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Ubika Cloud Protector Traffic

Overview

Ubika Cloud Protector is a cloud-native security solution, providing advanced threat detection and data protection to secure cloud environments, enabling real-time monitoring and mitigation of risks in cloud-based infrastructures.

Warning

Important note - This format is currently in beta. We highly value your feedback to improve its performance.

  • Vendor: Ubika
  • Plan: Prime
  • Supported environment: SaaS
  • Detection based on: Telemetry
  • Supported application or feature: Web proxy

Configure

How to get API keys info

Warning

The following instructions are based on the old interface of Ubika Cloud Protector. Please, switch to the old interface if you use the new one. choose old interfaces

To get API keys info:

  1. Log in the Ubika Cloud protector

  2. Go to Account > API Access

    api access

  3. In the API KEYS INFO section, please note the provider name and the tenant name

    api info

  4. The documentation to retrieve the token is still [under construction]

Create your intake

  1. Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the Ubika Cloud Protector.
  2. Copy the associated Intake key

Pull the logs to collect them on Sekoia.io

Go to the Sekoia.io playbook page, and follow these steps:

  • Click on + PLAYBOOK button to create a new one
  • Select Create a playbook from scratch
  • Give it a name in the field Name
  • Open the left panel, click Ubika then select the trigger Fetch new traffic events from Ubika Cloud Protector
  • Click on Create

  • Create a Trigger configuration using:

    • Type the Intake key created on the previous step
    • Type the provider, tenant and token from the How to get API keys info step

  • Click on the Save button

  • Activate the playbook with the toggle button on the top right corner of the page

Enjoy your events on the Events page

Raw Events Samples

In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.

{
    "id": "ZhVpSAoAQi8AAE20AkoAAABB",
    "application_id": "www.some-app.com",
    "ip_source": "1.2.3.4",
    "http_method": "GET",
    "protocol": "HTTP/1.1",
    "hostname": "www.some-app.com.289339716950101.app.d.eu-west-2.cloudprotector.com",
    "path": "/",
    "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
    "x_forwarded_for": "1.2.3.4",
    "http_status_code": 200,
    "response_size": 633,
    "total_response_time": 35,
    "timestamp": 1712679240
}

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Ubika Cloud Protector Traffic [BETA]. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Ubika Cloud Protector Traffic [BETA] on ATT&CK Navigator

Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing

Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls

  • Effort: intermediate
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)

Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Potential LokiBot User-Agent

Detects potential LokiBot communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: intermediate
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Web proxy Ubika detects and mitigates threats against web applications and APIs.

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category web
Type access

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "{\"id\": \"ZhVpSAoAQi8AAE20AkoAAABB\", \"application_id\": \"www.some-app.com\", \"ip_source\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"http_method\": \"GET\", \"protocol\": \"HTTP/1.1\", \"hostname\": \"www.some-app.com.289339716950101.app.d.eu-west-2.cloudprotector.com\", \"path\": \"/\", \"user_agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\", \"x_forwarded_for\": \"1.2.3.4\", \"http_status_code\": 200, \"response_size\": 633, \"total_response_time\": 35, \"timestamp\": 1712679240}",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 35000000,
        "type": [
            "access"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2024-04-09T16:14:00Z",
    "destination": {
        "bytes": 633
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET"
        },
        "response": {
            "status_code": 200
        },
        "version": "1.1"
    },
    "network": {
        "forwarded_ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "observer": {
        "name": "www.some-app.com.289339716950101.app.d.eu-west-2.cloudprotector.com",
        "product": "Cloud Protector",
        "vendor": "Ubika"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "ubika": {
        "cloud_protector": {
            "application_id": "www.some-app.com"
        }
    },
    "url": {
        "path": "/"
    },
    "user_agent": {
        "device": {
            "name": "Mac"
        },
        "name": "Chrome",
        "original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
        "os": {
            "name": "Mac OS X",
            "version": "10.15.7"
        },
        "version": "122.0.0"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
destination.bytes long Bytes sent from the destination to the source.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.duration long Duration of the event in nanoseconds.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
http.request.method keyword HTTP request method.
http.response.status_code long HTTP response status code.
http.version keyword HTTP version.
network.forwarded_ip ip Host IP address when the source IP address is the proxy.
observer.name keyword Custom name of the observer.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
ubika.cloud_protector.application_id keyword Website server name
url.path wildcard Path of the request, such as "/search".
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.