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RSA SecurID

Overview

SecurID is a token system, or authenticator, produced by RSA Security and intended to offer strong authentication to its user in the context of access to an information system.

  • Vendor: RSA Security
  • Supported environment: On prem
  • Version compatibility: 8,4
  • Detection based on: Telemetry
  • Supported application or feature: Authentication logs, Application logs

Configure

Prerequisites

An internal log concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.

Enable Syslog forwarding

In the Security Console of the RSA Authentication Manager:

  1. On the upper bar, go to Setup and select System Settings.
  2. Under Basic Settings, click on Logging.
  3. Select Primary as the selected instance and click Next
  4. In the section Log levels, choose the level for each type.
  5. In the section Log Data Retention, for each log data, select Save to internal database and remote Syslog at the following hostname or IP address, then type the location of the log concentration.
  6. Click Save

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format RSA SecurID.

Forward logs to Sekoia.io

Please consult the Sekoia Forwarder documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake RSA SecurID. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x RSA SecurID on ATT&CK Navigator

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adidnsdump Enumeration

Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line

Detects use of azureedge in the command line.

  • Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

  • Effort: advanced
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking

Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.

  • Effort: advanced
Compression Followed By Suppression

Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.

  • Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

  • Effort: master
Container Credential Access

Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable

A script has copied a System32 executable.

  • Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: master
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line

Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.

  • Effort: master
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
Impacket Addcomputer

Detects suspicious computer account creation based on impacket default pattern

  • Effort: intermediate
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets

Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.

  • Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload

Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process

  • Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)

Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: advanced
Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

  • Effort: advanced
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL

Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.

  • Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Macro Security Registry Modifications

Detects registry changes allowing an attacker to make Microsoft Office products runs Macros without warning. Events are collected either from ETW/Sysmon/EDR depending of the integration.

  • Effort: master
Mimikatz Basic Commands

Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.

  • Effort: elementary
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Mustang Panda Dropper

Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values

Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: advanced
Office Application Startup Office Test

Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.

  • Effort: elementary
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation

Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed

Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass

This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification

Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.

  • Effort: advanced
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services

Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: master
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line

Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern

Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution

Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation

Detects suspicious scheduled task creation, either executed by a non-system user or a user who is not administrator (the user ID is not S-1-5-18 or S-1-5-18-*). This detection rule doesn't match Sysmon EventID 1 because the user SID is always set to S-1-5-18.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

  • Effort: master
User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection

Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool

WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential

Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Authentication logs provides Authorization and Authentication events
Application logs provides activities logs

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "11:21:58,165, example.intranet, audit.admin.com.rsa.ims.admin.impl.PrincipalAdministrationImpl, INFO, f6202699f3af48788715faa8bcf50198,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,5.6.7.8,1.2.3.4,UPDATE_PRINCIPAL,10055,SUCCESS,,e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B,,000000000000000000001000d0021000,000000000000000000001000d0011000,000000000000000000001000e0011000,admin,Admin,Admin,PRINCIPAL,205b3dcb8bcd4186bb9dd9f170194d77,38b39da6807c4016ab4f7acbe6682c8b,000000000000000000001000e0011000,source.hostname,,,,,,",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "configuration"
        ],
        "code": "10055",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "INFO"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "UPDATE_PRINCIPAL"
            },
            "class": " audit.admin.com.rsa.ims.admin.impl.PrincipalAdministrationImpl",
            "domain": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
            },
            "event": {
                "outcome": "SUCCESS"
            },
            "objects": {
                "id": "205b3dcb8bcd4186bb9dd9f170194d77",
                "name": "source.hostname",
                "security": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
                },
                "source": {
                    "id": "38b39da6807c4016ab4f7acbe6682c8b"
                },
                "type": "PRINCIPAL"
            },
            "session": {
                "id": "e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B"
            },
            "source": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000d0011000"
            },
            "user": {
                "firstname": "Admin",
                "lastname": "Admin"
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "000000000000000000001000d0021000",
        "name": "admin"
    }
}

{
    "message": "11:21:58,183, example.intranet, audit.admin.com.rsa.authmgr.internal.admin.tokenmgt.impl.TokenAdministrationImpl, INFO, 1c91aa9d56d64ea6816814fbd5f4fd4b,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,5.6.7.8,1.2.3.4,AM_UNLINK_TOKEN_PRINCIPAL,20046,SUCCESS,,e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B,,000000000000000000001000d0021000,000000000000000000001000d0011000,000000000000000000001000e0011000,admin,Admin,Admin,AM_TOKEN,b43b74700a8c4634b2d5e6335a4a4a2a,,000000000000000000001000e0011000,000517223810,PRINCIPAL,54b6b5513c6410ac1cdda331149e66f3,0c38de293c6410ac0174e9584025c12f,000000000000000000001000e0011000,user.target,admin",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "20046",
        "type": [
            "end"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "INFO"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "AM_UNLINK_TOKEN_PRINCIPAL"
            },
            "class": " audit.admin.com.rsa.authmgr.internal.admin.tokenmgt.impl.TokenAdministrationImpl",
            "domain": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
            },
            "event": {
                "outcome": "SUCCESS"
            },
            "objects": {
                "id": "b43b74700a8c4634b2d5e6335a4a4a2a",
                "name": "000517223810",
                "security": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
                },
                "type": "AM_TOKEN"
            },
            "session": {
                "id": "e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B"
            },
            "source": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000d0011000"
            },
            "user": {
                "firstname": "Admin",
                "lastname": "Admin"
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "000000000000000000001000d0021000",
        "name": "admin",
        "target": {
            "name": "user.target"
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "11:26:43,377, example.intranet, audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.authn.impl.AuthenticationBrokerImpl, ERROR, 6b746adf1d0646f7bcc518cd6ae4a16d,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,5.6.7.8,1.2.3.4,AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT,23008,FAIL,AUTHN_METHOD_FAILED_SYNTAX_ERROR,,,,,admin,,,09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091,000000000000000000001000e0011000,1.2.3.4,source.hostname,1,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "23008",
        "reason": "AUTHN_METHOD_FAILED_SYNTAX_ERROR",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "agent": {
        "id": "09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091",
        "name": "source.hostname"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "ERROR"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT"
            },
            "agent": {
                "domain": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
                },
                "ip": "1.2.3.4"
            },
            "class": " audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.authn.impl.AuthenticationBrokerImpl",
            "event": {
                "outcome": "FAIL"
            },
            "policy": {
                "method": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "admin"
    }
}

{
    "message": "11:26:43,377, example.intranet, audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.authn.impl.AuthenticationBrokerImpl, ERROR, 6b746adf1d0646f7bcc518cd6ae4a16d,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,5.6.7.8,1.2.3.4,AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT,23008,FAIL,AUTHN_PRINCIPAL_LOCKED,,,,,admin,,,09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091,000000000000000000001000e0011000,1.2.3.4,source.hostname,1,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "23008",
        "reason": "AUTHN_PRINCIPAL_LOCKED",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "agent": {
        "id": "09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091",
        "name": "source.hostname"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "ERROR"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT"
            },
            "agent": {
                "domain": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
                },
                "ip": "1.2.3.4"
            },
            "class": " audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.authn.impl.AuthenticationBrokerImpl",
            "event": {
                "outcome": "FAIL"
            },
            "policy": {
                "method": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "admin"
    }
}

{
    "message": "11:26:43,377, example.intranet, audit.runtime.com.rsa.authmgr.internal.protocol.ace.AuthV4RequestHandler, ERROR, 6b746adf1d0646f7bcc518cd6ae4a16d,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,5.6.7.8,1.2.3.4,AUTH_PRINCIPAL_RESOLUTION,23008,FAIL,AUTH_RESOLUTION_FAILED_BY_ID_ALIAS,,,,,admin,,,09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091,000000000000000000001000e0011000,1.2.3.4,source.hostname,1,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "23008",
        "reason": "AUTH_RESOLUTION_FAILED_BY_ID_ALIAS",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "agent": {
        "id": "09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091",
        "name": "source.hostname"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "ERROR"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "AUTH_PRINCIPAL_RESOLUTION"
            },
            "agent": {
                "domain": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
                },
                "ip": "1.2.3.4"
            },
            "class": " audit.runtime.com.rsa.authmgr.internal.protocol.ace.AuthV4RequestHandler",
            "event": {
                "outcome": "FAIL"
            },
            "policy": {
                "method": {
                    "id": "1"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "admin"
    }
}

{
    "message": "11:23:02,069, example.intranet, audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.authn.impl.AuthenticationBrokerImpl, INFO, da0011b4f66e4b7e86f90f9dd6e937e7,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,5.6.7.8,1.2.3.4,AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT,13002,SUCCESS,AUTHN_METHOD_SUCCESS,e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B,39b1319237f946428aecf267190b537d,09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091,000000000000000000001000e0011000,HDTCO04,HDTCO04,,559eb5ec2d43408cbce2a43b65eafe8c,000000000000000000001000e0011000,1.2.3.4,source.hostname,000000000000000000002000f1022000,SecurID_Native,,,AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT,6,4,,,,,da624c0ecf554764953fcc346b999682,000523656192,,",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "13002",
        "reason": "AUTHN_METHOD_SUCCESS",
        "type": [
            "start"
        ]
    },
    "agent": {
        "id": "559eb5ec2d43408cbce2a43b65eafe8c",
        "name": "source.hostname"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "INFO"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "HDTCO04"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "AUTHN_LOGIN_EVENT"
            },
            "agent": {
                "domain": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
                },
                "ip": "1.2.3.4"
            },
            "class": " audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.authn.impl.AuthenticationBrokerImpl",
            "domain": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
            },
            "event": {
                "outcome": "SUCCESS"
            },
            "policy": {
                "method": {
                    "id": "000000000000000000002000f1022000",
                    "name": "SecurID_Native"
                }
            },
            "session": {
                "id": "e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B"
            },
            "source": {
                "id": "09f1f5fc30e947ce9e564d5a91745091"
            },
            "user": {
                "firstname": "HDTCO04"
            }
        }
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "39b1319237f946428aecf267190b537d",
        "name": "HDTCO04"
    }
}

{
    "message": "12:00:32,804, example.intranet, audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.session.impl.SessionManagerImpl, INFO, 3ab4596104a043b886a66e80f88b353e,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,,1.2.3.4,AUTHN_LOGOUT_EVENT,13001,SUCCESS,,e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B,000000000000000000001000d0021000,000000000000000000001000d0011000,000000000000000000001000e0011000,admin,Admin,Admin,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "13001",
        "type": [
            "end"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "INFO"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ],
        "user": [
            "admin"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "AUTHN_LOGOUT_EVENT"
            },
            "class": " audit.runtime.com.rsa.ims.session.impl.SessionManagerImpl",
            "domain": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000e0011000"
            },
            "event": {
                "outcome": "SUCCESS"
            },
            "session": {
                "id": "e7ec7ff59d604a2ba3fa09067bbd65a4-L0+/miv3k62B"
            },
            "source": {
                "id": "000000000000000000001000d0011000"
            },
            "user": {
                "firstname": "Admin",
                "lastname": "Admin"
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "id": "000000000000000000001000d0021000",
        "name": "admin"
    }
}

{
    "message": "rsaadmin : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/opt/rsa/am/server ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/opt/rsa/am/utils/bin/appliance/queryTimeSettings.sh",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "/opt/rsa/am/utils/bin/appliance/queryTimeSettings.sh",
        "working_directory": "/opt/rsa/am/server "
    },
    "related": {
        "user": [
            "root "
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "process": {
                "tty": "unknown "
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "root "
    }
}

{
    "message": "Startup finished in 9ms.",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "reason": "Startup finished in 9ms.",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "Reached target Timers.",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "reason": "Reached target Timers.",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "11:17:12,003, example.intranet, system.com.rsa.ims.configuration.impl.ConfigurationServiceImpl, SYSTEM, a9dbe1aae938465692320944498f095a,0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b,,1.2.3.4,CONF_VALUE_UPDATED,16256,SUCCESS,,,,,,,,,ims.agent.monitor.lastTimestamp,0000-Global-0000,2023-03-16 10:01:46.191,,,,",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "configuration"
        ],
        "code": "16256",
        "type": [
            "change"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "log": {
        "level": "SYSTEM"
    },
    "observer": {
        "hostname": " example.intranet",
        "serial_number": "0e34d92f7c6549b19ed28471c02a049b"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            " example.intranet"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ]
    },
    "rsa": {
        "securid": {
            "action": {
                "name": "CONF_VALUE_UPDATED"
            },
            "class": " system.com.rsa.ims.configuration.impl.ConfigurationServiceImpl",
            "event": {
                "outcome": "SUCCESS"
            }
        }
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
agent.id keyword Unique identifier of this agent.
agent.name keyword Custom name of the agent.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
event.code keyword Identification code for this event.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
log.level keyword Log level of the log event.
observer.hostname keyword Hostname of the observer.
observer.serial_number keyword Observer serial number.
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.working_directory keyword The working directory of the process.
rsa.securid.action.name keywords represents the name of the action taken in an RSA SecureID event, such as 'authenticate' or 'access denied'. It is also a keyword field and can be used to search for events based on the specific action taken.
rsa.securid.agent.domain.id keywords This field is similar to rsa.secureid.domain.id, but it specifically represents the domain or realm associated with the agent (such as a server or application) that generated the SecureID event.
rsa.securid.agent.ip keywords This field represents the IP address of the agent (server or application) that generated the SecureID event.
rsa.securid.class keywords represents the class or category of an RSA SecureID event. It is a keyword field, which means it can be used to group and filter events based on the SecureID class they belong to.
rsa.securid.domain.id keywords represents the unique ID of the domain or realm associated with a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.event.outcome keywords The outcome of the event
rsa.securid.objects.id keywords represents the unique ID of the object associated with a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.objects.name keywords represents the name of the object associated with a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.objects.security.id keywords represents the unique ID of the security context associated with the object in a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.objects.source.id keywords represents the unique ID of the source device or system associated with the object in a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.objects.type keywords represents the type of object (such as user, group, or resource) associated with a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.policy.expression keywords represents the expression used in the policy associated with a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.policy.id keywords represents the unique ID of the policy associated with a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.policy.method.id keywords represents the unique ID of the policy method used in a SecureID event. It can be used to track and analyze policy enforcement activity.
rsa.securid.policy.method.name keywords represents the name of the policy method used in a SecureID event.
rsa.securid.process.tty keywords This field likely represents the terminal or tty associated with the SecurID authentication process being logged.
rsa.securid.session.id keywords represents the unique ID of a SecureID session. It can be used to track and analyze user activity over multiple SecureID events.
rsa.securid.source.id keywords represents the unique ID of the source device or system that generated the SecureID event.
rsa.securid.user.firstname keywords This field likely represents the first name of the user associated with the SecurID authentication request being logged.
rsa.securid.user.lastname keywords This field likely represents the last name of the user associated with the SecurID authentication request being logged
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
user.id keyword Unique identifier of the user.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user.target.name keyword Short name or login of the user.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.

Further Readings