Skip to content

ISC DHCP

Overview

ISC DHCP offers a complete open-source solution for implementing DHCP servers.

  • Vendor: ISC (Internet Systems Consortium)
  • Supported environment: On Premise
  • Version compatibility, if applicable:
  • Detection based on: Network Telemetry
  • Supported application or feature: DHCP Server

High-Level Architecture Diagram

  • Type of integration: Outbound (PUSH to Sekoia.io)

Alternative

This will not be detailed in this documentation, but logs can also be sent directly to Sekoia.io over HTTPS using the Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent and the "Collect logs in files" method. This provides an alternative to the specified syslog collection method and may be preferable in certain environments.

Specification

Prerequisites

  • Resource:
    • Self-managed syslog forwarder
  • Network:
    • Outbound traffic allowed
  • Permissions:
    • Administrator rights on the ISC DHCP server
    • Root access to the Linux server with the syslog forwarder

Transport Protocol/Method

  • Indirect Syslog

Logs details

  • Supported functionalities: See section Overview
  • Supported type(s) of structure: syslog
  • Supported verbosity level: Emergency / Alert / Critical / Error / Warning / Notice / Informational / Debug

Note

Log levels are based on the taxonomy of RFC5424. Adapt according to the terminology used by the editor.

Step-by-Step Configuration Procedure

Instructions on the 3rd Party Solution

Forward ISC DHCP Logs to Sekoia.io

This setup guide will show you how to forward your ISC DHCP logs to Sekoia.io by means of a syslog transport channel.

Detailed Procedure:

  1. Prerequisites:

  2. An internal syslog concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.

  3. Rsyslog Configuration:

  4. As of now, the main solution to collect ISC DHCP logs leverages the Rsyslog recipe. Please share your experiences with other recipes by editing this documentation.

Instruction on Sekoia

Configure Your Intake

This section will guide you through creating the intake object in Sekoia, which provides a unique identifier called the "Intake key." The Intake key is essential for later configuration, as it references the Community, Entity, and Parser (Intake Format) used when receiving raw events on Sekoia.

  1. Go to the Sekoia Intake page.
  2. Click on the + New Intake button at the top right of the page.
  3. Search for your Intake by the product name in the search bar.
  4. Give it a Name and associate it with an Entity (and a Community if using multi-tenant mode).
  5. Click on Create.

Note

For more details on how to use the Intake page and to find the Intake key you just created, refer to this documentation.

Configure a forwarder

To forward events using syslog to Sekoia.io, you need to update the syslog header with the intake key you previously created. Here is an example of your message before the forwarder 

<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG RAW_MESSAGE
and after 
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG [SEKOIA@53288 intake_key=\"YOUR_INTAKE_KEY\"] RAW_MESSAGE

To achieve this you can:

  • Use the Sekoia.io forwarder which is the official supported way to collect data using the syslog protocol in Sekoia.io. In charge of centralizing data coming from many equipments/sources and forwarding them to Sekoia.io with the apporpriated format, it is a prepackaged option. You only have to provide your intake key as parameter.
  • Use your own Syslog service instance. Maybe you already have an intance of one of these components on your side and want to reuse it in order to centralize data before forwarding them to Sekoia.io. When using this mode, you have to configure and maintain your component in order to respect the expected Sekoia.io format.

Warning

Only the Sekoia.io forwarder is officially supported. Other options are documented for reference purposes but do not have official support.

Detection section

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Network device configuration logs include IP configuration of network devices in your networks

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category network
Type connection

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "DHCPACK on 10.100.102.108 to 6c:88:14:1d:97:1c (PDB746) via 10.100.100.4",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "outcome": "success",
        "type": [
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "10.100.100.4",
        "ip": "10.100.100.4"
    },
    "dhcpd": {
        "query": "ack"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PDB746"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.100.100.4",
            "10.100.102.108"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "PDB746",
        "domain": "PDB746",
        "ip": "10.100.102.108",
        "mac": "6c:88:14:1d:97:1c"
    }
}

{
    "message": "DHCPDISCOVER from ac:cc:8e:b0:2b:8c via 192.168.102.7: network 192.168.102.0/23: no free leases",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "outcome": "success",
        "type": [
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "192.168.102.7",
        "ip": "192.168.102.7"
    },
    "dhcpd": {
        "query": "discover"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "192.168.102.7"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "mac": "ac:cc:8e:b0:2b:8c"
    }
}

{
    "message": "DHCPRELEASE of 10.17.81.182 from 00:08:5d:71:92:15 (6867i00085D719105) via enp4s0f0 (found)",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "outcome": "success",
        "type": [
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "dhcpd": {
        "query": "release"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "6867i00085D719105"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.17.81.182"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "6867i00085D719105",
        "domain": "6867i00085D719105",
        "ip": "10.17.81.182",
        "mac": "00:08:5d:71:92:15"
    }
}

{
    "message": "DHCPREQUEST for 10.100.102.108 from 6c:88:14:1d:96:0c (PDB746) via 10.100.100.4",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "outcome": "success",
        "type": [
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "10.100.100.4",
        "ip": "10.100.100.4"
    },
    "dhcpd": {
        "query": "request"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "PDB746"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.100.100.4",
            "10.100.102.108"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "PDB746",
        "domain": "PDB746",
        "ip": "10.100.102.108",
        "mac": "6c:88:14:1d:96:0c"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
dhcpd.query keyword name of the DHCP query
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.outcome keyword The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
source.domain keyword The domain name of the source.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.mac keyword MAC address of the source.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake ISC DHCP. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x ISC DHCP on ATT&CK Navigator

Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master

Further readings