Forcepoint Secure Web Gateway
Overview
Forcepoint Secure Web Gateway (SWG) is a proxy, installed on the endpoint, applying routing policies and analyzing the traffic against threats. This product is supported by Forcepoint LLC.
- Vendor: Forcepoint
- Supported environment: On Premise
- Version compatibility: 8.5
- Detection based on: Telemetry
- Supported application or feature: HTTP traffic
Specification
Prerequisites
- Resource:
- Self-managed syslog forwarder
- Network:
- Outbound traffic allowed
- Permissions:
- Administrator or Root access to the Forcepoint Web Gateway server
- Root access to the Linux server with the syslog forwarder
Transport Protocol/Method
- Indirect Syslog
Logs details
- Supported functionalities: See section Overview
- Supported type(s) of structure: CEF
- Supported verbosity level: Informational
Note
Log levels are based on the taxonomy of RFC5424. Adapt according to the terminology used by the editor.
Step-by-Step Configuration Procedure
Instructions on the 3rd Party Solution
In this guide, you will configure the gateway to forward events to syslog.
Information
This procedure should be repeated for each Forcepoint Policy Server.
Enable SIEM Integration
Log on the Web Security module of the Forcepoint Security Manager and navigate to Settings > General > SIEM Integration.
In the Internet Activity Log Data, Click on the button Add.
Provide the IP address, the transport protocol (recommending TCP) and the listening port (514) of the concentrator.
Select the syslog/CEF as SIEM format. Click OK then Save and Deploy to enable the integration.
Instruction on Sekoia
Configure Your Intake
This section will guide you through creating the intake object in Sekoia, which provides a unique identifier called the "Intake key." The Intake key is essential for later configuration, as it references the Community, Entity, and Parser (Intake Format) used when receiving raw events on Sekoia.
- Go to the Sekoia Intake page.
- Click on the
+ New Intakebutton at the top right of the page. - Search for your Intake by the product name in the search bar.
- Give it a Name and associate it with an Entity (and a Community if using multi-tenant mode).
- Click on
Create.
Note
For more details on how to use the Intake page and to find the Intake key you just created, refer to this documentation.
Configure a forwarder
To forward events using syslog to Sekoia.io, you need to update the syslog header with the intake key you previously created. Here is an example of your message before the forwarder
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG RAW_MESSAGE
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG [SEKOIA@53288 intake_key=\"YOUR_INTAKE_KEY\"] RAW_MESSAGE
To achieve this you can:
- Use the Sekoia.io forwarder which is the official supported way to collect data using the syslog protocol in Sekoia.io. In charge of centralizing data coming from many equipments/sources and forwarding them to Sekoia.io with the apporpriated format, it is a prepackaged option. You only have to provide your intake key as parameter.
- Use your own Syslog service instance. Maybe you already have an intance of one of these components on your side and want to reuse it in order to centralize data before forwarding them to Sekoia.io. When using this mode, you have to configure and maintain your component in order to respect the expected Sekoia.io format.
Warning
Only the Sekoia.io forwarder is officially supported. Other options are documented for reference purposes but do not have official support.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
0|Forcepoint|Security|8.5.4|9|Transaction blocked|7| act=blocked app=http dvc=9.8.7.6 dst=5.6.7.8 dhost=ctldl.windowsupdate.com dpt=80 src=1.2.3.4 spt=62062 suser=- loginID=- destinationTranslatedPort=0 rt=1653557213000 in=0 out=0 requestMethod=GET requestClientApplication=Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0 reason=- cs1Label=Policy cs1=SupAd**_O365_ cs2Label=DynCat cs2=0 cs3Label=ContentType cs3=- cn1Label=DispositionCode cn1=1025 cn2Label=ScanDuration cn2=5 request=http://ctldl.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/disallowedcertstl.cab logRecordSource=OnPrem
0|Forcepoint|Security|8.5.5|220|Transaction blocked|7| act=blocked app=https dvc=9.8.7.6 dst=5.6.7.8 dhost=dangerous.xyz dpt=443 src=192.168.1.1 spt=52242 suser=LDAP://intranet.corp OU\=Users_CC,OU\=RC,OU\=France,DC
\=intranet,DC\=corp/DUPONT Jean loginID=USERXXX destinationTranslatedPort=0 rt=1721658958000 in=0 out=0 requestMethod=CONNECT requestClientApplication=Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/126.0.0.0 reason=- cs1Label=Policy cs1=Super Adm** cs2Label=DynCat cs2=0 cs3Label=ContentType cs3=- cn1Label=DispositionCode cn1=1025 cn2Label=ScanDuration cn2=3 request=https://dangerous.xyz:443 logRecordSource=OnPrem
0|Forcepoint|Security|8.5.4|222|Transaction permitted|1| act=permitted app=https dvc=9.8.7.6 dst=5.6.7.8 dhost=outlook.office365.com dpt=443 src=1.2.3.4 spt=50345 suser=LDAP://4.3.2.1 OU\=MyOrg,OU\=Users,DC\=Domain,DC\=LOCAL/User 1 loginID=n_nini destinationTranslatedPort=47486 rt=1653555521000 in=1038458 out=3967 requestMethod=POST requestClientApplication=Microsoft Office/16.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Microsoft Outlook 16.0.10386; Pro) reason=- cs1Label=Policy cs1=SupAd**1,SupAd**2 cs2Label=DynCat cs2=0 cs3Label=ContentType cs3=application/mapi-http cn1Label=DispositionCode cn1=1026 cn2Label=ScanDuration cn2=31 request=https://outlook.office365.com/ logRecordSource=OnPrem
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Forcepoint Secure Web Gateway. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Forcepoint Secure Web Gateway on ATT&CK Navigator
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
Burp Suite Tool Detected
Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2
Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint
Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604).
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint
Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server
Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952).
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE
Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access
Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read
Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter
The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter
The VMware vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection
Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability
Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF
Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.
- Effort: advanced
Computer Account Deleted
Detects computer account deletion.
- Effort: master
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing
Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls
- Effort: intermediate
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers
This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.
- Effort: elementary
Discord Suspicious Download
Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
- Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
EvilProxy Phishing Domain
Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.
- Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests
Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.
- Effort: advanced
Koadic MSHTML Command
Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module
- Effort: intermediate
Nimbo-C2 User Agent
Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.
- Effort: intermediate
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Possible Malicious File Double Extension
Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension
- Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: intermediate
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents
Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent
- Effort: elementary
Potential DNS Tunnel
Detects domain name which is longer than 95 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.
- Effort: advanced
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent
Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".
- Effort: elementary
Potential LokiBot User-Agent
Detects potential LokiBot communications through the user-agent
- Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths
Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL
Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
SecurityScorecard Vulnerability Assessment Scanner New Issues
Raises an alert when SecurityScorecard Vulnerability Assessment Scanner find new issues.
- Effort: master
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services
Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TOR Gateway
Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign
Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.
- Effort: intermediate
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request
Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind
- Effort: advanced
TrevorC2 HTTP Communication
Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.
- Effort: elementary
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Web proxy |
Forcepoint Secure Web Gateway logs provide information about the connected client and the requested resource. |
Web logs |
Forcepoint Secure Web Gateway logs provide information about the connected client and the requested resource. |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | `` |
| Category | network |
| Type | `` |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": " 0|Forcepoint|Security|8.5.4|9|Transaction blocked|7| act=blocked app=http dvc=9.8.7.6 dst=5.6.7.8 dhost=ctldl.windowsupdate.com dpt=80 src=1.2.3.4 spt=62062 suser=- loginID=- destinationTranslatedPort=0 rt=1653557213000 in=0 out=0 requestMethod=GET requestClientApplication=Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0 reason=- cs1Label=Policy cs1=SupAd**_O365_ cs2Label=DynCat cs2=0 cs3Label=ContentType cs3=- cn1Label=DispositionCode cn1=1025 cn2Label=ScanDuration cn2=5 request=http://ctldl.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/disallowedcertstl.cab logRecordSource=OnPrem",
"event": {
"action": "Transaction blocked",
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "1025",
"reason": "Category blocked",
"severity": 7,
"type": [
"denied"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-05-26T09:26:53Z",
"destination": {
"address": "ctldl.windowsupdate.com",
"domain": "ctldl.windowsupdate.com",
"ip": "5.6.7.8",
"port": 80,
"registered_domain": "windowsupdate.com",
"subdomain": "ctldl",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"forcepoint": {
"cef": {
"version": "0"
},
"webgateway": {
"category": "0",
"log": {
"source": "OnPrem"
},
"policies": [
"SupAd**_O365_"
]
}
},
"host": {
"ip": "9.8.7.6"
},
"http": {
"request": {
"method": "GET"
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "http"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Secure Web Gateway",
"vendor": "Forcepoint",
"version": "8.5.4"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"ctldl.windowsupdate.com"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8",
"9.8.7.6"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "9",
"ruleset": "Information Technology"
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 62062
},
"url": {
"domain": "ctldl.windowsupdate.com",
"original": "http://ctldl.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/disallowedcertstl.cab",
"path": "/msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/disallowedcertstl.cab",
"port": 80,
"registered_domain": "windowsupdate.com",
"scheme": "http",
"subdomain": "ctldl",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"user_agent": {
"device": {
"name": "Other"
},
"name": "Microsoft-CryptoAPI",
"original": "Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0",
"os": {
"name": "Other"
},
"version": "10.0"
}
}
{
"message": " 0|Forcepoint|Security|8.5.5|220|Transaction blocked|7| act=blocked app=https dvc=9.8.7.6 dst=5.6.7.8 dhost=dangerous.xyz dpt=443 src=192.168.1.1 spt=52242 suser=LDAP://intranet.corp OU\\=Users_CC,OU\\=RC,OU\\=France,DC\n\\=intranet,DC\\=corp/DUPONT Jean loginID=USERXXX destinationTranslatedPort=0 rt=1721658958000 in=0 out=0 requestMethod=CONNECT requestClientApplication=Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/126.0.0.0 reason=- cs1Label=Policy cs1=Super Adm** cs2Label=DynCat cs2=0 cs3Label=ContentType cs3=- cn1Label=DispositionCode cn1=1025 cn2Label=ScanDuration cn2=3 request=https://dangerous.xyz:443 logRecordSource=OnPrem\n",
"event": {
"action": "Transaction blocked",
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "1025",
"reason": "Category blocked",
"severity": 7,
"type": [
"denied"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2024-07-22T14:35:58Z",
"destination": {
"address": "dangerous.xyz",
"domain": "dangerous.xyz",
"ip": "5.6.7.8",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "dangerous.xyz",
"top_level_domain": "xyz"
},
"forcepoint": {
"cef": {
"version": "0"
},
"webgateway": {
"category": "0",
"log": {
"source": "OnPrem"
},
"policies": [
"Super Adm**"
]
}
},
"host": {
"ip": "9.8.7.6"
},
"http": {
"request": {
"method": "CONNECT"
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "https"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Secure Web Gateway",
"vendor": "Forcepoint",
"version": "8.5.5"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"dangerous.xyz"
],
"ip": [
"192.168.1.1",
"5.6.7.8",
"9.8.7.6"
],
"user": [
"DUPONT Jean"
]
},
"rule": {
"category": "Compromised Websites",
"id": "220",
"ruleset": "Security"
},
"source": {
"address": "192.168.1.1",
"ip": "192.168.1.1",
"port": 52242
},
"url": {
"domain": "dangerous.xyz",
"original": "https://dangerous.xyz:443",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "dangerous.xyz",
"scheme": "https",
"top_level_domain": "xyz"
},
"user": {
"domain": "corp/DUPONT Jean",
"id": "USERXXX",
"name": "DUPONT Jean"
},
"user_agent": {
"device": {
"name": "Other"
},
"name": "Edge",
"original": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/126.0.0.0",
"os": {
"name": "Windows",
"version": "10"
},
"version": "126.0.0"
}
}
{
"message": "0|Forcepoint|Security|8.5.4|222|Transaction permitted|1| act=permitted app=https dvc=9.8.7.6 dst=5.6.7.8 dhost=outlook.office365.com dpt=443 src=1.2.3.4 spt=50345 suser=LDAP://4.3.2.1 OU\\=MyOrg,OU\\=Users,DC\\=Domain,DC\\=LOCAL/User 1 loginID=n_nini destinationTranslatedPort=47486 rt=1653555521000 in=1038458 out=3967 requestMethod=POST requestClientApplication=Microsoft Office/16.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Microsoft Outlook 16.0.10386; Pro) reason=- cs1Label=Policy cs1=SupAd**1,SupAd**2 cs2Label=DynCat cs2=0 cs3Label=ContentType cs3=application/mapi-http cn1Label=DispositionCode cn1=1026 cn2Label=ScanDuration cn2=31 request=https://outlook.office365.com/ logRecordSource=OnPrem",
"event": {
"action": "Transaction permitted",
"category": [
"network"
],
"code": "1026",
"reason": "Category permitted",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"allowed"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-05-26T08:58:41Z",
"destination": {
"address": "outlook.office365.com",
"domain": "outlook.office365.com",
"ip": "5.6.7.8",
"nat": {
"port": 47486
},
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "office365.com",
"subdomain": "outlook",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"forcepoint": {
"cef": {
"version": "0"
},
"webgateway": {
"category": "0",
"log": {
"source": "OnPrem"
},
"policies": [
"SupAd**1",
"SupAd**2"
]
}
},
"host": {
"ip": "9.8.7.6"
},
"http": {
"request": {
"bytes": 3967,
"method": "POST",
"mime_type": "application/mapi-http"
},
"response": {
"bytes": 1038458
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "https"
},
"observer": {
"product": "Secure Web Gateway",
"vendor": "Forcepoint",
"version": "8.5.4"
},
"related": {
"hosts": [
"outlook.office365.com"
],
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8",
"9.8.7.6"
],
"user": [
"User 1"
]
},
"rule": {
"id": "222",
"ruleset": "Collaboration - Office"
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"port": 50345
},
"url": {
"domain": "outlook.office365.com",
"original": "https://outlook.office365.com/",
"path": "/",
"port": 443,
"registered_domain": "office365.com",
"scheme": "https",
"subdomain": "outlook",
"top_level_domain": "com"
},
"user": {
"domain": "Domain",
"id": "n_nini",
"name": "User 1"
},
"user_agent": {
"device": {
"name": "Other"
},
"name": "Outlook",
"original": "Microsoft Office/16.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Microsoft Outlook 16.0.10386; Pro)",
"os": {
"name": "Windows",
"version": "10"
},
"version": "2016"
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
destination.domain |
keyword |
The domain name of the destination. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.nat.port |
long |
Destination NAT Port |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.duration |
long |
Duration of the event in nanoseconds. |
event.severity |
long |
Numeric severity of the event. |
forcepoint.cef.version |
keyword |
The version of the CEF message |
forcepoint.webgateway.category |
keyword |
The category determined by real-time content analysis |
forcepoint.webgateway.log.source |
keyword |
The origin of the log |
forcepoint.webgateway.policies |
keyword |
The policies applied to the request |
host.ip |
ip |
Host ip addresses. |
http.request.bytes |
long |
Total size in bytes of the request (body and headers). |
http.request.method |
keyword |
HTTP request method. |
http.request.mime_type |
keyword |
Mime type of the body of the request. |
http.response.bytes |
long |
Total size in bytes of the response (body and headers). |
network.protocol |
keyword |
Application protocol name. |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
observer.version |
keyword |
Observer version. |
rule.id |
keyword |
Rule ID |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
url.original |
wildcard |
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. |
user.domain |
keyword |
Name of the directory the user is a member of. |
user.id |
keyword |
Unique identifier of the user. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user_agent.original |
keyword |
Unparsed user_agent string. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.