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TEHTRIS Endpoint Detection & Reponse

Overview

TEHTRIS EDR is a security product to monitor, detect and mitigate threats on endpoints. It reduces the attack surface and prevents attacks.

This setup guide shows how to forward events produced by TEHTRIS EDR to Sekoia.io.

  • Vendor: TEHTRIS
  • Supported environment: On Cloud
  • Detection based on: Telemetry / Alert
  • Supported application or feature: File monitoring, Process monitoring and Anti-virus

Configure

Prerequisites

To forward events produced by TEHTRIS EDR to Sekoia.io, you have to:

  1. Contact your TEHTRIS referent to activate the XDR Platform APIs for your tenant and ask to add the Sekoia.io IP address to the allowlist

  2. Log on the TEHTRIS XDR platform and navigate to SOAR > Key Management

  3. Click on the button Add, enter the label of the API Key and select, at least, the API Fetch Events. You may have to create a filter

  4. At the end, click on Create to generate the API Key

Create the intake

To create the intake, go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format TEHTRIS Endpoint Detection & Reponse.

Pull events

To start to pull events, you have to:

  1. Go to the playbook page and create a new playbook with the Fetch new events from TEHTRIS module

  2. Set up the module configuration with your API key and your tenant ID (most of time, your tenant ID is the subdomain of your TEHTRIS instance; eg: https://{tenant_id}.tehtris.net)

  3. Start the playbook and enjoy your events

Raw Events Samples

In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.

{
    "rflId": 1,
    "time": "2022-10-28T12:03:08.954602+00:00",
    "lvl": 4,
    "module": "das",
    "eventName": "antivirusAlert",
    "ipSrc": "1.2.3.4",
    "ipDst": "5.6.7.8",
    "egKBId": 130161020000004,
    "domain__": "example.org",
    "location": "Task: \\Microsoft\\Windows\\InstallService\\ScanForUpdates",
    "atime": "2022-10-28T06:47:03.009122+00:00",
    "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "pid": null,
    "description": "Antivirus detection: 1/65 (1%)\nAutostart entry",
    "username": null,
    "hostname__": "MR11111",
    "os_architecture__": "x86_64",
    "os_release__": "10",
    "hash_last_update": "2022-10-27T14:45:12.038340+00:00",
    "tags": "",
    "cmdline": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\InstallServiceTasks.dll",
    "uid": "a262506e-3c9e-4afe-9233-f2335167ea86;windows;MR11111;example.org",
    "total": 65,
    "ppid": null,
    "ctime": "2021-09-13T07:11:02.365029+00:00",
    "os__": "windows",
    "os_version__": "10.0.19041",
    "positives": 1,
    "os_server__": false,
    "pCreateDatetime": null,
    "uuid__": "a262506e-3c9e-4afe-9233-f2335167ea86",
    "path": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\InstallServiceTasks.dll",
    "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
    "mtime": "2021-09-13T07:11:02.349390+00:00",
    "id": 999999999
}

{
    "rflId": 1,
    "time": "2022-10-28T11:58:20.377350+00:00",
    "lvl": 5,
    "module": "das",
    "eventName": "HeuristicAlert",
    "ipSrc": "1.2.3.4",
    "ipDst": "5.6.7.8",
    "egKBId": 130181011000003,
    "ppid": 14172,
    "os_architecture__": "x86_64",
    "description": "Suspect spawn tree detected\n\u2500 (EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j) C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe (14172)\n\u2500\u2500 (EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j) C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe (10544)\n\nNo remediation taken",
    "os_version__": "10.0.19041",
    "pCreateDatetime": "2022-10-28T11:45:14.751830+00:00",
    "path": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "os_server__": false,
    "os__": "windows",
    "domain__": "example.org",
    "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "uuid__": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229",
    "os_release__": "10",
    "username": "EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j",
    "cmdline": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\cmd.exe /d /c \"C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Fake Company\\program.exe\" chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa/ --parent-window=0 < \\\\.\\pipe\\LOCAL\\1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 > \\\\.\\pipe\\LOCAL\\11111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
    "location": "",
    "hostname__": "MR11111",
    "uid": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org",
    "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
    "pid": 10544,
    "id": 888888888
}

{
    "rflId": 1,
    "time": "2022-10-28T15:23:27.128665+00:00",
    "lvl": 5,
    "module": "das",
    "eventName": "oletools",
    "ipSrc": "1.2.3.4",
    "ipDst": "5.6.7.8",
    "egKBId": 130181040000001,
    "domain__": "example.org",
    "uid": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org",
    "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "os__": "windows",
    "maliciousMacro": null,
    "firstTimeMacro": null,
    "unknownMacro": null,
    "description": "URLs detected in a document file\n\nRemediation: no remediation taken\n\nSuspicious URLs:\n- http://www.google.com",
    "os_version__": "10.0.19041",
    "os_architecture__": "x86_64",
    "os_server__": false,
    "hostname__": "MR11111",
    "uuid__": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229",
    "os_release__": "10",
    "path": "C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\Content.Outlook\\AAAAA\\suspicious.docx",
    "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
    "report": "",
    "id": 555555555
}

{
    "rflId": 1,
    "time": "2022-11-02T08:13:10.566734+00:00",
    "lvl": 6,
    "module": "das",
    "eventName": "oletools",
    "ipSrc": "1.2.3.4",
    "ipDst": "5.6.7.8",
    "egKBId": 130181041000003,
    "os_server__": false,
    "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
    "report": "Document file sha256: 01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "uid": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org",
    "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "hostname__": "MR11111",
    "maliciousMacro": 1,
    "os__": "windows",
    "domain__": "example.org",
    "os_version__": "10.0.19041",
    "uuid__": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229",
    "description": "Potential malicious VBA code detected in a document file\n- Suspicious macros detected (1)\n\nRemediation: no remediation taken\n\nBehaviors:\n- Suspicious | May run PowerShell commands\n\nSuspicious macros sha1:\n- adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
    "os_release__": "10",
    "os_architecture__": "x86_64",
    "firstTimeMacro": 0,
    "unknownMacro": 28,
    "path": "C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Analysis\\FUNCRES.XLAM",
    "id": 837562963
}

{
    "rflId": 1,
    "time": "2022-10-28T14:49:14.869905+00:00",
    "lvl": 6,
    "module": "das",
    "eventName": "HeuristicAlert",
    "ipSrc": "1.2.3.4",
    "ipDst": "5.6.7.8",
    "egKBId": 130171010000001,
    "ppid": 12296,
    "os_architecture__": "x86_64",
    "description": "Application policy: COPS WINDOWS v2 ([I] T1204.001 User Execution: Web requests from unusual sources)",
    "os_version__": "10.0.19041",
    "pCreateDatetime": "2022-10-28T14:31:26.157008+00:00",
    "path": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\106.0.1370.52\\identity_helper.exe",
    "os_server__": false,
    "os__": "windows",
    "domain__": "example.org",
    "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "uuid__": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229",
    "os_release__": "10",
    "username": "EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j",
    "cmdline": "\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\106.0.1370.52\\identity_helper.exe\" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=winrt_app_id.mojom.WinrtAppIdService --lang=fr --service-sandbox-type=none --unsafely-treat-insecure-origin-as-secure=http://astgedgecp.region.local,http://astgedgecq.region.local,http://astgedrheq.region.local,http://astgedrhep.region.local --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3564 --field-trial-handle=2140,i,6139612544440408755,5345815150035985187,131072 /prefetch:8",
    "location": "",
    "hostname__": "MR11111",
    "uid": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org",
    "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
    "pid": 2424,
    "id": 666666666
}

{
    "rflId": 1,
    "time": "2022-10-28T11:58:20.778323+00:00",
    "lvl": 5,
    "module": "das",
    "eventName": "sandboxAlert",
    "ipSrc": "1.2.3.4",
    "ipDst": "5.6.7.8",
    "egKBId": 130181030000003,
    "ppid": 3520,
    "os_architecture__": "x86_64",
    "description": "Sandbox detection: 45%",
    "os_version__": "10.0.19041",
    "pCreateDatetime": "2022-10-28T11:48:08.373808+00:00",
    "path": "C:\\Program Files\\Vendor\\Product\\program.exe",
    "os_server__": false,
    "os__": "windows",
    "domain__": "example.org",
    "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b",
    "uuid__": "64a2fa85-0852-4745-81d6-0815eb2d5248",
    "os_release__": "10",
    "username": "EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j",
    "cmdline": "program.exe",
    "hostname__": "MR11111",
    "signatures": "45%",
    "uid": "64a2fa85-0852-4745-81d6-0815eb2d5248;windows;MR11111;example.org",
    "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
    "pid": 3920,
    "id": 777777777
}

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake TEHTRIS EDR. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x TEHTRIS EDR on ATT&CK Navigator

AMSI Deactivation Using Registry Key

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable the AMSI provider by deleting the associated registry key.

  • Effort: master
AccCheckConsole Executing Dll

Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL.

  • Effort: advanced
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)

  • Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group

Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)

  • Effort: master
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde

Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.

  • Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

  • Effort: elementary
Add User to Privileged Group

Add user in a potential privileged group which can be used to elevate privileges on the system.

  • Effort: advanced
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration

ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it

  • Effort: intermediate
Adexplorer Usage

Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.

  • Effort: advanced
Adidnsdump Enumeration

Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.

  • Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell

Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet

  • Effort: intermediate
AutoIt3 Execution From Suspicious Folder

Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.

  • Effort: advanced
Autorun Keys Modification

Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line

Detects use of azureedge in the command line.

  • Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download

Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.

  • Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage

Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.

  • Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware

Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird

  • Effort: elementary
Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

  • Effort: intermediate
CMSTP Execution

Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

  • Effort: master
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare Suspicious Actions From Spoolsv

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

  • Effort: master
Capture a network trace with netsh.exe

Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality

  • Effort: intermediate
CertOC Loading Dll

Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification

Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.

  • Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

  • Effort: advanced
Change Default File Association

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

  • Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine

Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon

Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups

Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups

  • Effort: intermediate
Component Object Model Hijacking

Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.

  • Effort: advanced
Compress Data for Exfiltration via Archiver

Detects data compressed by specific tools.

  • Effort: master
Compression Followed By Suppression

Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.

  • Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted

Detects computer account deletion.

  • Effort: master
Container Credential Access

Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token

  • Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items

Detects the malicious use of a control panel item

  • Effort: advanced
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable

A script has copied a System32 executable.

  • Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials

Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.

  • Effort: elementary
Copying Sensitive Files With Credential Data

Detects copy of files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using esentutl. This requires Windows Security event log with the Detailed File Share logging policy enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Credential Dump Tools Related Files

Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.

  • Effort: advanced
Credential Harvesting Via Vaultcmd.exe

Detects when the process vaultcmd is used for credential harvesting.

  • Effort: advanced
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
DHCP Callout DLL Installation

Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution

Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution

  • Effort: intermediate
DNS Query For Iplookup

Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.

  • Effort: master
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program.

  • Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

  • Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation

Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.

  • Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell

Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key

Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.

  • Effort: elementary
Disable Windows Defender Credential Guard

Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

  • Effort: intermediate
Disabled IE Security Features

Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.

  • Effort: advanced
Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Dism Disabling Windows Defender

Detects windows defender disabled by dism.

  • Effort: advanced
Docker Escape Bind Mount

Catch Docker escape via mount escape followed by chroot

  • Effort: intermediate
Domain Group And Permission Enumeration

Detects adversaries attempts to find domain-level groups and permission settings. Commands such as net group /domain of the Net utility can list domain-level groups The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Wizard Spider, FIN6, and other groups used net in their campaigns.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Created Or Removed

A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.

  • Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)

  • Effort: elementary
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

  • Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable

LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.

  • Effort: master
ETW Tampering

Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion

  • Effort: intermediate
Elise Backdoor

Detects Elise backdoor activity as used by Lotus Blossom

  • Effort: elementary
Empire Monkey Activity

Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity

  • Effort: elementary
Enabling Restricted Admin Mode

Detects when the restricted admin mode is enabled.

  • Effort: elementary
Equation Group DLL_U Load

Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup

  • Effort: elementary
Erase Shell History

Malware and attacker try to reduce their fingerprints on compromised host by deleting shell history.

  • Effort: advanced
Exchange Mailbox Export

Detection of a standard Exchange Mailbox export, which stores all mails from a user in a pst file, from command line or PowerShell script.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution

Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling

  • Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line

Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Via Pscp

Detects the use of pscp which is a file sharing services.

  • Effort: advanced
Explorer Process Executing HTA File

Detects a suspicious execution of an HTA file by the explorer.exe process. This unusual activity was observed when running IcedID malspam.

  • Effort: intermediate
Fail2ban Unban IP

An IP was ubaned by Fail2ban. It could be use to allow malicous traffic.

  • Effort: advanced
Formbook File Creation DB1

Detects specific file creation (Users*\AppData\Local\Temp\DB1) to store data to exfiltrate (Formbook behavior). Logging for Sysmon event 11 is usually used for this detection.

  • Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line

Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.

  • Effort: master
Generic-reverse-shell-oneliner

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Gpresult Usage

Detects when an account uses gpresult to get information on gpo.

  • Effort: advanced
Grabbing Sensitive Hives Via Reg Utility

Detects dump of SAM, System or Security hives using reg.exe utility. Adversaries may attempt to dump these Windows Registry to retrieve password hashes and access credentials.

  • Effort: intermediate
HackTools Suspicious Names

Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.

  • Effort: elementary
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line

Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hiding Files With Attrib.exe

Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.

  • Effort: advanced
High Privileges Network Share Removal

Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.

  • Effort: intermediate
Hijack Legit RDP Session To Move Laterally

Identifies suspicious file creations in the startup folder of a remote system. An adversary could abuse this to move laterally by dropping a malicious script or executable that will be executed after a reboot or user logon.

  • Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All

Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

  • Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups

Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: intermediate
Interactive Terminal Spawned via Python

Identifies when a terminal (tty) is spawned via Python. Attackers may upgrade a simple reverse shell to a fully interactive tty after obtaining initial access to a host.

  • Effort: advanced
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets

Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.

  • Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line

Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
Kernel Module Alteration

Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.

  • Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders

Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT

  • Effort: elementary
Legitimate Process Execution From Unusual Folder

Detects the execution of a legitimate, windows built-in process name from an unusual / suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are c:\windows\system32\, \SystemRoot\system32\, c:\windows\syswow64\ and c:\windows\winsxs. Many malwares/attackers use legitimate names to masquerade but if they are not Administrator yet, they often can't write file into these legitimate folders.

  • Effort: advanced
Leviathan Registry Key Activity

Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.

  • Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell

To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Remove Immutable Attribute

Adversaries may used chattr utility to alter file and folder attributes to control sudden operations like the deletion and modification of files.

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload

Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Nohup Exec

Detects suspicious usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments

  • Effort: intermediate
Linux Suspicious Search

Adversaries may search for private key on compromised systems

  • Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment

Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.

  • Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)

Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: advanced
MSBuild Abuse

Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload, and on connections made by this process which is unusual.

  • Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions

Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.

  • Effort: advanced
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL

Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).

  • Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key

Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.

  • Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation

Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.

  • Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection

Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)

  • Effort: intermediate
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation

Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting some of the techniques being used (technique 1,2 and 5).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Scheduled Tasks

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender scheduled tasks via command line or PowerShell scripts.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable SecurityHealth

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender SecurityHealth through command line, PowerShell scripts, and registry. To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is recommended.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry

The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.

  • Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded

Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted

Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse

The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded

Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun

Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).

  • Effort: elementary
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data

Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Exchange Server Creating Unusual Files

Look for Microsoft Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Microsoft IIS Module Installation

Detects the installation of a new IIS module from the command line. It can used used to backdoor an IIS/OWA/Sharepoint server.

  • Effort: advanced
Microsoft Office Creating Suspicious File

Detects Microsoft Office process (word, excel, powerpoint) creating a suspicious file which corresponds to a script or an executable. This behavior highly corresponds to an executed macro which loads an installation script or a malware payload. The rule requires to log for File Creations to work properly, which can be done through Sysmon Event ID 11.

  • Effort: master
Mimikatz Basic Commands

Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.

  • Effort: elementary
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution

Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.

  • Effort: elementary
Mshta JavaScript Execution

Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands that execute JavaScript supplied as a command line argument.

  • Effort: elementary
Mustang Panda Dropper

Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers

  • Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File In Suspicious Directory

The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. The rule checks whether the file is in a legitimate directory or not (through file creation events). This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: advanced
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line

Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.

  • Effort: intermediate
Net.exe User Account Creation

Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command

  • Effort: master
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall

Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Allow Command

Netsh command line to allow a program to pass through firewall.

  • Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program

Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.

  • Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens a specific port. Can be used by malware or attackers for lateralisation/exfiltration (e.g. SMB/RDP opening).

  • Effort: master
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding

Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.

  • Effort: elementary
Netsh RDP Port Opening

Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Connection Via Certutil

Identifies certutil.exe making a network connection. Adversaries could abuse certutil.exe to download a certificate, or malware, from a remote URL. The rule excludes private IP addresses and IPV6. This requires Sysmon logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Network Scanning and Discovery

Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system

  • Effort: advanced
Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. This technique is frequently leveraged by threat actors such as APT32, APT41, Wizard Spider. But also, through the use of some malware such as Cobalt Strike, Empire, PlugX and Ramsay.

  • Effort: master
Network Sniffing

List of common tools used for network packages sniffing

  • Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows

Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

  • Effort: intermediate
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key

Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
New Service Creation

Detects creation of a new service from command line

  • Effort: advanced
Ngrok Process Execution

Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.

  • Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes

Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.

  • Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values

Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.

  • Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage

Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.

  • Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter

Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.

  • Effort: advanced
Office Application Startup Office Test

Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.

  • Effort: elementary
OneNote Embedded File

Detects creation or uses of OneNote embedded files with unusual extensions.

  • Effort: intermediate
OneNote Suspicious Children Process

In January 2023, a peak of attacks using .one files was observed in the wild. This rule tries to detect the effect of such attempts using this technique.

  • Effort: advanced
Openfiles Usage

Detects when the command openfiles, to get information on files opened remotely, is used.

  • Effort: advanced
Opening Of a Password File

Command line detection of common office software opening some password related file. It could be a security breach if an unauthorized user access it.

  • Effort: master
Outlook Registry Access

Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.

  • Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant

Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account

The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Permission Discovery Via Wmic

Detects discovery of permission on local groups via the tool wmic.

  • Effort: advanced
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command

Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".

  • Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading

Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack

This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerCat Function Loading

Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection

Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation

Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed

Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Downgrade Attack

Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0

  • Effort: elementary
PowerShell Download From URL

Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand

Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Execution Via Rundll32

Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll Rule modified

  • Effort: intermediate
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry

Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values

  • Effort: advanced
PowerShell Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets

Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2

Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell AMSI Bypass

This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.

  • Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function

Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Powershell Web Request

Detects the use of various web request methods executed remotely via Windows PowerShell.

  • Effort: advanced
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs

Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Createdump

Detects the use of createdump.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag

Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.

  • Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration

PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.

  • Effort: advanced
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
PsExec Process

Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.

  • Effort: advanced
Putty Sessions Listing

Detects attempts to list Putty sessions through registry. To fully work, this rule requires to log registry accesses, which can be done with the Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 but for that specific configuration is needed.

  • Effort: master
Python Exfiltration Tools

Python has some built-in modules or library that could be installed and later be used as exflitration tool by an attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server

Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.

  • Effort: intermediate
QakBot Process Creation

Detects QakBot like process executions

  • Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.

  • Effort: intermediate
RDP Session Discovery

Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.

  • Effort: advanced
RSA SecurID Failed Authentification

Detects many failed attempts to authenticate followed by a successfull login for a super admin account.

  • Effort: advanced
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccine Uninstall

Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

  • Effort: elementary
Rclone Process

Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.

  • Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation

Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line

Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.

  • Effort: advanced
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
SOCKS Tunneling Tool

Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.

  • Effort: intermediate
Schtasks Persistence With High Privileges

Detection of scheduled task with high privileges used by attacker for persistence.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
Shadow Copies

Detects command line used to create and list shadow copies. An adversary may attempt to get information on shadow volumes to perform deletion or extract password hashes from the ntds.dit file. This rule requires command line logging or Windows PowerShell events (4104).

  • Effort: master
Socat Relaying Socket

Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall

  • Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection

Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.

  • Effort: intermediate
SolarWinds Suspicious File Creation

Detects SolarWinds process creating a file with a suspicious extension. The process solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe created an unexpected file whose extension is ".exe", ".ps1", ".jpg", ".png" or ".dll".

  • Effort: intermediate
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks

Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).

  • Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services

Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).

  • Effort: master
Suncrypt Parameters

Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool

Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger. It needs file monitoring capabilities (Sysmon Event ID 11 with .sch file creation logging).

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share

Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CodePage Switch with CHCP

Detects a code page switch in command line

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern

Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Control Process

Detects suspicious execution of control.exe process when used to execute a DLL file.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal

Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution

Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Double Extension

Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services

Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious File Name

Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Finger Usage

Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays. An attacker can use finger to silently retrieve a command, a script or a payload from a remote server. For example, the tool Darkfinger-C2 uses this technique to download files from the C2 channel.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Headless Web Browser Execution To Download File

Detects a suspicious command used to execute a Chromium-based web browser (Chrome or Edge) using the headless mode, meaning that the browser window wouldn't be visible, and the dump mode to download a file. This technique can be used to fingerprint the compromised host, in particular by the Ducktail infostealer.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command

Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious Mshta Execution

Detects suspicious mshta.exe execution patterns, either involving file polyglotism, remote file (http, ftp or ldap) or suspicious location. This technique is often used by threat actors.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence

Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Network Args In Command Line

Detection on some commonly observed suspicious processes command lines using HTTP schema with port 443.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific

Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)

Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regasm Regsvcs Usage

catch abuse of regsvcs and regasm lolbin by attacker

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution

Detects suspicious regsvr32.exe executions, either regsvr32 registering a DLL in an unusual repository (temp/, appdata/ or public/), or regsvr32 executed by an unusual parent process, or regsvr32 executing an unusual process, or regsvr32 registering a media file and not a DLL (as seen in IcedID campaigns), or regsvr32 registering a ocx file in appdata/.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Execution

The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious Taskkill Command

Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious VBS Execution Parameter

Detects suspicious VBS file execution with a specific parameter by cscript. It was observed in the Operation CloudHopper.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution

Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Script Execution

Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a script in user directories (C:\ProgramData or C:\Users) with a .txt extension, which is very suspicious. It could strongly correspond to a malware dropper, as seen during SquirrelWaffle maldoc campaign.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line

Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious certutil command

Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious desktop.ini Action

Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.

  • Effort: advanced
Sysprep On AppData Folder

Detects suspicious Sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec). Sysprep is a Windows tool used to change Windows images from a generalized state to a specialized state, and then back to a generalized state. It can be used to remove all system-specific information and reset the computer.

  • Effort: intermediate
System Info Discovery

System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.

  • Effort: master
TEHTRIS EDR Alert

Tehtris EDR telemetry has raised an alert.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt

Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)

  • Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments

Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.

  • Effort: intermediate
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools

Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).

  • Effort: master
User Account Created

Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.

  • Effort: master
User Account Deleted

Detects local user deletion

  • Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection

Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.

  • Effort: intermediate
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary

Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.

  • Effort: elementary
WMI Persistence Script Event Consumer File Write

Detects file writes through WMI script event consumer.

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus

Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)

  • Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product

Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.

  • Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool

WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential

Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.

  • Effort: elementary
Webshell Creation

Detects possible webshell file creation. It requires File Creation monitoring, which can be done using Sysmon's Event ID 11. However the recommended SwiftOnSecurity configuration does not fully cover the needs for this rule, it needs to be updated with the proper file names extensions.

  • Effort: master
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh

Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.

  • Effort: advanced
Windows Firewall Changes

Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration

  • Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking

Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.

  • Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation

The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.

  • Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call

Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.

  • Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage

Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.

  • Effort: advanced
XSL Script Processing And SquiblyTwo Attack

Detection of an attack where adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Another variation of this technique, dubbed "Squiblytwo", involves to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.

  • Effort: intermediate
xWizard Execution

Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.

  • Effort: master

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
File monitoring Monitor files and devices activities
Process monitoring Monitor process activities
Process use of network Monitor network activities
Anti-virus Analyse processes and files to prevent malicious actions

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind alert
Category ``
Type info

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "{\n  \"rflId\": 1,\n  \"time\": \"2022-10-28T12:03:08.954602+00:00\",\n  \"lvl\": 4,\n  \"module\": \"das\",\n  \"eventName\": \"antivirusAlert\",\n  \"ipSrc\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n  \"ipDst\": \"5.6.7.8\",\n  \"egKBId\": 130161020000004,\n  \"domain__\": \"example.org\",\n  \"location\": \"Task: \\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\InstallService\\\\ScanForUpdates\",\n  \"atime\": \"2022-10-28T06:47:03.009122+00:00\",\n  \"sha256\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"pid\": null,\n  \"description\": \"Antivirus detection: 1/65 (1%)\\nAutostart entry\",\n  \"username\": null,\n  \"hostname__\": \"MR11111\",\n  \"os_architecture__\": \"x86_64\",\n  \"os_release__\": \"10\",\n  \"hash_last_update\": \"2022-10-27T14:45:12.038340+00:00\",\n  \"tags\": \"\",\n  \"cmdline\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\InstallServiceTasks.dll\",\n  \"uid\": \"a262506e-3c9e-4afe-9233-f2335167ea86;windows;MR11111;example.org\",\n  \"total\": 65,\n  \"ppid\": null,\n  \"ctime\": \"2021-09-13T07:11:02.365029+00:00\",\n  \"os__\": \"windows\",\n  \"os_version__\": \"10.0.19041\",\n  \"positives\": 1,\n  \"os_server__\": false,\n  \"pCreateDatetime\": null,\n  \"uuid__\": \"a262506e-3c9e-4afe-9233-f2335167ea86\",\n  \"path\": \"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\System32\\\\InstallServiceTasks.dll\",\n  \"tag\": \"TRI_AAA_WIN\",\n  \"mtime\": \"2021-09-13T07:11:02.349390+00:00\",\n  \"id\": 999999999\n}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "malware"
        ],
        "code": "130161020000004",
        "kind": "alert",
        "module": "das",
        "reason": "Antivirus detection: 1/65 (1%)\nAutostart entry",
        "severity": 4,
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-10-28T12:03:08.954602Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "a262506e-3c9e-4afe-9233-f2335167ea86"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "hostname": "MR11111",
        "name": "MR11111",
        "os": {
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0.19041"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Tehtris EDR",
        "type": "sensor",
        "vendor": "Tehtris"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\InstallServiceTasks.dll",
        "executable": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\InstallServiceTasks.dll",
        "name": "InstallServiceTasks.dll"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "MR11111"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "tehtris": {
        "edr": {
            "antivirus": {
                "positives": 1,
                "total": 65
            },
            "event": {
                "appliance": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "egKBId": "130161020000004",
                "id": "999999999",
                "location": "Task: \\Microsoft\\Windows\\InstallService\\ScanForUpdates",
                "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
                "type": "antivirusAlert"
            },
            "host": {
                "is_server": false,
                "os": {
                    "architecture": "x86_64",
                    "release": "10"
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\n  \"rflId\": 1,\n  \"time\": \"2022-10-28T11:58:20.377350+00:00\",\n  \"lvl\": 5,\n  \"module\": \"das\",\n  \"eventName\": \"HeuristicAlert\",\n  \"ipSrc\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n  \"ipDst\": \"5.6.7.8\",\n  \"egKBId\": 130181011000003,\n  \"ppid\": 14172,\n  \"os_architecture__\": \"x86_64\",\n  \"description\": \"Suspect spawn tree detected\\n\u2500 (EXAMPLE-NT\\\\doe-j) C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\Application\\\\msedge.exe (14172)\\n\u2500\u2500 (EXAMPLE-NT\\\\doe-j) C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe (10544)\\n\\nNo remediation taken\",\n  \"os_version__\": \"10.0.19041\",\n  \"pCreateDatetime\": \"2022-10-28T11:45:14.751830+00:00\",\n  \"path\": \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe\",\n  \"os_server__\": false,\n  \"os__\": \"windows\",\n  \"domain__\": \"example.org\",\n  \"sha256\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"uuid__\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229\",\n  \"os_release__\": \"10\",\n  \"username\": \"EXAMPLE-NT\\\\doe-j\",\n  \"cmdline\": \"C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\cmd.exe /d /c \\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\doe-j\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Programs\\\\Fake Company\\\\program.exe\\\" chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa/ --parent-window=0 < \\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\LOCAL\\\\1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 > \\\\\\\\.\\\\pipe\\\\LOCAL\\\\11111111111111111111111111111111111111111\",\n  \"location\": \"\",\n  \"hostname__\": \"MR11111\",\n  \"uid\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org\",\n  \"tag\": \"TRI_AAA_WIN\",\n  \"pid\": 10544,\n  \"id\": 888888888\n}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "code": "130181011000003",
        "kind": "alert",
        "module": "das",
        "reason": "Suspect spawn tree detected\n\u2500 (EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j) C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe (14172)\n\u2500\u2500 (EXAMPLE-NT\\doe-j) C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe (10544)\n\nNo remediation taken",
        "severity": 5,
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-10-28T11:58:20.377350Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "hostname": "MR11111",
        "name": "MR11111",
        "os": {
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0.19041"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Tehtris EDR",
        "type": "sensor",
        "vendor": "Tehtris"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\cmd.exe /d /c \"C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Fake Company\\program.exe\" chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa/ --parent-window=0 < \\\\.\\pipe\\LOCAL\\1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 > \\\\.\\pipe\\LOCAL\\11111111111111111111111111111111111111111",
        "executable": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
        "name": "cmd.exe",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 14172
        },
        "pid": 10544
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "MR11111"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "doe-j"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "tehtris": {
        "edr": {
            "event": {
                "appliance": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "egKBId": "130181011000003",
                "id": "888888888",
                "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
                "type": "HeuristicAlert"
            },
            "host": {
                "is_server": false,
                "os": {
                    "architecture": "x86_64",
                    "release": "10"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "EXAMPLE-NT",
        "name": "doe-j"
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\n  \"rflId\": 1,\n  \"time\": \"2022-10-28T15:23:27.128665+00:00\",\n  \"lvl\": 5,\n  \"module\": \"das\",\n  \"eventName\": \"oletools\",\n  \"ipSrc\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n  \"ipDst\": \"5.6.7.8\",\n  \"egKBId\": 130181040000001,\n  \"domain__\": \"example.org\",\n  \"uid\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org\",\n  \"sha256\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"os__\": \"windows\",\n  \"maliciousMacro\": null,\n  \"firstTimeMacro\": null,\n  \"unknownMacro\": null,\n  \"description\": \"URLs detected in a document file\\n\\nRemediation: no remediation taken\\n\\nSuspicious URLs:\\n- http://www.google.com\",\n  \"os_version__\": \"10.0.19041\",\n  \"os_architecture__\": \"x86_64\",\n  \"os_server__\": false,\n  \"hostname__\": \"MR11111\",\n  \"uuid__\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229\",\n  \"os_release__\": \"10\",\n  \"path\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\doe-j\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\INetCache\\\\Content.Outlook\\\\AAAAA\\\\suspicious.docx\",\n  \"tag\": \"TRI_AAA_WIN\",\n  \"report\": \"\",\n  \"id\": 555555555\n}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "code": "130181040000001",
        "module": "das",
        "reason": "URLs detected in a document file\n\nRemediation: no remediation taken\n\nSuspicious URLs:\n- http://www.google.com",
        "severity": 5,
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-10-28T15:23:27.128665Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\Content.Outlook\\AAAAA",
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        },
        "name": "suspicious.docx",
        "path": "C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\Content.Outlook\\AAAAA\\suspicious.docx"
    },
    "host": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "hostname": "MR11111",
        "name": "MR11111",
        "os": {
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0.19041"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Tehtris EDR",
        "type": "sensor",
        "vendor": "Tehtris"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "MR11111"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "tehtris": {
        "edr": {
            "event": {
                "appliance": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "egKBId": "130181040000001",
                "id": "555555555",
                "remediation_status": "no remediation taken",
                "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
                "type": "oletools"
            },
            "host": {
                "is_server": false,
                "os": {
                    "architecture": "x86_64",
                    "release": "10"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "www.google.com",
        "original": "http://www.google.com",
        "port": 80,
        "registered_domain": "google.com",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "www",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\n  \"rflId\": 1,\n  \"time\": \"2022-11-02T08:13:10.566734+00:00\",\n  \"lvl\": 6,\n  \"module\": \"das\",\n  \"eventName\": \"oletools\",\n  \"ipSrc\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n  \"ipDst\": \"5.6.7.8\",\n  \"egKBId\": 130181041000003,\n  \"os_server__\": false,\n  \"tag\": \"TRI_AAA_WIN\",\n  \"report\": \"Document file sha256: 01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"uid\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org\",\n  \"sha256\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"hostname__\": \"MR11111\",\n  \"maliciousMacro\": 1,\n  \"os__\": \"windows\",\n  \"domain__\": \"example.org\",\n  \"os_version__\": \"10.0.19041\",\n  \"uuid__\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229\",\n  \"description\": \"Potential malicious VBA code detected in a document file\\n- Suspicious macros detected (1)\\n\\nRemediation: no remediation taken\\n\\nBehaviors:\\n- Suspicious | May run PowerShell commands\\n\\nSuspicious macros sha1:\\n- adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc\",\n  \"os_release__\": \"10\",\n  \"os_architecture__\": \"x86_64\",\n  \"firstTimeMacro\": 0,\n  \"unknownMacro\": 28,\n  \"path\": \"C:\\\\Users\\\\doe-j\\\\AppData\\\\Local\\\\Analysis\\\\FUNCRES.XLAM\",\n  \"id\": 837562963\n}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "code": "130181041000003",
        "module": "das",
        "reason": "Potential malicious VBA code detected in a document file\n- Suspicious macros detected (1)\n\nRemediation: no remediation taken\n\nBehaviors:\n- Suspicious | May run PowerShell commands\n\nSuspicious macros sha1:\n- adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc",
        "severity": 6,
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-11-02T08:13:10.566734Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "file": {
        "directory": "C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Analysis",
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        },
        "name": "FUNCRES.XLAM",
        "path": "C:\\Users\\doe-j\\AppData\\Local\\Analysis\\FUNCRES.XLAM"
    },
    "host": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "hostname": "MR11111",
        "name": "MR11111",
        "os": {
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0.19041"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Tehtris EDR",
        "type": "sensor",
        "vendor": "Tehtris"
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "MR11111"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "tehtris": {
        "edr": {
            "event": {
                "appliance": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "egKBId": "130181041000003",
                "id": "837562963",
                "remediation_status": "no remediation taken",
                "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
                "type": "oletools"
            },
            "file": {
                "macro": {
                    "behavior_status": "Suspicious | May run PowerShell commands",
                    "detection_status": "Suspicious macros detected (1)",
                    "is_malicious": true,
                    "sha1": "adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc"
                }
            },
            "host": {
                "is_server": false,
                "os": {
                    "architecture": "x86_64",
                    "release": "10"
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\n  \"rflId\": 1,\n  \"time\": \"2022-10-28T14:49:14.869905+00:00\",\n  \"lvl\": 6,\n  \"module\": \"das\",\n  \"eventName\": \"HeuristicAlert\",\n  \"ipSrc\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n  \"ipDst\": \"5.6.7.8\",\n  \"egKBId\": 130171010000001,\n  \"ppid\": 12296,\n  \"os_architecture__\": \"x86_64\",\n  \"description\": \"Application policy: COPS WINDOWS v2 ([I] T1204.001 User Execution: Web requests from unusual sources)\",\n  \"os_version__\": \"10.0.19041\",\n  \"pCreateDatetime\": \"2022-10-28T14:31:26.157008+00:00\",\n  \"path\": \"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\Application\\\\106.0.1370.52\\\\identity_helper.exe\",\n  \"os_server__\": false,\n  \"os__\": \"windows\",\n  \"domain__\": \"example.org\",\n  \"sha256\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"uuid__\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229\",\n  \"os_release__\": \"10\",\n  \"username\": \"EXAMPLE-NT\\\\doe-j\",\n  \"cmdline\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\Microsoft\\\\Edge\\\\Application\\\\106.0.1370.52\\\\identity_helper.exe\\\" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=winrt_app_id.mojom.WinrtAppIdService --lang=fr --service-sandbox-type=none --unsafely-treat-insecure-origin-as-secure=http://astgedgecp.region.local,http://astgedgecq.region.local,http://astgedrheq.region.local,http://astgedrhep.region.local --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3564 --field-trial-handle=2140,i,6139612544440408755,5345815150035985187,131072 /prefetch:8\",\n  \"location\": \"\",\n  \"hostname__\": \"MR11111\",\n  \"uid\": \"5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229;windows;MR11111;example.org\",\n  \"tag\": \"TRI_AAA_WIN\",\n  \"pid\": 2424,\n  \"id\": 666666666\n}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "code": "130171010000001",
        "kind": "alert",
        "module": "das",
        "reason": "Application policy: COPS WINDOWS v2 ([I] T1204.001 User Execution: Web requests from unusual sources)",
        "severity": 6,
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-10-28T14:49:14.869905Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "5c3ff0bc-5101-4152-a330-923e569c9229"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "hostname": "MR11111",
        "name": "MR11111",
        "os": {
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0.19041"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Tehtris EDR",
        "type": "sensor",
        "vendor": "Tehtris"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\106.0.1370.52\\identity_helper.exe\" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=winrt_app_id.mojom.WinrtAppIdService --lang=fr --service-sandbox-type=none --unsafely-treat-insecure-origin-as-secure=http://astgedgecp.region.local,http://astgedgecq.region.local,http://astgedrheq.region.local,http://astgedrhep.region.local --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3564 --field-trial-handle=2140,i,6139612544440408755,5345815150035985187,131072 /prefetch:8",
        "executable": "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\106.0.1370.52\\identity_helper.exe",
        "name": "identity_helper.exe",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 12296
        },
        "pid": 2424
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "MR11111"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "doe-j"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "name": "COPS WINDOWS v2"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "tehtris": {
        "edr": {
            "event": {
                "appliance": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "egKBId": "130171010000001",
                "id": "666666666",
                "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
                "type": "HeuristicAlert"
            },
            "host": {
                "is_server": false,
                "os": {
                    "architecture": "x86_64",
                    "release": "10"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "threat": {
        "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
        "technique": {
            "id": "T1204.001",
            "name": "User Execution: Web requests from unusual sources"
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "EXAMPLE-NT",
        "name": "doe-j"
    }
}

{
    "message": "{\n  \"rflId\": 1,\n  \"time\": \"2022-10-28T11:58:20.778323+00:00\",\n  \"lvl\": 5,\n  \"module\": \"das\",\n  \"eventName\": \"sandboxAlert\",\n  \"ipSrc\": \"1.2.3.4\",\n  \"ipDst\": \"5.6.7.8\",\n  \"egKBId\": 130181030000003,\n  \"ppid\": 3520,\n  \"os_architecture__\": \"x86_64\",\n  \"description\": \"Sandbox detection: 45%\",\n  \"os_version__\": \"10.0.19041\",\n  \"pCreateDatetime\": \"2022-10-28T11:48:08.373808+00:00\",\n  \"path\": \"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Vendor\\\\Product\\\\program.exe\",\n  \"os_server__\": false,\n  \"os__\": \"windows\",\n  \"domain__\": \"example.org\",\n  \"sha256\": \"01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b\",\n  \"uuid__\": \"64a2fa85-0852-4745-81d6-0815eb2d5248\",\n  \"os_release__\": \"10\",\n  \"username\": \"EXAMPLE-NT\\\\doe-j\",\n  \"cmdline\": \"program.exe\",\n  \"hostname__\": \"MR11111\",\n  \"signatures\": \"45%\",\n  \"uid\": \"64a2fa85-0852-4745-81d6-0815eb2d5248;windows;MR11111;example.org\",\n  \"tag\": \"TRI_AAA_WIN\",\n  \"pid\": 3920,\n  \"id\": 777777777\n}\n",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "process"
        ],
        "code": "130181030000003",
        "kind": "alert",
        "module": "das",
        "reason": "Sandbox detection: 45%",
        "severity": 5,
        "type": [
            "info"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-10-28T11:58:20.778323Z",
    "agent": {
        "id": "64a2fa85-0852-4745-81d6-0815eb2d5248"
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "5.6.7.8",
        "ip": "5.6.7.8"
    },
    "file": {
        "hash": {
            "sha256": "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        }
    },
    "host": {
        "domain": "example.org",
        "hostname": "MR11111",
        "name": "MR11111",
        "os": {
            "platform": "windows",
            "version": "10.0.19041"
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Tehtris EDR",
        "type": "sensor",
        "vendor": "Tehtris"
    },
    "process": {
        "command_line": "program.exe",
        "executable": "C:\\Program Files\\Vendor\\Product\\program.exe",
        "name": "program.exe",
        "parent": {
            "pid": 3520
        },
        "pid": 3920
    },
    "related": {
        "hash": [
            "01ba4719c80b6fe911b091a7c05124b64eeece964e09c058ef8f9805daca546b"
        ],
        "hosts": [
            "MR11111"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.2.3.4",
            "5.6.7.8"
        ],
        "user": [
            "doe-j"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.2.3.4",
        "ip": "1.2.3.4"
    },
    "tehtris": {
        "edr": {
            "event": {
                "appliance": {
                    "id": "1"
                },
                "egKBId": "130181030000003",
                "id": "777777777",
                "tag": "TRI_AAA_WIN",
                "type": "sandboxAlert"
            },
            "host": {
                "is_server": false,
                "os": {
                    "architecture": "x86_64",
                    "release": "10"
                }
            }
        }
    },
    "user": {
        "domain": "EXAMPLE-NT",
        "name": "doe-j"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
agent.id keyword Unique identifier of this agent.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
event.code keyword Identification code for this event.
event.kind keyword The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.module keyword Name of the module this data is coming from.
event.reason keyword Reason why this event happened, according to the source
event.severity long Numeric severity of the event.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.created date File creation time.
file.ctime date Last time the file attributes or metadata changed.
file.directory keyword Directory where the file is located.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.mtime date Last time the file content was modified.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
file.path keyword Full path to the file, including the file name.
host.domain keyword Name of the directory the group is a member of.
host.hostname keyword Hostname of the host.
host.os.platform keyword Operating system platform (such centos, ubuntu, windows).
host.os.version keyword Operating system version as a raw string.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.type keyword The type of the observer the data is coming from.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
process.command_line wildcard Full command line that started the process.
process.executable keyword Absolute path to the process executable.
process.name keyword Process name.
process.parent.pid long Process id.
process.pid long Process id.
process.start date The time the process started.
rule.name keyword Rule name
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
tehtris.edr.antivirus.positives number The number of malicious files
tehtris.edr.antivirus.total number The number of scanned files
tehtris.edr.event.appliance.id keyword The identifier of the Event Appliance
tehtris.edr.event.egKBId keyword The identifier in the Event Knowledge Base
tehtris.edr.event.id keyword The identifier of the event (from the Tehtris side)
tehtris.edr.event.location keyword The location associated to the event
tehtris.edr.event.remediation_status keyword The remediation applied on the cause of the event
tehtris.edr.event.tag keyword The tag associated to the event
tehtris.edr.event.type keyword The type of the Event
tehtris.edr.file.macro.behavior_status keyword The detected behaviour of the macro
tehtris.edr.file.macro.detection_status keyword The detection status of the macro
tehtris.edr.file.macro.is_malicious boolean Is the macro malicious
tehtris.edr.file.macro.sha1 keyword The SHA1 hashsum of the macro
tehtris.edr.host.is_server boolean Is the host operating as a server
tehtris.edr.host.os.architecture keyword The cpu architecture of the operating system
tehtris.edr.host.os.release keyword The release of the operating system
threat.framework keyword Threat classification framework.
threat.technique.id keyword Threat technique id.
threat.technique.name keyword Threat technique name.
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
user.domain keyword Name of the directory the user is a member of.
user.name keyword Short name or login of the user.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.