Windows
Overview
- Vendor:
- Supported environment:
- Version compatibility:
- Detection based on: Telemetry
- Supported application or feature:
Microsoft Windows is a widely used operating system that has been developed by Microsoft since 1985.
This page will provide you with two methods for collecting and forwarding Windows logs to Sekoia.io.
-
The first method involves using the NXLog agent to send logs directly from the Windows machine to Sekoia.io.
-
The second method involves using NXLog to forward logs from an internal log concentrator to Sekoia.io.
Additionally, this documentation will offer guidance on collecting and forwarding logs from sensitive assets, such as Domain Controllers, without requiring the installation of a third-party agent.
Warning
Please be advised that this documentation assumes the use of the 64-bit version of NXLog. If you are using the 32-bit version, it is crucial that you replace all references to C:\Program Files\nxlog\ in the commands and configuration files with C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog\. Failure to make this adjustment may result in errors.
Warning
Please be advised that collecting Windows events with NXLog on certain Windows languages that contain accents (such as French for "Système" keyword), are not correctly encoded by NXLog and results in an error of interpreation on our product. In such case, please consider the installation of our agent on the supported OS).
Windows Event logs
On Microsoft Windows workstations and servers, most of the important hardward and software activities that are relevant for security detection and analysis, are logged into three files:
Application: for Windows components such as drivers and built-in interface elementsSystem: records events related to programs installed on a systemSecurity: records events related to security (such as logon attempts and ressource access)
Those logs a readable locally in the Windows Event Viewer, in the section Windows Logs.
If you want to improve detection and analysis, you may want to enable Sysmon.
Sysmon is a Microsoft tool you can download on their website. A common installation instruction and configuration file is available on Florian Roth's Github. This configuration is an updated (and maintained) version of the SwiftOnSecurity's configuration, which can also be used.
Warning
Please be aware that installing this tool may generate additional logs, resulting in increased consumption of CPU resources. It is important to ensure that the equipment on which the tool is installed is appropriately sized and has sufficient resources to handle the additional workload. We recommend that you first test the installation on lower-risk assets before deploying it on more critical systems.
You will find dedicated NXLog configuration file for Sysmon usage in this section.
NXLog directly to Sekoia.io
This section describes how to configure NXLog to forward your Windows events by means of a syslog transport channel.
NXLog setup
To get started with NXLog, follow these steps:
- Download the NXLog installation package from the official website
- After the download is complete, proceed with the installation
- Navigate to the NXLog configuration file, which is located at
C:\Program Files\nxlog\conf\nxlog.conf - Update the configuration file with your intake key by following these instructions:
Note
Don't forget to replace YOUR_INTAKE_KEY variable with your actual intake key.
## This is a sample configuration file. See the nxlog reference manual about the configuration options.
## It should be installed locally and is also available online at http://nxlog.org/nxlog-docs/en/nxlog-reference-manual.html
## Please set the ROOT to the folder your nxlog was installed into,
## otherwise it will not start.
#define ROOT C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog
define ROOT C:\Program Files\nxlog
define CERTDIR %ROOT%\cert
Moduledir %ROOT%\modules
CacheDir %ROOT%\data
Pidfile %ROOT%\data\nxlog.pid
SpoolDir %ROOT%\data
LogFile %ROOT%\data\nxlog.log
<Extension _syslog>
Module xm_syslog
</Extension>
<Extension _json>
Module xm_json
</Extension>
<Input eventlog>
# Use 'im_mseventlog' for Windows XP, 2000 and 2003
Module im_msvistalog
Exec $Message = to_json();
</Input>
<Output sekoia_output>
Module om_ssl
Host intake.sekoia.io
Port 10514
CAFile %CERTDIR%\Sekoia.io-intake.pem
AllowUntrusted FALSE
Exec to_syslog_ietf();
Exec $raw_event = replace($raw_event, '[NXLOG@', '[SEKOIA@53288 intake_key="YOUR_INTAKE_KEY"][NXLOG@', 1);
OutputType Syslog_TLS
</Output>
<Route eventlog_to_sekoia_intake>
Path eventlog => sekoia_output
</Route>
Download the certificate
To enable the connection between your events forwarder and the Sekoia.io intake, it is necessary to download the Sekoia.io intake certificate. Please follow these steps:
- Open a PowerShell console as an administrator.
-
Use the following command to retrieve the certificate and save it to the appropriate directory:
powershell Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://app.sekoia.io/assets/files/SEKOIA-IO-intake.pem -OutFile 'C:\Program Files\nxlog\cert\Sekoia.io-intake.pem' -
Restart the NXLog service through the Services tool as an administrator or use the following PowerShell command line as an administrator:
Restart-Service nxlog
After completing these steps, your events forwarder should be able to establish a secure connection with the Sekoia.io intake using the newly downloaded certificate.
NXLog to a concentrator
Configure NXLog
This section describes how to configure NXLog to forward your Windows events by means of a syslog transport channel to a concentrator.
To get started, follow these steps:
- Download the NXLog installation package from the official website
- After the download is complete, proceed with the installation
- Navigate to the NXLog configuration file, which is located at
C:\Program Files\nxlog\conf\nxlog.conf - Update the configuration file by following these instructions:
## This is a sample configuration file. See the nxlog reference manual about the
## configuration options. It should be installed locally and is also available
## online at http://nxlog.org/nxlog-docs/en/nxlog-reference-manual.html
## Please set the ROOT to the folder your nxlog was installed into,
## otherwise it will not start.
#define ROOT C:\Program Files\nxlog
define ROOT C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog
define CERTDIR %ROOT%\cert
Moduledir %ROOT%\modules
CacheDir %ROOT%\data
Pidfile %ROOT%\data\nxlog.pid
SpoolDir %ROOT%\data
LogFile %ROOT%\data\nxlog.log
<Extension _syslog>
Module xm_syslog
</Extension>
<Extension _json>
Module xm_json
</Extension>
<Input eventlog>
# Use 'im_mseventlog' for Windows XP, 2000 and 2003
Module im_msvistalog
Exec $Message = to_json();
</Input>
<Output rsyslog>
Module om_tcp
Host RSYSLOG_HOST
Port 514
OutputType Syslog_TLS
Exec to_syslog_ietf();
</Output>
<Route eventlog_to_rsyslog>
Path eventlog => rsyslog
</Route>
Info
To ensure proper configuration, it is important to replace the RSYSLOG_HOST variable with the IP address of your concentrator.
Warning
OutputType Syslog_TLS is needed for TCP transport even if you do not encrypt data. It does not depend on SSL transport at all.
Remove it ONLY if you use UDP - om_udp.
For more information, consult NXLog documentation.
Note
The iso8859-1 character encoding is limited to 256 characters, which is not enough to represent all French characters. This means that some French characters might not be correctly interpreted or displayed when using iso8859-1 encoding. For example, iso8859-1 does not include characters such as é, è, ê, and ë. In order to correctly represent these characters, it is recommended to install the Sekoia.io agent. This endpoint agent is specifically designed to handle such issues, ensuring the accurate and secure transmission of data.
Restart the NXLog service through the Services tool as Administrator or use this Powershell command line as admin:
Restart-Service nxlog
Configure the concentrator to forward events to Sekoia.io
Please read the dedicated documentation for each concentrator:
Note
While Sekoia.io docker concentrator is highly recommended, you are free to use the one that you are most comfortable with.
Windows Event Forwarder to Windows Event Collector to a concentrator
Most of the following commands are to be run as Administrator in a Powershell interpretor.
Windows Event Collector (WEC) setup
The Windows Event Collector, also known as WEC, is a Microsoft service that can be enabled and configured to aggregate logs from the Windows Event Forwarders (WEF).
1. Get the WEC FQDN
Log in the Windows Event Collector and execute the following command:
([System.Net.Dns]::GetHostByName(($env:computerName))).Hostname
Note
Please take note of the following information as it will be required in the upcoming section "Deploying the GPO'. Specifically, you will need to replace the FQDN_WEC_SERVER field with this information to complete the deployment process.
2. Configure the subscription file Get the SDDL information by executing the following command:
wevtutil gl security
Note
Take note of the channelAccess information.
On the WEC server, create an XML file, named DC_SUBSCRIPTION.xml with the following information:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Subscription xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/2006/03/windows/events/subscription">
<!-- Name of subscription -->
<SubscriptionId>DC_SUBSCRIPTION</SubscriptionId>
<!-- Push mode (DC to WEC) -->
<SubscriptionType>SourceInitiated</SubscriptionType>
<Description>Source Initiated Subscription from DC_SUBSCRIPTION</Description>
<!-- Subscription is active -->
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
<Uri>http://schemas.microsoft.com/wbem/wsman/1/windows/EventLog</Uri>
<!-- This mode ensures that events are delivered with minimal delay -->
<!-- It is an appropriate choice if you are collecting alerts or critical events -->
<!-- It uses push delivery mode and sets a batch timeout of 30 seconds -->
<ConfigurationMode>MinLatency</ConfigurationMode>
<!-- Event log to retrieved -->
<Query>
<![CDATA[
<QueryList>
<Query Id="0">
<Select Path="Application">*</Select>
<Select Path="Security">*</Select>
<Select Path="System">*</Select>
</Query>
</QueryList>
]]>
</Query>
<!-- Collect events generated since the subscription (not oldest) -->
<ReadExistingEvents>false</ReadExistingEvents>
<!-- Protocol and port used (DC to WEC) -->
<TransportName>http</TransportName>
<!-- Mandatory value (https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?crawler=1&uid=swg1IV71375) -->
<ContentFormat>RenderedText</ContentFormat>
<Locale Language="en-US"/>
<!-- Target Event log on WEC -->
<LogFile>ForwardedEvents</LogFile>
<!-- Define which domain computers are allowed or not to initiate subscriptions -->
<!-- This exemple grants members of the Domain Computers domain group, as well as the local Network Service group (for local forwarder) -->
<AllowedSourceDomainComputers>O:NSG:NSD:(A;;GA;;;DC)(A;;GA;;;NS)</AllowedSourceDomainComputers>
</Subscription>
Warning
You have to replace Domain Computers domain group "(A;;GA;;;DC)" by "(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-....)" using information you previously collected in the channelAccess.
More information of the SDDL format can be found here.
Ensure the file is correctly saved, then close it.
3. Configure the Windows Remote Management
On the WEC server, open a command interpretor as Administrator, and run the following command:
winrm qc -q
4. Activate the "Event Collector" service
As Administrator, enter the following command:
wecutil qc /q
5. Activate the subscription to a zone
As Administrator, enter the following command:
Warning
Please change the character FILE_PATH.
wecutil cs "<FILE_PATH>\DC_SUBSCRIPTION.xml"
6. Display the state of the subscription to this zone
As Administrator, enter the following command:
wecutil gr DC_SUBSCRIPTION
Windows Event Forwarder (WEF) setup
The Windows Event Forwarder, also known as WEF, is a Microsoft service that can be activated for log forwarding towards a Windows Event Collector (WEC).
Configure the Event Log Reader
To configure the Event Log Reader, follow the steps below:
-
Configure the collector URI(s) to specify the location where you want to send the logs. The collector URI must be a valid HTTP or HTTPS address.
-
Start the WinRM service. Open a command prompt as an Administrator and run the following command:
net start winrm -
Add the Network Service account to the built-in Event Log Readers security group. This will allow the Event Log Reader to access the Windows event logs.
Note that these steps are necessary to allow the Event Log Reader to access the Windows event logs.
Configure the Windows Remote Management
On the AD admin console, open a command interpretor as Administrator and run the following command:
winrm qc -q
Deploying the GPO
In Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Event Forwarding -> Configure target Subscription Manager, execute the following command:
Warn
Please replace the FQDN_WEC_SERVER by the previously collected information
Server=http://FQDN_WEC_SERVER:5985/wsman/SubscriptionManager/WEC,Refresh=60
Apply the GPO
On the AD admin console, open a command interpretor as Administrator and run the following command:
gpupdate /force
Tip
More documentation is available on the official Microsoft documentation.
Windows Event Collector to a concentrator
To ensure proper logging configuration, please follow the steps below:
- Verify that logs are being correctly received on the Windows Event Collector (WEC) server. To do this, open the Windows Event Viewer and navigate to Windows Logs > Forwarded Events.
-
Set up the Nxlog agent to forward the logs to the concentrator by using the following configuration:
define ROOT C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog Moduledir %ROOT%\modules CacheDir %ROOT%\data Pidfile %ROOT%\data\nxlog.pid SpoolDir %ROOT%\data LogFile %ROOT%\data\nxlog.log <Extension _syslog> Module xm_syslog </Extension> <Extension _json> Module xm_json </Extension> <Input eventlog1> Module im_msvistalog Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="Application">*</Select></Query></QueryList> Exec $Message = to_json(); </Input> <Input eventlog2> Module im_msvistalog Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="System">*</Select></Query></QueryList> Exec $Message = to_json(); </Input> <Input eventlog3> Module im_msvistalog Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="Security">*</Select></Query></QueryList> Exec $Message = to_json(); </Input> <Input eventlog4> Module im_msvistalog Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="ForwardedEvents">*</Select></Query></QueryList> Exec $Message = to_json(); </Input> <Output rsyslog> Module om_tcp Host RSYSLOG_HOST Port 514 OutputType Syslog_TLS Exec to_syslog_ietf(); </Output> <Route eventlog_to_rsyslog> Path eventlog1, eventlog2, eventlog3, eventlog4 => rsyslog </Route>
Important
In the above configuration, make sure to replace RSYSLOG_HOST variable by the IP of your concentrator.
-
Restart the NXLog service through the Services tool as Administrator or use this Powershell command line as Administrator:
Restart-Service nxlog
Sysmon usage
Sysmon is a Microsoft tool you can download on their website.
A common installation instruction and configuration file is available on Florian Roth's Github. This configuration is an updated (and maintained) version of the SwiftOnSecurity's configuration, which can also be used.
Install Sysmon
-
Download and extract Sysmon from the official the website. With powershell:
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Sysmon.zip" -OutFile "Sysmon.zip" Expand-Archive -Path Sysmon.zip -DestinationPath Sysmon -
Download the configuration you want to use, for instance from Florian Roth's Github. With Powershell:
cd .\Sysmon\ Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/master/sysmonconfig-export.xml" -OutFile "sysmonconfig-export.xml" -
Install Sysmon
.\Sysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmonconfig-export.xml
NXLog configuration for Sysmon usage
If you are using the NXLog community edition, there is a limitation in terms of number of different eventlog entries that could be processed.
In order to monitor Sysmon and the common ones (Application, System, Security), make the following changes in C:\Program Files\nxlog\conf\nxlog.conf:
...
<Input eventlog1>
Module im_msvistalog
Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="Application">*</Select></Query></QueryList>
Exec $Message = to_json();
</Input>
<Input eventlog2>
Module im_msvistalog
Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="System">*</Select></Query></QueryList>
Exec $Message = to_json();
</Input>
<Input eventlog3>
Module im_msvistalog
Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="Security">*</Select></Query></QueryList>
Exec $Message = to_json();
</Input>
<Input eventlog4>
Module im_msvistalog
Query <QueryList><Query Id="0"><Select Path="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational">*</Select></Query></QueryList>
Exec $Message = to_json();
</Input>
...
<Route eventlog_to_rsyslog>
Path eventlog1, eventlog2, eventlog3, eventlog4 => rsyslog
</Route>
...
Restart the NXLog service through the Services tool as Administrator or use this PowerShell command line as Administrator:
Restart-Service nxlog
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
{
"EventTime": "2023-07-27 12:58:38",
"Hostname": "local.example.org",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 1117,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 11190,
"ActivityID": "{0E8E4EFB-F7EC-487F-BE78-82B11D0D3DB7}",
"ProcessID": 12848,
"ThreadID": 11792,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Product Name": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus",
"Product Version": "4.18.23050.9",
"Detection ID": "{FEEEC80B-1F6D-4B88-81F9-19C54AF3F889}",
"Detection Time": "2023-07-27T10:58:19.035Z",
"Threat ID": "2147780199",
"Threat Name": "Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml",
"Severity ID": "5",
"Severity Name": "Severe",
"Category ID": "8",
"Category Name": "Trojan",
"FWLink": "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml&threatid=2147780199&enterprise=0",
"Status Code": "3",
"State": "2",
"Source ID": "2",
"Source Name": "System",
"Process Name": "C:\\Program Files\\Cybereason ActiveProbe\\minionhost.exe",
"Detection User": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"Path": "file:_C:\\Users\\john-doe\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Cache\\Cache_Data\\f_221f56",
"Origin ID": "1",
"Origin Name": "Local machine",
"Execution ID": "1",
"Execution Name": "Suspended",
"Type ID": "8",
"Type Name": "FastPath",
"Pre Execution Status": "0",
"Action ID": "2",
"Action Name": "Quarantine",
"Error Code": "0x00000000",
"Error Description": "The operation completed successfully. ",
"Post Clean Status": "0",
"Additional Actions ID": "0",
"Additional Actions String": "No additional actions required",
"Remediation User": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"Security intelligence Version": "AV: 1.393.1459.0, AS: 1.393.1459.0, NIS: 1.393.1459.0",
"Engine Version": "AM: 1.1.23060.1005, NIS: 1.1.23060.1005",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-07-27 13:03:23",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:33",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": 36028797018963968,
"EventType": "WARNING",
"SeverityValue": 3,
"Severity": "WARNING",
"EventID": 39,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center",
"ProviderGuid": "{3FD9DA1A-5A54-46C5-9A26-9BD7C0685056}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1673393,
"ProcessID": 0,
"ThreadID": 0,
"Channel": "System",
"Message": "Le centre de distribution de cl\u00e9s (KDC) a rencontr\u00e9 un certificat utilisateur valide mais qui n\u2019a pas pu \u00eatre mapp\u00e9 \u00e0 un utilisateur de mani\u00e8re s\u00e9curis\u00e9e (par exemple via un mappage explicite, un mappage d\u2019approbation de cl\u00e9 ou un SID). Ces certificats doivent \u00eatre remplac\u00e9s ou mapp\u00e9s directement \u00e0 l\u2019utilisateur via un mappage explicite. Consultez https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 pour en savoir plus.\r\n\r\n Utilisateur : JDOE\r\n Sujet du certificat :\u00e9metteur de certificat @@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\r\n :num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\r\n :empreinte de certificat 78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\r\n : A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\r\n",
"AccountName": "JDOE",
"Subject": "@@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR",
"Issuer": "EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification",
"SerialNumber": "78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239",
"Thumbprint": "A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:34",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-01-07 14:09:58",
"Hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 6416,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 13316,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 16859866,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 6432,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A new external device was recognized by the system.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTFOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nDevice ID:\tSCSI\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\5&e55476b&0&000100\r\n\r\nDevice Name:\tVMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\r\n\r\nClass ID:\t\t{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\r\n\r\nClass Name:\tDiskDrive\r\n\r\nVendor IDs:\t\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__\r\n\t\tSCSI\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tGenDisk\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\r\nCompatible IDs:\t\r\n\t\tSCSI\\Disk\r\n\t\tSCSI\\RAW\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\r\nLocation Information:\t\r\n\t\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\r\n\t\t",
"Category": "Plug and Play Events",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "HOSTFOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"DeviceId": "SCSI\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\5&e55476b&0&000100",
"DeviceDescription": "VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device",
"ClassId": "{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}",
"ClassName": "DiskDrive",
"VendorIds": "\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__\r\n\t\tSCSI\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tGenDisk\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t",
"CompatibleIds": "\r\n\t\tSCSI\\Disk\r\n\t\tSCSI\\RAW\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t",
"LocationInformation": "\r\n\t\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\r\n\t\t",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-01-07 14:09:59",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"Channel": "Security",
"Hostname": "vm-foo",
"LogonType": "3",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"IpPort": "-",
"Severity": "Info",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "VM-FOO$",
"EventID": "4625",
"IpAddress": "-",
"SubjectDomainName": "CORPDOMAIN",
"ProcessId": "0x354",
"LogonProcessName": "Schannel",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0"
}
{
"Category": "Logon",
"Channel": "Security",
"EventID": 4625,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Hostname": "test.test",
"IpAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"LogonProcessName": "Advapi ",
"LogonType": "3",
"Message": "An account failed to log on.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tTESTACCOUNTS$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tDOMAINNAME\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nAccount For Which Logon Failed:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tTEST-USERNAME\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tDOMAINNAME\r\n\r\nFailure Information:\r\n\tFailure Reason:\t\tUnknown user name or bad password.\r\n\tStatus:\t\t\t0xC000006D\r\n\tSub Status:\t\t0xC000006A\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tCaller Process ID:\t0x25c\r\n\tCaller Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tWorkstation Name:\tTESTACCOUNTS\r\n\tSource Network Address:\t192.168.128.203\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t41974\r\n\r\nDetailed Authentication Information:\r\n\tLogon Process:\t\tAdvapi \r\n\tAuthentication Package:\tMICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\t-\r\n\tKey Length:\t\t0\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon request fails. It is generated on the computer where access was attempted.\r\n\r\nThe Subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\r\n\r\nThe Logon Type field indicates the kind of logon that was requested. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\r\n\r\nThe Process Information fields indicate which account and process on the system requested the logon.\r\n\r\nThe Network Information fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\r\n\r\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\r\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\r\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\r\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
"ProcessID": 604,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "DOMAINNAME",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "TESTACCOUNTS$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetDomainName": "DOMAINNAME",
"TargetUserName": "TEST-USERNAME",
"sekoia.intake.windows": "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-10-04 10:24:15",
"Hostname": "foo.net",
"Keywords": -9218868437227405312,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 4625,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12544,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3443172796,
"ProcessID": 704,
"ThreadID": 9992,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "\u00c9chec d\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte.\r\n\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\t-\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\t-\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nType d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nCompte pour lequel l\u2019ouverture de session a \u00e9chou\u00e9 :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tFooSSO\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tFOO\r\n\r\nInformations sur l\u2019\u00e9chec :\r\n\tRaison de l\u2019\u00e9chec :\t\tNom d\u2019utilisateur inconnu ou mot de passe incorrect.\r\n\t\u00c9tat :\t\t\t0xC000006D\r\n\tSous-\u00e9tat :\t\t0xC0000064\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du processus de l\u2019appelant :\t0x0\r\n\tNom du processus de l\u2019appelant :\t-\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tNom de la station de travail :\tFOO-AD1\r\n\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort source :\t\t60917\r\n\r\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l\u2019authentification :\r\n\tProcessus d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\tNtLmSsp \r\n\tPackage d\u2019authentification :\tNTLM\r\n\tServices en transit :\t-\r\n\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\t-\r\n\tLongueur de cl\u00e9 :\t\t0\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une demande d\u2019ouverture de session \u00e9choue. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l\u2019ordinateur sur lequel l\u2019acc\u00e8s a \u00e9t\u00e9 tent\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session. Il s\u2019agit le plus souvent d\u2019un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\r\n\r\nLe champ Type d\u2019ouverture de session indique le type d\u2019ouverture de session qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le processus indiquent quel est le compte et le processus sur le syst\u00e8me qui ont demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance de la demande d\u2019ouverture de session distante. Le nom de la station de travail n\u2019\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut rester vide dans certains cas.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d\u2019authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session.\r\n\t- Le nom du package indique quel a \u00e9t\u00e9 le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\r\n\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.",
"Category": "Logon",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "FooSSO",
"TargetDomainName": "FOO",
"Status": "0xc000006d",
"FailureReason": "%%2313",
"SubStatus": "0xc0000064",
"LogonType": "3",
"LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
"AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
"WorkstationName": "FOO-AD1",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"LmPackageName": "-",
"KeyLength": "0",
"ProcessName": "-",
"IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "60917",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-10-04 10:24:16",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog3",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 14:40:12",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4670,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13570,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1711795990,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 5708,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Les autorisations sur un objet ont \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nSujet\u00a0:\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte\u00a0:\t\tJDOE\r\n\tDomaine du compte\u00a0:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session\u00a0:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObjet\u00a0:\r\n\tServeur de l\u2019objet\u00a0:\tSecurity\r\n\tType d\u2019objet\u00a0:\tToken\r\n\tNom de l\u2019objet\u00a0:\t-\r\n\tID du handle\u00a0:\t0x2214\r\n\r\nProcessus\u00a0:\r\n\tID du processus\u00a0:\t0x3f8\r\n\tNom du processus\u00a0:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nModification des autorisations\u00a0:\r\n\tDescripteur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d\u2019origine\u00a0:\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\r\n\tNouveau descripteur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0:\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)",
"Category": "Modification de la strat\u00e9gie d\u2019autorisation",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "JDOE",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"ObjectType": "Token",
"ObjectName": "-",
"HandleId": "0x2214",
"OldSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)",
"NewSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 14:40:15",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:34",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4768,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14339,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 2089533206,
"ProcessID": 660,
"ThreadID": 4536,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Un ticket d\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9.\r\n\r\nInformations sur le compte\u00a0:\r\n\tNom du compte\u00a0:\t\\JDOE\r\n\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni\u00a0:\tlocal.example.org\r\n\tID de l\u2019utilisateur\u00a0:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\r\n\r\nInformations sur le service\u00a0:\r\n\tNom du service\u00a0:\t\tkrbtgt\r\n\tID du service\u00a0:\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau\u00a0:\r\n\tAdresse du client\u00a0:\t\t::ffff:55.99.99.6\r\n\tPort client\u00a0:\t\t61359\r\n\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires\u00a0:\r\n\tOptions du ticket\u00a0:\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tCode de r\u00e9sultat\u00a0:\t\t0x0\r\n\tType de chiffrement du ticket\u00a0:\t0x12\r\n\tType de pr\u00e9-authentification\u00a0:\t15\r\n\r\nInformations sur le certificat\u00a0:\r\n\tNom de l\u2019\u00e9metteur du certificat\u00a0:\t\tEXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\r\n\tNum\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat\u00a0:\t78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\r\n\t Empreinte num\u00e9rique du certificat\u00a0:\t\t32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\r\n\r\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 pour la pr\u00e9-authentification.\r\n\r\nLes types de pr\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\u00e9sultats sont d\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.",
"Category": "Service d\u2019authentification Kerberos",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"TargetUserName": "JDOE",
"TargetDomainName": "local.example.org",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444",
"ServiceName": "krbtgt",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810010",
"Status": "0x0",
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"PreAuthType": "15",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:55.99.99.6",
"IpPort": "61359",
"CertIssuerName": "EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification",
"CertSerialNumber": "78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A",
"CertThumbprint": "32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 09:59:11",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-03-27 10:57:48",
"Hostname": "server001.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600035000,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4698,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{70F17275-E2D6-40BF-9990-D3347AD59BBF}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12804,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 60217389,
"ActivityID": "{70F17275-E2D6-40BF-9990-D3347AD59BBF}",
"ProcessID": 816,
"ThreadID": 3272,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "JDOE$",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"TaskName": "\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateBrowserReplacementTask",
"TaskContent": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Version>1.3.185.27</Version>\r\n <Description>Keeps your Microsoft software up to date. If this task is disabled or stopped, your Microsoft software will not be kept up to date, meaning security vulnerabilities that may arise cannot be fixed and features may not work. This task uninstalls itself when there is no Microsoft software using it.</Description>\r\n <URI>\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateBrowserReplacementTask</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <BootTrigger>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </BootTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeUpdate\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>/browserreplacement</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>",
"ClientProcessStartKey": "20829148276605418",
"ClientProcessId": "5632",
"ParentProcessId": "808",
"RpcCallClientLocality": "0",
"FQDN": "server001.example.org",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-03-27 10:58:34",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-05-06 11:38:15",
"Hostname": "server01.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4738,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13824,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 105098604,
"ProcessID": 688,
"ThreadID": 2676,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A user account was changed.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-7\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tANONYMOUS LOGON\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tNT AUTHORITY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E6\r\n\r\nTarget Account:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-55555\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tjdoe\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\r\nChanged Attributes:\r\n\tSAM Account Name:\t-\r\n\tDisplay Name:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Principal Name:\t-\r\n\tHome Directory:\t\t-\r\n\tHome Drive:\t\t-\r\n\tScript Path:\t\t-\r\n\tProfile Path:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Workstations:\t-\r\n\tPassword Last Set:\t06.05.2024 11:38:15\r\n\tAccount Expires:\t\t-\r\n\tPrimary Group ID:\t-\r\n\tAllowedToDelegateTo:\t-\r\n\tOld UAC Value:\t\t-\r\n\tNew UAC Value:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Account Control:\t-\r\n\tUser Parameters:\t-\r\n\tSID History:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon Hours:\t\t-\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tPrivileges:\t\t-",
"Category": "User Account Management",
"Opcode": "Info",
"Dummy": "-",
"TargetUserName": "jdoe",
"TargetDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-55555",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-7",
"SubjectUserName": "ANONYMOUS LOGON",
"SubjectDomainName": "NT AUTHORITY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e6",
"PrivilegeList": "-",
"SamAccountName": "-",
"DisplayName": "-",
"UserPrincipalName": "-",
"HomeDirectory": "-",
"HomePath": "-",
"ScriptPath": "-",
"ProfilePath": "-",
"UserWorkstations": "-",
"PasswordLastSet": "06.05.2024 11:38:15",
"AccountExpires": "-",
"PrimaryGroupId": "-",
"AllowedToDelegateTo": "-",
"OldUacValue": "321",
"NewUacValue": "123",
"UserAccountControl": "-",
"UserParameters": "-",
"SidHistory": "-",
"LogonHours": "-",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-05-06 11:38:16",
"SourceModuleName": "SecurityLog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-30 08:58:21",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9218868437227405312,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 4768,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14339,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 971339700,
"ProcessID": 572,
"ThreadID": 8432,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Un ticket d\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9.\r\n\r\nInformations sur le compte :\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tjdoe\r\n\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni :\tlocal.example.org\r\n\tID de l\u2019utilisateur :\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\r\nInformations sur le service :\r\n\tNom du service :\t\tkrbtgt/local.example.org\r\n\tID du service :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tAdresse du client :\t\t::ffff:10.24.20.7\r\n\tPort client :\t\t49681\r\n\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires :\r\n\tOptions du ticket :\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tCode de r\u00e9sultat :\t\t0x4B\r\n\tType de chiffrement du ticket :\t0xFFFFFFFF\r\n\tType de pr\u00e9-authentification :\t-\r\n\r\nInformations sur le certificat :\r\n\tNom de l\u2019\u00e9metteur du certificat :\t\tCN=INDSI218\r\n\tNum\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat :\t01\r\n\t Empreinte num\u00e9rique du certificat :\t\t4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\r\n\r\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 pour la pr\u00e9-authentification.\r\n\r\nLes types de pr\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\u00e9sultats sont d\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.",
"Category": "Service d\u2019authentification Kerberos",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"TargetUserName": "jdoe",
"TargetDomainName": "local.example.org",
"TargetSid": "S-1-0-0",
"ServiceName": "krbtgt/local.example.org",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810010",
"Status": "0x4b",
"TicketEncryptionType": "0xffffffff",
"PreAuthType": "-",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:55.99.99.7",
"IpPort": "49681",
"CertIssuerName": "CN=INDSI218",
"CertSerialNumber": "01",
"CertThumbprint": "4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-30 08:58:24",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog10",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-01-29 10:10:59",
"Hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"Keywords": -9218868437227405312,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 4825,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12551,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 5298486139,
"ProcessID": 1400,
"ThreadID": 1996,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tUser Name:\tUSERFOO\r\n\tDomain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t0x67D43768\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t1.1.1.1\r\n\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.",
"Category": "Other Logon/Logoff Events",
"Opcode": "Info",
"AccountName": "USERFOO",
"AccountDomain": "KEY",
"LogonID": "0x67d43768",
"ClientAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-01-29 10:11:00",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"Hostname": "mars.example.org",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 4825,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProcessID": 632,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tUser Name:\tJDOE\r\n\tDomain:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\tLogon ID:\t0xA360BC6B\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.",
"Category": "Other Logon/Logoff Events"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-07-10 14:57:48",
"Hostname": "FD001.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4886,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12805,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 4403229,
"ActivityID": "{47CB07C4-5532-467D-A89C-724B854B59F7}",
"ProcessID": 900,
"ThreadID": 8040,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Certificate Services received a certificate request.\r\n\t\r\nRequest ID:\t2715945\r\nRequester:\tEXAMPLE\\jdoe\r\nAttributes:\t\nCertificateTemplate:NDSEClient\r\n\nccm:NDFR10923.example.org",
"Category": "Certification Services",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RequestId": "2715945",
"Requester": "EXAMPLE\\jdoe",
"Attributes": "\nCertificateTemplate:NDSEClient\r\n\nccm:NDFR10923.example.org",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-07-10 14:57:50",
"SourceModuleName": "SecurityLog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-09-13 09:24:22",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4929,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14083,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 652068049,
"ActivityID": "{0AFF6AA6-47D0-416B-8F6B-5931182E4C30}",
"ProcessID": 592,
"ThreadID": 760,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed.\r\n\r\nDestination DRA:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nSource DRA:\t-\r\nSource Address:\t6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\r\nNaming Context:\tDC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions:\t\t16640\r\nStatus Code:\t0",
"Category": "Detailed Directory Service Replication",
"Opcode": "Info",
"DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"SourceDRA": "-",
"SourceAddr": "6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org",
"NamingContext": "DC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org",
"Options": "16640",
"StatusCode": "0",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-09-13 09:38:52",
"SourceModuleName": "SecurityLog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:34",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4932,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 14082,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1672200421,
"ActivityID": "{E2C58E0C-C3FA-0001-9D8E-C5E2FAC3D901}",
"ProcessID": 596,
"ThreadID": 3620,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "La synchronisation d\u2019un r\u00e9plica d\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory a commenc\u00e9.\r\n\r\nDRA de destination\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nDRA source\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nContexte de nommage\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions\u00a0:\t\t524307\r\nID de la session\u00a0:\t437014\r\nUSN de d\u00e9marrage\u00a0:\t239636074",
"Category": "R\u00e9plication du service d\u2019annuaire",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"SourceDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"NamingContext": "DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org",
"Options": "524307",
"SessionID": "437014",
"StartUSN": "239636074",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:36",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:34",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4933,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 14082,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1672200422,
"ActivityID": "{E2C58E0C-C3FA-0001-9D8E-C5E2FAC3D901}",
"ProcessID": 596,
"ThreadID": 3620,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "La synchronisation d\u2019un r\u00e9plica d\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory s\u2019est termin\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nDRA de destination\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nDRA source\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nContexte de nommage\u00a0:\tDC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions\u00a0:\t\t524307\r\nID de session\u00a0:\t437014\r\nUSN de fin\u00a0:\t239636088\r\nCode d\u2019\u00e9tat\u00a0:\t0",
"Category": "R\u00e9plication du service d\u2019annuaire",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"SourceDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"NamingContext": "DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org",
"Options": "524307",
"SessionID": "437014",
"EndUSN": "239636088",
"StatusCode": "0",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 09:46:36",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-10-26 12:34:55",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5136,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14081,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3509403758,
"ProcessID": 724,
"ThreadID": 868,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Un objet du service d\u2019annuaire a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9.\r\n\t\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tSyst\u00e8me\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tAUTORITE NT\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x16CDFB96\r\n\r\nService d\u2019annuaire :\r\n\tNom :\texample.org\r\n\tType :\tServices de domaine Active Directory\r\n\t\r\nObjet :\r\n\tDN :\tDC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\r\n\tGUID :\t{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\r\n\tClasse :\tdnsNode\r\n\t\r\nAttribut :\r\n\tNom complet LDAP :\tdNSTombstoned\r\n\tSyntaxe (OID) :\t2.5.5.8\r\n\tValeur :\tFALSE\r\n\t\r\nOp\u00e9ration :\r\n\tType :\tFinance\r\n\tID de corr\u00e9lation :\t{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\r\n\tID de corr\u00e9lation d\u2019application :\t-",
"Category": "Directory Service Changes",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"OpCorrelationID": "{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}",
"AppCorrelationID": "-",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"SubjectDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x16cdfb96",
"DSName": "example.org",
"DSType": "%%14676",
"ObjectDN": "DC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org",
"ObjectGUID": "{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}",
"ObjectClass": "dnsNode",
"AttributeLDAPDisplayName": "dNSTombstoned",
"AttributeSyntaxOID": "2.5.5.8",
"AttributeValue": "FALSE",
"OperationType": "%%14674",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-10-26 12:34:56",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog3",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-23 11:20:47",
"Hostname": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL",
"Keywords": 4611686018427912192,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 514,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer",
"ProviderGuid": "{EB79061A-A566-4698-9119-3ED2807060E7}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 5,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1285844,
"ProcessID": 2580,
"ThreadID": 3344,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer/Audit",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "The zone mail.corp.net was updated. The MasterServers setting has been set to 1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2. [virtualization instance: .].",
"Category": "ZONE_OP",
"Opcode": "Info",
"Zone": "mail.corp.net",
"PropertyKey": "MasterServers",
"NewValue": "1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2",
"VirtualizationID": ".",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-23 11:20:48",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_other",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-08-05 11:38:06",
"Hostname": "hostname.test.com",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5156,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12810,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3909688690,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 6140,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.\r\n\r\nApplication Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t832\r\n\tApplication Name:\t\\device\\harddisk\\windows\\system32\\test.exe\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tDirection:\t\tInbound\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t1\r\n\tDestination Address:\t5.6.7.8\r\n\tDestination Port:\t\t2\r\n\tProtocol:\t\t6\r\n\r\nFilter Information:\r\n\tFilter Run-Time ID:\t0\r\n\tLayer Name:\t\tReceive/Accept\r\n\tLayer Run-Time ID:\t44",
"Category": "Filtering Platform Connection",
"Opcode": "Info",
"Application": "\\device\\harddisk\\windows\\system32\\test.exe",
"Direction": "%%14592",
"SourceAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"SourcePort": "1",
"DestAddress": "5.6.7.8",
"DestPort": "2",
"Protocol": "6",
"FilterRTID": "0",
"LayerName": "%%14610",
"LayerRTID": "44",
"RemoteUserID": "S-1-0-0",
"RemoteMachineID": "S-1-0-0",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-08-05 11:38:47",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-09-25 15:29:18",
"Hostname": "foo.net",
"Keywords": 1152921504606846976,
"EventType": "VERBOSE",
"SeverityValue": 1,
"Severity": "DEBUG",
"EventID": 5408,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering",
"ProviderGuid": "{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 764816422,
"ActivityID": "{D938DD9B-F8EF-4227-A505-1169A1E3873E}",
"ProcessID": 5440,
"ThreadID": 8428,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\",\"Hostname\":\"foo.net\",\"Keywords\":1152921504606846976,\"EventType\":\"VERBOSE\",\"SeverityValue\":1,\"Severity\":\"DEBUG\",\"EventID\":5408,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":764816422,\"ActivityID\":\"{D938DD9B-F8EF-4227-A505-1169A1E3873E}\",\"ProcessID\":5440,\"ThreadID\":8428,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\r\\n\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"LogString\":\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"Opcode": "Info",
"LogString": "[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \r\n",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-09-25 15:29:18",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-10-05 23:50:40",
"Hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"Keywords": 36028797018963968,
"EventType": "ERROR",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 56,
"SourceName": "TermDD",
"Task": 0,
"RecordNumber": 930150,
"ProcessID": 0,
"ThreadID": 0,
"Channel": "System",
"Message": "The Terminal Server security layer detected an error in the protocol stream and has disconnected the client. Client IP: 1.1.1.1.",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-10-18 09:34:39",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-10-26 13:11:01",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 6272,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 12552,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1674356873,
"ActivityID": "{0320A758-C2C2-0002-9DA7-2003C2C2D901}",
"ProcessID": 788,
"ThreadID": 7392,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Network Policy Server granted access to a user.\r\n\r\nUser:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\thost/l4523.example.org\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t\tEX1\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\tEX1\\L4523\r\n\r\nClient Machine:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\t-\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\t-\r\n\tCalled Station Identifier:\t\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\r\n\tCalling Station Identifier:\t\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\r\n\r\nNAS:\r\n\tNAS IPv4 Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tNAS IPv6 Address:\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Identifier:\t\t\tELEBEYCOBI\r\n\tNAS Port-Type:\t\t\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\r\n\tNAS Port:\t\t\t8\r\n\r\nRADIUS Client:\r\n\tClient Friendly Name:\t\tELEBEYCOBI\r\n\tClient IP Address:\t\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\nAuthentication Details:\r\n\tConnection Request Policy Name:\tSecure Wireless Connections\r\n\tNetwork Policy Name:\t\tSecure Wifi Computer\r\n\tAuthentication Provider:\t\tWindows\r\n\tAuthentication Server:\t\tauth.example.org\r\n\tAuthentication Type:\t\tPEAP\r\n\tEAP Type:\t\t\tMicrosoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\r\n\tAccount Session Identifier:\t\t111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\r\n\tLogging Results:\t\t\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\r\n",
"Category": "Network Policy Server",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"SubjectUserName": "host/l4523.example.org",
"SubjectDomainName": "EX1",
"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName": "EX1\\L4523",
"SubjectMachineSID": "S-1-0-0",
"SubjectMachineName": "-",
"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName": "-",
"CalledStationID": "0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos",
"CallingStationID": "a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67",
"NASIPv4Address": "1.2.3.4",
"NASIPv6Address": "-",
"NASIdentifier": "ELEBEYCOBI",
"NASPortType": "Wireless - IEEE 802.11",
"NASPort": "8",
"ClientName": "ELEBEYCOBI",
"ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"ProxyPolicyName": "Secure Wireless Connections",
"NetworkPolicyName": "Secure Wifi Computer",
"AuthenticationProvider": "Windows",
"AuthenticationServer": "auth.example.org",
"AuthenticationType": "PEAP",
"EAPType": "Microsoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)",
"AccountSessionIdentifier": "111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
"LoggingResult": "Accounting information was written to the local log file.",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-10-26 13:11:01",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-10-26 14:42:27",
"Hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"Keywords": -9218868437227405312,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 6273,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 12552,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 783949626,
"ActivityID": "{7C2CEDDA-C2C3-0003-04EE-2C7CC3C2D901}",
"ProcessID": 760,
"ThreadID": 3448,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Network Policy Server denied access to a user.\r\n\r\nContact the Network Policy Server administrator for more information.\r\n\r\nUser:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\tjdoe\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t\tEX1\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\texample.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\r\n\r\nClient Machine:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\t-\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\t-\r\n\tCalled Station Identifier:\t\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\r\n\tCalling Station Identifier:\t\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\r\n\r\nNAS:\r\n\tNAS IPv4 Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tNAS IPv6 Address:\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Identifier:\t\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Port-Type:\t\t\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\r\n\tNAS Port:\t\t\t29\r\n\r\nRADIUS Client:\r\n\tClient Friendly Name:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tClient IP Address:\t\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\nAuthentication Details:\r\n\tConnection Request Policy Name:\tSecure Wireless Connections\r\n\tNetwork Policy Name:\t\tConnections to other access servers\r\n\tAuthentication Provider:\t\tWindows\r\n\tAuthentication Server:\t\tauth.example.org\r\n\tAuthentication Type:\t\tEAP\r\n\tEAP Type:\t\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Session Identifier:\t\t1111111111111111111111111111111111\r\n\tLogging Results:\t\t\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\r\n\tReason Code:\t\t\t66\r\n\tReason:\t\t\t\tThe user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\r\n",
"Category": "Network Policy Server",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"SubjectUserName": "jdoe",
"SubjectDomainName": "EX1",
"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName": "example.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE",
"SubjectMachineSID": "S-1-0-0",
"SubjectMachineName": "-",
"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName": "-",
"CalledStationID": "0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos",
"CallingStationID": "a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67",
"NASIPv4Address": "1.2.3.4",
"NASIPv6Address": "-",
"NASIdentifier": "-",
"NASPortType": "Wireless - IEEE 802.11",
"NASPort": "29",
"ClientName": "1.2.3.4",
"ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"ProxyPolicyName": "Secure Wireless Connections",
"NetworkPolicyName": "Connections to other access servers",
"AuthenticationProvider": "Windows",
"AuthenticationServer": "auth.example.org",
"AuthenticationType": "EAP",
"EAPType": "-",
"AccountSessionIdentifier": "1111111111111111111111111111111111",
"ReasonCode": "66",
"Reason": "The user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.",
"LoggingResult": "Accounting information was written to the local log file.",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-10-26 14:42:33",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-07 17:51:22",
"Hostname": "local",
"Keywords": -922355554775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 7,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{77777-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 7,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 13717971,
"ProcessID": 4916,
"ThreadID": 6372,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-99",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Image loaded:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\r\nProcessGuid: {9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\r\nProcessId: 15368\r\nImage: C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\r\nImageLoaded: C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe\r\nFileVersion: -\r\nDescription: -\r\nProduct: -\r\nCompany: -\r\nOriginalFileName: -\r\nHashes: -\r\nSigned: failed: Invalid hash\r\nSignature: -\r\nSignatureStatus: -\r\nUser: myuser",
"Category": "Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2023-08-07 15:51:22.721",
"ProcessGuid": "{9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}",
"Image": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
"ImageLoaded": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe",
"FileVersion": "-",
"Description": "-",
"Product": "-",
"Company": "-",
"OriginalFileName": "-",
"Hashes": "-",
"Signed": "failed: Invalid hash",
"Signature": "-",
"SignatureStatus": "-",
"User": "myuser",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-07 17:51:23",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-08-05 17:56:15",
"Hostname": "Hostname.test.com",
"Keywords": -921436483760000000,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 255073557,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 22092,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A new process has been created.\r\n\r\nCreator Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tSE-1-1-1\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tJOEDOE$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tTEST\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x388\r\n\r\nTarget Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tSE-0-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tNew Process ID:\t\t0x5878\r\n\tNew Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\Sys\\test.exe\r\n\tToken Elevation Type:\t%%1936\r\n\tMandatory Label:\t\tSE-1-1-14\r\n\tCreator Process ID:\t0x4534\r\n\tCreator Process Name:\tC:\\Program Files (x86)\\TEST\\TEST Client\\TEST.exe\r\n\tProcess Command Line:\t\r\n\r\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance always program using Run as administrator.",
"Category": "Process Creation",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "SE-1-5-1",
"SubjectUserName": "JOEDOE$",
"SubjectDomainName": "TEST",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"NewProcessId": "0x5878",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\Sys\\TEST.exe",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
"TargetUserSid": "SE-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"ParentProcessName": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TEST\\TEST Client\\TEST.exe",
"MandatoryLabel": "SE-1-16-16384",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-08-05 17:56:17",
"SourceModuleName": "sourcemoduletest",
"SourceModuleType": "testlog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 14:58:41",
"Hostname": "hostfoo",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 1,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 1,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 4244505,
"ProcessID": 2932,
"ThreadID": 3956,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Process Create:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\\r\\nProcessGuid: {478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\\r\\nProcessId: 5524\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\r\\nFileVersion: 10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\\r\\nDescription: Windows PowerShell\\r\\nProduct: Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\\r\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\r\\nOriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE\\r\\nCommandLine: powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\\r\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\r\\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\nLogonGuid: {478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\\r\\nLogonId: 0x3E7\\r\\nTerminalSessionId: 0\\r\\nIntegrityLevel: System\\r\\nHashes: SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\\r\\nParentProcessGuid: {478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\\r\\nParentProcessId: 1776\\r\\nParentImage: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\\r\\nParentCommandLine: \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\" service --run --name nscp\\r\\nParentUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM",
"Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2023-08-22 12:58:41.279",
"ProcessGuid": "{478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}",
"Image": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe",
"FileVersion": "10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)",
"Description": "Windows PowerShell",
"Product": "Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System",
"Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"OriginalFileName": "PowerShell.EXE",
"CommandLine": "powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1",
"CurrentDirectory": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\",
"User": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM",
"LogonGuid": "{478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}",
"LogonId": "0x3e7",
"TerminalSessionId": "0",
"IntegrityLevel": "System",
"Hashes": "SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478",
"ParentProcessGuid": "{478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}",
"ParentProcessId": "1776",
"ParentImage": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe",
"ParentCommandLine": "\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\" service --run --name nscp",
"ParentUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 14:58:42",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2012-09-13 16:15:44",
"Hostname": "<REDACTED>",
"Keywords": -9182839640208441000,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 1201,
"SourceName": "AD FS Auditing",
"Task": 3,
"RecordNumber": 1012533579,
"ProcessID": 0,
"ThreadID": 0,
"Channel": "Security",
"Domain": "KEY",
"AccountName": "<REDACTED>",
"UserID": "S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "The Federation Service failed to issue a valid token. See XML for failure details. \r\n\r\nActivity ID: bc38fffc-f8ab-42f2-b5e3-69fabf2e20e6 \r\n\r\nAdditional Data \r\nXML: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-16\"?>\r\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"AppTokenAudit\">\r\n <AuditType>AppToken</AuditType>\r\n <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\r\n <FailureType>GenericError</FailureType>\r\n <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\r\n <ContextComponents>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ResourceAuditComponent\">\r\n <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\r\n <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\r\n <UserId>firstname.lastname@example.org</UserId>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"AuthNAuditComponent\">\r\n <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\r\n <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\r\n <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\r\n <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\r\n <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\r\n <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\r\n <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\r\n <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ProtocolAuditComponent\">\r\n <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\r\n <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"RequestAuditComponent\">\r\n <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\r\n <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\r\n <NetworkLocation>Extranet</NetworkLocation>\r\n <IpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\r\n <ForwardedIpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</ForwardedIpAddress>\r\n <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\r\n <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\r\n <ProxyServer>proxy-server</ProxyServer>\r\n <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36</UserAgentString>\r\n <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\r\n </Component>\r\n </ContextComponents>\r\n</AuditBase>",
"Opcode": "Info",
"EventReceivedTime": "2012-09-13 16:15:45",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2012-09-20 15:54:13",
"Hostname": "<REDACTED>",
"Keywords": -9182839640208441000,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 1203,
"SourceName": "AD FS Auditing",
"Task": 3,
"RecordNumber": 959944122,
"ProcessID": 0,
"ThreadID": 0,
"Channel": "Security",
"Domain": "KEY",
"AccountName": "<REDACTED>",
"UserID": "S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "The Federation Service failed to validate a new credential. See XML for failure details. \r\n\r\nActivity ID: d404fc6c-c19c-40d7-a4fb-e8ebeb1bfc56 \r\n\r\nAdditional Data \r\nXML: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-16\"?>\r\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"FreshCredentialAudit\">\r\n <AuditType>FreshCredentials</AuditType>\r\n <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\r\n <FailureType>CredentialValidationError</FailureType>\r\n <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\r\n <ContextComponents>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ResourceAuditComponent\">\r\n <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\r\n <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\r\n <UserId>username@example.org</UserId>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"AuthNAuditComponent\">\r\n <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\r\n <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\r\n <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\r\n <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\r\n <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\r\n <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\r\n <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\r\n <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ProtocolAuditComponent\">\r\n <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\r\n <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"RequestAuditComponent\">\r\n <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\r\n <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\r\n <NetworkLocation>Intranet</NetworkLocation>\r\n <IpAddress>1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\r\n <ForwardedIpAddress />\r\n <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\r\n <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\r\n <ProxyServer>N/A</ProxyServer>\r\n <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044</UserAgentString>\r\n <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\r\n </Component>\r\n </ContextComponents>\r\n</AuditBase>",
"Opcode": "Info",
"EventReceivedTime": "2012-09-20 15:54:15",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-07-06 02:20:36",
"Hostname": "srv023.example.com",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "WARNING",
"SeverityValue": 3,
"Severity": "WARNING",
"EventID": 1,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE",
"ProviderGuid": "{85A62A0D-7E17-485F-9D4F-749A287193A6}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 606266,
"ProcessID": 2392,
"ThreadID": 2932,
"Channel": "Application",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "System",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "D\u00e9tection possible de CVE : [CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires : Cert: <CS.EXAMPLE.ORG> sha1: ADC83B19E793491B1C6EA0FD8B46CD9F32E592FC IssuerDepthCount: 13 Limit: 12\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une tentative d\u2019exploitation d\u2019une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 connue ([CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit) est d\u00e9tect\u00e9e.\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est d\u00e9clench\u00e9 par un processus en mode utilisateur.\r\n",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"CVEID": "[CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit",
"AdditionalDetails": "Cert: <CS.EXAMPLE.ORG> sha1: ADC83B19E793491B1C6EA0FD8B46CD9F32E592FC IssuerDepthCount: 13 Limit: 12",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-07-06 02:20:37",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlogs",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-03-02 01:40:47",
"Hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"Keywords": 4611686018427387904,
"EventType": "WARNING",
"SeverityValue": 3,
"Severity": "WARNING",
"EventID": 61,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 2,
"RecordNumber": 18732,
"ActivityID": "{5B327F5A-B797-4B7E-AB05-11A0E98A15AF}",
"ProcessID": 5796,
"ThreadID": 12472,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3 l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.",
"Opcode": "Arr\u00c3\u00aater",
"transferId": "{5b327f5a-b797-4b7e-ab05-11a0e98a15af}",
"name": "Font Download",
"Id": "{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}",
"url": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
"hr": "2147954402",
"fileTime": "1601-01-01T00:00:00.0000000Z",
"fileLength": "18446744073709551615",
"bytesTotal": "18446744073709551615",
"bytesTransferred": "0",
"peerProtocolFlags": "0",
"bytesTransferredFromPeer": "0",
"AdditionalInfoHr": "0",
"PeerContextInfo": "0",
"bandwidthLimit": "18446744073709551615",
"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan": "false",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-03-02 01:40:48",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-29 17:08:37",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": 4611686018427387904,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 16403,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 199,
"ActivityID": "{60ACDE36-DDFA-0001-6410-AD60FADDD601}",
"ProcessID": 7908,
"ThreadID": 2432,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational",
"Domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"AccountName": "userXYZ",
"UserID": "S-1-5-21-1808781047-1579666423-2539082804-1000",
"AccountType": "User",
"Opcode": "Info",
"User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ",
"jobTitle": "sharpbitsTest.zip",
"jobId": "{bbe838b2-40bc-49ec-adbb-2251f6030f40}",
"jobOwner": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ",
"fileCount": "1",
"RemoteName": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"LocalName": "C:\\Users\\userXYZ\\Downloads\\sharpbits.zip",
"ClientProcessStartKey": "2251799813685416",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-29 17:08:39",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog6",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-29 17:08:50",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR",
"Keywords": 4611686018427387904,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 60,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 2,
"RecordNumber": 206,
"ActivityID": "{510DF63E-554F-4823-8F87-A23BDEDE0898}",
"ProcessID": 7908,
"ThreadID": 2432,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "BITS stopped transferring the sharpbitsTestX.zip transfer job that is associated with the https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip URL. The status code is 0x0.",
"Opcode": "Stop",
"transferId": "{510df63e-554f-4823-8f87-a23bdede0898}",
"name": "sharpbitsTestX.zip",
"Id": "{c10c39b1-5f4e-47bc-a848-dc7505233471}",
"url": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"hr": "0",
"fileTime": "2018-02-05T22:41:26.0000000Z",
"fileLength": "524444",
"bytesTotal": "524444",
"bytesTransferred": "524444",
"peerProtocolFlags": "0",
"bytesTransferredFromPeer": "0",
"AdditionalInfoHr": "0",
"PeerContextInfo": "0",
"bandwidthLimit": "18446744073709551615",
"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan": "false",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-29 17:08:51",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog6",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-11-05 15:26:31",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "WARNING",
"SeverityValue": 3,
"Severity": "WARNING",
"EventID": 1116,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 424,
"ProcessID": 2484,
"ThreadID": 9244,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Antivirus Windows Defender a d\u00c3\u00a9tect\u00c3\u00a9 un logiciel malveillant ou potentiellement ind\u00c3\u00a9sirable.\r\n Pour plus d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122informations, reportez-vous aux \u00c3\u00a9l\u00c3\u00a9ments suivants :\r\nhttps://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha&threatid=2147705511&enterprise=0\r\n \tNom : HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha\r\n \tID : 2147705511\r\n \tGravit\u00c3\u00a9 : \u00c3\u2030lev\u00c3\u00a9e\r\n \tCat\u00c3\u00a9gorie : Outil\r\n \tChemin : file:_C:\\Users\\r1\\Downloads\\tmp2\\tmp2\\Win32\\mimidrv.sys\r\n \tOrigine de la d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Ordinateur local\r\n \tType de d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Concret\r\n \tSource de d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Protection en temps r\u00c3\u00a9el\r\n \tUtilisateur : DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\r1\r\n \tNom du processus : C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00c3\u00a9curit\u00c3\u00a9 : AV: 1.325.803.0, AS: 1.325.803.0, NIS: 1.325.803.0\r\n \tVersion du moteur : AM: 1.1.17500.4, NIS: 1.1.17500.4",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"Product Name": "%%827",
"Product Version": "4.18.2009.7",
"Detection ID": "{3A24708D-3147-43F8-B63D-60CAD6A64298}",
"Detection Time": "2010-11-05T14:26:30.985Z",
"Threat ID": "2147705511",
"Threat Name": "HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha",
"Severity ID": "4",
"Severity Name": "\u00c3\u2030lev\u00c3\u00a9e",
"Category ID": "34",
"Category Name": "Outil",
"FWLink": "https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha&threatid=2147705511&enterprise=0",
"Status Code": "1",
"State": "1",
"Source ID": "3",
"Source Name": "%%818",
"Process Name": "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"Detection User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\r1",
"Path": "file:_C:\\Users\\r1\\Downloads\\tmp2\\tmp2\\Win32\\mimidrv.sys",
"Origin ID": "1",
"Origin Name": "%%845",
"Execution ID": "1",
"Execution Name": "%%813",
"Type ID": "0",
"Type Name": "%%822",
"Pre Execution Status": "0",
"Action ID": "9",
"Action Name": "%%887",
"Error Code": "0x00000000",
"Error Description": "L\u00e2\u20ac\u2122op\u00c3\u00a9ration a r\u00c3\u00a9ussi. ",
"Post Clean Status": "0",
"Additional Actions ID": "0",
"Additional Actions String": "No additional actions required",
"Security intelligence Version": "AV: 1.325.803.0, AS: 1.325.803.0, NIS: 1.325.803.0",
"Engine Version": "AM: 1.1.17500.4, NIS: 1.1.17500.4",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-11-05 15:26:39",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog2",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2012-12-22 20:25:26",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 1151,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 215,
"ProcessID": 5472,
"ThreadID": 5596,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Rapport d'int\u00e9grit\u00e9 du client Endpoint Protection (heure UTC)\u00a0: \r\n \tVersion de plateforme\u00a0: 4.18.2011.6\r\n \tVersion de moteur\u00a0: 1.1.19900.2\r\n \tVersion du moteur du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0: 1.1.19900.2\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Antivirus\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\r\n \tVersion de la la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\r\n \t\u00c9tat RTP\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat OA\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat OAV\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat BM\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0: 1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 4294967295\r\n \tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0: 21/12/2012 01:50:25\r\n \tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 21/12/2012 01:50:26\r\n \tHeure de d\u00e9but la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 21/12/2012 10:30:01\r\n \tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 21/12/2012 10:40:38\r\n \tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 2\r\n \tHeure de d\u00e9but de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 01/01/1601 00:00:00\r\n \tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 01/01/1601 00:00:00\r\n \tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 0\r\n \tStatut du produit\u00a0: 0x00080000\r\n",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"Product Name": "Antivirus Microsoft Defender",
"Platform version": "4.18.2011.6",
"Engine version": "1.1.19900.2",
"NRI engine version": "1.1.19900.2",
"AV security intelligence version": "1.381.814.0",
"AS security intelligence version": "1.381.814.0",
"NRI security intelligence version": "1.381.814.0",
"RTP state": "Activ\u00e9",
"OA state": "Activ\u00e9",
"IOAV state": "Activ\u00e9",
"BM state": "Activ\u00e9",
"Last AV security intelligence age": "1",
"Last AS security intelligence age": "1",
"Last quick scan age": "1",
"Last full scan age": "4294967295",
"AV security intelligence creation time": "21/12/2012 01:50:25",
"AS security intelligence creation time": "21/12/2012 01:50:26",
"Last quick scan start time": "21/12/2012 10:30:01",
"Last quick scan end time": "21/12/2012 10:40:38",
"Last quick scan source": "2",
"Last full scan start time": "01/01/1601 00:00:00",
"Last full scan end time": "01/01/1601 00:00:00",
"Last full scan source": "0",
"Product status": "0x00080000",
"EventReceivedTime": "2012-12-22 20:25:28",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-09-13 09:20:39",
"Hostname": "lb-foobar",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5007,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1166,
"ProcessID": 3532,
"ThreadID": 5956,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\r\n \tOld value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\powershell.exe = 0x0\r\n \tNew value: ",
"Opcode": "Info",
"Product Name": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus",
"Product Version": "4.18.2108.7",
"Old Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\powershell.exe = 0x0",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-09-13 09:20:41",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog6",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-06-02 15:04:18",
"Hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"Keywords": 0,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4103,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 106,
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"RecordNumber": 712900,
"ActivityID": "{260C9E3C-4B0F-0002-DC86-2D260F4BD701}",
"ProcessID": 22244,
"ThreadID": 16456,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\r\n\r\n\r\nContexte :\r\n Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = Select-Object\r\n Type de commande = Cmdlet\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\r\n\r\n",
"Category": "Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline",
"Opcode": "\u00c0 utiliser lorsque l'op\u00e9ration ex\u00e9cute uniquement une m\u00e9thode",
"ContextInfo": " Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = Select-Object\r\n Type de commande = Cmdlet\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence\u00a0= 138\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Payload": "CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\r\n",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-06-02 15:04:18",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2022-03-21 09:17:49",
"Hostname": "dcclient-vm",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5007,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 4178,
"ProcessID": 3292,
"ThreadID": 5848,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\r\n \tOld value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x5\r\n \tNew value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x4",
"Opcode": "Info",
"Product Name": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus",
"Product Version": "4.18.2202.4",
"Old Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x5",
"New Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x4",
"EventReceivedTime": "2022-03-18 14:42:03",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog6",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-05-22 15:37:23",
"Hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4768,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14339,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 26287385371,
"ProcessID": 1796,
"ThreadID": 17268,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.\r\n\r\nAccount Information:\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOO$\r\n\tSupplied Realm Name:\tKEY.HOSTFOO.INT\r\n\tUser ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\r\n\r\nService Information:\r\n\tService Name:\t\tkrbtgt\r\n\tService ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\r\n\tClient Port:\t\t65016\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tTicket Options:\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tResult Code:\t\t0x0\r\n\tTicket Encryption Type:\t0x12\r\n\tPre-Authentication Type:\t2\r\n\r\nCertificate Information:\r\n\tCertificate Issuer Name:\t\t\r\n\tCertificate Serial Number:\t\r\n\tCertificate Thumbprint:\t\t\r\n\r\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\r\n\r\nPre-authentication types, ticket options, encryption types and result codes are defined in RFC 4120.",
"Category": "Kerberos Authentication Service",
"Opcode": "Info",
"TargetUserName": "FOO$",
"TargetDomainName": "KEY.HOSTFOO.INT",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436",
"ServiceName": "krbtgt",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810010",
"Status": "0x0",
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"PreAuthType": "2",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "65016",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-05-22 15:37:24",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-05-16 11:55:18",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223354444668731392,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 8001,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Store",
"ProviderGuid": "{9C2A37F3-E5FD-5CAE-BCD1-43DAFEEE1FF0}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 8001,
"OpcodeValue": 14,
"RecordNumber": 4644,
"ProcessID": 2368,
"ThreadID": 836,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Store/Operational",
"Domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"AccountName": "UserFoo",
"UserID": "S-1-5-21-1695726573-3959282566-3642579326-1001",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Skipping license manager: PFN Microsoft.Messaging_2.15.20002.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe\r\nFunction: InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\r\nSource: enduser\\winstore\\licensemanager\\apisethost\\activationapis.cpp (205)",
"Category": "LM",
"Opcode": "Info",
"Function": "InvokeLicenseManagerRequired",
"Source": "enduser\\winstore\\licensemanager\\apisethost\\activationapis.cpp",
"Line Number": "205",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-05-16 11:55:20",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-12-16 15:24:15",
"Hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4634,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12545,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 47121546,
"ProcessID": 560,
"ThreadID": 2172,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "An account was logged off.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tAD\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3912391A\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
"Category": "Logoff",
"Opcode": "Info",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
"TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
"TargetDomainName": "AD",
"TargetLogonId": "0x3912391a",
"LogonType": "3",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-12-16 15:24:17",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog3",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-06-18 15:28:23",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4624,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12544,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 10457874880,
"ProcessID": 744,
"ThreadID": 2352,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "An account was successfully logged on.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nImpersonation Level:\t\tImpersonation\r\n\r\nNew Logon:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tSVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xFBEE0744\r\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\t-\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tWorkstation Name:\tV-FOO\r\n\tSource Network Address:\t-\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t-\r\n\r\nDetailed Authentication Information:\r\n\tLogon Process:\t\tNtLmSsp \r\n\tAuthentication Package:\tNTLM\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\tNTLM V2\r\n\tKey Length:\t\t128\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\r\n\r\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\r\n\r\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\r\n\r\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\r\n\r\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\r\n\r\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\r\n\r\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\r\n\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\r\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\r\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\r\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
"Category": "Logon",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701",
"TargetUserName": "SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH",
"TargetDomainName": "KEY",
"TargetLogonId": "0xfbee0744",
"LogonType": "3",
"LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
"AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
"WorkstationName": "V-FOO",
"LogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"LmPackageName": "NTLM V2",
"KeyLength": "128",
"ProcessName": "-",
"IpAddress": "-",
"IpPort": "-",
"ImpersonationLevel": "%%1833",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-06-18 15:28:24",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-04-12 17:42:04",
"Hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4624,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 12544,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 504041,
"ActivityID": "{593B242C-183A-44F2-8977-2A836ABEC213}",
"ProcessID": 996,
"ThreadID": 1920,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "L'ouverture de session d'un compte s'est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nObjet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tPCFOO$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tFOOBAR\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session :\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nInformations d'ouverture de session :\r\n\tType d'ouverture de session :\t\t9\r\n\tMode administrateur restreint :\t-\r\n\tCompte virtuel :\t\tNon\r\n\tJeton \u00e9lev\u00e9 :\t\tOui\r\n\r\nNiveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 :\t\tEmprunt d\u2019identit\u00e9\r\n\r\nNouvelle ouverture de session :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tSyst\u00e8me\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tAUTORITE NT\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session :\t\t0x7E767BC\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session li\u00e9e :\t\t0x0\r\n\tNom du compte r\u00e9seau :\tsvc_admin_sccm\r\n\tDomaine du compte r\u00e9seau :\tFOOBAR\r\n\tGUID d'ouverture de session :\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du processus :\t\t0x2780\r\n\tNom du processus :\t\tC:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tNom de la station de travail :\t-\r\n\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\t-\r\n\tPort source :\t\t-\r\n\r\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l'authentification :\r\n\tProcessus d'ouverture de session :\t\tAdvapi \r\n\tPackage d'authentification :\tNegotiate\r\n\tServices en transit :\t-\r\n\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\t-\r\n\tLongueur de la cl\u00e9 :\t\t0\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lors de la cr\u00e9ation d'une ouverture de session. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l'ordinateur sur lequel l'ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l'ouverture de session. Il s'agit le plus souvent d'un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\r\n\r\nLe champ Type d'ouverture de session indique le type d'ouverture de session qui s'est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\r\n\r\nLe champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, par exemple, le compte qui s'est connect\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs au r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance d'une demande d'ouverture de session \u00e0 distance. Le nom de la station de travail n'\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut \u00eatre laiss\u00e9 vide dans certains cas.\r\n\r\nLe champ du niveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 indique la port\u00e9e de l'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 que peut prendre un processus dans la session d'ouverture de session.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d'authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d'ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\t- Le GUID d'ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir \u00e0 associer cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement KDC .\r\n\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d'ouverture de session.\r\n\t- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\r\n\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.",
"Category": "Logon",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "PCFOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "FOOBAR",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"TargetDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
"TargetLogonId": "0x7e767bc",
"LogonType": "9",
"LogonProcessName": "Advapi ",
"AuthenticationPackageName": "Negotiate",
"WorkstationName": "-",
"LogonGuid": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"LmPackageName": "-",
"KeyLength": "0",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
"IpAddress": "-",
"IpPort": "-",
"ImpersonationLevel": "%%1833",
"RestrictedAdminMode": "-",
"TargetOutboundUserName": "svc_admin_sccm",
"TargetOutboundDomainName": "FOOBAR",
"VirtualAccount": "%%1843",
"TargetLinkedLogonId": "0x0",
"ElevatedToken": "%%1842",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-04-12 17:42:06",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-12-16 15:24:15",
"Hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4634,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12545,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 47121546,
"ProcessID": 560,
"ThreadID": 2172,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "An account was logged off.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tAD\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3912391A\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
"Category": "Logoff",
"Opcode": "Info",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
"TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
"ComputerName": "FoobarComputer",
"TargetDomainName": "AD",
"TargetLogonId": "0x3912391a",
"LogonType": "3",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-12-16 15:24:17",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog3",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-04-24 00:06:15",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5145,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12811,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 23997037887,
"ProcessID": 776,
"ThreadID": 784,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\r\n\t\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tBAZ256$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xA62B3A8AE\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\t\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tFile\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t51042\r\n\t\r\nShare Information:\r\n\tShare Name:\t\t\\\\*\\SYSVOL\r\n\tShare Path:\t\t\\??\\D:\\ActiveDirectory\\SYSVOL\\sysvol\r\n\tRelative Target Name:\tKEY.ACME.COM\\POLICIES\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\MACHINE\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x100081\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tSYNCHRONIZE\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\nAccess Check Results:\r\n\tSYNCHRONIZE:\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes:\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n",
"Category": "Detailed File Share",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016",
"SubjectUserName": "BAZ256$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xa62b3a8ae",
"ObjectType": "File",
"IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "51042",
"ShareName": "\\\\*\\SYSVOL",
"ShareLocalPath": "\\??\\D:\\ActiveDirectory\\SYSVOL\\sysvol",
"RelativeTargetName": "KEY.ACME.COM\\POLICIES\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\MACHINE",
"AccessMask": "0x100081",
"AccessList": "%%1541\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4416\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4423\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessReason": "%%1541:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4416:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4423:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-04-24 00:06:17",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-05-17 11:52:46",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 3,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 3,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 51,
"ProcessID": 3912,
"ThreadID": 532,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Network connection detected:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\r\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\r\nProcessId: 4200\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\r\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\UserFoo\r\nProtocol: tcp\r\nInitiated: true\r\nSourceIsIpv6: false\r\nSourceIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nSourceHostname: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\r\nSourcePort: 49718\r\nSourcePortName: \r\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\r\nDestinationIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nDestinationHostname: \r\nDestinationPort: 443\r\nDestinationPortName: https",
"Category": "Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2019-05-17 09:52:38.882",
"ProcessGuid": "{0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
"User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\UserFoo",
"Protocol": "tcp",
"Initiated": "true",
"SourceIsIpv6": "false",
"SourceIp": "1.1.1.1",
"SourceHostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia",
"SourcePort": "49718",
"DestinationIsIpv6": "false",
"DestinationIp": "1.1.1.1",
"DestinationPort": "443",
"DestinationPortName": "https",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-05-17 11:52:46",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-04-28 08:22:44",
"Hostname": "CAYENNE",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1551703898,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 13732,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A new process has been created.\r\n\r\nCreator Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tadm_FOOBAZ\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xF22F28C6\r\n\r\nTarget Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tNew Process ID:\t\t0x2bfc\r\n\tNew Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIC.exe\r\n\tToken Elevation Type:\tTokenElevationTypeFull (2)\r\n\tCreator Process ID:\t0x2a28\r\n\tProcess Command Line:\t\r\n\r\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\r\n\r\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\r\n\r\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\r\n\r\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.",
"Category": "Process Creation",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301",
"SubjectUserName": "adm_FOOBAZ",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xf22f28c6",
"NewProcessId": "0x2bfc",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIC.exe",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1937",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-04-28 08:22:45",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-05-16 18:07:37",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": 36028797018963968,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 6000,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon",
"ProviderGuid": "{DBE9B383-7CF3-4331-91CC-A3CB16A3B538}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 628,
"ProcessID": 0,
"ThreadID": 0,
"Channel": "Application",
"Message": "L\u00e2\u0080\u0099abonn\u00c3\u00a9 aux notifications Winlogon <SessionEnv> n\u00e2\u0080\u0099\u00c3\u00a9tait pas disponible pour traiter un \u00c3\u00a9v\u00c3\u00a9nement de notification.",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-05-17 09:56:11",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-04-23 13:28:14",
"Hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4662,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14080,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 25279566314,
"ProcessID": 1816,
"ThreadID": 15456,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "An operation was performed on an object.\r\n\r\nSubject :\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x8C042A219\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tDS\r\n\tObject Type:\t\t%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\r\n\tObject Name:\t\t%{e013e2c9-bd38-4fe7-9afc-c50c377cb028}\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nOperation:\r\n\tOperation Type:\t\tObject Access\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tControl Access\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x100\r\n\tProperties:\t\tControl Access\r\n\t\t{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\r\n\t{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\r\n\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tParameter 1:\t\t-\r\n\tParameter 2:\t\t",
"Category": "Directory Service Access",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x8c042a219",
"ObjectServer": "DS",
"ObjectType": "%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}",
"ObjectName": "%{e013e2c9-bd38-4fe7-9afc-c50c377cb028}",
"OperationType": "Object Access",
"HandleId": "0x0",
"AccessList": "%%7688\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessMask": "0x100",
"Properties": "%%7688\r\n\t\t{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\r\n\t{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\r\n",
"AdditionalInfo": "-",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-04-23 13:28:14",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-05-19 12:11:47",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": 0,
"EventType": "VERBOSE",
"SeverityValue": 1,
"Severity": "DEBUG",
"EventID": 4104,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 2,
"OpcodeValue": 15,
"RecordNumber": 272330460,
"ActivityID": "{5D86B418-29E5-0000-F508-CD69E529D601}",
"ProcessID": 968,
"ThreadID": 5568,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):\r\n{ @('Object') -contains $_ }\r\n\r\nScriptBlock ID: 592078b2-e981-40be-a166-10896495067b\r\nPath: ",
"Category": "Execute a Remote Command",
"Opcode": "On create calls",
"MessageNumber": "1",
"MessageTotal": "1",
"ScriptBlockText": "{ @('Object') -contains $_ }",
"ScriptBlockId": "592078b2-e981-40be-a166-10896495067b",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-05-19 12:11:48",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-02 17:20:14",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": 0,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4103,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 106,
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"RecordNumber": 249099289,
"ActivityID": "{264E110A-980D-0002-50EB-4F260D98D601}",
"ProcessID": 2816,
"ThreadID": 3184,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "CommandInvocation(Write-Verbose): \"Write-Verbose\"\r\nParameterBinding(Write-Verbose): name=\"Message\"; value=\"ParentDisplayName\"\r\n\r\n\r\nContext:\r\n Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Host ID = 6d715a18-8dd8-44ce-889d-67bbbd36962b\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\ProgramData\\PuppetLabs\\facter\\facts.d\\InstalledSoftware.ps1\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Runspace ID = 28ef971b-d5e6-46a0-a1eb-275b26023d17\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Write-Verbose\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = C:\\Program Files\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\PSSoftware\\1.0.29\\PSSoftware.psm1\r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 3930\r\n User = WORKGROUP\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nUser Data:\r\n\r\n",
"Category": "Executing Pipeline",
"Opcode": "To be used when operation is just executing a method",
"ContextInfo": " Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Host ID = 6d715a18-8dd8-44ce-889d-67bbbd36962b\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\ProgramData\\PuppetLabs\\facter\\facts.d\\InstalledSoftware.ps1\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Runspace ID = 28ef971b-d5e6-46a0-a1eb-275b26023d17\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Write-Verbose\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = C:\\Program Files\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\PSSoftware\\1.0.29\\PSSoftware.psm1\r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 3930\r\n User = WORKGROUP\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Payload": "CommandInvocation(Write-Verbose): \"Write-Verbose\"\r\nParameterBinding(Write-Verbose): name=\"Message\"; value=\"ParentDisplayName\"\r\n",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-02 17:20:19",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-22 20:12:26",
"Hostname": "DC2.corp.net",
"Keywords": 0,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4103,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 106,
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"RecordNumber": 32670,
"ActivityID": "{AA56825F-C7FE-0000-D33D-F2AAFEC7D901}",
"ProcessID": 5676,
"ThreadID": 3020,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "CommandInvocation(Add-Type): \"Add-Type\"\r\nParameterBinding(Add-Type): name=\"AssemblyName\"; value=\"System.Core\"\r\n\r\n\r\nContext:\r\n Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Host ID = 26838e02-12cb-467c-a81a-bb1479f74427\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Runspace ID = 4185b66b-3f0e-486d-a15e-3d2bc90f39a7\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Add-Type\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = \r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 18\r\n User = INTRANET\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nUser Data:\r\n\r\n",
"Category": "Executing Pipeline",
"Opcode": "To be used when operation is just executing a method",
"ContextInfo": " Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Host ID = 26838e02-12cb-467c-a81a-bb1479f74427\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Runspace ID = 4185b66b-3f0e-486d-a15e-3d2bc90f39a7\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Add-Type\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = \r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 18\r\n User = INTRANET\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Payload": "CommandInvocation(Add-Type): \"Add-Type\"\r\nParameterBinding(Add-Type): name=\"AssemblyName\"; value=\"System.Core\"\r\n",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-22 20:12:27",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-04-18 14:51:32",
"Hostname": "PCFOO4147.corp.net",
"Keywords": 0,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4103,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 106,
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"RecordNumber": 1079309,
"ActivityID": "{83B38D2A-3444-0004-D607-B4834434D701}",
"ProcessID": 5532,
"ThreadID": 7212,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "CommandInvocation (Out-Default) : \u00ab Out-Default \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=ApplicationFrameHost} \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=armsvc} \u00bb\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nContexte :\r\n Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = b9b8ea4b-cd03-4f71-86f7-2fd8e89b52a4\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = bad57214-6381-4f0a-a2ea-ad1575bdb55d\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = \r\n Type de commande = Script\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 18\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\r\n\r\n",
"Category": "Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline",
"Opcode": "\u00c0 utiliser lorsque l'op\u00e9ration ex\u00e9cute uniquement une m\u00e9thode",
"ContextInfo": " Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = b9b8ea4b-cd03-4f71-86f7-2fd8e89b52a4\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = bad57214-6381-4f0a-a2ea-ad1575bdb55d\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = \r\n Type de commande = Script\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 18\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Payload": "CommandInvocation (Out-Default) : \u00ab Out-Default \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=ApplicationFrameHost} \u00bb\r\n",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-04-18 14:51:33",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-09-28 18:30:29",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9218868437227405312,
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 4656,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12804,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 9931381860,
"ProcessID": 728,
"ThreadID": 736,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A handle to an object was requested.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xA4FA5F41\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tWS-Management Listener\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tUnknown\r\n\tObject Name:\t\tUnknown\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\tResource Attributes:\t-\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x3d4\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tTransaction ID:\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tMAX_ALLOWED\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n\tAccess Reasons:\t\t-\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x2000000\r\n\tPrivileges Used for Access Check:\t-\r\n\tRestricted SID Count:\t0",
"Category": "Other Object Access Events",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xa4fa5f41",
"ObjectServer": "WS-Management Listener",
"ObjectType": "Unknown",
"ObjectName": "Unknown",
"HandleId": "0x0",
"TransactionId": "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}",
"AccessList": "%%1543\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessReason": "-",
"AccessMask": "0x2000000",
"PrivilegeList": "-",
"RestrictedSidCount": "0",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"ResourceAttributes": "-",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-09-28 18:30:30",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-09-30 12:01:24",
"Hostname": "FOOBAZ02",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4657,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12801,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 27949645047,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 14940,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A registry value was modified.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOOBAZ02$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Name:\t\t\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WindowsUpdate\\Auto Update\r\n\tObject Value Name:\tFirmwareUpdatesNotInstalled\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x22cc\r\n\tOperation Type:\t\tNew registry value created\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0xac0\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nChange Information:\r\n\tOld Value Type:\t\t-\r\n\tOld Value:\t\t-\r\n\tNew Value Type:\t\tREG_DWORD\r\n\tNew Value:\t\t0",
"Category": "Registry",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "FOOBAZ02$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ObjectName": "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WindowsUpdate\\Auto Update",
"ObjectValueName": "FirmwareUpdatesNotInstalled",
"HandleId": "0x22cc",
"OperationType": "%%1904",
"OldValueType": "-",
"OldValue": "-",
"NewValueType": "%%1876",
"NewValue": "0",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-09-30 12:01:25",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-09-30 12:32:03",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4658,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12801,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 11254204732,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 6740,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "The handle to an object was closed.\r\n\r\nSubject :\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tSecurity\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x5c44\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x4e58\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"Category": "Registry",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"HandleId": "0x5c44",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-09-30 12:32:03",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-09-30 14:43:13",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4663,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12802,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1507550680,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 10820,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "An attempt was made to access an object.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tSecurity\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tProcess\r\n\tObject Name:\t\t\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x5d4\r\n\tResource Attributes:\t-\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0xcc8\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tRead from process memory\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x10",
"Category": "Kernel Object",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"ObjectType": "Process",
"ObjectName": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"HandleId": "0x5d4",
"AccessList": "%%4484\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessMask": "0x10",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
"ResourceAttributes": "-",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-09-30 14:43:15",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-01 17:52:46",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4670,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13570,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 878009,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 7416,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "FOOBAZ$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"ObjectType": "Token",
"ObjectName": "-",
"HandleId": "0x444",
"OldSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-80-117416528-2204451360-1913602512-1355018040-1234992034)(A;;GA;;;BA)",
"NewSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-80-117416528-2204451360-1913602512-1355018040-1234992034)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;SWRPRC;;;S-1-5-5-0-1093861)",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-01 18:00:19",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2012-01-25 18:20:06",
"Hostname": "REDACTED",
"Keywords": -9214364837600035000,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 968049,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 14728,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectDomainName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"NewProcessId": "0xe40",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
"CommandLine": "taskhostw.exe",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"ParentProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"MandatoryLabel": "S-1-16-16384",
"EventReceivedTime": "2012-01-25 18:31:58",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2012-01-26 11:33:55",
"Hostname": "REDACTED",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4689,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13313,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1840478,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 13048,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectDomainName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"Status": "0x0",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2012-01-26 11:38:04",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-08-25 12:13:33",
"Hostname": "srv-foo",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4698,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12804,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 4302958134,
"ActivityID": "{25C1B30D-1E8B-4A26-9E80-ED3A242DB52E}",
"ProcessID": 912,
"ThreadID": 5584,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A scheduled task was created.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tsrv-foo$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nTask Information:\r\n\tTask Name: \t\t\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates\r\n\tTask Content: \t\t<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Author>KEY\\adm_foo</Author>\r\n <URI>\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <CalendarTrigger>\r\n <Repetition>\r\n <Interval>PT1H</Interval>\r\n <Duration>P1D</Duration>\r\n <StopAtDurationEnd>true</StopAtDurationEnd>\r\n </Repetition>\r\n <StartBoundary>2016-05-02T04:45:00</StartBoundary>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT30M</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <ScheduleByDay>\r\n <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>\r\n </ScheduleByDay>\r\n </CalendarTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\System</UserId>\r\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT1H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n <RestartOnFailure>\r\n <Interval>PT15M</Interval>\r\n <Count>3</Count>\r\n </RestartOnFailure>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\Exploitation\\Scripts\\Nagios\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\"</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>\r\n\r\nOther Information:\r\n\tProcessCreationTime: \t\t28428972647776291\r\n\tClientProcessId: \t\t\t1700\r\n\tParentProcessId: \t\t\t892\r\n\tFQDN: \t\t0\r\n\t",
"Category": "Other Object Access Events",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "srv-foo$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"TaskName": "\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates",
"TaskContent": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Author>KEY\\adm_foo</Author>\r\n <URI>\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <CalendarTrigger>\r\n <Repetition>\r\n <Interval>PT1H</Interval>\r\n <Duration>P1D</Duration>\r\n <StopAtDurationEnd>true</StopAtDurationEnd>\r\n </Repetition>\r\n <StartBoundary>2016-05-02T04:45:00</StartBoundary>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT30M</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <ScheduleByDay>\r\n <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>\r\n </ScheduleByDay>\r\n </CalendarTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\System</UserId>\r\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT1H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n <RestartOnFailure>\r\n <Interval>PT15M</Interval>\r\n <Count>3</Count>\r\n </RestartOnFailure>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\Exploitation\\Scripts\\Nagios\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\"</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>",
"ClientProcessStartKey": "28428972647776291",
"ClientProcessId": "1700",
"ParentProcessId": "892",
"RpcCallClientLocality": "0",
"FQDN": "srv-foo.key.corp.net",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-08-25 12:13:34",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-01-11 13:11:59",
"Hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4719,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13568,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3128,
"ActivityID": "{3B3C7595-E81B-0008-9F75-3C3B1BE8D601}",
"ProcessID": 764,
"ThreadID": 932,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "FOOBAR$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"CategoryId": "%%8278",
"SubcategoryId": "%%13825",
"SubcategoryGuid": "{0cce9236-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030}",
"AuditPolicyChanges": "%%8449, %%8451",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-01-11 13:12:05",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2020-11-27 17:05:18",
"Hostname": "SERVERFOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4720,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13824,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 2077430259,
"ProcessID": 1808,
"ThreadID": 9204,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A user account was created.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tSVC_sitemanager\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tEXTRAWEB\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x8A2F8844\r\n\r\nNew Account:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-47859\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tEXTRAWEB\r\n\r\nAttributes:\r\n\tSAM Account Name:\tUSERFOO\r\n\tDisplay Name:\t\tUSERFOO USERLASTNAME\r\n\tUser Principal Name:\\tuserfoo@mycorp.nett\r\n\tHome Directory:\t\t-\r\n\tHome Drive:\t\t-\r\n\tScript Path:\t\t-\r\n\tProfile Path:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Workstations:\t-\r\n\tPassword Last Set:\t<never>\r\n\tAccount Expires:\t\t28/11/2021 00:00:00\r\n\tPrimary Group ID:\t513\r\n\tAllowed To Delegate To:\t-\r\n\tOld UAC Value:\t\t0x0\r\n\tNew UAC Value:\t\t0x15\r\n\tUser Account Control:\t\r\n\t\tAccount Disabled\r\n\t\t'Password Not Required' - Enabled\r\n\t\t'Normal Account' - Enabled\r\n\tUser Parameters:\t-\r\n\tSID History:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon Hours:\t\t<value not set>\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tPrivileges\t\t-",
"Category": "User Account Management",
"Opcode": "Info",
"TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
"TargetDomainName": "EXTRAWEB",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-47859",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746",
"SubjectUserName": "SVC_sitemanager",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXTRAWEB",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x8a2f8844",
"PrivilegeList": "-",
"SamAccountName": "USERFOO",
"DisplayName": "USERFOO USERLASTNAME",
"UserPrincipalName": "userfoo@mycorp.nett",
"HomeDirectory": "-",
"HomePath": "-",
"ScriptPath": "-",
"ProfilePath": "-",
"UserWorkstations": "-",
"PasswordLastSet": "%%1794",
"AccountExpires": "28/11/2021 00:00:00",
"PrimaryGroupId": "513",
"AllowedToDelegateTo": "-",
"OldUacValue": "0x0",
"NewUacValue": "0x15",
"UserAccountControl": "\r\n\t\t%%2080\r\n\t\t%%2082\r\n\t\t%%2084",
"UserParameters": "-",
"SidHistory": "-",
"LogonHours": "%%1793",
"EventReceivedTime": "2020-11-27 17:05:19",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-11 16:17:08",
"Hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4769,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14337,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 30707351571,
"ProcessID": 1812,
"ThreadID": 4500,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A Kerberos service ticket was requested.\r\n\r\nAccount Information:\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY.HOSTFOO\r\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{25EC3BE0-427C-8A48-FD6F-0EF462F18BEB}\r\n\r\nService Information:\r\n\tService Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tService ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-74694\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\r\n\tClient Port:\t\t54021\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tTicket Options:\t\t0x40810000\r\n\tTicket Encryption Type:\t0x12\r\n\tFailure Code:\t\t0x0\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\r\nThis event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.\r\n\r\nThis event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.\r\n\r\nTicket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.",
"Category": "Kerberos Service Ticket Operations",
"Opcode": "Info",
"TargetUserName": "HOSTFOO@KEY.HOSTFOO",
"TargetDomainName": "KEY.HOSTFOO",
"ServiceName": "V-FOO$",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-74694",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810000",
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "54021",
"Status": "0x0",
"LogonGuid": "{25EC3BE0-427C-8A48-FD6F-0EF462F18BEB}",
"TransmittedServices": "-",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-11 16:17:09",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-11-13 17:25:22",
"Hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5136,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 14081,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 30373281570,
"ProcessID": 1928,
"ThreadID": 12604,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A directory service object was modified.\r\n\t\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTNAMEBAZ\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x2245EEC18\r\n\r\nDirectory Service:\r\n\tName:\tkey.mycorp.int\r\n\tType:\tActive Directory Domain Services\r\n\t\r\nObject:\r\n\tDN:\tCN=MYUSER,OU=Ten,OU=MYCORP Computers,OU=MYCORP Data,DC=key,DC=mycorp,DC=int\r\n\tGUID:\t{5E818E06-674B-4D67-8D7C-FD08473C7FD4}\r\n\tClass:\tcomputer\r\n\t\r\nAttribute:\r\n\tLDAP Display Name:\tservicePrincipalName\r\n\tSyntax (OID):\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tValue:\tCmRcService/MYUSER\r\n\t\r\nOperation:\r\n\tType:\tValue Added\r\n\tCorrelation ID:\t{862BB478-DF85-4696-B45A-8C27F04C9377}\r\n\tApplication Correlation ID:\t-",
"Category": "Directory Service Changes",
"Opcode": "Info",
"OpCorrelationID": "{862BB478-DF85-4696-B45A-8C27F04C9377}",
"AppCorrelationID": "-",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990",
"SubjectUserName": "HOSTNAMEBAZ",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x2245eec18",
"DSName": "key.mycorp.int",
"DSType": "%%14676",
"ObjectDN": "CN=MYUSER,OU=Ten,OU=MYCORP Computers,OU=MYCORP Data,DC=key,DC=mycorp,DC=int",
"ObjectGUID": "{5E818E06-674B-4D67-8D7C-FD08473C7FD4}",
"ObjectClass": "computer",
"AttributeLDAPDisplayName": "servicePrincipalName",
"AttributeSyntaxOID": "1.1.1.1",
"AttributeValue": "CmRcService/MYUSER",
"OperationType": "%%14674",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-11-13 17:25:22",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"@timestamp": "2010-10-29T12:16:10.651Z",
"TimeCreated": "2010-10-29T12:16:10.651Z",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
"SourcePort": "8000",
"LayerName": "%%14609",
"SourceAddress": "::",
"Level": "0",
"Channel": "Security",
"Task": "12810",
"Protocol": "6",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Hostname": "WORKSTATION5",
"ProcessId": "10220",
"LayerRTID": "42",
"FilterRTID": "81935",
"EventID": 5154,
"Keywords": "0x8020000000000000",
"Application": "\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\users\\wardog\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\python.exe",
"Message": "The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.\r\n\r\nApplication Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t10220\r\n\tApplication Name:\t\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\users\\wardog\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\python.exe\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t::\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t8000\r\n\tProtocol:\t\t6\r\n\r\nFilter Information:\r\n\tFilter Run-Time ID:\t81935\r\n\tLayer Name:\t\tListen\r\n\tLayer Run-Time ID:\t42",
"EventTime": "2011-06-10 08:53:53"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-21 14:10:49",
"Hostname": "host.foo.local",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 5156,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 12810,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 10943,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 148,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "La plateforme WPF (Windows Filtering Platform) a autoris\u00e9 une connexion.\r\n\r\nInformations sur l\u2019application :\r\n\tID du processus :\t\t1452\r\n\tNom de l\u2019application :\t\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\program files (x86)\\nxlog\\nxlog.exe\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tDirection :\t\tEntrant\r\n\tAdresse source :\t\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort source :\t\t51845\r\n\tAdresse de destination :\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort de destination :\t\t51846\r\n\tProtocole :\t\t6\r\n\r\nInformations sur le filtre :\r\n\tID d\u2019ex\u00e9cution du filtre :\t9\r\n\tNom de la couche :\t\tR\u00e9ception/Acceptation\r\n\tID d\u2019ex\u00e9cution de la couche :\t44",
"Category": "Connexion de la plateforme de filtrage",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"Application": "\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\program files (x86)\\nxlog\\nxlog.exe",
"Direction": "%%14592",
"SourceAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"SourcePort": "51845",
"DestAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"DestPort": "51846",
"Protocol": "6",
"FilterRTID": "9",
"LayerName": "%%14610",
"LayerRTID": "44",
"RemoteUserID": "S-1-0-0",
"RemoteMachineID": "S-1-0-0",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-21 14:10:50",
"SourceModuleName": "security",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-09-18 10:08:41",
"Hostname": "test",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 6272,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{000000000-0000-0000-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 12552,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 2324634,
"ActivityID": "{9481D23D-1111-1111-1111-1DD10B0E2623}",
"ProcessID": 672,
"ThreadID": 3752,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Le serveur NPS a accorde lacces a un utilisateur. Utilisateur : ID de securite : S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111 Nom de compte : testUser Domaine de compte : NT01 Nom de compte complet : net/Administrateurs/ITUser/testUser Ordinateur client : ID de securite : S-1-0-0 Nom de compte : - Nom de compte complet : - Identificateur de la station appelee : 1.2.3.4 Identificateur de la station appelante : 10.24.25.25 Serveur NAS : Adresse IPv4 du serveur NAS : 1.2.3.4 Adresse IPv6 du serveur NAS : - Identificateur du serveur NAS : - Type de port du serveur NAS : Virtuel Port du serveur NAS : 450560 Client RADIUS : Nom convivial du client : FW01 Adresse IP du client : 1.2.3.4 Informations detaillees sur lauthentification : Nom de strategie de demande de connexion : interface_admin_reseau Nom de strategie reseau : FWASA01_Admin Fournisseur dauthentification : RADIUS distant vers le mappage utilisateur Windows Serveur dauthentification : 1.2.3.4 Type dauthentification : - Type EAP : - Identificateur de la session du compte : - Resultats de la journalisation : Les informations de suivi ont ete inscrites dans le fichier journal local. ",
"Category": "Network Policy Server",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111",
"SubjectUserName": "testUser",
"SubjectDomainName": "NT01",
"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName": "test.net/Administrateurs/ITUser/testUser",
"SubjectMachineSID": "S-1-0-0",
"SubjectMachineName": "-",
"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName": "-",
"CalledStationID": "1.2.3.4",
"CallingStationID": "10.24.25.25",
"NASIPv4Address": "1.2.3.4",
"NASIPv6Address": "-",
"NASIdentifier": "-",
"NASPortType": "Virtuel",
"NASPort": "450560",
"ClientName": "FW01",
"ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"ProxyPolicyName": "interface_admin_reseau",
"NetworkPolicyName": "FWASA01_Admin",
"AuthenticationProvider": "RADIUS distant vers le mappage utilisateur Windows",
"AuthenticationServer": "1.2.3.4",
"AuthenticationType": "-",
"EAPType": "-",
"AccountSessionIdentifier": "-",
"LoggingResult": "Les informations de suivi ont ete inscrites dans le fichier journal local.",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-09-18 10:09:24",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog41",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-26 16:58:35",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9187343239835811840,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 7045,
"SourceName": "Service Control Manager",
"ProviderGuid": "{555908D1-A6D7-4695-8E1E-26931D2012F4}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 749,
"ProcessID": 528,
"ThreadID": 636,
"Channel": "System",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "A service was installed in the system.\r\n\r\nService Name: MpKslDrv\r\nService File Name: C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Definition Updates\\{5A27824B-0561-40A5-BA9A-9B3E8B24D58D}\\MpKslDrv.sys\r\nService Type: kernel mode driver\r\nService Start Type: system start\r\nService Account: ",
"ServiceName": "MpKslDrv",
"ImagePath": "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Definition Updates\\{5A27824B-0561-40A5-BA9A-9B3E8B24D58D}\\MpKslDrv.sys",
"ServiceType": "kernel mode driver",
"StartType": "system start",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-26 16:58:36",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog2",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-10-02 10:42:24",
"Hostname": "HOST.test.fr",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 8002,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker",
"ProviderGuid": "{CBDA4DBF-8D5D-4F69-9578-BE14AA540D22}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1812526,
"ProcessID": 2476,
"ThreadID": 2720,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-2-34",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "%SYSTEM32%\\TEST\\APP.EXE was allowed to run.",
"Opcode": "Info",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-10-02 10:42:25",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2024-10-02 10:42:01",
"Hostname": "FOOBAR",
"Keywords": 4611686018427388000,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 8005,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker",
"ProviderGuid": "{CBDA4DBF-8D5D-4F69-9578-BE14AA540D22}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 16535331,
"ActivityID": "{FE138280-0FB7-0002-8AA0-31FEB70FDB01}",
"ProcessID": 5532,
"ThreadID": 10772,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/MSI and Script",
"Domain": "DOM",
"AccountName": "account",
"UserID": "S-1-2-34",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "%OSDRIVE%\\USERS\\ACCOUNT\\APPDATA\\LOCAL\\TEMP\\file.test was allowed to run.",
"Opcode": "Info",
"EventReceivedTime": "2024-10-02 10:42:02",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-05-17 11:52:59",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 1,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 1,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 66,
"ProcessID": 3912,
"ThreadID": 2152,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Process Create:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:59.277\r\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-847B-5CDE-0000-001038720D00}\r\nProcessId: 4540\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe\r\nFileVersion: 10.0.10586.0 (th2_release.151029-1700)\r\nDescription: Windows Logon User Interface Host\r\nProduct: Microsoft\u00c2\u00ae Windows\u00c2\u00ae Operating System\r\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\r\nCommandLine: \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe\" /flags:0x0 /state0:0xa39dd855 /state1:0x41c64e6d\r\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\Windows\\system32\\\r\nUser: AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00c3\u00a8me\r\nLogonGuid: {0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0020E7030000}\r\nLogonId: 0x3E7\r\nTerminalSessionId: 1\r\nIntegrityLevel: System\r\nHashes: MD5=D40C84E829922B70D511BB2CC6268D49,SHA256=9A54EE3D6D16D0FE3458B1AE1212F546F94B9E28E5A845D311A04191C724D652\r\nParentProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0010883A0000}\r\nParentProcessId: 476\r\nParentImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe\r\nParentCommandLine: winlogon.exe",
"Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2019-05-17 09:52:59.277",
"ProcessGuid": "{0BA009B0-847B-5CDE-0000-001038720D00}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe",
"FileVersion": "10.0.10586.0 (th2_release.151029-1700)",
"Description": "Windows Logon User Interface Host",
"Product": "Microsoft\u00c2\u00ae Windows\u00c2\u00ae Operating System",
"Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"CommandLine": "\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe\" /flags:0x0 /state0:0xa39dd855 /state1:0x41c64e6d",
"CurrentDirectory": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\",
"User": "AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00c3\u00a8me",
"LogonGuid": "{0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0020E7030000}",
"LogonId": "0x3e7",
"TerminalSessionId": "1",
"IntegrityLevel": "System",
"Hashes": "MD5=D40C84E829922B70D511BB2CC6268D49,SHA256=9A54EE3D6D16D0FE3458B1AE1212F546F94B9E28E5A845D311A04191C724D652",
"ParentProcessGuid": "{0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0010883A0000}",
"ParentProcessId": "476",
"ParentImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe",
"ParentCommandLine": "winlogon.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-05-17 11:53:00",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-05-04 12:06:15",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1639089,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 3484,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "HOSTFOOBAR",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"NewProcessId": "0xf50",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\reg.exe",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
"CommandLine": "\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\reg.exe\" add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\" /v DisableUNCCheck /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f /reg:32",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"ParentProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"MandatoryLabel": "S-1-16-16384",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-05-07 11:48:52",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-08-19 11:37:56",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1454160,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 5632,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-78445",
"SubjectUserName": "USERFOO",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xc2801",
"NewProcessId": "0x138c",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\WINWORD.EXE",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
"CommandLine": "\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\Root\\Office16\\WINWORD.EXE\" /n \"C:\\Users\\USERFOO\\Downloads\\Background for ADI-MSI-DIS June 2010 FR (1).docx\" /o \"\"",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"ParentProcessName": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"MandatoryLabel": "S-1-16-8192",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-08-19 11:40:33",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-28 12:23:17",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 13,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 34819,
"ProcessID": 1436,
"ThreadID": 2860,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Registry value set:\\r\\nRuleName: InvDB\\r\\nEventType: SetValue\\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-10-28 11:23:17.379\\r\\nProcessGuid: {34EA5B98-48E6-5F99-1600-000000000E00}\\r\\nProcessId: 1012\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\\r\\nTargetObject: HKU\\\\S-1-5-21-375581984-207109644-1491462053-1001\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Compatibility Assistant\\\\Store\\\\C:\\\\Program Files\\\\WindowsApps\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftOfficeHub_18.2008.12711.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\LocalBridge.exe\\r\\nDetails: Binary Data",
"Category": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "InvDB",
"UtcTime": "2010-10-28 11:23:17.379",
"ProcessGuid": "{34EA5B98-48E6-5F99-1600-000000000E00}",
"Image": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe",
"TargetObject": "HKU\\\\S-1-5-21-375581984-207109644-1491462053-1001\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\Compatibility Assistant\\\\Store\\\\C:\\\\Program Files\\\\WindowsApps\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftOfficeHub_18.2008.12711.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\LocalBridge.exe",
"Details": "Binary Data",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-28 12:23:19",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-03-02 01:40:47",
"Hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"Keywords": 4611686018427387904,
"EventType": "WARNING",
"SeverityValue": 3,
"Severity": "WARNING",
"EventID": 61,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 0,
"OpcodeValue": 2,
"RecordNumber": 18732,
"ActivityID": "{5B327F5A-B797-4B7E-AB05-11A0E98A15AF}",
"ProcessID": 5796,
"ThreadID": 12472,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3 l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.",
"Opcode": "Arr\u00c3\u00aater",
"transferId": "{5b327f5a-b797-4b7e-ab05-11a0e98a15af}",
"name": "Font Download",
"Id": "{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}",
"url": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
"hr": "2147954402",
"fileTime": "1601-01-01T00:00:00.0000000Z",
"fileLength": "18446744073709551615",
"bytesTotal": "18446744073709551615",
"bytesTransferred": "0",
"peerProtocolFlags": "0",
"bytesTransferredFromPeer": "0",
"AdditionalInfoHr": "0",
"PeerContextInfo": "0",
"bandwidthLimit": "18446744073709551615",
"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan": "false",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-03-02 01:40:48",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-04-01 16:37:06",
"Hostname": "host.foo.local",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4702,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12804,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 393771,
"ActivityID": "{13AB68AE-1C3D-0000-296A-AB133D1CD701}",
"ProcessID": 608,
"ThreadID": 244,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Une t\u00e2che planifi\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 mise \u00e0 jour.\r\n\r\nObjet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom de compte :\t\tSEKADWV01$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tSEKOPOC\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nInformations sur la t\u00e2che :\r\n\tNom de la t\u00e2che : \t\t\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan\r\n\tNouveau contenu de la t\u00e2che : \t\t<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <URI>\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <TimeTrigger>\r\n <StartBoundary>2011-04-15T14:37:06.282Z</StartBoundary>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </TimeTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT10M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>true</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>%systemroot%\\system32\\usoclient.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>StartScan</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\r\n <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n</Task>\r\n\t",
"Category": "Other Object Access Events",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "SEKADWV01$",
"SubjectDomainName": "SEKOPOC",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"TaskName": "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan",
"TaskContentNew": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <URI>\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <TimeTrigger>\r\n <StartBoundary>2011-04-15T14:37:06.282Z</StartBoundary>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </TimeTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT10M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>true</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>%systemroot%\\system32\\usoclient.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>StartScan</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\r\n <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n</Task>",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-04-01 16:37:08",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog3",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-11-16 14:49:29",
"Hostname": "pps-val-app",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4673,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 13056,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 10604999,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 19016,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A privileged service was called.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tPPS-VAL-APP$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nService:\r\n\tServer:\tNT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service\r\n\tService Name:\tLsaRegisterLogonProcess()\r\n\r\nProcess:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t0x7e0\r\n\tProcess Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\n\r\nService Request Information:\r\n\tPrivileges:\t\tSeTcbPrivilege",
"Category": "Sensitive Privilege Use",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "PPS-VAL-APP$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ObjectServer": "NT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service",
"Service": "LsaRegisterLogonProcess()",
"PrivilegeList": "SeTcbPrivilege",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-11-16 14:49:31",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-11-04 16:04:45",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4697,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 0,
"Task": 12289,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1704922,
"ActivityID": "{C92BC79E-B26B-0000-26C8-2BC96BB2D601}",
"ProcessID": 640,
"ThreadID": 8908,
"Channel": "Security",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"ServiceName": "WpnUserService_14bec52",
"Service File Name": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup",
"ServiceType": "0xe0",
"ServiceStartType": "2",
"ServiceAccount": "LocalSystem",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-11-04 16:04:49",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-15 16:52:28",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 10,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 10,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1481365,
"ProcessID": 9628,
"ThreadID": 10352,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Process accessed:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-10-15 14:52:28.536\r\nSourceProcessGUID: {c8188de9-3743-5f84-0000-00100ef00000}\r\nSourceProcessId: 920\r\nSourceThreadId: 1052\r\nSourceImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe\r\nTargetProcessGUID: {c8188de9-3771-5f84-0000-0010443b0900}\r\nTargetProcessId: 4324\r\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\ctfmon.exe\r\nGrantedAccess: 0x1400\r\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+305fe|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+12d8d|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+140cf|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+1435d|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+fc2b|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+1071a|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+17fe|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+31c1f|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+35682|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+fbbeb|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+fbc7f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51",
"Category": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2010-10-15 14:52:28.536",
"SourceProcessGUID": "{c8188de9-3743-5f84-0000-00100ef00000}",
"SourceProcessId": "920",
"SourceThreadId": "1052",
"SourceImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe",
"TargetProcessGUID": "{c8188de9-3771-5f84-0000-0010443b0900}",
"TargetProcessId": "4324",
"TargetImage": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\ctfmon.exe",
"GrantedAccess": "0x1400",
"CallTrace": "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+305fe|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+12d8d|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+140cf|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+1435d|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+fc2b|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+1071a|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+17fe|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+31c1f|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+35682|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+fbbeb|C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxService.exe+fbc7f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-15 16:56:02",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-12-16 16:10:53",
"Hostname": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 11,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 11,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3561,
"ProcessID": 4492,
"ThreadID": 9332,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\ufffdme",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "File created:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 15:10:53.715\r\nProcessGuid: {23AD1E42-B4F1-5C41-0000-001028060400}\r\nProcessId: 2060\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Bin\\ccSvcHst.exe\r\nTargetFilename: C:\\Windows\\Temp\\SymDelta_2060\\content.zip.tmp\\cur.scr\r\nCreationUtcTime: 2019-12-16 15:10:53.715",
"Category": "File created (rule: FileCreate)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2019-12-16 15:10:53.715",
"ProcessGuid": "{23AD1E42-B4F1-5C41-0000-001028060400}",
"Image": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Bin\\ccSvcHst.exe",
"TargetFilename": "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\SymDelta_2060\\content.zip.tmp\\cur.scr",
"CreationUtcTime": "2019-12-16 15:10:53.715",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-12-16 16:10:54",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-12-16 08:10:31",
"Hostname": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 13,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3456,
"ProcessID": 44420,
"ThreadID": 27948,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\ufffdme",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Registry value set:\r\nRuleName: \r\nEventType: SetValue\r\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 07:10:31.795\r\nProcessGuid: {D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\r\nProcessId: 572\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe\r\nTargetObject: HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\nolmhash\r\nDetails: DWORD (0x00000001)",
"Category": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2019-12-16 07:10:31.795",
"ProcessGuid": "{D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe",
"TargetObject": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\nolmhash",
"Details": "DWORD (0x00000001)",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-12-16 08:10:32",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-03-31 15:02:03",
"Hostname": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 13,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 13,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 49665,
"ProcessID": 16532,
"ThreadID": 35536,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Registry value set:\r\nRuleName: T1031,T1050\r\nEventType: SetValue\r\nUtcTime: 2010-03-31 13:02:03.124\r\nProcessGuid: {D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\r\nProcessId: 572\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe\r\nTargetObject: HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\NAVENG\\ImagePath\r\nDetails: \\??\\C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20100330.020\\ENG64.SYS",
"Category": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"RuleName": "T1031,T1050",
"UtcTime": "2010-03-31 13:02:03.124",
"ProcessGuid": "{D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe",
"TargetObject": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\NAVENG\\ImagePath",
"Details": "\\??\\C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20100330.020\\ENG64.SYS",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-03-31 15:02:05",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-05-11 17:36:44",
"Hostname": "PCFOO4019.Comte.local",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 15,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 15,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 111672,
"ProcessID": 5288,
"ThreadID": 6860,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "File stream created:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2011-05-11 15:36:44.305\r\nProcessGuid: {3cb7cf38-a48b-609a-490c-000000002a00}\r\nProcessId: 3768\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe\r\nTargetFilename: C:\\Users\\Pipin_Touque\\Downloads\\HOSTFOO avril 2011_Plan d \u00e9pargne entreprise_1400085 (4).zip:Zone.Identifier\r\nCreationUtcTime: 2011-05-11 15:36:43.452\r\nHash: MD5=C570199C8261A913BBAA5C7D5020498B,SHA256=0454B363C7F09FF5AB778F07DF4F5FA123CC73E950283234717C50066CB62EA7,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000\r\nContents: [ZoneTransfer] ZoneId=3 HostUrl=https://entreprises.interepargne.natixis.com/ ",
"Category": "File stream created (rule: FileCreateStreamHash)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2011-05-11 15:36:44.305",
"ProcessGuid": "{3cb7cf38-a48b-609a-490c-000000002a00}",
"Image": "C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"TargetFilename": "C:\\Users\\Pipin_Touque\\Downloads\\HOSTFOO avril 2011_Plan d \u00e9pargne entreprise_1400085 (4).zip:Zone.Identifier",
"CreationUtcTime": "2011-05-11 15:36:43.452",
"Hash": "MD5=C570199C8261A913BBAA5C7D5020498B,SHA256=0454B363C7F09FF5AB778F07DF4F5FA123CC73E950283234717C50066CB62EA7,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000",
"Contents": "[ZoneTransfer] ZoneId=3 HostUrl=https://entreprises.interepargne.natixis.com/ ",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-05-11 17:36:44",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-07-23 10:38:21",
"Hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 16,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 16,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 6045,
"ProcessID": 12624,
"ThreadID": 4724,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Sysmon config state changed",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2011-07-23 08:38:21.996",
"Configuration": "C:\\Windows\\ccmcache\\1r\\config.xml",
"ConfigurationFileHash": "SHA256=F89C54AE9EEB2BF3810DC3F1B974A4AC56FF013D0A67BBFBB33D217530279740",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-07-23 10:38:23",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-16 12:36:40",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 17,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 17,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1148,
"ProcessID": 8764,
"ThreadID": 2780,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Pipe Created:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nEventType: CreatePipe\r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-16 11:36:40.267\r\nProcessGuid: {FC729081-EDD6-5FD9-3D00-000000000500}\r\nProcessId: 2584\r\nPipeName: \\wkssvc\r\nImage: c:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"Category": "Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2010-12-16 11:36:40.267",
"ProcessGuid": "{FC729081-EDD6-5FD9-3D00-000000000500}",
"PipeName": "\\wkssvc",
"Image": "c:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-16 12:36:42",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-16 12:37:00",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 18,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 18,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1151,
"ProcessID": 8764,
"ThreadID": 2780,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Pipe Connected:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nEventType: ConnectPipe\r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-16 11:37:00.267\r\nProcessGuid: {FC729081-EDDC-5FD9-5800-000000000500}\r\nProcessId: 4032\r\nPipeName: \\wkssvc\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe",
"Category": "Pipe Connected (rule: PipeEvent)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2010-12-16 11:37:00.267",
"ProcessGuid": "{FC729081-EDDC-5FD9-5800-000000000500}",
"PipeName": "\\wkssvc",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-16 12:37:02",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-03-20 11:19:20",
"Hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 1,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 1,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 129451,
"ProcessID": 5044,
"ThreadID": 7472,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Process Create:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2011-03-20 10:19:20.872\r\nProcessGuid: {9beb284d-cc28-6055-3602-000000004900}\r\nProcessId: 2016\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAComClient.exe\r\nFileVersion: 1.1.1.1\r\nDescription: Application IAComClient\r\nProduct: Interact\r\nCompany: Interact Software\r\nOriginalFileName: IAComClient\r\nCommandLine: \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAComClient.exe\"\r\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\\r\nUser: AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00c3\u00a8me\r\nLogonGuid: {9beb284d-c684-6055-e703-000000000000}\r\nLogonId: 0x3E7\r\nTerminalSessionId: 0\r\nIntegrityLevel: System\r\nHashes: MD5=6E2ED6BD7A43497C351551D04AEB6444,SHA256=E721BD7242E4571CDBC7729F54118ABAA806FA309059F21F09829B5275C1A751,IMPHASH=5EB894B14A9A429F917FA1E528B4E86B\r\nParentProcessGuid: {9beb284d-c689-6055-6900-000000004900}\r\nParentProcessId: 4756\r\nParentImage: C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAManager.exe\r\nParentCommandLine: \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAManager.exe\"",
"Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2011-03-20 10:19:20.872",
"ProcessGuid": "{9beb284d-cc28-6055-3602-000000004900}",
"Image": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAComClient.exe",
"FileVersion": "1.1.1.1",
"Description": "Application IAComClient",
"Product": "Interact",
"Company": "Interact Software",
"OriginalFileName": "IAComClient",
"CommandLine": "\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAComClient.exe\"",
"CurrentDirectory": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\",
"User": "AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00c3\u00a8me",
"LogonGuid": "{9beb284d-c684-6055-e703-000000000000}",
"LogonId": "0x3e7",
"TerminalSessionId": "0",
"IntegrityLevel": "System",
"Hashes": "MD5=6E2ED6BD7A43497C351551D04AEB6444,SHA256=E721BD7242E4571CDBC7729F54118ABAA806FA309059F21F09829B5275C1A751,IMPHASH=5EB894B14A9A429F917FA1E528B4E86B",
"ParentProcessGuid": "{9beb284d-c689-6055-6900-000000004900}",
"ParentProcessId": "4756",
"ParentImage": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAManager.exe",
"ParentCommandLine": "\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Interact\\Bin\\IAManager.exe\"",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-03-20 11:19:22",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2023-09-05 12:28:34",
"Hostname": "foo-vm",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 1,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 1,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 13871322,
"ProcessID": 2992,
"ThreadID": 748,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Process Create:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2023-09-05 12:28:34.887\r\nProcessGuid: {178446c4-1ef2-64f7-fa8d-010000001100}\r\nProcessId: 18144\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\SDXHelper.exe\r\nFileVersion: 16.0.16626.20170\r\nDescription: Microsoft Office SDX Helper\r\nProduct: Microsoft Office\r\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\r\nOriginalFileName: SDXHELPER.EXE\r\nCommandLine: \"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\sdxhelper.exe\" /onlogon\r\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\Windows\\system32\\\r\nUser: foo-vm\\adminuser\r\nLogonGuid: {178446c4-8d94-6495-fdfa-190200000000}\r\nLogonId: 0x219FAFD\r\nTerminalSessionId: 2\r\nIntegrityLevel: High\r\nHashes: MD5=F924BBC6FBF646FA0478AEBE5D37504C,SHA256=4494AA7BF1058262F3D2F412B681AF2AF42E34490144FBFD0DB579D966B8FBB6,IMPHASH=0AE5922AFCEF4767754A10F016CD4B30\r\nParentProcessGuid: {178446c4-7a9f-6491-2800-000000001100}\r\nParentProcessId: 1772\r\nParentImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\nParentCommandLine: C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k netsvfoo -p -s Schedule\r\nParentUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2023-09-05 12:28:34.887",
"ProcessGuid": "{178446c4-1ef2-64f7-fa8d-010000001100}",
"Image": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\SDXHelper.exe",
"FileVersion": "16.0.16626.20170",
"Description": "Microsoft Office SDX Helper",
"Product": "Microsoft Office",
"Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"OriginalFileName": "SDXHELPER.EXE",
"CommandLine": "\"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\sdxhelper.exe\" /onlogon",
"CurrentDirectory": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\",
"User": "foo-vm\\adminuser",
"LogonGuid": "{178446c4-8d94-6495-fdfa-190200000000}",
"LogonId": "0x219fafd",
"TerminalSessionId": "2",
"IntegrityLevel": "High",
"Hashes": "MD5=F924BBC6FBF646FA0478AEBE5D37504C,SHA256=4494AA7BF1058262F3D2F412B681AF2AF42E34490144FBFD0DB579D966B8FBB6,IMPHASH=0AE5922AFCEF4767754A10F016CD4B30",
"ParentProcessGuid": "{178446c4-7a9f-6491-2800-000000001100}",
"ParentProcessId": "1772",
"ParentImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"ParentCommandLine": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k netsvfoo -p -s Schedule",
"ParentUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-09-05 12:28:35",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-18 15:57:58",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 20,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 20,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 17336,
"ProcessID": 3140,
"ThreadID": 4420,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "WmiEventConsumer activity detected:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nEventType: WmiConsumerEvent\r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-18 14:57:58.828\r\nOperation: Created\r\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ\r\nName: \"ServiceConsumer\"\r\nType: Log File\r\nDestination: \"C:\\\\Log.log\"",
"Category": "WmiEventConsumer activity detected (rule: WmiEvent)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2010-12-18 14:57:58.828",
"Operation": "Created",
"User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ",
"Name": " \"ServiceConsumer\"",
"Type": "Log File",
"Destination": " \"C:\\\\Log.log\"",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-18 15:58:00",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-02-14 14:50:28",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 22,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 22,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 23609,
"ProcessID": 2556,
"ThreadID": 3448,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\ufffdme",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Dns query:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-02-10 12:10:41.909\r\nProcessGuid: {c8188de9-a5a2-5e46-0000-00104fae7900}\r\nProcessId: 5228\r\nQueryName: login.live.com\r\nQueryStatus: 0\r\nQueryResults: type: 5 login.msa.msidentity.com;type: 5 lgin.msa.trafficmanager.net;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;\r\nImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"Category": "Dns query (rule: DnsQuery)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2010-02-10 12:10:41.909",
"ProcessGuid": "{c8188de9-a5a2-5e46-0000-00104fae7900}",
"QueryName": "login.live.com",
"QueryStatus": "0",
"QueryResults": "type: 5 login.msa.msidentity.com;type: 5 lgin.msa.trafficmanager.net;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;",
"Image": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-02-14 14:50:29",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2011-05-17 13:36:18",
"Hostname": "VM_FOO",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 25,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 25,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 514759,
"ProcessID": 4888,
"ThreadID": 3768,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2011-05-17 13:36:18.525",
"ProcessGuid": "{ab376ee3-7152-60a2-6808-000000001000}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe",
"Type": "Image is replaced",
"EventReceivedTime": "2011-05-17 13:36:19",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2012-09-08 13:12:51",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854776000,
"EventType": "ERROR",
"SeverityValue": 4,
"Severity": "ERROR",
"EventID": 255,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 255,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 320976,
"ProcessID": 2788,
"ThreadID": 4008,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Error report:\r\nUtcTime: 2012-09-08 11:12:51.685\r\nID: DriverCommunication\r\nDescription: Failed to retrieve events - Last error: L'op\u00e9ration d'entr\u00e9e/sortie a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e en raison de l'arr\u00eat d'un thread ou \u00e0 la demande d'une application.\r\n",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2012-09-08 11:12:51.685",
"ID": "DriverCommunication",
"Description": "Failed to retrieve events - Last error: L'op\u00e9ration d'entr\u00e9e/sortie a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e en raison de l'arr\u00eat d'un thread ou \u00e0 la demande d'une application.\r\n",
"EventReceivedTime": "2012-09-08 13:12:53",
"SourceModuleName": "evtx_win",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2019-12-16 08:46:46",
"Hostname": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 3,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 5,
"Task": 3,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3463,
"ProcessID": 4492,
"ThreadID": 8112,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\ufffdme",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Network connection detected:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 07:46:27.307\r\nProcessGuid: {23AD1E42-B4C1-5C41-0000-0010B4020100}\r\nProcessId: 564\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\nUser: AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00e8me\r\nProtocol: udp\r\nInitiated: true\r\nSourceIsIpv6: false\r\nSourceIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nSourceHostname: USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local\r\nSourcePort: 389\r\nSourcePortName: \r\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\r\nDestinationIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nDestinationHostname: \r\nDestinationPort: 1723\r\nDestinationPortName: ",
"Category": "Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2019-12-16 07:46:27.307",
"ProcessGuid": "{23AD1E42-B4C1-5C41-0000-0010B4020100}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"User": "AUTORITE NT\\Syst\u00e8me",
"Protocol": "udp",
"Initiated": "true",
"SourceIsIpv6": "false",
"SourceIp": "1.1.1.1",
"SourceHostname": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local",
"SourcePort": "389",
"DestinationIsIpv6": "false",
"DestinationIp": "1.1.1.1",
"DestinationPort": "1723",
"EventReceivedTime": "2019-12-16 08:46:47",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-10-09 03:03:03",
"Hostname": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 6,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 6,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 82505,
"ProcessID": 2456,
"ThreadID": 3548,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Driver loaded:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-10-09 01:03:03.880\r\nImageLoaded: C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20101008.007\\eng64.sys\r\nHashes: MD5=BE2D7ADB437EB7C9607D60F481729C1F,SHA256=873E305A5BBCC47D0729B4E015F8C06BFF8E381F4A115B0CC8A9961A236B18B2,IMPHASH=48152BC64CB1EA5E4592C852D8BAC3FD\r\nSigned: true\r\nSignature: Symantec Corporation\r\nSignatureStatus: Valid",
"Category": "Driver loaded (rule: DriverLoad)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2010-10-09 01:03:03.880",
"ImageLoaded": "C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20101008.007\\eng64.sys",
"Hashes": "MD5=BE2D7ADB437EB7C9607D60F481729C1F,SHA256=873E305A5BBCC47D0729B4E015F8C06BFF8E381F4A115B0CC8A9961A236B18B2,IMPHASH=48152BC64CB1EA5E4592C852D8BAC3FD",
"Signed": "true",
"Signature": "Symantec Corporation",
"SignatureStatus": "Valid",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-10-09 03:03:05",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-08 14:12:27",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 7,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 3,
"Task": 7,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3035010,
"ProcessID": 10164,
"ThreadID": 5408,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "Image loaded:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-08 13:12:27.356\r\nProcessGuid: {c8188de9-7bbb-5fcf-0000-0010f7277203}\r\nProcessId: 10540\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_16005.13228.41011.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\HxTsr.exe\r\nImageLoaded: C:\\Windows\\System32\\bcryptprimitives.dll\r\nFileVersion: 10.0.18362.836 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\r\nDescription: Windows Cryptographic Primitives Library\r\nProduct: Microsoft\u00c2\u00ae Windows\u00c2\u00ae Operating System\r\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\r\nOriginalFileName: bcryptprimitives.dll\r\nHashes: MD5=EF2BBEAFF07D32A2EC77FB4602FA9664,SHA256=6B47F3E88CDEDF8F31F91940E38A4544818C79D153323262F9F46B21F41D262C\r\nSigned: true\r\nSignature: Microsoft Windows\r\nSignatureStatus: Valid",
"Category": "Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2010-12-08 13:12:27.356",
"ProcessGuid": "{c8188de9-7bbb-5fcf-0000-0010f7277203}",
"Image": "C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_16005.13228.41011.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\HxTsr.exe",
"ImageLoaded": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\bcryptprimitives.dll",
"FileVersion": "10.0.18362.836 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"Description": "Windows Cryptographic Primitives Library",
"Product": "Microsoft\u00c2\u00ae Windows\u00c2\u00ae Operating System",
"Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"OriginalFileName": "bcryptprimitives.dll",
"Hashes": "MD5=EF2BBEAFF07D32A2EC77FB4602FA9664,SHA256=6B47F3E88CDEDF8F31F91940E38A4544818C79D153323262F9F46B21F41D262C",
"Signed": "true",
"Signature": "Microsoft Windows",
"SignatureStatus": "Valid",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-08 14:20:43",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-11 16:45:08",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 8,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 8,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 3697557,
"ProcessID": 9520,
"ThreadID": 10704,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "CreateRemoteThread detected:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-11 15:45:08.062\r\nSourceProcessGuid: {c8188de9-704e-5fcf-0000-001073ed4903}\r\nSourceProcessId: 9808\r\nSourceImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxTray.exe\r\nTargetProcessGuid: {c8188de9-702f-5fcf-0000-00101b084403}\r\nTargetProcessId: 10576\r\nTargetImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe\r\nNewThreadId: 9368\r\nStartAddress: 0xFFFFCFBA48C52460\r\nStartModule: C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll\r\nStartFunction: LoadLibraryA",
"Category": "CreateRemoteThread detected (rule: CreateRemoteThread)",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"UtcTime": "2010-12-11 15:45:08.062",
"SourceProcessGuid": "{c8188de9-704e-5fcf-0000-001073ed4903}",
"SourceProcessId": "9808",
"SourceImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxTray.exe",
"TargetProcessGuid": "{c8188de9-702f-5fcf-0000-00101b084403}",
"TargetProcessId": "10576",
"TargetImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe",
"NewThreadId": "9368",
"StartAddress": "0xFFFFCFBA48C52460",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-11 16:52:15",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-12-17 15:52:55",
"Hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"Keywords": -9223372036854775808,
"EventType": "INFO",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 9,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Version": 2,
"Task": 9,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 4797,
"ProcessID": 2704,
"ThreadID": 3916,
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"UserID": "S-1-5-18",
"AccountType": "User",
"Message": "RawAccessRead detected:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-17 14:52:55.449\r\nProcessGuid: {FC729081-70A2-5FDB-6701-000000000600}\r\nProcessId: 6428\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe\r\nDevice: \\Device\\HarddiskVolume1",
"Category": "RawAccessRead detected (rule: RawAccessRead)",
"Opcode": "Info",
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2010-12-17 14:52:55.449",
"ProcessGuid": "{FC729081-70A2-5FDB-6701-000000000600}",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe",
"Device": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume1",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-12-17 15:52:56",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog4",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-07-29 15:24:16",
"HOSTNAME": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1284656143,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 92,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "Un nouveau processus a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9.\r\n\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tUSERNAME01$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tACT\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x3e7\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du nouveau processus :\t\t0x32b4\r\n\tNom du nouveau processus :\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\qwinsta.exe\r\n\tType d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation du jeton :\tType d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation de jeton par d\u00e9faut (1)\r\n\tID du processus cr\u00e9ateur :\t0x2748\r\n\tLigne de commande de processus :\t\r\n\r\nLe type d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation du jeton indique le type de jeton qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 attribu\u00e9 au nouveau processus conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur.\r\n\r\nLe type 1 est un jeton complet sans aucun privil\u00e8ge supprim\u00e9 ni aucun groupe d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9. Un jeton complet est uniquement utilis\u00e9 si le contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur est d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9, ou si l\u2019utilisateur est le compte d\u2019administrateur int\u00e9gr\u00e9 ou un compte de service.\r\n\r\nLe type 2 est un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s sans aucun privil\u00e8ge supprim\u00e9 ni aucun groupe d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9. Un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s est utilis\u00e9 lorsque le contr\u00f4le de compte d\u2019utilisateur est activ\u00e9 et que l\u2019utilisateur choisit de d\u00e9marrer le programme en tant qu\u2019administrateur. Un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s est \u00e9galement utilis\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une application est configur\u00e9e pour toujours exiger un privil\u00e8ge administratif ou pour toujours exiger les privil\u00e8ges maximum, et que l\u2019utilisateur est membre du groupe Administrateurs.\r\n\r\nLe type 3 est un jeton limit\u00e9 dont les privil\u00e8ges administratifs sont supprim\u00e9s et les groupes administratifs d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9s. Le jeton limit\u00e9 est utilis\u00e9 lorsque le contr\u00f4le de compte d\u2019 utilisateur est activ\u00e9, que l\u2019application n\u2019exige pas le privil\u00e8ge administratif et que l\u2019utilisateur ne choisit pas de d\u00e9marrer le programme en tant qu\u2019administrateur.",
"Category": "Cr\u00e9ation du processus",
"Opcode": "Informations",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "USERNAME01$",
"SubjectDomainName": "ACT",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"NewProcessId": "0x32b4",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\qwinsta.exe",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-07-29 15:24:18",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog3",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
{
"EventTime": "2010-08-05 16:21:20",
"Hostname": "V-FOO",
"Keywords": -9214364837600034816,
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"SeverityValue": 2,
"Severity": "INFO",
"EventID": 4688,
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Version": 1,
"Task": 13312,
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"RecordNumber": 1132084818,
"ProcessID": 4,
"ThreadID": 88,
"Channel": "Security",
"Message": "A new process has been created.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3e7\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tNew Process ID:\t\t0x111c\r\n\tNew Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe\r\n\tToken Elevation Type:\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\r\n\tCreator Process ID:\t0x204\r\n\tProcess Command Line:\t\r\n\r\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\r\n\r\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\r\n\r\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\r\n\r\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.",
"Category": "Process Creation",
"Opcode": "Info",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"NewProcessId": "0x111c",
"NewProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe",
"TokenElevationType": "%%1936",
"EventReceivedTime": "2010-08-05 16:21:21",
"SourceModuleName": "in",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
:{
"EventTime": "2023-09-19 12:02:19",
"Hostname": "mycorp.net",
"EventReceivedTime": "2023-09-19 12:02:20",
"SourceModuleName": "eventlog",
"SourceModuleType": "im_msvistalog"
}
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Windows. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Windows on ATT&CK Navigator
ACLight Discovering Privileged Accounts
Detects use of ACLight tool. This tool aims to discover privileged accounts by scanning the network.
- Effort: advanced
AD Object WriteDAC Access
Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object. This requires Windows Event ID 4662.
- Effort: advanced
AD Privileged Users Or Groups Reconnaissance
Detect privileged users or groups reconnaissance based on 4661 Event ID and known privileged users or groups SIDs. If the user account name is not a known admin it is suspicious.
- Effort: master
AD User Enumeration
Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account. This requires Windows Security Event ID 4662 and could be triggered by some administrators configuring new users.
- Effort: master
AMSI Deactivation Using Registry Key
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable the AMSI provider by deleting the associated registry key.
- Effort: master
APT29 Fake Google Update Service Install
This method detects malicious services mentioned in APT29 report by FireEye. The legitimate path for the Google update service is C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe so the service names and executable locations used by APT29 are specific enough to be detected in log files.
- Effort: elementary
Abusing Azure Browser SSO
Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll
Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.
- Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons
This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.
- Effort: advanced
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
Active Directory Database Dump Via Ntdsutil
Detects the dump of ntdis.dit database by using the utility ntdsutil.exe. NTDS.dit database stores Active Directory data, including passwords hashes for all users in the domain.
- Effort: elementary
Active Directory Delegate To KRBTGT Service
Detects potential persistence installation from an already compromised administrator domain account. The attacker will create a TGT and abuse a service account with the constrained delegation and update it with the krbtgt service. The detection relies on the Event ID 4738.
- Effort: intermediate
Active Directory Replication User Backdoor
Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to regular user or machine account, this technics is often used to give ResetPassword or WriteMembers or DCSync permission(s) for persistency on a domain.
- Effort: intermediate
Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account
Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. It requires a configuration step where the legit service account should be added to the exclusion list.
- Effort: advanced
Active Directory Shadow Credentials
Detects alternative credentials material adding. Attackers can abuse msDS-KeyCredentialLink and create a key pair to obtain a persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer.
- Effort: elementary
Active Directory User Backdoors
Detects scenarios where the attacker controls another user or computer account without having to use their credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group
Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system.
- Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Admin Share Access
Detects access to $ADMIN share. The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure. Also be very cautious to previously check if this is not commonly used by your administrators as to remotely manage your computers.
- Effort: master
Admin User RDP Remote Logon
Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.
- Effort: master
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config
- Effort: advanced
Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).
- Effort: elementary
Antivirus Password Dumper Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This detection relies on Windows Defender events logs. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).
- Effort: elementary
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This is only based on Windows Defender events.
- Effort: intermediate
Antivirus Web Shell Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. This is based on Windows Defender logs (Event ID 1116 and 1117).
- Effort: elementary
Aspnet Compiler
Detects the starts of aspnet compiler.
- Effort: advanced
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
Audit CVE Event
Detects events generated by Windows to indicate the exploitation of a known vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.
- Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line
Detects use of azureedge in the command line.
- Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
Backup Catalog Deleted
The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.
- Effort: intermediate
Bazar Loader DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)
Detects Bazar Loader domains based on the Bazar Loader DGA
- Effort: elementary
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
Burp Suite Tool Detected
Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).
- Effort: intermediate
CMSTP Execution
Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution
- Effort: intermediate
CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access
Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects
- Effort: intermediate
COM Hijack Via Sdclt
Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute', to bypass UAC using 'sdclt.exe'.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE 2022-1292
The c_rehash script does not properly sanitise shell metacharacters to prevent command injection. This script is distributed by some operating systems in a manner where it is automatically executed. On such operating systems, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the script.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
CVE-2019-0708 Scan
Detects the use of a scanner that discovers targets vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE
Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access
Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read
Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability
Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe
Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality
- Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Chafer (APT 39) Activity
Detects previous Chafer (APT 39) activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Check Point Harmony Mobile Application Forbidden
Detects when someone attempts to access/use a forbidden application.
- Effort: master
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Cmd.exe Used To Run Reconnaissance Commands
Detects command lines with suspicious args
- Effort: advanced
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon
Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Service Creation Usage
Detects Cobalt Strike usage from an existing beacon when attacker tries to elevate or move laterally through a service creation.
- Effort: elementary
Cobalt Strike Named Pipes
Detects the pipes established by Cobalt Strike to allow a communication between its beacons.
- Effort: master
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking
Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.
- Effort: advanced
Compress Data for Exfiltration via Archiver
Detects data compressed by specific tools.
- Effort: master
Compression Followed By Suppression
Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.
- Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted
Detects computer account deletion.
- Effort: master
Container Credential Access
Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Cookies Deletion
Detects when cookies are deleted by a suspicious process.
- Effort: master
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable
A script has copied a System32 executable.
- Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data
Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Impacket Smbexec
This rule detects the execution of smbexec via the relevant share pattern name
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Internal Kerberos Password Spraying
Detect multiple Kerberos authentication failed on several account from one source
- Effort: master
Correlation Internal Ntlm Password Spraying
Detect multiple NTLM authentication failed on several account from one source
- Effort: master
Correlation Multi Service Disable
The rule detects a high number of services stopped or de-activated in a short period of time.
- Effort: master
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Correlation Supicious Powershell Drop and Exec
Detects a PowerShell process that download and exec a payload
- Effort: intermediate
Correlation Suspicious Authentication Coercer Behavior
Detect a possible NTLM Relay attack combine with authent coerce
- Effort: intermediate
Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing
Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls
- Effort: intermediate
Creation or Modification of a GPO Scheduled Task
Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Credential Dumping By LaZagne
Detects LSASS process access by LaZagne for credential dumping.
- Effort: elementary
Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dumping-Tools Common Named Pipes
Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipes. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config
- Effort: master
Credential Harvesting Via Vaultcmd.exe
Detects when the process vaultcmd is used for credential harvesting.
- Effort: advanced
Credentials Extraction
This rule aims to detect the use of a specific command to access some credentials without using mimikatz or another tool.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
Csrss Child Found
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Csrss Wrong Parent
The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
DC Shadow via Service Principal Name (SPN) creation
Detects DCShadow via new Service Principal Name (SPN) creation
- Effort: intermediate
DCSync Attack
Detects DCSync attack, it is highly likely that the post-exploitation tool Mimikatz was executed.
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Callout DLL Installation
Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL
This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.
- Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL
This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.
- Effort: intermediate
DLL Load via LSASS Registry Key
Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events. This can be done with Sysmon events 12, 13 and 14 and monitor SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Query For Iplookup
Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.
- Effort: master
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL
This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.
- Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation
Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
DNS Tunnel Technique From MuddyWater
Detecting DNS Tunnel Activity For Muddywater intrusion set. This is the loading of a specific DLL from an Excel macro which is detected.
- Effort: elementary
DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction
Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers
- Effort: intermediate
Data Compressed With Rar
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Denied Access To Remote Desktop
Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.
- Effort: intermediate
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers
This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.
- Effort: elementary
Detection of default Mimikatz banner
Detection of default Mimikatz banner in powershell events
- Effort: intermediate
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled
Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt
Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events for this specific registry key is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disable Windows Defender Credential Guard
Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Workstation Lock
Registry change in order to disable the ability to lock the computer by using CTRL+ALT+DELETE or CTRL+L. This registry key does not exist by default. Its creation is suspicious and the value set to "1" means an activation. It has been used by FatalRAT, but other attacker/malware could probably use it. This rule needs Windows Registry changes (add,modification,deletion) logging which can be done through Sysmon Event IDs 12,13,14.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Disabling SmartScreen Via Registry
Detects when a user disables smartscreen.
- Effort: elementary
Discord Suspicious Download
Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Discovery Commands Correlation
Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.
- Effort: intermediate
Dism Disabling Windows Defender
Detects windows defender disabled by dism.
- Effort: advanced
Dllhost Wrong Parent
Dllhost.exe is a process belonging to Microsoft Windows Operating System. The dllhost.exe file manages DLL based applications. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Docker Escape Bind Mount
Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot
- Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration
Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Download Files From Non-Legitimate TLDs
Detects file downloads from non-legitimate TLDs. Additional legitimates TLDs should be filtered according to the business habits.
- Effort: master
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
- Effort: master
Dumpert LSASS Process Dumper
Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory
- Effort: elementary
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: master
Dynwrapx Module Loading
Detects the loading of DynamicWrapperX (Dynwrapx). It is used by some malware in their infection chain and could help to detect its usage from vbs/wscript/cscript scripts. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 7).
- Effort: advanced
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor
Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom
- Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity
Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity
- Effort: elementary
Enabling Restricted Admin Mode
Detects when the restricted admin mode is enabled.
- Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History
Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history.
- Effort: advanced
Eventlog Cleared
Some threat groups tend to delete local EventLogs (Security being the most common one to be deleted) using certain utilities. The EventID 517 is old and 1102 should be used for this instead on newer Windows versions.
- Effort: intermediate
EvilProxy Phishing Domain
Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Mailbox Export
Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file, from command line or PowerShell script.
- Effort: intermediate
Exchange Server Spawning Suspicious Processes
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service spawning suspicious sub-processes, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability.
- Effort: intermediate
Execution From Suspicious Folder
Detects a suspicious execution from an uncommon folder
- Effort: master
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp
Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.
- Effort: advanced
Exploit For CVE-2015-1641
Detects Winword process starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
- Effort: elementary
Exploit For CVE-2017-0261 Or CVE-2017-0262
Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262 through command line or PowerShell script. This is a very basic detection method relying on the rare usage of EPS files from Winword.
- Effort: advanced
Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine
Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189.
- Effort: elementary
Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
Detects exploitation attempts of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378.
- Effort: intermediate
Explorer Process Executing HTA File
Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.
- Effort: intermediate
External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device
Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB device.
- Effort: advanced
FLTMC command usage
Detects the use of fltmc to list and load/unload a filter driver.
- Effort: advanced
Fail2ban Unban IP
An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.
- Effort: advanced
File Or Folder Permissions Modifications
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.
- Effort: master
FlowCloud Malware
Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410. This requires Windows Event registry logging.
- Effort: elementary
FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading
Detects DLL image load activity as used by the threat group NOBELIUM with the FoggyWeb backdoor loader. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done through the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
Formbook File Creation DB1
Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.
- Effort: intermediate
Formbook Hijacked Process Command
Detects process hijacked by Formbook malware which executes specific commands to delete the dropper or copy browser credentials to the database before sending them to the C2.
- Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line
Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.
- Effort: master
GPO Executable Delivery
Detects MSI binaries run through GPOs.
- Effort: intermediate
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
GitLab CVE-2021-22205
Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.
- Effort: intermediate
Gpresult Usage
Detects when an account uses gpresult to get information on gpo.
- Effort: advanced
Gpscript Suspicious Parent
Gpscript defines GPO scripts for users and applies them to login / logout sessions. This rule checks if the parent of this process is the supposed one (svchost) or not.
- Effort: intermediate
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility
Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.
- Effort: intermediate
HTA Infection Chains
Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).
- Effort: intermediate
HTML Smuggling Suspicious Usage
Based on several samples from different botnets, this rule aims at detecting HTML infection chain by looking for HTML created files followed by suspicious files being executed.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
HarfangLab EDR Critical Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a critical level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Critical Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a critical level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR High Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a high level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR High Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a high level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Hlai Engine Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on its hlai engine
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Low Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a low level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Low Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a low level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Medium Level Rule Detection
HarfangLab EDR has raised an alert based on a medium level rule (not using hlai engine)
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Medium Threat
HarfangLab EDR detected a threat with a medium level. This detection by the EDR is based on several detection rules.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Process Execution Blocked (HL-AI engine)
HarfangLab EDR's machine learning malware detection module (HL-AI) has detected a suspicious binary and blocked its execution. To know more on what caused this alert, you should check the value of the process name and the concerned computer and user.
- Effort: master
HarfangLab EDR Suspicious Process Behavior Has Been Detected
HarfangLab EDR has detected a suspicious process behavior based on its detection rule. Check the rule name and description for more information.
- Effort: master
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe
Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
- Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
ISO LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.
- Effort: intermediate
IcedID Execution Using Excel
Detects Excel spawning a process (rundll32 or wmic) running suspicious command-line. This behaviour could correspond to IcedID activity.
- Effort: elementary
Impacket Addcomputer
Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern
- Effort: intermediate
Impacket Secretsdump.py Tool
Detects credential dumping via secretdump of impacket suite.
- Effort: intermediate
Impacket Wmiexec Module
Detection of impacket's wmiexec example, used by attackers to execute commands remotely.
- Effort: elementary
In-memory PowerShell
Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's "load powershell" extension and tool such PowerShDll.
- Effort: master
Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs
Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.
- Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python
Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.
- Effort: advanced
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets
Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.
- Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Kerberos Pre-Auth Disabled in UAC
The rule identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication
- Effort: elementary
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command
Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module
- Effort: intermediate
LSASS Access From Non System Account
Detects LSASS Access from Non System Account (e.g. Mimikatz)
- Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump
Detects process accessing LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools. The rule requires Sysmon EventID 10 to work as it is based on the GrantedAccess mask.
- Effort: master
LSASS Memory Dump File Creation
LSASS memory dump creation using operating systems utilities. Procdump will use process name in output file if no name is specified.
- Effort: intermediate
LanManServer Registry Modify
Detects when the LanManServer registry sub-key MaxMpxCt is modified. An attacker can modified this value to increase the maximum number of outstanding client requests supported.
- Effort: elementary
Lateral Movement Remote Named Pipe
Detects lateral movement and remote exec using named pipe over network. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share enable policy.
- Effort: advanced
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder
Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.
- Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute
Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload
Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Nohup Exec
Detects suspicious usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search
Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems
- Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: advanced
Load Of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL From Suspicious Process
Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes. Many tools import dbghelp.dll and / or dbgcore.dll to use the MiniDumpWriteDump function. As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine. Dumpert from OUTFLANK also uses this.
- Effort: advanced
Login Brute-Force Successful On SentinelOne EDR Management Console
A user has attempted to login several times (brute-force) on the SentinelOne EDR Management Console and succeeded to login.
- Effort: master
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)
Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: advanced
Logonui Wrong Parent
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It doesn't only make it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Lsass Access Through WinRM
Detects the access of LSASS.exe process through Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol. This is often done using Invoke-Mimikatz -ComputerName command, which uses PSRemoting and therefore WinRM. However, this is not limited to the Mimikatz threat and can be done by other tools as well. This rule needs Process Access monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's event ID 10.
- Effort: intermediate
Lsass Wrong Parent
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This rule checks if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
MMC Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC process
- Effort: intermediate
MMC20 Lateral Movement
Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe.
- Effort: intermediate
MOFComp Execution
Detects rare usage of the Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler on Microsoft Windows. This could be abused by some attackers to load WMI classes.
- Effort: intermediate
MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir
Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio. This is a common technique used by attackers with documents embedding macros. It requires Windows command line logging events.
- Effort: master
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
Malicious Named Pipe
Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known malware. Prerequisites are logging for PipeEvents in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and 18).
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
- Effort: advanced
Malicious Service Installations
Generic and known malicious service installation that appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping and other suspicious activity. It detects the use of PAExec, Wannacry commonly used malicious service, APT29 known malicious service name and net user service file name which is known as a sign of persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL
Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).
- Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key
Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.
- Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Metasploit PSExec Service Creation
Detects Metasploit service creation when using the PSExec module. The ImagePath here is usually a malicious command line using powershell.exe and/or cmd.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration Changed
Detects when an feature configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (enabling or disabling real-time protection, etc.)
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable SecurityHealth
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender SecurityHealth through command line, PowerShell scripts, and registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is recommended.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Configuration
Detects when an exclusion configuration change is made to Microsoft Windows Defender (adding either a path or process bypass)
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Deleted
Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Tampering Detected
Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Threat Detected
Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft IIS Module Installation
Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.
- Effort: advanced
Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash
Detects a crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine process (MsMpEng.exe), which is suspicious and could be related to an attacker disabling the Windows protection.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell
Detects a Windows command or scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Office Spawning Script
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) spawning wscript.exe or cscript.exe. This typically indicates the parent process launched a malicious macro, or run an exploit. This infection vector is very common and could lead to the deployment of harmful malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Startup Add-In
Detects add-ins that load when Microsoft Word or Excel starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel). The rule requires File Creation logging to work, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Windows Active Directory Module Commandlets
Detects use of commandlets linked to the AD Module.
- Effort: advanced
Mimikatz Basic Commands
Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.
- Effort: elementary
Mimikatz LSASS Memory Access
Detection of in-memory Mimikatz by focusing on processes opening the Local Security Authority (Lsass.exe) process and reading the memory contents of it. This probably means that Mimikatz has been executed on the host, meaning the attacker already has high privileges and is looking to dump credentials, most likely for lateral movement or privilege escalation purposes. The rule requires Sysmon EventID 10 to work as it is based on the GrantedAccess mask.
- Effort: advanced
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution
Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution
Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.
- Effort: elementary
Mshta Suspicious Child Process
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell
- Effort: intermediate
Mustang Panda Dropper
Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
Narrator Feedback-Hub Persistence
The Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub registry key has been modified which could be done by an attacker for persistence purposes. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13). Careful since the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon's configuration needs to be changed to log for this specifically.
- Effort: master
Net.exe User Account Creation
Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command
- Effort: master
NetNTLM Downgrade Attack
Detects changes in Windows Registry key (LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec or RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) which can lead to NetNTLM downgrade attack. The rule requires to log registry keys creation or update, it can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: intermediate
Netscan Share Access Artefact
Detects netscan artefact on windows network share - indicate network share discovery.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command
Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).
- Effort: master
Netsh Program Allowed With Suspicious Location
Detects Netsh commands that allow a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall, seen on kasidet worm. Last part of the existing rule (commandline startwith) was not added to this rule because it is not relevant.
- Effort: advanced
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening
Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Connection Via Certutil
Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Share Discovery
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.
- Effort: master
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
New Or Renamed User Account With '$' In Attribute 'SamAccountName'
Detects possible bypass EDR and SIEM via abnormal user account name.
- Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service from command line
- Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent
Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values
Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: advanced
OceanLotus Registry Activity
Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attack. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Office Application Startup Office Test
Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
- Effort: elementary
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process
In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.
- Effort: advanced
Openfiles Usage
Detects when the command openfiles, to get information on files opened remotely, is used.
- Effort: advanced
Opening Of a Password File
Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.
- Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Password Dumper Activity On LSASS
Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic
Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.
- Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading
Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.
- Effort: elementary
Phosphorus (APT35) Exchange Discovery
According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about its the environment of compromised Microsoft Exchange servers. The command is the following: Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders
- Effort: elementary
Phosphorus Domain Controller Discovery
According to the Miscosoft's report, the group Phosphorus (part of APT35) uses a specific PowerShell command to collect information about the Domain Controller. The command is the following: "powershell.exe" /c Get-WMIObject Win32_NTDomain | findstr DomainController
- Effort: intermediate
Possible Malicious File Double Extension
Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension
- Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: intermediate
Possible RottenPotato Attack
Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack leveraging RottenPotato.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)
Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents
Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent
- Effort: elementary
Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent
Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".
- Effort: elementary
Potential RDP Connection To Non-Domain Host
Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain using RDP (TermSrv). Event ID 8001 corresponds to outgoing NTLM authentication traffic and TermSrv stands for RDP Terminal Services Server. Check if the contacted host is legitimate. To use this detection rule, enable logging of outbound NTLM authentications on all domain controllers, using the following Group Policy (GPO) - Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers -> Define this policy setting: Audit all.
- Effort: master
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation
Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Credential Prompt
Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt (using PromptForCredential), like $Credential = $host.ui.PromptForCredential("Need credentials", "Please enter your user name and password.", "", "NetBiosUserName"). The same result can be obtained by using the Get-Credential function but detecting it will trigger a lot of FP.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed
Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Downgrade Attack
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
- Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL
Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32
Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious PowerShell Commandlets
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks (PowerSploit...).
- Effort: master
PowerShell NTFS Alternate Data Stream
Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from PowerShell. Needs Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104)
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass
This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request
Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell Winlogon Helper DLL
Detects modifications to the Winlogon Registry keys, which may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.
- Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
Privileged AD Builtin Group Modified
Detects changes to privileged AD builtin groups in Active Directory that could indicate malicious or unexpected administrative activity. This detection rule detects changes on specific groups that are Administrators (S-1-5--500), Domain Admins (S-1-5--512), Enterprise Admins (S-1-5--519), Schema Admins (S-1-5--518), Account Operators (S-1-5-32-548) and Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551).
- Effort: master
Process Herpaderping
Detection of process herpaderping using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been locked for access. Several processes have been excluded to avoid FPs.
- Effort: master
Process Hollowing Detection
Detection of process hollowing using Sysmon Event ID 25. It detects that an image has been replaced in a process memory.
- Effort: master
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump
Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
Protected Storage Service Access
Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. It could identify potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers.
- Effort: master
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths
Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Putty Sessions Listing
Detects attempts to list Putty sessions through registry. To fully work, this rule requires to log registry accesses, which can be done with the Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 but for that specific configuration is needed.
- Effort: master
Python Exfiltration Tools
Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Python Opening Ports
Detects when the Windows Filtering Platform has permitted Python.exe to listen on a port for incoming connections. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: advanced
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Configuration File From Mail Process
Detects RDP configuration file being created or executed by a Mail-related process like Outlook. RDP configuration file will allow, when opened, an user to connect to the configured server easily. Attackers use this to trick victims in order to get a shared drive and potentially retrieve the data from that drive, but also drop a malicious file on the drive to establish persistence. Using RDP can also expose the victim's credential and clipboard data on some cases.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Login From Localhost
Detects RDP login from localhost source address, which may be a tunnelled login to bypass network restrictions.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Port Change Using Powershell
Detects RDP port configuration change using a PowerShell command such as 'Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name PortNumber -Value XXX Restart-Service termservice -force'. Threat actors can change RDP to another port to bypass protections, avoid detection based on the port, or to take full control of the system.
- Effort: intermediate
RDP Sensitive Settings Changed
Detects changes to RDP terminal service sensitive settings. Logging for registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification
Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
RUN Registry Key Created From Suspicious Folder
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL
Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.
- Effort: elementary
Rare Logonui Child Found
Logonui.exe is a file associated with the Logon user interface. The login user interface is an essential part of the Windows operating system. It not only makes it easy for the user to log in to the PC but also determines whether the user has logged in and logged out correctly and makes it easy to switch between users. This process could create a child process but it is very rare and could be a signal of some process injection.
- Effort: advanced
Rare Lsass Child Found
Lsass ensures the identification of users (domain users or local users). Domain users are identified based on information in the Active Directory. Local users are identified based on information from the Security Account Manager (SAM) local database. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
Rebooting
Detects when forcing a computer to shutdown.
- Effort: master
Reconnaissance Commands Activities
Based on Cynet, Microsoft and Kaspersky analysis of Qakbot, this rule tries to detect some discovery TTPs.
- Effort: intermediate
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Dropped File
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook
- Effort: elementary
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Registry Checked For Lanmanserver DisableCompression Parameter
Detects registry access for Lanmanserver\Parameters. The check of the value DisableCompression could be a sign of an attack trying to exploit SMBGhost vulnerability (CVE-2020-0796).
- Effort: master
Registry Key Used By Some Old Agent Tesla Samples
Detects potential use of the RUN registry key to execute some Agent Tesla samples at boot. Prerequisites are to log for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Registry Persistence Using 'Image File Execution' And 'SilentProcessExit' Keys
Detects persistence registry keys. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Enumeration Of Lateral Movement Groups
Detects remote session lists the member of four local groups relevant to lateral movement. This behavior is common in Active Directory mapping tools such as SharpHound.
- Effort: intermediate
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
Remote Privileged Group Enumeration
Detects remote listing of local privileged group. Potential false positives, which should justify alert filters, are service accounts and administrators doing maintenance.
- Effort: advanced
Remote Registry Management Using Reg Utility
Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation. This requires Windows Security events logging.
- Effort: master
Remote Service Activity Via SVCCTL Named Pipe
Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe
- Effort: master
Remote System Discovery Via Telnet
Detects use of the protocol telnet to access information.
- Effort: advanced
Remote Task Creation Via ATSVC Named Pipe
Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC Named Pipe. This requires Windows Security event logging with the File Share policy.
- Effort: intermediate
Rubeus Register New Logon Process
Detects potential use of Rubeus through registering a new logon process. This rule needs the EventID 4611, which can be configured through Group Policies (Audit Security System Extension)
- Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SAM Registry Hive Handle Request
Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive
- Effort: advanced
SCM Database Handle Failure
Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.
- Effort: master
SCM Database Privileged Operation
Detects non-system users performing privileged operation on the SCM database
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
STRRAT Scheduled Task
Detect STRRAT when it achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task. STRRAT is a Java-based stealer and remote backdoor, it establishes persistence using this specific command line: 'cmd /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 30 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\SAMPLENAME.jar"'
- Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges
Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.
- Effort: elementary
Schtasks Suspicious Parent
Detects schtasks started from suspicious and/or unusual processes.
- Effort: intermediate
Screenconnect Remote Execution
Detect cmd or powershell remote execution cmdline via ScreenConnect
- Effort: intermediate
SeEnableDelagationPrivilege Granted To User Or Machine In Active Directory
Detects the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory granted to a user of a computer, it would allow control of other AD user objects
- Effort: elementary
Searchindexer Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Indexer was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Indexer is the Windows service that handles indexing of your files for Windows Search.
- Effort: master
Searchprotocolhost Child Found
SearchProtocolHost.exe is part of the Windows Indexing Service, an application that indexes files from the local drive making them easier to search. This is a crucial part of the Windows operating system. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: intermediate
Searchprotocolhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Search Protocol Host process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Search Protocol Host is part of the Windows Indexing Service, a service indexing files on the local drive making them easier to search.
- Effort: master
Secure Deletion With SDelete
Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool. SDelete is a tool that permits to securely delete files by overwriting them (no recovery possible). Few threat actors are using it to delete traces of their malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration
Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. This is commonly used for persistence. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. Logging for Registry events is needed for this rule to work (this can be done through Sysmon EventIDs 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Shadow Copies
Detects command line used to create and list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).
- Effort: master
Sliver DNS Beaconing
Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Sliver beaconing
- Effort: intermediate
Smbexec.py Service Installation
Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation
- Effort: elementary
Smss Wrong Parent
Detects if the Smss process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Session Manager Subsystem (smss) process is a component of the Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems.
- Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Wrong Child Process
Detects SolarWinds process starting an unusual child process. Process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe and solarwinds.businesslayerhostx64.exe created an unexepected child process which doesn't correspond to the legitimate ones.
- Effort: intermediate
Spoolsv Wrong Parent
Detects if the Spoolsv process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Printer Spooler Service (Spoolsv) process is responsible for managing spooled print/fax jobs.
- Effort: master
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
SquirrelWaffle Malspam Execution Loading DLL
Detects cscript running suspicious command to load a DLL. This behavior has been detected in SquirrelWaffle campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events, which can be done with Sysmon (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
StoneDrill Service Install
This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky
- Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services
Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: master
Successful Brute Force Login From Internet
Detects a spike of failed login followed by a success one from Internet for a given source and target
- Effort: advanced
Successful Overpass The Hash Attempt
Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
- Effort: intermediate
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspect Svchost Memory Access
Detects suspect access to svchost process memory such as that used by Invoke-Phantom (v1.0) to kill the winRM windows event logging service.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool
Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Access To Sensitive File Extensions
Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share. This activity could possibly correspond to a malicious one (removing backup, reading sensitive files, etc.).
- Effort: master
Suspicious Certificate Request-adcs Abuse
Detects when a new certificate is requested or granted against Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) using a Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line
Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP
Detects a code page switch in command line
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern
Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Commands From MS SQL Server Shell
Detection of some shell commmands run from a cmd executed by Microsoft MS SQL Server. It could be a sign of xp_cmdshell allowed on the MS-SQL server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process
Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
Detects suspicious DLL being loaded by an Microsoft Office Product. Considered as suspects are some .NET DLLs, clr.dll, GAC DLL, DSParse (Active Directoryi services API) or Kerberos DLLs which may be loaded by MS Office processes when executing a potentially malicious macro. The prerequisite is to log the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL side loading from ProgramData
Detects suspicious DLL side-loading from C:\ProgramData where the DLL is not signed.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DNS Child Process
Detects suspicious processes spawned by the dns.exe process. It could be a great indication of the exploitation of the DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRED).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services
Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Driver Loaded
Checks the registry key for suspicious driver names that are vulnerable most of the time and loaded in a specific location by the KDU tool from hfiref0x. Some drivers are used by several SysInternals tools, which should have been whitelisted in the filter condition. The driver named "DBUtilDrv2" has been removed as it caused too many false positives unfortunately. It can be added under "drv_name" if more coverage is wanted. This rule needs registry key monitoring (can be done with Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious File Name
Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Finger Usage
Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Hangul Word Processor Child Process
Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) child process that could indicate an exploitation as used by the Lazarus APT during the Operation Ghost Puppet (2018). This activity could correspond to a maldoc execution related to a .hwp file. Hangul is a proprietary word processing application that supports the Korean written language.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File
Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Hostname
Detects suspicious hostnames such as ones with kali in it, to detect kali linux default hosts, but also other hostnames commonly used in attacks. List can be improved according to the environment.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Kerberos Ticket
Detect suspicious Kerberos ticket based on on their parameters which suggest that it could be forged.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used
Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. Careful as the 5136 is only on domain controllers and needs to be activated through the Group Policy.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution
Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Mshta Execution From Wmi
Detects mshta executed by wmiprvse as parent. It has been used by TA505 with some malicious documents.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line
Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious New Printer Ports In Registry
Detects a suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048. The CVE-2020-1048 consists in gaining persistence, privilege by abusing a flaw in the Print Spooler service to execute a payload whose path is stored in the registry key. To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection
Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spearphishing activity.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Process Requiring DLL Starts Without DLL
Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PsExec Execution
Detects execution of PsExec, different from the Sysinternals one. This rule helps to filter out the noise if PsExec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different PsExec client other than Sysinternals one. The prerequisite is to log the Event ID 5145 (by setting "Audit Policy > Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" to Success/Failure).
- Effort: master
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage
catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution
Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious SAM Dump
Detects suspicious SAM dump to AppData repository, as cause by QuarksPwDump and other password dumpers. Logging for Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General Event ID 16 or Sysmon Event ID 11 is needed.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Scripting In A WMI Consumer
Detects suspicious scripting in WMI Event Consumers. The rule requires to log WMI Consumers, which can be done through Sysmon's Event IDs 20 and 21.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TGS requests (Kerberoasting)
The rule aims at detecting the Kerberoasting technique, when an attacker requests TGS in order to crack them offline. Toease its task, the attacker requests tickets with weak encryption (such as RC4_HMAC_MD5). The rule therefore detects when an user is requesting 5 TGS for different users in 5 minutes.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious TOR Gateway
Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign
Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URL Requested By Curl Or Wget Commands
Correlation rule aiming to be multi-source to detect URL with suspicious files extensions (seen on a network level by proxies or firewalls) being requested by curl or wget processes (seen on a host level).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter
Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created
Detects the creation of suspicious accounts simliar to ANONYMOUS LOGON, such as using additional spaces. Created as a covering detection for attackers trying to created an ANONYMOUS LOGON account as it is an account named used in internal Windows events and frequently filtered by attackers.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries
Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action
Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
- Effort: advanced
Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack
Detects svchost process hijacking through DLL loading. IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\Windows\System32\ by default. An attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services "svchost.exe -k netsvcs" to gain code execution on a remote machine.
- Effort: master
Svchost Modification
Detects the modification of svchost in the registry.
- Effort: advanced
Svchost Wrong Parent
Detects if the svchost.exe process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Svchost (Service Host Process) is a generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries (DLLs).
- Effort: master
SysKey Registry Keys Access
Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey. The SysKey allows to decrypt Security Account Mannager (SAM) database entries (from registry or hive) and get NTLM, and sometimes LM hashes of local accounts passwords. Adversaries can calculate the Syskey by using RegOpenKeyEx/RegQueryInfoKey API calls to query the appropriate class info and values from the HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\JD, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Skew1, HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\GBG, and HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Data keys.
- Effort: elementary
Sysmon Windows File Block Executable
Sysmon has blocked an executable file from being written to the disk. This could be a malicious binary to investigate.
- Effort: master
Sysprep On AppData Folder
Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.
- Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
System Network Connections Discovery
Detects system network connections discovery via powershell and cmd.
- Effort: advanced
TOR Usage
Detects TOR usage, based on the IP address and the destination port (filtered on NTP). TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
TUN/TAP Driver Installation
Detects the installation of the TUN or TAP driver service, this activity could be related to data exfiltration using tunneling techniques. The TUN/TAP Windows Adapter is a network driver that enables some VPN providers to facilitate a VPN connection to their server. TUN/TAP driver is only used by specific VPNs (e.g. OpenVPN, Wireguard), not by thoses based on IKE protocols (e.g. IPsec).
- Effort: intermediate
Taskhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhost is the process of the Windows Task Manager which lists the processes that are currently running on the computer system.
- Effort: master
Taskhost or Taskhostw Suspicious Child Found
Task Host manages pop-up windows when users try to close them in a Windows environment. Taskhost.exe triggers the host process for the task. Task Host is a Windows process designed to alert users when dialog boxes close. It is usually launched when restarting and shutting down a PC, and checks if all programs have been properly closed. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.
- Effort: master
Taskhostw Wrong Parent
Detects if the Taskhostw process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. Taskhostw is a software component of Windows service start manager, it starts DLL-based Windows services when the computer boots up.
- Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request
Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind
- Effort: advanced
Transfering Files With Credential Data Via Network Shares
Detects file transfer of sensitive files which contain credential data using network shares.
- Effort: intermediate
TrevorC2 HTTP Communication
Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.
- Effort: elementary
Trickbot Malware Activity
Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe.
- Effort: intermediate
TrustedInstaller Impersonation
The rule detects attempts to impersonate TrustedInstaller. TrustedInstaller rights could allow a threat actor to delete or modify protected file or create/delete/modify files in protected folders. This technique is used by threat actors to disable Windows Defender.
- Effort: intermediate
Turla Named Pipes
Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples. Prerequisites: Logging for PipeEvents is needed in Sysmon config
- Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass Using Fodhelper
Detects UAC bypass method using Fodhelper after setting the proper registry key, used in particular by Agent Tesla (RAT) or more recently by Earth Luscas. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt
Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)
- Effort: elementary
UAC Bypass via Event Viewer
Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer.
- Effort: intermediate
Unsigned Image Loaded Into LSASS Process
Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process. To activate this rule you need to monitor loaded images into the LSASS process, this can be done with SYSMON Event ID 7.
- Effort: advanced
Ursnif Registry Key
Detects a new registry key created by Ursnif malware. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using SYsmon's Event IDs 12,13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
User Added to Local Administrators
Detects when user accounts are added which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity, Potential False-Positives Legitimate administrative activity WinRM clients
- Effort: master
User Couldn't Call A Privileged Service LsaRegisterLogonProcess
The LsaRegisterLogonProcess function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA. This rule requires to log the Event ID 4673, which can be done by updating the Audit Policy.
- Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI DLL Loaded Via Office
Detects Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) DLL loaded via Office process. This activity may correspond to VBA macro executing WMI commands, which is highly suspicious. The prerequisite is to log Loaded DLLs images, which can be done with the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).
- Effort: master
WMI Event Subscription
Detects creation of WMI event subscription persistence method
- Effort: advanced
WMI Fingerprint Commands
Detects attacker fingerprint activities based on the correlation of specific WMIC commands. This has been observed with Aurora malware.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Command Line Event Consumer
Detects WMI command line event consumers.
- Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the /FORMAT argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). The rule requires to log Loaded DLLs to work properly, which can be done using Sysmon Event ID 7.
- Effort: master
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool
WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.
- Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
Web Application Launching Shell
Detects when a web application launches a shell.
- Effort: master
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
Werfault DLL Injection
Werfault DLL search order look first in the current file, which lets an attacker use th legitimate exe to run its own DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Credential Editor Registry Key
Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE). Prerequisites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Windows Defender Deactivation Using PowerShell Script
Detects attempts to deactivate Windows Defender with PowerShell using ScriptBlockLogging.
- Effort: master
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking
Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order. Logging for Registry events is needed, it can be done with Sysmon's Event IDs 12 and 13.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation
The rule identify creation of new scheduled task who run suspicious or dangerous command
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Suspicious Service Creation
Detects the creation of a new suspicious service - attacker could use MSRPC to create a remote service
- Effort: intermediate
Windows Update LolBins
This rule try to detect a suspicious behavior of wuauclt.exe (windows update client) that could be a lolbins. Wuauctl.exe could be used to execute a malicious program.
- Effort: elementary
Wininit Wrong Parent
Windows Boot is a background application launcher for the Windows operating system. Wininit.exe is responsible for performing the Windows initialization process. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Winlogon wrong parent
Winlogon.exe is a process that performs the Windows login management function, handling user login and logout in Windows. You see this process in action whenever the operating system asks you for your username and password. It is also responsible for loading user profiles after login, this supports automated login (when relevant) and keyboard and mouse inactivity monitoring to decide when to invoke the screen saver. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.
- Effort: master
Winrshost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Winrshosts process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process The winrshost.exe is a Host Process for WinRM's Remote Shell plugin.
- Effort: master
Winword Document Droppers
Detects specific process characteristics of word document droppers. This techniques has been used by Maze ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Suspicious Commands
Detects suspicious commands used by the process wmic to get informations on the system.
- Effort: advanced
Wsmprovhost Wrong Parent
Detects if the Wsmprovhost process was executed by a non-legitimate parent process. The PowerShell host wsmprovhost.exe is a proxy process executed remotely through PowerShell when using Windows Remote Management (WinRM).
- Effort: master
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack
Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.
- Effort: intermediate
ZIP LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ZIP download followed by a child-process of explorer, followed by multiple Windows processes.This is widely used as an infection chain mechanism.
- Effort: advanced
xWizard Execution
Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Access tokens |
security identifiers are extracted from several events |
Anti-virus |
Windows Defender events are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up |
Authentication logs |
audit logon events are examined in detail |
DLL monitoring |
information about dlls are extracted from several events |
File monitoring |
information about files are extracted from several events |
Host network interface |
Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities |
Loaded DLLs |
Sysmon events provide information on DLL loading |
PowerShell logs |
Windows PowerShell logs are analyzed, and need to be specifically set up |
Process command-line parameters |
Windows Security Auditing logs provide information about process creation |
Process monitoring |
Windows Security Auditing logs are process tracking events |
Process use of network |
Windows Filtering Platform collects information on processes having network activities |
Windows event logs |
events related to Windows Event logs shutdown or restart are analyzed |
Windows Registry |
registry auditing events are examined in detail |
WMI Objects |
Windows WMI Activity events are analyzed, and events related to WMI process too |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-07-27 12:58:38\", \"Hostname\": \"local.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9223372036854775808, \"EventType\": \"INFO\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 1117, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 0, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 11190, \"ActivityID\": \"{0E8E4EFB-F7EC-487F-BE78-82B11D0D3DB7}\", \"ProcessID\": 12848, \"ThreadID\": 11792, \"Channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\", \"Domain\": \"NT AUTHORITY\", \"AccountName\": \"SYSTEM\", \"UserID\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"AccountType\": \"User\", \"Product Name\": \"Microsoft Defender Antivirus\", \"Product Version\": \"4.18.23050.9\", \"Detection ID\": \"{FEEEC80B-1F6D-4B88-81F9-19C54AF3F889}\", \"Detection Time\": \"2023-07-27T10:58:19.035Z\", \"Threat ID\": \"2147780199\", \"Threat Name\": \"Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml\", \"Severity ID\": \"5\", \"Severity Name\": \"Severe\", \"Category ID\": \"8\", \"Category Name\": \"Trojan\", \"FWLink\": \"https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml&threatid=2147780199&enterprise=0\", \"Status Code\": \"3\", \"State\": \"2\", \"Source ID\": \"2\", \"Source Name\": \"System\", \"Process Name\": \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Cybereason ActiveProbe\\\\minionhost.exe\", \"Detection User\": \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\", \"Path\": \"file:_C:\\\\Users\\\\john-doe\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Cache\\\\Cache_Data\\\\f_221f56\", \"Origin ID\": \"1\", \"Origin Name\": \"Local machine\", \"Execution ID\": \"1\", \"Execution Name\": \"Suspended\", \"Type ID\": \"8\", \"Type Name\": \"FastPath\", \"Pre Execution Status\": \"0\", \"Action ID\": \"2\", \"Action Name\": \"Quarantine\", \"Error Code\": \"0x00000000\", \"Error Description\": \"The operation completed successfully. \", \"Post Clean Status\": \"0\", \"Additional Actions ID\": \"0\", \"Additional Actions String\": \"No additional actions required\", \"Remediation User\": \"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\", \"Security intelligence Version\": \"AV: 1.393.1459.0, AS: 1.393.1459.0, NIS: 1.393.1459.0\", \"Engine Version\": \"AM: 1.1.23060.1005, NIS: 1.1.23060.1005\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-07-27 13:03:23\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"in\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "1117",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
},
"action": {
"id": 1117,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"AdditionalActionsID": "0",
"AdditionalActionsString": "No additional actions required",
"DetectionUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"ErrorCode": "0x00000000",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Execution Name": "Suspended",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"Path": "file:_C:\\Users\\john-doe\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\\Default\\Cache\\Cache_Data\\f_221f56",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Program Files\\Cybereason ActiveProbe\\minionhost.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"Task": 0,
"ThreatName": "Trojan:Script/Sabsik.FL.A!ml"
},
"record_id": 11190,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "local.example.org",
"name": "local.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "local.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 12848,
"pid": 12848,
"thread": {
"id": 11792
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"local.example.org"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:33\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": 36028797018963968, \"EventType\": \"WARNING\", \"SeverityValue\": 3, \"Severity\": \"WARNING\", \"EventID\": 39, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{3FD9DA1A-5A54-46C5-9A26-9BD7C0685056}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 0, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1673393, \"ProcessID\": 0, \"ThreadID\": 0, \"Channel\": \"System\", \"Message\": \"Le centre de distribution de cl\\u00e9s (KDC) a rencontr\\u00e9 un certificat utilisateur valide mais qui n\\u2019a pas pu \\u00eatre mapp\\u00e9 \\u00e0 un utilisateur de mani\\u00e8re s\\u00e9curis\\u00e9e (par exemple via un mappage explicite, un mappage d\\u2019approbation de cl\\u00e9 ou un SID). Ces certificats doivent \\u00eatre remplac\\u00e9s ou mapp\\u00e9s directement \\u00e0 l\\u2019utilisateur via un mappage explicite. Consultez https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 pour en savoir plus.\\r\\n\\r\\n Utilisateur : JDOE\\r\\n Sujet du certificat :\\u00e9metteur de certificat @@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\\r\\n :num\\u00e9ro de s\\u00e9rie du certificat EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\\r\\n :empreinte de certificat 78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\\r\\n : A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\\r\\n\", \"AccountName\": \"JDOE\", \"Subject\": \"@@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\", \"Issuer\": \"EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\", \"SerialNumber\": \"78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\", \"Thumbprint\": \"A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "39",
"message": "Le centre de distribution de cl\u00e9s (KDC) a rencontr\u00e9 un certificat utilisateur valide mais qui n\u2019a pas pu \u00eatre mapp\u00e9 \u00e0 un utilisateur de mani\u00e8re s\u00e9curis\u00e9e (par exemple via un mappage explicite, un mappage d\u2019approbation de cl\u00e9 ou un SID). Ces certificats doivent \u00eatre remplac\u00e9s ou mapp\u00e9s directement \u00e0 l\u2019utilisateur via un mappage explicite. Consultez https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2189925 pour en savoir plus.\r\n\r\n Utilisateur : JDOE\r\n Sujet du certificat :\u00e9metteur de certificat @@@OID.0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1=JDOE, CN=JOHN DOE, OU=1111 222222222, O=EXAMPLE, C=FR\r\n :num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\r\n :empreinte de certificat 78F88CB45C07B31EC7CF2239\r\n : A519392EE6D0CB8C3C1F9D74F951A4A8299F8889\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center"
},
"action": {
"id": 39,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "JDOE",
"EventType": "WARNING",
"Issuer": "EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification",
"Keywords": "36028797018963968",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{3FD9DA1A-5A54-46C5-9A26-9BD7C0685056}",
"Severity": "WARNING",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 1673393,
"type": "System"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "warning"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 0,
"pid": 0,
"thread": {
"id": 0
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"user": [
"JDOE"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "JDOE"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-01-07 14:09:58\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":6416,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":13316,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":16859866,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":6432,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A new external device was recognized by the system.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tHOSTFOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nDevice ID:\\tSCSI\\\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\\\5&e55476b&0&000100\\r\\n\\r\\nDevice Name:\\tVMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\\r\\n\\r\\nClass ID:\\t\\t{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\\r\\n\\r\\nClass Name:\\tDiskDrive\\r\\n\\r\\nVendor IDs:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tGenDisk\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nCompatible IDs:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\Disk\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\RAW\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nLocation Information:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"Category\":\"Plug and Play Events\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"HOSTFOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"DeviceId\":\"SCSI\\\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\\\5&e55476b&0&000100\",\"DeviceDescription\":\"VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\",\"ClassId\":\"{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\",\"ClassName\":\"DiskDrive\",\"VendorIds\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\DiskVMware__\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\\r\\n\\t\\tGenDisk\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"CompatibleIds\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\Disk\\r\\n\\t\\tSCSI\\\\RAW\\r\\n\\t\\t\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"LocationInformation\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\\r\\n\\t\\t\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-01-07 14:09:59\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "6416",
"message": "A new external device was recognized by the system.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTFOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nDevice ID:\tSCSI\\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\\5&e55476b&0&000100\r\n\r\nDevice Name:\tVMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device\r\n\r\nClass ID:\t\t{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\r\n\r\nClass Name:\tDiskDrive\r\n\r\nVendor IDs:\t\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____2.0_\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__Virtual_disk____\r\n\t\tSCSI\\DiskVMware__\r\n\t\tSCSI\\VMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tVMware__Virtual_disk____2\r\n\t\tGenDisk\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\r\nCompatible IDs:\t\r\n\t\tSCSI\\Disk\r\n\t\tSCSI\\RAW\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\r\nLocation Information:\t\r\n\t\tBus Number 0, Target Id 1, LUN 0\r\n\t\t",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 6416,
"name": "A new external device was recognized by the system.",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Plug and Play Events",
"ClassName": "DiskDrive",
"DeviceDescription": "VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "HOSTFOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13316
},
"record_id": 16859866,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"name": "HOSTFOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 4,
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 6432
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTFOO"
],
"user": [
"HOSTFOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "HOSTFOO$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\",\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Hostname\":\"vm-foo\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"Severity\":\"Info\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"VM-FOO$\",\"EventID\":\"4625\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"CORPDOMAIN\",\"ProcessId\":\"0x354\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Schannel\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\"}",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_network",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4625",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"action": {
"id": 4625,
"name": "An account failed to log on",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"IpAddress": "-",
"IpPort": "-",
"LogonProcessName": "Schannel",
"LogonType": "3",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"Severity": "Info",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "CORPDOMAIN",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "VM-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0"
},
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "vm-foo",
"name": "vm-foo"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "vm-foo",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"name": "lsass.exe",
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"vm-foo"
],
"user": [
"VM-FOO$"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "Schannel"
}
},
"client": {
"name": "vm-foo",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "vm-foo",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"user": {
"domain": "CORPDOMAIN",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "VM-FOO$",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-0-0"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"EventID\":4625,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"Hostname\":\"test.test\",\"IpAddress\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Advapi \",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"Message\":\"An account failed to log on.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tTESTACCOUNTS$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tDOMAINNAME\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nAccount For Which Logon Failed:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tTEST-USERNAME\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tDOMAINNAME\\r\\n\\r\\nFailure Information:\\r\\n\\tFailure Reason:\\t\\tUnknown user name or bad password.\\r\\n\\tStatus:\\t\\t\\t0xC000006D\\r\\n\\tSub Status:\\t\\t0xC000006A\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tCaller Process ID:\\t0x25c\\r\\n\\tCaller Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tWorkstation Name:\\tTESTACCOUNTS\\r\\n\\tSource Network Address:\\t192.168.128.203\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t41974\\r\\n\\r\\nDetailed Authentication Information:\\r\\n\\tLogon Process:\\t\\tAdvapi \\r\\n\\tAuthentication Package:\\tMICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0\\r\\n\\tTransited Services:\\t-\\r\\n\\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\\t-\\r\\n\\tKey Length:\\t\\t0\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon request fails. It is generated on the computer where access was attempted.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe Subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe Logon Type field indicates the kind of logon that was requested. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\\r\\n\\r\\nThe Process Information fields indicate which account and process on the system requested the logon.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe Network Information fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\\r\\n\\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.\",\"ProcessID\":604,\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\",\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"DOMAINNAME\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"TESTACCOUNTS$\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"DOMAINNAME\",\"TargetUserName\":\"TEST-USERNAME\",\"sekoia.intake.windows\":\"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\"}",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_network",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4625",
"message": "An account failed to log on.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tTESTACCOUNTS$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tDOMAINNAME\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nAccount For Which Logon Failed:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tTEST-USERNAME\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tDOMAINNAME\r\n\r\nFailure Information:\r\n\tFailure Reason:\t\tUnknown user name or bad password.\r\n\tStatus:\t\t\t0xC000006D\r\n\tSub Status:\t\t0xC000006A\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tCaller Process ID:\t0x25c\r\n\tCaller Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tWorkstation Name:\tTESTACCOUNTS\r\n\tSource Network Address:\t192.168.128.203\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t41974\r\n\r\nDetailed Authentication Information:\r\n\tLogon Process:\t\tAdvapi \r\n\tAuthentication Package:\tMICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\t-\r\n\tKey Length:\t\t0\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon request fails. It is generated on the computer where access was attempted.\r\n\r\nThe Subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\r\n\r\nThe Logon Type field indicates the kind of logon that was requested. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\r\n\r\nThe Process Information fields indicate which account and process on the system requested the logon.\r\n\r\nThe Network Information fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\r\n\r\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\r\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\r\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\r\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"reason": "Unknown user name or bad password.",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"action": {
"id": 4625,
"name": "An account failed to log on",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"Category": "Logon",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"IpAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"LogonProcessName": "Advapi ",
"LogonType": "3",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "DOMAINNAME",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "TESTACCOUNTS$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetDomainName": "DOMAINNAME",
"TargetUserName": "TEST-USERNAME"
},
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "test.test",
"name": "test.test"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "test.test",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"id": 604,
"name": "lsass.exe",
"pid": 604,
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"test.test"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"TESTACCOUNTS$"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "Advapi "
}
},
"client": {
"name": "test.test",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "test.test",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"domain": "DOMAINNAME",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "TESTACCOUNTS$",
"target": {
"domain": "DOMAINNAME",
"name": "TEST-USERNAME"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-10-04 10:24:15\",\"Hostname\":\"foo.net\",\"Keywords\":-9218868437227405312,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":4625,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12544,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3443172796,\"ProcessID\":704,\"ThreadID\":9992,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"\u00c9chec d\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte.\\r\\n\\r\\nSujet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nType d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nCompte pour lequel l\u2019ouverture de session a \u00e9chou\u00e9 :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tFooSSO\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tFOO\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur l\u2019\u00e9chec :\\r\\n\\tRaison de l\u2019\u00e9chec :\\t\\tNom d\u2019utilisateur inconnu ou mot de passe incorrect.\\r\\n\\t\u00c9tat :\\t\\t\\t0xC000006D\\r\\n\\tSous-\u00e9tat :\\t\\t0xC0000064\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le processus :\\r\\n\\tID du processus de l\u2019appelant :\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tNom du processus de l\u2019appelant :\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tNom de la station de travail :\\tFOO-AD1\\r\\n\\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tPort source :\\t\\t60917\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l\u2019authentification :\\r\\n\\tProcessus d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\tNtLmSsp \\r\\n\\tPackage d\u2019authentification :\\tNTLM\\r\\n\\tServices en transit :\\t-\\r\\n\\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\\t-\\r\\n\\tLongueur de cl\u00e9 :\\t\\t0\\r\\n\\r\\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une demande d\u2019ouverture de session \u00e9choue. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l\u2019ordinateur sur lequel l\u2019acc\u00e8s a \u00e9t\u00e9 tent\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session. Il s\u2019agit le plus souvent d\u2019un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Type d\u2019ouverture de session indique le type d\u2019ouverture de session qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le processus indiquent quel est le compte et le processus sur le syst\u00e8me qui ont demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance de la demande d\u2019ouverture de session distante. Le nom de la station de travail n\u2019\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut rester vide dans certains cas.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d\u2019authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\\r\\n\\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\t- Le nom du package indique quel a \u00e9t\u00e9 le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\\r\\n\\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.\",\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TargetUserName\":\"FooSSO\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"FOO\",\"Status\":\"0xc000006d\",\"FailureReason\":\"%%2313\",\"SubStatus\":\"0xc0000064\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"NtLmSsp \",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"NTLM\",\"WorkstationName\":\"FOO-AD1\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"IpAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"60917\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-10-04 10:24:16\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_network",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4625",
"message": "\u00c9chec d\u2019ouverture de session d\u2019un compte.\r\n\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\t-\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\t-\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nType d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nCompte pour lequel l\u2019ouverture de session a \u00e9chou\u00e9 :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tFooSSO\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tFOO\r\n\r\nInformations sur l\u2019\u00e9chec :\r\n\tRaison de l\u2019\u00e9chec :\t\tNom d\u2019utilisateur inconnu ou mot de passe incorrect.\r\n\t\u00c9tat :\t\t\t0xC000006D\r\n\tSous-\u00e9tat :\t\t0xC0000064\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du processus de l\u2019appelant :\t0x0\r\n\tNom du processus de l\u2019appelant :\t-\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tNom de la station de travail :\tFOO-AD1\r\n\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort source :\t\t60917\r\n\r\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l\u2019authentification :\r\n\tProcessus d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\tNtLmSsp \r\n\tPackage d\u2019authentification :\tNTLM\r\n\tServices en transit :\t-\r\n\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\t-\r\n\tLongueur de cl\u00e9 :\t\t0\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une demande d\u2019ouverture de session \u00e9choue. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l\u2019ordinateur sur lequel l\u2019acc\u00e8s a \u00e9t\u00e9 tent\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session. Il s\u2019agit le plus souvent d\u2019un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\r\n\r\nLe champ Type d\u2019ouverture de session indique le type d\u2019ouverture de session qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le processus indiquent quel est le compte et le processus sur le syst\u00e8me qui ont demand\u00e9 l\u2019ouverture de session.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations sur le r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance de la demande d\u2019ouverture de session distante. Le nom de la station de travail n\u2019\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut rester vide dans certains cas.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d\u2019authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d\u2019ouverture de session.\r\n\t- Le nom du package indique quel a \u00e9t\u00e9 le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\r\n\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"reason": "user_not_exist",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"action": {
"id": 4625,
"name": "An account failed to log on",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
"Category": "Logon",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "60917",
"KeyLength": "0",
"Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
"LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
"LogonType": "3",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "-",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0xc000006d",
"SubStatus": "0xc0000064",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetDomainName": "FOO",
"TargetUserName": "FooSSO",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"Task": 12544,
"WorkstationName": "FOO-AD1"
},
"record_id": 3443172796,
"type": "Security"
},
"client": {
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "foo.net",
"name": "foo.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "foo.net",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 704,
"pid": 704,
"thread": {
"id": 9992
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"foo.net"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "NtLmSsp "
}
},
"client": {
"name": "FOO-AD1",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "foo.net",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-0-0",
"target": {
"domain": "FOO",
"id": "S-1-0-0",
"name": "FooSSO"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 14:40:12\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4670, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 13570, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1711795990, \"ProcessID\": 4, \"ThreadID\": 5708, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Les autorisations sur un objet ont \\u00e9t\\u00e9 modifi\\u00e9es.\\r\\n\\r\\nSujet\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tID de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9\\u00a0:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte\\u00a0:\\t\\tJDOE\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte\\u00a0:\\t\\tEXAMPLE\\r\\n\\tID d\\u2019ouverture de session\\u00a0:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nObjet\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tServeur de l\\u2019objet\\u00a0:\\tSecurity\\r\\n\\tType d\\u2019objet\\u00a0:\\tToken\\r\\n\\tNom de l\\u2019objet\\u00a0:\\t-\\r\\n\\tID du handle\\u00a0:\\t0x2214\\r\\n\\r\\nProcessus\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tID du processus\\u00a0:\\t0x3f8\\r\\n\\tNom du processus\\u00a0:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nModification des autorisations\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tDescripteur de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9 d\\u2019origine\\u00a0:\\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\\r\\n\\tNouveau descripteur de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9\\u00a0:\\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)\", \"Category\": \"Modification de la strat\\u00e9gie d\\u2019autorisation\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"JDOE\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EXAMPLE\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\", \"ObjectServer\": \"Security\", \"ObjectType\": \"Token\", \"ObjectName\": \"-\", \"HandleId\": \"0x2214\", \"OldSd\": \"D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\", \"NewSd\": \"D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)\", \"ProcessName\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 14:40:15\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4670",
"message": "Les autorisations sur un objet ont \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nSujet\u00a0:\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte\u00a0:\t\tJDOE\r\n\tDomaine du compte\u00a0:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session\u00a0:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObjet\u00a0:\r\n\tServeur de l\u2019objet\u00a0:\tSecurity\r\n\tType d\u2019objet\u00a0:\tToken\r\n\tNom de l\u2019objet\u00a0:\t-\r\n\tID du handle\u00a0:\t0x2214\r\n\r\nProcessus\u00a0:\r\n\tID du processus\u00a0:\t0x3f8\r\n\tNom du processus\u00a0:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nModification des autorisations\u00a0:\r\n\tDescripteur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d\u2019origine\u00a0:\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)\r\n\tNouveau descripteur de s\u00e9curit\u00e9\u00a0:\tD:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4670,
"name": "Permissions on an object were changed",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Modification de la strat\u00e9gie d\u2019autorisation",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HandleId": "0x2214",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NewSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-86-111111111-22222222-3333333333-44444444-5555555555)",
"ObjectName": "-",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"ObjectType": "Token",
"OldSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;NS)",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "JDOE",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13570
},
"record_id": 1711795990,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 5708
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"user": [
"JDOE"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "JDOE"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4768, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14339, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 2089533206, \"ProcessID\": 660, \"ThreadID\": 4536, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Un ticket d\\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 demand\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le compte\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tNom du compte\\u00a0:\\t\\\\JDOE\\r\\n\\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni\\u00a0:\\tlocal.example.org\\r\\n\\tID de l\\u2019utilisateur\\u00a0:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le service\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tNom du service\\u00a0:\\t\\tkrbtgt\\r\\n\\tID du service\\u00a0:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\\u00e9seau\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tAdresse du client\\u00a0:\\t\\t::ffff:55.99.99.6\\r\\n\\tPort client\\u00a0:\\t\\t61359\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations suppl\\u00e9mentaires\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tOptions du ticket\\u00a0:\\t\\t0x40810010\\r\\n\\tCode de r\\u00e9sultat\\u00a0:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tType de chiffrement du ticket\\u00a0:\\t0x12\\r\\n\\tType de pr\\u00e9-authentification\\u00a0:\\t15\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le certificat\\u00a0:\\r\\n\\tNom de l\\u2019\\u00e9metteur du certificat\\u00a0:\\t\\tEXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\\r\\n\\tNum\\u00e9ro de s\\u00e9rie du certificat\\u00a0:\\t78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\\r\\n\\t Empreinte num\\u00e9rique du certificat\\u00a0:\\t\\t32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\\r\\n\\r\\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 utilis\\u00e9 pour la pr\\u00e9-authentification.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes types de pr\\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\\u00e9sultats sont d\\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.\", \"Category\": \"Service d\\u2019authentification Kerberos\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"TargetUserName\": \"JDOE\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"local.example.org\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\", \"ServiceName\": \"krbtgt\", \"ServiceSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\", \"TicketOptions\": \"0x40810010\", \"Status\": \"0x0\", \"TicketEncryptionType\": \"0x12\", \"PreAuthType\": \"15\", \"IpAddress\": \"::ffff:55.99.99.6\", \"IpPort\": \"61359\", \"CertIssuerName\": \"EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\", \"CertSerialNumber\": \"78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\", \"CertThumbprint\": \"32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:59:11\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4768",
"message": "Un ticket d\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9.\r\n\r\nInformations sur le compte\u00a0:\r\n\tNom du compte\u00a0:\t\\JDOE\r\n\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni\u00a0:\tlocal.example.org\r\n\tID de l\u2019utilisateur\u00a0:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444\r\n\r\nInformations sur le service\u00a0:\r\n\tNom du service\u00a0:\t\tkrbtgt\r\n\tID du service\u00a0:\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau\u00a0:\r\n\tAdresse du client\u00a0:\t\t::ffff:55.99.99.6\r\n\tPort client\u00a0:\t\t61359\r\n\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires\u00a0:\r\n\tOptions du ticket\u00a0:\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tCode de r\u00e9sultat\u00a0:\t\t0x0\r\n\tType de chiffrement du ticket\u00a0:\t0x12\r\n\tType de pr\u00e9-authentification\u00a0:\t15\r\n\r\nInformations sur le certificat\u00a0:\r\n\tNom de l\u2019\u00e9metteur du certificat\u00a0:\t\tEXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification\r\n\tNum\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat\u00a0:\t78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A\r\n\t Empreinte num\u00e9rique du certificat\u00a0:\t\t32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D\r\n\r\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 pour la pr\u00e9-authentification.\r\n\r\nLes types de pr\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\u00e9sultats sont d\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4768,
"name": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Service d\u2019authentification Kerberos",
"CertIssuerName": "EXAMPLE_ORG_Authentification",
"CertSerialNumber": "78F88CB4AFBAB3AC089E147A",
"CertThumbprint": "32BE1AF04D9E00A97E0A17C6A335CEB5A7B6F60D",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:55.99.99.6",
"IpPort": "61359",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PreAuthType": "15",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ServiceName": "krbtgt",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-555",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0x0",
"TargetDomainName": "local.example.org",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-444444",
"TargetUserName": "JDOE",
"Task": 14339,
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810010"
},
"record_id": 2089533206,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 660,
"pid": 660,
"thread": {
"id": 4536
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"ip": [
"55.99.99.6"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "::ffff:55.99.99.6",
"ip": "55.99.99.6"
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "local.example.org",
"name": "JDOE"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"EventTime\": \"2024-03-27 10:57:48\",\n \"Hostname\": \"server001.example.org\",\n \"Keywords\": -9214364837600035000,\n \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\n \"SeverityValue\": 2,\n \"Severity\": \"INFO\",\n \"EventID\": 4698,\n \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"ProviderGuid\": \"{70F17275-E2D6-40BF-9990-D3347AD59BBF}\",\n \"Version\": 1,\n \"Task\": 12804,\n \"OpcodeValue\": 0,\n \"RecordNumber\": 60217389,\n \"ActivityID\": \"{70F17275-E2D6-40BF-9990-D3347AD59BBF}\",\n \"ProcessID\": 816,\n \"ThreadID\": 3272,\n \"Channel\": \"Security\",\n \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\",\n \"SubjectUserName\": \"JDOE$\",\n \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EXAMPLE\",\n \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\",\n \"TaskName\": \"\\\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateBrowserReplacementTask\",\n \"TaskContent\": \"<?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<Task version=\\\"1.2\\\" xmlns=\\\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\\\">\\r\\n <RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Version>1.3.185.27</Version>\\r\\n <Description>Keeps your Microsoft software up to date. If this task is disabled or stopped, your Microsoft software will not be kept up to date, meaning security vulnerabilities that may arise cannot be fixed and features may not work. This task uninstalls itself when there is no Microsoft software using it.</Description>\\r\\n <URI>\\\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateBrowserReplacementTask</URI>\\r\\n </RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Triggers>\\r\\n <BootTrigger>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n </BootTrigger>\\r\\n </Triggers>\\r\\n <Principals>\\r\\n <Principal id=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\\r\\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\\r\\n </Principal>\\r\\n </Principals>\\r\\n <Settings>\\r\\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\\r\\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\\r\\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\\r\\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Priority>4</Priority>\\r\\n </Settings>\\r\\n <Actions Context=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <Exec>\\r\\n <Command>C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Microsoft\\\\EdgeUpdate\\\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe</Command>\\r\\n <Arguments>/browserreplacement</Arguments>\\r\\n </Exec>\\r\\n </Actions>\\r\\n</Task>\",\n \"ClientProcessStartKey\": \"20829148276605418\",\n \"ClientProcessId\": \"5632\",\n \"ParentProcessId\": \"808\",\n \"RpcCallClientLocality\": \"0\",\n \"FQDN\": \"server001.example.org\",\n \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2024-03-27 10:58:34\",\n \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\",\n \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"\n}",
"event": {
"code": "4698",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4698,
"name": "A scheduled task was created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600035000",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{70F17275-E2D6-40BF-9990-D3347AD59BBF}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "JDOE$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12804,
"TaskContent": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Version>1.3.185.27</Version>\r\n <Description>Keeps your Microsoft software up to date. If this task is disabled or stopped, your Microsoft software will not be kept up to date, meaning security vulnerabilities that may arise cannot be fixed and features may not work. This task uninstalls itself when there is no Microsoft software using it.</Description>\r\n <URI>\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateBrowserReplacementTask</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <BootTrigger>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </BootTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeUpdate\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>/browserreplacement</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>",
"TaskContentNew_Args": "/browserreplacement",
"TaskContentNew_Command": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeUpdate\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe",
"TaskName": "\\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateBrowserReplacementTask"
},
"record_id": 60217389,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "server001.example.org",
"name": "server001.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "server001.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 816,
"pid": 816,
"ppid": "808",
"thread": {
"id": 3272
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"server001.example.org"
],
"user": [
"JDOE$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "JDOE$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"EventTime\": \"2024-05-06 11:38:15\",\n \"Hostname\": \"server01.example.org\",\n \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816,\n \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\n \"SeverityValue\": 2,\n \"Severity\": \"INFO\",\n \"EventID\": 4738,\n \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\n \"Version\": 0,\n \"Task\": 13824,\n \"OpcodeValue\": 0,\n \"RecordNumber\": 105098604,\n \"ProcessID\": 688,\n \"ThreadID\": 2676,\n \"Channel\": \"Security\",\n \"Message\": \"A user account was changed.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-7\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tANONYMOUS LOGON\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tNT AUTHORITY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E6\\r\\n\\r\\nTarget Account:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-55555\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tjdoe\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tEXAMPLE\\r\\n\\r\\nChanged Attributes:\\r\\n\\tSAM Account Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tDisplay Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tUser Principal Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tHome Directory:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tHome Drive:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tScript Path:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tProfile Path:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tUser Workstations:\\t-\\r\\n\\tPassword Last Set:\\t06.05.2024 11:38:15\\r\\n\\tAccount Expires:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tPrimary Group ID:\\t-\\r\\n\\tAllowedToDelegateTo:\\t-\\r\\n\\tOld UAC Value:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNew UAC Value:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tUser Account Control:\\t-\\r\\n\\tUser Parameters:\\t-\\r\\n\\tSID History:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon Hours:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tPrivileges:\\t\\t-\",\n \"Category\": \"User Account Management\",\n \"Opcode\": \"Info\",\n \"Dummy\": \"-\",\n \"TargetUserName\": \"jdoe\",\n \"TargetDomainName\": \"EXAMPLE\",\n \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-55555\",\n \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-7\",\n \"SubjectUserName\": \"ANONYMOUS LOGON\",\n \"SubjectDomainName\": \"NT AUTHORITY\",\n \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e6\",\n \"PrivilegeList\": \"-\",\n \"SamAccountName\": \"-\",\n \"DisplayName\": \"-\",\n \"UserPrincipalName\": \"-\",\n \"HomeDirectory\": \"-\",\n \"HomePath\": \"-\",\n \"ScriptPath\": \"-\",\n \"ProfilePath\": \"-\",\n \"UserWorkstations\": \"-\",\n \"PasswordLastSet\": \"06.05.2024 11:38:15\",\n \"AccountExpires\": \"-\",\n \"PrimaryGroupId\": \"-\",\n \"AllowedToDelegateTo\": \"-\",\n \"OldUacValue\": \"321\",\n \"NewUacValue\": \"123\",\n \"UserAccountControl\": \"-\",\n \"UserParameters\": \"-\",\n \"SidHistory\": \"-\",\n \"LogonHours\": \"-\",\n \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2024-05-06 11:38:16\",\n \"SourceModuleName\": \"SecurityLog\",\n \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"\n}",
"event": {
"code": "4738",
"message": "A user account was changed.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-7\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tANONYMOUS LOGON\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tNT AUTHORITY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E6\r\n\r\nTarget Account:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-55555\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tjdoe\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\r\nChanged Attributes:\r\n\tSAM Account Name:\t-\r\n\tDisplay Name:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Principal Name:\t-\r\n\tHome Directory:\t\t-\r\n\tHome Drive:\t\t-\r\n\tScript Path:\t\t-\r\n\tProfile Path:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Workstations:\t-\r\n\tPassword Last Set:\t06.05.2024 11:38:15\r\n\tAccount Expires:\t\t-\r\n\tPrimary Group ID:\t-\r\n\tAllowedToDelegateTo:\t-\r\n\tOld UAC Value:\t\t-\r\n\tNew UAC Value:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Account Control:\t-\r\n\tUser Parameters:\t-\r\n\tSID History:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon Hours:\t\t-\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tPrivileges:\t\t-",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4738,
"name": "A user account was changed",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AllowedToDelegateTo": "-",
"Category": "User Account Management",
"DisplayName": "-",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HomeDirectory": "-",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NewUAC": "123",
"OldUAC": "321",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PrivilegeList": "-",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"SamAccountName": "-",
"ScriptPath": "-",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SidHistory": "-",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "NT AUTHORITY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e6",
"SubjectUserName": "ANONYMOUS LOGON",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-7",
"TargetDomainName": "EXAMPLE",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-222222222-444444444-55555",
"TargetUserName": "jdoe",
"Task": 13824,
"UserPrincipalName": "-"
},
"record_id": 105098604,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "server01.example.org",
"name": "server01.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "server01.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 688,
"pid": 688,
"thread": {
"id": 2676
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"server01.example.org"
],
"user": [
"ANONYMOUS LOGON"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-7",
"name": "ANONYMOUS LOGON",
"target": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"name": "jdoe"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-30 08:58:21\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9218868437227405312, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_FAILURE\", \"SeverityValue\": 4, \"Severity\": \"ERROR\", \"EventID\": 4768, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14339, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 971339700, \"ProcessID\": 572, \"ThreadID\": 8432, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Un ticket d\\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 demand\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le compte :\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tjdoe\\r\\n\\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni :\\tlocal.example.org\\r\\n\\tID de l\\u2019utilisateur :\\t\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le service :\\r\\n\\tNom du service :\\t\\tkrbtgt/local.example.org\\r\\n\\tID du service :\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tAdresse du client :\\t\\t::ffff:10.24.20.7\\r\\n\\tPort client :\\t\\t49681\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations suppl\\u00e9mentaires :\\r\\n\\tOptions du ticket :\\t\\t0x40810010\\r\\n\\tCode de r\\u00e9sultat :\\t\\t0x4B\\r\\n\\tType de chiffrement du ticket :\\t0xFFFFFFFF\\r\\n\\tType de pr\\u00e9-authentification :\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le certificat :\\r\\n\\tNom de l\\u2019\\u00e9metteur du certificat :\\t\\tCN=INDSI218\\r\\n\\tNum\\u00e9ro de s\\u00e9rie du certificat :\\t01\\r\\n\\t Empreinte num\\u00e9rique du certificat :\\t\\t4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\\r\\n\\r\\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 utilis\\u00e9 pour la pr\\u00e9-authentification.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes types de pr\\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\\u00e9sultats sont d\\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.\", \"Category\": \"Service d\\u2019authentification Kerberos\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"TargetUserName\": \"jdoe\", \"TargetDomainName\": \"local.example.org\", \"TargetSid\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"ServiceName\": \"krbtgt/local.example.org\", \"ServiceSid\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"TicketOptions\": \"0x40810010\", \"Status\": \"0x4b\", \"TicketEncryptionType\": \"0xffffffff\", \"PreAuthType\": \"-\", \"IpAddress\": \"::ffff:55.99.99.7\", \"IpPort\": \"49681\", \"CertIssuerName\": \"CN=INDSI218\", \"CertSerialNumber\": \"01\", \"CertThumbprint\": \"4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-30 08:58:24\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog10\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4768",
"message": "Un ticket d\u2019authentification Kerberos (TGT) a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9.\r\n\r\nInformations sur le compte :\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tjdoe\r\n\tNom du domaine Kerberos fourni :\tlocal.example.org\r\n\tID de l\u2019utilisateur :\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\r\nInformations sur le service :\r\n\tNom du service :\t\tkrbtgt/local.example.org\r\n\tID du service :\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tAdresse du client :\t\t::ffff:10.24.20.7\r\n\tPort client :\t\t49681\r\n\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires :\r\n\tOptions du ticket :\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tCode de r\u00e9sultat :\t\t0x4B\r\n\tType de chiffrement du ticket :\t0xFFFFFFFF\r\n\tType de pr\u00e9-authentification :\t-\r\n\r\nInformations sur le certificat :\r\n\tNom de l\u2019\u00e9metteur du certificat :\t\tCN=INDSI218\r\n\tNum\u00e9ro de s\u00e9rie du certificat :\t01\r\n\t Empreinte num\u00e9rique du certificat :\t\t4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9\r\n\r\nLes informations sur le certificat sont fournies uniquement si un certificat a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 pour la pr\u00e9-authentification.\r\n\r\nLes types de pr\u00e9-authentification, les options de ticket, les types de chiffrement et les codes de r\u00e9sultats sont d\u00e9finis dans la RFC 4120.",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4768,
"name": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"Category": "Service d\u2019authentification Kerberos",
"CertIssuerName": "CN=INDSI218",
"CertSerialNumber": "01",
"CertThumbprint": "4871F03F06CB961643295C961CA999D4AC43A0F9",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:55.99.99.7",
"IpPort": "49681",
"Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PreAuthType": "-",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ServiceName": "krbtgt/local.example.org",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-0-0",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0x4b",
"TargetDomainName": "local.example.org",
"TargetSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserName": "jdoe",
"Task": 14339,
"TicketEncryptionType": "0xffffffff",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810010"
},
"record_id": 971339700,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 572,
"pid": 572,
"thread": {
"id": 8432
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"ip": [
"55.99.99.7"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "::ffff:55.99.99.7",
"ip": "55.99.99.7"
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "local.example.org",
"name": "jdoe"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-01-29 10:10:59\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":-9218868437227405312,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":4825,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12551,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":5298486139,\"ProcessID\":1400,\"ThreadID\":1996,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tUser Name:\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tDomain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t0x67D43768\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tClient Address:\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.\",\"Category\":\"Other Logon/Logoff Events\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"AccountName\":\"USERFOO\",\"AccountDomain\":\"KEY\",\"LogonID\":\"0x67d43768\",\"ClientAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-01-29 10:11:00\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4825",
"message": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tUser Name:\tUSERFOO\r\n\tDomain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t0x67D43768\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t1.1.1.1\r\n\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4825,
"name": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "USERFOO",
"Category": "Other Logon/Logoff Events",
"ClientAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 12551
},
"record_id": 5298486139,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"name": "HOSTFOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 1400,
"pid": 1400,
"thread": {
"id": 1996
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTFOO"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
],
"user": [
"USERFOO"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"domain": "HOSTFOO",
"name": "USERFOO"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"Hostname\": \"mars.example.org\",\n \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\n \"Severity\": \"ERROR\",\n \"EventID\": 4825,\n \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"ProcessID\": 632,\n \"Channel\": \"Security\",\n \"Message\": \"A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tUser Name:\\tJDOE\\r\\n\\tDomain:\\t\\tEXAMPLE\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t0xA360BC6B\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tClient Address:\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.\",\n \"Category\": \"Other Logon/Logoff Events\"\n}",
"event": {
"code": "4825",
"message": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tUser Name:\tJDOE\r\n\tDomain:\t\tEXAMPLE\r\n\tLogon ID:\t0xA360BC6B\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4825,
"name": "A user was denied the access to Remote Desktop. By default, users are allowed to connect only if they are members of the Remote Desktop Users group or Administrators group",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"Category": "Other Logon/Logoff Events",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "mars.example.org",
"name": "mars.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "mars.example.org",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 632,
"pid": 632
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"mars.example.org"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"JDOE"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"name": "JDOE"
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"EventTime\": \"2024-07-10 14:57:48\",\n \"Hostname\": \"FD001.example.org\",\n \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816,\n \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\n \"SeverityValue\": 2,\n \"Severity\": \"INFO\",\n \"EventID\": 4886,\n \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\n \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\n \"Version\": 0,\n \"Task\": 12805,\n \"OpcodeValue\": 0,\n \"RecordNumber\": 4403229,\n \"ActivityID\": \"{47CB07C4-5532-467D-A89C-724B854B59F7}\",\n \"ProcessID\": 900,\n \"ThreadID\": 8040,\n \"Channel\": \"Security\",\n \"Message\": \"Certificate Services received a certificate request.\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nRequest ID:\\t2715945\\r\\nRequester:\\tEXAMPLE\\\\jdoe\\r\\nAttributes:\\t\\nCertificateTemplate:NDSEClient\\r\\n\\nccm:NDFR10923.example.org\",\n \"Category\": \"Certification Services\",\n \"Opcode\": \"Info\",\n \"RequestId\": \"2715945\",\n \"Requester\": \"EXAMPLE\\\\jdoe\",\n \"Attributes\": \"\\nCertificateTemplate:NDSEClient\\r\\n\\nccm:NDFR10923.example.org\",\n \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2024-07-10 14:57:50\",\n \"SourceModuleName\": \"SecurityLog\",\n \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"\n}",
"event": {
"code": "4886",
"message": "Certificate Services received a certificate request.\r\n\t\r\nRequest ID:\t2715945\r\nRequester:\tEXAMPLE\\jdoe\r\nAttributes:\t\nCertificateTemplate:NDSEClient\r\n\nccm:NDFR10923.example.org",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4886,
"name": "Certificate Services received a certificate request",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Attributes": "\nCertificateTemplate:NDSEClient\r\n\nccm:NDFR10923.example.org",
"Category": "Certification Services",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Requester": "EXAMPLE\\jdoe",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 12805
},
"record_id": 4403229,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "FD001.example.org",
"name": "FD001.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "FD001.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 900,
"pid": 900,
"thread": {
"id": 8040
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"FD001.example.org"
],
"user": [
"jdoe"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EXAMPLE",
"name": "jdoe"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-09-13 09:24:22\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4929, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14083, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 652068049, \"ActivityID\": \"{0AFF6AA6-47D0-416B-8F6B-5931182E4C30}\", \"ProcessID\": 592, \"ThreadID\": 760, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed.\\r\\n\\r\\nDestination DRA:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nSource DRA:\\t-\\r\\nSource Address:\\t6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\\r\\nNaming Context:\\tDC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nOptions:\\t\\t16640\\r\\nStatus Code:\\t0\", \"Category\": \"Detailed Directory Service Replication\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"DestinationDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"SourceDRA\": \"-\", \"SourceAddr\": \"6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\", \"NamingContext\": \"DC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\", \"Options\": \"16640\", \"StatusCode\": \"0\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-09-13 09:38:52\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"SecurityLog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4929",
"message": "An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed.\r\n\r\nDestination DRA:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nSource DRA:\t-\r\nSource Address:\t6c073888-8c3b-45a2-8a4e-e57c65a214e9._msdcs.example.org\r\nNaming Context:\tDC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions:\t\t16640\r\nStatus Code:\t0",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4929,
"name": "An Active Directory replica source naming context was removed",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Detailed Directory Service Replication",
"DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NamingContext": "DC=Forest,DC=example,DC=org",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceDRA": "-",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 14083
},
"record_id": 652068049,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 592,
"pid": 592,
"thread": {
"id": 760
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4932, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 1, \"Task\": 14082, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1672200421, \"ActivityID\": \"{E2C58E0C-C3FA-0001-9D8E-C5E2FAC3D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 596, \"ThreadID\": 3620, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"La synchronisation d\\u2019un r\\u00e9plica d\\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory a commenc\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nDRA de destination\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nDRA source\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nContexte de nommage\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nOptions\\u00a0:\\t\\t524307\\r\\nID de la session\\u00a0:\\t437014\\r\\nUSN de d\\u00e9marrage\\u00a0:\\t239636074\", \"Category\": \"R\\u00e9plication du service d\\u2019annuaire\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"DestinationDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"SourceDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"NamingContext\": \"DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\", \"Options\": \"524307\", \"SessionID\": \"437014\", \"StartUSN\": \"239636074\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:36\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4932",
"message": "La synchronisation d\u2019un r\u00e9plica d\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory a commenc\u00e9.\r\n\r\nDRA de destination\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nDRA source\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nContexte de nommage\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions\u00a0:\t\t524307\r\nID de la session\u00a0:\t437014\r\nUSN de d\u00e9marrage\u00a0:\t239636074",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4932,
"name": "Synchronization of a replica of an Active Directory naming context has begun",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "R\u00e9plication du service d\u2019annuaire",
"DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NamingContext": "DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"SessionID": "437014",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"StartUSN": "239636074",
"Task": 14082
},
"record_id": 1672200421,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 596,
"pid": 596,
"thread": {
"id": 3620
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:34\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4933, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 1, \"Task\": 14082, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1672200422, \"ActivityID\": \"{E2C58E0C-C3FA-0001-9D8E-C5E2FAC3D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 596, \"ThreadID\": 3620, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"La synchronisation d\\u2019un r\\u00e9plica d\\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory s\\u2019est termin\\u00e9e.\\r\\n\\r\\nDRA de destination\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nDRA source\\u00a0:\\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nContexte de nommage\\u00a0:\\tDC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\nOptions\\u00a0:\\t\\t524307\\r\\nID de session\\u00a0:\\t437014\\r\\nUSN de fin\\u00a0:\\t239636088\\r\\nCode d\\u2019\\u00e9tat\\u00a0:\\t0\", \"Category\": \"R\\u00e9plication du service d\\u2019annuaire\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"DestinationDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"SourceDRA\": \"CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\", \"NamingContext\": \"DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\", \"Options\": \"524307\", \"SessionID\": \"437014\", \"EndUSN\": \"239636088\", \"StatusCode\": \"0\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-22 09:46:36\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4933",
"message": "La synchronisation d\u2019un r\u00e9plica d\u2019un contexte de nommage Active Directory s\u2019est termin\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nDRA de destination\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nDRA source\u00a0:\tCN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org\r\nContexte de nommage\u00a0:\tDC=bois,DC=example,DC=org\r\nOptions\u00a0:\t\t524307\r\nID de session\u00a0:\t437014\r\nUSN de fin\u00a0:\t239636088\r\nCode d\u2019\u00e9tat\u00a0:\t0",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4933,
"name": "Synchronization of a replica of an Active Directory naming context has ended",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "R\u00e9plication du service d\u2019annuaire",
"DestinationDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Lyon,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"EndUSN": "239636088",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NamingContext": "DC=bois,DC=example,DC=org",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"SessionID": "437014",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceDRA": "CN=NTDS Settings,CN=Nancy,CN=Servers,CN=EU-WEST1,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=example,DC=org",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 14082
},
"record_id": 1672200422,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 596,
"pid": 596,
"thread": {
"id": 3620
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-10-26 12:34:55\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 5136, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 14081, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 3509403758, \"ProcessID\": 724, \"ThreadID\": 868, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Un objet du service d\\u2019annuaire a \\u00e9t\\u00e9 modifi\\u00e9.\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nSujet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\\u00e9curit\\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tSyst\\u00e8me\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tAUTORITE NT\\r\\n\\tID d\\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x16CDFB96\\r\\n\\r\\nService d\\u2019annuaire :\\r\\n\\tNom :\\texample.org\\r\\n\\tType :\\tServices de domaine Active Directory\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nObjet :\\r\\n\\tDN :\\tDC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\\r\\n\\tGUID :\\t{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\\r\\n\\tClasse :\\tdnsNode\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nAttribut :\\r\\n\\tNom complet LDAP :\\tdNSTombstoned\\r\\n\\tSyntaxe (OID) :\\t2.5.5.8\\r\\n\\tValeur :\\tFALSE\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nOp\\u00e9ration :\\r\\n\\tType :\\tFinance\\r\\n\\tID de corr\\u00e9lation :\\t{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\\r\\n\\tID de corr\\u00e9lation d\\u2019application :\\t-\", \"Category\": \"Directory Service Changes\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"OpCorrelationID\": \"{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\", \"AppCorrelationID\": \"-\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"Syst\\u00e8me\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"AUTORITE NT\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x16cdfb96\", \"DSName\": \"example.org\", \"DSType\": \"%%14676\", \"ObjectDN\": \"DC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\", \"ObjectGUID\": \"{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\", \"ObjectClass\": \"dnsNode\", \"AttributeLDAPDisplayName\": \"dNSTombstoned\", \"AttributeSyntaxOID\": \"2.5.5.8\", \"AttributeValue\": \"FALSE\", \"OperationType\": \"%%14674\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-10-26 12:34:56\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog3\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5136",
"message": "Un objet du service d\u2019annuaire a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9.\r\n\t\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tSyst\u00e8me\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tAUTORITE NT\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x16CDFB96\r\n\r\nService d\u2019annuaire :\r\n\tNom :\texample.org\r\n\tType :\tServices de domaine Active Directory\r\n\t\r\nObjet :\r\n\tDN :\tDC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org\r\n\tGUID :\t{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}\r\n\tClasse :\tdnsNode\r\n\t\r\nAttribut :\r\n\tNom complet LDAP :\tdNSTombstoned\r\n\tSyntaxe (OID) :\t2.5.5.8\r\n\tValeur :\tFALSE\r\n\t\r\nOp\u00e9ration :\r\n\tType :\tFinance\r\n\tID de corr\u00e9lation :\t{0d91bb0f-05ef-470e-9ba3-ecd9be52703c}\r\n\tID de corr\u00e9lation d\u2019application :\t-",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 5136,
"name": "A directory service object was modified",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AttributeLDAPDisplayName": "dNSTombstoned",
"AttributeValue": "FALSE",
"Category": "Directory Service Changes",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectClass": "dnsNode",
"ObjectDN": "DC=dhcp,DC=example.org,cn=MicrosoftDNS,cn=System,DC=example,DC=org",
"ObjectGUID": "{2b7f344c-843a-4056-b411-7114b87974a4}",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"OperationType": "%%14674",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x16cdfb96",
"SubjectUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 14081
},
"record_id": 3509403758,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 724,
"pid": 724,
"thread": {
"id": 868
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-08-23 11:20:47\",\"Hostname\":\"VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427912192,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":514,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EB79061A-A566-4698-9119-3ED2807060E7}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":5,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1285844,\"ProcessID\":2580,\"ThreadID\":3344,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer/Audit\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"The zone mail.corp.net was updated. The MasterServers setting has been set to 1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2. [virtualization instance: .].\",\"Category\":\"ZONE_OP\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Zone\":\"mail.corp.net\",\"PropertyKey\":\"MasterServers\",\"NewValue\":\"1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2\",\"VirtualizationID\":\".\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-08-23 11:20:48\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_other\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "514",
"message": "The zone mail.corp.net was updated. The MasterServers setting has been set to 1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2. [virtualization instance: .].",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer"
},
"action": {
"id": 514,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "ZONE_OP",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "4611686018427912192",
"NewValue": "1.1.1.1,2.2.2.2",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{EB79061A-A566-4698-9119-3ED2807060E7}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer",
"Task": 5,
"Zone": "mail.corp.net"
},
"record_id": 1285844,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-DNSServer/Audit"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL",
"name": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 2580,
"pid": 2580,
"thread": {
"id": 3344
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"VWSERV.CORP.LOCAL"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2024-08-05 11:38:06\",\"Hostname\":\"hostname.test.com\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5156,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":12810,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3909688690,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":6140,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.\\r\\n\\r\\nApplication Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t832\\r\\n\\tApplication Name:\\t\\\\device\\\\harddisk\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tDirection:\\t\\tInbound\\r\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t1\\r\\n\\tDestination Address:\\t5.6.7.8\\r\\n\\tDestination Port:\\t\\t2\\r\\n\\tProtocol:\\t\\t6\\r\\n\\r\\nFilter Information:\\r\\n\\tFilter Run-Time ID:\\t0\\r\\n\\tLayer Name:\\t\\tReceive/Accept\\r\\n\\tLayer Run-Time ID:\\t44\",\"Category\":\"Filtering Platform Connection\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Application\":\"\\\\device\\\\harddisk\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\test.exe\",\"Direction\":\"%%14592\",\"SourceAddress\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"SourcePort\":\"1\",\"DestAddress\":\"5.6.7.8\",\"DestPort\":\"2\",\"Protocol\":\"6\",\"FilterRTID\":\"0\",\"LayerName\":\"%%14610\",\"LayerRTID\":\"44\",\"RemoteUserID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"RemoteMachineID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2024-08-05 11:38:47\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5156",
"message": "The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.\r\n\r\nApplication Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t832\r\n\tApplication Name:\t\\device\\harddisk\\windows\\system32\\test.exe\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tDirection:\t\tInbound\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t1\r\n\tDestination Address:\t5.6.7.8\r\n\tDestination Port:\t\t2\r\n\tProtocol:\t\t6\r\n\r\nFilter Information:\r\n\tFilter Run-Time ID:\t0\r\n\tLayer Name:\t\tReceive/Accept\r\n\tLayer Run-Time ID:\t44",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 5156,
"name": "The Windows Filtering Platform has allowed a connection",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Application": "\\device\\harddisk\\windows\\system32\\test.exe",
"Category": "Filtering Platform Connection",
"DestinationPort": "2",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 12810
},
"record_id": 3909688690,
"target": "network-traffic",
"type": "Security"
},
"destination": {
"address": "5.6.7.8",
"ip": "5.6.7.8",
"port": 2
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.test.com",
"name": "hostname.test.com"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.test.com",
"level": "info"
},
"network": {
"transport": "6"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 4,
"name": "test.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 6140
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.test.com"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 1
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\",\"Hostname\":\"foo.net\",\"Keywords\":1152921504606846976,\"EventType\":\"VERBOSE\",\"SeverityValue\":1,\"Severity\":\"DEBUG\",\"EventID\":5408,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":764816422,\"ActivityID\":\"{D938DD9B-F8EF-4227-A505-1169A1E3873E}\",\"ProcessID\":5440,\"ThreadID\":8428,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"{\\\"EventTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\\\",\\\"Hostname\\\":\\\"foo.net\\\",\\\"Keywords\\\":1152921504606846976,\\\"EventType\\\":\\\"VERBOSE\\\",\\\"SeverityValue\\\":1,\\\"Severity\\\":\\\"DEBUG\\\",\\\"EventID\\\":5408,\\\"SourceName\\\":\\\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering\\\",\\\"ProviderGuid\\\":\\\"{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}\\\",\\\"Version\\\":0,\\\"Task\\\":0,\\\"OpcodeValue\\\":0,\\\"RecordNumber\\\":764816422,\\\"ActivityID\\\":\\\"{D938DD9B-F8EF-4227-A505-1169A1E3873E}\\\",\\\"ProcessID\\\":5440,\\\"ThreadID\\\":8428,\\\"Channel\\\":\\\"Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose\\\",\\\"Domain\\\":\\\"NT AUTHORITY\\\",\\\"AccountName\\\":\\\"SYSTEM\\\",\\\"UserID\\\":\\\"S-1-5-18\\\",\\\"AccountType\\\":\\\"User\\\",\\\"Message\\\":\\\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\\\r\\\\n\\\",\\\"Opcode\\\":\\\"Info\\\",\\\"LogString\\\":\\\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\\\r\\\\n\\\",\\\"EventReceivedTime\\\":\\\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\\\",\\\"SourceModuleName\\\":\\\"eventlog\\\",\\\"SourceModuleType\\\":\\\"im_msvistalog\\\"}\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"LogString\":\"[RCM] Sending Control Code GET_PRIVATE_PROPERTIES Id 25237136 \\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-09-25 15:29:18\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}\n",
"event": {
"code": "5408",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering"
},
"action": {
"id": 5408,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "VERBOSE",
"Keywords": "1152921504606846976",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{BAF908EA-3421-4CA9-9B84-6689B8C6F85F}",
"Severity": "DEBUG",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 764816422,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-FailoverClustering/DiagnosticVerbose"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "foo.net",
"name": "foo.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "foo.net",
"level": "debug"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 5440,
"pid": 5440,
"thread": {
"id": 8428
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"foo.net"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-10-05 23:50:40\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":36028797018963968,\"EventType\":\"ERROR\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":56,\"SourceName\":\"TermDD\",\"Task\":0,\"RecordNumber\":930150,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"System\",\"Message\":\"The Terminal Server security layer detected an error in the protocol stream and has disconnected the client. Client IP: 1.1.1.1.\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-10-18 09:34:39\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "56",
"message": "The Terminal Server security layer detected an error in the protocol stream and has disconnected the client. Client IP: 1.1.1.1.",
"provider": "TermDD"
},
"action": {
"id": 56,
"properties": {
"EventType": "ERROR",
"Keywords": "36028797018963968",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "TermDD",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 930150,
"type": "System"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"name": "HOSTFOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 0,
"pid": 0,
"thread": {
"id": 0
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTFOO"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-10-26 13:11:01\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 6272, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 2, \"Task\": 12552, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 1674356873, \"ActivityID\": \"{0320A758-C2C2-0002-9DA7-2003C2C2D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 788, \"ThreadID\": 7392, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Network Policy Server granted access to a user.\\r\\n\\r\\nUser:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\thost/l4523.example.org\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t\\tEX1\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\tEX1\\\\L4523\\r\\n\\r\\nClient Machine:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tCalled Station Identifier:\\t\\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\\r\\n\\tCalling Station Identifier:\\t\\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\\r\\n\\r\\nNAS:\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv4 Address:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv6 Address:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNAS Identifier:\\t\\t\\tELEBEYCOBI\\r\\n\\tNAS Port-Type:\\t\\t\\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\\r\\n\\tNAS Port:\\t\\t\\t8\\r\\n\\r\\nRADIUS Client:\\r\\n\\tClient Friendly Name:\\t\\tELEBEYCOBI\\r\\n\\tClient IP Address:\\t\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\r\\nAuthentication Details:\\r\\n\\tConnection Request Policy Name:\\tSecure Wireless Connections\\r\\n\\tNetwork Policy Name:\\t\\tSecure Wifi Computer\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Provider:\\t\\tWindows\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Server:\\t\\tauth.example.org\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Type:\\t\\tPEAP\\r\\n\\tEAP Type:\\t\\t\\tMicrosoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\\r\\n\\tAccount Session Identifier:\\t\\t111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\\r\\n\\tLogging Results:\\t\\t\\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\\r\\n\", \"Category\": \"Network Policy Server\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"host/l4523.example.org\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EX1\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName\": \"EX1\\\\L4523\", \"SubjectMachineSID\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"SubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"CalledStationID\": \"0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\", \"CallingStationID\": \"a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\", \"NASIPv4Address\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"NASIPv6Address\": \"-\", \"NASIdentifier\": \"ELEBEYCOBI\", \"NASPortType\": \"Wireless - IEEE 802.11\", \"NASPort\": \"8\", \"ClientName\": \"ELEBEYCOBI\", \"ClientIPAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"ProxyPolicyName\": \"Secure Wireless Connections\", \"NetworkPolicyName\": \"Secure Wifi Computer\", \"AuthenticationProvider\": \"Windows\", \"AuthenticationServer\": \"auth.example.org\", \"AuthenticationType\": \"PEAP\", \"EAPType\": \"Microsoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\", \"AccountSessionIdentifier\": \"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\", \"LoggingResult\": \"Accounting information was written to the local log file.\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-10-26 13:11:01\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "6272",
"message": "Network Policy Server granted access to a user.\r\n\r\nUser:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\thost/l4523.example.org\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t\tEX1\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\tEX1\\L4523\r\n\r\nClient Machine:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\t-\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\t-\r\n\tCalled Station Identifier:\t\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\r\n\tCalling Station Identifier:\t\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\r\n\r\nNAS:\r\n\tNAS IPv4 Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tNAS IPv6 Address:\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Identifier:\t\t\tELEBEYCOBI\r\n\tNAS Port-Type:\t\t\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\r\n\tNAS Port:\t\t\t8\r\n\r\nRADIUS Client:\r\n\tClient Friendly Name:\t\tELEBEYCOBI\r\n\tClient IP Address:\t\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\nAuthentication Details:\r\n\tConnection Request Policy Name:\tSecure Wireless Connections\r\n\tNetwork Policy Name:\t\tSecure Wifi Computer\r\n\tAuthentication Provider:\t\tWindows\r\n\tAuthentication Server:\t\tauth.example.org\r\n\tAuthentication Type:\t\tPEAP\r\n\tEAP Type:\t\t\tMicrosoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)\r\n\tAccount Session Identifier:\t\t111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111\r\n\tLogging Results:\t\t\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\r\n",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 6272,
"name": "Network Policy Server granted access to a user",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationProvider": "Windows",
"AuthenticationServer": "auth.example.org",
"AuthenticationType": "PEAP",
"CallingStationID": "a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67",
"Category": "Network Policy Server",
"ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"ClientName": "ELEBEYCOBI",
"EAPType": "Microsoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NASIdentifier": "ELEBEYCOBI",
"NASPort": "8",
"NASPortType": "Wireless - IEEE 802.11",
"NetworkPolicyName": "Secure Wifi Computer",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ProxyPolicyName": "Secure Wireless Connections",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "EX1",
"SubjectUserName": "host/l4523.example.org",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"Task": 12552
},
"record_id": 1674356873,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 788,
"pid": 788,
"thread": {
"id": 7392
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"user": [
"host/l4523.example.org"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EX1",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "host/l4523.example.org"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-10-26 14:42:27\", \"Hostname\": \"hostname.example.org\", \"Keywords\": -9218868437227405312, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_FAILURE\", \"SeverityValue\": 4, \"Severity\": \"ERROR\", \"EventID\": 6273, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 2, \"Task\": 12552, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 783949626, \"ActivityID\": \"{7C2CEDDA-C2C3-0003-04EE-2C7CC3C2D901}\", \"ProcessID\": 760, \"ThreadID\": 3448, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"Network Policy Server denied access to a user.\\r\\n\\r\\nContact the Network Policy Server administrator for more information.\\r\\n\\r\\nUser:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\tjdoe\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t\\tEX1\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\texample.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\\r\\n\\r\\nClient Machine:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tFully Qualified Account Name:\\t-\\r\\n\\tCalled Station Identifier:\\t\\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\\r\\n\\tCalling Station Identifier:\\t\\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\\r\\n\\r\\nNAS:\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv4 Address:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tNAS IPv6 Address:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNAS Identifier:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNAS Port-Type:\\t\\t\\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\\r\\n\\tNAS Port:\\t\\t\\t29\\r\\n\\r\\nRADIUS Client:\\r\\n\\tClient Friendly Name:\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\tClient IP Address:\\t\\t\\t1.2.3.4\\r\\n\\r\\nAuthentication Details:\\r\\n\\tConnection Request Policy Name:\\tSecure Wireless Connections\\r\\n\\tNetwork Policy Name:\\t\\tConnections to other access servers\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Provider:\\t\\tWindows\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Server:\\t\\tauth.example.org\\r\\n\\tAuthentication Type:\\t\\tEAP\\r\\n\\tEAP Type:\\t\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Session Identifier:\\t\\t1111111111111111111111111111111111\\r\\n\\tLogging Results:\\t\\t\\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\\r\\n\\tReason Code:\\t\\t\\t66\\r\\n\\tReason:\\t\\t\\t\\tThe user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\\r\\n\", \"Category\": \"Network Policy Server\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"jdoe\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"EX1\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName\": \"example.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\", \"SubjectMachineSID\": \"S-1-0-0\", \"SubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName\": \"-\", \"CalledStationID\": \"0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\", \"CallingStationID\": \"a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\", \"NASIPv4Address\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"NASIPv6Address\": \"-\", \"NASIdentifier\": \"-\", \"NASPortType\": \"Wireless - IEEE 802.11\", \"NASPort\": \"29\", \"ClientName\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"ClientIPAddress\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"ProxyPolicyName\": \"Secure Wireless Connections\", \"NetworkPolicyName\": \"Connections to other access servers\", \"AuthenticationProvider\": \"Windows\", \"AuthenticationServer\": \"auth.example.org\", \"AuthenticationType\": \"EAP\", \"EAPType\": \"-\", \"AccountSessionIdentifier\": \"1111111111111111111111111111111111\", \"ReasonCode\": \"66\", \"Reason\": \"The user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\", \"LoggingResult\": \"Accounting information was written to the local log file.\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-10-26 14:42:33\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "6273",
"message": "Network Policy Server denied access to a user.\r\n\r\nContact the Network Policy Server administrator for more information.\r\n\r\nUser:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\tjdoe\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t\tEX1\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\texample.org/EX1/Users/Standard/John DOE\r\n\r\nClient Machine:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t\t-\r\n\tFully Qualified Account Name:\t-\r\n\tCalled Station Identifier:\t\t0c-c2-6d-91-dd-25:Athos\r\n\tCalling Station Identifier:\t\ta9-7c-7d-ac-47-67\r\n\r\nNAS:\r\n\tNAS IPv4 Address:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tNAS IPv6 Address:\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Identifier:\t\t\t-\r\n\tNAS Port-Type:\t\t\tWireless - IEEE 802.11\r\n\tNAS Port:\t\t\t29\r\n\r\nRADIUS Client:\r\n\tClient Friendly Name:\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\tClient IP Address:\t\t\t1.2.3.4\r\n\r\nAuthentication Details:\r\n\tConnection Request Policy Name:\tSecure Wireless Connections\r\n\tNetwork Policy Name:\t\tConnections to other access servers\r\n\tAuthentication Provider:\t\tWindows\r\n\tAuthentication Server:\t\tauth.example.org\r\n\tAuthentication Type:\t\tEAP\r\n\tEAP Type:\t\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Session Identifier:\t\t1111111111111111111111111111111111\r\n\tLogging Results:\t\t\tAccounting information was written to the local log file.\r\n\tReason Code:\t\t\t66\r\n\tReason:\t\t\t\tThe user attempted to use an authentication method that is not enabled on the matching network policy.\r\n",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 6273,
"name": "Network Policy Server denied access to a user",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationProvider": "Windows",
"AuthenticationServer": "auth.example.org",
"AuthenticationType": "EAP",
"CallingStationID": "a9-7c-7d-ac-47-67",
"Category": "Network Policy Server",
"ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"ClientName": "1.2.3.4",
"EAPType": "-",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
"NASIdentifier": "-",
"NASPort": "29",
"NASPortType": "Wireless - IEEE 802.11",
"NetworkPolicyName": "Connections to other access servers",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ProxyPolicyName": "Secure Wireless Connections",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "EX1",
"SubjectUserName": "jdoe",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"Task": 12552
},
"record_id": 783949626,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"name": "hostname.example.org"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostname.example.org",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 760,
"pid": 760,
"thread": {
"id": 3448
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"hostname.example.org"
],
"user": [
"jdoe"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EX1",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "jdoe"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-07 17:51:22\", \"Hostname\": \"local\", \"Keywords\": -922355554775808, \"EventType\": \"INFO\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 7, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{77777-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\", \"Version\": 3, \"Task\": 7, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 13717971, \"ProcessID\": 4916, \"ThreadID\": 6372, \"Channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\", \"Domain\": \"AUTORITE NT\", \"AccountName\": \"Syst\\u00e8me\", \"UserID\": \"S-1-5-99\", \"AccountType\": \"User\", \"Message\": \"Image loaded:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\\r\\nProcessGuid: {9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\\r\\nProcessId: 15368\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\\r\\nImageLoaded: C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\stage\\\\Teams.exe\\r\\nFileVersion: -\\r\\nDescription: -\\r\\nProduct: -\\r\\nCompany: -\\r\\nOriginalFileName: -\\r\\nHashes: -\\r\\nSigned: failed: Invalid hash\\r\\nSignature: -\\r\\nSignatureStatus: -\\r\\nUser: myuser\", \"Category\": \"Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)\", \"Opcode\": \"Informations\", \"RuleName\": \"-\", \"UtcTime\": \"2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\", \"ProcessGuid\": \"{9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\", \"Image\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\current\\\\Teams.exe\", \"ImageLoaded\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\myuser\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Teams\\\\stage\\\\Teams.exe\", \"FileVersion\": \"-\", \"Description\": \"-\", \"Product\": \"-\", \"Company\": \"-\", \"OriginalFileName\": \"-\", \"Hashes\": \"-\", \"Signed\": \"failed: Invalid hash\", \"Signature\": \"-\", \"SignatureStatus\": \"-\", \"User\": \"myuser\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-07 17:51:23\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"evtx_win\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "7",
"message": "Image loaded:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2023-08-07 15:51:22.721\r\nProcessGuid: {9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}\r\nProcessId: 15368\r\nImage: C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe\r\nImageLoaded: C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe\r\nFileVersion: -\r\nDescription: -\r\nProduct: -\r\nCompany: -\r\nOriginalFileName: -\r\nHashes: -\r\nSigned: failed: Invalid hash\r\nSignature: -\r\nSignatureStatus: -\r\nUser: myuser",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2023-08-07T15:51:22.721000Z",
"action": {
"id": 7,
"name": "Image loaded",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
"ImageLoaded": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe",
"Keywords": "-922355554775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{9b7ebdcf-12fa-64d1-5e12-000000009f00}",
"ProviderGuid": "{77777-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"Signature": "-",
"SignatureStatus": "-",
"Signed": "failed: Invalid hash",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 7,
"User": "myuser"
},
"record_id": 13717971,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"dll": {
"path": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\stage\\Teams.exe"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "local",
"name": "local"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "local",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\Teams.exe",
"id": 15368,
"name": "Teams.exe",
"pid": 15368,
"thread": {
"id": 6372
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Users\\myuser\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Teams\\current\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"local"
],
"user": [
"myuser"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-99",
"name": "myuser"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2024-08-05 17:56:15\",\"Hostname\":\"Hostname.test.com\",\"Keywords\":-921436483760000000,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4688,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":13312,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":255073557,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":22092,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A new process has been created.\\r\\n\\r\\nCreator Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tSE-1-1-1\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tJOEDOE$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tTEST\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x388\\r\\n\\r\\nTarget Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tSE-0-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x5878\\r\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\Sys\\\\test.exe\\r\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\t%%1936\\r\\n\\tMandatory Label:\\t\\tSE-1-1-14\\r\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x4534\\r\\n\\tCreator Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\TEST\\\\TEST Client\\\\TEST.exe\\r\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance always program using Run as administrator.\",\"Category\":\"Process Creation\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"SE-1-5-1\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"JOEDOE$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"TEST\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"NewProcessId\":\"0x5878\",\"NewProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Sys\\\\TEST.exe\",\"TokenElevationType\":\"%%1936\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"SE-1-0-0\",\"TargetUserName\":\"-\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"-\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"ParentProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\TEST\\\\TEST Client\\\\TEST.exe\",\"MandatoryLabel\":\"SE-1-16-16384\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2024-08-05 17:56:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"sourcemoduletest\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"testlog\"}\n",
"event": {
"code": "4688",
"message": "A new process has been created.\r\n\r\nCreator Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tSE-1-1-1\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tJOEDOE$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tTEST\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x388\r\n\r\nTarget Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tSE-0-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tNew Process ID:\t\t0x5878\r\n\tNew Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\Sys\\test.exe\r\n\tToken Elevation Type:\t%%1936\r\n\tMandatory Label:\t\tSE-1-1-14\r\n\tCreator Process ID:\t0x4534\r\n\tCreator Process Name:\tC:\\Program Files (x86)\\TEST\\TEST Client\\TEST.exe\r\n\tProcess Command Line:\t\r\n\r\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance always program using Run as administrator.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4688,
"name": "A new process has been created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Process Creation",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-921436483760000000",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "TEST",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "JOEDOE$",
"SubjectUserSid": "SE-1-5-1",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetUserSid": "SE-1-0-0",
"Task": 13312
},
"record_id": 255073557,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "Hostname.test.com",
"name": "Hostname.test.com"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "Hostname.test.com",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\Sys\\TEST.exe",
"id": 22648,
"name": "TEST.exe",
"parent": {
"command_line": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TEST\\TEST Client\\TEST.exe",
"executable": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TEST\\TEST Client\\TEST.exe",
"name": "TEST.exe",
"pid": 17716,
"working_directory": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TEST\\TEST Client\\"
},
"pid": 22648,
"thread": {
"id": 22092
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\Sys\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"Hostname.test.com"
],
"user": [
"JOEDOE$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "TEST",
"id": "SE-1-5-1",
"name": "JOEDOE$",
"target": {
"id": "SE-1-0-0"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-08-22 14:58:41\",\"Hostname\":\"hostfoo\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":1,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":1,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":4244505,\"ProcessID\":2932,\"ThreadID\":3956,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Process Create:\\\\r\\\\nRuleName: -\\\\r\\\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\\\\r\\\\nProcessGuid: {478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\\\\r\\\\nProcessId: 5524\\\\r\\\\nImage: C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\\\\\v1.0\\\\\\\\powershell.exe\\\\r\\\\nFileVersion: 10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\\\\r\\\\nDescription: Windows PowerShell\\\\r\\\\nProduct: Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\\\\r\\\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\\\r\\\\nOriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE\\\\r\\\\nCommandLine: powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\\\\r\\\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\\\\r\\\\nLogonGuid: {478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\\\\r\\\\nLogonId: 0x3E7\\\\r\\\\nTerminalSessionId: 0\\\\r\\\\nIntegrityLevel: System\\\\r\\\\nHashes: SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\\\\r\\\\nParentProcessGuid: {478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\\\\r\\\\nParentProcessId: 1776\\\\r\\\\nParentImage: C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\\\\r\\\\nParentCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\\\" service --run --name nscp\\\\r\\\\nParentUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\",\"Category\":\"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"RuleName\":\"-\",\"UtcTime\":\"2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\\\\\v1.0\\\\\\\\powershell.exe\",\"FileVersion\":\"10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\",\"Description\":\"Windows PowerShell\",\"Product\":\"Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\",\"Company\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"OriginalFileName\":\"PowerShell.EXE\",\"CommandLine\":\"powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\",\"CurrentDirectory\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\\",\"User\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\",\"LogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"TerminalSessionId\":\"0\",\"IntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"Hashes\":\"SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\",\"ParentProcessGuid\":\"{478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\",\"ParentProcessId\":\"1776\",\"ParentImage\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\",\"ParentCommandLine\":\"\\\"C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\\\nscp.exe\\\" service --run --name nscp\",\"ParentUser\":\"NT AUTHORITY\\\\\\\\SYSTEM\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-08-22 14:58:42\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "1",
"message": "Process Create:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2023-08-22 12:58:41.279\\r\\nProcessGuid: {478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}\\r\\nProcessId: 5524\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\\r\\nFileVersion: 10.0.14409.1005 (rs1_srvoob.161208-1155)\\r\\nDescription: Windows PowerShell\\r\\nProduct: Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\\r\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\r\\nOriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE\\r\\nCommandLine: powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1\\r\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\\\r\\nUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\nLogonGuid: {478F86EF-58DE-64E4-E703-000000000000}\\r\\nLogonId: 0x3E7\\r\\nTerminalSessionId: 0\\r\\nIntegrityLevel: System\\r\\nHashes: SHA1=E5B0A0F4A59D6D5377332EECE20F8F3DF5CEBE4E,MD5=B3AD5364CF04B6AB05616DD483AAF618,SHA256=7375ADEDB82FD62CEFC6B6FD20A704A164E056022F3B8C2E1B94F3A9B8361478\\r\\nParentProcessGuid: {478F86EF-58E2-64E4-2600-00000000E900}\\r\\nParentProcessId: 1776\\r\\nParentImage: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\\r\\nParentCommandLine: \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe\" service --run --name nscp\\r\\nParentUser: NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"reason": "Windows PowerShell"
},
"@timestamp": "2023-08-22T12:58:41.279000Z",
"action": {
"id": 1,
"name": "Process creation",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ParentImage": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe",
"ProcessGuid": "{478F86EF-B101-64E4-F904-00000000E900}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 1,
"User": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM"
},
"record_id": 4244505,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "hostfoo",
"name": "hostfoo"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "hostfoo",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "powershell.exe -file C:/Dir/Scripts/Nagios/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership/Get-LocalAdmGroupMembership.ps1",
"executable": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe",
"hash": {
"md5": "b3ad5364cf04b6ab05616dd483aaf618",
"sha1": "e5b0a0f4a59d6d5377332eece20f8f3df5cebe4e",
"sha256": "7375adedb82fd62cefc6b6fd20a704a164e056022f3b8c2e1b94f3a9b8361478"
},
"id": 2932,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"parent": {
"command_line": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe service --run --name nscp",
"executable": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\nscp.exe",
"name": "nscp.exe",
"working_directory": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\"
},
"pid": 2932,
"ppid": "1776",
"thread": {
"id": 3956
},
"working_directory": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\NSClient++\\\\"
},
"related": {
"hash": [
"7375adedb82fd62cefc6b6fd20a704a164e056022f3b8c2e1b94f3a9b8361478",
"b3ad5364cf04b6ab05616dd483aaf618",
"e5b0a0f4a59d6d5377332eece20f8f3df5cebe4e"
],
"hosts": [
"hostfoo"
],
"user": [
"NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-09-13 16:15:44\",\"Hostname\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"Keywords\":-9182839640208441000,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":1201,\"SourceName\":\"AD FS Auditing\",\"Task\":3,\"RecordNumber\":1012533579,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Domain\":\"KEY\",\"AccountName\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"The Federation Service failed to issue a valid token. See XML for failure details. \\r\\n\\r\\nActivity ID: bc38fffc-f8ab-42f2-b5e3-69fabf2e20e6 \\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Data \\r\\nXML: <?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"utf-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\\\" xmlns:xsi=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\\\" xsi:type=\\\"AppTokenAudit\\\">\\r\\n <AuditType>AppToken</AuditType>\\r\\n <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\\r\\n <FailureType>GenericError</FailureType>\\r\\n <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\\r\\n <ContextComponents>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"ResourceAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\\r\\n <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\\r\\n <UserId>firstname.lastname@example.org</UserId>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"AuthNAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\\r\\n <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\\r\\n <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\\r\\n <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\\r\\n <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\\r\\n <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\\r\\n <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\\r\\n <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"ProtocolAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\\r\\n <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"RequestAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\\r\\n <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\\r\\n <NetworkLocation>Extranet</NetworkLocation>\\r\\n <IpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\\r\\n <ForwardedIpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</ForwardedIpAddress>\\r\\n <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\\r\\n <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\\r\\n <ProxyServer>proxy-server</ProxyServer>\\r\\n <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36</UserAgentString>\\r\\n <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n </ContextComponents>\\r\\n</AuditBase>\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-09-13 16:15:45\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "1201",
"message": "The Federation Service failed to issue a valid token. See XML for failure details. \r\n\r\nActivity ID: bc38fffc-f8ab-42f2-b5e3-69fabf2e20e6 \r\n\r\nAdditional Data \r\nXML: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-16\"?>\r\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"AppTokenAudit\">\r\n <AuditType>AppToken</AuditType>\r\n <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\r\n <FailureType>GenericError</FailureType>\r\n <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\r\n <ContextComponents>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ResourceAuditComponent\">\r\n <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\r\n <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\r\n <UserId>firstname.lastname@example.org</UserId>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"AuthNAuditComponent\">\r\n <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\r\n <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\r\n <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\r\n <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\r\n <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\r\n <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\r\n <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\r\n <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ProtocolAuditComponent\">\r\n <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\r\n <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"RequestAuditComponent\">\r\n <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\r\n <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\r\n <NetworkLocation>Extranet</NetworkLocation>\r\n <IpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\r\n <ForwardedIpAddress>1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1,1.1.1.1</ForwardedIpAddress>\r\n <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\r\n <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\r\n <ProxyServer>proxy-server</ProxyServer>\r\n <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36</UserAgentString>\r\n <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\r\n </Component>\r\n </ContextComponents>\r\n</AuditBase>",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "AD FS Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 1201,
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "<REDACTED>",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "KEY",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Keywords": "-9182839640208441000",
"ProxyServer": "proxy-server",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "AD FS Auditing",
"Task": 3
},
"record_id": 1012533579,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "<REDACTED>",
"name": "<REDACTED>"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "<REDACTED>",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 0,
"pid": 0,
"thread": {
"id": 0
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"<REDACTED>"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
],
"user": [
"<REDACTED>"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000",
"name": "<REDACTED>"
},
"user_agent": {
"device": {
"name": "Samsung SM-A217F"
},
"name": "Chrome Mobile WebView",
"original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 11; SM-A217F Build/RP1A.200720.012; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/94.0.4606.85 Mobile Safari/537.36",
"os": {
"name": "Android",
"version": "11"
},
"version": "94.0.4606"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-09-20 15:54:13\",\"Hostname\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"Keywords\":-9182839640208441000,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":1203,\"SourceName\":\"AD FS Auditing\",\"Task\":3,\"RecordNumber\":959944122,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Domain\":\"KEY\",\"AccountName\":\"<REDACTED>\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"The Federation Service failed to validate a new credential. See XML for failure details. \\r\\n\\r\\nActivity ID: d404fc6c-c19c-40d7-a4fb-e8ebeb1bfc56 \\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Data \\r\\nXML: <?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"utf-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\\\" xmlns:xsi=\\\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\\\" xsi:type=\\\"FreshCredentialAudit\\\">\\r\\n <AuditType>FreshCredentials</AuditType>\\r\\n <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\\r\\n <FailureType>CredentialValidationError</FailureType>\\r\\n <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\\r\\n <ContextComponents>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"ResourceAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\\r\\n <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\\r\\n <UserId>username@example.org</UserId>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"AuthNAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\\r\\n <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\\r\\n <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\\r\\n <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\\r\\n <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\\r\\n <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\\r\\n <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\\r\\n <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"ProtocolAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\\r\\n <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n <Component xsi:type=\\\"RequestAuditComponent\\\">\\r\\n <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\\r\\n <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\\r\\n <NetworkLocation>Intranet</NetworkLocation>\\r\\n <IpAddress>1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\\r\\n <ForwardedIpAddress />\\r\\n <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\\r\\n <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\\r\\n <ProxyServer>N/A</ProxyServer>\\r\\n <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044</UserAgentString>\\r\\n <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\\r\\n </Component>\\r\\n </ContextComponents>\\r\\n</AuditBase>\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-09-20 15:54:15\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "1203",
"message": "The Federation Service failed to validate a new credential. See XML for failure details. \r\n\r\nActivity ID: d404fc6c-c19c-40d7-a4fb-e8ebeb1bfc56 \r\n\r\nAdditional Data \r\nXML: <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-16\"?>\r\n<AuditBase xmlns:xsd=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"FreshCredentialAudit\">\r\n <AuditType>FreshCredentials</AuditType>\r\n <AuditResult>Failure</AuditResult>\r\n <FailureType>CredentialValidationError</FailureType>\r\n <ErrorCode>N/A</ErrorCode>\r\n <ContextComponents>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ResourceAuditComponent\">\r\n <RelyingParty>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</RelyingParty>\r\n <ClaimsProvider>N/A</ClaimsProvider>\r\n <UserId>username@example.org</UserId>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"AuthNAuditComponent\">\r\n <PrimaryAuth>N/A</PrimaryAuth>\r\n <DeviceAuth>false</DeviceAuth>\r\n <DeviceId>N/A</DeviceId>\r\n <MfaPerformed>false</MfaPerformed>\r\n <MfaMethod>N/A</MfaMethod>\r\n <TokenBindingProvidedId>false</TokenBindingProvidedId>\r\n <TokenBindingReferredId>false</TokenBindingReferredId>\r\n <SsoBindingValidationLevel>NotSet</SsoBindingValidationLevel>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"ProtocolAuditComponent\">\r\n <OAuthClientId>N/A</OAuthClientId>\r\n <OAuthGrant>N/A</OAuthGrant>\r\n </Component>\r\n <Component xsi:type=\"RequestAuditComponent\">\r\n <Server>http://auth.example.org/adfs/services/trust</Server>\r\n <AuthProtocol>WSFederation</AuthProtocol>\r\n <NetworkLocation>Intranet</NetworkLocation>\r\n <IpAddress>1.1.1.1</IpAddress>\r\n <ForwardedIpAddress />\r\n <ProxyIpAddress>N/A</ProxyIpAddress>\r\n <NetworkIpAddress>N/A</NetworkIpAddress>\r\n <ProxyServer>N/A</ProxyServer>\r\n <UserAgentString>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044</UserAgentString>\r\n <Endpoint>/adfs/ls/</Endpoint>\r\n </Component>\r\n </ContextComponents>\r\n</AuditBase>",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "AD FS Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 1203,
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "<REDACTED>",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "KEY",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"Keywords": "-9182839640208441000",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "AD FS Auditing",
"Task": 3
},
"record_id": 959944122,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "<REDACTED>",
"name": "<REDACTED>"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "<REDACTED>",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 0,
"pid": 0,
"thread": {
"id": 0
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"<REDACTED>"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
],
"user": [
"<REDACTED>"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-0000000000-0000000000-0000000000-000000",
"name": "<REDACTED>"
},
"user_agent": {
"device": {
"name": "Other"
},
"name": "Edge",
"original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; WebView/3.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36 Edge/18.19044",
"os": {
"name": "Windows",
"version": "10"
},
"version": "18.19044"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2024-07-06 02:20:36\",\"Hostname\":\"srv023.example.com\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"WARNING\",\"SeverityValue\":3,\"Severity\":\"WARNING\",\"EventID\":1,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{85A62A0D-7E17-485F-9D4F-749A287193A6}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":606266,\"ProcessID\":2392,\"ThreadID\":2932,\"Channel\":\"Application\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"System\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"D\u00e9tection possible de CVE : [CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit\\r\\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires : Cert: <CS.EXAMPLE.ORG> sha1: ADC83B19E793491B1C6EA0FD8B46CD9F32E592FC IssuerDepthCount: 13 Limit: 12\\r\\n\\r\\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une tentative d\u2019exploitation d\u2019une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 connue ([CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit) est d\u00e9tect\u00e9e.\\r\\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est d\u00e9clench\u00e9 par un processus en mode utilisateur.\\r\\n\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"CVEID\":\"[CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit\",\"AdditionalDetails\":\"Cert: <CS.EXAMPLE.ORG> sha1: ADC83B19E793491B1C6EA0FD8B46CD9F32E592FC IssuerDepthCount: 13 Limit: 12\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2024-07-06 02:20:37\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlogs\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}\n",
"event": {
"code": "1",
"message": "D\u00e9tection possible de CVE : [CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit\r\nInformations suppl\u00e9mentaires : Cert: <CS.EXAMPLE.ORG> sha1: ADC83B19E793491B1C6EA0FD8B46CD9F32E592FC IssuerDepthCount: 13 Limit: 12\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une tentative d\u2019exploitation d\u2019une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 connue ([CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit) est d\u00e9tect\u00e9e.\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est d\u00e9clench\u00e9 par un processus en mode utilisateur.\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE"
},
"action": {
"id": 1,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "System",
"AccountType": "User",
"CVEID": "[CVE-2020-158] cert chain exceeded limit",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "WARNING",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{85A62A0D-7E17-485F-9D4F-749A287193A6}",
"Severity": "WARNING",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 606266,
"type": "Application"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "srv023.example.com",
"name": "srv023.example.com"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "srv023.example.com",
"level": "warning"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 2392,
"pid": 2392,
"thread": {
"id": 2932
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"srv023.example.com"
],
"user": [
"System"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "System"
}
}
{
"message": " {\"EventTime\":\"2011-03-02 01:40:47\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427387904,\"EventType\":\"WARNING\",\"SeverityValue\":3,\"Severity\":\"WARNING\",\"EventID\":61,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":2,\"RecordNumber\":18732,\"ActivityID\":\"{5B327F5A-B797-4B7E-AB05-11A0E98A15AF}\",\"ProcessID\":5796,\"ThreadID\":12472,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3 l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.\",\"Opcode\":\"Arr\u00c3\u00aater\",\"transferId\":\"{5b327f5a-b797-4b7e-ab05-11a0e98a15af}\",\"name\":\"Font Download\",\"Id\":\"{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}\",\"url\":\"https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json\",\"hr\":\"2147954402\",\"fileTime\":\"1601-01-01T00:00:00.0000000Z\",\"fileLength\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"bytesTotal\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"bytesTransferred\":\"0\",\"peerProtocolFlags\":\"0\",\"bytesTransferredFromPeer\":\"0\",\"AdditionalInfoHr\":\"0\",\"PeerContextInfo\":\"0\",\"bandwidthLimit\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan\":\"false\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-03-02 01:40:48\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "61",
"message": "BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3 l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client"
},
"action": {
"id": 61,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"BytesTotal": "-1",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "WARNING",
"Id": "{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}",
"Keywords": "4611686018427387904",
"OpcodeValue": 2,
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Severity": "WARNING",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"Task": 0,
"bytesTransferred": "0"
},
"record_id": 18732,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational"
},
"destination": {
"address": "fs.microsoft.com",
"domain": "fs.microsoft.com",
"size_in_char": 16
},
"file": {
"name": "Font Download",
"size": -1
},
"host": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"level": "warning"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 5796,
"pid": 5796,
"thread": {
"id": 12472
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"PCFOO.corp.net",
"fs.microsoft.com"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"url": {
"domain": "fs.microsoft.com",
"full": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
"original": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
"path": "/fs/windows/config.json",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "microsoft.com",
"scheme": "https",
"subdomain": "fs",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-12-29 17:08:37\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427387904,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":16403,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":199,\"ActivityID\":\"{60ACDE36-DDFA-0001-6410-AD60FADDD601}\",\"ProcessID\":7908,\"ThreadID\":2432,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"AccountName\":\"userXYZ\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-1808781047-1579666423-2539082804-1000\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"User\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\userXYZ\",\"jobTitle\":\"sharpbitsTest.zip\",\"jobId\":\"{bbe838b2-40bc-49ec-adbb-2251f6030f40}\",\"jobOwner\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\userXYZ\",\"fileCount\":\"1\",\"RemoteName\":\"https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip\",\"LocalName\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\userXYZ\\\\Downloads\\\\sharpbits.zip\",\"ClientProcessStartKey\":\"2251799813685416\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-12-29 17:08:39\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog6\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "16403",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client"
},
"action": {
"id": 16403,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "userXYZ",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "4611686018427387904",
"LocalName": "C:\\Users\\userXYZ\\Downloads\\sharpbits.zip",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"Task": 0,
"User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ",
"jobTitle": "sharpbitsTest.zip"
},
"record_id": 199,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational"
},
"destination": {
"address": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
"domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
"size_in_char": 37
},
"file": {
"name": "sharpbits.zip",
"owner": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ",
"path": "C:\\Users\\userXYZ\\Downloads\\sharpbits.zip"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 7908,
"pid": 7908,
"thread": {
"id": 2432
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net"
],
"user": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ",
"userXYZ"
]
},
"url": {
"domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
"full": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"original": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"path": "/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "windows.net",
"scheme": "https",
"subdomain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core",
"top_level_domain": "net"
},
"user": {
"domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1808781047-1579666423-2539082804-1000",
"name": "userXYZ"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-12-29 17:08:50\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBAR\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427387904,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":60,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":2,\"RecordNumber\":206,\"ActivityID\":\"{510DF63E-554F-4823-8F87-A23BDEDE0898}\",\"ProcessID\":7908,\"ThreadID\":2432,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"BITS stopped transferring the sharpbitsTestX.zip transfer job that is associated with the https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip URL. The status code is 0x0.\",\"Opcode\":\"Stop\",\"transferId\":\"{510df63e-554f-4823-8f87-a23bdede0898}\",\"name\":\"sharpbitsTestX.zip\",\"Id\":\"{c10c39b1-5f4e-47bc-a848-dc7505233471}\",\"url\":\"https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip\",\"hr\":\"0\",\"fileTime\":\"2018-02-05T22:41:26.0000000Z\",\"fileLength\":\"524444\",\"bytesTotal\":\"524444\",\"bytesTransferred\":\"524444\",\"peerProtocolFlags\":\"0\",\"bytesTransferredFromPeer\":\"0\",\"AdditionalInfoHr\":\"0\",\"PeerContextInfo\":\"0\",\"bandwidthLimit\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan\":\"false\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-12-29 17:08:51\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog6\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "60",
"message": "BITS stopped transferring the sharpbitsTestX.zip transfer job that is associated with the https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip URL. The status code is 0x0.",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client"
},
"action": {
"id": 60,
"name": "BITS has stopped transferring the BITS Transfer job",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"BytesTotal": "524444",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Id": "{c10c39b1-5f4e-47bc-a848-dc7505233471}",
"Keywords": "4611686018427387904",
"OpcodeValue": 2,
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"Task": 0,
"bytesTransferred": "524444"
},
"record_id": 206,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational"
},
"destination": {
"address": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
"domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
"size_in_char": 37
},
"file": {
"name": "sharpbitsTestX.zip",
"path": "sharpbitsTestX.zip",
"size": 524444
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBAR",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 7908,
"pid": 7908,
"thread": {
"id": 2432
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBAR",
"codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"url": {
"domain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net",
"full": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"original": "https://codeplexarchive.blob.core.windows.net/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"path": "/archive/projects/sharpbits/sharpbits.zip",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "windows.net",
"scheme": "https",
"subdomain": "codeplexarchive.blob.core",
"top_level_domain": "net"
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-11-05 15:26:31\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"WARNING\",\"SeverityValue\":3,\"Severity\":\"WARNING\",\"EventID\":1116,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":424,\"ProcessID\":2484,\"ThreadID\":9244,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Antivirus Windows Defender a d\u00c3\u00a9tect\u00c3\u00a9 un logiciel malveillant ou potentiellement ind\u00c3\u00a9sirable.\\r\\n Pour plus d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122informations, reportez-vous aux \u00c3\u00a9l\u00c3\u00a9ments suivants :\\r\\nhttps://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha&threatid=2147705511&enterprise=0\\r\\n \\tNom : HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha\\r\\n \\tID : 2147705511\\r\\n \\tGravit\u00c3\u00a9 : \u00c3\u2030lev\u00c3\u00a9e\\r\\n \\tCat\u00c3\u00a9gorie : Outil\\r\\n \\tChemin : file:_C:\\\\Users\\\\r1\\\\Downloads\\\\tmp2\\\\tmp2\\\\Win32\\\\mimidrv.sys\\r\\n \\tOrigine de la d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Ordinateur local\\r\\n \\tType de d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Concret\\r\\n \\tSource de d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Protection en temps r\u00c3\u00a9el\\r\\n \\tUtilisateur : DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\r1\\r\\n \\tNom du processus : C:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe\\r\\n \\tVersion de la veille de s\u00c3\u00a9curit\u00c3\u00a9 : AV: 1.325.803.0, AS: 1.325.803.0, NIS: 1.325.803.0\\r\\n \\tVersion du moteur : AM: 1.1.17500.4, NIS: 1.1.17500.4\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"Product Name\":\"%%827\",\"Product Version\":\"4.18.2009.7\",\"Detection ID\":\"{3A24708D-3147-43F8-B63D-60CAD6A64298}\",\"Detection Time\":\"2010-11-05T14:26:30.985Z\",\"Threat ID\":\"2147705511\",\"Threat Name\":\"HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha\",\"Severity ID\":\"4\",\"Severity Name\":\"\u00c3\u2030lev\u00c3\u00a9e\",\"Category ID\":\"34\",\"Category Name\":\"Outil\",\"FWLink\":\"https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha&threatid=2147705511&enterprise=0\",\"Status Code\":\"1\",\"State\":\"1\",\"Source ID\":\"3\",\"Source Name\":\"%%818\",\"Process Name\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\explorer.exe\",\"Detection User\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\r1\",\"Path\":\"file:_C:\\\\Users\\\\r1\\\\Downloads\\\\tmp2\\\\tmp2\\\\Win32\\\\mimidrv.sys\",\"Origin ID\":\"1\",\"Origin Name\":\"%%845\",\"Execution ID\":\"1\",\"Execution Name\":\"%%813\",\"Type ID\":\"0\",\"Type Name\":\"%%822\",\"Pre Execution Status\":\"0\",\"Action ID\":\"9\",\"Action Name\":\"%%887\",\"Error Code\":\"0x00000000\",\"Error Description\":\"L\u00e2\u20ac\u2122op\u00c3\u00a9ration a r\u00c3\u00a9ussi. \",\"Post Clean Status\":\"0\",\"Additional Actions ID\":\"0\",\"Additional Actions String\":\"No additional actions required\",\"Security intelligence Version\":\"AV: 1.325.803.0, AS: 1.325.803.0, NIS: 1.325.803.0\",\"Engine Version\":\"AM: 1.1.17500.4, NIS: 1.1.17500.4\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-11-05 15:26:39\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog2\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "1116",
"message": "Antivirus Windows Defender a d\u00c3\u00a9tect\u00c3\u00a9 un logiciel malveillant ou potentiellement ind\u00c3\u00a9sirable.\r\n Pour plus d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122informations, reportez-vous aux \u00c3\u00a9l\u00c3\u00a9ments suivants :\r\nhttps://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha&threatid=2147705511&enterprise=0\r\n \tNom : HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha\r\n \tID : 2147705511\r\n \tGravit\u00c3\u00a9 : \u00c3\u2030lev\u00c3\u00a9e\r\n \tCat\u00c3\u00a9gorie : Outil\r\n \tChemin : file:_C:\\Users\\r1\\Downloads\\tmp2\\tmp2\\Win32\\mimidrv.sys\r\n \tOrigine de la d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Ordinateur local\r\n \tType de d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Concret\r\n \tSource de d\u00c3\u00a9tection : Protection en temps r\u00c3\u00a9el\r\n \tUtilisateur : DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\r1\r\n \tNom du processus : C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00c3\u00a9curit\u00c3\u00a9 : AV: 1.325.803.0, AS: 1.325.803.0, NIS: 1.325.803.0\r\n \tVersion du moteur : AM: 1.1.17500.4, NIS: 1.1.17500.4",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
},
"action": {
"id": 1116,
"name": "The antimalware platform detected malware or other potentially unwanted software.",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"AdditionalActionsID": "0",
"AdditionalActionsString": "No additional actions required",
"DetectionUser": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\r1",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"ErrorCode": "0x00000000",
"EventType": "WARNING",
"Execution Name": "%%813",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"Path": "file:_C:\\Users\\r1\\Downloads\\tmp2\\tmp2\\Win32\\mimidrv.sys",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Severity": "WARNING",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"Task": 0,
"ThreatName": "HackTool:Win64/Mikatz!dha"
},
"record_id": 424,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "warning"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 2484,
"pid": 2484,
"thread": {
"id": 9244
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-12-22 20:25:26\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":1151,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":215,\"ProcessID\":5472,\"ThreadID\":5596,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Rapport d'int\u00e9grit\u00e9 du client Endpoint Protection (heure UTC)\u00a0: \\r\\n \\tVersion de plateforme\u00a0: 4.18.2011.6\\r\\n \\tVersion de moteur\u00a0: 1.1.19900.2\\r\\n \\tVersion du moteur du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0: 1.1.19900.2\\r\\n \\tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Antivirus\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\\r\\n \\tVersion de la la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\\r\\n \\tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\\r\\n \\t\u00c9tat RTP\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\\r\\n \\t\u00c9tat OA\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\\r\\n \\t\u00c9tat OAV\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\\r\\n \\t\u00c9tat BM\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\\r\\n \\t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0: 1\\r\\n \\t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 1\\r\\n \\t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 1\\r\\n \\t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 4294967295\\r\\n \\tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0: 21/12/2012 01:50:25\\r\\n \\tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 21/12/2012 01:50:26\\r\\n \\tHeure de d\u00e9but la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 21/12/2012 10:30:01\\r\\n \\tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 21/12/2012 10:40:38\\r\\n \\tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 2\\r\\n \\tHeure de d\u00e9but de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 01/01/1601 00:00:00\\r\\n \\tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 01/01/1601 00:00:00\\r\\n \\tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 0\\r\\n \\tStatut du produit\u00a0: 0x00080000\\r\\n\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"Product Name\":\"Antivirus Microsoft Defender\",\"Platform version\":\"4.18.2011.6\",\"Engine version\":\"1.1.19900.2\",\"NRI engine version\":\"1.1.19900.2\",\"AV security intelligence version\":\"1.381.814.0\",\"AS security intelligence version\":\"1.381.814.0\",\"NRI security intelligence version\":\"1.381.814.0\",\"RTP state\":\"Activ\u00e9\",\"OA state\":\"Activ\u00e9\",\"IOAV state\":\"Activ\u00e9\",\"BM state\":\"Activ\u00e9\",\"Last AV security intelligence age\":\"1\",\"Last AS security intelligence age\":\"1\",\"Last quick scan age\":\"1\",\"Last full scan age\":\"4294967295\",\"AV security intelligence creation time\":\"21/12/2012 01:50:25\",\"AS security intelligence creation time\":\"21/12/2012 01:50:26\",\"Last quick scan start time\":\"21/12/2012 10:30:01\",\"Last quick scan end time\":\"21/12/2012 10:40:38\",\"Last quick scan source\":\"2\",\"Last full scan start time\":\"01/01/1601 00:00:00\",\"Last full scan end time\":\"01/01/1601 00:00:00\",\"Last full scan source\":\"0\",\"Product status\":\"0x00080000\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-12-22 20:25:28\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "1151",
"message": "Rapport d'int\u00e9grit\u00e9 du client Endpoint Protection (heure UTC)\u00a0: \r\n \tVersion de plateforme\u00a0: 4.18.2011.6\r\n \tVersion de moteur\u00a0: 1.1.19900.2\r\n \tVersion du moteur du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0: 1.1.19900.2\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Antivirus\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\r\n \tVersion de la la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\r\n \tVersion de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me d\u2019inspection du r\u00e9seau en temps r\u00e9el\u00a0: 1.381.814.0\r\n \t\u00c9tat RTP\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat OA\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat OAV\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c9tat BM\u00a0: Activ\u00e9\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0: 1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 1\r\n \t\u00c2ge de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 4294967295\r\n \tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l'antivirus\u00a0: 21/12/2012 01:50:25\r\n \tHeure de cr\u00e9ation de la veille de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du logiciel anti-espion\u00a0: 21/12/2012 01:50:26\r\n \tHeure de d\u00e9but la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 21/12/2012 10:30:01\r\n \tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 21/12/2012 10:40:38\r\n \tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse rapide\u00a0: 2\r\n \tHeure de d\u00e9but de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 01/01/1601 00:00:00\r\n \tHeure de fin de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 01/01/1601 00:00:00\r\n \tSource de la derni\u00e8re analyse compl\u00e8te\u00a0: 0\r\n \tStatut du produit\u00a0: 0x00080000\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
},
"action": {
"id": 1151,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"LastASSecurityIntelligenceAge": "1",
"LastAVSecurityIntelligenceAge": "1",
"LastFullScanAge": "4294967295",
"LastQuickScanAge": "1",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 215,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 5472,
"pid": 5472,
"thread": {
"id": 5596
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-09-13 09:20:39\",\"Hostname\":\"lb-foobar\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5007,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1166,\"ProcessID\":3532,\"ThreadID\":5956,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\\r\\n \\tOld value: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\Processes\\\\powershell.exe = 0x0\\r\\n \\tNew value: \",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Product Name\":\"Microsoft Defender Antivirus\",\"Product Version\":\"4.18.2108.7\",\"Old Value\":\"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Exclusions\\\\Processes\\\\powershell.exe = 0x0\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-09-13 09:20:41\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog6\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5007",
"message": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\r\n \tOld value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\powershell.exe = 0x0\r\n \tNew value: ",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
},
"action": {
"id": 5007,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"Old Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\powershell.exe = 0x0",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 1166,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "lb-foobar",
"name": "lb-foobar"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "lb-foobar",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 3532,
"pid": 3532,
"thread": {
"id": 5956
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"lb-foobar"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-06-02 15:04:18\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":0,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4103,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":106,\"OpcodeValue\":20,\"RecordNumber\":712900,\"ActivityID\":\"{260C9E3C-4B0F-0002-DC86-2D260F4BD701}\",\"ProcessID\":22244,\"ThreadID\":16456,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nContexte :\\r\\n Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\\r\\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\\r\\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\\r\\n Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\\r\\n ID de pipeline = 1\\r\\n Nom de commande = Select-Object\\r\\n Type de commande = Cmdlet\\r\\n Nom du script = \\r\\n Chemin de la commande = \\r\\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\\r\\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\\\Syst\u00e8me\\r\\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \\r\\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline\",\"Opcode\":\"\u00c0 utiliser lorsque l'op\u00e9ration ex\u00e9cute uniquement une m\u00e9thode\",\"ContextInfo\":\" Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\\r\\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\\r\\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\\r\\n Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\\r\\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\\r\\n ID de pipeline = 1\\r\\n Nom de commande = Select-Object\\r\\n Type de commande = Cmdlet\\r\\n Nom du script = \\r\\n Chemin de la commande = \\r\\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence\u00a0= 138\\r\\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\\\Syst\u00e8me\\r\\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \\r\\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\",\"Payload\":\"CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-06-02 15:04:18\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4103",
"message": "CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\r\n\r\n\r\nContexte :\r\n Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = Select-Object\r\n Type de commande = Cmdlet\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\r\n\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell"
},
"action": {
"id": 4103,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline",
"ContextInfo": " Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = d480b34d-9bc5-4b03-bef2-0c4642484e60\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.19041.906\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = de38a11e-707d-4cc0-a009-a4af63866bf6\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = Select-Object\r\n Type de commande = Cmdlet\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 138\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"HostApplication": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname",
"HostName": "ConsoleHost",
"Keywords": "0",
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"Payload": "CommandInvocation (Select-Object) : \u00ab Select-Object \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab First \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab 1 \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Select-Object) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab __AllParameterSets \u00bb\r\n",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"Task": 106
},
"record_id": 712900,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 22244,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 22244,
"thread": {
"id": 16456
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"PCFOO.corp.net"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-21 09:17:49\", \"Hostname\": \"dcclient-vm\", \"Keywords\": -9223372036854775808, \"EventType\": \"INFO\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 5007, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}\", \"Version\": 0, \"Task\": 0, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 4178, \"ProcessID\": 3292, \"ThreadID\": 5848, \"Channel\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\", \"Domain\": \"NT AUTHORITY\", \"AccountName\": \"SYSTEM\", \"UserID\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"AccountType\": \"User\", \"Message\": \"Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\\r\\n \\tOld value: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x5\\r\\n \\tNew value: HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x4\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"Product Name\": \"Microsoft Defender Antivirus\", \"Product Version\": \"4.18.2202.4\", \"Old Value\": \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x5\", \"New Value\": \"HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Features\\\\TamperProtection = 0x4\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2022-03-18 14:42:03\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog6\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5007",
"message": "Microsoft Defender Antivirus Configuration has changed. If this is an unexpected event you should review the settings as this may be the result of malware.\r\n \tOld value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x5\r\n \tNew value: HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x4",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender"
},
"action": {
"id": 5007,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"New Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x4",
"Old Value": "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection = 0x5",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{11CD958A-C507-4EF3-B3F2-5FD9DFBD2C78}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 4178,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "dcclient-vm",
"name": "dcclient-vm"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "dcclient-vm",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 3292,
"pid": 3292,
"thread": {
"id": 5848
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"dcclient-vm"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-05-22 15:37:23\",\"Hostname\":\"FOOBAZ11\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4768,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":14339,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":26287385371,\"ProcessID\":1796,\"ThreadID\":17268,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.\\r\\n\\r\\nAccount Information:\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tFOO$\\r\\n\\tSupplied Realm Name:\\tKEY.HOSTFOO.INT\\r\\n\\tUser ID:\\t\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\\r\\n\\r\\nService Information:\\r\\n\\tService Name:\\t\\tkrbtgt\\r\\n\\tService ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tClient Address:\\t\\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tClient Port:\\t\\t65016\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tTicket Options:\\t\\t0x40810010\\r\\n\\tResult Code:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tTicket Encryption Type:\\t0x12\\r\\n\\tPre-Authentication Type:\\t2\\r\\n\\r\\nCertificate Information:\\r\\n\\tCertificate Issuer Name:\\t\\t\\r\\n\\tCertificate Serial Number:\\t\\r\\n\\tCertificate Thumbprint:\\t\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\\r\\n\\r\\nPre-authentication types, ticket options, encryption types and result codes are defined in RFC 4120.\",\"Category\":\"Kerberos Authentication Service\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserName\":\"FOO$\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"KEY.HOSTFOO.INT\",\"TargetSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\",\"ServiceName\":\"krbtgt\",\"ServiceSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\",\"TicketOptions\":\"0x40810010\",\"Status\":\"0x0\",\"TicketEncryptionType\":\"0x12\",\"PreAuthType\":\"2\",\"IpAddress\":\"::ffff:1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"65016\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-05-22 15:37:24\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4768",
"message": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.\r\n\r\nAccount Information:\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOO$\r\n\tSupplied Realm Name:\tKEY.HOSTFOO.INT\r\n\tUser ID:\t\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436\r\n\r\nService Information:\r\n\tService Name:\t\tkrbtgt\r\n\tService ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\r\n\tClient Port:\t\t65016\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tTicket Options:\t\t0x40810010\r\n\tResult Code:\t\t0x0\r\n\tTicket Encryption Type:\t0x12\r\n\tPre-Authentication Type:\t2\r\n\r\nCertificate Information:\r\n\tCertificate Issuer Name:\t\t\r\n\tCertificate Serial Number:\t\r\n\tCertificate Thumbprint:\t\t\r\n\r\nCertificate information is only provided if a certificate was used for pre-authentication.\r\n\r\nPre-authentication types, ticket options, encryption types and result codes are defined in RFC 4120.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4768,
"name": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Kerberos Authentication Service",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "65016",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PreAuthType": "2",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ServiceName": "krbtgt",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-502",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0x0",
"TargetDomainName": "KEY.HOSTFOO.INT",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-83436",
"TargetUserName": "FOO$",
"Task": 14339,
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810010"
},
"record_id": 26287385371,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"name": "FOOBAZ11"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 1796,
"pid": 1796,
"thread": {
"id": 17268
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"FOOBAZ11"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "KEY.HOSTFOO.INT",
"name": "FOO$"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-05-16 11:55:18\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223354444668731392,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":8001,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Store\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{9C2A37F3-E5FD-5CAE-BCD1-43DAFEEE1FF0}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":8001,\"OpcodeValue\":14,\"RecordNumber\":4644,\"ProcessID\":2368,\"ThreadID\":836,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Store/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"AccountName\":\"UserFoo\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-21-1695726573-3959282566-3642579326-1001\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Skipping license manager: PFN Microsoft.Messaging_2.15.20002.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\r\\nFunction: InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\\r\\nSource: enduser\\\\winstore\\\\licensemanager\\\\apisethost\\\\activationapis.cpp (205)\",\"Category\":\"LM\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"Function\":\"InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\",\"Source\":\"enduser\\\\winstore\\\\licensemanager\\\\apisethost\\\\activationapis.cpp\",\"Line Number\":\"205\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-05-16 11:55:20\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "8001",
"message": "Skipping license manager: PFN Microsoft.Messaging_2.15.20002.0_x86__8wekyb3d8bbwe\r\nFunction: InvokeLicenseManagerRequired\r\nSource: enduser\\winstore\\licensemanager\\apisethost\\activationapis.cpp (205)",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Store"
},
"action": {
"id": 8001,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "UserFoo",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "LM",
"Domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223354444668731392",
"OpcodeValue": 14,
"ProviderGuid": "{9C2A37F3-E5FD-5CAE-BCD1-43DAFEEE1FF0}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"Source": "enduser\\winstore\\licensemanager\\apisethost\\activationapis.cpp",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Store",
"Task": 8001
},
"record_id": 4644,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Store/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 2368,
"pid": 2368,
"thread": {
"id": 836
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"UserFoo"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1695726573-3959282566-3642579326-1001",
"name": "UserFoo"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:15\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4634,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12545,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":47121546,\"ProcessID\":560,\"ThreadID\":2172,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An account was logged off.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tAD\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3912391A\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.\",\"Category\":\"Logoff\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\",\"TargetUserName\":\"USERFOO\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AD\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x3912391a\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4634",
"message": "An account was logged off.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tAD\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3912391A\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4634,
"name": "An account was logged off",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Logoff",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"LogonType": "3",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"TargetDomainName": "AD",
"TargetLogonId": "0x3912391a",
"TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
"Task": 12545
},
"record_id": 47121546,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
"name": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 560,
"pid": 560,
"thread": {
"id": 2172
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
]
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "AD",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
"name": "USERFOO"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-06-18 15:28:23\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4624,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":12544,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":10457874880,\"ProcessID\":744,\"ThreadID\":2352,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An account was successfully logged on.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nImpersonation Level:\\t\\tImpersonation\\r\\n\\r\\nNew Logon:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tSVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0xFBEE0744\\r\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tWorkstation Name:\\tV-FOO\\r\\n\\tSource Network Address:\\t-\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nDetailed Authentication Information:\\r\\n\\tLogon Process:\\t\\tNtLmSsp \\r\\n\\tAuthentication Package:\\tNTLM\\r\\n\\tTransited Services:\\t-\\r\\n\\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\\tNTLM V2\\r\\n\\tKey Length:\\t\\t128\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\\r\\n\\r\\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\\r\\n\\r\\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\\r\\n\\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\\r\\n\\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\\r\\n\\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.\",\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"-\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"-\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\",\"TargetUserName\":\"SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0xfbee0744\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"NtLmSsp \",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"NTLM\",\"WorkstationName\":\"V-FOO\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"LmPackageName\":\"NTLM V2\",\"KeyLength\":\"128\",\"ProcessName\":\"-\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"ImpersonationLevel\":\"%%1833\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-06-18 15:28:24\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_network",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4624",
"message": "An account was successfully logged on.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nImpersonation Level:\t\tImpersonation\r\n\r\nNew Logon:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tSVC_DD_SP-SEARCH\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xFBEE0744\r\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\t-\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tWorkstation Name:\tV-FOO\r\n\tSource Network Address:\t-\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t-\r\n\r\nDetailed Authentication Information:\r\n\tLogon Process:\t\tNtLmSsp \r\n\tAuthentication Package:\tNTLM\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\tPackage Name (NTLM only):\tNTLM V2\r\n\tKey Length:\t\t128\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.\r\n\r\nThe subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.\r\n\r\nThe logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).\r\n\r\nThe New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.\r\n\r\nThe network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.\r\n\r\nThe impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.\r\n\r\nThe authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.\r\n\t- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.\r\n\t- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.\r\n\t- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.\r\n\t- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"action": {
"id": 4624,
"name": "An account was successfully logged on",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationPackageName": "NTLM",
"Category": "Logon",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"IpAddress": "-",
"IpPort": "-",
"KeyLength": "128",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"LogonProcessName": "NtLmSsp ",
"LogonType": "3",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "-",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "-",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x0",
"SubjectUserName": "-",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"TargetDomainName": "KEY",
"TargetLogonId": "0xfbee0744",
"TargetUserName": "SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701",
"Task": 12544,
"WorkstationName": "V-FOO"
},
"record_id": 10457874880,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 744,
"pid": 744,
"thread": {
"id": 2352
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "NtLmSsp "
}
},
"client": {
"name": "V-FOO",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "V-FOO",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-0-0",
"target": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-69701",
"name": "SVC_DD_SP-SEARCH"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-04-12 17:42:04\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4624,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":12544,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":504041,\"ActivityID\":\"{593B242C-183A-44F2-8977-2A836ABEC213}\",\"ProcessID\":996,\"ThreadID\":1920,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"L'ouverture de session d'un compte s'est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.\\r\\n\\r\\nObjet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tPCFOO$\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tFOOBAR\\r\\n\\tID d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations d'ouverture de session :\\r\\n\\tType d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t9\\r\\n\\tMode administrateur restreint :\\t-\\r\\n\\tCompte virtuel :\\t\\tNon\\r\\n\\tJeton \u00e9lev\u00e9 :\\t\\tOui\\r\\n\\r\\nNiveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 :\\t\\tEmprunt d\u2019identit\u00e9\\r\\n\\r\\nNouvelle ouverture de session :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tSyst\u00e8me\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tAUTORITE NT\\r\\n\\tID d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x7E767BC\\r\\n\\tID d'ouverture de session li\u00e9e :\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tNom du compte r\u00e9seau :\\tsvc_admin_sccm\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte r\u00e9seau :\\tFOOBAR\\r\\n\\tGUID d'ouverture de session :\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le processus :\\r\\n\\tID du processus :\\t\\t0x2780\\r\\n\\tNom du processus :\\t\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\CCM\\\\CcmExec.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tNom de la station de travail :\\t-\\r\\n\\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\\t-\\r\\n\\tPort source :\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l'authentification :\\r\\n\\tProcessus d'ouverture de session :\\t\\tAdvapi \\r\\n\\tPackage d'authentification :\\tNegotiate\\r\\n\\tServices en transit :\\t-\\r\\n\\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\\t-\\r\\n\\tLongueur de la cl\u00e9 :\\t\\t0\\r\\n\\r\\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lors de la cr\u00e9ation d'une ouverture de session. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l'ordinateur sur lequel l'ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l'ouverture de session. Il s'agit le plus souvent d'un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Type d'ouverture de session indique le type d'ouverture de session qui s'est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, par exemple, le compte qui s'est connect\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs au r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance d'une demande d'ouverture de session \u00e0 distance. Le nom de la station de travail n'\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut \u00eatre laiss\u00e9 vide dans certains cas.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe champ du niveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 indique la port\u00e9e de l'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 que peut prendre un processus dans la session d'ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\r\\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d'authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d'ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\\r\\n\\t- Le GUID d'ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir \u00e0 associer cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement KDC .\\r\\n\\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d'ouverture de session.\\r\\n\\t- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\\r\\n\\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.\",\"Category\":\"Logon\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"PCFOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"FOOBAR\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"TargetUserName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x7e767bc\",\"LogonType\":\"9\",\"LogonProcessName\":\"Advapi \",\"AuthenticationPackageName\":\"Negotiate\",\"WorkstationName\":\"-\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"LmPackageName\":\"-\",\"KeyLength\":\"0\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\CCM\\\\CcmExec.exe\",\"IpAddress\":\"-\",\"IpPort\":\"-\",\"ImpersonationLevel\":\"%%1833\",\"RestrictedAdminMode\":\"-\",\"TargetOutboundUserName\":\"svc_admin_sccm\",\"TargetOutboundDomainName\":\"FOOBAR\",\"VirtualAccount\":\"%%1843\",\"TargetLinkedLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"ElevatedToken\":\"%%1842\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-04-12 17:42:06\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"action": "authentication_alternative_credentials",
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "4624",
"message": "L'ouverture de session d'un compte s'est correctement d\u00e9roul\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nObjet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tPCFOO$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tFOOBAR\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session :\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nInformations d'ouverture de session :\r\n\tType d'ouverture de session :\t\t9\r\n\tMode administrateur restreint :\t-\r\n\tCompte virtuel :\t\tNon\r\n\tJeton \u00e9lev\u00e9 :\t\tOui\r\n\r\nNiveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 :\t\tEmprunt d\u2019identit\u00e9\r\n\r\nNouvelle ouverture de session :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tSyst\u00e8me\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tAUTORITE NT\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session :\t\t0x7E767BC\r\n\tID d'ouverture de session li\u00e9e :\t\t0x0\r\n\tNom du compte r\u00e9seau :\tsvc_admin_sccm\r\n\tDomaine du compte r\u00e9seau :\tFOOBAR\r\n\tGUID d'ouverture de session :\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du processus :\t\t0x2780\r\n\tNom du processus :\t\tC:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tNom de la station de travail :\t-\r\n\tAdresse du r\u00e9seau source :\t-\r\n\tPort source :\t\t-\r\n\r\nInformations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur l'authentification :\r\n\tProcessus d'ouverture de session :\t\tAdvapi \r\n\tPackage d'authentification :\tNegotiate\r\n\tServices en transit :\t-\r\n\tNom du package (NTLM uniquement) :\t-\r\n\tLongueur de la cl\u00e9 :\t\t0\r\n\r\nCet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 lors de la cr\u00e9ation d'une ouverture de session. Il est g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 sur l'ordinateur sur lequel l'ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9e.\r\n\r\nLe champ Objet indique le compte sur le syst\u00e8me local qui a demand\u00e9 l'ouverture de session. Il s'agit le plus souvent d'un service, comme le service Serveur, ou un processus local tel que Winlogon.exe ou Services.exe.\r\n\r\nLe champ Type d'ouverture de session indique le type d'ouverture de session qui s'est produit. Les types les plus courants sont 2 (interactif) et 3 (r\u00e9seau).\r\n\r\nLe champ Nouvelle ouverture de session indique le compte pour lequel la nouvelle ouverture de session a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, par exemple, le compte qui s'est connect\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs au r\u00e9seau indiquent la provenance d'une demande d'ouverture de session \u00e0 distance. Le nom de la station de travail n'\u00e9tant pas toujours disponible, peut \u00eatre laiss\u00e9 vide dans certains cas.\r\n\r\nLe champ du niveau d'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 indique la port\u00e9e de l'emprunt d'identit\u00e9 que peut prendre un processus dans la session d'ouverture de session.\r\n\r\nLes champs relatifs aux informations d'authentification fournissent des d\u00e9tails sur cette demande d'ouverture de session sp\u00e9cifique.\r\n\t- Le GUID d'ouverture de session est un identificateur unique pouvant servir \u00e0 associer cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement \u00e0 un \u00e9v\u00e9nement KDC .\r\n\t- Les services en transit indiquent les services interm\u00e9diaires qui ont particip\u00e9 \u00e0 cette demande d'ouverture de session.\r\n\t- Nom du package indique quel est le sous-protocole qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9 parmi les protocoles NTLM.\r\n\t- La longueur de la cl\u00e9 indique la longueur de la cl\u00e9 de session g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e. Elle a la valeur 0 si aucune cl\u00e9 de session n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 demand\u00e9e.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"action": {
"id": 4624,
"name": "An account was successfully logged on",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationPackageName": "Negotiate",
"Category": "Logon",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"IpAddress": "-",
"IpPort": "-",
"KeyLength": "0",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"LogonProcessName": "Advapi ",
"LogonType": "9",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "FOOBAR",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "PCFOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetDomainName": "AUTORITE NT",
"TargetLogonId": "0x7e767bc",
"TargetOutboundDomainName": "FOOBAR",
"TargetOutboundUserName": "svc_admin_sccm",
"TargetUserName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12544,
"WorkstationName": "-"
},
"record_id": 504041,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
"id": 996,
"name": "CcmExec.exe",
"pid": 996,
"thread": {
"id": 1920
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\CCM\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"PCFOO.corp.net"
],
"user": [
"PCFOO$"
]
},
"sekoiaio": {
"authentication": {
"process": {
"name": "Advapi "
}
},
"client": {
"name": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
},
"server": {
"name": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"os": {
"type": "windows"
}
}
},
"user": {
"domain": "FOOBAR",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "PCFOO$",
"target": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:15\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4634,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12545,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":47121546,\"ProcessID\":560,\"ThreadID\":2172,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An account was logged off.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tAD\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3912391A\\r\\n\\r\\nLogon Type:\\t\\t\\t3\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.\",\"Category\":\"Logoff\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\",\"TargetUserName\":\"USERFOO\",\"ComputerName\":\"FoobarComputer\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"AD\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x3912391a\",\"LogonType\":\"3\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:24:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4634",
"message": "An account was logged off.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tAD\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3912391A\r\n\r\nLogon Type:\t\t\t3\r\n\r\nThis event is generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on the same computer.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4634,
"name": "An account was logged off",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Logoff",
"ComputerName": "FoobarComputer",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"LogonType": "3",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"TargetDomainName": "AD",
"TargetLogonId": "0x3912391a",
"TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
"Task": 12545
},
"record_id": 47121546,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
"name": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 560,
"pid": 560,
"thread": {
"id": 2172
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTBAZ-001.ad.HOSTFOO.com"
]
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "AD",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1519513455-2607746426-4144247390-71234",
"name": "USERFOO"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-04-24 00:06:15\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5145,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12811,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":23997037887,\"ProcessID\":776,\"ThreadID\":784,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tBAZ256$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0xA62B3A8AE\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\t\\r\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\tFile\\r\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t51042\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nShare Information:\\r\\n\\tShare Name:\\t\\t\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\\r\\n\\tShare Path:\\t\\t\\\\??\\\\D:\\\\ActiveDirectory\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol\\r\\n\\tRelative Target Name:\\tKEY.ACME.COM\\\\POLICIES\\\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\\\MACHINE\\r\\n\\r\\nAccess Request Information:\\r\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x100081\\r\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tSYNCHRONIZE\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadAttributes\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\nAccess Check Results:\\r\\n\\tSYNCHRONIZE:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\tReadAttributes:\\tGranted by\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Detailed File Share\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"BAZ256$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0xa62b3a8ae\",\"ObjectType\":\"File\",\"IpAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"51042\",\"ShareName\":\"\\\\\\\\*\\\\SYSVOL\",\"ShareLocalPath\":\"\\\\??\\\\D:\\\\ActiveDirectory\\\\SYSVOL\\\\sysvol\",\"RelativeTargetName\":\"KEY.ACME.COM\\\\POLICIES\\\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\\\MACHINE\",\"AccessMask\":\"0x100081\",\"AccessList\":\"%%1541\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"AccessReason\":\"%%1541:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4416:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t%%4423:\\t%%1801\\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-04-24 00:06:17\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5145",
"message": "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.\r\n\t\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tBAZ256$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xA62B3A8AE\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\t\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tFile\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t51042\r\n\t\r\nShare Information:\r\n\tShare Name:\t\t\\\\*\\SYSVOL\r\n\tShare Path:\t\t\\??\\D:\\ActiveDirectory\\SYSVOL\\sysvol\r\n\tRelative Target Name:\tKEY.ACME.COM\\POLICIES\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\MACHINE\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x100081\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tSYNCHRONIZE\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\nAccess Check Results:\r\n\tSYNCHRONIZE:\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory):\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes:\tGranted by\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 5145,
"name": "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AccessList": "%%1541\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4416\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4423\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessMask": "0x100081",
"AccessReason": "%%1541:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4416:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t%%4423:\t%%1801\tD:(A;;0x1200a9;;;WD)\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"Accesses": "\t\tSYNCHRONIZE\r\n\t\t\t\tReadData (or ListDirectory)\r\n\t\t\t\tReadAttributes",
"Category": "Detailed File Share",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"IpAddress": "1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "51042",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectType": "File",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"RelativeTargetName": "KEY.ACME.COM\\POLICIES\\{C69D840B-35D8-4172-97E2-E54446703FF2}\\MACHINE",
"Severity": "INFO",
"ShareLocalPath": "\\??\\D:\\ActiveDirectory\\SYSVOL\\sysvol",
"ShareName": "\\\\*\\SYSVOL",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xa62b3a8ae",
"SubjectUserName": "BAZ256$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016",
"Task": 12811
},
"record_id": 23997037887,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 776,
"pid": 776,
"thread": {
"id": 784
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
],
"user": [
"BAZ256$"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123016",
"name": "BAZ256$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-05-17 11:52:46\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":3,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":3,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":51,\"ProcessID\":3912,\"ThreadID\":532,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Network connection detected:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\\r\\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\\r\\nProcessId: 4200\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\\r\\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\UserFoo\\r\\nProtocol: tcp\\r\\nInitiated: true\\r\\nSourceIsIpv6: false\\r\\nSourceIp: 1.1.1.1\\r\\nSourceHostname: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\\r\\nSourcePort: 49718\\r\\nSourcePortName: \\r\\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\\r\\nDestinationIp: 1.1.1.1\\r\\nDestinationHostname: \\r\\nDestinationPort: 443\\r\\nDestinationPortName: https\",\"Category\":\"Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SystemApps\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\",\"User\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\UserFoo\",\"Protocol\":\"tcp\",\"Initiated\":\"true\",\"SourceIsIpv6\":\"false\",\"SourceIp\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"SourceHostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\",\"SourcePort\":\"49718\",\"DestinationIsIpv6\":\"false\",\"DestinationIp\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"DestinationPort\":\"443\",\"DestinationPortName\":\"https\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-05-17 11:52:46\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "3",
"message": "Network connection detected:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:38.882\r\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}\r\nProcessId: 4200\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe\r\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\UserFoo\r\nProtocol: tcp\r\nInitiated: true\r\nSourceIsIpv6: false\r\nSourceIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nSourceHostname: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia\r\nSourcePort: 49718\r\nSourcePortName: \r\nDestinationIsIpv6: false\r\nDestinationIp: 1.1.1.1\r\nDestinationHostname: \r\nDestinationPort: 443\r\nDestinationPortName: https",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2019-05-17T09:52:38.882000Z",
"action": {
"id": 3,
"name": "Network connection",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Network connection detected (rule: NetworkConnect)",
"DestinationPort": "443",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{0BA009B0-846C-5CDE-0000-0010821E0D00}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 3,
"User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\UserFoo"
},
"record_id": 51,
"target": "network-traffic",
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"destination": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1",
"port": 443
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp",
"type": "ipv4"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
"id": 4200,
"name": "MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe",
"pid": 4200,
"thread": {
"id": 532
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
],
"user": [
"UserFoo"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ.entreprise.sekoia",
"ip": "1.1.1.1",
"port": 49718,
"size_in_char": 33
},
"user": {
"domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "UserFoo"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-04-28 08:22:44\",\"Hostname\":\"CAYENNE\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4688,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":13312,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1551703898,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":13732,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A new process has been created.\\r\\n\\r\\nCreator Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tadm_FOOBAZ\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0xF22F28C6\\r\\n\\r\\nTarget Subject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-0-0\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x2bfc\\r\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WMIC.exe\\r\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\tTokenElevationTypeFull (2)\\r\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x2a28\\r\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\",\"Category\":\"Process Creation\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"adm_FOOBAZ\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0xf22f28c6\",\"NewProcessId\":\"0x2bfc\",\"NewProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WMIC.exe\",\"TokenElevationType\":\"%%1937\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TargetUserName\":\"-\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"-\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-04-28 08:22:45\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4688",
"message": "A new process has been created.\r\n\r\nCreator Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tadm_FOOBAZ\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xF22F28C6\r\n\r\nTarget Subject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-0-0\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\t-\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tNew Process ID:\t\t0x2bfc\r\n\tNew Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIC.exe\r\n\tToken Elevation Type:\tTokenElevationTypeFull (2)\r\n\tCreator Process ID:\t0x2a28\r\n\tProcess Command Line:\t\r\n\r\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\r\n\r\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\r\n\r\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\r\n\r\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4688,
"name": "A new process has been created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Process Creation",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xf22f28c6",
"SubjectUserName": "adm_FOOBAZ",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"Task": 13312
},
"record_id": 1551703898,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "CAYENNE",
"name": "CAYENNE"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "CAYENNE",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIC.exe",
"id": 11260,
"name": "WMIC.exe",
"parent": {
"pid": 10792
},
"pid": 11260,
"thread": {
"id": 13732
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"CAYENNE"
],
"user": [
"adm_FOOBAZ"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-122301",
"name": "adm_FOOBAZ",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-0-0"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-05-16 18:07:37\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":36028797018963968,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":6000,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{DBE9B383-7CF3-4331-91CC-A3CB16A3B538}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":628,\"ProcessID\":0,\"ThreadID\":0,\"Channel\":\"Application\",\"Message\":\"L\u00e2\u0080\u0099abonn\u00c3\u00a9 aux notifications Winlogon <SessionEnv> n\u00e2\u0080\u0099\u00c3\u00a9tait pas disponible pour traiter un \u00c3\u00a9v\u00c3\u00a9nement de notification.\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-05-17 09:56:11\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "6000",
"message": "L\u00e2\u0080\u0099abonn\u00c3\u00a9 aux notifications Winlogon <SessionEnv> n\u00e2\u0080\u0099\u00c3\u00a9tait pas disponible pour traiter un \u00c3\u00a9v\u00c3\u00a9nement de notification.",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon"
},
"action": {
"id": 6000,
"properties": {
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "36028797018963968",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{DBE9B383-7CF3-4331-91CC-A3CB16A3B538}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 628,
"type": "Application"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 0,
"pid": 0,
"thread": {
"id": 0
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
]
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-04-23 13:28:14\",\"Hostname\":\"FOOBAZ11\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4662,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":14080,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":25279566314,\"ProcessID\":1816,\"ThreadID\":15456,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An operation was performed on an object.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject :\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tV-FOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x8C042A219\\r\\n\\r\\nObject:\\r\\n\\tObject Server:\\t\\tDS\\r\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\t%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\\r\\n\\tObject Name:\\t\\t%{e013e2c9-bd38-4fe7-9afc-c50c377cb028}\\r\\n\\tHandle ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\r\\nOperation:\\r\\n\\tOperation Type:\\t\\tObject Access\\r\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tControl Access\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x100\\r\\n\\tProperties:\\t\\tControl Access\\r\\n\\t\\t{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\\r\\n\\t{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tParameter 1:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tParameter 2:\\t\\t\",\"Category\":\"Directory Service Access\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x8c042a219\",\"ObjectServer\":\"DS\",\"ObjectType\":\"%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\",\"ObjectName\":\"%{e013e2c9-bd38-4fe7-9afc-c50c377cb028}\",\"OperationType\":\"Object Access\",\"HandleId\":\"0x0\",\"AccessList\":\"%%7688\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"AccessMask\":\"0x100\",\"Properties\":\"%%7688\\r\\n\\t\\t{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\\r\\n\\t{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\\r\\n\",\"AdditionalInfo\":\"-\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-04-23 13:28:14\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4662",
"message": "An operation was performed on an object.\r\n\r\nSubject :\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x8C042A219\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tDS\r\n\tObject Type:\t\t%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\r\n\tObject Name:\t\t%{e013e2c9-bd38-4fe7-9afc-c50c377cb028}\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\r\nOperation:\r\n\tOperation Type:\t\tObject Access\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tControl Access\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x100\r\n\tProperties:\t\tControl Access\r\n\t\t{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\r\n\t{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\r\n\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tParameter 1:\t\t-\r\n\tParameter 2:\t\t",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4662,
"name": "An operation was performed on an object",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AccessList": "%%7688\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessMask": "0x100",
"Accesses": "\t\tControl Access",
"Category": "Directory Service Access",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HandleId": "0x0",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectName": "%{e013e2c9-bd38-4fe7-9afc-c50c377cb028}",
"ObjectServer": "DS",
"ObjectType": "%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"OperationType": "Object Access",
"Properties": "%%7688\r\n\t\t{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\r\n\t{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}\r\n",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x8c042a219",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189",
"Task": 14080
},
"record_id": 25279566314,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"name": "FOOBAZ11"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 1816,
"pid": 1816,
"thread": {
"id": 15456
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"FOOBAZ11"
],
"user": [
"V-FOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-98189",
"name": "V-FOO$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-05-19 12:11:47\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":0,\"EventType\":\"VERBOSE\",\"SeverityValue\":1,\"Severity\":\"DEBUG\",\"EventID\":4104,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":2,\"OpcodeValue\":15,\"RecordNumber\":272330460,\"ActivityID\":\"{5D86B418-29E5-0000-F508-CD69E529D601}\",\"ProcessID\":968,\"ThreadID\":5568,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):\\r\\n{ @('Object') -contains $_ }\\r\\n\\r\\nScriptBlock ID: 592078b2-e981-40be-a166-10896495067b\\r\\nPath: \",\"Category\":\"Execute a Remote Command\",\"Opcode\":\"On create calls\",\"MessageNumber\":\"1\",\"MessageTotal\":\"1\",\"ScriptBlockText\":\"{ @('Object') -contains $_ }\",\"ScriptBlockId\":\"592078b2-e981-40be-a166-10896495067b\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-05-19 12:11:48\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4104",
"message": "Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1):\r\n{ @('Object') -contains $_ }\r\n\r\nScriptBlock ID: 592078b2-e981-40be-a166-10896495067b\r\nPath: ",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell"
},
"action": {
"id": 4104,
"name": "Creating Scriptblock text",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Execute a Remote Command",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "VERBOSE",
"Keywords": "0",
"MessageNumber": "1",
"MessageTotal": "1",
"OpcodeValue": 15,
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"ScriptBlockId": "592078b2-e981-40be-a166-10896495067b",
"ScriptBlockText": "{ @('Object') -contains $_ }",
"Severity": "DEBUG",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"Task": 2
},
"record_id": 272330460,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "debug"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 968,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 968,
"thread": {
"id": 5568
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-10-02 17:20:14\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":0,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4103,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":106,\"OpcodeValue\":20,\"RecordNumber\":249099289,\"ActivityID\":\"{264E110A-980D-0002-50EB-4F260D98D601}\",\"ProcessID\":2816,\"ThreadID\":3184,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"CommandInvocation(Write-Verbose): \\\"Write-Verbose\\\"\\r\\nParameterBinding(Write-Verbose): name=\\\"Message\\\"; value=\\\"ParentDisplayName\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nContext:\\r\\n Severity = Informational\\r\\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Host Version = 5.1.14409.1018\\r\\n Host ID = 6d715a18-8dd8-44ce-889d-67bbbd36962b\\r\\n Host Application = C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\PuppetLabs\\\\facter\\\\facts.d\\\\InstalledSoftware.ps1\\r\\n Engine Version = 5.1.14409.1018\\r\\n Runspace ID = 28ef971b-d5e6-46a0-a1eb-275b26023d17\\r\\n Pipeline ID = 1\\r\\n Command Name = Write-Verbose\\r\\n Command Type = Cmdlet\\r\\n Script Name = C:\\\\Program Files\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\Modules\\\\PSSoftware\\\\1.0.29\\\\PSSoftware.psm1\\r\\n Command Path = \\r\\n Sequence Number = 3930\\r\\n User = WORKGROUP\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\n Connected User = \\r\\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nUser Data:\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Executing Pipeline\",\"Opcode\":\"To be used when operation is just executing a method\",\"ContextInfo\":\" Severity = Informational\\r\\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Host Version = 5.1.14409.1018\\r\\n Host ID = 6d715a18-8dd8-44ce-889d-67bbbd36962b\\r\\n Host Application = C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\PuppetLabs\\\\facter\\\\facts.d\\\\InstalledSoftware.ps1\\r\\n Engine Version = 5.1.14409.1018\\r\\n Runspace ID = 28ef971b-d5e6-46a0-a1eb-275b26023d17\\r\\n Pipeline ID = 1\\r\\n Command Name = Write-Verbose\\r\\n Command Type = Cmdlet\\r\\n Script Name = C:\\\\Program Files\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\Modules\\\\PSSoftware\\\\1.0.29\\\\PSSoftware.psm1\\r\\n Command Path = \\r\\n Sequence Number = 3930\\r\\n User = WORKGROUP\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\n Connected User = \\r\\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\",\"Payload\":\"CommandInvocation(Write-Verbose): \\\"Write-Verbose\\\"\\r\\nParameterBinding(Write-Verbose): name=\\\"Message\\\"; value=\\\"ParentDisplayName\\\"\\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-10-02 17:20:19\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4103",
"message": "CommandInvocation(Write-Verbose): \"Write-Verbose\"\r\nParameterBinding(Write-Verbose): name=\"Message\"; value=\"ParentDisplayName\"\r\n\r\n\r\nContext:\r\n Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Host ID = 6d715a18-8dd8-44ce-889d-67bbbd36962b\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\ProgramData\\PuppetLabs\\facter\\facts.d\\InstalledSoftware.ps1\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Runspace ID = 28ef971b-d5e6-46a0-a1eb-275b26023d17\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Write-Verbose\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = C:\\Program Files\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\PSSoftware\\1.0.29\\PSSoftware.psm1\r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 3930\r\n User = WORKGROUP\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nUser Data:\r\n\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell"
},
"action": {
"id": 4103,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Executing Pipeline",
"ContextInfo": " Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Host ID = 6d715a18-8dd8-44ce-889d-67bbbd36962b\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\ProgramData\\PuppetLabs\\facter\\facts.d\\InstalledSoftware.ps1\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14409.1018\r\n Runspace ID = 28ef971b-d5e6-46a0-a1eb-275b26023d17\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Write-Verbose\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = C:\\Program Files\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\PSSoftware\\1.0.29\\PSSoftware.psm1\r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 3930\r\n User = WORKGROUP\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"HostApplication": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -NoLogo -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\ProgramData\\PuppetLabs\\facter\\facts.d\\InstalledSoftware.ps1",
"HostName": "ConsoleHost",
"Keywords": "0",
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"Payload": "CommandInvocation(Write-Verbose): \"Write-Verbose\"\r\nParameterBinding(Write-Verbose): name=\"Message\"; value=\"ParentDisplayName\"\r\n",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"Task": 106
},
"record_id": 249099289,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 2816,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 2816,
"thread": {
"id": 3184
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2023-08-22 20:12:26\",\"Hostname\":\"DC2.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":0,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4103,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":106,\"OpcodeValue\":20,\"RecordNumber\":32670,\"ActivityID\":\"{AA56825F-C7FE-0000-D33D-F2AAFEC7D901}\",\"ProcessID\":5676,\"ThreadID\":3020,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"CommandInvocation(Add-Type): \\\"Add-Type\\\"\\r\\nParameterBinding(Add-Type): name=\\\"AssemblyName\\\"; value=\\\"System.Core\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nContext:\\r\\n Severity = Informational\\r\\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Host Version = 5.1.14393.5582\\r\\n Host ID = 26838e02-12cb-467c-a81a-bb1479f74427\\r\\n Host Application = C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}\\r\\n Engine Version = 5.1.14393.5582\\r\\n Runspace ID = 4185b66b-3f0e-486d-a15e-3d2bc90f39a7\\r\\n Pipeline ID = 1\\r\\n Command Name = Add-Type\\r\\n Command Type = Cmdlet\\r\\n Script Name = \\r\\n Command Path = \\r\\n Sequence Number = 18\\r\\n User = INTRANET\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\n Connected User = \\r\\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nUser Data:\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Executing Pipeline\",\"Opcode\":\"To be used when operation is just executing a method\",\"ContextInfo\":\" Severity = Informational\\r\\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Host Version = 5.1.14393.5582\\r\\n Host ID = 26838e02-12cb-467c-a81a-bb1479f74427\\r\\n Host Application = C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}\\r\\n Engine Version = 5.1.14393.5582\\r\\n Runspace ID = 4185b66b-3f0e-486d-a15e-3d2bc90f39a7\\r\\n Pipeline ID = 1\\r\\n Command Name = Add-Type\\r\\n Command Type = Cmdlet\\r\\n Script Name = \\r\\n Command Path = \\r\\n Sequence Number = 18\\r\\n User = INTRANET\\\\SYSTEM\\r\\n Connected User = \\r\\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\",\"Payload\":\"CommandInvocation(Add-Type): \\\"Add-Type\\\"\\r\\nParameterBinding(Add-Type): name=\\\"AssemblyName\\\"; value=\\\"System.Core\\\"\\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2023-08-22 20:12:27\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4103",
"message": "CommandInvocation(Add-Type): \"Add-Type\"\r\nParameterBinding(Add-Type): name=\"AssemblyName\"; value=\"System.Core\"\r\n\r\n\r\nContext:\r\n Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Host ID = 26838e02-12cb-467c-a81a-bb1479f74427\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Runspace ID = 4185b66b-3f0e-486d-a15e-3d2bc90f39a7\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Add-Type\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = \r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 18\r\n User = INTRANET\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nUser Data:\r\n\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell"
},
"action": {
"id": 4103,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Executing Pipeline",
"ContextInfo": " Severity = Informational\r\n Host Name = ConsoleHost\r\n Host Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Host ID = 26838e02-12cb-467c-a81a-bb1479f74427\r\n Host Application = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}\r\n Engine Version = 5.1.14393.5582\r\n Runspace ID = 4185b66b-3f0e-486d-a15e-3d2bc90f39a7\r\n Pipeline ID = 1\r\n Command Name = Add-Type\r\n Command Type = Cmdlet\r\n Script Name = \r\n Command Path = \r\n Sequence Number = 18\r\n User = INTRANET\\SYSTEM\r\n Connected User = \r\n Shell ID = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"HostApplication": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command & {Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Core\nfunction Run-Server() { param([string]$h); $b = New-Object byte[] 8; $p = New-Object System.IO.Pipes.AnonymousPipeClientStream -ArgumentList @([System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::In, $h); if ($p) { $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8); while ($l -gt 7) { $c = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 0); $l = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4); $t = $null; if ($l -gt 0) { $t1 = New-Object byte[] $l; $l = $p.Read($t1, 0, $t1.Length); $t = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($t1, 0, $l) } if ($c -eq 1) { Invoke-Expression $t } elseif ($c -eq 9) { break } $l = $p.Read($b, 0, 8) } $p.Dispose() } } Run-Server -h 1412}",
"HostName": "ConsoleHost",
"Keywords": "0",
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"Payload": "CommandInvocation(Add-Type): \"Add-Type\"\r\nParameterBinding(Add-Type): name=\"AssemblyName\"; value=\"System.Core\"\r\n",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"Task": 106
},
"record_id": 32670,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DC2.corp.net",
"name": "DC2.corp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DC2.corp.net",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 5676,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 5676,
"thread": {
"id": 3020
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DC2.corp.net"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-04-18 14:51:32\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO4147.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":0,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4103,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":106,\"OpcodeValue\":20,\"RecordNumber\":1079309,\"ActivityID\":\"{83B38D2A-3444-0004-D607-B4834434D701}\",\"ProcessID\":5532,\"ThreadID\":7212,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"CommandInvocation (Out-Default) : \u00ab Out-Default \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=ApplicationFrameHost} \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=armsvc} \u00bb\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nContexte :\\r\\n Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\\r\\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.18362.1171\\r\\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = b9b8ea4b-cd03-4f71-86f7-2fd8e89b52a4\\r\\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\\r\\n Version du moteur = 5.1.18362.1171\\r\\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = bad57214-6381-4f0a-a2ea-ad1575bdb55d\\r\\n ID de pipeline = 1\\r\\n Nom de commande = \\r\\n Type de commande = Script\\r\\n Nom du script = \\r\\n Chemin de la commande = \\r\\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 18\\r\\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\\\Syst\u00e8me\\r\\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \\r\\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\\r\\n\\r\\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\"Category\":\"Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline\",\"Opcode\":\"\u00c0 utiliser lorsque l'op\u00e9ration ex\u00e9cute uniquement une m\u00e9thode\",\"ContextInfo\":\" Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\\r\\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\\r\\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.18362.1171\\r\\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = b9b8ea4b-cd03-4f71-86f7-2fd8e89b52a4\\r\\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\\r\\n Version du moteur = 5.1.18362.1171\\r\\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = bad57214-6381-4f0a-a2ea-ad1575bdb55d\\r\\n ID de pipeline = 1\\r\\n Nom de commande = \\r\\n Type de commande = Script\\r\\n Nom du script = \\r\\n Chemin de la commande = \\r\\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 18\\r\\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\\\Syst\u00e8me\\r\\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \\r\\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\\r\\n\",\"Payload\":\"CommandInvocation (Out-Default) : \u00ab Out-Default \u00bb\\r\\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=ApplicationFrameHost} \u00bb\\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-04-18 14:51:33\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4103",
"message": "CommandInvocation (Out-Default) : \u00ab Out-Default \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=ApplicationFrameHost} \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=armsvc} \u00bb\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nContexte :\r\n Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = b9b8ea4b-cd03-4f71-86f7-2fd8e89b52a4\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = bad57214-6381-4f0a-a2ea-ad1575bdb55d\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = \r\n Type de commande = Script\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 18\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n\r\n\r\nDonn\u00e9es utilisateur :\r\n\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell"
},
"action": {
"id": 4103,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Ex\u00e9cution du pipeline",
"ContextInfo": " Gravit\u00e9 = Informational\r\n Nom d\u2019h\u00f4te = ConsoleHost\r\n Version de l\u2019h\u00f4te = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019h\u00f4te = b9b8ea4b-cd03-4f71-86f7-2fd8e89b52a4\r\n Application h\u00f4te = C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname\r\n Version du moteur = 5.1.18362.1171\r\n ID d\u2019instance d\u2019ex\u00e9cution = bad57214-6381-4f0a-a2ea-ad1575bdb55d\r\n ID de pipeline = 1\r\n Nom de commande = \r\n Type de commande = Script\r\n Nom du script = \r\n Chemin de la commande = \r\n Num\u00e9ro de s\u00e9quence = 18\r\n Utilisateur = FOOBAR\\Syst\u00e8me\r\n Utilisateur connect\u00e9 = \r\n ID d\u2019interpr\u00e9teur de commandes = Microsoft.PowerShell\r\n",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"HostApplication": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe get-process | select processname",
"HostName": "ConsoleHost",
"Keywords": "0",
"OpcodeValue": 20,
"Payload": "CommandInvocation (Out-Default) : \u00ab Out-Default \u00bb\r\nLiaison de param\u00e8tre (Out-Default) : nom = \u00ab InputObject \u00bb ; valeur = \u00ab @{ProcessName=ApplicationFrameHost} \u00bb\r\n",
"ProviderGuid": "{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell",
"Task": 106
},
"record_id": 1079309,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "PCFOO4147.corp.net",
"name": "PCFOO4147.corp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "PCFOO4147.corp.net",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 5532,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 5532,
"thread": {
"id": 7212
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"PCFOO4147.corp.net"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-09-28 18:30:29\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9218868437227405312,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_FAILURE\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":4656,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":12804,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":9931381860,\"ProcessID\":728,\"ThreadID\":736,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A handle to an object was requested.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tV-FOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0xA4FA5F41\\r\\n\\r\\nObject:\\r\\n\\tObject Server:\\t\\tWS-Management Listener\\r\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\tUnknown\\r\\n\\tObject Name:\\t\\tUnknown\\r\\n\\tHandle ID:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tResource Attributes:\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x3d4\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nAccess Request Information:\\r\\n\\tTransaction ID:\\t\\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\\r\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tMAX_ALLOWED\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\n\\tAccess Reasons:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x2000000\\r\\n\\tPrivileges Used for Access Check:\\t-\\r\\n\\tRestricted SID Count:\\t0\",\"Category\":\"Other Object Access Events\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0xa4fa5f41\",\"ObjectServer\":\"WS-Management Listener\",\"ObjectType\":\"Unknown\",\"ObjectName\":\"Unknown\",\"HandleId\":\"0x0\",\"TransactionId\":\"{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\",\"AccessList\":\"%%1543\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"AccessReason\":\"-\",\"AccessMask\":\"0x2000000\",\"PrivilegeList\":\"-\",\"RestrictedSidCount\":\"0\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"ResourceAttributes\":\"-\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-09-28 18:30:30\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4656",
"message": "A handle to an object was requested.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0xA4FA5F41\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tWS-Management Listener\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tUnknown\r\n\tObject Name:\t\tUnknown\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x0\r\n\tResource Attributes:\t-\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x3d4\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tTransaction ID:\t\t{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tMAX_ALLOWED\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n\tAccess Reasons:\t\t-\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x2000000\r\n\tPrivileges Used for Access Check:\t-\r\n\tRestricted SID Count:\t0",
"outcome": "failure",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4656,
"name": "A handle to an object was requested",
"outcome": "failure",
"properties": {
"AccessList": "%%1543\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessMask": "0x2000000",
"AccessReason": "-",
"Accesses": "\t\tMAX_ALLOWED",
"Category": "Other Object Access Events",
"EventType": "AUDIT_FAILURE",
"HandleId": "0x0",
"Keywords": "-9218868437227405312",
"ObjectName": "Unknown",
"ObjectServer": "WS-Management Listener",
"ObjectType": "Unknown",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PrivilegeList": "-",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0xa4fa5f41",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322",
"Task": 12804
},
"record_id": 9931381860,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"id": 728,
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 728,
"thread": {
"id": 736
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"user": [
"V-FOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-73322",
"name": "V-FOO$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-09-30 12:01:24\",\"Hostname\":\"FOOBAZ02\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4657,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12801,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":27949645047,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":14940,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A registry value was modified.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tFOOBAZ02$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nObject:\\r\\n\\tObject Name:\\t\\t\\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\Auto Update\\r\\n\\tObject Value Name:\\tFirmwareUpdatesNotInstalled\\r\\n\\tHandle ID:\\t\\t0x22cc\\r\\n\\tOperation Type:\\t\\tNew registry value created\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0xac0\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nChange Information:\\r\\n\\tOld Value Type:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tOld Value:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tNew Value Type:\\t\\tREG_DWORD\\r\\n\\tNew Value:\\t\\t0\",\"Category\":\"Registry\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"FOOBAZ02$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"ObjectName\":\"\\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\WindowsUpdate\\\\Auto Update\",\"ObjectValueName\":\"FirmwareUpdatesNotInstalled\",\"HandleId\":\"0x22cc\",\"OperationType\":\"%%1904\",\"OldValueType\":\"-\",\"OldValue\":\"-\",\"NewValueType\":\"%%1876\",\"NewValue\":\"0\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-09-30 12:01:25\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4657",
"message": "A registry value was modified.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tFOOBAZ02$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Name:\t\t\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WindowsUpdate\\Auto Update\r\n\tObject Value Name:\tFirmwareUpdatesNotInstalled\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x22cc\r\n\tOperation Type:\t\tNew registry value created\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0xac0\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe\r\n\r\nChange Information:\r\n\tOld Value Type:\t\t-\r\n\tOld Value:\t\t-\r\n\tNew Value Type:\t\tREG_DWORD\r\n\tNew Value:\t\t0",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4657,
"name": "A registry value was modified",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Registry",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HandleId": "0x22cc",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NewValue": "0",
"ObjectName": "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WindowsUpdate\\Auto Update",
"ObjectValueName": "FirmwareUpdatesNotInstalled",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"OperationType": "%%1904",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "FOOBAZ02$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12801
},
"record_id": 27949645047,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ02",
"name": "FOOBAZ02"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ02",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 14940
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"FOOBAZ02"
],
"user": [
"FOOBAZ02$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "FOOBAZ02$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-09-30 12:32:03\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4658,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12801,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":11254204732,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":6740,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"The handle to an object was closed.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject :\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tV-FOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nObject:\\r\\n\\tObject Server:\\t\\tSecurity\\r\\n\\tHandle ID:\\t\\t0x5c44\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0x4e58\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\",\"Category\":\"Registry\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"ObjectServer\":\"Security\",\"HandleId\":\"0x5c44\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-09-30 12:32:03\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4658",
"message": "The handle to an object was closed.\r\n\r\nSubject :\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tSecurity\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x5c44\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0x4e58\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4658,
"name": "The handle to an object was closed",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Registry",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HandleId": "0x5c44",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12801
},
"record_id": 11254204732,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "powershell.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 6740
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"user": [
"V-FOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "V-FOO$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-09-30 14:43:13\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4663,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":12802,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1507550680,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":10820,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"An attempt was made to access an object.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tV-FOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nObject:\\r\\n\\tObject Server:\\t\\tSecurity\\r\\n\\tObject Type:\\t\\tProcess\\r\\n\\tObject Name:\\t\\t\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume2\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\\r\\n\\tHandle ID:\\t\\t0x5d4\\r\\n\\tResource Attributes:\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t0xcc8\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\t\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiPrvSE.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nAccess Request Information:\\r\\n\\tAccesses:\\t\\tRead from process memory\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\\r\\n\\tAccess Mask:\\t\\t0x10\",\"Category\":\"Kernel Object\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"ObjectServer\":\"Security\",\"ObjectType\":\"Process\",\"ObjectName\":\"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume2\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\",\"HandleId\":\"0x5d4\",\"AccessList\":\"%%4484\\r\\n\\t\\t\\t\\t\",\"AccessMask\":\"0x10\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wbem\\\\WmiPrvSE.exe\",\"ResourceAttributes\":\"-\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-09-30 14:43:15\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4663",
"message": "An attempt was made to access an object.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nObject:\r\n\tObject Server:\t\tSecurity\r\n\tObject Type:\t\tProcess\r\n\tObject Name:\t\t\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\n\tHandle ID:\t\t0x5d4\r\n\tResource Attributes:\t-\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t0xcc8\r\n\tProcess Name:\t\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe\r\n\r\nAccess Request Information:\r\n\tAccesses:\t\tRead from process memory\r\n\t\t\t\t\r\n\tAccess Mask:\t\t0x10",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4663,
"name": "An attempt was made to access an object",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AccessList": "%%4484\r\n\t\t\t\t",
"AccessMask": "0x10",
"Accesses": "\t\tRead from process memory",
"Category": "Kernel Object",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HandleId": "0x5d4",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectName": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"ObjectType": "Process",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12802
},
"record_id": 1507550680,
"type": "Security"
},
"file": {
"name": "lsass.exe",
"path": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "WmiPrvSE.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 10820
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"user": [
"V-FOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "V-FOO$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-10-01 17:52:46\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4670,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":13570,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":878009,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":7416,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"FOOBAZ$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"ObjectServer\":\"Security\",\"ObjectType\":\"Token\",\"ObjectName\":\"-\",\"HandleId\":\"0x444\",\"OldSd\":\"D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-80-117416528-2204451360-1913602512-1355018040-1234992034)(A;;GA;;;BA)\",\"NewSd\":\"D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-80-117416528-2204451360-1913602512-1355018040-1234992034)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;SWRPRC;;;S-1-5-5-0-1093861)\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\SearchIndexer.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-10-01 18:00:19\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4670",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4670,
"name": "Permissions on an object were changed",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HandleId": "0x444",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NewSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-80-117416528-2204451360-1913602512-1355018040-1234992034)(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;SWRPRC;;;S-1-5-5-0-1093861)",
"ObjectName": "-",
"ObjectServer": "Security",
"ObjectType": "Token",
"OldSd": "D:(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;RC;;;OW)(A;;GA;;;S-1-5-80-117416528-2204451360-1913602512-1355018040-1234992034)(A;;GA;;;BA)",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "FOOBAZ$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13570
},
"record_id": 878009,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "SearchIndexer.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 7416
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"user": [
"FOOBAZ$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "FOOBAZ$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-01-25 18:20:06\",\"Hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600035000,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4688,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":13312,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":968049,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":14728,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"REDACTED\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"REDACTED\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"NewProcessId\":\"0xe40\",\"NewProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\taskhostw.exe\",\"TokenElevationType\":\"%%1936\",\"CommandLine\":\"taskhostw.exe\",\"TargetUserSid\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"TargetUserName\":\"-\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"-\",\"TargetLogonId\":\"0x0\",\"ParentProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"MandatoryLabel\":\"S-1-16-16384\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-01-25 18:31:58\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4688",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4688,
"name": "A new process has been created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600035000",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"TargetDomainName": "-",
"TargetLogonId": "0x0",
"TargetUserName": "-",
"TargetUserSid": "S-1-0-0",
"Task": 13312
},
"record_id": 968049,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "taskhostw.exe",
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe",
"id": 3648,
"name": "taskhostw.exe",
"parent": {
"command_line": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"name": "svchost.exe",
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"pid": 3648,
"thread": {
"id": 14728
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
],
"user": [
"REDACTED"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "REDACTED",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "REDACTED",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-0-0"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-01-26 11:33:55\",\"Hostname\":\"REDACTED\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4689,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":13313,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1840478,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":13048,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"REDACTED\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"REDACTED\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"Status\":\"0x0\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-01-26 11:38:04\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4689",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4689,
"name": "A process has exited",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0x0",
"SubjectDomainName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "REDACTED",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13313
},
"record_id": 1840478,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"name": "REDACTED"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "REDACTED",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 13048
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"REDACTED"
],
"user": [
"REDACTED"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "REDACTED",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "REDACTED"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\": \"2023-08-25 12:13:33\", \"Hostname\": \"srv-foo\", \"Keywords\": -9214364837600034816, \"EventType\": \"AUDIT_SUCCESS\", \"SeverityValue\": 2, \"Severity\": \"INFO\", \"EventID\": 4698, \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\", \"Version\": 1, \"Task\": 12804, \"OpcodeValue\": 0, \"RecordNumber\": 4302958134, \"ActivityID\": \"{25C1B30D-1E8B-4A26-9E80-ED3A242DB52E}\", \"ProcessID\": 912, \"ThreadID\": 5584, \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Message\": \"A scheduled task was created.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tsrv-foo$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nTask Information:\\r\\n\\tTask Name: \\t\\t\\\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates\\r\\n\\tTask Content: \\t\\t<?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<Task version=\\\"1.2\\\" xmlns=\\\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\\\">\\r\\n <RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Author>KEY\\\\adm_foo</Author>\\r\\n <URI>\\\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates</URI>\\r\\n </RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Triggers>\\r\\n <CalendarTrigger>\\r\\n <Repetition>\\r\\n <Interval>PT1H</Interval>\\r\\n <Duration>P1D</Duration>\\r\\n <StopAtDurationEnd>true</StopAtDurationEnd>\\r\\n </Repetition>\\r\\n <StartBoundary>2016-05-02T04:45:00</StartBoundary>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT30M</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <ScheduleByDay>\\r\\n <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>\\r\\n </ScheduleByDay>\\r\\n </CalendarTrigger>\\r\\n </Triggers>\\r\\n <Principals>\\r\\n <Principal id=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\\r\\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\\\System</UserId>\\r\\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\\r\\n </Principal>\\r\\n </Principals>\\r\\n <Settings>\\r\\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\\r\\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\\r\\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\\r\\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\\r\\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\\r\\n <IdleSettings>\\r\\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\\r\\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\\r\\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\\r\\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\\r\\n </IdleSettings>\\r\\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\\r\\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT1H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Priority>7</Priority>\\r\\n <RestartOnFailure>\\r\\n <Interval>PT15M</Interval>\\r\\n <Count>3</Count>\\r\\n </RestartOnFailure>\\r\\n </Settings>\\r\\n <Actions Context=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <Exec>\\r\\n <Command>C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe</Command>\\r\\n <Arguments>-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \\\"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\\\Exploitation\\\\Scripts\\\\Nagios\\\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\\\"</Arguments>\\r\\n </Exec>\\r\\n </Actions>\\r\\n</Task>\\r\\n\\r\\nOther Information:\\r\\n\\tProcessCreationTime: \\t\\t28428972647776291\\r\\n\\tClientProcessId: \\t\\t\\t1700\\r\\n\\tParentProcessId: \\t\\t\\t892\\r\\n\\tFQDN: \\t\\t0\\r\\n\\t\", \"Category\": \"Other Object Access Events\", \"Opcode\": \"Info\", \"SubjectUserSid\": \"S-1-5-18\", \"SubjectUserName\": \"srv-foo$\", \"SubjectDomainName\": \"KEY\", \"SubjectLogonId\": \"0x3e7\", \"TaskName\": \"\\\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates\", \"TaskContent\": \"<?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<Task version=\\\"1.2\\\" xmlns=\\\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\\\">\\r\\n <RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Author>KEY\\\\adm_foo</Author>\\r\\n <URI>\\\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates</URI>\\r\\n </RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Triggers>\\r\\n <CalendarTrigger>\\r\\n <Repetition>\\r\\n <Interval>PT1H</Interval>\\r\\n <Duration>P1D</Duration>\\r\\n <StopAtDurationEnd>true</StopAtDurationEnd>\\r\\n </Repetition>\\r\\n <StartBoundary>2016-05-02T04:45:00</StartBoundary>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT30M</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <ScheduleByDay>\\r\\n <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>\\r\\n </ScheduleByDay>\\r\\n </CalendarTrigger>\\r\\n </Triggers>\\r\\n <Principals>\\r\\n <Principal id=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\\r\\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\\\System</UserId>\\r\\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\\r\\n </Principal>\\r\\n </Principals>\\r\\n <Settings>\\r\\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\\r\\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\\r\\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\\r\\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\\r\\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\\r\\n <IdleSettings>\\r\\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\\r\\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\\r\\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\\r\\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\\r\\n </IdleSettings>\\r\\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\\r\\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT1H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Priority>7</Priority>\\r\\n <RestartOnFailure>\\r\\n <Interval>PT15M</Interval>\\r\\n <Count>3</Count>\\r\\n </RestartOnFailure>\\r\\n </Settings>\\r\\n <Actions Context=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <Exec>\\r\\n <Command>C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe</Command>\\r\\n <Arguments>-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \\\"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\\\Exploitation\\\\Scripts\\\\Nagios\\\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\\\"</Arguments>\\r\\n </Exec>\\r\\n </Actions>\\r\\n</Task>\", \"ClientProcessStartKey\": \"28428972647776291\", \"ClientProcessId\": \"1700\", \"ParentProcessId\": \"892\", \"RpcCallClientLocality\": \"0\", \"FQDN\": \"srv-foo.key.corp.net\", \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-08-25 12:13:34\", \"SourceModuleName\": \"in\", \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4698",
"message": "A scheduled task was created.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tsrv-foo$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nTask Information:\r\n\tTask Name: \t\t\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates\r\n\tTask Content: \t\t<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Author>KEY\\adm_foo</Author>\r\n <URI>\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <CalendarTrigger>\r\n <Repetition>\r\n <Interval>PT1H</Interval>\r\n <Duration>P1D</Duration>\r\n <StopAtDurationEnd>true</StopAtDurationEnd>\r\n </Repetition>\r\n <StartBoundary>2016-05-02T04:45:00</StartBoundary>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT30M</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <ScheduleByDay>\r\n <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>\r\n </ScheduleByDay>\r\n </CalendarTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\System</UserId>\r\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT1H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n <RestartOnFailure>\r\n <Interval>PT15M</Interval>\r\n <Count>3</Count>\r\n </RestartOnFailure>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\Exploitation\\Scripts\\Nagios\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\"</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>\r\n\r\nOther Information:\r\n\tProcessCreationTime: \t\t28428972647776291\r\n\tClientProcessId: \t\t\t1700\r\n\tParentProcessId: \t\t\t892\r\n\tFQDN: \t\t0\r\n\t",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4698,
"name": "A scheduled task was created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Other Object Access Events",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "srv-foo$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12804,
"TaskContent": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Author>KEY\\adm_foo</Author>\r\n <URI>\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <CalendarTrigger>\r\n <Repetition>\r\n <Interval>PT1H</Interval>\r\n <Duration>P1D</Duration>\r\n <StopAtDurationEnd>true</StopAtDurationEnd>\r\n </Repetition>\r\n <StartBoundary>2016-05-02T04:45:00</StartBoundary>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT30M</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <ScheduleByDay>\r\n <DaysInterval>1</DaysInterval>\r\n </ScheduleByDay>\r\n </CalendarTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\\System</UserId>\r\n <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT5M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT1H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n <RestartOnFailure>\r\n <Interval>PT15M</Interval>\r\n <Count>3</Count>\r\n </RestartOnFailure>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\Exploitation\\Scripts\\Nagios\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\"</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task>",
"TaskContentNew_Args": "-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command \"Import-Module -Name 'PSWindowsUpdate'; Get-WUHistory -MaxDate (Get-Date).AddMonths(-3) | Export-Clixml -Path 'C:\\Exploitation\\Scripts\\Nagios\\LastInstalledUpdates.xml'\"",
"TaskContentNew_Command": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
"TaskName": "\\CORP-Dump_Installed_Updates"
},
"record_id": 4302958134,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "srv-foo",
"name": "srv-foo"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "srv-foo",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 912,
"pid": 912,
"ppid": "892",
"thread": {
"id": 5584
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"srv-foo"
],
"user": [
"srv-foo$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "srv-foo$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-01-11 13:11:59\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTFOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4719,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":13568,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3128,\"ActivityID\":\"{3B3C7595-E81B-0008-9F75-3C3B1BE8D601}\",\"ProcessID\":764,\"ThreadID\":932,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"FOOBAR$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"CategoryId\":\"%%8278\",\"SubcategoryId\":\"%%13825\",\"SubcategoryGuid\":\"{0cce9236-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030}\",\"AuditPolicyChanges\":\"%%8449, %%8451\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-01-11 13:12:05\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4719",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4719,
"name": "System audit policy was changed",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AuditPolicyChanges": "%%8449, %%8451",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "FOOBAR$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13568
},
"record_id": 3128,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"name": "HOSTFOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTFOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 764,
"pid": 764,
"thread": {
"id": 932
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTFOO"
],
"user": [
"FOOBAR$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "FOOBAR$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2020-11-27 17:05:18\",\"Hostname\":\"SERVERFOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4720,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":13824,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":2077430259,\"ProcessID\":1808,\"ThreadID\":9204,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A user account was created.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tSVC_sitemanager\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tEXTRAWEB\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x8A2F8844\\r\\n\\r\\nNew Account:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-47859\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tEXTRAWEB\\r\\n\\r\\nAttributes:\\r\\n\\tSAM Account Name:\\tUSERFOO\\r\\n\\tDisplay Name:\\t\\tUSERFOO USERLASTNAME\\r\\n\\tUser Principal Name:\\\\tuserfoo@mycorp.nett\\r\\n\\tHome Directory:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tHome Drive:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tScript Path:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tProfile Path:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tUser Workstations:\\t-\\r\\n\\tPassword Last Set:\\t<never>\\r\\n\\tAccount Expires:\\t\\t28/11/2021 00:00:00\\r\\n\\tPrimary Group ID:\\t513\\r\\n\\tAllowed To Delegate To:\\t-\\r\\n\\tOld UAC Value:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tNew UAC Value:\\t\\t0x15\\r\\n\\tUser Account Control:\\t\\r\\n\\t\\tAccount Disabled\\r\\n\\t\\t'Password Not Required' - Enabled\\r\\n\\t\\t'Normal Account' - Enabled\\r\\n\\tUser Parameters:\\t-\\r\\n\\tSID History:\\t\\t-\\r\\n\\tLogon Hours:\\t\\t<value not set>\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tPrivileges\\t\\t-\",\"Category\":\"User Account Management\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserName\":\"USERFOO\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"EXTRAWEB\",\"TargetSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-47859\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"SVC_sitemanager\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"EXTRAWEB\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x8a2f8844\",\"PrivilegeList\":\"-\",\"SamAccountName\":\"USERFOO\",\"DisplayName\":\"USERFOO USERLASTNAME\",\"UserPrincipalName\":\"userfoo@mycorp.nett\",\"HomeDirectory\":\"-\",\"HomePath\":\"-\",\"ScriptPath\":\"-\",\"ProfilePath\":\"-\",\"UserWorkstations\":\"-\",\"PasswordLastSet\":\"%%1794\",\"AccountExpires\":\"28/11/2021 00:00:00\",\"PrimaryGroupId\":\"513\",\"AllowedToDelegateTo\":\"-\",\"OldUacValue\":\"0x0\",\"NewUacValue\":\"0x15\",\"UserAccountControl\":\"\\r\\n\\t\\t%%2080\\r\\n\\t\\t%%2082\\r\\n\\t\\t%%2084\",\"UserParameters\":\"-\",\"SidHistory\":\"-\",\"LogonHours\":\"%%1793\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2020-11-27 17:05:19\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4720",
"message": "A user account was created.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tSVC_sitemanager\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tEXTRAWEB\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x8A2F8844\r\n\r\nNew Account:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-47859\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tUSERFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tEXTRAWEB\r\n\r\nAttributes:\r\n\tSAM Account Name:\tUSERFOO\r\n\tDisplay Name:\t\tUSERFOO USERLASTNAME\r\n\tUser Principal Name:\\tuserfoo@mycorp.nett\r\n\tHome Directory:\t\t-\r\n\tHome Drive:\t\t-\r\n\tScript Path:\t\t-\r\n\tProfile Path:\t\t-\r\n\tUser Workstations:\t-\r\n\tPassword Last Set:\t<never>\r\n\tAccount Expires:\t\t28/11/2021 00:00:00\r\n\tPrimary Group ID:\t513\r\n\tAllowed To Delegate To:\t-\r\n\tOld UAC Value:\t\t0x0\r\n\tNew UAC Value:\t\t0x15\r\n\tUser Account Control:\t\r\n\t\tAccount Disabled\r\n\t\t'Password Not Required' - Enabled\r\n\t\t'Normal Account' - Enabled\r\n\tUser Parameters:\t-\r\n\tSID History:\t\t-\r\n\tLogon Hours:\t\t<value not set>\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tPrivileges\t\t-",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4720,
"name": "A user account was created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AllowedToDelegateTo": "-",
"Category": "User Account Management",
"DisplayName": "USERFOO USERLASTNAME",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"HomeDirectory": "-",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NewUAC": "0x15",
"OldUAC": "0x0",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PrivilegeList": "-",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"SamAccountName": "USERFOO",
"ScriptPath": "-",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SidHistory": "-",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "EXTRAWEB",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x8a2f8844",
"SubjectUserName": "SVC_sitemanager",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746",
"TargetDomainName": "EXTRAWEB",
"TargetSid": "S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-47859",
"TargetUserName": "USERFOO",
"Task": 13824,
"UserPrincipalName": "userfoo@mycorp.nett"
},
"record_id": 2077430259,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "SERVERFOO",
"name": "SERVERFOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "SERVERFOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 1808,
"pid": 1808,
"thread": {
"id": 9204
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVERFOO"
],
"user": [
"SVC_sitemanager"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "EXTRAWEB",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1595408694-1749029380-1551332766-2746",
"name": "SVC_sitemanager",
"target": {
"domain": "EXTRAWEB",
"name": "USERFOO"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-12-11 16:17:08\",\"Hostname\":\"FOOBAZ11\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4769,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":14337,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":30707351571,\"ProcessID\":1812,\"ThreadID\":4500,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A Kerberos service ticket was requested.\\r\\n\\r\\nAccount Information:\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tHOSTFOO\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY.HOSTFOO\\r\\n\\tLogon GUID:\\t\\t{25EC3BE0-427C-8A48-FD6F-0EF462F18BEB}\\r\\n\\r\\nService Information:\\r\\n\\tService Name:\\t\\tV-FOO$\\r\\n\\tService ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-74694\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tClient Address:\\t\\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tClient Port:\\t\\t54021\\r\\n\\r\\nAdditional Information:\\r\\n\\tTicket Options:\\t\\t0x40810000\\r\\n\\tTicket Encryption Type:\\t0x12\\r\\n\\tFailure Code:\\t\\t0x0\\r\\n\\tTransited Services:\\t-\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.\\r\\n\\r\\nThis event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.\\r\\n\\r\\nTicket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.\",\"Category\":\"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"TargetUserName\":\"HOSTFOO@KEY.HOSTFOO\",\"TargetDomainName\":\"KEY.HOSTFOO\",\"ServiceName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"ServiceSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-74694\",\"TicketOptions\":\"0x40810000\",\"TicketEncryptionType\":\"0x12\",\"IpAddress\":\"::ffff:1.1.1.1\",\"IpPort\":\"54021\",\"Status\":\"0x0\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{25EC3BE0-427C-8A48-FD6F-0EF462F18BEB}\",\"TransmittedServices\":\"-\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-12-11 16:17:09\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4769",
"message": "A Kerberos service ticket was requested.\r\n\r\nAccount Information:\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTFOO\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY.HOSTFOO\r\n\tLogon GUID:\t\t{25EC3BE0-427C-8A48-FD6F-0EF462F18BEB}\r\n\r\nService Information:\r\n\tService Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tService ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-74694\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tClient Address:\t\t::ffff:1.1.1.1\r\n\tClient Port:\t\t54021\r\n\r\nAdditional Information:\r\n\tTicket Options:\t\t0x40810000\r\n\tTicket Encryption Type:\t0x12\r\n\tFailure Code:\t\t0x0\r\n\tTransited Services:\t-\r\n\r\nThis event is generated every time access is requested to a resource such as a computer or a Windows service. The service name indicates the resource to which access was requested.\r\n\r\nThis event can be correlated with Windows logon events by comparing the Logon GUID fields in each event. The logon event occurs on the machine that was accessed, which is often a different machine than the domain controller which issued the service ticket.\r\n\r\nTicket options, encryption types, and failure codes are defined in RFC 4120.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4769,
"name": "A Kerberos service ticket was requested",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Kerberos Service Ticket Operations",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"FailureCode": "0x0",
"IpAddress": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"IpPort": "54021",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ServiceName": "V-FOO$",
"ServiceSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-74694",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Status": "0x0",
"TargetDomainName": "KEY.HOSTFOO",
"TargetUserName": "HOSTFOO@KEY.HOSTFOO",
"Task": 14337,
"TicketEncryptionType": "0x12",
"TicketOptions": "0x40810000"
},
"record_id": 30707351571,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"name": "FOOBAZ11"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 1812,
"pid": 1812,
"thread": {
"id": 4500
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"FOOBAZ11"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1"
},
"user": {
"target": {
"domain": "KEY.HOSTFOO",
"name": "HOSTFOO@KEY.HOSTFOO"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-11-13 17:25:22\",\"Hostname\":\"FOOBAZ11\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5136,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":14081,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":30373281570,\"ProcessID\":1928,\"ThreadID\":12604,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A directory service object was modified.\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tHOSTNAMEBAZ\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x2245EEC18\\r\\n\\r\\nDirectory Service:\\r\\n\\tName:\\tkey.mycorp.int\\r\\n\\tType:\\tActive Directory Domain Services\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nObject:\\r\\n\\tDN:\\tCN=MYUSER,OU=Ten,OU=MYCORP Computers,OU=MYCORP Data,DC=key,DC=mycorp,DC=int\\r\\n\\tGUID:\\t{5E818E06-674B-4D67-8D7C-FD08473C7FD4}\\r\\n\\tClass:\\tcomputer\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nAttribute:\\r\\n\\tLDAP Display Name:\\tservicePrincipalName\\r\\n\\tSyntax (OID):\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tValue:\\tCmRcService/MYUSER\\r\\n\\t\\r\\nOperation:\\r\\n\\tType:\\tValue Added\\r\\n\\tCorrelation ID:\\t{862BB478-DF85-4696-B45A-8C27F04C9377}\\r\\n\\tApplication Correlation ID:\\t-\",\"Category\":\"Directory Service Changes\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"OpCorrelationID\":\"{862BB478-DF85-4696-B45A-8C27F04C9377}\",\"AppCorrelationID\":\"-\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"HOSTNAMEBAZ\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x2245eec18\",\"DSName\":\"key.mycorp.int\",\"DSType\":\"%%14676\",\"ObjectDN\":\"CN=MYUSER,OU=Ten,OU=MYCORP Computers,OU=MYCORP Data,DC=key,DC=mycorp,DC=int\",\"ObjectGUID\":\"{5E818E06-674B-4D67-8D7C-FD08473C7FD4}\",\"ObjectClass\":\"computer\",\"AttributeLDAPDisplayName\":\"servicePrincipalName\",\"AttributeSyntaxOID\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"AttributeValue\":\"CmRcService/MYUSER\",\"OperationType\":\"%%14674\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-11-13 17:25:22\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5136",
"message": "A directory service object was modified.\r\n\t\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tHOSTNAMEBAZ\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x2245EEC18\r\n\r\nDirectory Service:\r\n\tName:\tkey.mycorp.int\r\n\tType:\tActive Directory Domain Services\r\n\t\r\nObject:\r\n\tDN:\tCN=MYUSER,OU=Ten,OU=MYCORP Computers,OU=MYCORP Data,DC=key,DC=mycorp,DC=int\r\n\tGUID:\t{5E818E06-674B-4D67-8D7C-FD08473C7FD4}\r\n\tClass:\tcomputer\r\n\t\r\nAttribute:\r\n\tLDAP Display Name:\tservicePrincipalName\r\n\tSyntax (OID):\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tValue:\tCmRcService/MYUSER\r\n\t\r\nOperation:\r\n\tType:\tValue Added\r\n\tCorrelation ID:\t{862BB478-DF85-4696-B45A-8C27F04C9377}\r\n\tApplication Correlation ID:\t-",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 5136,
"name": "A directory service object was modified",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AttributeLDAPDisplayName": "servicePrincipalName",
"AttributeValue": "CmRcService/MYUSER",
"Category": "Directory Service Changes",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectClass": "computer",
"ObjectDN": "CN=MYUSER,OU=Ten,OU=MYCORP Computers,OU=MYCORP Data,DC=key,DC=mycorp,DC=int",
"ObjectGUID": "{5E818E06-674B-4D67-8D7C-FD08473C7FD4}",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"OperationType": "%%14674",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x2245eec18",
"SubjectUserName": "HOSTNAMEBAZ",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990",
"Task": 14081
},
"record_id": 30373281570,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"name": "FOOBAZ11"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "FOOBAZ11",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 1928,
"pid": 1928,
"thread": {
"id": 12604
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"FOOBAZ11"
],
"user": [
"HOSTNAMEBAZ"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1574594750-1263408776-2012955550-123990",
"name": "HOSTNAMEBAZ"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"@timestamp\": \"2010-10-29T12:16:10.651Z\", \"TimeCreated\": \"2010-10-29T12:16:10.651Z\", \"ProviderGuid\": \"{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}\", \"SourcePort\": \"8000\", \"LayerName\": \"%%14609\", \"SourceAddress\": \"::\", \"Level\": \"0\", \"Channel\": \"Security\", \"Task\": \"12810\", \"Protocol\": \"6\", \"SourceName\": \"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\", \"Hostname\": \"WORKSTATION5\", \"ProcessId\": \"10220\", \"LayerRTID\": \"42\", \"FilterRTID\": \"81935\", \"EventID\": 5154, \"Keywords\": \"0x8020000000000000\", \"Application\": \"\\\\device\\\\harddiskvolume2\\\\users\\\\wardog\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\programs\\\\python\\\\python39\\\\python.exe\", \"Message\": \"The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.\\r\\n\\r\\nApplication Information:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t\\t10220\\r\\n\\tApplication Name:\\t\\\\device\\\\harddiskvolume2\\\\users\\\\wardog\\\\appdata\\\\local\\\\programs\\\\python\\\\python39\\\\python.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nNetwork Information:\\r\\n\\tSource Address:\\t\\t::\\r\\n\\tSource Port:\\t\\t8000\\r\\n\\tProtocol:\\t\\t6\\r\\n\\r\\nFilter Information:\\r\\n\\tFilter Run-Time ID:\\t81935\\r\\n\\tLayer Name:\\t\\tListen\\r\\n\\tLayer Run-Time ID:\\t42\", \"EventTime\": \"2011-06-10 08:53:53\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5154",
"message": "The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections.\r\n\r\nApplication Information:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t\t10220\r\n\tApplication Name:\t\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\users\\wardog\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\python.exe\r\n\r\nNetwork Information:\r\n\tSource Address:\t\t::\r\n\tSource Port:\t\t8000\r\n\tProtocol:\t\t6\r\n\r\nFilter Information:\r\n\tFilter Run-Time ID:\t81935\r\n\tLayer Name:\t\tListen\r\n\tLayer Run-Time ID:\t42",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 5154,
"name": "The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted an application or service to listen on a port for incoming connections",
"properties": {
"Application": "\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\users\\wardog\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\python.exe",
"Keywords": "0x8020000000000000",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 12810
},
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "WORKSTATION5",
"name": "WORKSTATION5"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "WORKSTATION5"
},
"network": {
"transport": "6"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"name": "python.exe"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"WORKSTATION5"
],
"ip": [
"::"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "::",
"ip": "::",
"port": 8000
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-10-21 14:10:49\",\"Hostname\":\"host.foo.local\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":5156,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":12810,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":10943,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":148,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"La plateforme WPF (Windows Filtering Platform) a autoris\u00e9 une connexion.\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur l\u2019application :\\r\\n\\tID du processus :\\t\\t1452\\r\\n\\tNom de l\u2019application :\\t\\\\device\\\\harddiskvolume2\\\\program files (x86)\\\\nxlog\\\\nxlog.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\\r\\n\\tDirection :\\t\\tEntrant\\r\\n\\tAdresse source :\\t\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tPort source :\\t\\t51845\\r\\n\\tAdresse de destination :\\t1.1.1.1\\r\\n\\tPort de destination :\\t\\t51846\\r\\n\\tProtocole :\\t\\t6\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le filtre :\\r\\n\\tID d\u2019ex\u00e9cution du filtre :\\t9\\r\\n\\tNom de la couche :\\t\\tR\u00e9ception/Acceptation\\r\\n\\tID d\u2019ex\u00e9cution de la couche :\\t44\",\"Category\":\"Connexion de la plateforme de filtrage\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"Application\":\"\\\\device\\\\harddiskvolume2\\\\program files (x86)\\\\nxlog\\\\nxlog.exe\",\"Direction\":\"%%14592\",\"SourceAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"SourcePort\":\"51845\",\"DestAddress\":\"1.1.1.1\",\"DestPort\":\"51846\",\"Protocol\":\"6\",\"FilterRTID\":\"9\",\"LayerName\":\"%%14610\",\"LayerRTID\":\"44\",\"RemoteUserID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"RemoteMachineID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-10-21 14:10:50\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"security\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "5156",
"message": "La plateforme WPF (Windows Filtering Platform) a autoris\u00e9 une connexion.\r\n\r\nInformations sur l\u2019application :\r\n\tID du processus :\t\t1452\r\n\tNom de l\u2019application :\t\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\program files (x86)\\nxlog\\nxlog.exe\r\n\r\nInformations sur le r\u00e9seau :\r\n\tDirection :\t\tEntrant\r\n\tAdresse source :\t\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort source :\t\t51845\r\n\tAdresse de destination :\t1.1.1.1\r\n\tPort de destination :\t\t51846\r\n\tProtocole :\t\t6\r\n\r\nInformations sur le filtre :\r\n\tID d\u2019ex\u00e9cution du filtre :\t9\r\n\tNom de la couche :\t\tR\u00e9ception/Acceptation\r\n\tID d\u2019ex\u00e9cution de la couche :\t44",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 5156,
"name": "The Windows Filtering Platform has allowed a connection",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Application": "\\device\\harddiskvolume2\\program files (x86)\\nxlog\\nxlog.exe",
"Category": "Connexion de la plateforme de filtrage",
"DestinationPort": "51846",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"Task": 12810
},
"record_id": 10943,
"target": "network-traffic",
"type": "Security"
},
"destination": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1",
"port": 51846
},
"host": {
"hostname": "host.foo.local",
"name": "host.foo.local"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "host.foo.local",
"level": "info"
},
"network": {
"transport": "6"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 4,
"name": "nxlog.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 148
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"host.foo.local"
],
"ip": [
"1.1.1.1"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.1.1.1",
"ip": "1.1.1.1",
"port": 51845
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2024-09-18 10:08:41\",\"Hostname\":\"test\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":6272,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{000000000-0000-0000-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":12552,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":2324634,\"ActivityID\":\"{9481D23D-1111-1111-1111-1DD10B0E2623}\",\"ProcessID\":672,\"ThreadID\":3752,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"Le serveur NPS a accorde lacces a un utilisateur. Utilisateur : ID de securite : S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111 Nom de compte : testUser Domaine de compte : NT01 Nom de compte complet : net/Administrateurs/ITUser/testUser Ordinateur client : ID de securite : S-1-0-0 Nom de compte : - Nom de compte complet : - Identificateur de la station appelee : 1.2.3.4 Identificateur de la station appelante : 10.24.25.25 Serveur NAS : Adresse IPv4 du serveur NAS : 1.2.3.4 Adresse IPv6 du serveur NAS : - Identificateur du serveur NAS : - Type de port du serveur NAS : Virtuel Port du serveur NAS : 450560 Client RADIUS : Nom convivial du client : FW01 Adresse IP du client : 1.2.3.4 Informations detaillees sur lauthentification : Nom de strategie de demande de connexion : interface_admin_reseau Nom de strategie reseau : FWASA01_Admin Fournisseur dauthentification : RADIUS distant vers le mappage utilisateur Windows Serveur dauthentification : 1.2.3.4 Type dauthentification : - Type EAP : - Identificateur de la session du compte : - Resultats de la journalisation : Les informations de suivi ont ete inscrites dans le fichier journal local. \",\"Category\":\"Network Policy Server\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"testUser\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"NT01\",\"FullyQualifiedSubjectUserName\":\"test.net/Administrateurs/ITUser/testUser\",\"SubjectMachineSID\":\"S-1-0-0\",\"SubjectMachineName\":\"-\",\"FullyQualifiedSubjectMachineName\":\"-\",\"CalledStationID\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"CallingStationID\":\"10.24.25.25\",\"NASIPv4Address\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"NASIPv6Address\":\"-\",\"NASIdentifier\":\"-\",\"NASPortType\":\"Virtuel\",\"NASPort\":\"450560\",\"ClientName\":\"FW01\",\"ClientIPAddress\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"ProxyPolicyName\":\"interface_admin_reseau\",\"NetworkPolicyName\":\"FWASA01_Admin\",\"AuthenticationProvider\":\"RADIUS distant vers le mappage utilisateur Windows\",\"AuthenticationServer\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"AuthenticationType\":\"-\",\"EAPType\":\"-\",\"AccountSessionIdentifier\":\"-\",\"LoggingResult\":\"Les informations de suivi ont ete inscrites dans le fichier journal local.\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2024-09-18 10:09:24\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog41\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "6272",
"message": "Le serveur NPS a accorde lacces a un utilisateur. Utilisateur : ID de securite : S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111 Nom de compte : testUser Domaine de compte : NT01 Nom de compte complet : net/Administrateurs/ITUser/testUser Ordinateur client : ID de securite : S-1-0-0 Nom de compte : - Nom de compte complet : - Identificateur de la station appelee : 1.2.3.4 Identificateur de la station appelante : 10.24.25.25 Serveur NAS : Adresse IPv4 du serveur NAS : 1.2.3.4 Adresse IPv6 du serveur NAS : - Identificateur du serveur NAS : - Type de port du serveur NAS : Virtuel Port du serveur NAS : 450560 Client RADIUS : Nom convivial du client : FW01 Adresse IP du client : 1.2.3.4 Informations detaillees sur lauthentification : Nom de strategie de demande de connexion : interface_admin_reseau Nom de strategie reseau : FWASA01_Admin Fournisseur dauthentification : RADIUS distant vers le mappage utilisateur Windows Serveur dauthentification : 1.2.3.4 Type dauthentification : - Type EAP : - Identificateur de la session du compte : - Resultats de la journalisation : Les informations de suivi ont ete inscrites dans le fichier journal local. ",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 6272,
"name": "Network Policy Server granted access to a user",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"AuthenticationProvider": "RADIUS distant vers le mappage utilisateur Windows",
"AuthenticationServer": "1.2.3.4",
"AuthenticationType": "-",
"CallingStationID": "10.24.25.25",
"Category": "Network Policy Server",
"ClientIPAddress": "1.2.3.4",
"ClientName": "FW01",
"EAPType": "-",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"NASIdentifier": "-",
"NASPort": "450560",
"NASPortType": "Virtuel",
"NetworkPolicyName": "FWASA01_Admin",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{000000000-0000-0000-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ProxyPolicyName": "interface_admin_reseau",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "NT01",
"SubjectUserName": "testUser",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111",
"Task": 12552
},
"record_id": 2324634,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "test",
"name": "test"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "test",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 672,
"pid": 672,
"thread": {
"id": 3752
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"test"
],
"user": [
"testUser"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT01",
"id": "S-1-5-21-1111111111-111111111-1111111111-1111",
"name": "testUser"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-10-26 16:58:35\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9187343239835811840,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":7045,\"SourceName\":\"Service Control Manager\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{555908D1-A6D7-4695-8E1E-26931D2012F4}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":749,\"ProcessID\":528,\"ThreadID\":636,\"Channel\":\"System\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"A service was installed in the system.\\r\\n\\r\\nService Name: MpKslDrv\\r\\nService File Name: C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Definition Updates\\\\{5A27824B-0561-40A5-BA9A-9B3E8B24D58D}\\\\MpKslDrv.sys\\r\\nService Type: kernel mode driver\\r\\nService Start Type: system start\\r\\nService Account: \",\"ServiceName\":\"MpKslDrv\",\"ImagePath\":\"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows Defender\\\\Definition Updates\\\\{5A27824B-0561-40A5-BA9A-9B3E8B24D58D}\\\\MpKslDrv.sys\",\"ServiceType\":\"kernel mode driver\",\"StartType\":\"system start\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-10-26 16:58:36\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog2\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "7045",
"message": "A service was installed in the system.\r\n\r\nService Name: MpKslDrv\r\nService File Name: C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Definition Updates\\{5A27824B-0561-40A5-BA9A-9B3E8B24D58D}\\MpKslDrv.sys\r\nService Type: kernel mode driver\r\nService Start Type: system start\r\nService Account: ",
"provider": "Service Control Manager"
},
"action": {
"id": 7045,
"name": "A new service was installed in the system",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"ImagePath": "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Definition Updates\\{5A27824B-0561-40A5-BA9A-9B3E8B24D58D}\\MpKslDrv.sys",
"Keywords": "-9187343239835811840",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{555908D1-A6D7-4695-8E1E-26931D2012F4}",
"ServiceName": "MpKslDrv",
"ServiceType": "kernel mode driver",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Service Control Manager",
"StartType": "system start",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 749,
"type": "System"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 528,
"pid": 528,
"thread": {
"id": 636
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2024-10-02 10:42:24\",\"Hostname\":\"HOST.test.fr\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":8002,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{CBDA4DBF-8D5D-4F69-9578-BE14AA540D22}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1812526,\"ProcessID\":2476,\"ThreadID\":2720,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-2-34\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"%SYSTEM32%\\\\TEST\\\\APP.EXE was allowed to run.\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2024-10-02 10:42:25\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "8002",
"message": "%SYSTEM32%\\TEST\\APP.EXE was allowed to run.",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker"
},
"action": {
"id": 8002,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{CBDA4DBF-8D5D-4F69-9578-BE14AA540D22}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker",
"Task": 0
},
"record_id": 1812526,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL"
},
"file": {
"name": "APP.EXE",
"path": "%SYSTEM32%\\TEST\\APP.EXE"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOST.test.fr",
"name": "HOST.test.fr"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOST.test.fr",
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{
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},
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{
"message": " {\"EventTime\":\"2019-05-17 11:52:59\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":1,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":1,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":66,\"ProcessID\":3912,\"ThreadID\":2152,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Process Create:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2019-05-17 09:52:59.277\\r\\nProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-847B-5CDE-0000-001038720D00}\\r\\nProcessId: 4540\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogonUI.exe\\r\\nFileVersion: 10.0.10586.0 (th2_release.151029-1700)\\r\\nDescription: Windows Logon User Interface Host\\r\\nProduct: Microsoft\u00c2\u00ae Windows\u00c2\u00ae Operating System\\r\\nCompany: Microsoft Corporation\\r\\nCommandLine: \\\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogonUI.exe\\\" /flags:0x0 /state0:0xa39dd855 /state1:0x41c64e6d\\r\\nCurrentDirectory: C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\\\r\\nUser: AUTORITE NT\\\\Syst\u00c3\u00a8me\\r\\nLogonGuid: {0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0020E7030000}\\r\\nLogonId: 0x3E7\\r\\nTerminalSessionId: 1\\r\\nIntegrityLevel: System\\r\\nHashes: MD5=D40C84E829922B70D511BB2CC6268D49,SHA256=9A54EE3D6D16D0FE3458B1AE1212F546F94B9E28E5A845D311A04191C724D652\\r\\nParentProcessGuid: {0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0010883A0000}\\r\\nParentProcessId: 476\\r\\nParentImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\winlogon.exe\\r\\nParentCommandLine: winlogon.exe\",\"Category\":\"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2019-05-17 09:52:59.277\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{0BA009B0-847B-5CDE-0000-001038720D00}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogonUI.exe\",\"FileVersion\":\"10.0.10586.0 (th2_release.151029-1700)\",\"Description\":\"Windows Logon User Interface Host\",\"Product\":\"Microsoft\u00c2\u00ae Windows\u00c2\u00ae Operating System\",\"Company\":\"Microsoft Corporation\",\"CommandLine\":\"\\\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogonUI.exe\\\" /flags:0x0 /state0:0xa39dd855 /state1:0x41c64e6d\",\"CurrentDirectory\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\\",\"User\":\"AUTORITE NT\\\\Syst\u00c3\u00a8me\",\"LogonGuid\":\"{0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0020E7030000}\",\"LogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"TerminalSessionId\":\"1\",\"IntegrityLevel\":\"System\",\"Hashes\":\"MD5=D40C84E829922B70D511BB2CC6268D49,SHA256=9A54EE3D6D16D0FE3458B1AE1212F546F94B9E28E5A845D311A04191C724D652\",\"ParentProcessGuid\":\"{0BA009B0-82CF-5CDE-0000-0010883A0000}\",\"ParentProcessId\":\"476\",\"ParentImage\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\winlogon.exe\",\"ParentCommandLine\":\"winlogon.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-05-17 11:53:00\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
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},
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{
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},
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"log": {
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},
"process": {
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"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\reg.exe",
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"target": {
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}
}
}
{
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"event": {
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},
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},
"host": {
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},
"log": {
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"level": "info"
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"os": {
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},
"process": {
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"id": 5004,
"name": "WINWORD.EXE",
"parent": {
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"executable": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"name": "chrome.exe",
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"pid": 5004,
"thread": {
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},
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"name": "USERFOO",
"target": {
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}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-10-28 12:23:17\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":13,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":13,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":34819,\"ProcessID\":1436,\"ThreadID\":2860,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Registry value set:\\\\r\\\\nRuleName: InvDB\\\\r\\\\nEventType: SetValue\\\\r\\\\nUtcTime: 2010-10-28 11:23:17.379\\\\r\\\\nProcessGuid: {34EA5B98-48E6-5F99-1600-000000000E00}\\\\r\\\\nProcessId: 1012\\\\r\\\\nImage: C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\svchost.exe\\\\r\\\\nTargetObject: HKU\\\\\\\\S-1-5-21-375581984-207109644-1491462053-1001\\\\\\\\Software\\\\\\\\Microsoft\\\\\\\\Windows NT\\\\\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\\\\\Compatibility Assistant\\\\\\\\Store\\\\\\\\C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\WindowsApps\\\\\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftOfficeHub_18.2008.12711.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\\\\\LocalBridge.exe\\\\r\\\\nDetails: Binary Data\",\"Category\":\"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"RuleName\":\"InvDB\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-10-28 11:23:17.379\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{34EA5B98-48E6-5F99-1600-000000000E00}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\System32\\\\\\\\svchost.exe\",\"TargetObject\":\"HKU\\\\\\\\S-1-5-21-375581984-207109644-1491462053-1001\\\\\\\\Software\\\\\\\\Microsoft\\\\\\\\Windows NT\\\\\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\\\\\AppCompatFlags\\\\\\\\Compatibility Assistant\\\\\\\\Store\\\\\\\\C:\\\\\\\\Program Files\\\\\\\\WindowsApps\\\\\\\\Microsoft.MicrosoftOfficeHub_18.2008.12711.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\\\\\\\LocalBridge.exe\",\"Details\":\"Binary Data\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-10-28 12:23:19\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog4\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
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},
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"action": {
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"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
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},
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},
"host": {
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"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
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"process": {
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"thread": {
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},
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},
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},
"user": {
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}
{
"message": " {\"EventTime\":\"2011-03-02 01:40:47\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO.corp.net\",\"Keywords\":4611686018427387904,\"EventType\":\"WARNING\",\"SeverityValue\":3,\"Severity\":\"WARNING\",\"EventID\":61,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":0,\"OpcodeValue\":2,\"RecordNumber\":18732,\"ActivityID\":\"{5B327F5A-B797-4B7E-AB05-11A0E98A15AF}\",\"ProcessID\":5796,\"ThreadID\":12472,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3 l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.\",\"Opcode\":\"Arr\u00c3\u00aater\",\"transferId\":\"{5b327f5a-b797-4b7e-ab05-11a0e98a15af}\",\"name\":\"Font Download\",\"Id\":\"{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}\",\"url\":\"https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json\",\"hr\":\"2147954402\",\"fileTime\":\"1601-01-01T00:00:00.0000000Z\",\"fileLength\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"bytesTotal\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"bytesTransferred\":\"0\",\"peerProtocolFlags\":\"0\",\"bytesTransferredFromPeer\":\"0\",\"AdditionalInfoHr\":\"0\",\"PeerContextInfo\":\"0\",\"bandwidthLimit\":\"18446744073709551615\",\"ignoreBandwidthLimitsOnLan\":\"false\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-03-02 01:40:48\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "61",
"message": "BITS a arr\u00c3\u00aat\u00c3\u00a9 la t\u00c3\u00a2che de transfert Font Download qui est associ\u00c3\u00a9e \u00c3 l\u00e2\u20ac\u2122URL https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json. Le code d\u00e2\u20ac\u2122\u00c3\u00a9tat est 0x80072EE2.",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client"
},
"action": {
"id": 61,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"BytesTotal": "-1",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "WARNING",
"Id": "{895bd5ca-3d9e-4ea9-8965-8cbb9e2961dc}",
"Keywords": "4611686018427387904",
"OpcodeValue": 2,
"ProviderGuid": "{EF1CC15B-46C1-414E-BB95-E76B077BD51E}",
"Severity": "WARNING",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client",
"Task": 0,
"bytesTransferred": "0"
},
"record_id": 18732,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational"
},
"destination": {
"address": "fs.microsoft.com",
"domain": "fs.microsoft.com",
"size_in_char": 16
},
"file": {
"name": "Font Download",
"size": -1
},
"host": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"name": "PCFOO.corp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "PCFOO.corp.net",
"level": "warning"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 5796,
"pid": 5796,
"thread": {
"id": 12472
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"PCFOO.corp.net",
"fs.microsoft.com"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"url": {
"domain": "fs.microsoft.com",
"full": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
"original": "https://fs.microsoft.com/fs/windows/config.json",
"path": "/fs/windows/config.json",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "microsoft.com",
"scheme": "https",
"subdomain": "fs",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-04-01 16:37:06\",\"Hostname\":\"host.foo.local\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4702,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12804,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":393771,\"ActivityID\":\"{13AB68AE-1C3D-0000-296A-AB133D1CD701}\",\"ProcessID\":608,\"ThreadID\":244,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"Une t\u00e2che planifi\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 mise \u00e0 jour.\\r\\n\\r\\nObjet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom de compte :\\t\\tSEKADWV01$\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tSEKOPOC\\r\\n\\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur la t\u00e2che :\\r\\n\\tNom de la t\u00e2che : \\t\\t\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\UpdateOrchestrator\\\\Backup Scan\\r\\n\\tNouveau contenu de la t\u00e2che : \\t\\t<?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<Task version=\\\"1.2\\\" xmlns=\\\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\\\">\\r\\n <RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <URI>\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\UpdateOrchestrator\\\\Backup Scan</URI>\\r\\n </RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Triggers>\\r\\n <TimeTrigger>\\r\\n <StartBoundary>2011-04-15T14:37:06.282Z</StartBoundary>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n </TimeTrigger>\\r\\n </Triggers>\\r\\n <Settings>\\r\\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\\r\\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\\r\\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\\r\\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\\r\\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\\r\\n <IdleSettings>\\r\\n <Duration>PT10M</Duration>\\r\\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\\r\\n <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>\\r\\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\\r\\n </IdleSettings>\\r\\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\\r\\n <WakeToRun>true</WakeToRun>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Priority>7</Priority>\\r\\n </Settings>\\r\\n <Actions Context=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <Exec>\\r\\n <Command>%systemroot%\\\\system32\\\\usoclient.exe</Command>\\r\\n <Arguments>StartScan</Arguments>\\r\\n </Exec>\\r\\n </Actions>\\r\\n <Principals>\\r\\n <Principal id=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\\r\\n <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>\\r\\n </Principal>\\r\\n </Principals>\\r\\n</Task>\\r\\n\\t\",\"Category\":\"Other Object Access Events\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"SEKADWV01$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"SEKOPOC\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"TaskName\":\"\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\UpdateOrchestrator\\\\Backup Scan\",\"TaskContentNew\":\"<?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-16\\\"?>\\r\\n<Task version=\\\"1.2\\\" xmlns=\\\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\\\">\\r\\n <RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <URI>\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\UpdateOrchestrator\\\\Backup Scan</URI>\\r\\n </RegistrationInfo>\\r\\n <Triggers>\\r\\n <TimeTrigger>\\r\\n <StartBoundary>2011-04-15T14:37:06.282Z</StartBoundary>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n </TimeTrigger>\\r\\n </Triggers>\\r\\n <Settings>\\r\\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\\r\\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\\r\\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\\r\\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\\r\\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\\r\\n <IdleSettings>\\r\\n <Duration>PT10M</Duration>\\r\\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\\r\\n <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>\\r\\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\\r\\n </IdleSettings>\\r\\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\\r\\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\\r\\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\\r\\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\\r\\n <WakeToRun>true</WakeToRun>\\r\\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\\r\\n <Priority>7</Priority>\\r\\n </Settings>\\r\\n <Actions Context=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <Exec>\\r\\n <Command>%systemroot%\\\\system32\\\\usoclient.exe</Command>\\r\\n <Arguments>StartScan</Arguments>\\r\\n </Exec>\\r\\n </Actions>\\r\\n <Principals>\\r\\n <Principal id=\\\"Author\\\">\\r\\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\\r\\n <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>\\r\\n </Principal>\\r\\n </Principals>\\r\\n</Task>\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-04-01 16:37:08\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4702",
"message": "Une t\u00e2che planifi\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 mise \u00e0 jour.\r\n\r\nObjet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom de compte :\t\tSEKADWV01$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tSEKOPOC\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nInformations sur la t\u00e2che :\r\n\tNom de la t\u00e2che : \t\t\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan\r\n\tNouveau contenu de la t\u00e2che : \t\t<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <URI>\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <TimeTrigger>\r\n <StartBoundary>2011-04-15T14:37:06.282Z</StartBoundary>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </TimeTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT10M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>true</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>%systemroot%\\system32\\usoclient.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>StartScan</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\r\n <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n</Task>\r\n\t",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4702,
"name": "A scheduled task was updated",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Other Object Access Events",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "SEKOPOC",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "SEKADWV01$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12804,
"TaskContentNew": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo>\r\n <URI>\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan</URI>\r\n </RegistrationInfo>\r\n <Triggers>\r\n <TimeTrigger>\r\n <StartBoundary>2011-04-15T14:37:06.282Z</StartBoundary>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n </TimeTrigger>\r\n </Triggers>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <Duration>PT10M</Duration>\r\n <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>true</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT72H</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>7</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>%systemroot%\\system32\\usoclient.exe</Command>\r\n <Arguments>StartScan</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>\r\n <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n</Task>",
"TaskContentNew_Args": "StartScan",
"TaskContentNew_Command": "%systemroot%\\system32\\usoclient.exe",
"TaskName": "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\Backup Scan"
},
"record_id": 393771,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "host.foo.local",
"name": "host.foo.local"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "host.foo.local",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 608,
"pid": 608,
"thread": {
"id": 244
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"host.foo.local"
],
"user": [
"SEKADWV01$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "SEKOPOC",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SEKADWV01$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-11-16 14:49:29\",\"Hostname\":\"pps-val-app\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4673,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":13056,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":10604999,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":19016,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A privileged service was called.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tPPS-VAL-APP$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3E7\\r\\n\\r\\nService:\\r\\n\\tServer:\\tNT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service\\r\\n\\tService Name:\\tLsaRegisterLogonProcess()\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess:\\r\\n\\tProcess ID:\\t0x7e0\\r\\n\\tProcess Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\\r\\n\\r\\nService Request Information:\\r\\n\\tPrivileges:\\t\\tSeTcbPrivilege\",\"Category\":\"Sensitive Privilege Use\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"PPS-VAL-APP$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"ObjectServer\":\"NT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service\",\"Service\":\"LsaRegisterLogonProcess()\",\"PrivilegeList\":\"SeTcbPrivilege\",\"ProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-11-16 14:49:31\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4673",
"message": "A privileged service was called.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tPPS-VAL-APP$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3E7\r\n\r\nService:\r\n\tServer:\tNT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service\r\n\tService Name:\tLsaRegisterLogonProcess()\r\n\r\nProcess:\r\n\tProcess ID:\t0x7e0\r\n\tProcess Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe\r\n\r\nService Request Information:\r\n\tPrivileges:\t\tSeTcbPrivilege",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4673,
"name": "A privileged service was called",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Sensitive Privilege Use",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"ObjectServer": "NT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"PrivilegeList": "SeTcbPrivilege",
"ProcessName": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Service": "LsaRegisterLogonProcess()",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "PPS-VAL-APP$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13056
},
"record_id": 10604999,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "pps-val-app",
"name": "pps-val-app"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "pps-val-app",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
"id": 4,
"name": "lsass.exe",
"pid": 4,
"thread": {
"id": 19016
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"pps-val-app"
],
"user": [
"PPS-VAL-APP$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "PPS-VAL-APP$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-11-04 16:04:45\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4697,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":0,\"Task\":12289,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1704922,\"ActivityID\":\"{C92BC79E-B26B-0000-26C8-2BC96BB2D601}\",\"ProcessID\":640,\"ThreadID\":8908,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"ServiceName\":\"WpnUserService_14bec52\",\"Service File Name\":\"C:\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\system32\\\\\\\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup\",\"ServiceType\":\"0xe0\",\"ServiceStartType\":\"2\",\"ServiceAccount\":\"LocalSystem\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-11-04 16:04:49\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4697",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4697,
"name": "A service was installed in the system",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"ServiceAccount": "LocalSystem",
"ServiceFileName": "C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup",
"ServiceName": "WpnUserService_14bec52",
"ServiceStartType": "2",
"ServiceType": "0xe0",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 12289
},
"record_id": 1704922,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 640,
"pid": 640,
"thread": {
"id": 8908
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"V-FOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "V-FOO$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-10-15 16:52:28\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":10,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":3,\"Task\":10,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1481365,\"ProcessID\":9628,\"ThreadID\":10352,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Process accessed:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-10-15 14:52:28.536\\r\\nSourceProcessGUID: {c8188de9-3743-5f84-0000-00100ef00000}\\r\\nSourceProcessId: 920\\r\\nSourceThreadId: 1052\\r\\nSourceImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe\\r\\nTargetProcessGUID: {c8188de9-3771-5f84-0000-0010443b0900}\\r\\nTargetProcessId: 4324\\r\\nTargetImage: C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\ctfmon.exe\\r\\nGrantedAccess: 0x1400\\r\\nCallTrace: C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\SYSTEM32\\\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\KERNELBASE.dll+305fe|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+12d8d|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+140cf|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+1435d|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+fc2b|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+1071a|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+17fe|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+31c1f|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+35682|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+fbbeb|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+fbc7f|C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\SYSTEM32\\\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\",\"Category\":\"Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-10-15 14:52:28.536\",\"SourceProcessGUID\":\"{c8188de9-3743-5f84-0000-00100ef00000}\",\"SourceProcessId\":\"920\",\"SourceThreadId\":\"1052\",\"SourceImage\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe\",\"TargetProcessGUID\":\"{c8188de9-3771-5f84-0000-0010443b0900}\",\"TargetProcessId\":\"4324\",\"TargetImage\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\ctfmon.exe\",\"GrantedAccess\":\"0x1400\",\"CallTrace\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\SYSTEM32\\\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\KERNELBASE.dll+305fe|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+12d8d|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+140cf|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+1435d|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+fc2b|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+1071a|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+17fe|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+31c1f|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+35682|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+fbbeb|C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxService.exe+fbc7f|C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\SYSTEM32\\\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-10-15 16:56:02\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
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"Category": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
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"OpcodeValue": 0,
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},
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},
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},
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}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-12-16 16:10:53\",\"Hostname\":\"USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":11,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":11,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3561,\"ProcessID\":4492,\"ThreadID\":9332,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\ufffdme\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"File created:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 15:10:53.715\\r\\nProcessGuid: {23AD1E42-B4F1-5C41-0000-001028060400}\\r\\nProcessId: 2060\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Symantec\\\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\\\Bin\\\\ccSvcHst.exe\\r\\nTargetFilename: C:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\SymDelta_2060\\\\content.zip.tmp\\\\cur.scr\\r\\nCreationUtcTime: 2019-12-16 15:10:53.715\",\"Category\":\"File created (rule: FileCreate)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:10:53.715\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{23AD1E42-B4F1-5C41-0000-001028060400}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Symantec\\\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\\\Bin\\\\ccSvcHst.exe\",\"TargetFilename\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\SymDelta_2060\\\\content.zip.tmp\\\\cur.scr\",\"CreationUtcTime\":\"2019-12-16 15:10:53.715\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-12-16 16:10:54\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog4\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "11",
"message": "File created:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 15:10:53.715\r\nProcessGuid: {23AD1E42-B4F1-5C41-0000-001028060400}\r\nProcessId: 2060\r\nImage: C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Bin\\ccSvcHst.exe\r\nTargetFilename: C:\\Windows\\Temp\\SymDelta_2060\\content.zip.tmp\\cur.scr\r\nCreationUtcTime: 2019-12-16 15:10:53.715",
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},
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"action": {
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"Category": "File created (rule: FileCreate)",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Bin\\ccSvcHst.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
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"Task": 11
},
"record_id": 3561,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"file": {
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"name": "cur.scr",
"path": "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\SymDelta_2060\\content.zip.tmp\\cur.scr"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local",
"name": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
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"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Bin\\ccSvcHst.exe",
"id": 2060,
"name": "ccSvcHst.exe",
"pid": 2060,
"thread": {
"id": 9332
},
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},
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],
"user": [
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]
},
"user": {
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"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\ufffdme"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2019-12-16 08:10:31\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":13,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":13,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3456,\"ProcessID\":44420,\"ThreadID\":27948,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\ufffdme\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Registry value set:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nEventType: SetValue\\r\\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 07:10:31.795\\r\\nProcessGuid: {D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\\r\\nProcessId: 572\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\services.exe\\r\\nTargetObject: HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\nolmhash\\r\\nDetails: DWORD (0x00000001)\",\"Category\":\"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2019-12-16 07:10:31.795\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\services.exe\",\"TargetObject\":\"HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Lsa\\\\nolmhash\",\"Details\":\"DWORD (0x00000001)\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2019-12-16 08:10:32\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog4\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "13",
"message": "Registry value set:\r\nRuleName: \r\nEventType: SetValue\r\nUtcTime: 2019-12-16 07:10:31.795\r\nProcessGuid: {D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\r\nProcessId: 572\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe\r\nTargetObject: HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\nolmhash\r\nDetails: DWORD (0x00000001)",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2019-12-16T07:10:31.795000Z",
"action": {
"id": 13,
"name": "RegistryEvent (Value Set)",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\ufffdme",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
"Details": "DWORD (0x00000001)",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"MessEventType": "SetValue",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"TargetObject": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\nolmhash",
"Task": 13
},
"record_id": 3456,
"target": "registry",
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local",
"name": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe",
"id": 572,
"name": "services.exe",
"pid": 572,
"thread": {
"id": 27948
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\"
},
"registry": {
"data": {
"strings": [
"1"
],
"type": "REG_DWORD"
},
"hive": "HKLM",
"key": "System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa",
"path": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\nolmhash",
"value": "nolmhash"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
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],
"user": [
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]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\ufffdme"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-03-31 15:02:03\",\"Hostname\":\"HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":13,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":13,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":49665,\"ProcessID\":16532,\"ThreadID\":35536,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Registry value set:\\r\\nRuleName: T1031,T1050\\r\\nEventType: SetValue\\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-03-31 13:02:03.124\\r\\nProcessGuid: {D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\\r\\nProcessId: 572\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\services.exe\\r\\nTargetObject: HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\services\\\\NAVENG\\\\ImagePath\\r\\nDetails: \\\\??\\\\C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Symantec\\\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\\\Data\\\\Definitions\\\\VirusDefs\\\\20100330.020\\\\ENG64.SYS\",\"Category\":\"Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"RuleName\":\"T1031,T1050\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-03-31 13:02:03.124\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\services.exe\",\"TargetObject\":\"HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\services\\\\NAVENG\\\\ImagePath\",\"Details\":\"\\\\??\\\\C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Symantec\\\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\\\Data\\\\Definitions\\\\VirusDefs\\\\20100330.020\\\\ENG64.SYS\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-03-31 15:02:05\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog4\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
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"message": "Registry value set:\r\nRuleName: T1031,T1050\r\nEventType: SetValue\r\nUtcTime: 2010-03-31 13:02:03.124\r\nProcessGuid: {D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}\r\nProcessId: 572\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe\r\nTargetObject: HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\NAVENG\\ImagePath\r\nDetails: \\??\\C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20100330.020\\ENG64.SYS",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2010-03-31T13:02:03.124000Z",
"action": {
"id": 13,
"name": "RegistryEvent (Value Set)",
"properties": {
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"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)",
"Details": "\\??\\C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20100330.020\\ENG64.SYS",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\services.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"MessEventType": "SetValue",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{D19882A0-7814-5B1E-0000-001015400100}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
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"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"TargetObject": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\NAVENG\\ImagePath",
"Task": 13
},
"record_id": 49665,
"target": "registry",
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local",
"name": "HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local"
},
"log": {
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"level": "info"
},
"os": {
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"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
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"id": 572,
"name": "services.exe",
"pid": 572,
"thread": {
"id": 35536
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\system32\\"
},
"registry": {
"data": {
"strings": [
"\\??\\C:\\ProgramData\\Symantec\\Symantec Endpoint Protection\\12.1.5337.5000.105\\Data\\Definitions\\VirusDefs\\20100330.020\\ENG64.SYS"
],
"type": "REG_SZ"
},
"hive": "HKLM",
"key": "System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\NAVENG",
"path": "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\NAVENG\\ImagePath",
"value": "ImagePath"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"HOSTNAMEFOO.ACT.CORP.local"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"rule": {
"name": "T1031,T1050"
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-05-11 17:36:44\",\"Hostname\":\"PCFOO4019.Comte.local\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":15,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":15,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":111672,\"ProcessID\":5288,\"ThreadID\":6860,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"File stream created:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2011-05-11 15:36:44.305\\r\\nProcessGuid: {3cb7cf38-a48b-609a-490c-000000002a00}\\r\\nProcessId: 3768\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\Application\\\\chrome.exe\\r\\nTargetFilename: C:\\\\Users\\\\Pipin_Touque\\\\Downloads\\\\HOSTFOO avril 2011_Plan d \u00e9pargne entreprise_1400085 (4).zip:Zone.Identifier\\r\\nCreationUtcTime: 2011-05-11 15:36:43.452\\r\\nHash: MD5=C570199C8261A913BBAA5C7D5020498B,SHA256=0454B363C7F09FF5AB778F07DF4F5FA123CC73E950283234717C50066CB62EA7,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000\\r\\nContents: [ZoneTransfer] ZoneId=3 HostUrl=https://entreprises.interepargne.natixis.com/ \",\"Category\":\"File stream created (rule: FileCreateStreamHash)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"RuleName\":\"-\",\"UtcTime\":\"2011-05-11 15:36:44.305\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{3cb7cf38-a48b-609a-490c-000000002a00}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\Application\\\\chrome.exe\",\"TargetFilename\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\Pipin_Touque\\\\Downloads\\\\HOSTFOO avril 2011_Plan d \u00e9pargne entreprise_1400085 (4).zip:Zone.Identifier\",\"CreationUtcTime\":\"2011-05-11 15:36:43.452\",\"Hash\":\"MD5=C570199C8261A913BBAA5C7D5020498B,SHA256=0454B363C7F09FF5AB778F07DF4F5FA123CC73E950283234717C50066CB62EA7,IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000\",\"Contents\":\"[ZoneTransfer] ZoneId=3 HostUrl=https://entreprises.interepargne.natixis.com/ \",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-05-11 17:36:44\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
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{
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"code": "1",
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},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-05T12:28:34.887000Z",
"action": {
"id": 1,
"name": "Process creation",
"properties": {
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"Category": "Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)",
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"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
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},
"record_id": 13871322,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "foo-vm",
"name": "foo-vm"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "foo-vm",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\sdxhelper.exe /onlogon",
"executable": "C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\SDXHelper.exe",
"hash": {
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"sha256": "4494aa7bf1058262f3d2f412b681af2af42e34490144fbfd0db579d966b8fbb6"
},
"id": 18144,
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"name": "svchost.exe",
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},
"pid": 18144,
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],
"hosts": [
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],
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]
},
"user": {
"domain": "foo-vm",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "adminuser"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-12-18 15:57:58\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":20,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":3,\"Task\":20,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":17336,\"ProcessID\":3140,\"ThreadID\":4420,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"WmiEventConsumer activity detected:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nEventType: WmiConsumerEvent\\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-12-18 14:57:58.828\\r\\nOperation: Created\\r\\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\userXYZ\\r\\nName: \\\"ServiceConsumer\\\"\\r\\nType: Log File\\r\\nDestination: \\\"C:\\\\\\\\Log.log\\\"\",\"Category\":\"WmiEventConsumer activity detected (rule: WmiEvent)\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"RuleName\":\"-\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-12-18 14:57:58.828\",\"Operation\":\"Created\",\"User\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\\\userXYZ\",\"Name\":\" \\\"ServiceConsumer\\\"\",\"Type\":\"Log File\",\"Destination\":\" \\\"C:\\\\\\\\Log.log\\\"\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-12-18 15:58:00\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog4\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "20",
"message": "WmiEventConsumer activity detected:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nEventType: WmiConsumerEvent\r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-18 14:57:58.828\r\nOperation: Created\r\nUser: DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ\r\nName: \"ServiceConsumer\"\r\nType: Log File\r\nDestination: \"C:\\\\Log.log\"",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2010-12-18T14:57:58.828000Z",
"action": {
"id": 20,
"name": "WmiEventConsumer activity detected",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "WmiEventConsumer activity detected (rule: WmiEvent)",
"Destination": " \"C:\\\\Log.log\"",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"MessEventType": "WmiConsumerEvent",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"Operation": "Created",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 20,
"Type": "Log File",
"User": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\\userXYZ"
},
"record_id": 17336,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 3140,
"pid": 3140,
"thread": {
"id": 4420
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"userXYZ"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "userXYZ"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-02-14 14:50:28\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":22,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":22,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":23609,\"ProcessID\":2556,\"ThreadID\":3448,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\ufffdme\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Dns query:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-02-10 12:10:41.909\\r\\nProcessGuid: {c8188de9-a5a2-5e46-0000-00104fae7900}\\r\\nProcessId: 5228\\r\\nQueryName: login.live.com\\r\\nQueryStatus: 0\\r\\nQueryResults: type: 5 login.msa.msidentity.com;type: 5 lgin.msa.trafficmanager.net;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"Category\":\"Dns query (rule: DnsQuery)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-02-10 12:10:41.909\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{c8188de9-a5a2-5e46-0000-00104fae7900}\",\"QueryName\":\"login.live.com\",\"QueryStatus\":\"0\",\"QueryResults\":\"type: 5 login.msa.msidentity.com;type: 5 lgin.msa.trafficmanager.net;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-02-14 14:50:29\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "22",
"message": "Dns query:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-02-10 12:10:41.909\r\nProcessGuid: {c8188de9-a5a2-5e46-0000-00104fae7900}\r\nProcessId: 5228\r\nQueryName: login.live.com\r\nQueryStatus: 0\r\nQueryResults: type: 5 login.msa.msidentity.com;type: 5 lgin.msa.trafficmanager.net;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;::ffff:1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;1.1.1.1;\r\nImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2010-02-10T12:10:41.909000Z",
"action": {
"id": 22,
"name": "DNS query",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\ufffdme",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "Dns query (rule: DnsQuery)",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{c8188de9-a5a2-5e46-0000-00104fae7900}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 22
},
"record_id": 23609,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"dns": {
"answers": [
{
"name": "login.msa.msidentity.com",
"type": "CNAME"
},
{
"name": "lgin.msa.trafficmanager.net",
"type": "CNAME"
},
{
"name": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"type": "AAAA"
},
{
"name": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"type": "AAAA"
},
{
"name": "::ffff:1.1.1.1",
"type": "AAAA"
},
{
"name": "1.1.1.1",
"type": "A"
},
{
"name": "1.1.1.1",
"type": "A"
}
],
"question": {
"name": "login.live.com",
"registered_domain": "live.com",
"subdomain": "login",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"response_code": "0",
"size_in_char": 14,
"type": "answer"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe",
"id": 5228,
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 5228,
"thread": {
"id": 3448
},
"working_directory": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"login.live.com"
],
"user": [
"Syst\ufffdme"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\ufffdme"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2011-05-17 13:36:18\",\"Hostname\":\"VM_FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":25,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":5,\"Task\":25,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":514759,\"ProcessID\":4888,\"ThreadID\":3768,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"RuleName\":\"-\",\"UtcTime\":\"2011-05-17 13:36:18.525\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{ab376ee3-7152-60a2-6808-000000001000}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\svchost.exe\",\"Type\":\"Image is replaced\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2011-05-17 13:36:19\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "25",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2011-05-17T13:36:18.525000Z",
"action": {
"id": 25,
"name": "Process Tampering",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "SYSTEM",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{ab376ee3-7152-60a2-6808-000000001000}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 25,
"Type": "Image is replaced"
},
"record_id": 514759,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "VM_FOO",
"name": "VM_FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "VM_FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe",
"id": 4888,
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 4888,
"thread": {
"id": 3768
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"VM_FOO"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2012-09-08 13:12:51\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854776000,\"EventType\":\"ERROR\",\"SeverityValue\":4,\"Severity\":\"ERROR\",\"EventID\":255,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":3,\"Task\":255,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":320976,\"ProcessID\":2788,\"ThreadID\":4008,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"Error report:\\r\\nUtcTime: 2012-09-08 11:12:51.685\\r\\nID: DriverCommunication\\r\\nDescription: Failed to retrieve events - Last error: L'op\u00e9ration d'entr\u00e9e/sortie a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e en raison de l'arr\u00eat d'un thread ou \u00e0 la demande d'une application.\\r\\n\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2012-09-08 11:12:51.685\",\"ID\":\"DriverCommunication\",\"Description\":\"Failed to retrieve events - Last error: L'op\u00e9ration d'entr\u00e9e/sortie a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e en raison de l'arr\u00eat d'un thread ou \u00e0 la demande d'une application.\\r\\n\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2012-09-08 13:12:53\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"evtx_win\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "255",
"message": "Error report:\r\nUtcTime: 2012-09-08 11:12:51.685\r\nID: DriverCommunication\r\nDescription: Failed to retrieve events - Last error: L'op\u00e9ration d'entr\u00e9e/sortie a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e en raison de l'arr\u00eat d'un thread ou \u00e0 la demande d'une application.\r\n",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"reason": "Failed to retrieve events - Last error: L'op\u00e9ration d'entr\u00e9e/sortie a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e en raison de l'arr\u00eat d'un thread ou \u00e0 la demande d'une application.\r\n"
},
"@timestamp": "2012-09-08T11:12:51.685000Z",
"action": {
"id": 255,
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "ERROR",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "ERROR",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"Task": 255
},
"record_id": 320976,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "error"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"id": 2788,
"pid": 2788,
"thread": {
"id": 4008
}
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"Syst\u00e8me"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
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"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"reason": "Windows Cryptographic Primitives Library"
},
"@timestamp": "2010-12-08T13:12:27.356000Z",
"action": {
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"name": "Image loaded",
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"Category": "Image loaded (rule: ImageLoad)",
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"EventType": "INFO",
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"ProcessGuid": "{c8188de9-7bbb-5fcf-0000-0010f7277203}",
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"Task": 7
},
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"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"dll": {
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},
"name": "bcryptprimitives.dll",
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},
"host": {
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"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
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"level": "info"
},
"os": {
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},
"process": {
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"thread": {
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},
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},
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],
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],
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]
},
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"id": "S-1-5-18",
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}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-12-11 16:45:08\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":8,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":8,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":3697557,\"ProcessID\":9520,\"ThreadID\":10704,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"AUTORITE NT\",\"AccountName\":\"Syst\u00e8me\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"CreateRemoteThread detected:\\r\\nRuleName: \\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-12-11 15:45:08.062\\r\\nSourceProcessGuid: {c8188de9-704e-5fcf-0000-001073ed4903}\\r\\nSourceProcessId: 9808\\r\\nSourceImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxTray.exe\\r\\nTargetProcessGuid: {c8188de9-702f-5fcf-0000-00101b084403}\\r\\nTargetProcessId: 10576\\r\\nTargetImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\csrss.exe\\r\\nNewThreadId: 9368\\r\\nStartAddress: 0xFFFFCFBA48C52460\\r\\nStartModule: C:\\\\Windows\\\\SYSTEM32\\\\ntdll.dll\\r\\nStartFunction: LoadLibraryA\",\"Category\":\"CreateRemoteThread detected (rule: CreateRemoteThread)\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-12-11 15:45:08.062\",\"SourceProcessGuid\":\"{c8188de9-704e-5fcf-0000-001073ed4903}\",\"SourceProcessId\":\"9808\",\"SourceImage\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\VBoxTray.exe\",\"TargetProcessGuid\":\"{c8188de9-702f-5fcf-0000-00101b084403}\",\"TargetProcessId\":\"10576\",\"TargetImage\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\csrss.exe\",\"NewThreadId\":\"9368\",\"StartAddress\":\"0xFFFFCFBA48C52460\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-12-11 16:52:15\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
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"message": "CreateRemoteThread detected:\r\nRuleName: \r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-11 15:45:08.062\r\nSourceProcessGuid: {c8188de9-704e-5fcf-0000-001073ed4903}\r\nSourceProcessId: 9808\r\nSourceImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxTray.exe\r\nTargetProcessGuid: {c8188de9-702f-5fcf-0000-00101b084403}\r\nTargetProcessId: 10576\r\nTargetImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe\r\nNewThreadId: 9368\r\nStartAddress: 0xFFFFCFBA48C52460\r\nStartModule: C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll\r\nStartFunction: LoadLibraryA",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"@timestamp": "2010-12-11T15:45:08.062000Z",
"action": {
"id": 8,
"name": "CreateRemoteThread",
"properties": {
"AccountName": "Syst\u00e8me",
"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "CreateRemoteThread detected (rule: CreateRemoteThread)",
"Domain": "AUTORITE NT",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\VBoxTray.exe",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"SourceProcessId": "9808",
"StartAddress": "0xFFFFCFBA48C52460",
"StartFunction": "LoadLibraryA",
"StartModule": "C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll",
"TargetImage": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe",
"TargetProcessId": "10576",
"Task": 8
},
"record_id": 3697557,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
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"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
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"level": "info"
},
"os": {
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"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
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"id": 9808,
"name": "VBoxTray.exe",
"pid": 9808,
"thread": {
"id": 10704
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
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],
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]
},
"user": {
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"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "Syst\u00e8me"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-12-17 15:52:55\",\"Hostname\":\"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ\",\"Keywords\":-9223372036854775808,\"EventType\":\"INFO\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":9,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}\",\"Version\":2,\"Task\":9,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":4797,\"ProcessID\":2704,\"ThreadID\":3916,\"Channel\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\",\"Domain\":\"NT AUTHORITY\",\"AccountName\":\"SYSTEM\",\"UserID\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"AccountType\":\"User\",\"Message\":\"RawAccessRead detected:\\r\\nRuleName: -\\r\\nUtcTime: 2010-12-17 14:52:55.449\\r\\nProcessGuid: {FC729081-70A2-5FDB-6701-000000000600}\\r\\nProcessId: 6428\\r\\nImage: C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogonUI.exe\\r\\nDevice: \\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume1\",\"Category\":\"RawAccessRead detected (rule: RawAccessRead)\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"RuleName\":\"-\",\"UtcTime\":\"2010-12-17 14:52:55.449\",\"ProcessGuid\":\"{FC729081-70A2-5FDB-6701-000000000600}\",\"Image\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\LogonUI.exe\",\"Device\":\"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume1\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-12-17 15:52:56\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog4\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
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"message": "RawAccessRead detected:\r\nRuleName: -\r\nUtcTime: 2010-12-17 14:52:55.449\r\nProcessGuid: {FC729081-70A2-5FDB-6701-000000000600}\r\nProcessId: 6428\r\nImage: C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe\r\nDevice: \\Device\\HarddiskVolume1",
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},
"@timestamp": "2010-12-17T14:52:55.449000Z",
"action": {
"id": 9,
"name": "RawAccessRead",
"properties": {
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"AccountType": "User",
"Category": "RawAccessRead detected (rule: RawAccessRead)",
"Device": "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume1",
"Domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"EventType": "INFO",
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe",
"Keywords": "-9223372036854775808",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProcessGuid": "{FC729081-70A2-5FDB-6701-000000000600}",
"ProviderGuid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Severity": "INFO",
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"Task": 9
},
"record_id": 4797,
"type": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"name": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-FOOBARZ",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe",
"id": 6428,
"name": "LogonUI.exe",
"pid": 6428,
"thread": {
"id": 3916
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-FOOBARZ"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-07-29 15:24:16\",\"HOSTNAME\":\"USERNAME01.ACT.CORP.local\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4688,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":13312,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1284656143,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":92,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"Un nouveau processus a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9.\\r\\n\\r\\nSujet :\\r\\n\\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tNom du compte :\\t\\tUSERNAME01$\\r\\n\\tDomaine du compte :\\t\\tACT\\r\\n\\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\\t\\t0x3e7\\r\\n\\r\\nInformations sur le processus :\\r\\n\\tID du nouveau processus :\\t\\t0x32b4\\r\\n\\tNom du nouveau processus :\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\qwinsta.exe\\r\\n\\tType d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation du jeton :\\tType d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation de jeton par d\u00e9faut (1)\\r\\n\\tID du processus cr\u00e9ateur :\\t0x2748\\r\\n\\tLigne de commande de processus :\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nLe type d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation du jeton indique le type de jeton qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 attribu\u00e9 au nouveau processus conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe type 1 est un jeton complet sans aucun privil\u00e8ge supprim\u00e9 ni aucun groupe d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9. Un jeton complet est uniquement utilis\u00e9 si le contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur est d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9, ou si l\u2019utilisateur est le compte d\u2019administrateur int\u00e9gr\u00e9 ou un compte de service.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe type 2 est un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s sans aucun privil\u00e8ge supprim\u00e9 ni aucun groupe d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9. Un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s est utilis\u00e9 lorsque le contr\u00f4le de compte d\u2019utilisateur est activ\u00e9 et que l\u2019utilisateur choisit de d\u00e9marrer le programme en tant qu\u2019administrateur. Un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s est \u00e9galement utilis\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une application est configur\u00e9e pour toujours exiger un privil\u00e8ge administratif ou pour toujours exiger les privil\u00e8ges maximum, et que l\u2019utilisateur est membre du groupe Administrateurs.\\r\\n\\r\\nLe type 3 est un jeton limit\u00e9 dont les privil\u00e8ges administratifs sont supprim\u00e9s et les groupes administratifs d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9s. Le jeton limit\u00e9 est utilis\u00e9 lorsque le contr\u00f4le de compte d\u2019 utilisateur est activ\u00e9, que l\u2019application n\u2019exige pas le privil\u00e8ge administratif et que l\u2019utilisateur ne choisit pas de d\u00e9marrer le programme en tant qu\u2019administrateur.\",\"Category\":\"Cr\u00e9ation du processus\",\"Opcode\":\"Informations\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"USERNAME01$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"ACT\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"NewProcessId\":\"0x32b4\",\"NewProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\qwinsta.exe\",\"TokenElevationType\":\"%%1936\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-07-29 15:24:18\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"eventlog3\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4688",
"message": "Un nouveau processus a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9.\r\n\r\nSujet :\r\n\tID de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 :\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tNom du compte :\t\tUSERNAME01$\r\n\tDomaine du compte :\t\tACT\r\n\tID d\u2019ouverture de session :\t\t0x3e7\r\n\r\nInformations sur le processus :\r\n\tID du nouveau processus :\t\t0x32b4\r\n\tNom du nouveau processus :\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\qwinsta.exe\r\n\tType d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation du jeton :\tType d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation de jeton par d\u00e9faut (1)\r\n\tID du processus cr\u00e9ateur :\t0x2748\r\n\tLigne de commande de processus :\t\r\n\r\nLe type d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9vation du jeton indique le type de jeton qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 attribu\u00e9 au nouveau processus conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur.\r\n\r\nLe type 1 est un jeton complet sans aucun privil\u00e8ge supprim\u00e9 ni aucun groupe d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9. Un jeton complet est uniquement utilis\u00e9 si le contr\u00f4le du compte d\u2019utilisateur est d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9, ou si l\u2019utilisateur est le compte d\u2019administrateur int\u00e9gr\u00e9 ou un compte de service.\r\n\r\nLe type 2 est un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s sans aucun privil\u00e8ge supprim\u00e9 ni aucun groupe d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9. Un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s est utilis\u00e9 lorsque le contr\u00f4le de compte d\u2019utilisateur est activ\u00e9 et que l\u2019utilisateur choisit de d\u00e9marrer le programme en tant qu\u2019administrateur. Un jeton aux droits \u00e9lev\u00e9s est \u00e9galement utilis\u00e9 lorsqu\u2019une application est configur\u00e9e pour toujours exiger un privil\u00e8ge administratif ou pour toujours exiger les privil\u00e8ges maximum, et que l\u2019utilisateur est membre du groupe Administrateurs.\r\n\r\nLe type 3 est un jeton limit\u00e9 dont les privil\u00e8ges administratifs sont supprim\u00e9s et les groupes administratifs d\u00e9sactiv\u00e9s. Le jeton limit\u00e9 est utilis\u00e9 lorsque le contr\u00f4le de compte d\u2019 utilisateur est activ\u00e9, que l\u2019application n\u2019exige pas le privil\u00e8ge administratif et que l\u2019utilisateur ne choisit pas de d\u00e9marrer le programme en tant qu\u2019administrateur.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4688,
"name": "A new process has been created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Cr\u00e9ation du processus",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "ACT",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "USERNAME01$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13312
},
"record_id": 1284656143,
"type": "Security"
},
"log": {
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\qwinsta.exe",
"id": 12980,
"name": "qwinsta.exe",
"pid": 12980,
"thread": {
"id": 92
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"user": [
"USERNAME01$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "ACT",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "USERNAME01$"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"EventTime\":\"2010-08-05 16:21:20\",\"Hostname\":\"V-FOO\",\"Keywords\":-9214364837600034816,\"EventType\":\"AUDIT_SUCCESS\",\"SeverityValue\":2,\"Severity\":\"INFO\",\"EventID\":4688,\"SourceName\":\"Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing\",\"ProviderGuid\":\"{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}\",\"Version\":1,\"Task\":13312,\"OpcodeValue\":0,\"RecordNumber\":1132084818,\"ProcessID\":4,\"ThreadID\":88,\"Channel\":\"Security\",\"Message\":\"A new process has been created.\\r\\n\\r\\nSubject:\\r\\n\\tSecurity ID:\\t\\tS-1-5-18\\r\\n\\tAccount Name:\\t\\tV-FOO$\\r\\n\\tAccount Domain:\\t\\tKEY\\r\\n\\tLogon ID:\\t\\t0x3e7\\r\\n\\r\\nProcess Information:\\r\\n\\tNew Process ID:\\t\\t0x111c\\r\\n\\tNew Process Name:\\tC:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\conhost.exe\\r\\n\\tToken Elevation Type:\\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\\r\\n\\tCreator Process ID:\\t0x204\\r\\n\\tProcess Command Line:\\t\\r\\n\\r\\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\\r\\n\\r\\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.\",\"Category\":\"Process Creation\",\"Opcode\":\"Info\",\"SubjectUserSid\":\"S-1-5-18\",\"SubjectUserName\":\"V-FOO$\",\"SubjectDomainName\":\"KEY\",\"SubjectLogonId\":\"0x3e7\",\"NewProcessId\":\"0x111c\",\"NewProcessName\":\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\conhost.exe\",\"TokenElevationType\":\"%%1936\",\"EventReceivedTime\":\"2010-08-05 16:21:21\",\"SourceModuleName\":\"in\",\"SourceModuleType\":\"im_msvistalog\"}",
"event": {
"code": "4688",
"message": "A new process has been created.\r\n\r\nSubject:\r\n\tSecurity ID:\t\tS-1-5-18\r\n\tAccount Name:\t\tV-FOO$\r\n\tAccount Domain:\t\tKEY\r\n\tLogon ID:\t\t0x3e7\r\n\r\nProcess Information:\r\n\tNew Process ID:\t\t0x111c\r\n\tNew Process Name:\tC:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe\r\n\tToken Elevation Type:\tTokenElevationTypeDefault (1)\r\n\tCreator Process ID:\t0x204\r\n\tProcess Command Line:\t\r\n\r\nToken Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.\r\n\r\nType 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.\r\n\r\nType 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also used when an application is configured to always require administrative privilege or to always require maximum privilege, and the user is a member of the Administrators group.\r\n\r\nType 3 is a limited token with administrative privileges removed and administrative groups disabled. The limited token is used when User Account Control is enabled, the application does not require administrative privilege, and the user does not choose to start the program using Run as administrator.",
"outcome": "success",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"action": {
"id": 4688,
"name": "A new process has been created",
"outcome": "success",
"properties": {
"Category": "Process Creation",
"EventType": "AUDIT_SUCCESS",
"Keywords": "-9214364837600034816",
"OpcodeValue": 0,
"ProviderGuid": "{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}",
"Severity": "INFO",
"SourceName": "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"SubjectDomainName": "KEY",
"SubjectLogonId": "0x3e7",
"SubjectUserName": "V-FOO$",
"SubjectUserSid": "S-1-5-18",
"Task": 13312
},
"record_id": 1132084818,
"type": "Security"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"name": "V-FOO"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "V-FOO",
"level": "info"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"process": {
"executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe",
"id": 4380,
"name": "conhost.exe",
"parent": {
"pid": 516
},
"pid": 4380,
"thread": {
"id": 88
},
"working_directory": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"V-FOO"
],
"user": [
"V-FOO$"
]
},
"user": {
"domain": "KEY",
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "V-FOO$"
}
}
{
"message": ":{\n \"EventTime\": \"2023-09-19 12:02:19\",\n \"Hostname\": \"mycorp.net\",\n \"EventReceivedTime\": \"2023-09-19 12:02:20\",\n \"SourceModuleName\": \"eventlog\",\n \"SourceModuleType\": \"im_msvistalog\"\n}\n\n\n",
"action": {
"properties": {}
},
"host": {
"hostname": "mycorp.net",
"name": "mycorp.net"
},
"log": {
"hostname": "mycorp.net"
},
"os": {
"family": "windows",
"platform": "windows"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"mycorp.net"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
action.id |
number |
|
action.properties.Accesses |
keyword |
|
action.properties.AdditionalActionsID |
keyword |
|
action.properties.AdditionalActionsString |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Attributes |
keyword |
|
action.properties.BytesTotal |
keyword |
|
action.properties.CallingStationID |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ConfigurationFile |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Content |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ContextInfo |
keyword |
|
action.properties.DestinationPort |
integer |
|
action.properties.DetectionUser |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ErrorCode |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Execution Name |
keyword |
|
action.properties.FailureCode |
integer |
|
action.properties.HealthAttestationServer |
keyword |
|
action.properties.HostApplication |
keyword |
|
action.properties.HostName |
keyword |
|
action.properties.HostUrl |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Image |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Keywords |
keyword |
|
action.properties.LastASSecurityIntelligenceAge |
keyword |
|
action.properties.LastAVSecurityIntelligenceAge |
keyword |
|
action.properties.LastFullScanAge |
keyword |
|
action.properties.LastQuickScanAge |
keyword |
|
action.properties.MessEventType |
keyword |
|
action.properties.New Value |
keyword |
|
action.properties.NewUAC |
keyword |
|
action.properties.NewValue |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Old Value |
keyword |
|
action.properties.OldUAC |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ParentImage |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ProcessName |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ProxyServer |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ReferrerUrl |
keyword |
|
action.properties.Requester |
keyword |
|
action.properties.SentUpdateServer |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ServiceFileName |
keyword |
|
action.properties.StartFunction |
keyword |
|
action.properties.StartModule |
keyword |
|
action.properties.StatusInformation |
keyword |
|
action.properties.TaskContent |
keyword |
|
action.properties.TaskContentNew_Args |
keyword |
|
action.properties.TaskContentNew_Command |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ThreatName |
keyword |
|
action.properties.ZoneId |
keyword |
|
action.target |
keyword |
|
destination.address |
keyword |
Destination network address. |
destination.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the destination. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
destination.size_in_char |
number |
|
dll.hash.imphash |
keyword |
|
dll.hash.md5 |
keyword |
MD5 hash. |
dll.hash.sha256 |
keyword |
SHA256 hash. |
dll.name |
keyword |
Name of the library. |
dll.path |
keyword |
Full file path of the library. |
dns.answers |
array |
|
dns.question.name |
keyword |
The name being queried. |
dns.response_code |
keyword |
The DNS response code. |
dns.size_in_char |
number |
|
dns.type |
keyword |
The type of DNS event captured, query or answer. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.provider |
keyword |
Source of the event. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
file.created |
date |
File creation time. |
file.hash.imphash |
keyword |
|
file.hash.md5 |
keyword |
MD5 hash. |
file.hash.sha256 |
keyword |
SHA256 hash. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.owner |
keyword |
File owner's username. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
file.size |
long |
File size in bytes. |
host.hostname |
keyword |
Hostname of the host. |
log.level |
keyword |
Log level of the log event. |
network.transport |
keyword |
Protocol Name corresponding to the field iana_number. |
network.type |
keyword |
In the OSI Model this would be the Network Layer. ipv4, ipv6, ipsec, pim, etc |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.hash.imphash |
keyword |
|
process.hash.md5 |
keyword |
MD5 hash. |
process.hash.sha1 |
keyword |
SHA1 hash. |
process.hash.sha256 |
keyword |
SHA256 hash. |
process.id |
integer |
|
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.parent.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.parent.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.parent.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
process.parent.pid |
long |
Process id. |
process.parent.working_directory |
keyword |
The working directory of the process. |
process.pid |
long |
Process id. |
process.ppid |
integer |
|
process.thread.id |
long |
Thread ID. |
process.working_directory |
keyword |
The working directory of the process. |
registry.data.strings |
wildcard |
List of strings representing what was written to the registry. |
registry.data.type |
keyword |
Standard registry type for encoding contents |
registry.hive |
keyword |
Abbreviated name for the hive. |
registry.key |
keyword |
Hive-relative path of keys. |
registry.path |
keyword |
Full path, including hive, key and value |
registry.value |
keyword |
Name of the value written. |
rule.name |
keyword |
Rule name |
source.address |
keyword |
Source network address. |
source.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the source. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
source.size_in_char |
number |
|
url.domain |
keyword |
Domain of the url. |
url.full |
wildcard |
Full unparsed URL. |
url.original |
wildcard |
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. |
url.path |
wildcard |
Path of the request, such as "/search". |
url.scheme |
keyword |
Scheme of the url. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.target.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.target.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.target.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user_agent.original |
keyword |
Unparsed user_agent string. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.