown socket; <io_obj p:0x000000f7c12bd0a8, h:23, <TCP '5.6.7.8 : 443'>, <TCP '1.2.3.4 : 39664'>>, e: 104(shutdown: Connection reset by peer)",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Failed to shutdown socket; <io_obj p:0x000000f7c12bd0a8, h:23, <TCP '5.6.7.8 : 443'>, <TCP '1.2.3.4 : 39664'>>, e: 104(shutdown: Connection reset by peer)",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " verbose rhttpproxy[2099165] [Originator@6876 sub=Proxy Req 06028] Connected to localhost:8307 (/sdk) over <io_obj p:0x000000f7c12be288, h:24, <TCP '127.0.0.1 : 29013'>, <TCP '127.0.0.1 : 8307'>>",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Connected to localhost:8307 (/sdk) over <io_obj p:0x000000f7c12be288, h:24, <TCP '127.0.0.1 : 29013'>, <TCP '127.0.0.1 : 8307'>>",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " error kmxa[2098475] [Originator@6876 sub=Libs opID=InitCache-52a74d0e-554c-1fc3-1b1f-bd3c439fd0a3-0] Trust Authority Components not configured.",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Trust Authority Components not configured.",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " verbose fdm[7599763] [Originator@6876 sub=Invt opID=SWI-1361339f] Healthstatus of VM /vmfs/volumes/0ced57f7-f5da65c8/ntpnim02/ntpnim02.vmx on live hostId host-103 : true",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Healthstatus of VM /vmfs/volumes/0ced57f7-f5da65c8/ntpnim02/ntpnim02.vmx on live hostId host-103 : true",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " info hostd[2099655] [Originator@6876 sub=Libs opID=2338d373 user=vpxuser] NetstackInstanceImpl: congestion control algorithm: newreno",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "NetstackInstanceImpl: congestion control algorithm: newreno",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": "info fdm[7599763] [Originator@6876 sub=Invt opID=SWI-1b24a1a7] Unset _accessible for datastore (/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb)",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Unset _accessible for datastore (/vmfs/volumes/aaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbb)",
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
}
}
{
"message": " QuerySerialNumber --- real serial number is 1111222233334444",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"wmware": {
"esxi": {
"event": {
"serial_number": 1111222233334444
}
}
}
}
{
"message": " get_serial_num_of_SATA_SAS_disk---serial num is 1111222233334444",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"observer": {
"product": "ESXi",
"vendor": "VMware"
},
"wmware": {
"esxi": {
"event": {
"serial_number": 1111222233334444
}
}
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.outcome |
keyword |
The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.pid |
long |
Process id. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
source.user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user_agent.original |
keyword |
Unparsed user_agent string. |
wmware.esxi.event.serial_number |
number |
Serial number |
wmware.esxi.key.id |
keyword |
Key ID |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.