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SonicWall SMA

Overview

SonicWall Secure Mobile Access offers secure and seamless remote access to corporate resources, applications, and data, enhancing workforce mobility while maintaining robust security and compliance measures.

  • Vendor: SonicWall
  • Plan: Defend Core & Defend Prime
  • Supported environment: On prem
  • Version compatibility: 10.2
  • Detection based on: Telemetry
  • Supported application or feature: DNS records

Configure

This setup guide will show you how to forward your SonicWall SMA logs to Sekoia.io by means of a syslog transport channel.

Prerequisites

  • Have an internal log concentrator (Rsyslog)

Enable Syslog forwarding for SonicWall SMA

  1. Log in to the SonicWall SMA appliance’s management interface
  2. Go to Log > Settings
  3. In the Log & Alert levels section, define the severity level of log messages.

  4. In the syslog settings, type the ip address and the port of your log concentrator as Primary syslog server.

    SonicWall SMA settings

  5. Click Accept to save your configuration settings

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format SonicWall SMA.

Forward logs to Sekoia.io

Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.

Raw Events Samples

In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.

id=sslvpn sn=111111111111 time="2023-09-18 07:43:15" vp_time="2023-09-18 05:43:15 UTC" fw=5.6.7.8 pri=5 m=1 c=1 src=1.2.3.4 dst="off0123.example.com" user="JDOE@OFF0123" usr="JDOE@OFF0123" msg="User login successful" portal="off0123" domain="off0123" agent="SonicWALL NetExtender for Windows 10.2.336 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1) x86_64"

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake SonicWall Secure Mobile Access. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x SonicWall Secure Mobile Access on ATT&CK Navigator

Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
DNS records Both DNS queries and responses handled by the SonicWall domain name servers can be recorded.

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category network
Type info

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "id=sslvpn sn=111111111111 time=\"2023-09-18 07:43:15\" vp_time=\"2023-09-18 05:43:15 UTC\" fw=5.6.7.8 pri=5 m=1 c=1 src=1.2.3.4 dst=\"off0123.example.com\" user=\"JDOE@OFF0123\" usr=\"JDOE@OFF0123\" msg=\"User login successful\" portal=\"off0123\" domain=\"off0123\" agent=\"SonicWALL NetExtender for Windows 10.2.336 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1) x86_64\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network"
        ],
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-09-18T05:43:15Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "off0123.example.com"
    },
    "observer": {
        "ip": [
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "product": "Secure Mobile Access",
        "type": "firewall",
        "vendor": "SonicWall"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "JDOE"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "OFF0123",
        "name": "JDOE"
    },
    "user_agent": {
        "device": {
            "name": "Other"
        },
        "name": "IE",
        "original": "SonicWALL NetExtender for Windows 10.2.336 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1) x86_64",
        "os": {
            "name": "Windows",
            "version": "10"
        },
        "version": "7.0"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
destination.address keyword Destination network address.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
observer.ip ip IP addresses of the observer.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.type keyword The type of the observer the data is coming from.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.