SonicWall Firewall
Overview
SonicWall firewalls enable you to identify and control all applications that are running on your network. By identifying applications based on their unique signatures rather than ports or protocols, this additional control improves compliance and data leakage prevention.
- Vendor: SonicWall
- Supported environment: On prem
- Version compatibility: 7,0,1
- Detection based on: Telemetry
- Supported application or feature: DNS records, Host network interface, Network device logs, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol, Web logs analysis
Configure
This setup guide will show you how to forward your SonicWall logs to Sekoia.io by means of a syslog transport channel.
Prerequisites
- Must have GMS server or On-Prem Analytics server installed and configured.
- Have an Address Object Created on the Firewall for SonicWall Analytics system.
- Have an internal log concentrator (Rsyslog)
Enable Syslog forwarding for SonicWall 6.5 and 7.X
Info
Only the Syslog format ArcSight is supported by this integration.
Log on your SonicWall appliance and follow this guide to enable syslog forwarding, except for the step 4 : Select Syslog Format as 'Enhanced', you must select Syslog format 'ArcSight' instead.
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format SonicWall Firewall.
Forward logs to Sekoia.io
Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4700|7.0.1-1234-R5678|1154|Application Control Detection Alert|9|cat=0 gcat=3 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=10.0.10.20 spt= 12345 deviceInboundInterface=X1 cs3Label=WAN dmac=12:cc:44:00:66:11 dst=10.0.20.30 dpt=49773 deviceOutboundInterface=X6-V320 cs4Label=WORKSTATION proto=tcp/https in=1240 app=49000 appName="General HTTPS" sid=7900 appcat="PROTOCOLS" appid=1234 catid=77 msg="Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version, SID: 7900, AppID: 1200, CatID: 77" msg="Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version" sid=7800 appcat="PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version" appid=1234 catid=55 cnt=7800123 fw_action="NA"
CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|537|Connection Closed|4|cat=1024 gcat=6 src=12.3.123.123 spt=40000 deviceInboundInterface=X0-V12 cs3Label=LAN dmac=33:33:33:33:33:33 dst=22.3.4.55 dpt=55 deviceOutboundInterface=X0-V13 cs4Label=LAN proto=udp/dns out=77 in=99 cn2Label=1 cn1Label=1 cn3Label=33333 cs1="Default Access Rule" app=49169 appName="General DNS" cnt=2162123123 fw_action="NA" dpi=0
CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|98|Connection Opened|4|cat=262111 gcat=6 src=10.0.10.20 spt=12345 deviceInboundInterface=X6-V333 cs1Label=123.123.123.123 snpt=12345 dst=123.45.67.123 dpt=123 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 cs2Label=123.45.67.123 dnpt=123 susr="ABC\user" proto=tcp/https out=12 cs5Label="Auto" app=12345 appName="General HTTPS" cnt=1234567890 fw_action="NA" dpi=0
CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4700|7.0.1-5000-R3000|1460|Capture ATP File Transfer Result|5|cat=1 gcat=3 src=10.0.10.20 spt=444 deviceInboundInterface=X6-V333 dst=123.45.67.123 dpt=123 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 proto=tcp/12345 in=1500 msg="Gateway Anti-Virus Status: SMB file restart detected. File forwarding to Sandbox truncated for filename: hello.xlsx." cnt=123456 fw_action="NA" fileid="0b9999999999999999ff99" filetxstatus=230
CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|1574|Filename Logging|5|cat=0 gcat=3 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=10.0.30.40 spt=12345 deviceInboundInterface=X3-V333 cs3Label=WORKSTATION dmac=66:77:88:99:00:11 dst=22.3.4.55 dpt=444 deviceOutboundInterface=X3-V33 cs4Label=LAN susr="USER" proto=tcp/445 out=32701234 in=31445678 cs5Label="Auto" cs1="555 (WORKSTATION->WORK)" app=9876 msg="Filename: FILENAME" cnt=123456789 fw_action="NA" dpi=1
0|SonicWall|TZ 370|7.1.1-7058-R6162|608|IPS Detection Alert|9|11111:22:33:44:55:666.7.8.9999999ABVOIPCD.7.8.111111111:22:33:44:55:6666.7.8.9999999A0-V10WAN92.168.0.1udp/50601010"Default Access Rule_145"35"IPS Detection Alert: INFO SIP Session Progress, SID: 1188, Priority: Low" msg="IPS Detection Alert: INFO SIP Session Progress" sid=1188 ipscat="INFO SIP Session Progress" ipspri=3 51117
CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|97|Syslog Website Accessed|4|cat=1024 gcat=2 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=12.3.123.123 spt=60000 deviceInboundInterface=X0-V123 cs3Label=WORKSTATION cs1Label=123.123.123.123 snpt=12345 dmac=33:33:33:33:33:33 dst=123.3.4.55 dpt=444 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 cs4Label=WAN cs2Label=123.45.67.123 dnpt=444 susr="USER" proto=tcp/https out=1234 in=4567 cs5Label="Auto" cs1="WORKSTATIONS -> WEB" app=2233 request=microsoft.com/ reason=22 Category-"Computers" cs6="Policy: Default Policy" cnt=123456789 fw_action="drop" dpi=1
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake SonicWall Firewall. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x SonicWall Firewall on ATT&CK Navigator
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Burp Suite Tool Detected
Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2
Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint
Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604).
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint
Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server
Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952).
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE
Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access
Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read
Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter
The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter
The VMware vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection
Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability
Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF
Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv
Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.
- Effort: master
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Computer Account Deleted
Detects computer account deletion.
- Effort: master
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing
Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls
- Effort: intermediate
Credential Dump Tools Related Files
Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.
- Effort: advanced
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
DNS Query For Iplookup
Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.
- Effort: master
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers
This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.
- Effort: elementary
Discord Suspicious Download
Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Discovery Commands Correlation
Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.
- Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
- Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Elevated Shell Launched By Browser
Detects when openwith.exe is launched with privileges followed by a browser launching an elevated shell. Related to the CVE-2024-38014.
- Effort: master
EvilProxy Phishing Domain
Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests
Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.
- Effort: advanced
HTA Infection Chains
Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).
- Effort: advanced
HTML Smuggling Suspicious Usage
Based on several samples from different botnets, this rule aims at detecting HTML infection chain by looking for HTML created files followed by suspicious files being executed.
- Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: elementary
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally
Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.
- Effort: intermediate
ISO LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.
- Effort: intermediate
Information Stealer Downloading Legitimate Third-Party DLLs
Detects operations that involved legitimate third-party DLLs used by information-stealing malware for data collection on the infected host. This detection rule correlates at least 7 events including the following DLLs - freebl3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, msvcp140.dll, nss3.dll, sqlite3.dll, softokn3.dll, mozglue.dll and libcurl.dll. This behaviour matches activities of several widespread stealer like Vidar, Raccoon Stealer v2, Mars Stealer, etc.
- Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command
Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module
- Effort: intermediate
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files
Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File
Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.
- Effort: master
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory
The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: advanced
Network Connection Via Certutil
Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.
- Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent
Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
OneNote Embedded File
Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.
- Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process
In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.
- Effort: advanced
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension
Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension
- Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents
Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent
- Effort: elementary
Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent
Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".
- Effort: elementary
Potential LokiBot User-Agent
Detects potential LokiBot communications through the user-agent
- Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths
Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification
Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL
Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SecurityScorecard Vulnerability Assessment Scanner New Issues
Raises an alert when SecurityScorecard Vulnerability Assessment Scanner find new issues.
- Effort: master
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation
Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services
Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious File Name
Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious TOR Gateway
Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign
Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows DNS Queries
Detects a suspicious Windows command-line process making a DNS query via known abuse text paste web services. This is based on Microsoft Windows Sysmon events (Event ID 22).
- Effort: advanced
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request
Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind
- Effort: advanced
TrevorC2 HTTP Communication
Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.
- Effort: elementary
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
WCE wceaux.dll Creation
Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write
Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.
- Effort: advanced
Webshell Creation
Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.
- Effort: master
ZIP LNK Infection Chain
Detection of an ZIP download followed by a child-process of explorer, followed by multiple Windows processes.This is widely used as an infection chain mechanism.
- Effort: advanced
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
DNS records |
Both DNS queries and responses handled by the SonicWall domain name servers can be recorded. |
Host network interface |
SonicWall produces log about every packets. |
Network device logs |
SonicWall can record traffic logs flowing through their firewall. |
Network intrusion detection system |
The monitoring of the network generates log about prevented intrusions. |
Network protocol analysis |
TCP and UDP packets are analyzed. |
Web logs |
SonicWall produces log about URL access. |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | alert |
| Category | network |
| Type | allowed, denied, error, protocol |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4700|7.0.1-1234-R5678|1154|Application Control Detection Alert|9|cat=0 gcat=3 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=10.0.10.20 spt= 12345 deviceInboundInterface=X1 cs3Label=WAN dmac=12:cc:44:00:66:11 dst=10.0.20.30 dpt=49773 deviceOutboundInterface=X6-V320 cs4Label=WORKSTATION proto=tcp/https in=1240 app=49000 appName=\"General HTTPS\" sid=7900 appcat=\"PROTOCOLS\" appid=1234 catid=77 msg=\"Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version, SID: 7900, AppID: 1200, CatID: 77\" msg=\"Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version\" sid=7800 appcat=\"PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version\" appid=1234 catid=55 cnt=7800123 fw_action=\"NA\"",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "1154",
"kind": "alert",
"reason": "Application Control Detection Alert: PROTOCOLS SSL/TLS Protocol -- TLSv1.2 Version, SID: 7900, AppID: 1200, CatID: 77",
"severity": 9,
"type": [
"protocol"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"destination": {
"address": "10.0.20.30",
"bytes": 1240,
"ip": "10.0.20.30",
"mac": "12:cc:44:00:66:11",
"port": 49773
},
"host": {
"network": {
"ingress": {
"bytes": 1240
}
}
},
"network": {
"application": "General HTTPS",
"protocol": "https",
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"egress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X6-V320"
}
},
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X1"
}
},
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
},
"process": {
"entity_id": "1234"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.0.10.20",
"10.0.20.30"
]
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"appcat": "PROTOCOLS",
"cat": 0,
"catid": 77,
"cnt": 7800123,
"cs3Label": "WAN",
"cs4Label": "WORKSTATION",
"event": {
"name": "Application Control Detection Alert"
},
"gcat": 3,
"gcatname": "Security Services",
"priority": "ALERT",
"sid": 7900
}
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.10.20",
"ip": "10.0.10.20",
"mac": "00:11:22:33:44:55",
"port": 12345
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|537|Connection Closed|4|cat=1024 gcat=6 src=12.3.123.123 spt=40000 deviceInboundInterface=X0-V12 cs3Label=LAN dmac=33:33:33:33:33:33 dst=22.3.4.55 dpt=55 deviceOutboundInterface=X0-V13 cs4Label=LAN proto=udp/dns out=77 in=99 cn2Label=1 cn1Label=1 cn3Label=33333 cs1=\"Default Access Rule\" app=49169 appName=\"General DNS\" cnt=2162123123 fw_action=\"NA\" dpi=0",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "537",
"severity": 4,
"type": [
"protocol"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"destination": {
"address": "22.3.4.55",
"bytes": 99,
"ip": "22.3.4.55",
"mac": "33:33:33:33:33:33",
"packets": 1,
"port": 55
},
"host": {
"network": {
"egress": {
"bytes": 77
},
"ingress": {
"bytes": 99
}
}
},
"network": {
"application": "General DNS",
"protocol": "dns",
"transport": "udp"
},
"observer": {
"egress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X0-V13"
}
},
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X0-V12"
}
},
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"12.3.123.123",
"22.3.4.55"
]
},
"rule": {
"name": "Default Access Rule"
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"cat": 1024,
"cnt": 2162123123,
"cs3Label": "LAN",
"cs4Label": "LAN",
"dpi": false,
"event": {
"name": "Connection Closed"
},
"gcat": 6,
"gcatname": "Network",
"priority": "INFO"
}
},
"source": {
"address": "12.3.123.123",
"bytes": 77,
"ip": "12.3.123.123",
"packets": 1,
"port": 40000
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|98|Connection Opened|4|cat=262111 gcat=6 src=10.0.10.20 spt=12345 deviceInboundInterface=X6-V333 cs1Label=123.123.123.123 snpt=12345 dst=123.45.67.123 dpt=123 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 cs2Label=123.45.67.123 dnpt=123 susr=\"ABC\\user\" proto=tcp/https out=12 cs5Label=\"Auto\" app=12345 appName=\"General HTTPS\" cnt=1234567890 fw_action=\"NA\" dpi=0",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "98",
"severity": 4,
"type": [
"protocol"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"destination": {
"address": "123.45.67.123",
"ip": "123.45.67.123",
"nat": {
"ip": "123.45.67.123",
"port": 123
},
"port": 123
},
"host": {
"network": {
"egress": {
"bytes": 12
}
}
},
"network": {
"application": "General HTTPS",
"protocol": "https",
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"egress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X1"
}
},
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X6-V333"
}
},
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.0.10.20",
"123.123.123.123",
"123.45.67.123"
],
"user": [
"user"
]
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"cat": 262111,
"cnt": 1234567890,
"cs5Label": "Auto",
"dpi": false,
"event": {
"name": "Connection Opened"
},
"gcat": 6,
"gcatname": "Network",
"priority": "INFO"
}
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.10.20",
"bytes": 12,
"ip": "10.0.10.20",
"nat": {
"ip": "123.123.123.123",
"port": 12345
},
"port": 12345
},
"user": {
"domain": "ABC",
"name": "user"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4700|7.0.1-5000-R3000|1460|Capture ATP File Transfer Result|5|cat=1 gcat=3 src=10.0.10.20 spt=444 deviceInboundInterface=X6-V333 dst=123.45.67.123 dpt=123 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 proto=tcp/12345 in=1500 msg=\"Gateway Anti-Virus Status: SMB file restart detected. File forwarding to Sandbox truncated for filename: hello.xlsx.\" cnt=123456 fw_action=\"NA\" fileid=\"0b9999999999999999ff99\" filetxstatus=230",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "1460",
"reason": "Gateway Anti-Virus Status: SMB file restart detected. File forwarding to Sandbox truncated for filename: hello.xlsx.",
"severity": 5,
"type": [
"protocol"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"destination": {
"address": "123.45.67.123",
"bytes": 1500,
"ip": "123.45.67.123",
"port": 123
},
"file": {
"name": "hello.xlsx"
},
"host": {
"network": {
"ingress": {
"bytes": 1500
}
}
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"egress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X1"
}
},
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X6-V333"
}
},
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.0.1-5000-R3000"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.0.10.20",
"123.45.67.123"
]
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"cat": 1,
"cnt": 123456,
"event": {
"name": "Capture ATP File Transfer Result"
},
"fileid": "0b9999999999999999ff99",
"filetxstatus": 230,
"gcat": 3,
"gcatname": "Security Services",
"priority": "INFO"
}
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.10.20",
"ip": "10.0.10.20",
"port": 444
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|1574|Filename Logging|5|cat=0 gcat=3 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=10.0.30.40 spt=12345 deviceInboundInterface=X3-V333 cs3Label=WORKSTATION dmac=66:77:88:99:00:11 dst=22.3.4.55 dpt=444 deviceOutboundInterface=X3-V33 cs4Label=LAN susr=\"USER\" proto=tcp/445 out=32701234 in=31445678 cs5Label=\"Auto\" cs1=\"555 (WORKSTATION->WORK)\" app=9876 msg=\"Filename: FILENAME\" cnt=123456789 fw_action=\"NA\" dpi=1",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "1574",
"reason": "Filename: FILENAME",
"severity": 5,
"type": [
"protocol"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"destination": {
"address": "22.3.4.55",
"bytes": 31445678,
"ip": "22.3.4.55",
"mac": "66:77:88:99:00:11",
"port": 444
},
"file": {
"name": "FILENAME"
},
"host": {
"network": {
"egress": {
"bytes": 32701234
},
"ingress": {
"bytes": 31445678
}
}
},
"network": {
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"egress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X3-V33"
}
},
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X3-V333"
}
},
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.0.30.40",
"22.3.4.55"
],
"user": [
"USER"
]
},
"rule": {
"name": "555 (WORKSTATION->WORK)"
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"cat": 0,
"cnt": 123456789,
"cs3Label": "WORKSTATION",
"cs4Label": "LAN",
"cs5Label": "Auto",
"dpi": true,
"event": {
"name": "Filename Logging"
},
"gcat": 3,
"gcatname": "Security Services",
"priority": "INFO"
}
},
"source": {
"address": "10.0.30.40",
"bytes": 32701234,
"ip": "10.0.30.40",
"mac": "00:11:22:33:44:55",
"port": 12345
},
"user": {
"name": "USER"
}
}
{
"message": "0|SonicWall|TZ 370|7.1.1-7058-R6162|608|IPS Detection Alert|9|11111:22:33:44:55:666.7.8.9999999ABVOIPCD.7.8.111111111:22:33:44:55:6666.7.8.9999999A0-V10WAN92.168.0.1udp/50601010\"Default Access Rule_145\"35\"IPS Detection Alert: INFO SIP Session Progress, SID: 1188, Priority: Low\" msg=\"IPS Detection Alert: INFO SIP Session Progress\" sid=1188 ipscat=\"INFO SIP Session Progress\" ipspri=3 51117",
"event": {
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "608",
"kind": "alert",
"reason": "IPS Detection Alert: INFO SIP Session Progress",
"severity": 9,
"type": [
"protocol"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"observer": {
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.1.1-7058-R6162"
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"event": {
"name": "IPS Detection Alert"
},
"ipscat": "INFO SIP Session Progress",
"ipspri": 351117,
"priority": "ALERT",
"sid": 1188
}
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|SonicWall|NSa 4500|7.0.1-1234-R5678|97|Syslog Website Accessed|4|cat=1024 gcat=2 smac=00:11:22:33:44:55 src=12.3.123.123 spt=60000 deviceInboundInterface=X0-V123 cs3Label=WORKSTATION cs1Label=123.123.123.123 snpt=12345 dmac=33:33:33:33:33:33 dst=123.3.4.55 dpt=444 deviceOutboundInterface=X1 cs4Label=WAN cs2Label=123.45.67.123 dnpt=444 susr=\"USER\" proto=tcp/https out=1234 in=4567 cs5Label=\"Auto\" cs1=\"WORKSTATIONS -> WEB\" app=2233 request=microsoft.com/ reason=22 Category-\"Computers\" cs6=\"Policy: Default Policy\" cnt=123456789 fw_action=\"drop\" dpi=1",
"event": {
"action": "dropped",
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "97",
"severity": 4,
"type": [
"denied"
]
},
"cef": {
"event_type": "base event"
},
"destination": {
"address": "123.3.4.55",
"bytes": 4567,
"ip": "123.3.4.55",
"mac": "33:33:33:33:33:33",
"nat": {
"ip": "123.45.67.123",
"port": 444
},
"port": 444
},
"host": {
"network": {
"egress": {
"bytes": 1234
},
"ingress": {
"bytes": 4567
}
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "https",
"transport": "tcp"
},
"observer": {
"egress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X1"
}
},
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "X0-V123"
}
},
"type": "firewall",
"vendor": "SonicWall",
"version": "7.0.1-1234-R5678"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"12.3.123.123",
"123.123.123.123",
"123.3.4.55",
"123.45.67.123"
],
"user": [
"USER"
]
},
"rule": {
"name": "WORKSTATIONS -> WEB\" app=2233 request=microsoft.com/ reason=22 Category-\"Computers"
},
"sonicwall": {
"fw": {
"cat": 1024,
"cnt": 123456789,
"cs3Label": "WORKSTATION",
"cs4Label": "WAN",
"cs5Label": "Auto",
"cs6": "Policy: Default Policy",
"dpi": true,
"event": {
"name": "Syslog Website Accessed"
},
"fw_action": "drop",
"gcat": 2,
"gcatname": "Log",
"priority": "INFO"
}
},
"source": {
"address": "12.3.123.123",
"bytes": 1234,
"ip": "12.3.123.123",
"mac": "00:11:22:33:44:55",
"nat": {
"ip": "123.123.123.123",
"port": 12345
},
"port": 60000
},
"user": {
"name": "USER"
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
destination.bytes |
long |
Bytes sent from the destination to the source. |
destination.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the destination. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.mac |
keyword |
MAC address of the destination. |
destination.nat.ip |
ip |
Destination NAT ip |
destination.nat.port |
long |
Destination NAT Port |
destination.packets |
long |
Packets sent from the destination to the source. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
destination.user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
destination.user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.end |
date |
event.end contains the date when the event ended or when the activity was last observed. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.outcome |
keyword |
The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.severity |
long |
Numeric severity of the event. |
event.start |
date |
event.start contains the date when the event started or when the activity was first observed. |
event.timezone |
keyword |
Event time zone. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
file.inode |
keyword |
Inode representing the file in the filesystem. |
file.mtime |
date |
Last time the file content was modified. |
file.name |
keyword |
Name of the file including the extension, without the directory. |
file.path |
keyword |
Full path to the file, including the file name. |
file.size |
long |
File size in bytes. |
file.type |
keyword |
File type (file, dir, or symlink). |
host.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the group is a member of. |
host.hostname |
keyword |
Hostname of the host. |
host.id |
keyword |
Unique host id. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
host.network.egress.bytes |
long |
The number of bytes sent on all network interfaces. |
host.network.ingress.bytes |
long |
The number of bytes received on all network interfaces. |
http.request.method |
keyword |
HTTP request method. |
http.request.referrer |
keyword |
Referrer for this HTTP request. |
log.syslog.facility.name |
keyword |
Syslog text-based facility of the event. |
network.application |
keyword |
Application level protocol name. |
observer.egress.interface.name |
keyword |
Interface name |
observer.ingress.interface.name |
keyword |
Interface name |
observer.type |
keyword |
The type of the observer the data is coming from. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
observer.version |
keyword |
Observer version. |
process.entity_id |
keyword |
Unique identifier for the process. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
rule.name |
keyword |
Rule name |
server.ip |
ip |
IP address of the server. |
service.name |
keyword |
Name of the service. |
sonicwall.fw.appcat |
keyword |
Application Control: Display the application category when Application Control is enabled |
sonicwall.fw.cat |
number |
Message category (legacy only): Indicates the legacy category number. |
sonicwall.fw.catid |
number |
Indicates the category ID of the rule |
sonicwall.fw.cn1 |
number |
Indicates the ICMP type |
sonicwall.fw.cn2 |
number |
Indicates the ICMP code |
sonicwall.fw.cnt |
number |
Message count: Indicates the number of times event occurs |
sonicwall.fw.cs2 |
keyword |
Source VPN policy name: Displays the source VPN policy name of event |
sonicwall.fw.cs3 |
keyword |
Destination VPN policy name: Displays the destination VPN policy name of event |
sonicwall.fw.cs3Label |
keyword |
Source zone name: Displays source zone |
sonicwall.fw.cs4 |
keyword |
Interface Statistics: Display interface statistics |
sonicwall.fw.cs4Label |
keyword |
Destination zone name |
sonicwall.fw.cs5 |
keyword |
URL: Applicable only when Network Packet Capture System (NPCS Solera) is enabled, displays URL of an NPCS object |
sonicwall.fw.cs5Label |
keyword |
Pre-defined string indicating session type: Applies to Syslogs with an associated user session being tracked by the UTM. |
sonicwall.fw.cs6 |
keyword |
Additional information that is application-dependent |
sonicwall.fw.cs6Label |
keyword |
Displays the connection duration in seconds; pertains to the activity time of an authenticated user session (such as logout messages) |
sonicwall.fw.dpi |
boolean |
Indicates that a flow underwent inspection by Deep Packet Inspection. |
sonicwall.fw.event.name |
keyword |
Name of the event. |
sonicwall.fw.fileid |
keyword |
URL or MD5 (long URLs may be truncated): File identification or name, which may be in MD5 format or a URL. For example, Capture ATP uses this tag to indicate a file inspected by GAV or CloudAV. |
sonicwall.fw.filetxstatus |
number |
Capture ATP: File transmission status: Result of file transmission as reportedby Capture ATP. |
sonicwall.fw.fw_action |
keyword |
URL: Applicable only when Network Packet Capture System (NPCS Solera) is enabled, displays URL of an NPCS object |
sonicwall.fw.gcat |
number |
Group category: Display event group category number when using Enhanced Syslog |
sonicwall.fw.gcatname |
keyword |
Group category: Display event group category name when using Enhanced Syslog |
sonicwall.fw.ipscat |
keyword |
Displays the IPS category |
sonicwall.fw.ipspri |
number |
Displays the IPS priority |
sonicwall.fw.priority |
keyword |
Displays the event priority level |
sonicwall.fw.sid |
number |
Provides either IPS or Anti-Spyware signature ID |
source.bytes |
long |
Bytes sent from the source to the destination. |
source.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the source. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.mac |
keyword |
MAC address of the source. |
source.nat.ip |
ip |
Source NAT ip |
source.nat.port |
long |
Source NAT port |
source.packets |
long |
Packets sent from the source to the destination. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
source.user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
url.original |
wildcard |
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user_agent.original |
keyword |
Unparsed user_agent string. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.