Squid

Squid is a caching proxy for the Web. It reduces bandwidth and improves response times by caching and reusing frequently-requested web pages. The analysis of Squid logs by Sekoia.io can detect web threats along as in-progress intrusion and exfiltration attempts.

Configure

As of now, the main solution to collect Squid logs leverages the Rsyslog recipe. Please share your experiences with other recipes by editing this documentation.

Rsyslog

In this Section, we detail how to configure Squid’s logging output for Sekoia.io by means of the Rsyslog transport. We hereby focus on the configuration of Squid and invite the reader to the Rsyslog Transport documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.

To configure Squid logging, you can create a new configuration 99-sekoiaio.conf file in the /etc/squid/conf.d/ directory of your server. With most of Squid configurations (including Debian, Red Hat Entreprise Linux, etc.), this file will automatically be used.

This file should contain two information:

The log format used for Sekoia.io.
The Syslog facility and priority we would like to use.

Content of /etc/squid/conf.d/99-sekoiaio.conf file:

logformat sekoiaio %ts.%03tu %6tr %>a %Ss/%03>Hs %<st %rm %ru %[un %Sh/%<a %mt "%{Referer}>h" "%{User-Agent}>h"
access_log syslog:local5.info sekoiaio

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Squid. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Squid on ATT&CK Navigator

Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2

Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2018-13379. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2018. It is exploited by APT threat actors as well as cybercriminals. The exploitation of this CVE lead an unauthenticated user to get full access to FortiOS system file through SSL VPN via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. The exploit read /dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession file, that contains login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects FortiOS 5.6.3 to 5.6.7 and FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint

Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604).

Effort: advanced

CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Pulse Secure vulnerability CVE-2019-11510. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2019. It is exploited by diverse threat actors, leading sometimes in ransomware deployement among these groups: Maze, Conti, Egregor, DoppelPaymer, NetWalker and REvil. But also APT actors such as APT29. The exploitation of this CVE allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to compromise a vulnerable VPN server. The attacker may be able to gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials. It may also be possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on each VPN client as it successfully connects to the VPN server. The exploit reads /etc/passwd file to get access to login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 products.

Effort: elementary

CVE-2019-19781 Citrix NetScaler (ADC)

Detects CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempt against Citrix NetScaler (ADC), Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Attack.

Effort: elementary

CVE-2019-2725 Oracle Weblogic Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of a deserialization vulnerability in Oracle Weblogic Server, CVE-2019-2725. This vulnerability affects versions 10.X and 12.1.3 of WebLogic that have the components wls9_async_response.war and wls-wsat.war enabled. It is a remote code execution which can be exploited without authentication via HTTP. An HTTP response status code = 202, means the target is vulnerable, the analyst then has to look in depth to check if a webshell has been uploaded or something else has been done.

Effort: elementary

CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

Effort: elementary

CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint

Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server

Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952).

Effort: advanced

CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempts

Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902.

Effort: elementary

CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter

The VMware vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection

Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

Effort: intermediate

CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF

Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell Attempt

Detects CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell attempt against Microsoft Exchange Server, Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-41773 Apache 2.4.49 Path Traversal

Detects successful exploitation of the Apache Path Traversal CVE-2021-41773.

Effort: advanced

CVE-2021-43798 Grafana Directory Traversal

Grafana version 8.x has a 0day arbitrary file read (with no fix yet) based on a directory traversal vulnerability

Effort: intermediate

Cobalt Strike HTTP Default GET beaconing

Detects GET HTTP queries from known Cobalt Strike beacons (source code 4.3)

Effort: advanced

Cobalt Strike HTTP Default POST Beaconing

Detects POST HTTP queries from known Cobalt Strike beacons (source code 4.3)

Effort: advanced

Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

Effort: advanced

Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing

Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls

Effort: intermediate

Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

Effort: master

Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

Effort: elementary

Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

Effort: intermediate

Download Files From Non-Legitimate TLDs

Detects file downloads from non-legitimate TLDs. Additional legitimates TLDs should be filtered according to the business habits.

Effort: master

Download Files From Suspicious TLDs

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

Effort: master

Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

Effort: master

EvilProxy Phishing Domain

Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.

Effort: intermediate

Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

Effort: master

FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests

Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.

Effort: advanced

GitLab CVE-2021-22205

Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.

Effort: intermediate

Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

Effort: intermediate

LokiBot Default C2 URL

Detects default C2 URL for trojan LokiBot

Effort: elementary

Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

Effort: intermediate

Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

Effort: elementary

Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

Effort: elementary

Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

Effort: advanced

Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

Effort: elementary

Potential LokiBot User-Agent

Detects potential LokiBot communications through the user-agent

Effort: intermediate

Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

Effort: elementary

ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

Effort: elementary

Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

Effort: elementary

Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

Effort: master

Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

Effort: master

Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

Effort: master

SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

Effort: elementary

Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

Effort: master

SharePoint Authenticated SSRF

Detects succesful SSRF from an authenticated SharePoint user.

Effort: elementary

Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services

Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.

Effort: intermediate

Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

Effort: advanced

Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

Effort: intermediate

TOR Usage

Detects TOR usage, based on the IP address and the destination port (filtered on NTP). TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

Effort: master

TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

Effort: master

Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

Effort: advanced

TrevorC2 HTTP Communication

Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.

Effort: elementary

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source	Description
`Web logs`	Squid logs provide information about the connected client and the requested resource

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name	Values
Kind	``
Category	`network`, `web`
Type	`connection`, `denied`, `error`

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

connect.jsonconnect2.jsonconnect3.jsonconnect_ip.jsoncontent_type.jsonget.jsonget2.jsonget_dalid.jsonget_tcp_hit.jsonget_user_agent.json

{
    "message": "1564655684.277   3387 192.168.0.1 TCP_TUNNEL/200 19131 CONNECT example.org:443 - HIER_DIRECT/example.org -",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 3387
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-08-01T10:34:44.277000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "example.org",
        "domain": "example.org",
        "port": 443,
        "registered_domain": "example.org",
        "top_level_domain": "org"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "CONNECT"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 19131,
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "example.org"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "192.168.0.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.0.1",
        "ip": "192.168.0.1"
    },
    "squid": {
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1564576741.982   5756 192.168.0.1 TCP_TUNNEL/200 6295 CONNECT api42-api.example.com:443 - HIER_DIRECT/api42-api.example.com -",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 5756
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-07-31T12:39:01.982000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "api42-api.example.com",
        "domain": "api42-api.example.com",
        "port": 443,
        "registered_domain": "example.com",
        "subdomain": "api42-api",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "CONNECT"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 6295,
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "api42-api.example.com"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "192.168.0.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.0.1",
        "ip": "192.168.0.1"
    },
    "squid": {
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1587042596.494   1717 192.168.224.39 TCP_TUNNEL/200 3512 CONNECT 193-164-229-102_s-2-18-244-11_ts-1587042594-clienttons-s.akamaihd.net:443 - HIER_DIRECT/193-164-229-102_s-2-18-244-11_ts-1587042594-clienttons-s.akamaihd.net -",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 1717
    },
    "@timestamp": "2020-04-16T13:09:56.494000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "193-164-229-102_s-2-18-244-11_ts-1587042594-clienttons-s.akamaihd.net",
        "domain": "193-164-229-102_s-2-18-244-11_ts-1587042594-clienttons-s.akamaihd.net",
        "port": 443,
        "registered_domain": "akamaihd.net",
        "subdomain": "193-164-229-102_s-2-18-244-11_ts-1587042594-clienttons-s",
        "top_level_domain": "net"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "CONNECT"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 3512,
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "193-164-229-102_s-2-18-244-11_ts-1587042594-clienttons-s.akamaihd.net"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "192.168.224.39"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.224.39",
        "ip": "192.168.224.39"
    },
    "squid": {
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1642667037.129      0 10.0.4.4 TCP_DENIED/403 3868 CONNECT 45.138.98.34:80 - HIER_NONE/- text/html \"-\" \"-\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 0,
        "type": [
            "connection",
            "denied",
            "error"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-01-20T08:23:57.129000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "45.138.98.34",
        "ip": "45.138.98.34",
        "port": 80
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "CONNECT"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 3868,
            "mime_type": "text/html",
            "status_code": 403
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "10.0.4.4",
            "45.138.98.34"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.0.4.4",
        "ip": "10.0.4.4"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "denied",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_NONE"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1565598801.353     24 10.16.12.86 TCP_MISS/200 394 GET http://dt.adsafeprotected.com/dt?anId=929475&asId=f0fc9c04-7168-68e3-32ca-6cc17dd2223a&tv={c:l4fyeI,pingTime:-1,time:7884,type:u,clog:[{piv:100,vs:i,r:,w:1,h:1,t:78},{piv:0,vs:o,r:l,t:5971}],ndt:6,es:0,sc:1,ha:1,gm:1,slTimes:{i:5971,o:1913,n:0,pp:0,pm:0},slEvents:[{sl:i,t:78,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.74.1.1,am:i,cc:952.74.1.1,piv:100,obst:0,th:0,reas:,bkn:{piv:[5898~100],as:[5898~1.1]}},{sl:o,t:5971,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.-516.1.1,am:i,cc:952.-516.1.1,piv:0,obst:0,th:0,reas:l,bkn:{piv:[1914~0],as:[1914~1.1]}}],slEventCount:2,em:true,fr:true,e:,tt:jload,dtt:254,metricIdList:[publ1,grpm1],fm:ryV6ZcU+11|12|13|14*.929475|141|15.929475|151|152|16,idMap:14.c4c75fac-ccbe-9ba7-61b1-d1276709f9ec.31_289523-36779676|14*,rend:0,renddet:WINDOW,rmeas:0,lt:1}&br=c - HIER_DIRECT/dt.adsafeprotected.com image/gif",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 24
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-08-12T08:33:21.353000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "dt.adsafeprotected.com",
        "domain": "dt.adsafeprotected.com",
        "registered_domain": "adsafeprotected.com",
        "subdomain": "dt",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 394,
            "mime_type": "image/gif",
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "dt.adsafeprotected.com"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "10.16.12.86"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "10.16.12.86",
        "ip": "10.16.12.86"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "miss",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "dt.adsafeprotected.com",
        "full": "http://dt.adsafeprotected.com/dt?anId=929475&asId=f0fc9c04-7168-68e3-32ca-6cc17dd2223a&tv={c:l4fyeI,pingTime:-1,time:7884,type:u,clog:[{piv:100,vs:i,r:,w:1,h:1,t:78},{piv:0,vs:o,r:l,t:5971}],ndt:6,es:0,sc:1,ha:1,gm:1,slTimes:{i:5971,o:1913,n:0,pp:0,pm:0},slEvents:[{sl:i,t:78,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.74.1.1,am:i,cc:952.74.1.1,piv:100,obst:0,th:0,reas:,bkn:{piv:[5898~100],as:[5898~1.1]}},{sl:o,t:5971,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.-516.1.1,am:i,cc:952.-516.1.1,piv:0,obst:0,th:0,reas:l,bkn:{piv:[1914~0],as:[1914~1.1]}}],slEventCount:2,em:true,fr:true,e:,tt:jload,dtt:254,metricIdList:[publ1,grpm1],fm:ryV6ZcU+11|12|13|14*.929475|141|15.929475|151|152|16,idMap:14.c4c75fac-ccbe-9ba7-61b1-d1276709f9ec.31_289523-36779676|14*,rend:0,renddet:WINDOW,rmeas:0,lt:1}&br=c",
        "original": "http://dt.adsafeprotected.com/dt?anId=929475&asId=f0fc9c04-7168-68e3-32ca-6cc17dd2223a&tv={c:l4fyeI,pingTime:-1,time:7884,type:u,clog:[{piv:100,vs:i,r:,w:1,h:1,t:78},{piv:0,vs:o,r:l,t:5971}],ndt:6,es:0,sc:1,ha:1,gm:1,slTimes:{i:5971,o:1913,n:0,pp:0,pm:0},slEvents:[{sl:i,t:78,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.74.1.1,am:i,cc:952.74.1.1,piv:100,obst:0,th:0,reas:,bkn:{piv:[5898~100],as:[5898~1.1]}},{sl:o,t:5971,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.-516.1.1,am:i,cc:952.-516.1.1,piv:0,obst:0,th:0,reas:l,bkn:{piv:[1914~0],as:[1914~1.1]}}],slEventCount:2,em:true,fr:true,e:,tt:jload,dtt:254,metricIdList:[publ1,grpm1],fm:ryV6ZcU+11|12|13|14*.929475|141|15.929475|151|152|16,idMap:14.c4c75fac-ccbe-9ba7-61b1-d1276709f9ec.31_289523-36779676|14*,rend:0,renddet:WINDOW,rmeas:0,lt:1}&br=c",
        "path": "/dt",
        "port": 80,
        "query": "anId=929475&asId=f0fc9c04-7168-68e3-32ca-6cc17dd2223a&tv={c:l4fyeI,pingTime:-1,time:7884,type:u,clog:[{piv:100,vs:i,r:,w:1,h:1,t:78},{piv:0,vs:o,r:l,t:5971}],ndt:6,es:0,sc:1,ha:1,gm:1,slTimes:{i:5971,o:1913,n:0,pp:0,pm:0},slEvents:[{sl:i,t:78,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.74.1.1,am:i,cc:952.74.1.1,piv:100,obst:0,th:0,reas:,bkn:{piv:[5898~100],as:[5898~1.1]}},{sl:o,t:5971,wc:0.0.1920.1040,ac:952.-516.1.1,am:i,cc:952.-516.1.1,piv:0,obst:0,th:0,reas:l,bkn:{piv:[1914~0],as:[1914~1.1]}}],slEventCount:2,em:true,fr:true,e:,tt:jload,dtt:254,metricIdList:[publ1,grpm1],fm:ryV6ZcU+11|12|13|14*.929475|141|15.929475|151|152|16,idMap:14.c4c75fac-ccbe-9ba7-61b1-d1276709f9ec.31_289523-36779676|14*,rend:0,renddet:WINDOW,rmeas:0,lt:1}&br=c",
        "registered_domain": "adsafeprotected.com",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "dt",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1564670112.892   5007 192.168.95.17 TCP_HIT_ABORTED/000 0 GET http://smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA== - HIER_DIRECT/smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com -",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 5007,
        "type": [
            "connection",
            "error"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-08-01T14:35:12.892000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com",
        "domain": "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com",
        "registered_domain": "trendmicro.com",
        "subdomain": "smex10-2-en.url",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 0,
            "status_code": 0
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "192.168.95.17"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.95.17",
        "ip": "192.168.95.17"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "hit",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com",
        "full": "http://smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA==",
        "original": "http://smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA==",
        "path": "/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA==",
        "port": 80,
        "registered_domain": "trendmicro.com",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "smex10-2-en.url",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1565600128.411      0 192.168.0.1 TCP_DENIED/407 3980 GET http://api.example.org/api/v2/check - HIER_NONE/- text/html",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 0,
        "type": [
            "connection",
            "denied",
            "error"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-08-12T08:55:28.411000Z",
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 3980,
            "mime_type": "text/html",
            "status_code": 407
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "192.168.0.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.0.1",
        "ip": "192.168.0.1"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "denied",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_NONE"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "api.example.org",
        "full": "http://api.example.org/api/v2/check",
        "original": "http://api.example.org/api/v2/check",
        "path": "/api/v2/check",
        "port": 80,
        "registered_domain": "example.org",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "api",
        "top_level_domain": "org"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1628084203.491     82 192.168.2.2 TCP_MISS/200 318399 GET http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/others/2019/07/29477140_324519a81d0af914f765c56a1dc7141a5759ad4c.cab - HIER_DIRECT/13.107.4.50 application/vnd.ms-cab-compressed",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 82
    },
    "@timestamp": "2021-08-04T13:36:43.491000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "13.107.4.50",
        "ip": "13.107.4.50"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 318399,
            "mime_type": "application/vnd.ms-cab-compressed",
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "13.107.4.50",
            "192.168.2.2"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.2.2",
        "ip": "192.168.2.2"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "miss",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "download.windowsupdate.com",
        "full": "http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/others/2019/07/29477140_324519a81d0af914f765c56a1dc7141a5759ad4c.cab",
        "original": "http://download.windowsupdate.com/c/msdownload/update/others/2019/07/29477140_324519a81d0af914f765c56a1dc7141a5759ad4c.cab",
        "path": "/c/msdownload/update/others/2019/07/29477140_324519a81d0af914f765c56a1dc7141a5759ad4c.cab",
        "port": 80,
        "registered_domain": "windowsupdate.com",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "download",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1628150510.448    549 192.168.0.1 TCP_HIT/206 2055995 GET http://edgedl.me.gvt1.com/edgedl/release2/chrome_component/adbzvrjxj3ir3yvy5lknhgbxo6tq_92.267.200/gkmgaooipdjhmangpemjhigmamcehddo_92.267.200_win64_ac37t7snjqk4qthomil6kwgo54hq.crx3 - HIER_NONE/- application/octet-stream",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 549
    },
    "@timestamp": "2021-08-05T08:01:50.448000Z",
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 2055995,
            "mime_type": "application/octet-stream",
            "status_code": 206
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "ip": [
            "192.168.0.1"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.0.1",
        "ip": "192.168.0.1"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "hit",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_NONE"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "edgedl.me.gvt1.com",
        "full": "http://edgedl.me.gvt1.com/edgedl/release2/chrome_component/adbzvrjxj3ir3yvy5lknhgbxo6tq_92.267.200/gkmgaooipdjhmangpemjhigmamcehddo_92.267.200_win64_ac37t7snjqk4qthomil6kwgo54hq.crx3",
        "original": "http://edgedl.me.gvt1.com/edgedl/release2/chrome_component/adbzvrjxj3ir3yvy5lknhgbxo6tq_92.267.200/gkmgaooipdjhmangpemjhigmamcehddo_92.267.200_win64_ac37t7snjqk4qthomil6kwgo54hq.crx3",
        "path": "/edgedl/release2/chrome_component/adbzvrjxj3ir3yvy5lknhgbxo6tq_92.267.200/gkmgaooipdjhmangpemjhigmamcehddo_92.267.200_win64_ac37t7snjqk4qthomil6kwgo54hq.crx3",
        "port": 80,
        "registered_domain": "gvt1.com",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "edgedl.me",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    }
}

{
    "message": "1564670112.892   5007 192.168.95.17 TCP_HIT_ABORTED/000 0 GET http://smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA== - HIER_DIRECT/smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com - \"http://www.example.org\" \"TMUFE\"",
    "event": {
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "duration": 5007,
        "type": [
            "connection",
            "error"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2019-08-01T14:35:12.892000Z",
    "destination": {
        "address": "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com",
        "domain": "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com",
        "registered_domain": "trendmicro.com",
        "subdomain": "smex10-2-en.url",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "method": "GET",
            "referrer": "http://www.example.org"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 0,
            "status_code": 0
        }
    },
    "network": {
        "direction": "egress",
        "transport": "tcp"
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Squid",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Squid"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "192.168.95.17"
        ]
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "192.168.95.17",
        "ip": "192.168.95.17"
    },
    "squid": {
        "cache_status": "hit",
        "hierarchy_code": "HIER_DIRECT"
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com",
        "full": "http://smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA==",
        "original": "http://smex10-2-en.url.trendmicro.com/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA==",
        "path": "/T/152/oiCEKI6Xe7maaxpSHK-gvDyUEBfC6_avSkwxG5MiT4-LQlujnVUK3SbBFHZKimvaG-TwxeMEqOnp0BelYbpVeMfVAZU85B8kltUSjYiidio-IBs_8MdCCFayLkMpM2lboKcOX-RrnDx2oFrUco0cMA==",
        "port": 80,
        "registered_domain": "trendmicro.com",
        "scheme": "http",
        "subdomain": "smex10-2-en.url",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    },
    "user_agent": {
        "device": {
            "name": "Other"
        },
        "name": "Other",
        "original": "TMUFE",
        "os": {
            "name": "Other"
        }
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name	Type	Description
`@timestamp`	`date`	Date/time when the event originated.
`destination.domain`	`keyword`	The domain name of the destination.
`destination.ip`	`ip`	IP address of the destination.
`destination.port`	`long`	Port of the destination.
`event.category`	`keyword`	Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
`event.duration`	`long`	Duration of the event in nanoseconds.
`event.type`	`keyword`	Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
`http.request.method`	`keyword`	HTTP request method.
`http.request.referrer`	`keyword`	Referrer for this HTTP request.
`http.response.bytes`	`long`	Total size in bytes of the response (body and headers).
`http.response.mime_type`	`keyword`	Mime type of the body of the response.
`http.response.status_code`	`long`	HTTP response status code.
`network.direction`	`keyword`	Direction of the network traffic.
`network.transport`	`keyword`	Protocol Name corresponding to the field `iana_number`.
`observer.product`	`keyword`	The product name of the observer.
`observer.type`	`keyword`	The type of the observer the data is coming from.
`observer.vendor`	`keyword`	Vendor name of the observer.
`source.ip`	`ip`	IP address of the source.
`squid.cache_status`	`keyword`	Cache status for the request
`squid.hierarchy_code`	`keyword`	Hierarchy used by Squid for this connection.
`url.full`	`wildcard`	Full unparsed URL.
`url.original`	`wildcard`	Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
`user.name`	`keyword`	Short name or login of the user.
`user_agent.original`	`keyword`	Unparsed user_agent string.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.

Squid

Configure

Rsyslog

Further Readings

Raw Events Samples

Detection section

Event Categories

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

Extracted Fields

Squid

Configure

Rsyslog

Further Readings

Raw Events Samples

Detection section

Related Built-in Rules

Event Categories

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

Extracted Fields