ManageEngine ADAudit Plus
Overview
ManageEngine ADAudit Plus is a robust Active Directory auditing and compliance solution, empowering organizations to track and monitor changes, detect security threats, and ensure regulatory compliance within their Active Directory environment.
- Vendor: ManageEngine
- Supported environment: On prem
- Version compatibility: 8.1
- Detection based on: Telemetry
- Supported application or feature:
- Alerts (
ADAPAlerts
) - Group managements reports (
GroupMgmtReports
) - User managements reports (
UserMgmtReports
) - Logon reports (
LogonReports
) - Audit reports (
DNSAuditReports
andADObjectsAuditReports
)
- Alerts (
Configure
Prerequisites
An internal log concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.
Enable Syslog forwarding
In the ADAudit Plus console:
- Click on 'Admin' Tab → 'SIEM Integration'.
- Check the 'Enable forwarding of ADAudit Plus Data' checkbox
- Choose the 'ArcSight (CEF)' radio button.
- Enter the log concentrator server name.
- Enter the log concentrator port number and protocol.
- Save the configuration
- After saving this configuration, Choose the categories to forward.
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format ManageEngine ADAuditPlus
.
Forward logs to Sekoia.io
Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.
Futher Readings
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake ManageEngine ADAudit Plus. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x ManageEngine ADAudit Plus on ATT&CK Navigator
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Cron Files Alteration
Cron Files and Cron Directory alteration used by attacker for persistency or privilege escalation. To ensure full performance on this rule, auditbeat
intake must be configure with the module file_integrity
containing path mentionned in the pattern.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
Package Manager Alteration
Package manager (eg: apt, yum) can be altered to install malicious software. To ensure full performance on this rule, auditbeat
intake must be configure with the module file_integrity
containing path mentionned in the pattern.
- Effort: advanced
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification
Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SSH Authorized Key Alteration
The file authorized_keys is used by SSH server to identify SSH keys that are authorized to connect to the host, alteration of one of those files might indicate a user compromision.
- Effort: advanced
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Suspicious File Name
Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
Data Source | Description |
---|---|
Authentication logs |
None |
File monitoring |
None |
Network device configuration |
None |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
Name | Values |
---|---|
Kind | alert |
Category | authentication , configuration , file , iam , network |
Type | change , info , start |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|ADAPAlerts|1|cat=ADAPAlerts cn3=7054 cs4=Unusual Activity -Logon Failure Count (Based on Host) cs1=AD Analytics cs5=2 rt=1694682115000 msg=10+ number of Logon Failure Activity occured on SERVER02.example.org within 11AM - 12PM. Usual average is 0, Threshold calculated is 10. Anomaly category:Unusual Activity -Logon Failure Count (Based on Host) cs3=User Behaviour Analytics sntdom=example.org",
"event": {
"dataset": "ADAPAlerts",
"kind": "alert",
"module": "EventLog",
"reason": "10+ number of Logon Failure Activity occured on SERVER02.example.org within 11AM - 12PM. Usual average is 0, Threshold calculated is 10. Anomaly category:Unusual Activity -Logon Failure Count (Based on Host)",
"severity": 1
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T09:01:55Z",
"observer": {
"hostname": "User Behaviour Analytics",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"User Behaviour Analytics"
]
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|ADAPAlerts|1|cat=ADAPAlerts cn3=119667 cs4=Group Membership Changes cs1=Security Group Membership Changes cs5=2 rt=1694682147000 msg=Member 'CN\\=JaneDoe,OU\\=UTILISATEURS,DC\\=example,DC\\=org' was added to Global Security Group 'MyGROUP' by 'EXAMPLE\\J_DOE'. cs3=SERVER02.example.org sntdom=example.org",
"event": {
"dataset": "ADAPAlerts",
"kind": "alert",
"module": "EventLog",
"reason": "Member 'CN\\=JaneDoe,OU\\=UTILISATEURS,DC\\=example,DC\\=org' was added to Global Security Group 'MyGROUP' by 'EXAMPLE\\J_DOE'.",
"severity": 1
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T09:02:27Z",
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
]
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|ADObjectsAuditReports|1|cat=ADObjectsAuditReports cs1=Configuration Changes cn1=1234 rt=1694681920000 outcome=Success cs3=SERVER02.example.org reason=Write Property : msExchOAB duser=Default Offline Address Book cs4=null suser=JDX2093$ type=msExchOAB msg=msExchOAB 'Default Offline Address Book' was modified by 'EXAMPLE\\JDX2093$'. Modified Properties : ms-Exch-OAB-Last-Number-Of-Records. Value : 7970 cn2=1234567890 suid=S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444 sntdom=example.org",
"event": {
"category": [
"configuration"
],
"dataset": "ADObjectsAuditReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"outcome": "Success",
"reason": "msExchOAB 'Default Offline Address Book' was modified by 'EXAMPLE\\JDX2093$'. Modified Properties : ms-Exch-OAB-Last-Number-Of-Records. Value : 7970",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T08:58:40Z",
"action": {
"outcome": "Success"
},
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"user": [
"JDX2093$"
]
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "JDX2093$",
"target": {
"name": "Default Offline Address Book"
}
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|DNSAuditReports|1|cat=DNSAuditReports cs1=DNS Permission Changes cn1=1234 rt=1694681538000 outcome=Success cs3=SERVER02.example.org reason=No changes on the Security Descriptor duser=119251-P10 suser=SYSTEM msg=dnsNode (null) '119251-P10'was modified by 'NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM'. Modified Properties : NT-Security-Descriptor cn2=1234567890 suid=S-1-5-18 sntdom=example.org",
"event": {
"category": [
"configuration"
],
"dataset": "DNSAuditReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"outcome": "Success",
"reason": "dnsNode (null) '119251-P10'was modified by 'NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM'. Modified Properties : NT-Security-Descriptor",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T08:52:18Z",
"action": {
"outcome": "Success"
},
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"user": [
"SYSTEM"
]
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-18",
"name": "SYSTEM",
"target": {
"name": "119251-P10"
}
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|GroupMgmtReports|1|cat=GroupMgmtReports cs1=Group Attributes Changed cs3=SERVER02.example.org type=member msg=Group 'MyGROUP' was modified by 'EXAMPLE\\J_DOE' Modified Properties : member, Values : CN\\=JANEDOE,OU\\=USERS,DC\\=example,DC\\=org rt=1694682151000 duser=MyGROUP sntdom=example.org duid=%{S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-55555} suser=J_DOE cn1=1234 reason=Group Attribute Added cn2=1234567890 suid=S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"event": {
"category": [
"iam"
],
"dataset": "GroupMgmtReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"reason": "Group 'MyGROUP' was modified by 'EXAMPLE\\J_DOE' Modified Properties : member, Values : CN\\=JANEDOE,OU\\=USERS,DC\\=example,DC\\=org",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T09:02:31Z",
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"user": [
"J_DOE"
]
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "J_DOE",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-55555",
"name": "MyGROUP"
}
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|UserMgmtReports|1|cat=UserMgmtReports cs1=User Attributes Changed type=primaryGroupID rt=1694682151000 msg=User 'JaneDoe' was modified by 'EXAMPLE\\J_DOE' Modified Properties : primaryGroupID, Values : 513 duser=JaneDoe sntdom=example.org duid=%{S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-55555} suser=J_DOE cs3=SERVER02.example.org cn1=1234 reason=User Modified outcome=Success cn2=1234567890 suid=S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"event": {
"category": [
"iam"
],
"dataset": "UserMgmtReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"outcome": "Success",
"reason": "User 'JaneDoe' was modified by 'EXAMPLE\\J_DOE' Modified Properties : primaryGroupID, Values : 513",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T09:02:31Z",
"action": {
"outcome": "Success"
},
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"user": [
"J_DOE"
]
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "J_DOE",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-55555",
"name": "JaneDoe"
}
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|UserMgmtReports|1|cat=UserMgmtReports cs1=Password Changed Users type=Change Password Attempt rt=1694681589000 msg=Change Password Attempt by user 'J_DOE'. Status:Failure' duser=J_DOE sntdom=EXAMPLE duid=%{S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-55555} suser=J_DOE cs3=SERVER02.example.org cn1=1234 reason=Change Password Attempt outcome=Failure cn2=1234567890 suid=S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"event": {
"category": [
"iam"
],
"dataset": "UserMgmtReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"outcome": "Failure",
"reason": "Change Password Attempt by user 'J_DOE'. Status:Failure'",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T08:53:09Z",
"action": {
"outcome": "Failure"
},
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"user": [
"J_DOE"
]
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "J_DOE",
"target": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-55555",
"name": "J_DOE"
}
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|LogonReports|1|cat=LogonReports cs1=All Users Logon suser=johndoe cs2=1.2.3.4 shost=1.2.3.4 rt=1694681391000 cn2=1234567890 outcome=Failure sntdom=example.org cs3=SERVER02.example.org suid=S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444 reason=Bad password cn1=1234 msg=Kerberos pre-authentication failed.",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"dataset": "LogonReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"outcome": "Failure",
"reason": "Kerberos pre-authentication failed.",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T08:49:51Z",
"action": {
"outcome": "Failure"
},
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"johndoe"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "johndoe"
}
}
{
"message": "0|ManageEngine|ADAuditPlus|1|EventLog|LogonReports|1|cat=LogonReports cs1=All Users Logon suser=johndoe cs2=1.2.3.4 shost=LAPTOP234.example.org rt=1694682196000 cn2=1234567890 outcome=Success sntdom=example.org cs3=SERVER02.example.org suid=S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444 reason=- cn1=1234 msg=A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"dataset": "LogonReports",
"module": "EventLog",
"outcome": "Success",
"reason": "A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested.",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"start"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-09-14T09:03:16Z",
"action": {
"outcome": "Success"
},
"observer": {
"hostname": "SERVER02.example.org",
"product": "ADAuditPlus",
"vendor": "ManageEngine",
"version": "1"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"SERVER02.example.org"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4"
],
"user": [
"johndoe"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "LAPTOP234.example.org",
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-21-111111111-2222222222-3333333333-44444",
"name": "johndoe"
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
Name | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.dataset |
keyword |
Name of the dataset. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.module |
keyword |
Name of the module this data is coming from. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.severity |
long |
Numeric severity of the event. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
observer.hostname |
keyword |
Hostname of the observer. |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
observer.version |
keyword |
Observer version. |
source.address |
keyword |
Source network address. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.target.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.target.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.