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Trellix ePO

Overview

Trellix ePO monitors and manages your network, collects data on events and alerts, creates reports, and automates workflow to streamline product deployments, patch installations, and security updates. As an open and comprehensive platform, Trellix ePO integrates more than 150 third-party solutions for faster and more accurate responses.

Warning

Important note - This format is currently in alpha. We highly value your feedback to improve its performance.

  • Vendor: Trellix
  • Supported environment: SaaS
  • Version compatibility: 5.10
  • Detection based on: Telemetry
  • Supported application or feature: Application logs

Configure

This setup guide will show you how to forward your Trellix ePO events to Sekoia.io.

Prerequisites

  • You need to have access to the Trellix developer portal to be able to configure API.

Configure OAuth

  1. Get client_id, client_secret and x-api-token from your Trellix profile. Ensure that the following scopes are associated to your credentials: epo.evt.r, epo.pevt.r, epo.pevt.rp, epo.qery.g, epo.qery.u, epo.reg_token, epo.resp.ra, epo.resp.ru
  2. Make sure you have access to events by making a request from the documentation

Create an intake

  1. Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Trellix.
  2. Set up the intake configuration with the Client Id and Client Secret.

Raw Events Samples

In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.

{
    "timestamp": "2023-06-16T14:55:19.595Z",
    "autoguid": "d40cdc38-cd2e-4605-a119-d6b4b00b4c1c",
    "detectedutc": "1686927090000",
    "receivedutc": "1686927319594",
    "agentguid": "d751670f-2c24-422a-af97-23a008522910",
    "analyzer": "ENDP_AM_1070",
    "analyzername": "Trellix Endpoint Security",
    "analyzerversion": "10.7.0.5786",
    "analyzerhostname": "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm",
    "analyzeripv4": "10.0.4.4",
    "analyzeripv6": "/0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a00:404",
    "analyzermac": "6045bdeef272",
    "analyzerdatversion": null,
    "analyzerengineversion": "analyzer_engine_version_1",
    "analyzerdetectionmethod": "Exploit Prevention",
    "sourcehostname": null,
    "sourceipv4": "10.0.4.4",
    "sourceipv6": "/0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a00:404",
    "sourcemac": null,
    "sourceusername": "test_source_username",
    "sourceprocessname": "test_source_process_name",
    "sourceurl": null,
    "targethostname": null,
    "targetipv4": "10.0.4.5",
    "targetipv6": "/0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a00:404",
    "targetmac": null,
    "targetusername": "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm\\adminuser",
    "targetport": 2081,
    "targetprotocol": null,
    "targetprocessname": "POWERSHELL.EXE",
    "targetfilename": "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\WINDOWSPOWERSHELL\\V1.0\\POWERSHELL.EXE",
    "threatcategory": "hip.bo",
    "threateventid": 18054,
    "threatseverity": "2",
    "threatname": "ExP:Illegal API Use",
    "threattype": "IDS_THREAT_TYPE_VALUE_BOP",
    "threatactiontaken": "IDS_ACTION_WOULD_BLOCK",
    "threathandled": true,
    "nodepath": "1\\1016600\\1089555",
    "targethash": "bcf01e61144d6d6325650134823198b8",
    "sourceprocesshash": null,
    "sourceprocesssigned": null,
    "sourceprocesssigner": null,
    "sourcefilepath": null
}

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Trellix EPO [ALPHA]. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Trellix EPO [ALPHA] on ATT&CK Navigator

Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde

Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.

  • Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

  • Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
DNS Query For Iplookup

Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.

  • Effort: master
Discovery Commands Correlation

Detects some frequent discovery commands used by some ransomware operators.

  • Effort: intermediate
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
HackTools Suspicious Names

Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.

  • Effort: elementary
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.

  • Effort: advanced
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Application logs collect detections from the agent

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category intrusion_detection, process
Type ``

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "{\"timestamp\":\"2023-06-16T14:55:19.595Z\",\"autoguid\":\"d40cdc38-cd2e-4605-a119-d6b4b00b4c1c\",\"detectedutc\":\"1686927090000\",\"receivedutc\":\"1686927319594\",\"agentguid\":\"d751670f-2c24-422a-af97-23a008522910\",\"analyzer\":\"ENDP_AM_1070\",\"analyzername\":\"Trellix Endpoint Security\",\"analyzerversion\":\"10.7.0.5786\",\"analyzerhostname\":\"hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm\",\"analyzeripv4\":\"10.0.4.4\",\"analyzeripv6\":\"/0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a00:404\",\"analyzermac\":\"6045bdeef272\",\"analyzerdatversion\":null,\"analyzerengineversion\": \"analyzer_engine_version_1\",\"analyzerdetectionmethod\":\"Exploit Prevention\",\"sourcehostname\":null,\"sourceipv4\":\"10.0.4.4\",\"sourceipv6\":\"/0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a00:404\",\"sourcemac\":null,\"sourceusername\":\"test_source_username\",\"sourceprocessname\":\"test_source_process_name\",\"sourceurl\":null,\"targethostname\":null,\"targetipv4\":\"10.0.4.5\",\"targetipv6\":\"/0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a00:404\",\"targetmac\":null,\"targetusername\":\"hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm\\\\adminuser\",\"targetport\":2081,\"targetprotocol\":null,\"targetprocessname\":\"POWERSHELL.EXE\",\"targetfilename\":\"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\SYSTEM32\\\\WINDOWSPOWERSHELL\\\\V1.0\\\\POWERSHELL.EXE\",\"threatcategory\":\"hip.bo\",\"threateventid\":18054,\"threatseverity\":\"2\",\"threatname\":\"ExP:Illegal API Use\",\"threattype\":\"IDS_THREAT_TYPE_VALUE_BOP\",\"threatactiontaken\":\"IDS_ACTION_WOULD_BLOCK\",\"threathandled\":true,\"nodepath\":\"1\\\\1016600\\\\1089555\",\"targethash\":\"bcf01e61144d6d6325650134823198b8\",\"sourceprocesshash\":null,\"sourceprocesssigned\":null,\"sourceprocesssigner\":null,\"sourcefilepath\":null}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "intrusion_detection"
        ],
        "type": [
            "denied"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2023-06-16T14:55:19.595000Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "d751670f-2c24-422a-af97-23a008522910"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "10.0.4.5",
        "ip": "10.0.4.5",
        "port": 2081,
        "user": {
            "name": "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm\\adminuser"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "name": "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "ePO",
        "vendor": "Trellix"
    },
    "process": {
        "name": "test_source_process_name"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.4.4",
            "10.0.4.5"
        ],
        "user": [
            "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm\\adminuser",
            "test_source_username"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.0.4.4",
        "ip": "10.0.4.4",
        "user": {
            "name": "test_source_username"
        }
    },
    "trellix": {
        "analyzer": {
            "detection_method": "Exploit Prevention",
            "engine_version": "analyzer_engine_version_1",
            "host": "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm",
            "name": "Trellix Endpoint Security",
            "version": "10.7.0.5786"
        },
        "event": {
            "detect_date": "1686927090000",
            "id": "d40cdc38-cd2e-4605-a119-d6b4b00b4c1c",
            "receive_date": "1686927319594"
        },
        "threat": {
            "action_taken": "IDS_ACTION_WOULD_BLOCK",
            "category": "hip.bo",
            "event_id": "18054",
            "is_handled": "true",
            "name": "ExP:Illegal API Use",
            "severity": "2",
            "type": "IDS_THREAT_TYPE_VALUE_BOP"
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "name": "test_source_username",
        "target": {
            "name": "hyrvrxzcyuaz-vm\\adminuser"
        }
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
agent.id keyword Unique identifier of this agent.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
destination.port long Port of the destination.
destination.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
process.name keyword Process name.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
trellix.analyzer.detection_method keyword Trellix analyzer detection method
trellix.analyzer.engine_version keyword Trellix analyzer engine version
trellix.analyzer.host keyword Trellix analyzer host
trellix.analyzer.name keyword Trellix analyzer name
trellix.analyzer.version keyword Trellix analyzer version
trellix.event.detect_date keyword Trellix event detect date
trellix.event.id keyword Trellix event id
trellix.event.receive_date keyword Trellix event receive date
trellix.threat.action_taken keyword Trellix threat action taken
trellix.threat.category keyword Trellix threat category
trellix.threat.event_id keyword Trellix threat event id
trellix.threat.is_handled keyword Trellix threat is handled status
trellix.threat.name keyword Trellix threat name
trellix.threat.severity keyword Trellix threat severity
trellix.threat.type keyword Trellix threat type
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.
user.target.name keyword Short name or login of the user.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.