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Pulse Connect Secure

Overview

Pulse Connect Secure is an SSL VPN solution for remote and mobile users.

  • Vendor: Pulse Secure
  • Supported environment: On Premise
  • Version compatibility, if applicable:
  • Detection based on: VPN Logs
  • Supported application or feature: SSL VPN

High-Level Architecture Diagram

  • Type of integration: Outbound (PUSH to Sekoia.io)

Alternative

This will not be detailed in this documentation, but logs can also be sent directly to Sekoia.io over HTTPS using the Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent and the "Collect logs in files" method. This provides an alternative to the specified syslog collection method and may be preferable in certain environments.

Specification

Prerequisites

  • Resource:
    • Self-managed syslog forwarder
  • Network:
    • Outbound traffic allowed
  • Permissions:
    • Administrator rights on the Pulse Connect Secure system
    • Root access to the Linux server with the syslog forwarder

Transport Protocol/Method

  • Indirect Syslog

Logs details

  • Supported functionalities: See section Overview
  • Supported type(s) of structure: WELF log format
  • Supported verbosity level: Emergency / Alert / Critical / Error / Warning / Notice / Informational / Debug

Note

Log levels are based on the taxonomy of RFC5424. Adapt according to the terminology used by the editor.

Step-by-Step Configuration Procedure

Instructions on the 3rd Party Solution

Forward Pulse Connect Secure Logs to Sekoia.io

This setup guide will show you how to forward your Pulse Connect Secure logs to Sekoia.io by means of a syslog transport channel.

Detailed Procedure:

  1. Rsyslog Configuration:

  2. As of now, the main solution to collect Pulse Secure Connect logs leverages the Rsyslog recipe along with the WELF log format offered by Pulse Secure.

  3. Pulse Connect Secure Configuration:

  4. Please refer to the documentation of Pulse Secure Connect to forward events to your syslog concentrator.

  5. Forward Logs to Sekoia.io:

  6. The reader can consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.

Instruction on Sekoia

Configure Your Intake

This section will guide you through creating the intake object in Sekoia, which provides a unique identifier called the "Intake key." The Intake key is essential for later configuration, as it references the Community, Entity, and Parser (Intake Format) used when receiving raw events on Sekoia.

  1. Go to the Sekoia Intake page.
  2. Click on the + New Intake button at the top right of the page.
  3. Search for your Intake by the product name in the search bar.
  4. Give it a Name and associate it with an Entity (and a Community if using multi-tenant mode).
  5. Click on Create.

Note

For more details on how to use the Intake page and to find the Intake key you just created, refer to this documentation.

Configure a forwarder

To forward events using syslog to Sekoia.io, you need to update the syslog header with the intake key you previously created. Here is an example of your message before the forwarder 

<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG RAW_MESSAGE
and after 
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG [SEKOIA@53288 intake_key=\"YOUR_INTAKE_KEY\"] RAW_MESSAGE

To achieve this you can:

  • Use the Sekoia.io forwarder which is the official supported way to collect data using the syslog protocol in Sekoia.io. In charge of centralizing data coming from many equipments/sources and forwarding them to Sekoia.io with the apporpriated format, it is a prepackaged option. You only have to provide your intake key as parameter.
  • Use your own Syslog service instance. Maybe you already have an intance of one of these components on your side and want to reuse it in order to centralize data before forwarding them to Sekoia.io. When using this mode, you have to configure and maintain your component in order to respect the expected Sekoia.io format.

Warning

Only the Sekoia.io forwarder is officially supported. Other options are documented for reference purposes but do not have official support.

Detection section

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Authentication logs Events are produced when a user authenticate on services of the company my means of the VPN
Web logs Events are produced on web service access
Network device logs Events are produced on VPN connection

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category ``
Type info

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2021-01-28 13:46:08\" pri=6 fw=172.16.128.22 vpn=CB2XXPCS02 ivs=Root user=bob realm=\"SEKOIA_User\" roles=\"VDI-Pulse_User_Role\" proto=auth src=176.134.164.62 dst= dstname= type=vpn op= arg=\"\" result= sent= rcvd= agent=\"\" duration= msg=\"AUT24804: Host Checker policy 'Sekoia_Host Checker' failed on host '176.134.164.62' address '00-d8-61-35-80-81' for user 'bob' reason 'Rule-Antivirus_Check:Le logiciel antivirus indiqu\u00e9 dans les exigences de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 n'est pas install\u00e9.'.\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "code": "AUT24804",
        "provider": "auth",
        "reason": "Rule-Antivirus_Check:Le logiciel antivirus indiqu\u00e9 dans les exigences de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 n'est pas install\u00e9.",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "AUT24804"
    },
    "host": {
        "ip": [
            "176.134.164.62"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "00-d8-61-35-80-81"
        ]
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "172.16.128.22"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22",
            "176.134.164.62"
        ],
        "user": [
            "bob"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "name": "Sekoia_Host Checker"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "CB2XXPCS02",
        "type": "vpn"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "176.134.164.62",
        "ip": "176.134.164.62"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "SEKOIA_User",
        "name": "bob",
        "roles": [
            "VDI-Pulse_User_Role"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2021-01-28 13:46:05\" pri=6 fw=172.16.128.22 vpn=CB2XXPCS02 ivs=Root user=alice realm=\"SEKOIA_User\" roles=\"SEKOIA_User_Role\" proto=auth src=19.160.74.9 dst= dstname= type=vpn op= arg=\"\" result= sent= rcvd= agent=\"\" duration= msg=\"AUT24803: Host Checker policy 'Sekoia_Host Checker' passed on host '19.160.74.9' address '60-f2-62-ea-2d-a1' for user 'alice'.\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "host"
        ],
        "code": "AUT24803",
        "provider": "auth",
        "reason": " Host Checker policy 'Sekoia_Host Checker' passed on host '19.160.74.9' address '60-f2-62-ea-2d-a1' for user 'alice'.",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "AUT24803"
    },
    "host": {
        "ip": [
            "19.160.74.9"
        ],
        "mac": [
            "60-f2-62-ea-2d-a1"
        ]
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "172.16.128.22"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22",
            "19.160.74.9"
        ],
        "user": [
            "alice"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "name": "Sekoia_Host Checker"
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "CB2XXPCS02",
        "type": "vpn"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "19.160.74.9",
        "ip": "19.160.74.9"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "SEKOIA_User",
        "name": "alice",
        "roles": [
            "SEKOIA_User_Role"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2021-01-28 14:14:04\" pri=6 fw=172.16.128.22 vpn=CB2XXPCS02 ivs=Default Network user=bob realm=\"SEKOIA_User\" roles=\"\" proto=auth src=176.168.192.159 dst= dstname= type=vpn op= arg=\"\" result= sent= rcvd= agent=\"\" duration= msg=\"AUT23457: Login failed using auth server RSA (ACE Server).  Reason: Failed\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "authentication"
        ],
        "code": "AUT23457",
        "provider": "auth",
        "reason": " Login failed using auth server RSA (ACE Server).  Reason: Failed",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "AUT23457"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "172.16.128.22"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22",
            "176.168.192.159"
        ],
        "user": [
            "bob"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "CB2XXPCS02",
        "type": "vpn"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "176.168.192.159",
        "ip": "176.168.192.159"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "SEKOIA_User",
        "name": "bob"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2023-10-17 10:21:15\" pri=6 fw=3.4.5.6 vpn=EX023-V6 user=MYDomain\\\\johndoe realm=\"Example\" roles=\"Example_Sales\" type=mgmt proto=auth src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"AUT20920: Connection from IP 1.2.3.4 not authenticated yet (URL=/cgi/pal?tm=26&key=1234567890)\"\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "AUT20920",
        "provider": "auth",
        "reason": " Connection from IP 1.2.3.4 not authenticated yet (URL=/cgi/pal?tm=26&key=1234567890)",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "AUT20920"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "3.4.5.6"
        ],
        "user": [
            "MYDomain\\\\johndoe"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "url": {
        "path": "/cgi/pal?tm=26&key=1234567890"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "Example",
        "name": "MYDomain\\\\johndoe",
        "roles": [
            "Example_Sales"
        ]
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2023-10-17 10:21:14\" pri=4 fw=3.4.5.6 vpn=EX023-V6 user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" type=mgmt proto= src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"AUT24604: SSL negotiation failed while client at source IP '1.2.3.4' was trying to connect to '5.6.7.8'. Reason: 'sslv3 alert bad certificate'\"\n\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "AUT24604",
        "reason": "sslv3 alert bad certificate",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "AUT24604"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "3.4.5.6",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2023-10-17 18:18:12\" pri=6 fw=3.4.5.6 vpn=EX023-V6 ivs=Root user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" type=mgmt proto= src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"LIC30499: Leased 0 units of 'Virtual CPUs' from 1.2.3.4 - reserved: 0 maximum: 0 incremental quantum: 0\"\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "LIC30499",
        "reason": " Leased 0 units of 'Virtual CPUs' from 1.2.3.4 - reserved: 0 maximum: 0 incremental quantum: 0",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "LIC30499"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "3.4.5.6"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2023-10-17 10:19:03\" pri=0 fw=3.4.5.6 vpn=EX023-V6 user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" type=mgmt proto= src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"SYS20704: Sending iveLogNearlyFull [ logFullPercent='93' logName='event' ] SNMP trap to 5.6.7.8:162\"\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "SYS20704",
        "reason": " Sending iveLogNearlyFull [ logFullPercent='93' logName='event' ] SNMP trap to 5.6.7.8:162",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "SYS20704"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8",
        "port": 162
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "3.4.5.6",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2023-10-17 18:18:16\" pri=6 fw=3.4.5.6 vpn=EX023-V6 ivs=Default Network user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" type=mgmt proto= src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"SYS31231: Successfully executed 'Post Settings Request'.\"\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "SYS31231",
        "reason": " Successfully executed 'Post Settings Request'.",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "SYS31231"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "3.4.5.6"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2024-01-12 23:00:22\" pri=6 fw=8.8.8.8 vpn=EX023-V6 user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" type=mgmt proto= src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"SYS31437: Successful syslog connection to peer: '3.4.5.6'\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "SYS31437",
        "reason": " Successful syslog connection to peer: '3.4.5.6'",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "SYS31437"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "8.8.8.8"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "8.8.8.8"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6",
            "8.8.8.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "3.4.5.6",
        "ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2023-10-17 10:14:05\" pri=6 fw=3.4.5.6 vpn=EX023-V6 user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" type=mgmt proto= src=1.2.3.4 dst= dstname= sent= rcvd= msg=\"SYS32083: LMDB shards usage stats shard: 0:1%   1:1%   2:1%   3:1%   4:1%   5:1%   6:1%   7:1%   8:1%   9:1%   a:1%   b:1%   c:1%   d:1%   e:1%   f:1%   \"\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "SYS32083",
        "reason": " LMDB shards usage stats shard: 0:1%   1:1%   2:1%   3:1%   4:1%   5:1%   6:1%   7:1%   8:1%   9:1%   a:1%   b:1%   c:1%   d:1%   e:1%   f:1%",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "SYS32083"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "3.4.5.6"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "3.4.5.6"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "3.4.5.6"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "EX023-V6",
        "type": "mgmt"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

{
    "message": "id=firewall time=\"2021-03-04 17:05:15\" pri=6 fw=172.16.128.22 vpn=CB2XXPCS02 ivs=Default Network user=System realm=\"\" roles=\"\" proto= src=93.19.66.118 dst= dstname= type=vpn op= arg=\"\" result= sent= rcvd= agent=\"\" duration= msg=\"AUT31556: Unauthenticated request url /dana/js?prot=1&svc=4 came from IP 93.19.66.118.\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "code": "AUT31556",
        "reason": " Unauthenticated request url /dana/js?prot=1&svc=4 came from IP 93.19.66.118.",
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "action": {
        "name": "AUT31556"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "172.16.128.22"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22"
        ]
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "172.16.128.22",
            "93.19.66.118"
        ],
        "user": [
            "System"
        ]
    },
    "service": {
        "name": "CB2XXPCS02",
        "type": "vpn"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "93.19.66.118",
        "ip": "93.19.66.118"
    },
    "url": {
        "path": "/dana/js?prot=1&svc=4"
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "System"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
destination.bytes long Bytes sent from the destination to the source.
destination.domain keyword The domain name of the destination.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
event.code keyword Identification code for this event.
event.provider keyword Source of the event.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
host.ip ip Host ip addresses.
host.mac keyword Host MAC addresses.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
network.forwarded_ip ip Host IP address when the source IP address is the proxy.
observer.ip ip IP addresses of the observer.
rule.name keyword Rule name
service.name keyword Name of the service.
service.type keyword The type of the service.
source.bytes long Bytes sent from the source to the destination.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
url.path wildcard Path of the request, such as "/search".
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user.roles keyword Array of user roles at the time of the event.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Ivanti / Pulse Connect Secure. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Ivanti / Pulse Connect Secure on ATT&CK Navigator

Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Backup Catalog Deleted

The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

  • Effort: intermediate
Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

  • Effort: master
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded.

  • Effort: intermediate
DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Server Error Failed Loading The ServerLevelPluginDLL

This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. This requires the dedicated Windows event provider Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service.

  • Effort: master
Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
EvilProxy Phishing Domain

Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Deleted

Windows Defender history has been deleted. Could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Tampering Detected

Detection of Windows Defender Tampering, from definitions' deletion to deactivation of parts or all of Defender.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Threat Detected

Detection of a windows defender alert indicating the presence of potential malware

  • Effort: advanced
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)

Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification

Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.

  • Effort: advanced
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: advanced
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced
User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

  • Effort: master
User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master

Further readings