Cloudflare Gateway Network
Overview
Cloudflare is a global network designed to make everything you connect to the Internet secure, private, fast, and reliable. In this documentation, you will learn how to collect and send Gateway Network logs to Sekoia.io.
- Vendor: Cloudflare
- Supported environment: SaaS
- Detection based on: Telemetry
- Supported application or feature: Network device logs, Network protocol analysis
Configuration
Create the intake on Sekoia.io
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Cloudflare.
Configure events forwarding on Cloudflare
Retrieve necessary information
First, you will have to retrieve configuration information. Connect to Cloudflare Console to collect the following :
-
Cloudflare API Token
- Go to
My Profile
, then on the left panel, click onAPI Tokens
. - Click on the
Create Token
button and select theCreate Custom Token
entry. - Give a name to your token and set the following permissions:
Scope Group Level Account Account Analytics Read Account Logs Read Account Logs Edit Zone Logs Read Zone Logs Edit - If you want zerotrust logs you should also add:
Scope Group Level Account Zero Trust Read - Go to
-
Cloudflare Zone ID :
- This information is specific to a Website.
- On the left panel, click on
Websites
and select the Website you want. - On the right panel, there is an
API
section where you can retrieve theZone ID
.
Create a Logpush job
Configure a Logpush job with the following destination:
https://intake.sekoia.io/plain/batch?header_X-SEKOIAIO-INTAKE-KEY=<YOUR_INTAKE_KEY>
To do so, you can manage Logpush with cURL:
$ curl -X POST https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/<CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID>/logpush/jobs \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"dataset": "gateway_network",
"enabled": true,
"max_upload_bytes": 5000000,
"max_upload_records": 1000,
"logpull_options":"fields=AccountID,Action,Datetime,DestinationIP,DestinationPort,DeviceID,DeviceName,Email,OverrideIP,OverridePort,PolicyID,PolicyName,SNI,SessionID,SourceIP,SourceInternalIP,SourcePort,Transport,UserID×tamps=rfc3339",
"destination_conf": "https://intake.sekoia.io/plain/batch?header_X-SEKOIAIO-INTAKE-KEY=<YOUR_INTAKE_KEY>"
}' # (1)
- will return
{ "errors": [], "messages": [], "result": { "id": <ID>, "dataset": "gateway_network", "frequency": "high", "kind": "", "max_upload_bytes": 5000000, "max_upload_records": 1000, "enabled": true, "name": null, "logpull_options": "fields=<LIST_OF_FIELDS>", "destination_conf": "https://intake.sekoia.io/plain/batch?header_X-SEKOIAIO-INTAKE-KEY=<YOUR_INTAKE_KEY>", "last_complete": null, "last_error": null, "error_message": null, "time_created": "<TIMESTAMP>" }, "success": true }
Important
Replace :
<YOUR_INTAKE_KEY>
with the Intake key you generated in the Create the intake on Sekoia.io step.<CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID>
with the ACCOUNT_ID found on the overview page<CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN>
with the API Token you generated
Useful Cloudflare API endpoints
On their documentation, Cloudflare provides a list API endpoints you can use. Find below some useful endpoints:
https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/<ACCOUNT_ID>/logpush/jobs/<JOB_ID>
to verify the job you previously created is correct (you need to specify theJOB_ID
)https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/<ACCOUNT_ID>/logpush/datasets/<DATASET>/jobs
to get all the jobs for a specific dataset (dns_log
,firewalls_events
orhttp_requests
in our case)https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/<ACCOUNT_ID>/logpush/jobs/<JOB_ID>
to update a job if you noticed a mistake after the creation of the job (wrong fields, wrong SEKOIA API Key...)
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
{
"AccountID": "1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9",
"Action": "allowedOnNoRuleMatch",
"Datetime": "2023-02-24T16:33:05Z",
"DestinationIP": "104.244.42.193",
"DestinationPort": 443,
"DeviceID": "",
"DeviceName": "",
"Email": "",
"OverrideIP": "",
"OverridePort": 0,
"PolicyID": "",
"PolicyName": "",
"SNI": "www.twitter.com",
"SessionID": "1725de7a2d0000215517735400000001",
"SourceIP": "15.188.186.81",
"SourcePort": 34080,
"Transport": "tcp",
"UserID": ""
}
{
"AccountID": "1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9",
"Action": "allowedOnNoRuleMatch",
"Datetime": "2023-05-02T16:24:20Z",
"DestinationIP": "104.18.5.35",
"DestinationPort": 443,
"DeviceID": "b72ac397-e5c3-913e-11ed-03face9f2b6b",
"DeviceName": "DESKTOP-ABCDEF",
"Email": "john.doe@test.com",
"OverrideIP": "",
"OverridePort": 0,
"PolicyID": "",
"PolicyName": "",
"SNI": "commandandcontrolandbotnet.testcategory.com",
"SessionID": "187ee08b7d00003d0d8e47f400000001",
"SourceIP": "15.188.186.81",
"SourceInternalIP": "",
"SourcePort": 54945,
"Transport": "tcp",
"UserID": "2c46cdd9-92e3-5e5f-b3cf-67965d7c33e3"
}
{
"AccountID": "1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9",
"Action": "allowedOnNoRuleMatch",
"Datetime": "2023-02-24T16:33:05Z",
"DestinationIP": "104.244.42.193",
"DestinationPort": 443,
"DeviceID": "",
"DeviceName": "",
"Email": "",
"OverrideIP": "",
"OverridePort": 0,
"PolicyID": "",
"PolicyName": "",
"SNI": "",
"SessionID": "1725de7a2d0000215517735400000001",
"SourceIP": "15.188.186.81",
"SourcePort": 34080,
"Transport": "tcp",
"UserID": ""
}
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Cloudflare Gateway Network. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Cloudflare Gateway Network on ATT&CK Navigator
Burp Suite Tool Detected
Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).
- Effort: intermediate
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
EvilProxy Phishing Domain
Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
Internet Scanner
Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP. This could be a very noisy rule, so be careful to check your detection perimeter before activation.
- Effort: master
Internet Scanner Target
Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP and group by target address. This could be a very noisy rule, so be careful to check your detection perimeter before activation.
- Effort: master
Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Suspicious TOR Gateway
Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: advanced
TOR Usage
Detects TOR usage, based on the IP address and the destination port (filtered on NTP). TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request
Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind
- Effort: advanced
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
Data Source | Description |
---|---|
Network device logs |
The network is logged by cloudflare gateway |
Network protocol analysis |
The network is inspected by cloudflare gateway |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
Name | Values |
---|---|
Kind | `` |
Category | network |
Type | `` |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "{\"AccountID\":\"1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9\",\"Action\":\"allowedOnNoRuleMatch\",\"Datetime\":\"2023-02-24T16:33:05Z\",\"DestinationIP\":\"104.244.42.193\",\"DestinationPort\":443,\"DeviceID\":\"\",\"DeviceName\":\"\",\"Email\":\"\",\"OverrideIP\":\"\",\"OverridePort\":0,\"PolicyID\":\"\",\"PolicyName\":\"\",\"SNI\":\"www.twitter.com\",\"SessionID\":\"1725de7a2d0000215517735400000001\",\"SourceIP\":\"15.188.186.81\",\"SourcePort\":34080,\"Transport\":\"tcp\",\"UserID\":\"\"}",
"event": {
"action": "allowedOnNoRuleMatch",
"category": [
"network"
],
"dataset": "gateway_network",
"type": [
"allowed"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-02-24T16:33:05Z",
"cloud": {
"account": {
"id": "1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9"
}
},
"cloudflare": {
"OverridePort": 0,
"SessionID": "1725de7a2d0000215517735400000001"
},
"destination": {
"address": "104.244.42.193",
"domain": "www.twitter.com",
"ip": "104.244.42.193",
"port": 443
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"type": "proxy",
"vendor": "Cloudflare"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"www.twitter.com"
],
"ip": [
"104.244.42.193",
"15.188.186.81"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "15.188.186.81",
"ip": "15.188.186.81",
"port": 34080
},
"tls": {
"client": {
"server_name": "www.twitter.com"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"AccountID\":\"1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9\",\"Action\":\"allowedOnNoRuleMatch\",\"Datetime\":\"2023-05-02T16:24:20Z\",\"DestinationIP\":\"104.18.5.35\",\"DestinationPort\":443,\"DeviceID\":\"b72ac397-e5c3-913e-11ed-03face9f2b6b\",\"DeviceName\":\"DESKTOP-ABCDEF\",\"Email\":\"john.doe@test.com\",\"OverrideIP\":\"\",\"OverridePort\":0,\"PolicyID\":\"\",\"PolicyName\":\"\",\"SNI\":\"commandandcontrolandbotnet.testcategory.com\",\"SessionID\":\"187ee08b7d00003d0d8e47f400000001\",\"SourceIP\":\"15.188.186.81\",\"SourceInternalIP\":\"\",\"SourcePort\":54945,\"Transport\":\"tcp\",\"UserID\":\"2c46cdd9-92e3-5e5f-b3cf-67965d7c33e3\"}",
"event": {
"action": "allowedOnNoRuleMatch",
"category": [
"network"
],
"dataset": "gateway_network",
"type": [
"allowed"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-05-02T16:24:20Z",
"cloud": {
"account": {
"id": "1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9"
}
},
"cloudflare": {
"OverridePort": 0,
"SessionID": "187ee08b7d00003d0d8e47f400000001"
},
"destination": {
"address": "104.18.5.35",
"domain": "commandandcontrolandbotnet.testcategory.com",
"ip": "104.18.5.35",
"port": 443
},
"device": {
"id": "b72ac397-e5c3-913e-11ed-03face9f2b6b"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "DESKTOP-ABCDEF",
"name": "DESKTOP-ABCDEF"
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"type": "proxy",
"vendor": "Cloudflare"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"DESKTOP-ABCDEF",
"commandandcontrolandbotnet.testcategory.com"
],
"ip": [
"104.18.5.35",
"15.188.186.81"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "15.188.186.81",
"ip": "15.188.186.81",
"port": 54945
},
"tls": {
"client": {
"server_name": "commandandcontrolandbotnet.testcategory.com"
}
},
"user": {
"email": "john.doe@test.com",
"id": "2c46cdd9-92e3-5e5f-b3cf-67965d7c33e3"
}
}
{
"message": "{\"AccountID\":\"1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9\",\"Action\":\"allowedOnNoRuleMatch\",\"Datetime\":\"2023-02-24T16:33:05Z\",\"DestinationIP\":\"104.244.42.193\",\"DestinationPort\":443,\"DeviceID\":\"\",\"DeviceName\":\"\",\"Email\":\"\",\"OverrideIP\":\"\",\"OverridePort\":0,\"PolicyID\":\"\",\"PolicyName\":\"\",\"SNI\":\"\",\"SessionID\":\"1725de7a2d0000215517735400000001\",\"SourceIP\":\"15.188.186.81\",\"SourcePort\":34080,\"Transport\":\"tcp\",\"UserID\":\"\"}",
"event": {
"action": "allowedOnNoRuleMatch",
"category": [
"network"
],
"dataset": "gateway_network",
"type": [
"allowed"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2023-02-24T16:33:05Z",
"cloud": {
"account": {
"id": "1d1e650b3385b95db72bba7cfb1287e9"
}
},
"cloudflare": {
"OverridePort": 0,
"SessionID": "1725de7a2d0000215517735400000001"
},
"destination": {
"address": "104.244.42.193",
"ip": "104.244.42.193",
"port": 443
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"type": "proxy",
"vendor": "Cloudflare"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"104.244.42.193",
"15.188.186.81"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "15.188.186.81",
"ip": "15.188.186.81",
"port": 34080
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
Name | Type | Description |
---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
cloud.account.id |
keyword |
The cloud account or organization id. |
cloudflare.InternalSourceIP |
keyword |
Local LAN IP of the device. Only available when connected via a GRE/IPsec tunnel on-ramp. |
cloudflare.OverrideIP |
keyword |
Overriden IP of the network session, if any. |
cloudflare.OverridePort |
number |
Overriden port of the network session, if any. |
cloudflare.PolicyID |
keyword |
Identifier of the policy/rule that was applied, if any. |
cloudflare.PolicyName |
keyword |
The name of the gateway policy applied to the request, if any. |
cloudflare.SessionID |
keyword |
The session identifier of this network session. |
destination.address |
keyword |
Destination network address. |
destination.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the destination. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.dataset |
keyword |
Name of the dataset. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
host.hostname |
keyword |
Hostname of the host. |
network.transport |
keyword |
Protocol Name corresponding to the field iana_number . |
observer.type |
keyword |
The type of the observer the data is coming from. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
tls.client.server_name |
keyword |
Hostname the client is trying to connect to. Also called the SNI. |
user.email |
keyword |
User email address. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.